Does Participatory Democracy Actually Deepen Democracy?

Lessons from Brazil

Brian Wampler
bwampler@boisestate.edu, bwampler44@yahoo.com

Abstract: This article develops an analytical framework that can be utilized to

demonstrate how and where participatory institutions may contribute to the deepening
of democracy. The main argument in this article is that the substantial variation in the
outcomes produced by participatory institutions is best explained by identifying the
incentives of elected governments to delegate authority and the capacity of civil
society organizations (CSOs) to use contentious politics inside and outside of these
new institutions. Participatory institutions are being advocated by the World Bank
and United Nations as strategies to empower individuals, diminish corruption, and
improve the quality of policy-making. This article analyzes eight cases of Brazil’s
well-known Participatory Budgeting (PB) program in order to account for the wide
range of outcomes produced. Two municipalities produced strong results and two
other municipalities produced failed programs. Four municipalities produced PB
programs with mixed, and somewhat contradictory, results. The findings suggest that
failed participatory programs can have a pernicious effect on efforts to deepen
democracy while the most successful programs are managing to improve the quality
of local democratic processes.

This is a draft currently under review. Please do not directly cite without the author’s
permission. The author gladly accepts and appreciates feedbacks, comments, and
suggestions.

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Introduction

Over the past two decades participatory institutions have been initiated throughout

the developing world in order to deepen the quality of democracy. Local governments in

countries as diverse as Brazil, India, Venezuela, South Africa, and Indonesia have

experimented with participatory institutions to promote governmental accountability,

create active and knowledgeable citizens, and establish the conditions for achieving

social justice (Santos 1998; Heller 2001; Fung and Wright 2003). The initial body of

research on participatory democracy programs has largely extolled the positive benefits

of these institutions, highlighting how participatory institutions have been able to produce

specific social and political advances that deepen the quality of democracy (Abers 2001;

Avritzer 2002; Baoicchi 2005; Heller 2001; Nylen 2003; Santos 2005). According to this

literature, social capital is being generated, citizens are being empowered, and

governments are becoming more transparent (Baoicchi 2003 and 2005; Heller 2000;

Wampler and Avritzer 2004; Wampler 2004).

Despite a rich literature on participatory institutions in democratizing countries,

we continue to lack a coherent theoretical explanation to account for where and when

these participatory experiences are likely to be successful. Institutions as diverse as the

World Bank, the United Nations, Brazil’s leftist Workers’ Party, the Venezuelan

government led by Hugo Chavez, and India’s Communist Party are now promoting the

adoption of participatory institutions, which means that it now crucial to advance our

understanding of these programs.

The absence of a generalizable theoretical framework to explain the divergent

outcomes produced by participatory institutions has methodological and conceptual roots.

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Methodologically, most studies on participatory institutions are single case studies and

have focused on the most successful cases (Abers 1998 and 2001, Baoicchi 2003 and

2005; Santos 2003). While these studies have greatly advanced our understanding of how

participatory institutions can deepen democracy, their theoretical findings are not

generalizable because they select on the dependent variable (Brady and Collier 2004).

Conceptually, civil society has received the lion’s share of scholars’ attention. The role of

state officials has been downplayed despite the active role they play in these participatory

processes. If participatory institutions have the potential to deepen democracy, we must

also recognize that they also have the potential to undermine efforts to deepen the quality

of democracy.

What explains why some participatory institutions succeed, some fail, and others

produce mediocre results? The purpose of this article is to develop a framework to

explain how actual, existing participatory democratic institutions function by analyzing

the strategies and behaviors of governments and citizen-participants. The main argument

is that the substantial variation in the participatory institutions’ outcomes is best

explained by identifying the incentives of local governments to delegate authority, and

the capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs) to use contentious politics inside and

outside of new institutions.

Participatory institutions complement representative democracy, which means

that government officials must decide if delegating decision-making authority directly to

citizens coincides with their own interests. Elected officials must determine if they can

accommodate the demands presented by citizens in participatory institutions with their

broader electoral, intra-party, governing, and policy interests. As governments’

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willingness to delegate authority decreases, so too does the quality of the participatory

program.

When mayors are willing to delegate authority, citizens and CSOs must choose

how they will make use of this new type of authority. CSOs must be willing to engage in

intense cooperation with government officials; without cooperation, government officials

have a diminished interest in supporting a participatory program. Yet, close cooperation

can quickly led to co-optation. Thus, the presence of contentious politics provides a

means for citizens to place pressure on the government that allows citizen-participants to

avoid co-optation. Citizens and CSOs must be willing to publicly pressure government

officials over the government’s (in) actions related to the participatory institution.

In this article, I will draw from most well-known case of participatory democracy

in the developing world, Brazil’s Participatory Budgeting (PB), to show how government

official and citizens have managed this balancing act. I will argue that some PB programs

have been managed very skillfully (most notably the famous case of Porto Alegre), which

contributes to the deepening of democracay. I will also show that other PB programs

have not been managed similarly, producing weak and failed outcomes. Beyond Porto

Alegre’s PB, this article examines of seven additional PB programs in Brazil. This article

draws upon a broad selection of scholarly works on PB as well as nearly three years of

field research, a citizen-participant survey, budgetary analyses, elite interviews, and

hundreds of hours of participant observations.

The article proceeds in the following manner. There is first a brief overview of

Participatory Budgeting (PB). This is followed by a discussion of Strong Democracy and

the burgeoning literature on participatory institutions in Brazil (Barber 1984). The third

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section develops the argument. In the fourth section, I begin by setting up a typology of

four outcomes produced by the eight cases, which is followed by an analysis of the eight

cases.

What is Participatory Budgeting?

Brazil's federal system provides municipalities with nearly fifteen percent of all

public spending (Montero 2000). This helps to explain why social movements, non-

governmental organizations, neighborhood associations, and politicians have focused so

much attention on budgets at the municipal level. Brazilian mayors enjoy considerable

autonomy, allowing them to initiate new programs with only minimal interference from

municipal legislative chambers. Many local governments have used their relative

flexibility to implement PB (Wampler and Avritzer 2005; Goldfrank forthcoming).

Participatory Budgeting is a year-long decision-making process in which citizens

negotiate among themselves and with government officials in organized meetings over

the allocation of new capital investment spending on projects, such as health care clinics,

schools, and street paving (Abers 2001; Baoicchi 2003 and 2005; Fedozzi 1998; Nylen

2003; Wampler and Avritzer 2004). In the more successful cases, citizens have the

authority to make policy decisions, which has the potential to alter the basic decision-

making process in Brazilian politics. Citizens are mobilized to attend meetings during

which they vote for public policies and elected community representatives. PB programs

combine elements of direct (i.e. direct mobilization of citizens in decision-making

venues) and representative (i.e. electing representatives) democracy. These programs also

pay increased attention to transparency and social justice, both of which are designed to

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change how local governments in Brazil have long functioned, which is often described

as clientelistic and personalistic (Avritzer 2002; Baierle 1998; Avritzer and Navarro

2003).

Research has demonstrated that the majority of PB participants and PB delegates

are low income and have low levels of education (Baiocchi 2001; Nylen 2003; Wampler

2007). This means that when PB programs produce positive outcomes, they are most

intensely affecting individuals from historically excluded groups. PB programs have not

successfully incorporated middle and upper income individuals and groups, because PB’s

rules favor low-income neighborhoods by rewarding greater levels of resources on a per

capita basis to poorer and more densely populated neighborhoods.

PB was initially part of a broader transformative political project that the

Workers’ Party (PT) leadership believed would help create new types of citizens as well

as transform state-society relations by delegating authority to citizens (Genro 1995 and

1997; Nylen 2002). While the broader transformations have not yet materialized, PB has

been recognized as helping to overhaul how municipal governments function, becoming

one element of reform packages associated with “good government” (Hunter 2004;

Guidry 2003; Wampler and Avritzer 2005). Participatory Budgeting programs received

international attention when the United Nations named this institutional type one of the

best 40 practices at the 1996 Istanbul Habitat Conference.

Participatory Democracy

Benjamin Barber’s Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age calls

for citizens and government officials to design institutions that will directly incorporate

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citizens into decision-making venues (Barber 1984). Barber asserts that a fundamental

problem of actual, existing liberal democracy is the lack of active participation. While

Barber fretted about the lack of institutional innovation and re-design in the United

States, Barber’s call for Strong Democracy has been followed in developing world

democracies as reformers sought to overcome limitations associated with that of

representative democracy. Barber lays out several basic criteria that would allow for the

“viability and practicality as well as to the coherence of the theory” of Strong Democracy

(Barber 1984: 262). Participatory institutions should:

be realistic and workable. For all practical purposes, this means that they
ought to be a product of actual political experience.

complement and be compatible with the primary representative institutions

of large-scale modern societies.

directly address liberal anxieties over such unitary propensities of

participatory communities as irrationalism, prejudice, uniformity, and
intolerance.

deal concretely with the obstacles that modernity appears to place in the
way of participation: namely, scale, technology, complexity, and the
paradox of parochialism.

give expression to the special claims of strong democracy as a theory of

talk, judgment, and public seeing by offering alternatives to
representation, simple voting, and the rule of bureaucrats and experts.
(Barber 1984: 262).

PB’s basic set of rules meet Barber’s basic definitions for Strong Democracy. PB is an

institution that emerged from direct negotiations between government officials and civil

society leaders, as they sought to produce practical solutions to pressing needs (Abers

2001; Avritzer 2002; Fedozzi 1998). PB programs are housed within the mayoral

administration and complement the legal and political responsibilities of mayors and

municipal legislators. PB provides multiple opportunities for citizens to debate and vote

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on projects specific to their neighborhood and to the city more generally; citizens are also

encouraged to form solidarity packs with other citizens and groups (Abers 2001; Baiocchi

2005, Nylen 2003; Avritzer 2002). Finally, PB is a fairly complex decision-making

process that allows for the inclusion of information about the viability of proposed

policies (Wampler and Avritzer 2004).

Theoretical debate on Participatory Budgeting (PB)

Researchers have proposed a range of explanations for PB outcomes, which I will

briefly discuss. Each of the works cited below has made a significant contribution to

advancing our understanding of this pioneering participatory experience, but they are

limited by their inability to simultaneously consider the interests of the govermnent and

CSOs.

First, Abers’ pioneering work on PB asserts that there is a “synergy” between

governments and interested citizens in Porto Alegre, which helps to create the conditions

for the expansion of civil society (Abers 2001). According to Abers, PB represents a clear

effort of the local state to deepen the density of CSOs by encouraging them to work in

participatory decision-making venues. The state and citizens cooperate to build a broader

civil society, which then helps to improve the quality of Porto Alegre’s democracy. The

principal drawback to Abers’ approach is that she doesn’t explain why a government

would be interested in promoting PB. The government is treated as if it was a benevolent

actor, seemingly above the fray of politics and mainly interested in improving the quality

of political life. Furthermore, Abers does not adequately capture the tensions and

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conflicts within PB, as she emphasizes the cooperation among government officials and

citizens.

Baiocchi’s 2005 book, Militants and Citizens, draws from two years of fieldwork

in three of Porto Alegre’s regional districts. This sociological treatment does an excellent

job of showing how deliberative decision-making venues are constructed in a contested

political arena. Conflict and tension are present in the analysis, as is close cooperation

between government officials and participating citizens. Yet, the interests of the

government, the politicians, and political parties are absent from the analysis. Quite

simply, it is unclear from the analysis why government officials support PB. Baiocchi’s

work helps to show how and why individuals and groups engage in both cooperation and

contestation, but, again, the clear drawback to his work is that the government is

seemingly above the political fray.

Wampler and Avritzer argue that PB programs developed in the context of

“participatory publics” in civil society. During the 1980s and 1990s, citizens created new

organizations in which they sought to limit the pernicious effects that clientelism often

has on localized and low-income groups. Many groups sought to organize themselves

internally in more democratic fashions in order to exert more influence over state affairs

and to create a vibrant and more inclusive public sphere (Wampler and Avritzer 2004).

There was a strong emphasis on deliberation, public votes, and transparency. Institutional

innovations were then incorporated into state-sanctioned institutions, such as PB as CSO

activists and reformed-minded politicians sought to transform basic state-society

relationships by overhauling state institutions. However, the drawback to this approach is

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that it, like Aber and Baiocchi, provides few clues about why governments would be

willing to delegate authority to citizens.

Goldfrank, in a comparative analysis of participatory programs in Caracas,

Montevideo, and Porto Alegre argues that outcomes are best explained by the interaction

of two factors: The degree of decentralization afforded to municipal governments by the

national state and the degree of party institutionalization (Goldfrank, forthcoming). With

regard to decentralization, Goldfrank finds that greater levels of authority given to

mayors will result in stronger outcomes. In the eight Brazilian municipalities studied

here, the degree of authority afforded to mayors is held largely constant, which means

that the degree of decentralization cannot explain different outcomes among Brazilian

municipalities. With regard to party institutionalization, Goldfrank finds that strongly

institutionalized party systems have a limiting impact on the participatory institutions.

Entrenched political parties are unwilling to support innovation. Conceptually, this

argument marks an important turn in the debate, as it moves us away from a narrow focus

on civil society to a broader focus on the interests of government officials. However, this

approach still does not adequately explain why specific governments would be willing to

delegate authority to citizens.

The scholarly debates on PB have therefore emphasized how civil society has

been transformed, why civil society organizations support PB, and why some specific

political moments are conducive to initiating participatory democracy. Yet, little is

written about the political interests of the governments, which is at the center of this

analysis.

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The Argument: Explaining Outcomes

The two most important factors that account for the wide variation in PB

outcomes are the level of mayoral support for the delegation of authority directly to

citizens and the types and range of political activities utilized by CSOs. In order to

produce a strong PB program, it is necessary to have high levels of mayoral support for

delegation and a civil society that can engage in both cooperation and contentious

politics. As mayoral support drops, and as CSOs are unable to engage in both forms of

political behavior, PB outcomes weaken. These two factors interact: An increase in

contentious politics by CSOs often leads governments to delegate additional authority

and resources but there is also the ever-present possibility that too much contestation will

lead to a decrease in mayoral support. There are three factors that have an important

effect but will not be discussed in this analysis: mayoral-legislative relations, PB’s rules,

and the resources available in the budget for new capital investments.

Mayoral support

Strong mayoral support is vital to produce successful PB outcomes because

mayoral administrations initiate and administrator PB. Mayors must make a series of very

specific decisions regarding the degree of authority that they are willing to delegate; key

decision-makers within the mayoral administration must be willing to spend scarce

resources on projects selected by citizens. In Brazil, the implementation of “new capital

investment” spending, which is the principal focus of PB programs, is at the complete

discretion of the mayor’s office.1

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 While PB is a form of participatory democracy with direct and representative

elements, it is also falls within Brazil’s historical legacy of mayoral domination of

municipal agenda-setting (Nunes 1997). Ironically, mayors must first centralize authority

in their own hands before they can hand the authority back over to citizens via PB. For

PB to work well, mayors need to decentralize the administration, create internal

procedures to prepare information to allow citizens to make sense of complex policy

issues, re-train staff and bureaucrats to work directly with citizens, and, perhaps most

importantly, transform the process through which projects are “green lighted” towards

implementation. If a mayor is unable to gain control over the bureaucracy, or his/her own

political appointees, then it is not likely that a mayor will be able to delegate authority.

Why do some mayors delegate authority? First, mayors delegate authority to

citizens in new participatory institutions as a means to reach out to their municipality’s

most active CSO participants/leaders and to encourage the formation of new CSOs that

may become part of the government’s base of support. Through PB, mayors have direct

access to community leaders, which means that PB serves as a potential recruitment site

as well as a forum for government officials to discover community’s most pressing

problems. PB allows the mayoral administration to reach out to citizens and CSO

activists who were not initially part of the mayor’s political coalition.

Elections are held every two years in Brazil. Presidential, gubernatorial and state

and federal legislative elections are held at the same time (1994, 1998, 2002, 2006), while

mayoral and municipal legislative contests are held in the “mid-term” years time (1996,

2000, 2004). Federal senatorial elections may occur in either election cycle. Therefore,

mayors and municipal legislators are nearly constantly campaigning, which means that

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PB not only provides mayors with an opportunity to have close and constant access to the

most active CSO leaders, but it also allows the mayors to identify which CSO leaders do

the best job at turning out their supporters. This is crucial information for politicians as

they can more readily identify who they should hire for their electoral campaigns.

A second reason that mayors delegate authority is to reward their most loyal

supporters. In Brazil, CSO activists who work on behalf of leftist political parties have

demanded, since the late 1980s, that ordinary citizens be directly involved in decision-

making venues. PB provides a means for government officials to allow their political

base to “practice democracy” by having a direct role in governmental decision-making.

The political base is able to exercise “voice and vote” in a state institution, thereby

satisfying the basic demands of citizens to be directly involved. PB provides an

opportunity for ordinary party members to practice and be engaged in democratic

processes at the local level.

The third factor that helps to explain mayoral delegation is party politics. The

political party that has most strongly advocated PB is the leftist (sometime socialist)

Workers’ Party (PT). With only one exception, all PT mayoral administrations in large

municipalities (more than 100,000 residents) implemented some form of PB between

1989 and 2004 (Wampler and Avritzer 2005).2 PT mayors have been induced to adopt PB

to adhere to the “PT way of governing,” which involves the direct incorporation of

citizens in public policy decision-making venues, an emphasis on social justice, and an

effort to enhance transparency (Hunter 2004; Guidry 2003). However, the PT is

sufficiently decentralized that the national leadership does not attempt to verify that their

local governments dedicate the necessary time, energy, and resources to ensure the PB

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will function well. The PT sought to “brand” itself as a reformist political party, which is

why the party emphasized PB’s transparency, social justice, and deliberative components.

Finally, there is a generational component. The political leadership that came of

age during the mobilized opposition to Brazils military government in the 1970s

and1980s strongly supported the direct incorporation of citizens in order to “empower”

citizens and to transform how the Brazilian state functioned (Villas Boas and Telles

1995; Genro 1995 and 1997). The ideological composition of the mayor and his/her

closest advisors strongly conditions the extent to which mayors will be partially willing

to gamble their political future on the delegation of authority directly to citizens.

Therefore, part of PB’s original success is linked to ideological formation of a new

political elite during the transition to democratic rule, which means that it will be

increasingly less likely that new, younger mayors will be willing to delegate authority to

citizens.

Type of Civil Society Activity: Cooperation and Contestation

How do CSOs and individual citizens act inside and outside of PB? What

strategies do they pursue vis-à-vis government officials and their fellow participants?

CSOs and individual citizens must be willing to cooperate in a government-sponsored

program while also being able, when necessary, to engage in contentious behavior

(Tarrow 1998; McAdams, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). Cooperation and contestation are both

needed since there are deliberative and competitive decision-making components to PB.

Citizens must cooperate closely with government officials in order to gain access to

technical, legislative, and budgetary information. Participants must be willing to

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cooperate with the government and their fellow participants in order to facilitate meetings

and negotiation. For example, if civil society groups are bitter rivals and unable to agree

on seemingly simple matters such as a meeting format, then PB will weaken because it is

no longer a deliberative space focused on a broader set of problems, but instead becomes

a political space that rival groups try to occupy and control.

The cooperation that is a necessary part of PB can easily breed co-optation.

Contentious politics gives CSOs the opportunity to vigorously defend their projects in the

face of governmental doubts and potential indifference, which helps CSOs and activists

avoid co-optation. The use of contentious politics is more likely in urban settings where

there is a large plurality of organizations (safety in numbers), where citizens and civil

society organizations can appeal to different political parties (competition), where there is

a social and historical tradition of using direct action against governments and private

businesses, and where the leadership of the party overseeing PB makes it clear that they

will not penalize citizens and CSOs that use contentious politics.

First, a broad plurality of CSOs enables the use of cooperation and contestation

because a broader number of CSOs (higher density), with diverse sets of interests, makes

the cost of co-optation for the government higher. Simultaneously, CSOs have a lower

fear of reprisal because the government has a more difficult time punishing deviant

groups. Density, therefore, is important because of the benefits that it provides to CSOs

as they decide on the appropriate course of action. Second, when multiple political parties

vie for the support of CSOs and when CSOs are willing to align themselves with a

broader range of parties, CSOs are able increase their demands. CSOs may be able to

negotiate with multiple politicians rather than a narrow set of ideological partners.

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However, in a highly competitive party system, government officials may also bring

direct pressure to bear on CSOs to ensure that contentious politics is not used in a way

that would embarrass the government, which thereby limits the political strategies

available to CSOs.

Third, a history of contentious politics in a municipality appears to makes it easier

for currently active CSOs to use direct confrontation inside and outside of the

participatory institution. Contentious behavior is therefore not viewed as exceptional

behavior, but as a legitimate means for citizens and CSOs to express their political voice.

Finally, when government officials do not punish CSOs for using contentious politics

there is a greater likelihood that CSOs will be willing to directly confront government

officials inside and outside of PB. Conversely, when CSOs are discouraged from using

contentious forms of politics, especially when these had previously been part of their

repertoire of actions, then there will likely be a decrease in support for the participatory

institution.

Eight Brazilian cases of Participatory Budgeting

Figure 1, below, is a typology of four outcomes that have been produced by PB

programs. The two main components of the argument, the use of contentious politics by

CSOs and mayoral support for delegation, form the basis for the comparison. To illustrate

the level of mayoral support and the presence/absence of contentious politics, several

different measures are used. First, I draw from a survey (n=695) of PB delegates in these

eight municipalities, which tapped into citizens’ attitudes on their ability to exercise

authority within PB programs. I present the averaged results of six questions related to

16
authority. Second, I use the percentage of new capital investment spending that the

government allows the delegates to negotiate between 2001 and 2003, which helps to

demonstrate the extent to which government officials are willing to hand one type of

authority (budgetary authority) to citizens. There are yearly fluctuations so a three-year

average best captures the degree to which the governments delegate authority. I also draw

from participant-observation and more than 150 interviews over an eight-year period

(1996-2004) to establish the basis for assessing mayoral support and the presence of

contentious politics.

Figure 1
Participatory Democracy Outcomes

Use of Contentious Politics by CSOs

High Low
High Institutionalized
Participatory Democracy
N/A
Mayoral Porto Alegre
Support for Ipatinga
Delegation
Of Authority Informal and Contested Co-opted
To Citizens Participatory Democracy Participatory Democracy

Medium Recife Santo André

Belo Horizonte São Paulo

Emasculated
Participatory Democracy
N/A
Low Blumenau
Rio Claro

Institutionalized Participatory Democracy

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 The box in the top left includes the most successful cases, Porto Alegre and

Ipatinga. Institutionalized participatory democracy refers to a decision-making process in

which citizens have the authority to make specific binding decisions regarding how the

government will act. Citizens carefully study the rules, which can only be modified by a

citizens’ oversight committee, in order to pursue their private/particularistic interests and

contribute to the broader debates of the community. The government oversees or

manages the participatory institution and follows the rules, both in spirit and in practice.

The rules are well-known to all and are followed. Citizens are willing and able to use

contentious politics outside of PB, as a means to pressure legislators and media

representatives, but they were also able to use contentious politics inside of PB as a

means to pressure their government to act (Baiocchi 2005).

Porto Alegre is widely considered to be the most successful case of PB and has

been widely studied (Abers 1998 and 2001; Baoicchi 2003 and 2005; Fedozzi 1998). In

Porto Alegre, the PT won the 1988 mayoral election with just 35% of the vote. The new

government worked closely with an umbrella CSO and its own party activists to develop

the basic set of rules associated with PB (Abers 2001; Baierle 1998; Wampler and

Avritzer 2004). There was very strong support from PT members and civil society

activists to reform the very nature of the state by investing heavily in PB.

In Ipatinga, the PT also won the 1988 mayoral election and began to implement

participatory forms of politics in 1989. The PT’s base of support was firmly located in

leftist and PT-oriented labor unions. However, Ipatinga’s delgates did not have direct

control over decision-making until 1997 because the government was initially unwilling

to delegate any substantial levels of authority directly to citizens. In 1997, the

18
government slowly increased the level of authority they delegated because the mayor

realized that it was a beneficial political and governing strategy.3

Porto Alegre grew from a small number of participants, just 976 in 1990, to an

average of 31,000 a year between 2001 and 2004.4 The PT-led government invested

heavily in turning individuals out to participate (Abers 2001; Baiocchi 2005). PB became

a crucial base of support to the PT as the party’s candidates won mayoral elections in

1992, 1996, 2000, and the state’s governor’s office in 1998. The institutional design of

PB fosters deliberation and has a strong emphasis on social justice, which allowed the

main themes of the PT to be prominently featured. Since the government successfully

implemented a broad number of PB projects, there was a positive reinforcement

associated with PB (Goldfrank and Schneider 2003; Wampler 2004). In Porto Alegre,

100% of new capital investment funds were decided by delegates (Wampler and Avritzer

2004). As a result of the strong support by the government for PB, in Porto Alegre, 72%

of the survey respondents say that they are “always” or “almost always,” able to exercise

authority.5 Since the majority of the survey respondents are low income, this suggests

that authority is being transferred to representatives of Brazil’s historically excluded and

marginalized lower classes.

Ipatinga’s government has never able to count on a large turn-out of its citizens,

although they did grow from several hundred participants in the early 1990s to over 5,000

by 2002. Ipatinga’s PB is based on a dual-track system in which 50% of new capital

investment funds were directly decided by citizens. Citizens select projects that the

government agrees to implement if they are able to secure external funding. The

government annually seeks state and federal funds to complement the new capital

19
investment funds, which means that between 60-75% of new capital investment funds

were decided by citizens in PB forums. In Ipatinga, 64% of the respondents say that they

are “always” or “almost always” able to exercise authority, which is weaker than Porto

Alegre, reflecting the fact that Ipatinga’s PB participants could negotiate over a smaller

percentage of resources.

The PT governments in Porto Alegre and Ipatinga were first elected in 1989,

during a moment of political renewal in Brazil. Both elected governments were led by

political outsiders who sought to overhaul state-society relations, create a new path

towards socialism, and empower citizens (Fedozzi 1998; Genro 1997; Santos 1998).

Therefore, an important part of Porto Alegre’s and Ipatinga’s PB successes has been the

presence of leadership that was ideologically committed to revamping the municipality’s

basic decision-making processes.

The ideological commitment among the leadership includes support for the active

use of contentious politics. The local PT leadership in both municipalities came of age

politically as members of opposition to the military regime (1964) and were well versed

in the use of contentious politics. In Porto Alegre, throughout the 1990s, PB participants

engaged in contentious politics against opposition legislators and media outlets at key

events such as the World Social Forum. Importantly, PB meetings also have basic aspects

of contentious politics as citizens regularly denounced and criticized the government for

incompetence or indifference. The government did not dampen the debate, but allowed

for the development of free-flowing accountability sessions.

The high levels of mayoral support has helped to institutionalize participatory

democracy in Porto Alegre and Ipatinga, while the active use of contentious politics by

20
CSOs and citizens allows them to avoid co-optation. These two cases are successful

because government officials and citizens pursue their interests within the new

institution. Government officials don’t bypass the rules and citizens were rewarded for

their efforts to work within the new rules. This represents a significant change in local

politics in Brazil, where the rules are often manipulated by officeholders. Citizens were

able to use contentious politics inside and outside of PB to pressure government officials

to adhere to the basic rules of the game.

Emasculated Participatory Democracy

The bottom-right box, “Emasculated Participatory Democracy,” includes the least

successful cases, Blumenau and Rio Claro. In neither case has the government supported

participatory democratic processes. In neither case have citizens been able to use

contentious politics inside or outside of PB to press their claims. Blumenau has a very

dense civil society, with high levels of participation in its PB, but political

accommodation is the preferred method of reaching political decisions (Andrade 1996

and 2000). In Rio Claro, civil society has very low density and its leaders are unwilling to

risk their already weak influence on the mayoral administration to demand a more

expansive PB (Teixeira and Alburquque 2005). Neither mayoral administration was

deeply invested in PB, and the lack of pressure from civil society organizations neutered

the programs. If there is no pressure emanating from civil society, then there is no need to

expand the level of authority delegated to citizens.

In Blumenau, the Workers’ Party (PT) government initiated PB in 1997 at the

behest of two groups: A political group affiliated with the local university and

21
progressive CSOs that had ties to similar organizations in municipalities that already had

PB or similar participatory programs (Andrade 1996 and 2000; Rolim 2001). PB was

implemented to satisfy these groups and to allow them to practice the participatory

democracy that the PT had preached for so long. However, these groups were not central

to the mayor’s political base. Thus, with regard to the first criteria of using PB as a means

to reach out to the government’s own base of activists, there were few incentives for the

government to delegate authority. In Rio Claro, a Green Party mayor initiated PB at the

behest of one faction of his government and as means to reach out to middle class voters

(Texeira and Alburquque 2005). However, the main base of support of the mayor was

located within the Green Party, which emphasized innovative policies designed by

technical experts that would solve pressing agricultural and environmental problems.

Second, both governments had low interest in using PB as a means to establish a

supportive and mobilized voting base, although this lack of interest stemmed from very

different reasons. Blumenau had high rates of participation, with nearly 10% of the adult

population participating, which should have meant that the mayor would see the

opportunity and invest heavily in rewarding citizen’s choices. However, opposition

politicians (most notably, the PFL, a conservative, neo-liberal party) captured control

over nearly half of the regional districts.6 Thus, it was not in the government’s interest to

delegate decision-making authority to a participatory institution that was partially

captured by political opponents.

In Rio Claro, there was a weak civil society and people participated in very low

numbers. The government did not have an incentive to deepen its commitment to a

participatory policy-making program that was poorly attended. Less than one percent of

22
citizens attended meetings in any given year. Furthermore, the meetings were dominated

by government officials, which led citizens to believe that their participation would not

affect outcomes (Teixeira and Alburqueque 2005).

In Blumenau, the mayor allowed citizens to negotiate roughly 15% of new capital

investment spending.7 In Rio Claro, the mayor allowed citizens to negotiate less than

10% of new capital investment spending.8 These figures suggest that the mayors were not

interested in taking the political risk necessary to create vibrant PB programs. In Rio

Claro just 20% of the survey respondents declaring that they are “always” or “almost

always” able to exercise authority. Blumenau was a bit better, as 38% of the respondents

say that they are able, “always” or “almost always,” to exercise authority.

In Blumenau, the PT government that governed between 1997 and 2004 was not

driven by an ideological commitment to re-shape Brazilian politics and society by

directly incorporating citizens into key decision-making processes. Rather, the

government had been elected at a period of economic down-turn, a corruption scandal

among Blumenau’s leading politicians, and a split driven by personal factors among the

municipality’s two principal parties. The PT government had no mandate to embark on

serious reform. Thus, they produced an emasculated participatory program. In Rio Claro,

the government has also not been dedicated to a reversal of basic decision-making

processes. The government’s principal interest has focused on revising public policy

processes that would include policy innovations, rather than relying on citizens to be

actively involved in decision-making.

Of course, citizens and CSOs in Blumenau and Rio Claro could have led protests

against the government to pressure them to focus more energy, time, and resources on

23
PB. In Blumenau, however, there is no tradition of direct contestation and confrontation.

Blumeanu has a dense civil society, but it is based on the politics of accommodation

rather than confrontation. CSOs received a series of benefits from the government outside

of PB, so they were unwilling to directly confront the government over PB’s failings

(Souza 2003). Blumenau’s PB program failed because the government lacked any

substantial interest in promoting it as a new institutional decision-making venue and

citizen-participants had little interest or leverage in trying to pressure the government to

make PB the center of a new governing arrangement. In Rio Claro, too, there was not a

history of contentious politics (Teixeira and Albuquerque 2005). Union activity began in

the 1930s when Rio Claro became a major railroad stop, but politics was based on

accommodation and compromise rather than contentious politics. The combination of

low density and the lack of contentious politics have created an unsuccessful PB

programs.

“No contestation, no delegation.” This is key lesson to be drawn from the

experiences of Rio Claro and Blumenau. Without contestation, it is impossible to use PB

as a means to deepen democracy. The low levels of mayoral support for the delegation of

authority neutered the PB programs in Rio Claro and Blumenau. CSOs and citizens were

unwilling (Blumenau) or unable (Rio Claro) to rely on contentious politics to pressure the

government to dedicate more time, energy, and resources to PB. There was little cost to

the mayors to ignore an institution that their administrations had initiated. The overall

effect of PB was therefore negative because the most active CSOs leaders invested a

considerable amount of time and energy in PB only to have to government brush aside

their political efforts. This has obvious negative consequences for local democratic

24
processes because the emasculated participatory programs undermined the efforts of the

activists who were working to deepen the quality of democracy.

Co-opted Participatory Democracy

The middle right box, co-opted participatory democracy, has two cases, São

Paulo and Santo André, where the mayoral administrations sought to use PB as a means

to increase their direct influence over CSOs and citizen-participants. Contentious politics

were discouraged; both governments engaged in strategies that effectively co-opted

participants. The PT governments, in both municipalities, placed the politics of party-

building and governance ahead of the interests of building a vibrant participatory

institution.

Santo André’s PB was established in 1989 with a very different rule set from most

other PB programs. In Santo André there was initially strong mayoral support for PB

(Pontual 2000). However, the electoral interests of PT government trumped PB as

government officials were unwilling to risk their re-elections based on the interests of PB

participants. According to Teresa Santos, who directed PB from 1989-1992, “some of the

department heads emphasized their own projects and did not implement the projects

supported by the government.”9 CSOs were incorporated into PB but discouraged from

taking actions that would not promote the PT’s larger project of winning São Paulo’s

gubernatorial and Brazil’s presidential elections. Santo André has a unique rule structure

that increased the government’s direct control over PB participants (Daniel 2003). Their

PB had a 52-member council comprised of 26 government officials and 26 elected

citizens. This council had the responsibility of making a broader range of decisions; the

25
logic behind the program was “co-administration” in which citizens and government

officials would be jointly responsible for making policy decisions. This was an ambitious

attempt to directly incorporate the most active civil society leaders and lower level PT

officials into the governmental decision-making venues. In Santo André, elected PB

delegates were, at least theoretically, given control of well over half of new capital

investment spending, but the institutional rules were written in such a way that the

government had a veto over all policy choices.

Beginning in 1997, there was a shift in logic. The PT government decreased the

degree of authority allocated to citizens via PB. During the 1997-2000 period, Santo

André’s mayor initiated a series of other participatory programs, which had the net effect

of limiting the importance of PB because the type of decision-making authority in PB

was reduced to the negotiations over small projects. Instead of emphasizing radical

change, the PT began to use Santo André as a base from which they could strengthen the

PT. The government did not need to rely on PB as means to attract a base of support in

Santo André because they won in 62 and 70 percent, respectively, of the first round

mayoral vote in 1996 and 2000.

Just under half of Santo André’s respondents (46%) state that they are able,

“always” or “almost always,” to exercise authority. While their authority was more

limited than in Porto Alegre or Ipatinga, it was more robust than in Rio Claro or

Blumenau. The relatively strong results (46%) reflect the fact that PB represents a new

way of conducting politics in Brazil. Citizens have “voice and vote” in public decision-

making venues.

26
 In São Paulo, the government supported the delegation of authority to citizens, but

entirely on the terms dictated by the government (Wampler 2005). PB participants were

unable to successfully contest the policy choices of the government for two fundamental

reasons. First, the government was in an intense political struggle to help elect the PT’s

presidential candidate in 2002. São Paulo’s PB delegates were encouraged to subsume

their demands under the needs of party elites. This meant that CSOs had to decide if their

long-term political interests coincided with the political interests of the incumbent party.

Second, the mayor’s broader set of social policies were widely supported by PB

participants and social movement leaders, which has meant that they are unwilling to

directly challenge the government.

When the PT won the mayor’s office in São Paulo in 2000, the political group

around Mayor Marta Suplicy had very weak links to participatory forms of decision-

making. A small, left-wing faction within the PT spent its internal political capital to

ensure that Suplicy would implement PB. São Paulo’s PB was not used as a tool to build

a new base of support for the PT, but rather just one faction of the PT envisioned PB as a

means to build the party. PB activists were not encouraged to use it a political space to

transform decision-making.

In São Paulo, citizens were able to negotiate roughly 25-35% of new capital

investments between 2001-2004 (Wampler 2005). Authority was only partially extended

to citizens because the mayor was unwilling to risk her political futures on one particular

policy type. As might be expected, just under half of the respondents (49%) say that they

are able, “always” or “almost always,” to exercise authority. Mayors delegated lower

27
levels of authority than in Porto Alegre and Ipatinga, which is reflected in the attitudes of

the survey respondents.

Santo André has a long history of union and social movement organizing, which

could have created the conditions for the use of contentious politics by citizens in order to

maintain a robust PB. Instead of contentious politics, Santo Andre’s government was able

to co-opt citizens. How so? The emphasis on “co-administration” led the government to

work closely with citizens, and the rules gave the government a veto over citizens’

decisions. In order to get projects included in the government, citizens had to align

themselves with the government. Second, Santo André’s PB became part of a small

means to a greater end: Civil society activists did not want to embarrass the PT because

there were larger political issues at stake, namely the 1998 and 2002 gubernatorial and

presidential elections. The shared set of interests among activists and government

officials allowed the government to slowly withdraw support from PB without suffering

negative electoral outcomes. The mayor of Santo André was closely aligned with future

President Lula da Silva and the PT used their control of the government of Santo André

as a base from which they could run other elections.

São Paulo, too, has a long history of contentious politics. There were considerable

public demonstrations against the military regimes throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and

1980s. Yet, contentious politics did not occupy a central place in and around São Paulo’s

PB. The government discouraged contentious politics because they were working to

establish the necessary political momentum to re-elect Mayor Marta Suplicy (she was not

re-elected). To illustrate this point, the arguments of a government official and an elected

representative are telling.

28
 In a meeting on October 10, 2003, the PB administrator, Felix Sanchez, grew

increasingly upset as PB delegates leveled a series of complaints and accusations based

on the government’s weak support of PB. Sanchez sharply rebuked the PB delegates’

criticisms of PB, declaring that “no party has ever done more for São Paulo than the PT.”

Sanchez yelled and berated the PB councilors who “dared” to criticize the hard work of

the administration, thereby linking the party (PT) directly to the program (PB). It was a

stunning display that indicated that contentious politics within PB would not be tolerated.

Co-operation was emphasized, which came to mean that the government dominated PB.

PB delegates were aware of the larger political issues as the 2002 and 2004

elections came up repeatedly during focus groups and informal conversations. Many

delegates believed that they shouldn’t take action that might be detrimental to Mayor

Suplicy. As one delegate stated, “Look, we think that PB is the best thing that has

happened to us. We can participate. We are learning how to do this. But, we must re-elect

Marta [Mayor Suplicy]. There are many other programs that we would lose if she

loses.”10 Delegates were unwilling to publicly pressure Mayor Suplicy because of the

potential negative consequences, which may have helped the mayor politically but also

had the effect of weakening PB. PB delegates ceded one of their few extra-institutional

sources of influence in order to help the PT politically.

The PT governments in São Paulo and Santo André managed PB programs that

were ostensibly crafted to directly incorporate citizens into a participatory decision-

making venue. However, neither government was willing to delegate authority to citizens

and both governments dominated the participatory processes. Instead of delegating

decision-making authority directly to citizens, PB became a vehicle for both governments

29
to work with the most active participants to build the PT and to improve their electoral

results. CSO leaders were discouraged from entering into direct conflict with the

government, and government officials were quick to remind the participants how much

the government had done for them. Winning elections, rather than participatory decision-

making, became a central issue of both governments’ agendas.

The process of co-optation has obvious negative influences for efforts to deepen

the quality of democracy. The most active citizens were drawn out of their community

organizations and into the political party agenda of the PT, thereby creating a leadership

and representative vacuum at the neighborhood and community level. The interests of

CSOs and citizens became secondary to the electoral interests of the incumbent parties.

This has a contradictory effect on the deepening of democracy. Citizens and CSOs are

able to express their “voice” in a state-sanctioned public institution, which is a

noteworthy advance. However, participants’ demands were ultimately secondary to the

government’s electoral interests, which increases the risk that the most active members of

civil society will become disenchanted with working within institutionalized political

structures.

Informal and Contested Participatory Democracy

The middle-left box, informal and contested participatory democracy, includes

two municipalities, Recife and Belo Horizonte. These governments are noteworthy for

wide fluctuations in the level of mayoral support for PB. Recife and Belo Horizonte’s PB

is characterized as “informal and contested” because there is a high degree of informality

in how the government operates PB as well as how the government responds to

30
pressures/demands from the public. CSOs and citizens are able to pressure the

government outside of the formal confines of PB, making effective use of mobilizations

to draw the attention of the government back to PB programs. The governments in Recife

and Belo Horizonte are unable to control CSOs that choose to participate.

Belo Horizonte’s PB was initiated in 1993 by a PT mayor. The PT handily won

the 1992 election and the PT was led by a group of reformers committed to overhauling

basic decision-making processes in Brazil’s third largest city. The government initiated a

PB program that emphasized inclusion, access, and the direct involvement of citizens in

key decision-making venues. The PT government used PB as a way to reach out to

CSOs’ leadership, their party’s base as well as to build a base of support among potential

supporters. In Belo Horizonte, there has been rotating leadership at the top levels of the

government. The PT’s coalition partner, the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) held the

mayor’s office from 1997 through 2002, when a PT mayor returned to office. The PSB

mayor and the second PT mayor dedicated fewer resources and less time, energy and

political will to supporting PB. There was a decrease to 17% from 33% of the new capital

investment funds that were negotiated in PB over the 1997-2003 period. Half of the

respondents (50%) say that they are “always” or “almost always” able to exercise

authority, which again demonstrates relatively strong support for the role that citizens are

able to play in the new institutional format.

In Recife, mayoral support has been as low as in the cases of Rio Claro and

Blumenau, but it is has also been as high as the level in Ipatinga. Recife’s PB was

initiated in 1994 by a charismatic mayor who was then a member of the catch-all

Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). This mayor had initiated participatory

31
reforms during his first term in office (1986-1988) (Soares 1998). Recife’s PB was then

overseen by a conservative mayor (1997-2000), who formally maintained PB due to an

electoral alliance that had been fashioned with the first mayor. In 2001, a PT mayor

assumed office and dedicated increased resources, time, and energy to PB.

In Recife, the first mayor dedicated just 10% of new capital investment spending

to PB, although he did manage to implement 86% of the projects (1996). Between 1996

and 2000, delegates were able to negotiate 10% of new capital investment spending, but

few projects were actually implemented. In 2001, the new PT mayor increased the

amount of resources that could be negotiated to nearly 100% of new capital investment

spending but there is no clear record if the government has been able to implement these

programs. Just under half of the respondents (46%) say that they are able, “always” or

“almost always,” to exercise authority. The fluctuations in resources dedicated to PB led

to considerable institutional instability because it was not clear, from year to year, to

participants and government bureaucrats if the participatory process would be valued by

the mayoral administration or if it would be side-lined.

In Belo Horizonte, the government consistently sought to “improve” PB by

adopting new rules nearly every year, which created substantial confusion among CSOs

and citizens as they tried to design their most optimal strategies for securing resources.

The government did not have a clear system in place to move projects from the selection

to implementation phase, which created an informality in the policy process. This

informality combined with shifting interests of the government led to the active use of

contentious politics inside and outside of PB. Contentious politics then led to increased

informality as the government sought to respond to crisis by implementing projects of the

32
groups that were able to engage in contentious politics. Groups that were too small or

were unable to pressure the government via contentious politics had a more difficult time

receiving the public goods that they had worked hard to secure during the negotiation

phase. Contentious politics were present in Recife’s and Belo Horizonte’s PB as citizens

directly confronted government officials over problems associated with PB. Government

officials did not retaliate against these citizens nor did they attempt to dampen

discussions.

In Recife, there is strong electoral competition between two political parties for

the CSOs’ support. Protests and public demonstrations had to be addressed by

government officials because there was a real risk that the CSO will withdraw their

support for the party in power and support the opposition party. In Belo Horizonte, there

is a different logic at play. The PT, which oversees its PB, is the largest party in Belo

Horizonte. It is also has the strongest ties to CSOs. The party leadership, however, does

not face as intense threat from rival parties as in São Paulo or Santo André, which means

that CSOs are willing to use contentious politics as a way to get the government’s

attention. The use of extra-institutional protests leads the governments to privilege the

projects of the most active CSOs to ensure that there is not wide-spread dissatisfaction

among the most active and organized members of political society.

Outside of PB organized meetings, CSOs and citizens organized rallies to place

pressure on the government. For example, in Belo Horizonte, in March 2004, one CSO

led a mock funeral in which they symbolically buried PB. Importantly, they also

threatened to block a six-lane avenue during rush hour, which would have snarled traffic

for hours. This direct action was successful as the government agreed to their major

33
demands. This action sent signals to citizens throughout Belo Horizonte that direct action

outside of PB was a viable strategy to secure policy outputs, which then makes PB a

more ad hoc process. Instead of internal debates and negotiation with PB producing

public policy outcomes, it was the actions outside of PB that captured the attention of the

government and induced them to act.

Recife’s and Belo Horizonte’s PB programs are therefore best conceptualized as

informal governmental decision-making processes, through which government officials,

citizens, and CSOs pursue their interests. When the rules were not working, the

government changed them. When project implementation was slow, the government took

advantage of uncertainty in the process to reward groups that they were aligned with or

groups that could potentially embarrass them. The best organized CSOs that were willing

to use contentious politics were able to take advantage of the informality of the process to

secure the projects that had been previously selected in PB. But this meant that the groups

that followed the rules were less likely to secure projects via PB, which indicates that PB

has not transformed Belo Horizonte, but is part of a long tradition of elite-mass

accomadation.

The variation in mayoral support for the delegation of authority is what

differentiates Recife and Belo Horizonte from the other six cases. PB participants had to

actively engage in contentious politics in order to persuade the governments to fulfill

their commitment. This creates a central paradox for these two experiences: Contentious

politics by a small number of groups encouraged the government to respond to their

demands thereby reinforcing informality and flexibility into the decision-making process.

PB was designed to create a public and transparent process through which scarce

34
municipal resources would be distributed. In Recife and Belo Horizonte, this process

works for the first stage—policy selection—but does not work for policy implementation.

The effect on the deepening of democracy is therefore paradoxical as citizens are

rewarded for engaging in a rule-based decision-making body and for moving outside of

these rules to secure resources.

Conclusion

In this article I laid out the foundations of a framework that will hopefully

advance our understanding of the political and policy impact that the burgeoning numbers

of participatory experiences may have on efforts to empower citizens, clean up

government, and promote social justice in the hopes of deepening democracy. At the

heart of the framework is the recognition that we need to analyze the multi-faceted

interests of governments, CSOs, and citizens. Governments must be willing to actively

participate in a process in which they are delegating binding decision-making authority to

citizens.

If and when governments are unwilling to delegate real authority to citizens,

participatory programs are more likely to be formal shells without much policy or

democratic content. It is quite possible that these participatory institutions may emerge as

a space for ‘deliberation,’ which may allow citizens to exercise their right to “voice,” but

there it is also quite likely that the participants will quickly grow disenchanted with their

time spent in deliberative processes rather than in decision-making processes. Under

these circumstances, democracy is not deepened. Rather, there is a greater likelihood of

extensive disillusionment among the most active members of civil society, which may

35
lead to increased cynicism about the impact that the direct participation of citizens may

have on the deepening of democracy.

If and when, however, governments are willing to delegate authority, participants

not only directly influence specific policy outcomes, but they also alter basic state-society

relationships. Governments are more likely to delegate ever greater degrees of binding

decision-making authority when government officials believe that the participatory

institution will provide the political party in power with specific electoral, mobilization,

and governance benefits. Governments delegate authority when there is a sufficiently

dense civil society that is comprised of participants who are potential supporters of the

government. By delegating authority to potential supporters, the government has the

opportunity try to address the most pressing needs of the most active organizations.

Governments also delegate authority in order to allow their rank and file party

members (or strong sympathizers) the ability to “practice” democracy. The government

transfers some basic decision-making authority, thereby allowing the leadership and the

rank and file to think of themselves as being quite democratic. It is likely that many of the

decisions made by participants coincide with the general interests of the government, but

it would be far too reductionist to set this up as a general rule. Governments, especially

the case of Porto Alegre, find themselves implementing public policy projects that are not

their first-order preference, but were selected by PB participants. Therefore, the

deepening of democracy is most likely to occur when government officials’ and CSOs’

interests align. This finding should give us considerable pause about broader claims that

the deepening of democracy can be enhanced primarily through the energy and activism

of civil society activists.

36
 A key issue for citizens involved in participatory institutions is how to closely

cooperate with the government, but not fall into a clientelistic or co-opted relationship

with the government. Citizens must work closely with government officials in order to

schedule meetings, obtain information, prepare technical reports, monitor expenditures,

and verify the quality of public policy outputs. Without this close contact and

cooperation, participatory programs cannot function well. As argued in the article, the

ability of CSOs and participants to avoid co-optation is based on their capacity and

willingness to use contentious politics inside and outside of PB. Citizens need to have a

range of political tools that can effectively pressure the government to respond to their

demands. Often times this involves heated debate within the participatory institutions

during which citizens assert their rights and refer extensively to the rules that the

government pledged to follow. Participants do not have a posture of meek individuals,

but as citizens. CSOs and citizens must also have, at a minimum, the threat of public

demonstrations against the government or, in a more active fashion, the willingness to

take to the streets to denounce government actions. Governments are more willing to

delegate authority and honor their commitments when they face a potentially

embarrassing political situation. Therefore, the deepening of democracy is more likely to

occur when participants begin to utilize a broad range of practices. If they are unable to

simultaneously engage in cooperation and contentious politics, it becomes far less likely

that the quality of democracy will be deepened.

In sum, understanding the outcomes produced by a burgeoning number of

participatory institutions requires that we analyze governments’ willingness to delegate

and CSOs’ capacity and willingness to publicly contest the policies and actions of the

37
government who are delegating authority. By analyzing these two factors, we will greatly

expand our understanding of the impact that participatory democracy may have in

revitalizing older representative democracies and deepening representative democracy in

new democracies.

38
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 Endnotes

1
According to Brazilian law, no “new capital investment” projects (focus of most

PB programs) included in the budget have to be implemented; they are legally classified

as discretionary funding. Federal law 4.320. April 3, 1964.

2
In 1997, the PT government in Belem adopted a PB program. The government was re-

elected in 2000, but opted to implement an alternative participatory model in 2001.

3
Revista de COMPOR. Prefeitura de Ipatinga, MG. 1999. PP 1-4.
4
“Numero de participantes: Plenarias regionais do Orcamento Participativo.” Municipal

Government of Porto Alegre. June 7th, 2004.

5
The survey was initially conducted by the Instituto Ethos between November 25

and December 10. 2003 in eight municipalities. Survey methodology: This survey is a

representative sample of PB delegates rather than a random survey of PB delegates. The

distribution among the different municipalities was: Porto Alegre (60), Ipatinga (60),

Belo Horizonte (60), Santo Andre (60), São Paulo (300), Recife (60), Blumenau (60),and

Rio Claro (30). In order to generate an appropriate phone list of current delegates, the

author contacted each municipal government to obtain the names and phone numbers of

individuals who were serving as PB delegates in 2003. Individuals were then randomly

selected.
6
Interview with Vice-Mayor Inácio da Silva Mafra. January 22, 2004. Interview with

City Council Member Jean Klunderman. January 12, 2004.

7
“Orçamento Participativo: A vontade do povo via mostrar a sua força.” 2002.

Prefeitura Municipal de Blumenau.; “Prestação de Contas do Orçamento Participativo.

42
1999. Prefeitura Municipal de Blumenau. Analysis of the annul budget and final report

on spending, 1997-2002.
8
“Orçamento Participativo: Democratizando o Dinheiro Público.” Prefeitura

Municipal de Rio Claro.” 2002; “Venha Participar do Planejamento de Rio Claro”

Prefeitura Municipal de Rio Claro.” 2001.

9
Interview with Teresa Santos, 10/14/2003. Santo Andre, Brazil.
10
Interview with PB Delegate Fatima from Capella de Soccoro, November 11,

2003. Sao Paulo, Brazil.

43