The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath

THE
BANGLADESH
REVOLUTION
AND ITS
AFTERMATH
# ■
Ta l u k d e r M a n i r u z z a m a n
The great merit of Talukder Maniruzzaman's
book is that it shows that Bangladesh is not a
banana republic, but anation caught in the
coils of an unfinished revolution...
Maniruzzaman, perhaps because of his
presence at the creation of Bangladesh as a
involved intellectual, knows more of the
nation's tormented, tattered soul than any
other scholar who has written about
Bangladesh.
Journal of Asian Studies
Talukder Maniruzzaman here provides areliable

guide through the thicket of Bangladesh politics.
He both describes and explains events,
employing abroadly comparative framework
which makes his work usable to any student of
comparative politics.
■' P a c i fi c A f f a i r s
The problems analysed in this book are very
much unresolved.
The American Political Science Review
i-
- Talukder Maniruzzaman has probably written the
"t most comprehensive book on the stmcture of
East Pakistan, its conversion into Bangladesh,
and the new republic's polity.
The Statesman
OTHER BOOKS FROM UPL
Riitiqul Islam
Bangladesh Liberation Movemet :
International Legal Implications
Rangalal Sen
Political Elites'in Bangladesh
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THE BANGLADESH
REVOLUTION AND ITS
A F T E R M AT H
TA L U K D E R M A N I R U Z Z A M A N
Ûniversity
Press
Limited
c ;
m
THE UNIVERSITY PRESS LIMITED
Red Cross Building

114 Motijhae! Commercial Area
P O B o x 2 6 11 , D h a k a 1 0 0 0
Bangladesh
First published 1980

Second edition 1988
(g) Tahikder Maninizzaman
Published by Mohiuddin Ahmed, The Universily Press Limited,

114 Motijheel Commercial Area, Dhaka 1000 and printed at
Barnamichhil 42A Kazi Abdiir Rouf Road, Dhaka 1100 Bangladesh.
\
To my Wife
U.A.B. RAZIA AKTER BANU
who shared my quest to understand

the Bangladesh Revolution
P R E FA C E T O T H E S E C O N D E D I T I O N
In his preface to the second edition of The Eighteenth Brim-

aire of Louis Bonaparte, Karl Marx wrote, “A revision of the
present work would have robbed it of its peculiar colouring”.
It is the same feeling which prevented me from making any
revision of the present study. As Iwrote in the preface to
the first edition of the book, “My views of political life have
been indelibly coloured by my experience in observing at
first hand the grandeur of the people of Bangladesh who bro¬
ught about the cataclysic change that took place in 1971.
Ialso had the fortune to observe directly the dramatic de¬
velopments in Bangladesh that followed the traumatic birth
of the newest nation. The book is reprinted without modi¬
fication in the hope that the reader will gain areal feel of
the Bangladesh revolution of 1971 and its aftermath.
The only addition to this reprint of the book is aselect
bibliography. The bibliography consists, primarily, of the docu¬
ments and literature published in Bengali on the open and
underground political parties, student political organizations,
Bangladesh Government-in-exile and the liberation war of
1971. As these documents and literature constitute parts of
the primary sources of this study, the addendum accentuates
t h e fl a v o u r o f t h e b o o k .
The book was first published in December 1980. It went but

of print by the end of 1982. Since that time Ihave been
receiving innumerable inquiries about the book from both
within and outside Bangladesh. Ithank Mohiuddin Ahmed
of University Press Limited, Dhaka, for publishing this edition
of the book.
January 1988 Ta l u k d e r Maniruzzaman

PREFACE
During the last few years Ihave often thought of something

Krupskaya, Lenin’s wife and comrade, is reported to have said
in the latter years of her life, that “only one who has lived
through arevolution knows the grandeur of it”. My views of
political life have been indelibly coloured by my experience
in observing at first hand the grandeur of the people of Bangla¬
desh who brought about the cataclysmic change that took place
in 1971. Nevertheless, as astudent of the social sciences, Ihave
sought to understand events in Bangladesh in as thoughtful a
manner as possible. It has been an inner intellectual urge that has
sustained me in this pursuit,.despite an atmosphere that has fre¬
quently been uncongenial for rigorous and painstaking research.
This book had its origin in astudy in 1969 of the political
parties in former united Pakistan. As part of that study, I
collected party documents and literature and obtained infor¬
mation about the backgrounds of leading party personnel. In
this connection Iwent in late 1969 on aresearch trip to West
Pakistan, visiting the offices of various political parties in
Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar and interviewing alarge number
of the more prominent political leaders of West Pakistan.
Early in 1970, soon after Ibegan my writing, the new
military government of Yahya Khan announced its intention
to hold the first general elections in Pakistan. Idecided to
hold up my work in order to incorporate achapter on the
performance of the parties during the campaign and at the
polls. But from then on events in Pakistan moved swiftly and
dramatically, and my work had to be put to one side. After
the army craekdown on East Bengal on the night of 25 March
1971, survival itself became the principal problem for all in¬
tellectuals in Bangladesh, myself included. Nevertheless, through¬
out the entire nine-month period of army occupation Iremained
in Bangladesh, gaining first hand knowledge about the moves
and strategies adopted by the Pakistan army in its effort to
suppress the grim resistance it encountered.
vii
After the liberation of Bangladesh—on 16 December 1971 —

Iset about gathering materials on the liberation war, inter¬
viewing alarge number of Mukti Bahini (liberation army)
members and leaders and collecting newspapers published by
the various resistance groups in Calcutta. Ivisited Calcutta
and Delhi in February 1973 to find out more about India’s
role in the liberation of Bangladesh. The present study in¬
corporates the results of the.se different strands of activity.
Iam grateful to alarge number of political leaders of Pak¬
istan, Bangladesh and West Bengal, who not only supplied
me with rare party documents but also consented to long in¬
terviews. Alist of these persons is provided in the Appendix.
Dr. Craig Baxter lent me his personal collections of the
most recent books and articles on Pakistan and Bangladesh
which had been published abroad and were not available
in Dacca. My very close friend Professor Marcus F. Franda
made suggestions that contributed to substantial improvements
in the first draft. Dr. Peter Lyon kindly read and gave his
comments on Chapter VI. My greatest indebtedness is to
Professor W.H. Morris-Jones who went through the whole
manuscript meticulously and gave thoughtful suggestions w'hich
led to both substantive and stylistic improvements.
The research for this study, and the writing of the manus¬
cript, had to be carried out in addition to my departmental ad¬
ministrative duties and aheavy teaching load. Icoluld never
have completed this study without the help of my wife, U.A.B.
Razia Akter Banu, who not only provided acongenial home
but also acted as acomrade and critic throughout the work.
Imust also thank Mrs. Vonnie Franda who read the proofs
of the typed manuscript. My thanks are also due to Mr.
Manzurul Islam of Bangladesh Books International and Mr.
Golam Rasul Maffick of Eastern Commercial Service for their
help in the publication of the book.
Needless to say, despite the help of all these people, any
failings of the present work are mine alone.
February 1979 Ta l u k d e r m a n i r u z z a m a n
CONTENTS
Preface to the Second Edition v
Preface V I
Ta b l e o f C o n t e n t s I X
List of Tables, Diagrams and Maps X I
List of Abbreviations X U
Glossary of Terms XIV
INTRODUCTION 1
I . T H E P O W E R E L I T E I N PA K I S TA N 5
The Original Power Elite and its Problems 5

The 1958 Coup and Regrouping of the Power Elite 8
Consolidation of the Power Elite 10
Legitimacy Doctrines of the Power Elite 12
II. THE POLITICS OF AUTONOMY 19
The Awami League and the Demand for Autonomy 19

The Six-Point Movement 23
The Awami League Manifesto, 1970 25
Leadership and Bases of Support of the
EPAL, 1969-70 28
Muslim Politics in East Bengal 30
III. REGIONAL POLITICS AND THE LEFT IN EAST BENGAL 36
The Growth of the Bengali Left 36

NAP: The Anti-Imperialist Popular Front 38
The Split in EPCP and the Break-up of the EPNAP 39
Leadership of the pro-Moscow and pro-Peking
Parties, 1967-68 42
Factionalism and Doctrinal Disputes among the

pro-Peking Leftists 43
IV. STUDENT POLITICS AND MASS UPHEAVAL 53
The Organisation of Student Politics and the COA 53

The State Language Movement of 1952 5 5
The Institutionalisation of Student Politics 58
Student Movements During the Ayub Regime 61
X
Mass Upheaval in East Bengal (November 1968-

March 1969) 62
Students and the 11-Point Programme 63

( <
The Fall of the Bastille 65
V. R E V O L U T I O N B Y P H A S E S 70
First Phas e of Re vo lut i on 75
Mass Upsurge and the de facto Government

of Sheikh Mujib 79
Second Phase of the Revolution 82
Counter-Offensive by Pakistan Forces 96

Conclusions 99
V I . G U E R R I L L A WA R A N D T H E I N D I A N R O L E 108
Formation of the Government-in-exile 109
11 2
Building up Mukti Bahini
Mujib Bahini 11 6
Kader Bahini 11 7
Liberation War 11 8
Indian Military Intervention 124
Role of the Mukti Bahini 132
VII. ROLE OF THE LEFT 141

141
The EPCP (pro-Moscow)
143
The EPCPML (pro-Peking)
The EBCP 146
147
East Bengal Workers Movement (EBWM)
149
Bangladesh Mukti Sangram Samonnoy Committee
VIII. THE MUJIB REGIME AND POLITICAL POLARISATION 154
The Politics of Patronage 158
162
Fear of India and the Growth of Opposition
Government Response to the Left 174
178
Mujib’s “Second Revolution” and the 1975 Coups
IX. GENERAL Z I A’ S REGIME 198
202
Stability and Dependence
Restoration of Bureaucratic Power 208
Zia’s Policy of Political Development 212
X. CONCLUSION 233
242
Appendix: Select List of Persons Interviewed
Name Index 247
253
Subject Index
TA B L E S
1. Demographic Characteristics of the Party Elite

o f E PA M L 1 9 4 9 - 5 0 22
2. Demographic Characteristics of the Party Elite
of the EPAL, 1969-70 29
3. Demographic Characteristics of the Party Elite of East
Bengal Branch of the Jamaat-i-Islam (1969-70) 32
4. Demographic Characteristics of the Party Elite of the
pro-Moscow and pro-Peking EPNAP (January, 1968) 44
5. Demographic Characteristics of the Awami
League nominees of the National Assembly in 1970
General Elections 71
6. Ideological and Programmatic Orientation of Political
Parties in West Pakistan and their performance in
1970 elections 73
7. Ideological and Programmatic Orientation of Political
Parties in East Bengal and their Performance
in 1970 Elections 74
Results of the First General Election in Bangladesh

(March 7, 1973) 156
9. Number of Seats Contested, Won and Percentage of
Votes Secured by Political Parties in the National
Assembly Elections held in February 1979 225
D I A G R A M S
1. Splits in East Bengal Communist Movement, 1948-1970 40

2. Splits in Student Organisations in East Bengal 60
3. Splits and Reorganisations of Political Parties in
Post-Liberation Bangladesh 166
M A P S
1. Political Map of Pakistan Before 1971 X V I
2. Bangladesh Districts, 1971 87
3. Main Thrusts of the Indian Army, December 1971 131

ABBREVIATIONS
A L AvVami League
BAKSAL Bangladesh Krishak Sramik AWami League
B C L Bangladesh Chattra League
BCP Banglar Communist Party
BCPL Bangladesher Communist Party Leninbadi
BSF Border Security Force
BSS Biplobi Shainik Sangstha
C C C R Coordination Committee of Communist
Revolutionaries
C O A Committee of Action
C O P Combined Opposition Parties
CPI Communist Party of India
C P M Communist Party Marxist
C P M L Communist Party Marxist-Lsninist
D C Deputy Commissioner
EBCPML East Bengal Communist Party Marxists
Leninist
E B R East Bengal Regiment
E B W M East Bengal Workers Movement
EPAL East Pakistan AWanii League
E PA M L East Pakistan Awami Muslim League
EPCP East Pakistan Communist Party
EPCPML East Pakistan Communist Party Marxist
Leninist
E P M A L East Pakistan Muslim Awami League
EPMSL East Pakistan Muslim Students League
EPR East Pakistan Rifles
EPSL East Pakistan Students League
EPSU East Pakistan Students Union
F W P Food for Works Project
GOJ Gana Oikkya Jote
ICS Indian Civil Service
ICS Islami Chattra Sangha
I D L Islamic Democratic League
I L O International Labour Organisation
IPS Indian Police Service/Indian Political Service
JSD Jatio Samajtantric Dal
KSP Krishak Sramic Party
L F O Legal Framework Order
xiij
M N A Member of National Assembly

M P Member of Parliament
M P A Member of Provincial Assembly
N A P
National AWami Party
NSF National Students Federation
N W F P North-West Frontier Province
PDP
Pakistan Democratic Parly
P M L Pakistan Muslim League
PPP
Pakistan Peoples’ Party
PPR Political Parties Regulation
RTC Round Table Conference
SCA Students’ Committee of Action
SDO Subdivisional Officer
g l o s s a r y
Al-Badar Soldiers of the first battle fought by Prophet

Mohammad in Arabia
Al-Shams The Sun, name of acompany of soldiers of
Badar Battle
Amar Sonar Bangla My Golden Bengal

Ansar Helper (Civil armed guards)
Bangabandhu Friend of Bengal
Bastuhara The rootless pavement and slum dwellers
Bazar Market place
Chakma Name of atribe in the district of Chittagong Hill
Tracts
Char Silted islet of ariver
Ghat Docks
Gherao To e n c i r c l e
Hartal Strike
Hazong Name of atribe in the district of Mymensingh

Landholders
Jagirdars
Jawans Ordinary soldiers
Joy Bangla Glory to Bengal

Krishak Sramik Raj Rule of peasants and workers
Madrassah Islamic Religious Institute
Mahajans Money lenders

Mujahid Defender of the faith (from Jihad, Holy War)
Maiilana Religious leader
Mufassil Town Smalltown surrounded by countryside
M u k t i Emancipation
Muktl Bahini Liberation army
Quran The holy book of the Muslims revealed to

Prophet Mohammad
Rajakars Vo l u n t e e r s
Sangram Parishad Resistance Committee

Santal Name of atribe in North Bengal
X V
Seer Weight of about 2lbs

Shahid Minor Martyr ’s Memorial
Simnah Traditions of Prophet Mohammad (Words and
activites of the Prophet himself and those Words
and activities of his disciples which he approved
by silence)
Ta k a
Unit of Bangladesh Currency; £1—about
3 0 Ta k a
Thana Police Station

Ulema Experts in Islamic learning
Zamindar Landlord
1
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INTRODUCTION
The way that anation is bom conditions much of its later poli¬
tical development. The effects of the policy of blood and iron,
through which the German and Italian nations were created,
on the course of political development in both countries are
well-known. So far as indices of modernization go, no two other
nations seem so similar as Canada and the United States. But
the “revolutionary” birth of the United States and “counter¬
revolutionary” origin of Canada produced different political
institutions in these two countries.) The nature of politics in
Bangladesh cannot be understood without agrasp of the
extraordinary process which gave it birth.
It is the main thesis of this study that the formation of Ban¬
gladesh was the outcome of anational revolution that had been
in the making since Pakistan was born in 1947. It is contended
further that the revolution of 1971 was rather more than a
nationalist revolution. Although it stopped short of asocial
revolution, it marked amajor turning-point by its stimulation
of extremely radical ideas and opportunities.
Strains inherent in the formation of new States tend to lead
to unstable structures of authority; the difficulty has been
aggravated in Bangladesh by its revolutionary birth. Trends in
Bangladesh politics can hardly be explained, nor can con¬
clusions relevant to future policy be drawn without an under¬
standing of the tumultuous events of 1971.The impact of the
revolution will not be limited to the immediate future. As some
scholars of nationalism have argued, every nation in its own
way stores up in its memory the unique historical experiences
which it undergoes and it applies these experiences to “the
selection and treatment of items in its later intake, recall, o r
decisions.”)! The traumatic birth of Bangladesh will be are¬

ference-pointformanyfutureeventsaffectingthedestinyof
2The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath
the80millionpeopleofthisnation.Anunderstandingofthe
Bangladeshrevolutionisthereforeallthemoreimperative.
With the benefit of hindsight one might argue that the atte¬
mpt to build anation consisting of Muslims who were drawn
fromsuchdisparategeographicalareasasNorth-Westernand
EasternpartsofformerBritishIndiawasaforedoomedexperi-
m e n t . AndyetthebreakupofPakistanwasnotinevitable.®
The Muslims of Bengal had given almost as much support in

1946 to the creation of Pakistan as they lent to the creation of
Bangladesh in 1970.* Anation is aproduct of natural factors
notalonebutinconjunctionwithhumanpurpose,endeavourand
skill. Although balkanising tendencies are endemic in many
newstates,successfulsecessionistmovementsarerare.Bangla¬
desh is so far the only example of successful secession in the
Third World.
Itwasthepoliciesandstrategiesofnation-buildingpursued
bythepowereliteofPakistanthatprovokedtheleadersofEast
Bengal to embark upon the path of revolution. In order to
graspthenatureoftheBangladeshrevolutionitisnecessaryto
gainsomeunderstandingofthepowerelitethatservedasthe
targetagainstwhichpoliticaldiscontentwasdirected.Anatte¬
mptismadetoprovidesuchunderstandinginChapterI.
Men born “free” are gradually socialized into dominant
political values and thus become enslaved” as members of the
existing polity. To enact arevolution, to become involved m
the furious action of destroying awhole political edifice, men
have to be “free” again. They have to rid themselves of the
prevalentconceptionsandideasthatlegitimiseexistingpoli¬
tical structures. Revolutions are primarily intellectual events
and successful revolutions are won even before they are started.
In East Bengal, this ideological and mental transformation
was brought by various political groups, parties and student
organisations. Chapters II and III analyse the origins, structures,
basesofsupport,operationalstrategies,ideologicalplatforms
and leaderships of the various types of political parties that
sprangupinEastBengal.ThesetwoChaptersalsoshowhow,
by appealing to the primordial (especially linguistic) loyalties
of Bengalis, by arousing in them an acute sense of relative
deprivationvis-a-visWestPakistanis,politicalleadersandstu-
Introduction 3
dents brought about revolution and supplanted Pakistan n a -

tionalism by aradical and secular Bengali nationalism.
Chapter IV delineates the processes through which students’
politics became institutionalised in East Bengal and shows how
students organisations and their Ideologies were intertwined
with those of political parties. In addition, it describes the
various political movements which were led primarily by stu¬
dents and indicates how agitational politics develops its own
dynamics, each movement having an incremental affect on the
next.
Chapter Vfirst analyses the implications of the result of the

1970electionsforthenationalunityofPakistan.Secondly,it
explainsthedevelopmentofthemassivenon-cooperationmove¬
ment of 1March to 25 March 1971, at “which even Gandhi
would have marvelled. An attempt is then made to provide
an analysis of the initial phase of the armed revolution that
brokeoutafterthemilitarycrackdownonEastBengal.
Leftists in Bangladesh argue that it was direct military in¬
tervention by India which prevented the Bangladesh nation¬
alist revolution from maturing into asocial revolution. This
contention raises many questions. What was the nature and
extent of the Indian involvement in the Bangladesh revolution
before the December 1971 war? What was the social com¬
positionoftheMuktiBahini(LiberationArmy)?Whattypeof
training did Mukti Bahini members receive at the hands of
Indian army officers? What strategies did Mukti Bahini com¬
mandersdeveloptowinthewaragainstPakistan?Whatdeg¬
ree of success did the Mukti Bahini achieve before Decem¬
ber 1971 when the Indo-Pakistan war broke out? Was the
December 1971
war merely aspectacular blitz by the Indian
army? Or did the Indian army “walk in when we (Mukti
Bahini)hadalreadyfinishedthejob”?PartsofChaptersVI
and Vir attempt to provide some at least of the answers.
Chapter VIII is built around three themes. First, it shows
howtheradicalideasspawnedbytherevolutionof1971disrupt¬
edthepre-revolutionaryconsensusamongBangladeshleaders
abouttheadoptionofparliamentarygovernmentandbrought
apolarisation of the political forces. Second, an attempt is
made to explain the failure of Sheikh Mujib and the Awami
Leaguetocarrythroughasocialrevolution.Third,theChapter
shows how the experience of fighting aguerrilla war turned
aconventional army into ahotbed of unconventional and revo¬
lutionary ideas with critical effects on the whole political
process.
Chapter IX brings the story up to early 1979. It shows that

thedynamicsofpoliticalchangearestillbeingprovidedbythe
forcesgeneratedbytheliberationwar.TheJawans(privates)
radicalised by the liberation war are not only preventing the
stabilisation of aco-dictatorship of the military officers and
civilian bureaucrats, but are forcing the military ruler to build a
civilianpowerbase,transformhimselfintoapopularlyelected
head of the government and hold legislative assembly elec¬
tions.
In short, this study tries to explain both the varied roots of

the events of 1971 and the ramifications of that fateful year
through the subsequent period. The analyses in Chapters
VIII and IX indicate that if there is any inner logic in the bizarre
events in Bangladesh in recent years, it is that provided by an
understanding of the revolution of 1971.
NOTES
1. See, Chapter 1in S.M. Lipest, Revolution and Counter-revolution,

(London,HeinemannEducationalBecksLtd.,1969),pp.31-63.
2.See,K.W.Deutsch,NationalismandSocialCommunication:An
Inquiry into the Foundations of (Cambridge,TheM.I.T.
Press, Second Edition, 1966),p. 177. See also S.M. Lipset, Poli¬
tical Man: The Social Bases of Politics,{Cor^&cn, WilliEm Heinemann
Ltd., 1960), p. 46, 83.
3. See, W. H. Morris-Jones, “Pakistan Post-Mortem and the Roots
of Bangladesh”,Po//t;cfl/ Quarterly, Vcl. 43, 1972, pp. 187-200.
4. In the elections held in 1946 in the united province of Bengal, the
Muslim League fighting on the single issue of Pakistan, won 113 of
119 Muslim seats with 87 perc ent of the Muslim votes cast. For vot¬
ingpercentagesseethe,4zod(Calcutta),March1946.TheMuslim
Leaguesecured74percentofthevotesinthePunjaband50.20per
cent of the votes in the North-West Frontier Province in the pro¬
vincial elections of 1946.
CHAPTER I
THE POWER ELITE IN PAKISTAN
ThePakistanthatachieveditsindependencefromtheBritish
raj in 1947 was similar in
many respects to other nations that
haveemergedfromcolonialruleduringthepasttwodecades
It was poor, it lacked an institutionalised political process'
andusleaderswereseekinggreatchange.ButPakistan w a s
also different. The two
wingsofthecountry(WestandEast)
wereseparatedbyaboutathousandmilesofIndia,withthe
govenmental leadership of the nation concentrated almost
exclusivelyinthewingthatcontainedaminorityofthepopu¬
lation.Thesefactsalonecreatedasetofpolitical,andeconomic
dilemmasthatremainedunresolveduntilBangladeshsuccess¬
fullysecededfromPakistanin1971.Sincethissetofcircums¬
tancesissocentraltoanunderstandingofthepoliticalprocess
thatcreatedarevolutionarymilieuinBangladesh,ithastobe
carefully analysed before proceeding to astudy of the internal
politics of Bangladesh.
The Original Power Elite and its Problems
Perhapsthemostunusualpoliticalaspectofthespecialcircum¬
stances surrounding the creation of the united Pakistan of 1947-
1971wasthewayinwhichitv/asdominatedbyaleadership
that had only recently moved to the territories included in the
new state. The central leadership of the All-India Muslim Lea¬
gue, the party which fought for and won Pakistan, was in the
hands of Muslim leaders who had joined Pakistan from 'the
Muslim-minority provinces of India, the most prominent of
thesebeingMohammadAliJinnahandhischieflieutenant,Lia-
quat Ali Khan, both formerly residents of what is now India. In
the initial years (August 1947-October 1951) effective decision¬
making power rested successively with these two leaders.
6TheBangladeshRevolutionandItsAftermath
Jinnahsetthepatternofthegovermentalstructureofthe
nation by relying more on civil servants than on politicians
n e v e r
for major policy decisions. Although his authority was
equaltothatofJinnah,Liaquatmaintainedthetrarditionhe
established.!AfterLiaquat’sassassinationinOctober1951,not
surprisingly,effectivepowerpassedintothehandsofasmall
groupofbureaucrats.Thisrulingcoterieatfirstconsisted
of the Governor-General, Ghulam Mohammad, and his two
principal
advisers.
Finance
Minister
Chaudhri
Mohammad
Ah
andDefenceSecretaryMajor-GeneralIskanderMirza.^
Since this group had no political base, its support came
mainlyfromtheseniorofficersintheArmyandtheCivil
Service. Thus, in the first few years of Pakistan, administra¬
torsreplacedtheelectedrepresentativesofthepeopleaseffec¬
tivedecision-makers.The“decisionsofdecisiveconsequence”for
Pakistanduringthisperiod—theimpositionofMartialLawin i n
Lahore and removal of Khwaja Nazimuddin from office
1953, the dismissal of the first popularly elected United Front
MinistryofEastBengalinMay1954,thedissolutionofthefirst
ConstituentAssemblyinOctober1954,theforcedunification
of West Pakistan into one province and the imposition of the
formula of parity on East Bengal in 1955— were all taken by
the group of bureaucrats that clustered around Jinnah and
Liaquat.3 * . i■
The inauguration of the Second Constituent Assembly in
August 1955 did not diminish the power of this hard core.
Gulam Mohammad was replaced by Iskander Mirza as the
Head of the State and Chaudhri Mohammad Ali became his
first Prime Minister. Although ministerial manipulation and
changescontinueduntilthecoupd’etatofOctober1958,effective
powerremainedwithMirzaandhisadvisers,drawnfromthe
top echelons of the Civil Service and theArmy. Prior to 1958,
MirzagenerallyconsultedGeneralAyubbeforeanyvitaldeci¬
sion was taken.! He also used to boast of his power in front of
politicians, saying, for example, that “he had the Army in the
palmofhishandandhewoulduseittosendthempackingif
they got in his way too much.”®
The Civil Service of Pakistan and the Army were disciplined
institutions usually characterised as having high morale and an
The Power Elite in Pakistan 7
esprit de corps. Both, especially at the upper levels, were almost

wholly manned by non-Bengalis. In the mid-1950s out of 734
secretaries, joint secretaries and under secretaries in the Central
Secretariat, East Bengalis numbered only 42; no Bengali at the
time had the rank of secretary, only two were joint secretaries,-
10 deputy secretaries and 30 under secretaries.®
In the army Pakistan inherited apattern of recruitment that
provided for an efficient, homogeneous group of personnel.
More than half the combat troops in the British Indian Army
had been supplied by the Punjab districts of Rawalpindi, Jhelum,
Cainbellpur and Mianwali.’ In the mid-1950s the representation
of West Pakistan and East Bengal in the Army Officer corps
was as unbalanced as one could imagine. Out of 897 Officers in
the rank of Major and above in Pakistan Army in 1956 only 15
were Bengalis, most of whom were Majors.® The rise of abureau¬
crat-military elite to position of dominance in the Pakistan
Government, and the corresponding relegation of political lea¬
ders to lower positions in the power structure, was brought
about largely because of alack of either rapport or acommon
political orientation between the principal leaders of West Pakis¬
tan and East Bengal. Dissonance in political outlooks of the
leaders of the two parts of Pakistan was, in turn, the result of
their differing social structures.
In East Bengal the landed aristocracy had consisted prirha-
rily of Hindus.® During the 19th century. Hindu absentee land¬
lords, usually residing in Calcutta, became the principal rent-
collectors of East Bengal, exercising distant control over the
economic and social lives of cultivators. In 1951, the East Ben¬
gal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act was passed by the East:
Bengal Assembly in the face of strong opposition by the Con¬
gress Party, led by Hindu landlords. This Act fixed the land
ceiling at 33 acres per head and drastically altered land owner¬
ship patterns.
In West Pakistan, however, land ownership has remained
concentrated in afew hands right up to the present. Taking the
whole of West Pakistan, about 0.1 percent of landowners i.e,
about 6,000 people— possessed holdings of live hundred acres
or more.’® Economic power over their tenants gave the land¬
lords almost total political power in the local areas.
About 400 Bengalis and 500 West Pakistanis served as
membersoftheCentralandProvincialAssembliesduringthe
period1947-1958.While68percentofthepoliticalleaders
inEastBengalweredrawnfromprofessionalgroupslawyers,
doctors,teachersandjournalists—asimilarpercentageof
politicalleaderinWestPakistanwerelandlords.^Through¬
outthe1950sand1960sthepowerfullandedpoliticiansof
West Pakistanfearedthatestablishmentofdemocraticregime
the dominance of
with asystem of majority rule would mean
EastBengali‘commoners’overthem.They,therefore,sided
with the military-bureaucratic elite to frustrate the attempts
ofEastBengalistohaveaconstitutionalset-upwhichwould
express the rule of the majority.
By1958,“anew,able,ruthlessgroupofindustrialentre¬
preneurs” grew in Pakistan contributing over 6per cent to
national income.i^ The most significant feature of industrial
develompentinPakistanwastheveryunequalrateofgrowth
in the two wings. Not less than three-fourths of national
incomeoriginatingintheindustrialsectoraroseinWestPakis-
tan.i® Moreover, an astonishing 96 per cent of industrial
o r
investments were owned by people who either settled in
came from West Pakistan.^* Concentration of governmental
expenditureinWestPakistan,theavailabilityofmanagerial
and technical skill among refugee businessmen settled in West
Pakistan, the location of export-import licensing authorities
andfinancialinstitutionsinKarachimannedbynon-Bengalis—
all these led to the concentration of industrial power in West
Pakistan. West Pakistan’s industrial entrepreneurs, unwilling
tocedeanyportionoftheirmonopoliestoEastBengalibusiness¬
men, lent full support to the West Pakistan ruling elite.
The 1958 Coup and Regrouping of the Power Elite
In 1956 West Pakistan’s leadership sought to eliminate the
possibility of afuture domination of Pakistan by Bengalis.
The key administrative acts involved were the amalgamation
of West Pakistan’s four provinces into one administrative and
politicalunitandtheconstitutionalproposalforaunicameral
legislature, to have representation on the basis of parity
rather than population.
ButtheoneyearexperienceofrulebytheSuhrawardy-led
coalition ministry at the national level (September 1956-Octo-

ber 1957) convinced the West Pakistan ruling class that e v e n
within the 1956 constitutional framework political leaders with
roots among the people of East Bengal could impair the power
ofWestPakistan’svestedinterests.SuhrawardyasaBengali
ordered the allocation of foreign exchange and foreign aid
on the basis of parity between East Bengal and West Pakistan.
His government also appointed aseparate Controller of Imports
and Exports for East Bengal. Business and industrial interests
of West Pakistan resented these decisions. Tlrey were alarmed
when the Suhrawardy government proposed the establishment
of aNational Shipping Corporation for coastal trade between
East and West Pakistan, hitherto monopolised by afew
shipping magnates of West Pakistan. They reacted openly
against this proposal which, according to them, was “the
beginning of the end of free entrepreneurship” in Pakistan.
Shortly after this proposal was mooted they began to press
President Mirza for Suhrawardy’s removal.is
In the meantime the Suhrawardy government began to make
preparations to hold Pakistan’s first general elections in
February 1958. It was also clear from the political climate of
East Bengal that in these elections new political leaders would
gain popular support and that younger leaders were likely to
feel acommitment to agreater share of political and e c o n o m i c
power for East Bengal. Moreover, it was expected that adesire

for radical economic reforms would be very strong among
younger elected East Bengalis. Such aprospect unnerved the
power-elite in West Pakistan. Suhrawardy’s resignation was
manipulated by Mirza, who prodded the Republican Party
landlord members of the Assembly to withdraw support from
his government. Senior Army officers and civil servants then
began to press General Ayub ‘‘to take drastic action.””
In this atmosphere, the coup d'etat of October 1958— only
afew months before the first general elections were finally
scheduled (February 1959)— was, as stated by Gunnar Myrdal,
‘‘mainly adefensive regrouping of the old elite.”” In the years
following the coup d'etat General Ayub Khan established a
‘‘co-dictatorship” of senior army officers and civil servants under
his overall direction. This group which ruled the country under
10 The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath
martial law decrees from October 1958 to June 1962— did not
include asingle Bengali.
The new Constitution promulgated by Ayub in June 1962
concentrateddecisivepowersinthehandsofthePresident.Since
Ayub continued to rely on senior civil servants and military
officers for major policy advice, the new Constitution did not
effectanychangeinthepowerstructureofPakistan.TheCen¬
tral and Provincial Assemblies elected under the Constitution
of 1962 had costitutionally and operationally much less power
than that exercised by previous assemblies.The electoral system
devisedbyAyubfortheelectionofmembersoftheassemblies
and the President made it difficult for opposition political lea¬
ders to be elected to these offices. The essential feature of this
a s s e m -
systemwastheelectoralprocedure,whichrequiredthat
blies and the President be indirectly elected by an electoral
collegeof80,000“basicdemocrats,”thesebeingthelocallyin¬
fluential beneficiaries of governmental patronage.
Granted the nature of the new electoral system, it is not sur¬
prisingthatonly7membersoftheAwamiLeague(AL)the
mostpopularpartyinEastBengal—managedtoemergethrough
the elections of 1962 and 1965 as members of the National
Assembly.Norwasitunexpectedthat,despitemassivepopular
supportinEastBengalforMissFatimaJinnah’spresidential
candidacy in 1965, 53.4 per cent of the “basic democrats” in
East Bengal voted for Ayub. ” 1 8
Consolidation of the Power Elite
With the virtual elimination of Bengali influence in the central
decision-making process under theAyub system, the power elite
of Pakistan firmly established its control.^* During the Ayub
decade the representation of Bengalis in the armed forces re¬
mained as poor as it had been during the 1950s, while the per¬
centageoftheBengaliofficersinCentralSecretariatincreased
onlymarginally.2®Evenaftertwodecadesofanindependent
Pakistan, Bengalis could hardly reach the top echelons of either
the civil service or the armed forces. In 1969-70 out of 20 cen¬
tral secretaries only 3Bengali officers had attained the rank of
acting secretary.2i Of 35 officers in the ranks of Major-Gene¬
ral, Lieutenant-General and General in the Army in 1969-70,
there was only one Bengali.^^
Ayub could not afford to alienate West Pakistan’s landed

interests, the backbone of the class that provided the civil s e r -
vants and army officers of his regime. The land reforms carried
out by the Ayub regime were, therefore, anything but drastic.^^
Business in West Pakistan also thrived under the Ayub regime.
In August 1969 aLahore weekly (Nusrat) listed the 30 principal
families then monopolising the Pakistan economy. The list show¬
ed that some of the landed families (for example, the Daul-
tanas and Noons in the Punjab or the Hotis in the Frontier),
some retired army officers -Lieutenant-General Habibullah
Khan was among the most prominent— and some former civil
servants like Abbas Khaleeli had already become big n a m e s i n
business and industry.^-* In short by the end of the 1960s the
power elite of Pakistan had become established and consolidated.
The landed class, bureaucrats, senior army officers and indus¬
trial tycoons had come to be inter-related through mutual self¬
advancement and through marriage.
The mass upheaval against Ayub’s regime that took place
between November 1968 and March 1969 necessitated once again
achange in the leading figures of the power elite of Pakistan.
The Generals forced Ayub from office. But General Yahya
Khan, the new President of Pakistan after 1969, continued t o
safeguard the dominance of the same power elite. 25
Because of the domination by this elite, the relationship

between West Pakistan and East Bengal was an exploitative one,
based on classical 19th century colonial patterns. Governmental
expenditures in West Pakistan were much larger than in the East
and resources were also transferred from East to West. From
1955-56 to 1964-65 the Central Government spent atotal of
18,845.1 million rupees. Of this total, 10,107.9 million rupees
(about 54 per cent) went to defense, almost all of it being spent
in West Pakistan. During this same period, 3,678.8 million
rupees (about 19 per cent) supported the civil administration,
nearly 70 per cent of this going to West Pakistan.*®
Over 80 per cent of all foreign aid obtained during the period
1947-70 was utilised in West Pakistan. Over two-thirds of all
imports over the same period went to West Pakistan. In addi¬
tion, the foreign trade balances from 1948-49 to 1966-67 show
that East Bengal’s cumulative surplus amounted to 4,878.7 mil-
lion rupees. Yet during these 19 years East Bengal had adeficit
trade balance of 5,712.1 million rupees with West Pakistan.'^’
Clearly, East Bengal surrendered ahuge amount of foreign
exchange to West Pakistan, being forced to buy West Pakistani
consumer goods in aprotected market at much higher prices
than would be paid for equivalent foreign products. Even the
Secretary-General of the People’s Party in West Pakistan ad¬
mitted :‘‘We have seen that it is not amatter of offended senti¬
” 2 8
ment but ahard fact that East Pakistan is indeed acolony.
Legitimacy Doctrines of the Power Elite

During the years of the Pakistan movement prior to 1947
Muslim League leaders generated tremendous Islamic fervour
among the Muslims of South Asia with the slogan “Free
Islam in Free India.” After the inception of Pakistan the
nation’s ruler tried to sustain this fervour by projecting the
romantic goal of building an Islamic State. The Government
of Pakistan, they proclaimed, was trying to “put foward an
alternative system” based on Islam, as opposed to “Capitalism
as represented by certain countries of the West and Commu¬
” 2 9
nism as represented by Russia.
There was, however, little agreement among the Western
educated ruling class and the orthodox Ulema, or among the
different groups of educated Ulema, about the nature of Islamic
ideology.'*" By the mid-1950s it was evident that the rulers of
Pakistan had failed “to generate an interpretation of Islam
that could serve as an effective, realistic, meaningful ideology
or framework for ideology in the present situation.”"i Never¬
theless, vague and romanticist Islamic slogans continued to be
propagated and declarations to the effect that Pakistan would
be built up as an Islamic State were inserted in the preambles
and chapters on the Directive Principles of State Policy in the
Constitutions of both 1956 and 1962. The Islamic provisions of
the Constitutions, however, remained largely inoperative. The
Islamic slogans, however, stirred anti-Indian sentiment and
were no doubt thought helpful to the process of national
integration.
The complete rout of the Muslim League in the 1954
elections in East Bengal showed that by the mid-1950s
Islamic slogans had already lost much of their effectiveness in

rousing Bengali passions in favour of the rulers. Another
legitimacy doctrine had to be devised by the ruling elite t o
maintain its dominance. This was the doctrine of the unsuit¬

ability of democracy in acountry like Pakistan, primarily be¬
cause of the incompetence of the politicians. Dubbing the
politicians ‘‘crooks and scally wags”, Iskander Mirza argued
that politicians “make amess of things.” He stated further:
some under-developed counties have to learn democracy, and
until they do so they have to be controlled.”®* Ayub also
asserted that the Western system of democracy was “totally un¬
suited to the temper and climate of the country.”®® Denouncing
the politicians as “demagogues and charlatans”. Ayub stated
“since they have nothing to offer, they vie with each other
in arousing passions of the people and working on their
emotions.”®'*
With scanty representation in the civil service and armed

forces. East Bengalis could hope to gain control over the central
government only through ademocratic process that would
permit politicians to become decision-makers at the central
level. The doctrine of the unsuitability of the democreacy for
Pakistan could be interpreted as aploy designed to suit the
interests of the West Pakistan power elite. To add insult to
injury, some of its members went so far as to propagate the
view that Bengalis were an inferior race and Bengali Islam an
inferior form of the religion.®®
The preconception that Bengalis are inferior Muslims sus¬
ceptible to Hindu culture and language and therefore not
reliable Pakistanis, became linked in the minds of many West
Pakistanis with almost paranoid fear that the Indian govern¬
ment was constantly engaged in political and cultural sub¬
version in East Bengal. These ideas in turn prevented those in
power in Pakistan from viewing East Bengal’s political de¬
mands positively. As will be seen in detail in Chapters IV and
V, with the progress of time the West Pakistan leaders became
more and more inclined to use force to suppress every political
movement in East Bengal, in pursuit of along-term policy to
destroy East Bengal’s cultural and linguistic distinctiveness.
Two alternative strategies are generally open to the rulers of
new nations in their efforts to create national solidarity and
cohesion. One way is not to eradicate regional feelings com¬
pletely, but only to contain them within manageable limits. Such
astrategy involves the creation of asense of unity through a
recognition of the claims of the diverse groups to share power
and resources and to enjoy cultural autonomy. Development
along these lines can take place only when suitable political
formulas have been worked out to accommodate the conflicting
demands of various groups and institutional mechanisms are
available to meet them.
Such astrategy allows alow-tension level of regionalism, but
this facilities the growth of amixed political culture necessary
for the creation of ademocratic polity. The alternative way is
the policy of “blood and iron,” through which the authority
and culture of the dominant region is imposed upon the other
regions by resorting to military force and totalitarian devices of
cultural regimentation. The nineteenth century model of this
policy was the “Prussianisation” of Germany or the “Piedmon-
tisation” of Italy. In both these nation-states its use led to the
growth of asubject political culture and fascist regimes. In the
multi-racial and multi-lingual new states, such apolicy can only
breed counter-resistance, bloodshed, and ultimately, disintegra¬
tion of the polity.
The strategy to be adopted by anew state is largely deter¬
mined by the character of the ruling elite that takes over the
reins of power at the time of independence. The Indian ruling
elite, committed as it was to democratic values and massoriented
programmes and drawn from abroad spectrum of social strata
and regions, adopted apolicy of “unity through diversity”,
except during the period of Emergency under Mrs. Indira Gandhi
in 1975-77. This policy seems to have overcome the strains of a
possible balkanization of Indla.^*"’ The Pakistan elite, recruited
mainly from the upper strata of aparticular region and lacking
commitment democratic values and mass welfare, was interested
almost exclusively in retaining its dominant position. It adopted
from the beginning the second alternative, the pursuance of
which culminated in the separation of Pakistan’s eastern wing.
The process of evolution that characterised the colonial rela¬
tionship between East Bengal and West Pakistan was tersely
summarised in aWest Pakistan political document—The Elec¬
tion Manifesto of Pakistan People’’s Party 7P70—which read in
part as follows:
“Pakistan is geographically separated into two parts, of

which the Eastern was the major producer of exportable
wealth at the time of partition. The Central Government’s
expenditure, however, was mainly in the Western Part. Politi¬
cal power also lay in the West on that account and because of
thepresenceofanopulentfeudalclass.Thedevelopment
schemesweresomadeorimplementedbytheCentralGove¬
rnment that the private sector under these schemes fell into
the hands of asmall number of businessmen, who either had
their original homes in West Pakistan or had chosen to settle
there...The result was that East Pakistan was submitted to
ruthless exploitation. The decline of East Pakistan began
during the life time of the first National Assembly, and the
farce of the last one under the dictatorship of amilitary
usurper failed even to disguise the brutal facts. We must
frankly recognise that the unity of the nation has been gra¬
vely imperilled. It is no remedy to brand the victims of
exploitation as traitors because they are driven to protest
against the treatment they receive. Nor does it help to
improve matters by insulting them as bad Muslim.””
NOTES
1.
SeeKhalidBinSayeed,Pakistan:TheFormativePhase(Karachi,
Pakistan Publishing House, I960), pp. 383-385.
2. Ghulam Mohammad, amember of the Audit and Accounts Ser¬
vice of India, had been selected by Jinnah as the first Finance
Minister of Pakistan. Chaudhri Mohamad Ali also belonged to the
Audit and Accounts Service of India. Iskander Mirza started his career
in the British Indian Army and later joined the Indian Political Service.
3. See, Report ofiheInquiry constiti.ted under the Punjab Act Ilof 1954
to inquire into the Punjab disturbances of1953 (E&hoK, Punjab Govern¬
ment Press, 1954), p. 287; Col. Mohammad Ahmad, My Chief
(Longmans, Green &Co., 1960), pp. xii, 88, 86; MohammadAyub
Khan, Friends Not Masters (Karachi, Oxford University Press
1967), p. 196. ’
4. Col. Mohammad Ahmad, ojp. cit. pp. 50, 97-98.
5. Thomas R. Kenyon, “And Then There was One”, The Reporter,
XIX(1958), p.30.
6. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Jatmaty 25,1956, Vol.l,
p. 2050.
7. According to the Simon Commission, 62 per cent of the British
Indian Army was recruited from the former Punjab. Quite alarge
number were also recmited from the NWFP. Baluchistan supplied
afraction. Bengal’s contribution was nil. Indian Statutory Com¬
mission Vol. 1. Survey (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office,
1930), pp. 96-97.
8. Detailed figures for military personnel are provided in theCow-
tituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates. Jan. 17, 1956, Vol.l,p. 1845.
Out of 700 Air Force Officers only 7were Bengalis.
9. According to ageneral estimates, in East Bengal, 75 per cent of
the land, including the biggest zan;(Wrzr/ei, belonged to the Hindu
Rajas, some of them possessing as much as 75,000 acres of land.
Sit Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Feb. 14, 1956, Vol.l,
p. 3056.
10. Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements (Karachi, Pakistan Publi¬
cations, 1964), p. 50. In the Punjab, more than one-fifth of the
cultivable land was owned by one-half per cent of the owners
in the late 1950’s. At the same time, in Sind, thirty per cent of the
total occupied area was in the hands of those holding 500 acres
or more, abare one per cent of the total occupants. In North-
West Frontier Province, 0.1 per cent of land owners, each with
more than 500 acres, accounted for nearly cne-eighth of the total
area. See National Planning Board, The First Five Year Plan 1955-
60, (Karachi, Government of Pakistan Press, 1958), p. 309.
11. Talukder Maniruzzaman, “Crises in Political Development and the
Collapse of the Ayub Regime in Pakistan”, The Journal of Develop¬
ing Areas, Vol. 4, No. 2, January 1971, pp. 226-227.
12. Gustav F. Papanek, “The Development of Entrepreneurship”, The
American Economic Review, III (1962), p. 49.
13. Nurullslam, “The Economic System in Pakistan”, C.B. Hoover
(ed.) Economic Systems of the Commonwealth (Durham, Duke
University Press, 1962), p. 422.
14. Papanek, op. c/r.,p. 50.
15. See Maniruzzaman, “Group Interests in Pakistan Politics”, Pacific
Affairs, 43: 1&2,1966, pp. 89-91.
16. Major-General Fazal Moqueem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army
(Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 192.
17. Gunner Myrdal,/4iten Drama: An Enquiryinto the Poverty of Nations
(New York, Pantheon, 1968), p. 288.
18. See Karl Von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 288,
19. See Robert Laporte, Jr., “Succession in Pakistan: Continuity and

Change in aGarrison State”,s/on S'//rvey,IX,II (November 1969)
pp. 850-851.
20. See, Rounaq Jahan,Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, (Dacca,

Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 62.
21. These Bengali officers were appointed by General Yahya soon after
his assumption of office in March 1969 as aconcession to the Bengali
demand for ashare in central decision-making. They could not,
however, be effective as the officers under them were almost all from
West Pakistan.
22. 23 of these officers were Punjabis, 7were Pathans and 4were

from provinces that formed parts of India. The names and life-
sketches of 35 top army officers were culled from press releases
published in three daily newspapers—Dawn, The Pakistan Observer
and Morning News—A\irm% the period March, 1969 —December,
1971.
23. Probably not more than 2percent of all of the cultivated land of
West Pakistan was redistributed under the reforms by Ayub govern¬
ment, Myrdal, op. c/V.,p. 329.
24. Nusrat (Lahore), August 1969, pp. 7-22.
25. See Laporte, Jr., op. cit., pp. 859-61.
26. Pakistan Ministry of Finance, Pakistan Economic Survey 1964-65
(Rawalpindi, 1965), p. 124.
27. Anisur Rahman, “Who Pays Debt to Whom”, The Pakistan Observer,
March 21, 1968. The figures are from annual trade reports pub-
lished by the Pakistan Government.
28. I.NKahira,Outline of aFederal Constitution for Pakistan, p.71, quoted

in the statement of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, The Pakistan Obser-
ver, February 25,1971.
29. See, The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates (Government of
Pakistan, Karachi, 1949), Vol. 5, No. l.p. 2.
30. See, The Report of the Court of Inquiry into the Punjab Disturbances
of 1953, pp. 200-232.
31.
See, Wilfred C. Smith,IsIaminModernHistroy fPrinceton, Princeton
University Press, 1959), pp. 226-231.
32. The Times (London, October 30, 1954). Quoted in Sayeed, The
Political System of Pakistan (Karachi, Oxford University Press,
1967), p. 75.
33. Ayub Khan, “Pakistan Perspectives”, Foreign Affairs, XXXVm 4

(July 1960), p. 550.
34. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (Karachi, Oxford University Press
1967), p. 208.
35. See, Philip Deane, “The Men Who Really Run Pakistan”, The
Reporter (January?, 1955), p. 31; Ayub Kha.n,FriendsNotMasters,
p. 187; see also the text of Nasrullah Khan’s speeches in public
meetings in Karachi, The Daily Ittefaq (Dacca), February 4and
October 5,1970.
36. For adiscussion of balkanising tendencies in India in the first
decade after 1947, see SeligHarrison, India: The Most Dangerous
Decade (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960).
37. Karachi, Vision Publications, 1970. p, 9.
CHAPTER II
THE POLITICS OF AUTONOMY
As Lenin, the great organisational genius, knew very well, the

sheer existence of inequality and exploitation does not automa¬
tically lead the people to rise against the constituted government.
Before attempting arevolution, the vanguards must succeed
in arousing adeep sense of deprivation and insecurity among
the potential supporters of revolution. Every revolution, there¬
fore, requires along period of gestation. Thus it took 23 years
of hard political mobilisation by the leaders and cadres of East
Bengal’s political parties and students organisation to generate
intense hatred against West Pakistan’s ruling elite and erode the
influence of their legitimacy doctrines among the Bengali m a s s e s .
The most important political party propagating first the idea of
largely extended autonomy and later the independence of East
Bengal was the Awami League. The Awami League, however,
by no means had amonopoly of secessionist sentiments or acti¬
vists. The leftists of East Bengal clearly urged the Awami League
towards greater and greater militancy. Eventually the leftist pus¬
hed the Awami League over the brink to the demand for inde¬
pendence. Moreover, it was the student cadres of the leftist poli¬
tical parties that were most instrumental in pressing the Awami
League towards its role in history. In this chapter an attempt
will be made to place the Awami League and the rightist funda¬
mentalist parties as forces opposed to each other. The next cha¬
pter deals with the leftist organisations and Chapter IV traces
the inpact of student politics o n
both the Awami League and
independence movement.
TheAwamiLeagueandtheDemandforAutonomy
TheAwamiLeaguegrewasaprotestmovementbytheyounger
generation of the Bengal Muslim League against West Pakistan
domination. Just afew days before independence in 1947, the
landlord and orthodox section of the Bengal Muslim League,
with the tacit approval of the central leadership of the All-India
Muslim League, manoeuvered H. S. Suhrawardy, out of the lea¬
dership of the Bengal Muslim League Parliamentary Party.' Kh-
wajaNazimuddinwas.electedasthenewleaderandshortlyafter¬
wards, as Prime Minister of East Bengal. The young supporters
of the Muslim League who, under the leadership of Suhrawardy
had worked hard for the Muslim League victory in the 1945-46
elections (when Nazimuddin remained in voluntary retirement
from politics), were deeply frustrated. They were even more re¬
sentful when the central Muslim League leadership appointed
the ageing and conservative Maulana Akram Khan (71 in 1948)
as the chief organiser of the East Bengal Muslim League. When
MaulanaAkramKhanandhisassociatessystematicallyexcluded
Suhrawardy’sfollowersfrommembershipoftheEastBengalMus¬
limLeagueduringthenewmembershipdrivein1948-49,^resent¬
ment turned into open revolt.
Frustration was aggravated by the discriminatory policies
pursued by the Muslim League government in national and
provincial appointments. All key officers appointed in the
subdivisions, districts and Secretariat in East Bengal after
independence were non-Bengali Muslims, drawn from West
Punjab and the provinces of the former British India. As a
result, Bengalis began to feel that East Bengal was being neg¬
lected and treated merely as a“colony” of West Pakistan.®
The feeling of being colonised was further heightened when
central Muslim League leaders began to suggest that Urdu (a
language which was not read by even one per cent of East
Bengalis) would be the only state language of Pakistan. On
January 4, 1948 apro-Suhrawardy group of students formed
the East Pakistan Muslim Student’s League (EPMSL), with
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (at that time alaw student at the
University of Uacca) as one of the conveners. By the beginning
of February 1948 the Students League had launched amove¬
ment for recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages of
Pakistan, and in June 1949 this movement spearheaded the
formation of the East Pakistan Awami Muslim League
(EPAML), “representing both genuine social protest and the
Tlie Politics of Autonomy' 'h'
politicalambitionsofthefrustratedMuslimLeaguers”Maulana'
BhashaniwaselectedthePreisdentofthepartyandSuhrawardys
soon after became the convener of the All-Pakistan Committee
of the new party. .
The demographic, characteristics. of.. the office-bearers and
members of the Working Committee of the East Pakistan Awa-
mi Muslim League (EPAML) in 1950-51 are given in TableMV
73 per cent of the top leaders were in their 20s and 30s while
89percentofthemwereUniversity-educatedandthevastmaj¬
ority drawn from professional classes. More important, the 750-
member Executive Council of the EPAML was composed
most exclusively of younger Western educated members. Accord¬
ing to arough estimate, about 600 of them were graduates, '
about 300 with M. Adegrees. About 85 per cent of them w e r e
below 40.*
As EPAML began to grow in popularity its programme

underwent changes. The first draft manifesto (1949) indicated
that EPAML leaders accepted the Islamic character of the- state,
although it stressed that units of Pakistan would have the full
right of self-determination and demanded that East Pakistan
should have its own defence forces-.^ The leftists, who had alre¬
ady joined the Awami League in large numbers, began to put
pressure on the top leadership to adopt asecular, socialist and
anti-imperialist programme. The younger group of Awami Leag¬
uers who constituted the majority in leadership, and as well many
of the rank and file of the party, placed greater emphasis on
East Bengal’s colonial status vis-a-vis West Pakistan. The final
manifesto of the EPAML in the early 1950s omitted reference
to Islam and resurrected the Lahore Resolution of the AU-lndia
Muslim League (1940) which had referred to ‘independent sta¬
tes’ in the North-West and Eastern zones of the subcontinent.
Demanding full regional autonomy for East Bengal, the m a n i -
festo called for recognition of Bengali as one of the state lang¬

uages of Pakistan. In the economic sphere the manifesto advoc¬
ated aprogramme of amodern welfare state.®
Soon the EPAML leaders—all Muslims—began to plead for a
joint electorate system, in place of separate eleetorates for Hin- -
dus and Muslims, and in 1953 by aformal resolution in the
EPAML Council dropped the word ‘Muslim’ from the name
22Tlie Bangladesh Revolution and ItsAftermath
oftheorganisation.In1954,whenPakistanGovernmentsigned
the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement and latter joined the
American-sponsored Defence Pacts (SEATO and the Baghdad
Pact), the Working Committee and Council of the East Pakis¬
tanAwamiLeague(EPAL)passedresolutionsopposingboth.
Ta b l e 1
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PARTY ELITE OF

EPAML, 1949-.50.
Demographic Characteristics No. Percentage

of total
Age
1 3
Over 60
3 8
50-60
6 16
40-49
16 43
30-39
11 30
Below 30
37 100
To t a l s
Education
33 89
At least aB.A. degree
Entered college but did not
2 6
graduate
2 6
No College
To t a l s 37 101
!Total percentage exceeds 100 because of rounding.

Religion
Islam 37 100
Profession
Lawyer- 21 57
Business men (including

insurance men) 5 14
Trade Union 1 3
Pir (Religious leader) 1 3
Landholder 5 14
Teaching in School and

College 4 11
To t a l s 37 101
!Total percentage exceeds 100 because of rounding.
Source: Information from Abul Mansur Ahmed, one of the Vice-Presi-

dents of EPAML, 1950-51.
The Politics of Autonomy 23
In 1954 the EPAL (or AL) formed aUnited Front with the
Krishak Sramik Party (KSP) led by A.K. Fazlul Huq, the mover
of the Lahore Resolution. The 21-point electoral programme of
the United Front Party included demands for: 1) regional
autonomy for East Bengal, with only three subjects—Defence,
Foreign Affairs and Currency and Coinage—left with the central
government; and 2) recognition of Bengali as one of the state
languages of Pakistan."^ In the 1954 elections the United Front
won 223 of 237 Muslim seats and secured 57 per cent of the
total votes cast.®
However, personality clashes, between the leaders of the

Awami League (AL) on the one hand and Fazlul Huq of the
KSP on the other, prompted the central government of Pakis¬
tan to use “divide and rule” tactics, eventually resulting in the
break-up of the United Front Party. The Awami League itself
suffered aserious split when the AL-led coalition formed
governments in East Bengal as well as at the national level in
October 1956. After his elevation to the post of Prime Minister
Suhrawardy began to defend vigorously Pakistan’s pro-Western
foreign policy and Pakistan’s alliances with the United States.
In April 1957 the East Bengal Legislative Assembly passed a
unanimous resolution demanding that East Bengal be granted
‘‘full regional autonomy” leaving only three subjects—Foreign
affairs. Defence and Currency and Coinage—with the central gov¬
ernment. Suhrawardy dubbed the resolution a“political stunt”.®
Suhrawardy’s stand on foreign policy and autonomy was resent¬
ed by the leftists who, together with Maulana Bhashani, then
left the Awami League to form in July 1957 anew political
party—the National Awami Party (NAP).
The Six-Point Movement
In the initial period of military rule from October 1958 until

May 1962 political parties and political activities were banned
throughout Pakistan. With the withdrawal of martial law in
June 1962 and the subsequent promulgation of the constitution,
political activities were renewed. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
(Sheikh Mujib) who had been the general secretary of the AL
(1953-1958) took the initiative in reviving the party in early
1964. By that time Suhrawardy had died and separatist feelings
had grown even among Bengali civil servants and Bengali
officers and soldiers of the armed forces. While the Bengali
military preferred to be discreet, some senior Bengali civil
servants co-operated with University professors and economists
inpreparingaprogrammeofautonomyforEastBengalwhich
left only two subjects—defence and foreign affairs—with the
central government. Sheikh Mujib was in touch with these
developmentsandbegantoprepareamassmovementinsupport
of “full regional autonomy”.
These plans were accelerated by the Indo-Pakistan war of
September 1965. The power elite of Pakistan argued that the
defence of East Bengal lay in West Pakistan and sedulously
developed the myth that if India attacked East Bengal, West
Pakistan tanks would move up to Delhi. The 17-day war
shattered the myth and proved that the Pakistan armed forces
would not be able to defend even the West Pakistan frontier
in aprolonged war with India. During the war East Bengal was
cut off not only from West Pakistan but from the rest of the
world. Bengalis felt adeep sense of insecurity and became
convinced that their survival against amilitary attack from
India was dependent on their gaining the power to manage
their own defence and settle their own diplomatic and external
relations. After the cessation of hostilities. Sheik Mujib, a
political entrepreneur par excellence, thought that East Bengal’s
s e n s e of isolation could serve to spark anationalist explosion
among the politically discontented and economically frustrated
Bengalis. At apress conference on February 14, 1966 he stated:
“The question of autonomy appears to be more important after
the war. The time has come to make East Pakistan self-sufh-
” 1 0
cient in all respects.
At anational conference of opposition political parties held
in Lahore on February 5-6, 1966, Sheikh Mujib announced his
famous six-points ‘‘charter of survival programme” for East
Bengal; 1) reintroduction of aparliamentary form of govern¬
ment and universal adult franchise; 2) afederal form of govern¬
ment with only two departments—defence and foreign affairs —
to be lodged with the central government and all residual
powers to reside in the two states (East Bengal and West Pak¬
istan); 3) separate currencies and state banks for the two states;
4) all heads of taxation under the states; 5) independence of
the two states in international trade; and 6) the development
of amilitia or paramilitary force in East Bengal.”
To say that this programme evoked tremendous enthusiasm
among the people of East Bengal would be an understatement.
Encouraged by overwhelming popular support, Sheikh Mujib
convened ameeting of the AL council at which his programme
was unanimously approved and he was elected President of the
party. With aphalanx of organisers from the Students’ League,
Sheikh Mujib then launched avigorous campaign. For about
three months (from mid-February to mid-May) the urban cen¬
tres of East Bengal seemed to be in the grip of a“mass revolu¬
tion”, prompting the central government to arrest Sheikh Mujib
and his chief lieutenants (Tajuddin Ahmed, Khandokar Mush-
taq Ahmed, Mansoor Ali, Zahur Ahmed Chowdhury, and oth¬
ers) under the Defence of Pakistan Rules and to put down a
complete general strike in Dacca (June 7,1966) by killing 13 par¬
1 2
ticipating strikers.
As one might have expected. Sheikh Mujib’s arrest in 1966
only served to enhance his popularity, to the point where he
became the veritable symbol of Bengali nationalism. But at
time most of the support for his six-point programme still came
not from the bulk of ordinary people but from asection of
the rising East Bengal entrepreneurial class, students, govern¬
ment officers, teachers, lawyers, doctors, journalists and other
professional groups.
The militancy of the nationalist movement of the bitter urban
middle class in East Bengal, however, unnerved the power elite
of Pakistan. On the day following the approval of Sheikh
Mujib’s six-point programme by the AL council, President
Ayub compared the situation in Pakistan with the time of the
civil war in the United States. Ayub also threatened in the
same speech to use the “language of weapons” against the
“separatist” forces, suggesting that the nation would have to
face a‘‘civil war” if such were forced upon him by the seces-
sionists.”^^
The Awami League Manifesto 1970

The trial of Sheikh Mujib by special tribunal in Dacca Canton¬
ment was aturning-point in terms of the support for his 6-point-
26 the Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath
cause. Now the movement became ageneral revolt of all sections
against the Ayub government, arevolt lasting from November
1968 until March 1969. As discussed in detail-in Chapter IV, dur¬
ing this period Student Action Committees injected socialist slo-
gans and demands which radicalised East Bengal’s politics. To
appease the people, Generel Ayub withdrew the ‘‘conspiracy
c a s e against Sheikh Mujib and others on February 22, 1969.
At areception held on February 23, 1969 at Dacca’s Race Course,
more than half amillion people welcomed Sheikh Mujib from
his internment chanting the slogans of Joi Bangla (Long Live
Bengal) and Krishak Sramik Raj (Peasants’ and Workers’ Rule).
Sensing the mood of the people. Sheikh Mujib declared that his
party would work for the realisation of both the six-point progr¬
amme of the AL and arecently adopted eleven-point progr¬
amme of the Students’ Committee of Action.'*
In the short run the effect of the 1969 mass upheaval in East
Bengal was the fall from power of General Ayub Khan and
adeclaration of martial law throughout Pakistan by Ayub’s
successor. General Yahya Khan, on March 25, 1969. According
to knowledgeable political circles in West Pakistan there was at
that time considerable debate within the military as to the wis¬
dom of holding future elections, with the ‘‘hawks” (led by Gen¬
eral Tikka Khan and General Mohammad Akbar Khan) report¬
edly of the view that East Bengal had to be ‘‘cleared” of the
“secessionists” before any elections could take place. General
Yahya, supported by General Abdul Hamid Khan, advocated a
m o r e subtle strategy, which was eventually adopted.
According to the Yahya strategy, elections to aNational
Assembly would be held under aMartial Law Order, but this
Order would also preclude the possibility of the Assembly enact-
ing anew constitution on the basis of the six-point program¬
m e . 's Thus, the Legal Framework Order (LFO), issued by Gene¬
ral Yahya as the Chief Martial Law Administrator and binding
o n the proposed National Assembly, provided that
“the Federal Government shall also have adequate powers,
including legislative, administrative and financial powers,
to discharge its responsibilities in relation to external and
internal affairs and to preserve the independence and terre-
torial integrity of the country.”
The LFO further provided:
“The Constitution Bill, as passed by the National Assembly,
shall be presented to the President for authentication. The
National Assembly shall stand dissolved in the event that
authentication is refused.”^®
All the pro-Peking and pro-Moscow leftist groups and

parties in East Bengal reacted sharply against the LFO. They
argued that contesting the elections under LFO would be afutile
exercise as the Assembly would not be sovereign and realisation
of “full autonomy” for East Bengal would not be possible. They
therefore called for aunited movement by all political parties
for the withdrawal of the LFO.
Sheikh Mujib, on the other hand, thought it tactically un¬
wise to come into conflict with the army generals at that stage.
He had already made atactical gain. Soon after his release
from the charges of conspiracy he demanded representation on
the basis of population. This had been conceded under the LFO,
providing that East Bengal would have 169 out of atotal 313
members of the proposed National Assembly. With his immense
popularity, Mujib was sure of winning almost all of the seats in
East Bengal, thus securing for his party an absolute majority
in the Assembly. Sheikh Mujib further thought that his election
campaigns could be used to galvanise nationalist feelings behind
his party and if the army generals dared to flout the election
verdict, there would be spontaneous popular resistance. Mujib,
therefore, not only decided to participate in the elections but also
indicated privately to General Yahya and some of the political
leaders of West Pakistan that after the general elections he would
water down his six-point programme of autonomy. For this
reason the Pakistan government did not interfere with Mujib’s
election campaign.'^
In June 1970 the AL issued its election manifesto, carefully
drafted by AL expert to evoke maximum support from the peo¬
ple of East Bengal.18 The manifesto, while avoiding the word
“confederation”, suggested aconfederal solution for Pakistan’s
constitutional problem by incorporating in it the already popular
six point programme of Sheikh Mujib.'** To pre-empt the appeal
of the leftists the manifesto advocated the nationalisation of
banking, insurance, heavy industries, foreign trade and other key
28 The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath
industries as determined by the planning agency.^® It also assu¬
red the workers and their families free housing, medical care,
disability and retirement benefits and the like.î Since the annual
of floods caused incalculable damage to agriculture,
r e c u r r e n c e
flood control and water management were accorded the highest

priorities in the AL’s programme for reconstructing the economy
of East Bengal.^2
The AL manifesto challenged all the doctrines propagated
by the power elite of Pakistan, including the unsuitability of
democracy for Pakistan, communalism, and anti-Indianism.
The AL manifesto promised that “a real living democracy shall
be established in which people shall live in freedom and with
dignity, and in which justice and equality shall prevail.”^® The
” 2 4
manifesto assured minorities “the full rights of citizenship.
It projected aforeign policy which ran counter to that pursued
by the power elite in Pakistan. It favoured the immediate with¬
drawal of Pakistan from SEATO, CENTO and other military
pacts and pursuance of “an independent, non-aligned foreign
policy.In contrast to the traditional anti-lndianism of Pakis¬
tan’s ruling elite, the AL manifesto promised “peaceful co¬
existence with all countries, including our neighbours’’^® and it
also took up the leftist plank of “complete support to the strug¬
gle of the oppressed people of the world against imperialism,
colonialism and apartheid.
Leadership and Bases of Support of the EPAL, 1969-70

As shown in Table 2, the vast majority (77 per cent) of the
office-bearers and members of the Working Committee of the
AL in 1969-70 were in their 40s or younger, while 89 per cent'
of them had University education and amajority came from
professional classes. Acomparison between tables 1and 2
shows that, with the exception of age, the demographic charact¬
eristics of the party elite of the AL remained essentially the
s a m e from 1949-50 until 1969-70. Over the two decades the
AL leadership became older. The same leaders, who in their
twenties and thirties had helped Bhashani and Suhrawardy to
form the AL and constituted the majority of the party elite in
1949-50, retained the leadership as middle aged men in 1969-70.
During the intervening years they had increased their skill at
Ta b l e 2
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PARTY EEITE OF

THE EPAL, 1969-70
Demographic Characteristics No. Percentage

of total
Age
50-60 8 23
40-49 25 67
30-39 3 8
Below 30 1 2
To t a l s 37 100
Education
At least aB.A. degree 33 89

Entered college hut did
not graduate 1 3
No college 3 8
To t a l s 37 100
Religion
Islam 37 100
Profession
Lawyer 21 57
Business (including
contractors &insurance
men) 11 29
Trade Union Leader 1 3
Landholder 2 6
Former school &
college teacher 2 6
To t a l s 37 101
Source:
Obaidur Rahman, Social, Cultural, Relief and Rehabilitation
Secretary of the EPAL.
political mobilisation; at the same time the sufferings they

experienced at the hands of the Pakistan government enhanced
their antipathy towards the West Pakistan rulers and steeled
their determination to ‘‘emancipate the people of East Bengal
from the West Pakistan yoke.
As the Bengali nationalist party, the AL in 1969-70 drew
support from all sections of the people of East Bengal. Its
hold on the younger generation and especially students who
were to work volunteers in election campaigns, was massive.
The Students League, affiliated to the AL, won the student
union elections held in 1969-70 in all five Universities and in
132 of 142 colleges. Besides the students, the AL also had
about 10,000 regular party workers, including about 2,000 in
Dacca alone. AL leaders like Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni, Sera-
jul Alam Khan, Abdur Razzak, and Khaled Mohammad Ali,
all of whom had been working with industrial labour since the
mid-1950s, persuaded professional trade union leaders like
Abdul Mannan, Sayedur Rahman and Ruhul Amin Bhuiyan
to form Jatio Sramik (National Labour) League affiliated to
the AL. These were soon clustered together to form the largest
labour organization in East Bengal.
Almost the entire middle class—lawyers, doctors, teachers
and government servants—supported the AL programme of “full
regional autonomy”. The growing body of Bengali entrepren¬
eurs, who found themselves in competition with and obstructed
by their West Pakistan counterparts, as well as some of the
professional classes, poured asteady stream of contributions
into AL campaign funds.^® With its secular nationalist-socialist
slogans, and with the charismatic Sheikh Mujib as its leader,
the AL was poised for amassive victory in the general elec¬
tions of 1970.
Muslim Politics in East Bengal

From the preceding discussion it is clear that by 1968-69 the
Awami League was advocating aconfederal arrangement for
East Bengal with West Pakistan while, as will be shown in the
next chapter, the leftists were arguing for asocialist, sovereign
and independent East Bengal. The political groups opposed to
either aconfederal solution or independence for East Bengal
were the various factions of the Muslim League, Jamiat-al-
Ulema-e-Islam, Nizam-i-Islam and Jamaat-i-Islami. All of these
stood for astrong central government and for acontinued hos¬
tile posture toward India. Of these the most organised and pow¬
erful party was Janiaat-i-Islami, afanatical ultra conservative
Islami revivalist party.
Although the Muslim League (ML) had helped to create

Pakistan, its influence had steadily deteriorated after 1947. In
the 1954 elections it secured only 10 of 237 Muslim seats and
16.29 per cent of the total votes cast.^s By 1970 its popularity
declined further. The primary reason was its growing identifi¬
cation with policies pursued by the power elite in Pakistan,
which led to greater centralisation of political, economic and
monetary powers. The student community of East Bengal,
always the largest reservoir for political recruitment for all politi¬
cal parties, had become desenchanted with the Muslim League
after the agitation on the language issue. By the 1960s, therefore
the ML found it difficult to gain new recruits from among Ben¬
gali youth. Moreover, the ageing Muslim Leaguers became divi¬
ded into several groups.
In September 1962 some Muslim Leaguers in East Bengal
joined the Pakistan Muslim League Convention Group, an
adjunct of the Ayub government. The support of this group was
limited to the beneficiaries of various types of government con¬
tracts, export-import licences, and permits. Another group of
Muslim Leagures formed the Pakistan Muslim League Council
Group, being opposed to the Ayub regime and in favour of a
restoration of parliamentary democracy. Asmall number of a
older men in professions like law and medicine were attached
to this group. Yet another group of Muslim Leaguers formed
the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP) in September 1969. The
formation of the PDP only lead to the division of the already
small base of support of the Muslim League Council group. The
appeal of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam and Nizam-i-Islam again
was confined to the orthodox Ulema and students of madrassahs
(institutions of orthodox Islamic learning), Jamaat-i-Islami was
an Islamic nationalist party that worked with fanatical zeal to
counteract Bengali nationalism and socialism in East Bengal.
It was designed on apattern common to revolutionary totalita¬
rian parties, working through concentric circles of cells sprea¬
ding out their influence. Members of the party were recruited
by ahighly selective process and amember had to remain as
an associate for some time and take lessons in the ideology
of the party before he was entitled to full membership. In 1968-
69 Jamaat had about 425 full members and 40,000 associate
members in East Bengal. About 40 full members were whole¬
time workers of the party and v/ere paid from party funds.^®
As shown in Table 3, 36 per cent of the members of the
Executive Committee of the East Bengal branch of the Jamaat
and members of the All Pakistan Executive Committee of the
party elected from East Bengal were below forty years of age.
Ta b l e 3
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PARTY ELITE OF

EAST BENGAL BRANCH OF THE JAMAAT-MSLAMI (1969-70)
No. Percentage
Age
60 and above 2 8
4 16
50’s
10 40
40’s
9 36
3 0 ’s
Education
Graduate and above 18 72
2 8
Matric
5 20
Madrassah education
!Profession
School and College
14 56
teachers
Small Government
2 8
O f fi c e r s
6 24
Small businessmen
2 8
Service in private firms
1 4
Lawyer
25 100
To t a l s
♦As the party leaders were all whole-timers and paid by the par
1969-70, profession refers to occupations of leaders before
m
they became whole-timers.
Source: M. Nuruzzaman, Member, Working Committee, Jamaat-i-

Islami, July 19, 1969.
It was, therefore, the only party in this group that had some
recruits from among the younger generation of East Bengal. De¬
spite its ultra-conservative ideology, it was able to attraet some
Western educated people. Among its top leadership, 72 per cent
hadcollegeorUniversityeducation.Theprofessionalback¬
groundsofJamaatleadersshowthattheyweredrawnprima¬
rilyfromthemiddleandlowermiddleclasses.Inshort,Jamaat
-i-Islami was
an authoritarian movement of recently educated
ower middle classes who “found their psychological anchor
mtheprogrammeoftheJamaat-i-Islamiwithitsuncompro¬
mising stress on the revival of an Islamic state.”3i
Jamaat was one of the few political parties in Pakistan that
hadasteadypartyfund.TheannualbudgetoftheEastBengal
JamaatwasRs.450,000.Jamaatleadersthemselvesclaimed
thatthesourcesoftheparty’sfundswereregularcontributions
yullandassociatemembersoftheparty,donationsfrom
partysympathisersandprofitsfromthesaleofpartyliterature.®^
Secularandleftistleaders,however,allegedthatJamaathad
beenfinancedbythe“imperialistpowers”tocheckthespread
of communist and socialist ideas.
Înthe1970sJamaatlaunchedamassiveculturalandideolo¬
gicaloffensiveagainstbothsocialismandBengalinationalism.
The party cells of Jamaat began from 1968 to circulate free of
chargeabout10,000booksandpamphletspermonthonIs¬
lamandPakistan.Jamaatworkersalsosoughtto“reconstruct
andpurifythethoughtsofthepeople”throughpersonalcon¬
tacts,lectureprogrammes,seminarsandthelike.®®Asthepro¬
cessofpolarisationbetweensecularsocialistandBengalinatio¬
nalists on the one hand and the Islamic and Pakistan nationalists
on the other took shape in 1969-70, leaders and workers of the
Jamaat
became^
increasingly
aggressive.
They
even
began
to
talk
oan Indonesian-style civil war, prompting the Indonesian
AmbassadorinPakistantomakeanappealatapressconfe¬
renceinDaccanottoincludehiscountry’snameinthepoliti¬
cal controversies of Pakistan.®^
NOTES
1.
SseTheAmd(Calcutta),July8,10,23,31andAugust6,1947.
2.AtaurRahmanKhan.OjarotirDidBachhar(Two'yearsofMinister-
ship),Dacca:StandardPublishersLtd.,1961).pp.26-29.
^ of Pakistan Debates, 11:1 (February 24,
4.InterviewwithAbulMansurAhmedonJune3,1970,
34 TheBangladeshRevolutionandItsAftermath
5MRasliiduzzaman, “The Awanii Leagueinin Political Development
—
in Pakistan u, îtoiSHrve:r,X:7(Julyl970),p.581.
»
6. Interview withAbulMansurAhmed,Vice-Presidentandideologue
of the EPAML, 1950-54,on June 30,1970.
7Forthefulltextofthe21-pointprogrammeoftheUnitedFront
Partysee
Appendix1inTalukderManiruzzaman,TItePoliticsof
Development ;The Case of
Pakistan,
1947-1958,
(Dacca;
Green
Book
DSed*Îlectk)n
8 results
were
published
Azad
in(Dacca),
March
sLûshtaq
9. Ahmad,
Government andPolitics
Pakistan
in (Karachi,
Pakistan Publishing House, 1959), p. 173.
10 The Daily Ittefaq (Dacca), February 15, 1966.
n.
LmSarised
from
Sheik
Mujibur
Rahman,
Six-Point
Fornmla;
OurRighttoLivemcca:EastPakistanAwamiLeaê,1966).
12.Thenumberofpersonskilledwasgivenas13inthe
PressNoteissuedonJune8,1966.AccordingtoALleaders,at
least 100 persons were killed on that day.
13.ForthefulltextofPresidentAyub’sSpeechatthefinalsession
ofthePakistanMuslimLeague(conventiongrou^p)atDaccaon
March20,1966,seeTheIttefaq(Dacca),March21,1966.Tomd-
catetheseriousnessofhisintention,PresidentAyubcametotne
councilsessionattiredinGeneral’sdresswithmedafiionson.
14.SeeThePakistanObserver{Dacca),February24,1969.
IS.IntervewwithDr.JavcdIqbal,aCouncilMuslimLeagueLeader
in the Punjab, on November 19,1969. n .
16.SeethetextoftheLegalFrameworkOrderpublishedinDayn
(Karachi), March 30, 1970.
17 .InterviewwithSheikhMujiburRahmanonJuly231969.Yetat
thesametimeSheikhMujibwasquiteclearthatifhecouldwin
all the seats in East Bengal the power elite West Pakistan
Would not agree to constitutional
. . separation
. of EastwBengal
ith the
from West Pakistan. Sheikh Mujib ended the interview
statement;“Inanycase,theemancipationofEastBengalcannot
be secured without the blood of Sheikh Mujib.^j, ,
18. For the fulltext of the Awami League Manifesto see
Documents(Madras.TheBNKPress,1971),pp.66-82.
19. Ibid.,pp.6i-69.
20. Ibid.,p.n.
2 1 . I b i d „ V- ' n -
22. Ibid.,w-1^-16.
23. Ibid., p. 61.
24. Ibid..p.6S.
25. Ibid., p. Si.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. According to Obaidur Rahman, Social, Cultural, Relief and
Rehabilitation Secretary of the EPAL, 1969-70, about 200 people
contributed regularly to the AL party fund with donations
varying from Rs. 10 to Rs. 200 per month. Average totalI c o n t r i -
butions to AL funds per month was about Rs. 10,000, About
60,000-70,000 rupees were spent on the legal defence of Sheikh
Mu4ib and others in the “Agartala Conspiracy Case, T h e w h o l e
amount came as donations from AL supporters, including s o m e
high-ranking government officers. Interview with Obaidur

Rahman on 20 July, 1970.
29.ThepercentageofvotessecuredbytheMuslimLeagueinthe
1954electionsisderivedfromtheconstituency-wiseresultspub¬
lished in the Azad (Dacca), March 15-25, 1954.
30.InterviewwithChaudhriRahmatAli,Secretary-General,Jamaat-
i-Islami, Pakistan, on November 19,1969.
31.KhalidBinSayeed,T/iePoliticalSystemofPakistan, (Boston,
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967) p. 218.
32.InterviewwithAbdulKhaleque,GeneralSecretary, Jamaat-i-
Islami, East Bengal, on July 18, 1969.
33.GhulamAzam,4GuidetotheIslamicMovement(Dacca: Azmi
Publications, 1968), pp. 46-50.
34. Holiday (Dacca), November 9, 1969.
CHAPTER III
REGIONAL POLITICS AND THE LEFT IN

EAST BENGAL*
PerhapsthemostremarkablefeatureofpoliticsinEastBengal
since1947isthewayinwhichdebatehasbeendominatedby
leftist rhetoric and ideology. This is all the more striking when
oneconsiderstheratherweakbasewithwhichtheleftistsstarted
in1947.1Beforeproceedingtoananalysisofthegrowthofthe
organisations
that
spurred
the
liberation
struggle
in
Bangladesh,
therefore,itisessentialtotracethegrowthofthelargenumber
ofsmall,segmentedandintenselycommittedleftistgroupsthat
sprangintobeingduringtheperiodofaunitedPakistan.Ina
laterdiscussion(seeChapters8and9)anattemptwillbemade
to trace out the legacy of the Bengal left for contemporary
Bangladesh.
The Growth of the Bengali Left

In 1947 there was one leftist ideological platform in East
Bengal,
that
provided
by
former
members
and
sympathisers
of
the Communist Party of India (CPI), who had chosen to remain
in East Bengal. Indian CP leaders estimate that more than
10,000membersoftheCPIwereinitiallyresidentinEastBengal
afterthepartitionof1947,butthe1950sthenumberdecreased
to afew hundred.^
In1948-51,thesmallCommunistPartyinEastBengal(form¬
allycalledtheEastPakistanCommunistPartyEPCP)fomented
peasantrevoltsamongtheElazongpeasantsincertainareasof
the district of Mymensingh and among the Santal tribals in
Rajshahidistrict.Thegovernmenteffectivelythwartedthese
Communist-leduprisingsandarrestedmostoftheCommunists.®
By1954theCommunistPartyhadbeenbannedthroughout
Regional Politics and the Left in East Bengal 37
Pakistan, The EPCP however continued to exist as an undergr¬
ound party.
The Comiiiform, in early 1951 (in apolitical note published
in its organ, For aLasting Peace, for aPeoples’’ Democracy),
praised the role of the Awami League in “unleashing astruggle
against feudalism and colonial domination” and the EPCP
took this as ahint by the Cominform that the party should
work through the Awami League and other popular front
organisations.*
The first front organisation started by the Communists in
East Pakistan was the Youth League, formed in 1951. The
Youth League stimulated or actively supported various
movements against the Muslim League government, the most
important being that for the adoption of Bengali as one of the
state languages of Pakistan. Indeed, the Action Committee of the
State Language movement of 1952 had four Youth Leaguers
outofatotalof12membersandaCalcuttanewspaper{Swadh-
inata) claimed in its issue of March 11, 1952, that the state
language movement in East Bengal was being led primarily by
Communists.
Charges concerning Communist influence in the state lang¬

uage movement gave the Muslim League government an excuse
to arrest the members of the Action Committee and the
Youth League in early 1952. By March, three-fourths of the
members of the Executive Committee of the Youth League had
been arrested.^ In April 1952 the remaining Youth League lea¬
ders organised astudent front, the East Pakistan Students Union
(EPSU), with non-communalism, secularism and anti-imperialism
as its main planks.® This gradually became one of the largest
student organisations in East Bengal and has since functioned
as the main channel of recruitment for leftist cadres.
The Communists who joined the Awami League in 1952 began
to consolidate their position by working through its President
Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani. Born of an obscure
peasantfamily,Bhashanihadreceivedonlymadrassh(Islamicre¬
ligious school) education. He had acquired political fame by lead¬
ing peasant agitations against the oppressive Hindu zamindars
in the districts of Mymensingh, Pabna and Rajshahi in the early
1920s. Bengali Hindu landlords had at the time managed to get
Maulana Bhashani externed from Bengal on the pretext of preser¬
ving peace in the Province, but the Maulana had then moved
to Assam and settled in achar (silted islet of ariver) named
Bhashan.’ He took up the cause of Bengali immigrants to Assam
and started an agitation against the Assam government’s refusal
t o admit them. When the Assam government finally amended
its legislation and allowed 250,000 Bengali peasants to settle
i n Assam, Bhashani became afolk hero.
Although Bhashani had never read Marxist literature, his
life-long work among the peasants had given him an insight into
the nature of both the class struggle and forces of imperialism.
When,afterpartition,MaulanaBhashanimovedtoEastBengal
and became the President of the East Pakistan Awami Muslim
League, the Communists and their fellow travellers found in
him anatural sympathiser and ally. As President, Bhashani had
thepowertonominatememberstotheExecutiveCommittee.
Through him the leftists gained 9of the 37 places on the Execu¬
tive Committee of the EPAML and continued to exert consider¬
able influence on the overall policy decisions of the party. As
stated earlier,® the leftists pressed for the adoption of asecular
approach by the party. With the result that during the 1953
Council session the word® Muslim “was dropped from its
n a m e .The leftists also succeeded in getting official resolutions
passedbytheExecutiveCommitteeofEPMLcondemningthe
Defence Pacts and DefenceAssistanceAgreement. Imperialism
and autonomyquicklybecamedominantthemesinthepolitical
speeches of Maulana Bhashani.
NAP :The anti-imperialist Popular Front
As we have seen,® the leftists in the AL became dissadsfied
when Suhrawardy, after his appointment as Prime Minister
of Pakistan, began to defend vigorously Pakistan’s alliances
with the West and to oppose the granting of full autonomy
to East Bengal. Goaded by the leftists, Maulana Bhashani
took the issue to the EPAL Council and the Council approved
Suhrawardy’s pro-Western foreign policy. 1® At this point
MaulanaBhashahitogetherwiththenineleftistmembersofthe
Executive Committee, resigned from the Awami League.
After his resignation, Maulana Bhashani organised acon¬
vention of “anti-imperialist democratic forces’ of Pakistan in
kegional Politics and the Left in East Bengal 39
Dacca in September 1957. The leftists of East Bengal, some
Pathan, Baluch and Sindhi nationalists and afew leftist leaders
of the Punjab joined the convention. The National Awami
Party (NAP) was formed, its main platform planks being anti¬
imperialism, anti-feudalism, and the right of self-determination
for the various linguistic nationalities of Pakistan. Maulana
Bhashani was made the President of both the national and East
Bengal units of the new party. During the course of the next
decade some of the top leaders of the EPCP became members
of the Executive Committee of the East Pakistan National Awa¬
mi Party (EPNAP), and EPNAP became the exclusive popular
front of the EPCP.
The Split in EPCP and the Break-up of EPNAP

Ayub’s Martial Law regime of 1958 unleashed anew wave of
repression on the leftists. All political parties were banned.
Maulana Bhashani was arrested, and warrants of arrest were
issued against alarge number of leftist leaders and workers.
Some were eventually arrested while others went underground.
Maulana Bhashani was not released until November 3, 1962.
Goaded by the underground Communists, Bhashani then moved
in the direction of arevived political party, despite Suhra-
wardy’s call for non-revival of political parties until “the re¬
storation of full democracy.” However, it was not until Febru¬
ary 1964 that NAP and other left front organisations were
fully revived.
But by 1964 left unity was under strains. Differences emer¬
ged following the split of the international Communist move¬
ment as well as in relation to the foreign policy of the Pakistan
government and the internal political movement of all East
Bengal for full autonomy. Two membrs of the Central Commi¬
ttee of the EPCP became critical of the decisions of the Twen¬
tieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party held in February
1956 which advocated peaceful co-existence of the two world
systems (capitalism and socialism) and admitted the possibility
of adopting different roads to socialism in different countries.i^
On the other hand, 9members of the Central Committee justified
the decisions of the Soviet Party in the context of present re¬
alities of the world and charged two other members with echo-
ing the “non-creative” line adopted recently by the Chinese

Communist Party. The pro-Chinese Communists finally left the
EPCP and formed the East Pakistan Communist Party Marxist-
Leninist (EPCPML) in 1966, abreak which was soon followed
by splits in the communists front organisations both student
(EPSU) and popular (EPNAP).>3 The EPCPML later split into
different groups each forming aseparate communist party. The
continuous splits in the communist movement in East Bengal
are shown in Diagram 1.
Diagram 1
SPLITS IN EAST BENGAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT 1948-1970
EPCP
1948-1965
EPCP (pro-Soviet) EPCP-ML (pro-Chinese)

1966
EPCP (ML) EBCP CCCR EBWM

1970 1970 1970 1 9 7 0
After the first split in 1966, the pro-Chinese faction of

EPNAP held its party Council session at Rangpur in November
1667, under the Chairmanship of Maulana Bhashani, while
the pro-Soviet faction boycotted the Rangpur session and
held aseparate council session at Dacca in December 1967.
The factions differed in their analyses of the Pakistan political
situation and their tactical lines for bringing about socialism in
Pakistan. The pro-Peking group argued that Pakistan’s free¬
dom was fettered by imperialist control over the economy of
Pakistan. Colonialism, they argued, had simply been replaced
by amore subtle form of imperialism. The Defence Assistance
Agreement and other Defence Pacts formed with the American
imperialists had turned independence into afarce. Through in¬
terest-laden loans, the U.S. imperialists were further exploiting
the masses of Pakistan. To maintain their hegemony, U.S. im¬
perialists had been preventing the establishment of apeople’s
democracy which could take measures to create aself-reliant,
independent country with its own foreign policy. This in turn
had prevented the emergence of government that could force
the imperialists to forfeit foreign capital and liquidate big
business and feudalism.^*
Foreign policy became the key factor in determining the atti¬
tude of the pro-Peking NAP towards the Ayub government.
After the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, President Ayub Khan
sought closer alliance with the Chinese Government and began
to woo Bhashani’s pro-Peking faction of NAP with some succ¬
ess. During the Indo-Pak war in September 1965, the pro-Peking
leftists argued that the war was the result of the machinations
of the American imperialists who wanted to topple the pro-Pek¬
ing Ayub government and replace it with apro-American
government.
In 1964 all opposition parties (including NAP) had formed

an electoral alliance—the Combined Opposition Parties (COP)—
which then nominated Miss Fatima Jinnah as its Presidential
candidate to oppose Ayub. However, as the election campaign
developed, the pro-Peking leftists withdrew support from Miss
Jinnah and began to work for Ayub, on the ground that if COP
(which included such rightist parties as the Jamaat-i-lslami, the
Awami League and the Council Muslim League) were to win
the elections, the government formed would again be under the
hegemony of the American imperialists.
The principal leader of the opposition in East Pakistan after
the 1965 Indo-Pak war was, of course. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,
the President of the East Pakistan Awami League. While Mu-
jib quickly captured the centre of the East Bengal political stage
by launching amovement for autonomy, the pro-Peking leftists
stayed away from his ‘‘six-point revolution”. They argued
that the six-point programme did not reflect the aspirations of
the workers, peasants and lower middle classes. The vacillating
leadership of the AL, coming as it did from the bourgeois and
petty bourgeois classes, was seen by NAP essentially as com¬
promise with the international imperialist forces led by the
United States. The struggle for autonomy, according to NAP,
could not be separated from the overall fight against imperia¬
lism.
While pro-Moscow leftists did not disagree with the view

that American imperialism was the main enemy of the masses
of Pakistan, they did not agree with the pro-Peking leftists
that Ayub Khan’s foreign policy was anti-imherialist. The Ayub
government had not quit the American sponsored SEATO and
Banghdad pacts; Pakistan’s Defence Assistance Agreement with
America was still in effect, government development plans
were still dependent on American economic aid; monopoly
capitalism and feudalism—the main agents of the international
imperialists—continued to thrive under the patronage of the
Ayub government. What was first necessary, they argued, was the
replacement of the Ayub government by an anti-imperialist,
anti-monopoly capitalist and anti-feudal democratic govern¬
ment. Only a“national democratic government” that followed
“the road of noncapitalist development” could ultimately pave
the way for socialism in Pakistan, according to the pro-Moscow
left.15 In order to obtain a“national democratic government”
it was first necessary to establish aunited movement of various
democratic parties on aminimum programme of restoration of
parliamentary democracy and provincial autonomy. The pro-
Moscow leftists, therefore, advocated amass movement against
the Ayub government, in cooperation with the Awami League.
Leadership of the pro-Moscow and pro-Peking Parties, 1967-68
Until the split in 1966 the underground EPCP was led by Moni
Singh. Born at the turn of the century, Moni Singh came of a
Hindu zamindar family from Mymensingh district in Bangladesh.
Quite early in life he renounced his family property and joined
the CPI. After 1951 he was the Secretary General of EPCP
and worked underground for sixteen years, until he was arrested
on November 10, 1967. Moni Singh, together with anumber
of other comrades of his age group (all former members of the
CPI), continued until 1970 to publish ajournal called Flame,
under the most difficult circumstances.'® Through this journal
and party meetings, Moni Singh and his comrades tried at first
to persuade the pro-Peking communists not to divide the EP-
CP and its front organisations. But the pro-Peking leftists,
under the leadership of Sukhendu Dastidar, proved adamant.
They forced asplit in the organisation and formed aseparate
underground Communist Party (EPCPML) in 1966.1 7
The leftists affiliated to the two underground communist
parties, and some of the communists themselves, worked through
their front oganisations—the two NAPs. The demographic
characteristics of EPNAP party elites (members of the Executive
Committees of the East Pakistan parties and those members
of the Executive Committees of the All-Pakistan parties who
were elected from East Pakistan), given in Table 4, give us a
rough idea about the type of people who were in the leadership
of the two streams of leftists movement in East Bengal.
Acomparison indicates that the number of Hindu leftists
was higher among the pro-Moscow party leadership. In addition,
pro-Moscow party leaders were generally older while leaders
** of the pro-Peking party were better educated. However the
professional backgrounds of the two groups of leaders indicate
common middle-class backgrounds.
Factionalism and Doctrinal Disputes Among

the Pro-Peking Leftists
After their split the pro-Peking leftists, the pro-Moscow leftists
began working on the thesis that, with the international influ¬
ence of the socialist countries and through the possibility of
the growth of anational democratic system, socialism could
be achieved peacefully through the parliamentary road in East
Bengal. They believed that real strength of the leftists “springs
not from the barrel of the gun but from the revolutionary
consciousness and unity of the working people.”'® Revolutionary
awareness on the part of the suffering people could be aroused
through electioneering and parliamentary politics. Hence, their
participation in the elections held on December 7, 1970. On the
basis of their tactical line of forming an “anti-imperialist national
democratic government” as aprelude to transition to the soci-
Ta b l e 4
D E M O G R A P H I C C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F T H E PA R T Y E L I T E O F
THE PRO-MOSCOW AND PRO-PEKING EPNAP (JANUARY 1968)
Pro-Moscow NAP Pro-Peking NAP
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Age
6 15 1 3
More than 60
50-60 5 13 2 6
17 43 16 54
40-50
12 30 11 37
Less than 40
To t a l s 40 100 30 100
Education
At least B.A. 28 70 25 84
Entered College 5 13 3 10
No College 7 17 2 6
To t a l s 40 100 3 0 100
Religion
Muslim 36 90 29 97
Hindu 4 10 1 3
To t a l s 40 100 3 0 100
Profession
Lawyer 11 28 10 33
Businessman 6 15 3 10
Journalist &
Litterateur 3 6 4 14
Pir (religious man) 1 3

Trade union worker 3 8 4 14
Peasant leader 5 12 5 17
Doctor 1 3 1 3
Professor and tea¬
cher 9 23 2 6
Service in private
fi r m 2 5
Tc t a l s 4 0 100 30 ILO
Source : For the pro-Moscov/ EPNAP: Bazlur Rahman, Publicity

Secretary, Pro-Moscow EPNAP and Assistant Editor, The
Sangbad (Dacca), apro-Moscow daily. For the pro-Peking
EPNAP ;K.G. Mustafa, Sub-Editor, The Pakistan Observer
(Dacca) and amember of EPCPML. Assistance was also ren¬
dered by Abdul Karim, member of the Executive Commi¬
ttee, pro-Peking NAP.
alist system, the pro-Moscow NAP advocated an electoral allia¬

nce of all leftist forces and secular democratic parties, though
neither the pro-Peking leftists nor the AL paid any heed to
them.
The pro-Peking leftists were during the same period faced

with an almost interminable factionalism revolving around
varying analyses of revolutionary tactics. In what was gene¬
rally regarded as their relative order of strength, the four
groups (see Diagram 1above) could be listed as follows :1)
The East Pakistan Communist Party, Marxist-Leninist (EPC-
PML); 2) the. East Bengal Communist Party (EBCP) :3) the
Co-ordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (CC-
CR), and 4) the East Bengal Workers Movement (EBWM).
1. The EP CP ML saw the economic system of East Pakist¬
an as semi-feudal and semi-colonial in character. The British
had strengthened both the position of Pakistan’s feudal elements
and an indigenous capitalist class as props to imperialist rule.^®
This system could be supplanted only through a“people’s
democratic revolution’’ to be led by an alliance of landless
peasants (33 per cent of the agricultural population) and
small landholders (37 per cent of the agricultural population).
The conflict between these two large sectors of the populace
on the one hand, and the big landholders and moneylenders
on the other was highlighted in EPCPML literature as the main
contradiction of the society. Revolution, under the banner of
the EPCPML, was the only means to bring an end to the contra¬
diction. Because of the practical impossibility of organising
peasant revolutions simultaneously in both East and West
Pakistan under the direction of aclandestine Communist Party,
the EPCPML argued that revolution would have to be planned
in one wing at atime, beginning with East Bengal.2 0
2. The East Bengal Communist Party {EBCP) viewed
its programme as adirect counterthesis to that of the EPCPML
arguing that Pakistan was abourgeois state with acapitalist
economy. The main impact of British rule had been the decay
of Indian feudalism rather than its preservation. The EBCP
acknowledged that the British had created aclass of land¬
lords through the Permanent Settlement of 1793, but this
class of landlords had become mere rent collectors, while
the British had protected the rights of some peasants through
aseries of legislative enactments. Besides, modern com¬
munications had introduced the commodities produced by
the peasants into international capitalist markets, making
the peasants more commercially oriented. With the decay of
the feudal system, an indigenous, mainly Hindu bourgeois
class had grown up in India and this class, unable to flourish
rapidly due to the restrictions imposed upon it by the British,
had spearheaded the independence movement. Since the
weaker Muslim bourgeoisie was fearful being of absorbed
by the Hindu bourgeoisie, aseparate state of Pakistan had to
be created in 1947. Thus, the establishment to Pakistan was
itself abourgeois revolution. However, soon after the esta¬
blishment of Pakistan, contradictions arose between the larger
and stronger bourgeoisie of West Pakistan and the smaller and
weaker bourgeoisie of East Bengal. The latter were now trying
to separate from West Pakistan by exploiting the frustration
of the masses in East Bengal. The only course of salvation
for East Bengal, therefore, was to secure its independence under
the leadership of the workers (Communist) party, with the
active assistance of the peasant proletariat through a‘‘ People’s
democratic revolution.”^!
3. The CCCR. As aresult of dissatisfaction with the pers¬
onal bickerings of the leaders of the EPCPML and the EBCP,
some of the younger leftist cadres (mostly in their early thirties
and late twenties) revolted against the older leadership in both
parties and formed separate communist parties in the late 1960s.
One such group—the Coordination Com.mittee of Communist
Revolutionaries (CCCR)— was led by university pro-Chinese
students, almost all from upper middle-class family backgrounds.
As aresult of avariety of activities, the CCCR had come to
control the majority of the labour force in the Tongi industrial
area near the capital city of Dacca, and from this base they
tried to lead an unsuccessful revolt against both the EPCPML
and the EBCP in late 1969. They argued that Pakistan as a
whole was a“semi-capitalist, semi-feudal, and semi-colonial
country”, but that indigenous monopoly capitalism, mainly
based in West Pakistan, in collaboration with international
imperialist forces, accounted for the exploitation of the masses
of East Bengal. In East Bengal itself the main contradiction was

between the landless and lower class peasants on the one hand
and feudal elements on the other. For the CCCR, revolution
in East Bengal would take the shape of apeasant revolution,
but it would also involve the separation of East Bengal from
West Pakistan-23
4. The EBWM, asecond group of young communists, led

by a30-year-old engineer, Siraj Sikdar, first became established
in the late 1960s around the ‘‘Mao Research Centre” in Dacca,
eventually becoming an underground political party. For them
the main contradiction in Pakistan was the conflict between
the ruling clique of West Pakistan and the colonially exploited
people of East Bengal, and revolution in East Bengal had to
come through arevolution for national independence. By presen¬
ting various theses about whether the country was semi-feudal
and semi-colonial or capitalistic or semi-capitalistic, the other
“socalled” pro-Peking Communist groups were denying the funda¬
mental contradiction in Pakistan—the colonial exploitation
of East Bengal by West Pakistan. The EBWM’s goal, therefore,
was to bring about, first, the secession of East Bengal through
armed rebellion by apeople’s militia, then the revolution to
establish a“people’s democracy in asovereign East Bengal.”23
The splintering of so many communist parties among the
pro-Chinese leftists and their mutual recriminations and vilificat¬
ions ma,de it impossible for them to maintain acommon popu¬
lar front. Maulana Bhashani who had for so long been the
non-Marxist leader of the revolutionary Marxists, had neither
the intellectual sophistication to weave together the diver¬
gent views of the various leftist groups into acoherent doctrine
nor the training to lead atruly revolutionary party. By 1970 he
had outlived his usefulness for the communist revolutionaries.
However, Bhashani’s intuition and feeling for the oppressed
saved him from political death. After the devastating cyclones
of November 1970, when East Pakistan was left uncared for
both by the Pakistan Government and the political elites of
West Pakistan. Bhashani was quick to seize the opportunity
for demanding on December 4. 1970 complete independence of
East Pakistan.
To sum up our discussion thus far by 1969-70 the leftist
movement in East Pakistan had moved along way ahead of its
poor start in 1947-48. Through the use of techniques employed
by leftists in all underdeveloped countries—cultural sub¬
version, infiltration of popular political organisations, mani¬
pulation of sensitive issues of language, autonomy and
economic distress, and anti-imperialist agitation—the leftists
in East Bengal achieved amajor change in the political at¬
mosphere, making it favourable for secular and radical politics.
Taking advantage of the shift in the foreign policy by the Ayub
government towards Communist China, they stepped up their
propaganda among the impressionable younger generation.
All this radicalised East Bengal politics and increased the
number of activists. While in 1947-48 the number of members
of the EPCP was only afew hundred, it reportedly rose to about
3,000 in 1966, before the first split. Moreover, while the over¬
whelming majority of the cadres in the early years were from
the minority Hindu community, Muslim cadres were reported
to account for more than 90 per cent of the me.mbershlp of the
communist parties of East Bengal in 1970.-*
However, the leftists support was limited to sections of the
intelligentsia—students, lawyers and journalists. Except for afew
pockets, they had no support among the industrial workers and
peasants whose interests they claimed to uphold. The urban
workers of East Bengal v/ere not the rootless and alienated
proletariat of the Marxist conception. Urban workers continued
to maintain their ties with the rural areas and, being compara¬
tively rich than the village poor, strengthened their links by
buying houses and/or land in their home areas. The stakes thus
developed prevented the majority of the workers from joining
the revolutionary communist movement. For protection and
identity urban workers formed primordial groups on the
basis of the localities from which they came. The leftists failure
in the rural areas was due to the fact that exploitation of
landless and lower class peasants was not so visible and inhuman
as it had been in Russia and China before the communist
revolutions. The legislation ensuring the right of ownership of
land to tenants, enacted the last days of the British rule (espec¬
ially during the Ministry of A. K. Fazlul Huq, 1937-1942) and
the abolition of the Zam/nJan system in East Bengal in 1951,
had removed the more glaring inequalities in rural areas.
The inability of leftists to mobilise support among -workers
and peasants caused their prospect of capturing political power
to fade. They started to think that theoretical inadequacies were
responsible for their failure. Thus arose the doctrinal controve¬
rsies which fragmented the leftist movement. Moreover, the
idealistic young men who joined the leftist movement took
Marxism as areligious faith. As it happens with interpreters of
religion, differing interpretations of Marxism, often on the finest
distinctions or minutest detail, led to mutual accusations of
heresy and fragmentation by splits. Lastly, the very fact that
many communists had to work underground, and that some of
them were occasionally ferreted out by government security for¬
ces led to an attitude of suspicion among them and further
exacerbated factionalism.
But the erosion of unity among the leftists was not the only
factor weakening the leftist cause in East Bengal. Engaged ni
theoretical hair-splitting, the revolutionaries, while thrashing
out tactical moves, failed at first to take into consideration
the force of Bengali nationalism, in the mid-1960s the pro-
Peking communists, by siding with the Ayub government o n
the basis of his pro-Chinese stance in foreign policy and
opposing the six-point autonomy movement, gave the leadership
of East Bengal’s “anti-colonial movement” to the Awami League.
The Pro-Moscow leftists, after their break with the pro-Peking
leftists, lent their support to the six-point autonomy programme,
but they were not able to snatch the leadership of the Bengali
nationalist movement from the AL.
NOTES
This chapter is based on parts of my earlier work “Radical Politics

and the Emergence of Bangladesh” in P.R. Brass and M.F.
Franda, RmUcal Politics in South Asia (Cambridge, The MIT Press
1973) pp. 223-277.
1.
The term “leftists” in the chapter is deliberately defined quite
loosely, primarily because that was the way one had to define the
terra in Bangladesh before liberation. Since Communist member¬
ship was illegal in Bangladesh from 1954 until the liberation of
1971, most communists preferred to be called simply “leftists”,
which meant that it was extremely difficult to distinguish degrees
of “leftism” in public discourse. As is pointed out below, however,
the “leftist movement” in Bangladesh had its roots in the Commu¬
nist movement.
2. For amore detailed study of Communist membership in East Pak¬

istan see Marcus F. Franda, “Communism and Regional Politics
in East Pakistan”, Asian Survey, X:7(JuIy, 1970), pp. 588-606.
3. Agovernment account of the 1948-51 Communist insurrection in
East Pakistan is contained in Proceedings of the East Pakistan
Assembly, XVI: 3(1957), pp. 155-160.
4. This incident is analysed in K.G. Mustafa, “Awami League Mani¬
festo: Hopes and Realities” Holiday (Dacca Weekly), June 14,
1970. p. 2.
5. These are the figures quoted by Prime Minister Nurul Amin in

the East Bengal Legislative Assembly on March 24, 1952. Seethe
Proceedings of the East Bengal Legislative Assembly,Nlll: 3(March
1952) pp. 6-14.
6. The formation of the EPSU is described in Annual Report of

General Secretary in the Provincial Convention of the EPSU held on
June 2, 3, 4, (1966), pp. 6-7.
7. It was from this word that Maulana Abdul Hamid received his
popular name Bhashani.
8. See Chapter II, p. 21.
9. See Chapter II, p. 22.
10. See The Times (London), June 15, 1957.
11. For details of the formal programme of NAP, see M. Rashiduzzman,
“The National Awami Party: Leftist politics in Crisis”, Pacific
Affairs, XLIII: 3(Fall, 1970), p. 395. Rashiduzzaman, however,
fails to discuss how the underground communist party in East
B e n g a l u s e d N A P a s a p r o x y.
12. See “Two Principles” thesis (formally titled “Two Principles of the
World Communist Movement”) written by Sukhendu Dastidar
and Mohammad Toaha, under the aliases “Khaled”and “Bashir”,
Acopy of the thesis (publisher and date not mentioned) is available
f r o m t h e a u t h o r.
13. Both factions of NAP claimed the original names of the party, so
journalists and politicians simply referred to the two factions
as pro-Chinese and pro-Moscow. These are the names used
below.
14. This description of the pro-Peking NAP tactical line is based on

the Presidential Address of Maulana Bhashani at the Special EPNAP
Council Session at Rangpur on November 30,1967 (Dacca: Sultan,
Captan Bazar, 1968), pp. 11-20.
15. For more detailed descriptions of the pro-Moscow NAP tactical
line, see the speeches of Professor Muzaffar Ahmed and Mohi-
uddin Ahmed at the NAP Council session held at Dacca on Decem¬
ber 17, 1967,pp. i, 4,7,16. The thesis of these pro-Moscow leaders

obviously follows the concept of “national democratic revolu¬
tion” as advocated by the Soviet Union after 1965. See World
Revolutionary Movement and the Working Class (Moscow; Progress
Publishers, 1967) pp. 331-372.
16. Flame was the official underground journal of the EPCP until the
split in 1966.
17. Dastidar is descended from aprominent middle-class Hindu family
of Chittagong District. He was connected with the famous Chitta¬
gong Armoury Raid in 1930 and was given asentence of trans¬
portation for life by the British for his participation in the Chitta¬
gong raid. However, his sentence was commuted in 1946 by the
Suhrawardy Ministry of the united Bengal Province.
18. Adiscussion of the secession issue, as viewed by various Com¬
munist factions in 1969, appeared in Hatiar (Weapon) 1;23 (Sep¬
tember 19, 1969). Hatiar was the official weekly underground
o r g a n o f a f a c t i o n o f E P C P.
19. The principal theoretical statement of the EPCPML is Abdul Huq,

East Bengal: Semi-Feudal and Semi-Colonial. (Dacca: Syed Zafar,
Captan Bazar,1 968).
20. See Abdul Huq, “Colonial Theory and Democratic Movement”,
Ganashakti (Weekly), March 29,1970.
21. EBCP theoretical positions are spelled out in The Character of the
National Economy: Capitalistic by Abdul Samad, Hasan Ali Mollah,
Alauddin Ahmed, and Abdul Matin (Sirajganj :Tamizul Islam,
1967). The four authors of this book were all prominent leaders in
t h e E B C P.
22. For the CCCR programme see Haider Akbar Khan, The Main
Features of Imperialism, (Dacca, Jagrati Prakashani, n.d.).
23. See Programme for Establishing aSovereign, Democratic, Progres¬
sive Republic of East Bengal (Dacca, East Bengal Workers Move¬
ment n.d.).
24. These approximate figures were quoted to the author by aleader
of the EPCM (ML).
CHAPTER IV
STUDENT POLITICS AND MASS

U P H E AVA L
In no country in the world was student political activism in

the 1950s and 1960s of greater intensity, continuity and c o n -
cern than in Bangladeshi One main reason for this has to do

with the historical fact that the Muslim middle-classes in British
India were disproportionately smaller than their Hindu counter¬
parts. Lacking large numbers of potential party cadres, Mus¬
lim political leaders in pre-1947 India came to depend on stu¬
dents for work to mobilise the Muslim masses, to adegree that
was not characteristic of the predominantly Hindu Indian Na¬
tional Congress. Use of students as party cadres was also more
necessary in Bengal than in other Muslim majority provinces,
primarily because there the main politically relevant sections—
lawyers, doctors, businessmen and landlords—were almost
entirely dominated by Hindus.
The intenstiy of student political activities that provide much
of the dynamism for the Bangladesh liberation struggle resulted
in part from the existence of awidespread network of student
political organisations and along tradition of student politics.
Student sentiment against Pakistan was galvanised during the
state language movement of 1948 onwards. Such sentiment
was maintained during succeeding repressive anti-student cam¬
paigns undertaken by the Government of Pakistan. In this chap¬
ter an attempt will be made to provide the background to this
organised student activity and to analyse the catalytic role of
the state language movement in ci'eating conditions for mass
upheaval.
The Organisation of Student Politics and the COA
As pointed out in aprevious Chapter, ^soon after partition
student workers of the Muslim League became deeply frustra-
ted by the policies pursued by the rulers of Pakistan and they
formed the East Pakistan Muslim Students League (EPMSL).
By the beginning of February 1948 the EPMSL launched a
movement for the recognition of Bengali as one of the state
languages of Pakistan. ACombined Committee of Action (COA)
was formed, with representatives of EPMSL, Tamuddun Majlis,^
and Student Unions of the different Halls of Dacca University
represented on it. The Committee organised strikes in Dacca
University and other educational institutions in the province.
To appease the students, Khwaja Nazimuddin, the Prime Mini¬
ster of East Bengal, promised in writing that in the first week
of April 1948 aspecial motion would be moved in the East
Bengal Legislative Assembly recommending that Bengali be one
of the State languages and be given the same status as Urdu in
the Pakistan Assembly and in central government examinations.^
Despite the agreement signed between the Prime Minister
and the COA, the militant section of the students continued
its protest, the rationale for this being that should movements
of protest subside, the government would retract its pledges.
As the agitation continued, governmental leaders of East Bengal
persuaded Jinnah to come in person to pacify the students. Jin-
nah met the COA on March 17 and for four days he threatened,
cajoled and argued with its members. But the militants in the
Committee remained adamant about the need for speedy imp¬
lementation of the Nazimuddin-COA agreement. Jinnah then
characterised the movement as being inspired by “communists
and other agents financed by foreign help” and warned that the
movement would be “ruthlessly” crushed.®
Later, on March 24, while speaking at the Convocation of
Dacca University, Jinnah stated that “the state Language
of Pakistan should be Urdu and cannot be any other”'. At this
meeting alarge section of the students raised their voices in
protest. Failing to soothe the tempers of the students, Jinnah
sought to weaken the agitation by depriving it of some of its
supporters in the provincial legislature. Mohammad Ali was
sent to Burma as ambassador, Tofazzal Ali was taken into the
provincial cabinet, and Dr. A. M. Malik was given apost in
the central cabinet.
Student Politics and Mass Upheaval 55
Jinnah was reported to have rebuked Nazirauddin for
agreeing with CO Ato move aresolution in the East Bengal
Assembly, recommending adoption of Bengali as one of the
state languages of Pakistan. In any event the official resolution
moved by Nazimuddin and approved in the East Bengal legislat¬
ure on April 8, 1948 stated :
“Bengali shall be adopted as the official language for
replacing English in the Province of East Bengal, and it
will be implemented as soon as the practical difficulties are
removed.”<>
This fell far short of the promise in Nazimuddin’s agreement

with the students.
The State Language Movement of 1952

Attempts by the government to meet the demands of students
halfway, while winning over, through patronage, student suppor¬
ters, in the provincial assembly, gained some respite for those
dealing with the issue. In early 1951, Dacca university students
belonging to the Youth League’ took the initiative in organising
the “Dacca University State Language Committee of Action.”
The Committee first submitted amemorandum to members of
the Constituent Assembly urging them to decide the state lan¬
guage issue once and for all.
This memorandum brought asharp reaction from the
central government. Nazimuddin, now the Prime Minister of
Pakistan, declared January 26, 1952 in apublic meeting at
Paltan Maidan, Dacca that Urdu alone would be the state
language in Pakistan. Within afew days the Dacca University
State Language Committee organised aprotest strike and
convened an all party conference on January 30. They elected
aCommittee of Action, with Kazi Golam Mahboob as convener
and Maulana Bhashani as chairman, and with two representa¬
tives from each of the following organisations—the Awami
League, Students League, Youth League, Khilafat-e-Rabbani
Party (a small Islamic party), and the Dacca University State
Language Committee of Action. The All-Party Committee of
Action decided to observe February 21 as State Language
Day all over the province, and to organise on this day strikes,
demonstrations and public meetings.
At 6p. m. on February 20 an order under Section 144 of the
Criminal Procedure Code was promulgated. This order,
prohibiting processions and meetings in Dacca city, generated
tension and resentment among the students. The AL members
of the All-Party Comm ittee of Action argued that violation of
Section 144 would provide the government with an excuse to
suppress the movement by foixe and the crisis thus created wou¬
ld be used as plea to postpone the impending elections. But the
leftist student leaders of Dacca University decided to pursue
ahard line. At ameeting held at noon on the campus of the
University, these student leaders were able to excite the stude¬
nts to violate Section 144 and stage ademonstration in front of
the Provincial Assembly.® As the meeting ended, however, police
started teargasing the students within the campus area. Students
retaliated by brickbatting the police. The ensuing riot soon
spread to the nearby premises of the Medical and Engineering
colleges, being joined by other groups of students there.^
When the Provincial Assembly met at 3.30 p. m. great num¬
bers of students proceeded towards the Assembly building
to express their grievances. At about 4p. m. the police opened
fire in front of the Medical College hostel. Five persons—
Mohammad Salahuddin, Abdul Jabbar, Abul Barkat, Rafiq-
uddin Ahmed and Abdus Salam were killed, the first three of
these being students at Dacca University.io The news of the
killing spread like wildfire throughout the city and people
rushed in thousands towards the Medical College premises.
Inside the assembly, six opposition members pressd for the
adjournment of the House and demanded an inquiry into the
incidents. But Nurul Amin, Prime Minister of East Bengal,
urged the House to proceed with the planned agenda for the
day. At this point all the opposition members of the Assembly
walked out in protest.^!
On February 22 the movement acquired apopular character.
Thousands of men and women thronged the university, Medical
College and Engineering College areas to offer prayers for the
victims of the police-firing. After prayers, the people who asse¬
mbled took part in amammoth procession and the police opened
fire on the procession. The police also fired on angry mobs who
burned the offices of apro-government newspaper. Four persons
StudentPoliticsandMassUpheaval57
were killed and 70 wounded as aresult of these Brings. As the
situation deteriorated, the government called in the military
to bring things under control.^'^ Simultaneously Nurul Amin
bowing to the pressure, took the initiative in getting amotion
approved in East Bengal Legislative Assembly to the effect that
“the Assembly recommends to the Constituent Assembly of
Pakistan that Bengali be one of the State Languages of Pakis-
tan.”i3
The resolution by the provincial assembly was not enough to

pacify the students and politicised sections of the public. On Feb¬
ruary 23 acomplete strike was spontaneously observed in Dacca
and again the government responded with repressive measures.
Police resorted to lathicharges in several places. Microphones
used by students in the different halls were seized by the police.
Despite these repressive measures, the students of the Medical
College managed to erect overnight aShahid Minar (Martyr’s
Memorial) at the place where Barkat, one of the students, was
shot. On the same day some of the University student leaders
and members of the All-Party Committee of Action decided to
observe ageneral strike on February 25 to protest the govern¬
ment’s repressive measures.
From February 24 the government gave full authority to the
police and military to ’’bring the situation in Dacca back to
normal within 48 hours.During these 48 hours the police
arrested almost all the student and political leaders associated
with the language movement. The University was closed sine
die on February 25.i“
In the face of these repressive measures, the movement lost
its momentum in Dacca. But it spread widely throughout the
districts. In all district and subdivisonal towns students in schoo¬
ls and colleges took the lead in forming All-Party Language
Committees, while organising strikes and demonstrations. In
addition to demands for recognition of Bengali as one of the
state languages of Pakistan, students now began to call for the
resignation of the “bloody” Nurul Amin cabinet. In many of the
mufassil (up-country) towns alarge number of student leaders
and opposition political leaders were incarcerated by the police.
Nurul Amin claimed that the government ‘‘had saved the
province from disaster and chaos” by its repressive measures.’®
The students, however, argued that they had already “written the
success story of the movement on the streets with their blood.”
In retrospect, whatever the merits of government and student
actions, it is clear that the movement did sow the seeds of a
secular-linguistic Bengali nationalism in East Bengal. Its immed¬
iate impact was to prepare the ground for the complete routing
of the Muslim League in the 1954 elections by aUnited Front
of opposition political parties on anationalistic plank of cult¬
ural, political, and economic autonomy for East Bengal.
The Institutionalisation of Student Politics
The state language movement secularised the political atmosp¬

here of East Bengal. The success of the movement showed that
the politically relevant section of Bengalis and particularly
students, could no longer be diverted from substantive political
issues through slogans of Islam, anti-Indianism and anti-Hind¬
uism. As aresult, Communist Party leaders thought that time was
propitious for launching afront organisation among the stud¬
ents. The need for such afront was especially felt as most of
the leaders of the Youth League—the first front organisation of
the Communist Party—had infiltrated the Awami League. In April
1952, therefore, anew student organisation—the East Pakistan
Students Union (EPSU) was formed by the leftwing students.
The main planks of EPSU were secularism, non-communalism
and anti-imperialism.
The formation of anew organisation by leftist students led
to the formation of acounter-organisation based on Islamic
ideology. This took the form of aStudents Force (SF), aflllia-
ted to the Tamuddun Majlis, the stated purpose of which was
to fight the spread of communism and secularism among the
students.
Soon another fundamentalist student organisation the Islamic

Chhatra Sangha (ICS) was formed. The members of this organi¬
sation adhered to the Islamic ideology as interpreted by Syed
Abul Ala Maududi the Ideologue of the Jamaat-i-Islami. These
students also built up their organisation on the model of the
Jamaat-i-Islami, recruiting members through aselective process.
Thus, by the late 1950s aclear pattern of student involve¬
ment in the politics of East Bengal had emerged. There were
anumber of student organisations affiliated to different political
parties: the East Pakistan Students League (EPSL) affiliated to
theEPAL,theEastPakistanStudentsUnion(EPSU)affiliated
to the underground Communist Party and its front organisation
the NAP, and the Islami Chhatra Sangha (ICS) affiliated to Jama-
at-i-Islami. The manifestos of these student organisations r e -
fleeted more the political programme of their parent political
parties than demands stemming from their own student experien¬
ces. Yet these political platforms became the principal bases
for contesting university elections. Student organisations also
provided the bulk of the workers for their parent political part¬
ies and were later recruited to them. Thus, in 1968-69 about
half of the members of the Working Committees of the AL,
the two NAPs (pro-Peking and pro-Moscow) and the East
Pakistan Jamaat-i-Islami were former leaders of the EPSL
EPSU, ICS respectively.
Since student organisations were essentially the youth bran¬
ches of different political parties, factional and ideological dispu¬
tes in political parties were often first thrashed out in them.
The student organisations thus underwent the process of split,
groupings and regroupings, that were experienced by the parties.
As shown in Diagram 2, all the student organisations (except¬
ing ICS which like its parent organisation, Jamaat-i-Islam, was
free from ideological and factional disputes) became split by the
end of 1960s. Asmall section seceded from EPSL and formed
Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL). The BCLbecame an affiliate
to National Progressive, League (NPL), newly formed by Ataur
Rahman Khan, aformer Chief Minister of East Bengal. The
major section of SF seceded to form the National Students
Federation (NSF) which became allied to the section of the
Muslim League led by Ayub Khan. Like its parent body (the
Communist Party)’^ the EPSU became fragmented into several
separate organisations.
Paradoxically, students coming from the families of upper
socio-economic strata and top government officials were more
visible in the leadership of the leftist student organisations
than in any other student groups, although the rank and file
of the leftist student organisations like those of the other grou¬
ps came from middle and lower middle classes in urban areas
o
Diagram 2 H '
o
S P L I T S I N S T U D E N T O R G A N I S AT I O N S I N E A S T B E N G A L
P
O Q
P
CL
f P
C/3
CP
Late 1940s All Bengal Muslim Students League (ABMSL) o
C u
EPSL SF (Independent) EPSU (pro-NAP)

Mid-1950's
Q/i
>
o
!*n
C5*
Late 1%0's
EPSL BCL ICS S F NSF EPSU EPSU EPSU EPSU

(pro-AI) (pro-NPL) (pro-Jamaat) (inde- '(pro-Ayiib (pro- (pro- (pro- (pro-
pendent) M L ) Moscow) EPCL-M) EBCP) CCR)
and landholding classes in rural areas. However, in general,
familyandclassoriginsdidnotseemtobeadeterminingfactor
in students’ participation in politics. The influence of peer
groups, particularly circles of intimate friends, seemed to be
more effective in determining their political affiliations.!®
StudentMovementsDuringtheAyubRegime
While the ruling elite in Pakistan had grudgingly accepted
Bengali as one of the state languages of Pakistan by the mid-
1950s, their attempts at cultural regimentation of East Bengal
did not end. In early 1962, the government planned to implem¬
ent the proposals of the Commission on National Education
appointed by the Ayub government in 1959. The Commission
recommended, among other things, greater governmental control
o v e r
universities and colleges, extension of the duration of the
Bachelor’s degree course from two to three years, restriction
of entry into higher-level educational institutions, creation of
expensive model schools and colleges, postponement of the
introduction of free primary education for 15 years, and devel¬
opment of Roman scripts for both Bengali and Urdu.i® Simul¬
taneously the government sent directives to educational institu¬
tions to exclude Hindu litterateurs (including RabindraNath
Tagore the greatest poet in the Bengali language) from the
syllabi of schools, colleges and universities.
The students interpreted the recommendations as being
primarily aimed to the regimentation of educational institutions
and at the creation of an educated upper class loyal to West
Pakistan rulers. The proposal for the adoption of Roman script
and attempts to expunge some of the richest parts of Bengali
literature from various syllabi raised the fear of destruction of
the distinctiveness of the Bengali language.ô
The students response to these developments was similar to
that of their forerunners in 1952. In spite of the prevailing
martial law regulations (which imposed punishment of 14 years
of rigorous imprisonment for inciting public disturbances^ the
EPSL and EPSU leaders started an agitation against the implem¬
entation of the proposals. The students’ strikes, demonstrations
and processions continued during most of 1962.®i On September
17, at the call of the student leaders, acomplete hartal (close-
down) was observed throughout East Bengal. The army was call¬
ed in again to suppress the agitation in Dacca and several
demonstrators were killed. The government soon announced
the suspension of the implementation of the proposals and
at this point the agitation subsided.
Mass Upheaval in East Bengal (November 1968-March 1969)

An explosive situation developed in East Bengal when the
Ayub government instituted proceedings against Sheikh Mujib
and 35 others accused of conspiracy. Sheikh Mujib and his
associates were charged with plotting to bring about the secession
of East Bengal from Pakistan through an armed revolt with
Indian help. Supplies of arms had allegedly been discussed in July
1966 at Agartala just across the East Bengal border in India.
The conspiracy was said to have started in September 1964
when Sheikh Mujib attended ameeting convened by Lieutenant
Commander Moazzem Hossain who was accused number 2in
the case.'®
The trial was held in public in Dacca cantonment, before a

special tribunal chaired by aretired Chief Justice of the Sup¬
reme Court of Pakistan. The trial began in June 1968. During
the next six months the proceedings were given wide publicity
by government-controlled newspapers. For most Bengalis, who
believed that the case was afabrication designed by the ruling
elite to suppress the demand of autonomy for East Bengal, daily
coverage of the proceedings was amajor provocation. Apopu¬
lar upsurge in West Pakistan which began in early November
1968 then provided the spark for the awe-inspiring outburst of
popular wrath in East Bengal against both the Ayub regime
and West Pakistan domination.^^
The Bar Associations in Dacca and other towns of East Ben¬

gal were the first to organise processions and demonstrations.
Soon the different political parties NAP (pro-Moscow), NAP
(pro-Peking), and Awami League began to organise protests
and demonstrations. These drew aready response from all sec¬
tions. Surging crowds began to fill the streets of Dacca and
other urban centres of East Bengal almost every day, with
demonstrators chanting in favour of full provincial autonomy.
withdrawaloftheconspiracycase,restorationofdemocracy,
and the like.
_As the movement continued, the militancy of the crowds

increased. On December 6, aprocession led by Maulana Bhas-
hani‘‘gheraoed”-5theGovernor’shouseforsometimeandthe
militant
processionists brickbatted the police. In response of
MaulanaBhashani’scallforacompletehartal(stoppageof
all activity) on December 7, the government issued orders under
Section144oftheCriminalProceedureCodetoprohibitprocess¬
ionsandmeetingsinDacca.Nonetheless,acompletehartal
was observed in Dacca and other towns in East Bengal. In
Daccaangrymobssetapolicejeepandamunicipalgarbage
v a n
onfire.ThepoliceandEastPakistanRifles(EPR)resorted
to firing, killing two persons and injuring 23 others. The firings
in Dacca and killing elsewhere intensified opposition momentum.
Studentsandthe11-PointProgramine
ThemovemententeredamoremilitantphaseonDecember26,
whenDaccaUniversityv/asre-opened(ithadbeenclosedsine
die on October 22, following riots started against the student
demonstrations by the pro-government faction of NSF). The
major
student
organisations-EPSL,
EPSU
(pro-Moscow),
EPSU
(pro-Peking), and NSF (anti-government group) formed the All-
partyStudentsCommitteeofAction(SCA)withTofaelAhmed,
the fire brand
vice-president of the Dacca University Central
Smdents Union, as Chairman. Under Tofael Ahmed’s leaders¬
hip, SCAdrev/ up an 11-point programme and launched a m o v e -
ment against the Ayub government.
The 11 points of SCA were: (1) 14 demands relating to
education including rejection of the National Education Commis¬
sionReportandtheHamoodurRahmanCommissionReport
and repeal of the University Ordinances; (2) restoration of demo¬
cracy and universal adult franchise; (3) autonomy for East
Bengal along the lines of the six points; (4) establishment of a
subfederation in West Pakistan, giving full autonomy to Baluch¬
istan, the North-West Frontier Province and Sind; (5) nation¬
alisation of banks, insurance companies, and big industrial units;
(6) reduction of taxes on agriculturists; (7) payment of proper
wages to labourers; (8) introduction of aflood control plan in
East Bengal; (9) lifting of the state of emergency, public safety

acts and other repressive measures; (10) formation of an inde¬
pendent foreign policy, including withdrawal from CENTO and
SEATO pacts; and (11) release of all political prisoners and stu¬
dents and the dropping of all political cases including the Agartala
Conspiracy Case.ss By subsuming the AL’s six-point programme
with the leftists planks of socialist reforms and an anti-imperia¬
list foreign policy stance, the SCA aroused massive popular
support among all classes of people.
At the call of SCA, strikes, meetings and demonstrations
were continued. On January 21, the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR)
opened fire on amassive student procession in Dacca and killed
aprominent left-wing leader. The militancy of the crowd in¬
creased further and from January 24, the police force (manned
wholly by Bengalis) and the EPR (of whom 75 per cent were
Bengalis) were on the retreat. The army was then called out to
suppress the movement and curfews were imposed in the major
cities. Immediately the militant students and workers raised the
war-cry “Fight the Occupation Forces.” The curfews were
massively challenged. The number of persons killed could not
be known as the army did not allow hospital ambulances to
pick up the dead bodies which were removed by the army.
In aradio broadcast on February 1, President Ayub declared
that he would shortly invite “the representatives of the res¬
ponsible political parties” for talks and stated that “the enemies
of the country” were “responsible for the disturbances.”^’ This
broadcast enraged the Bengalis further and mass protests con¬
tinued unabated.
The mass revolt reached its peak in the third week of Feb¬
ruary. On February 15, armed guards had opened fire on two
of the Conspiracy Case accused, allegedly trying to escape
from custody. One was injured and died later the same day.
On February 18 the army opened fire on astudent demonstra¬
tion at Rajshahi and killed two persons, one of whom was Dr.
Mohammad Shamsuzzoha, Reader in the Department of Che¬
mistry and Proctor, P.ajshahi University. These killings infuri¬
ated the people who started to defy the curfew restrictions en
masse. Indiscriminate destruction of the property of “collabora¬
tors” of the Ayub regime began at this time.
Student Politics and Maas Upheaval 65
“The Fall of the Bastille”
Inthefaceofpersistentandorganisedviolationsbythepublic,
the government was forced to lift the curfew in Dacca and other
places on February 20. Processions appeared in the streets of
Dacca, chanting slogans like “We shall break open the prison
and bring back Sheikh Mujib”. Strikes, processions and meetings
continued on February 21, the famous Language Martyr’s Day,
InDaccaamammothmeeting,addressedbyleaders,demanded
the resignation of Basic Democrats and members of the national
and provincial assemblies elected under the Ayub constitution
and urged all recipients to renounce titles and decorations rece¬
ived from the Agub government.
The fury of the Bengalis finally brought about ‘-'the fall of
the Bastille”. On February 22 the Agartala Conspiracy Case w a s
withdrawn and all of the accused persons confined in Dacca
Cantonment were released unconditionally. On the following day
the SCA leaders arranged apublic reception for Sheikh Mujib,
where the proposal of SCA’s chairman, Tofael Ahmed, to confer
the epithet of Bemgabandhu (Friend of Bengal) on Sheikh Mujib
was endorsed by cheering thousands.
The unity of the mass movement broke down after the release
of Sheikh Mujib. The leaders of all political parties, except
Maulana Bhashani and other leaders of the pro-Peking NAP,
responded to the invitation of Ayub to join aRound Table
Conference. Here leaders of the rightist and ‘Pakistan nationalist’
parties of East Bengal did not go along with the type of auton¬
omy outlined in the AL’s 6-point and the SCA’s T1-point progr¬
ammes. But Sheikh Mujib, supported by Muzaffar Ahmed of
NAP (pro-Moscow), insisted on asettlement on the basis of the
6-points.
On the plea of alack of consensus, Ayub conceded two
demands only; 1) that elections would be held on the basis of
adult franchise; and 2) that parliamentary democracy would
be re-introduced. He promised to amend the 1962 constitution
to incorporate these two demands, without disturbing either the
parity of representation of East Bengal and West Pakistan in the
National Assembly or the distribution of federal subjects a s
provided in that constitution. The leaders of the Islamic and

‘Pakistan nationalist’ parties welcomed Ayub’s award.
66 The Bangladesh Revolution] and Its Aftermath
Sheikh Mujib, on the other hand, declared that the award
wasnotacceptabletothepeopleofEastBengalanddeclared
further that the struggle for realisation of autonomy would
continue on two fronts—through peacefid mass movements
and ballots. The leaders of the NAP (pro-Moscow) toed the
line taken by Sheikh Mujib but the pro-Peking NAP leaders now
started a“burn and gherao” movement to which the pro-Peking
EPSU lent its support.
The workers “gherao” had already started o n February 24,
the very day Sheikh Mujib left for Rawalpindi to attend the
conference, when workers of the Dacca Electric Supply Auth¬
ority went on alightning strike demanding increased pay,
house rent subsidies and the like. By the third week of March
1969 both government offices and utility services were comple¬
tely paralysed. Strikes and “gheraos” resorted to by the workers
in privately-owned industries caused managers to flee from the
mills and factories.
In rural areas the angry mobs began to kill pro-government
Basic Democrats and so-called “anti-social elements”, usually
burning their houses. According to newspaper reports, from
March 1to March 25 about 200 such people were killed and
more than 2,000 houses burnt in the rural areas.
With government law enforcement agencies paralysed, the
weekly Holiday advocated the formation of “Revolutionary
Committees in every locality to take over governmental con-
trol”.28 However, while pro-Peking firebrands could rouse public
wrath against ‘‘people’s enemies”, they had neither the cadre-
strength nor planned action programme to carry the revolution
forward.
As lawlessness continued senior army officers of General

Headquarters in Rawalpindi became impatient. The “hawks
had been totally against the withdrawal of the Agartala Cons¬
piracyCaseandnowthoughtthatthetimehadcometotake
drastic action, lest “East Bengal become another Biafra”. On
March 25, 1969 General Yahya took over and declared Martial
Law throughout the country, thus instituting direct military rule.
ThegreatupheavalinEastBengal,however,madetwothings
clear. First, in the event of aconflict between East Bengal and
West Pakistan, Bengali civil, police and military personnel would
side with the Bengali nationalist leaders.Second, by the end
of the 1960s, Bengali national consciousness had grown to such
apoint that autonomy demand could not be further suppressed
by deploying the West Pakistan military; Bengalis almost to a
man would resist such aggression.
NOTES
1. For some of the excellent works on student political activism

see S.M. Lipset and P.G. Altbach (eds.) Students in Revolt, (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1969) and D.K. Emmerson (ed.) Students andPoli-
tics in Developing Nations, (London; Pall Atall Press, 1968).See
also Daedalus, 95: 1(Winter, 1966).
2. See CSiapter II, p. 19.
3. Tamuddun Majlis (Cultural Society) was formed on September 1,

1945 as aliterary and cultural organisation by scholars, writers and
journalists oriented towards Islamic ideology. It published a
weekly, the Sainik (The Soldier) and aquarterly. (Lustre).
The Majlis was the first organisation after partition to demand
Bengali as one of the State Languages of Pakistan in abooklet
published on September 15, 1947 under the title “State Language
of Pakistan—Bengali or Urdu? The Secretary of the Majlis,
at that time aProfessor of Physics in Dacca University, was the
first person to convene aliterary meeting to discuss the state
Language issue in the Fazlul Huq Muslim Hall, astudent resi¬
dence of Dacca University. Supporters and sympathisers soon
afterwards formed apolitical party—the Khilafat-e-Rabbani
Party—with Abul Hashim as the Chairman.
4. East Bengal Legislative Assembly Proceedings, l;l,pp. 11-12.
Until 1956 the head of aprovincial cabinet in Pakistan was offi¬
cially designated as Prime Minister.
5.Jamil*ud-dinAhmad,SpeechesandWritingsofMr.Jinnah,(Lahore),
Mohammad Ashraf; 1960), Vol. II, pp. 485 and 491.
6. East Bengal Legislative Assembly Proceedings,
7. For adiscussion on the Youth League see Chapter III.p. 36.
8. Gaziul Huq, “Bhasha Andoloner Smriti”(Memories of State Lan¬
guage Movement) Ganashakti (Dacca), February 24, 1970.
9. According to the statements of some opposition members who
were present in the Provincial Assembly on the afternoon of
February 21, the police arrested by 3:30 p.m. about 200 students
and another 200 students received injuries. {East Bengal Legisla¬
tive Assembly Proceedings, Vol, VH, pp. 55-56.
10. The names of persons killed and wounded on February 21,1952
were published in Janapad (Dacca), February 21, 1973.
11. East Bengal Legislative Assembly Proceedings, Vol. VII, pp. 55-56.
12. East Bengal Legislative Assembly Proceedirgs, ^’ol. VII, pp, 106-107.
13. For the debate on Nurul Amin’s special motion, see Ibid., pp.
8 9 - 11 5 .
14. See Nurul Amin’s statement in the East Bengal Legislative Ass¬
embly on March 24,1952. Ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 9.
15. Maulana Bhashani, who had left Dacca on the night of February
20, was also arrested at his village home.
16. East Bengal Legislative Assembly Proceedings, Voi. VIII., pp. 9-12.
17. See Chapter III pp. 35-42.
18. This paragraph is based on the survey that the author conducted
among the students of arts and social science faculties of three
universities of East Bengal in October-November 1968. The other
fmdings were included in an article, Political Activism ofUr.i-
versity Students in Pakistan”, Journal of Commonwealth Political
Studies, IX; 3, 1971, pp. 234-245.
19. See Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education. Beport of
the Commission of National Education (Karachi: Manager of Publi¬
cations, I960).
20. For the reaction of EPSU and EPSL to the recommendations of
the Commission on National Education, see respectively Mani¬
festo, East Pakistan Students’ Union (Published by Central Secre¬
taries, East Pakistan Students’ Union, 1965) and Annual Report
of the General Secrete.rv by Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni, General
Secretary, EPSL (Publisher and date not mentioned).
21. Throughout the whole academic year 1962-63 students of the
Dacca University attended classes for 33 days only.
22. Hence the label Agartala conspiracy case.
23. For details of the conspiracy case, see H.Feldman,From Crisis to
Crisis; Pakistan 1962-1969 (Karachi; Oxford University Press.
1970) pp. 184-189.
24. The details of the mass upheaval in East Bengal given in this
chapter were culled from daily news reperting in The Pakistan
Observer (Dacca), Morning News (Dacca) and the Aiad (Dacca),
from November 1968 to March 1S69. The reports in The Pakistan
Observer were first collected and then checked against the reports
published in the Morning News and the Azed. Only those events
which had been detailed identically in all three newspapers
were taken as facts and used in this chapter. Besides, the author
was in East Bengal throughout the entire period and had direct
knowledge of some of the details of the mass upsurge. The
chapter also draws upon interviews with political leaders men¬
tioned in Appendix 1.
25. ‘Gherao’in Bengali means “surround”. The word was borrowed
from West Bengal, where workers in the 1960s frequently forced
m a n a g e m e n t t o sign agreements by confining them and using
intimidation and coercion.
26.
The full text of the 11-point programme of the SCAwas published
in The Pakistan Observer, January 29. 1969.
27. For the full text of President Ayub’s broadcast, see The Pakistan
Observer, February 2, 1969.
28. See the editorial “Stop This Anarchy”, Holiday, March 9, 1969.
29. Before President Ayub decided to invite the political leaders
for talks, he had sent his personal confidante, Fida Hasan, to
East Bengal. Fida Hasan conveyed to the senior officers of the
police and the civil service President Ayub’s desire to bring about
reformsinconsonancewiththe“genuine”demandsofEastBengal.
Blithe had to return disappointed when civil and police officials in
East Bengal refused to hide their sympathies for their rebellious
fellow-Bengalis.
CHAPTER V
REVOLUTION BY PHASES
Earlyonintheelectionsof1970,SheikhMujibdeclaredthat
the elections were areferendum on the AL’s six points an te
students’elevenpointsandtheALmanifestoconsequentlyfocus¬
sedprimarilyonadetailedexplicationofitsplankforauto¬
nomy.Forabouttwoyears—fromMarch1969toDecember
1970—Sheikh Mujib toured the length and breadth of East
Bengal,repeatingALdemandstopartyworkerswhileaddres¬
sing
innumerable
mass
rallies.
Finally,
when
elections
were
called
forDecember1970,theParliamentaryBoardoftheALcareal¬
lydrewupaslateof162partynomineesthatincludedthelea¬
ders of the dominant interests and age-groups of East Benga ,
theattemptbeingtopromoteabroad-based“nationalcoai-
tion.” f . ,
As shown in Table .5 the vast majority (78 per cent ot the
total)oftheALnomineesbelongedtotheage-group50and
below,agenerationthatconstitutedthemajorityofthevotersm
1970. This generation had scarcely experienced the economic
exploitationofBengaliMuslimsbyHindumahajans(money¬
lenders), businessmen, and zamindars, with the result that it
was less averse than the generation of its fathers to an alliance
with India and the destruction of Pakistan. Eight of the AL
nominees were in their 20s and three were prominent leader
of SCA, while the majority were recruited to the AL initially
through their participation in either the Students’ League or the
Students’ Union.
With regard to the professional backgrounds of the nominees,
it is striking that 19 per cent of the total were drawn from among
business and industrial groups. Like the national bourgeoisie
in most former colonial countrieSj the majority of Bengali busi-
Revolution by Phases 71
Table 5
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AWAMI LEAGUE

NOMINEES FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
IN 1970 GENERAL ELECTIONS
Demographic characteristics Number % o f To t a l
Age
60 and over 9 5
50-60 24 15
40-50 77 47
30.40 42 26
20-30 5
Not known 2 2
To t a l s 162 100
Education
At least aB.A. degree 132® 81
Graduate of Secondary school 6 3

Matriculation or less 12
Madrassah (traditional Islamic) education 2 2
Not known 10 6
To t a l s 162 100
Profession
Lawyer 77b 47
Doctors 7 4
Businessmen 31 19
Former Government Servants 3 2
S c h o o l Te a c h e r s 6 4
University and College Teachers 10 6

Trade Union Leaders 1 1
Student Loaders 3 2
Journalists 5 3
Former Military Service 3 2
Not known 9 6
To t a l s 162 100
{contd)
Table 5(contd.)
Religion
160 98.8
Muslim
1 0.6
Hindu
0.6
Buddlvst
To t a l s 162 100.0
“Ten of the 132 nominees having graduate and irost-graduate degrees

(6 per cent of the total) had higher education in foreign countries
(8 in Great Britain, one in Europe, and one in the Ehiitcd
States).
’’Three lawyers also had business ccnccrns and one lawyer was also
a l a n d h o l d e r.
Source: Part of the information about the nominees was supphed-
to the author by Obaidur Rahman, Social Service Secretary of the Awa-
mi League (1969-70) and an Awami League candidate himself in the
1970 elections; the rest ofths data was collected from the life-sketches
ofthe AL nominees published in the Banglar Bani (Awami League
Weekly, Dacca) in its various issues in November-Dacember. 1970.
n e s s m e n and industrialists backed the liberation movement
launched by the AL, and ultimately financed its election camp¬

aign.Sincetheonetradeunionleaderwhowasnominatedin
1970 was the general secretary of the Jatio Sramik League (Na¬
tional Labour League), which in 1969-70 was the largest labour
organisation in East Bengal, this meant that theALhad large-
scalesupportfrombothbusinessandlabour.Sevenpercentof
the AL nominees were landholders, all the rest being drawn
from Western-educated lawyers, doctors, school, college and
university teachers, retired men of the services and journalists.
In West Pakistan, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) captured
82 seats, constituting an absolute majority among the total 138
seats allocated to West Pakistan. The PPP led by Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto contested the elections on aplatform of Islamic nation¬
alism, strong centre, socialistic reforms and “a thousand years
war with India.”’
The Awami League’s victory in the elections of 1970 was
almost total. It captured 160 of 162 National Assembly seats
allocated to East Bengal, garnering 72.57 per cent of the votes
cast.2 Of the other two seats, one was won by an independent
candidate in aconstituency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
Acomparison of the ideological and programatic orienta¬
tions, number of seats won, and percentage of votes secured
devolution by Phases 73
by the political parties in West Pakistan and East Bengal in

the 1970 elections is provided in Table 6and 7.® This shows
that, while 81.5 per cent of the voters who cast their votes in
West Pakistan, voted for Islmic nationalism, astrong central
government and anti-lndianism. 74.30 per cent of the voters in
Ta b l e 6
I D E O L O G I C A L A N D P R O G R A M A I l C O R I E N TAT I O N O F
POLITICAL PA RT I E S IN WEST PA K I S TA N AND THEIR
PERFORMANCE IN 1970 ELECTIONS
Name of the Ideological and pro- Number of Number of Percentage

party gramatic orieiiiaticn seats ccn- seats won of votes
tested secured of
total cast
votes
PPP Islamic nationalism, 11 9 81 42.2
Strong centre,
Socialistic reforms,
Anti-lndianism
PML (Con¬ Islamic nationalism. 15S 11 10.2
vention) & Strong centre,

P M L An'i-Indianism
(Qayyum)
PML (Coun- Islamic nationalism, 69 7 10.8
cil) Strong centre.
Economic reforms,
Anti-lndianism
POP Islamic nationalism. 27 X
Strong centre.
Economic reforms,
Anti-lndianism
Jamaat-i- Islamic nationalism, 79 4 6.5
Islami Strong centre,
Anti-lndianism
Orthodox Islamic nationalism, 147 14 10.2
Islamic Strong centre,
Parties Anti-lndianism
Others:
NAP (pro- Secularism, Socialism, 19 6
Moscow) Provincial autonomy.

Friendly relations
with India
(contd.)
1A The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath
Table 6(contd.)
( (
4 X 18.5
NAP (pro- People’s democratic
Peking) Revolution”
Awami Full regional 9* X
League autonomy, Secularism,

economic reforms. Friendly
relations with India
Independent
and others 223 15
To t a l s 853 138 100
♦All the 9A.L. candidates in West Pakistan lost so heavily that their
deposits were forfeited.
Ta b l e 7
I D E O L O G I C A L A N D P R O G R A M AT I C O R I E N TAT I O N O F
P O L I T I C A L PA R T I E S I N E A S T B E N G A L A N D T H E I R
PERFORMANCE IN 1970 ELECTIONS
Name of the Ideological and Number Number Percentage

of seats seats of of votes
party programatic
orientation contested won secured of
total votes
cast
Awami Secularism, Bengali Nation¬ 162 160 72.57
League alism, Full autonomy for

East Bengal, Socialistic
reforms, Friendly relations
with India
Secularism, Full auonomy 36 X 1.83
NAP (pro-
Moscow) for East Bengal, Socialism,
Friendly relations with India
15 30
NAP (pro- “Peoples’ democratic X
Revolution 5 9
Peking)
Jamaat-i-IsIami
P D P
PML (Conven¬
tion) PML
(Qayyum) Islamic nationalism
PML (Coun¬ Strong centre,
cil )Jamiatc- Anti-Indianism 515 1 17.85
Ulema-e-Islam
Nizam-i-Islam
Independent
and others 139 1 7.72
To t a l s 747* 1 6 2 100
!500 out of747 candidates lost so heavily that their deposits were forfeited.
Revolution by Phases IS
East Bengal cast their ballots for secularism, Bengali national¬
ism, loose confederation with West Pakistan, and friendly rela¬
tions with India. The polarity in the political orientations and
political cultures among the vast majority of the people of
the two wings of Pakistan, as reflected in the elections result,
clearly indicated that the two sections of the country could n o t
remain as aunited nation. Pakistan’s first general election pro¬
ved that it was going to be the last general election in aunited
Pakistan.
First Phase of Revolution

In East Bengal ageneral sense of frustration and discontent
among various social groups alternated with rising hopes aroused
by the “talkers of revolutions”. Adegree of tactical liberalisa¬
tion by the rulers of West Pakistan had been followed by asud¬
den hardening of their attitude. The prevailing philosophy a m o -
ng the people in East Bengalis came to be that nothing could be
achieved without desperate measures.
After the state language movement of 1952, amajority of the
litterateurs, teachers, and students of Bengal had taken up the
cause of Bengali nationalism, as opposed to the Islamic nation¬
alism preached from West Pakistan. Every year, on Fabruary
21, political leaders, workers and students renewed their oath to
uphold the cause of which the martyrs of that day had shed
their blood. New poems were written to commemorate the occa¬
sion and to reinforce Bengali national identity. This discontent
developed acentral focns during the election campaign of 1954,
the movement against the Ayub Khan regime in 1962, and the
6-point movement led by the Awami League in 1966. The failure
of theAyub Khan government, despite its use of force to suppress
mass upheaval in East Bengal, emboldened political workers
and students. In 1968 they felt invincible. Although the re¬
imposition of Martial Law had created fresh discontent among
political workers and students, the promise of elections in 1970
brought afresh expectation of fulfilment.
The elections were held by the martial law regime under the
Legal Framework Order, although they were as free and as fair
as possible in an undeveloped country. In spite of martial law
regulations prohibiting speeches against Islamic ideology, the
unity of Pakistan, and Jinnah (“the father of the Nation”), the
%The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath
campaign undertaken by the Awami League advocated secular¬
ism and full autonomy for East Bengal.^ The usually control¬
led press of East Bengal was allowed free and fair reporting.
Sheikh Mujib, who had already become the symbol of Bengali
protest and nationalism, used the election campaign to rouse
discontent among the Bengalis to fever pitch.
Aspell-binding orator and aspectacularly successful crowd¬
gathering personality, Sheikh Mujib campaigned incessantly,
from March 1969 to December 1970, covering 55 cities, all dis¬
trict headquarters and subdivisional towns, and about 400 thana
(police) administrative units. In cities drew crowds numbering
hundreds of thousands. In district and subdivisional towns
Sheikh Mujib’s mass rallies usually attracted 200,000 people and
more. In the thana appearances, on an average 50,000 villagers
would come to hear and cheer Sheikh Mujib. Thus, arough esti¬
mate would suggest that Sheikh Mujib addressed over 30,000,000
people during this stretch of campaigning, afigure representing
almost half of the total population of East Bengal. These were
people who had at least asufficient degree of politicisation
to attend the mass rallies, and they obviously carried the message
of Sheikh Mujib to others through informal methods of com¬
munication
What was the message that Sheikh Mujib communicated?

He repeated the same theme in every gathering: Bangladesh
(he used the term repeatedly in the campaign) had been exploit¬
ed for centuries by outsiders; the Bengalis had joined Pakistan
with the expectation of freedom from all kinds of exploitation,
for them the achievement of Pakistan had led only to achange of
exploiters; Bangladesh had been turned into acolony of West
Pakistan by vested interests; it had become acaptive market for
goodsprodueed by West Pakistan’s industries, which were built
with the foreign exchange earned by Bangladesh and resources
drained out of Bangladesh by various means; if the Bengalis voted
for the 6-point and 11-point programmes espoused by the Awami
League, the emancipation (Mukti) of Bangladesh would surely
be achieved this time, and they would then be the masters of
their own destiny for the first time in their history.
During the election campaign AL workers blanketed the
walls in cities, towns and thana headquarters, with large posters
entitled, Sonar Bangla Swashan Kenol (Why is Golden Bengal

aCemetery?), projecting the figures of disparity between Bangla¬
desh and West Pakistan in per capita income, in civil as well
as defence employment, and in allocation of development funds
and foreign aid. Posters also showed the total amount of fore¬
ign exchange earned by Bangladesh but used in West Pakistan.®
The massive victroy of the AL created new hope for discon¬
tented Bengalis. There were, however, dormant portents that their
rightful aspiration to be free from West Pakistan might once
again be frustrated through plots and conspiracies by the military
junta and V/est Pakistan political leaders. It was inevitable
that in this mood of excessively raised expectations and fears,
any attempt to obstruct the electoral results would trigger off a
mass revolution.
Maulana Bhashani, aware of the pulse of the people, had

already demanded independence at apublic meeting held in Dacca
on December 4, 1970, just two days before ihe general election.®
After the elections he continued to repeat his demand. Soon
Ataur Rahman Khan, aformer Chief Minister of East Bengal,
joined Bhashani in demanding the sovereignty of Bangladesh.
The extremist group in the Students’ League (the Rab-Siraj
group, which separated itself from the AL after the liberation
of the country in 197!),'^ also began to bring pressure on AL
leaders to take an extreme stand. It was clear to Sheikh Mujib
at this time that he had to ride the high tide of Bangali nation¬
alism, atide that he and his party had helped to generate, if he
was to survive as the unchallenged leader of the Bengali nation¬
alist movement.
Even after the elections, in his press statement and public

meetings. Sheikh Mujib continued to stress that the constitution
w'ould be drafted in strict conformity with the 6-point and II-
point programmes. He kept up the tempo of the Bengali nation¬
alist upsurge by continuously warning the people of Bangladesh
that vested interests in West Pakistan were conspiring to foil the
election verdict of Bangladesh. Finally, at apublic meeting in
Dacca, attended by about half amillion people on .Tanuary 3,
1971, Sheikh Mujib declared: “Since the people of Bangladesh
have given their clear verdict in favour of the 6-point and 11-po¬
int programmes in areferendum, even my party has no power to
amend or alter it, if anyone interferes 'vith this verdict there will
be abloody movement which nobody will be able to control.”®

At the same meeting he took an oath before the newly elected
members of the National and Provincial Assemblies, pledging
C(
in the name of God Almighty to remain faithful to the clear 5 J
verdict of the people on (the) 6-point and 11-point programmes

and “to engage all our efforts to ensure atrue reflection of
6-point basic autonomy and the 11-point programme in the con¬
stitution and in practical application.’’^
As has already been noted earlier,“ the military junta was
divided on the question of holding the elections before “sorting
out” the secessionists in Bangladesh. The assumption of the
“doves”~that the AL would notwin amajority of seats in
Bangladesh and that Sheikh Mujib, even if he won the elections,
would compromise on his 6-point programme in order to become
the Prime Minister of aunited Pakistan proved wrong.
The massive victory, followed by repeated declarations by
Sheikh Mujib that the constitution would be enacted in strict
conformity with the 6-point and 11 point programmes, alarmed
the military junta. The “hawks” in the army prevailed and
their interests converged with those of Bhutto. For it was now
clear that in the elected National Assembly the AL would
easily be able to enact aconstitution based on its autonomy
programme, which would in turn convert Pakistan into little
more than aloose confederation.
The armed force’s leadership was an elite group, with high

salaries and entrenched privileges. The military in Pakistan
during the 1950s and 1960s had spent more than half of the
country’s yearly budget. Military men had astake in keeping
East Bengal as an integral part of Pakistan. For Bhutto, the
acceptance of aconstitution based on the AL programme would
have meant the loss of his massive popularity in the Punjab,
where he had all along proinised astrong central government,
apowerful army, and above all, ‘‘a thousand years’ war with
India.” For these reasons, both the military junta and Bhutto
attempted to postpone the opening session of the Assembly,
while Bhutto launched acampaign to rouse the feelings of West
Pakistanis against Bangladesh.
In late December 1970 Bhutto declared that Sind and the
Punjab were the bastions of power in Pakistan,and that,
since his party had emerged with asweeping electoral victory
in those two provinces, it could not accept any constitution that

was thrust upon West Pakistan by the “brute majority of the
Awami League.”i3 \series of meetings between General Yahya
Khan and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, between Bhutto and Yah¬
ya Khan, and finally between Sheikh Mujib and Bhutto all in
January 1971—ultimately produced apromise from Yahya Khan
that asession of the National Assembly would be convened at
Dacca on March 3, 1971.
But the real intentions of the Yahya Khan regime were be¬
trayed when on Februay 17, the airport at Dacca was fortified
with anti-aircraft guns. Afew days later aship with aheavy
load of arms and ammunitions left Karachi for Chittagoag. On
February 23, the civilian Council of Ministers of Pakistan was
dissolved “in view of the political situation obtaining in the
country” and Bhutto then declared that he would not attend
the session of the National Assembly to “sign adictated con¬
stitution.” Bhutto also insinuated that India had played asig¬
nificant role in Sheikh Mujib’s future plan of action and stated
that his partymen could not become “double hostages” by going
to Dacca to attend the Assembly session.i=* In Bhutto’s words,
“under the circumstances the Assembly would be aslaugter
house.’’i*
Finally, before amammoth public meeting at Lahore on Feb¬

ruary 28, Bhutto declared that his party would organise alarge-
scale hartal “from the Khyber Pass down to Karachi” in protest
against the summoning of the National Assembly. Fie also prom¬
ised to “liquidate” any member of his party who attended the
opening session.'5 Major-General Omar, Chairman of the Nati¬
onal Security Council, acting in the name of President Yahya
Khan, had also instructed those West Pakistan members of the
National Assembly that did not belong Bhutto’s Peoples’ Party
to boycott the Assembly. Thus, by early 1971 there had develo¬
ped ajoint West Pakistan front against Sheikh Mujib. 16
Mass Upsurge and the de Facto Government of Sheikh Mujib

Threatening military tactics, coupled with Bhutto’s inflammatory
speeches, raised the passion of Bengali nationalists. The sudden
announcement on March 1over Radio Pakistan that General
Yahya Khan had postponed the forthcoming session of the Nati¬
onal Assembly, brought people spontaneously on the streets to
demand an outright declaration of independence for Bangladesh.
Themassupsurgehadbegun.TheStude.nts’Leaguehelda m a m -
moth rally on March 2in Dacca and hoisted the flag of Bangla¬
desh in the presence of Sheikh Mujib. Anumber of Students
League leaders afew days later formed aSwadhin Bangladesh
Kendrio Chhatra Sangram Parishad (Central Students’ Action
Committee of Independent Bangladesh).
In response to these events, Sheikh Mujib called for a n o n -
violent non-cooperation movement” against the central govern¬
ment of Pakistan, for an indefinite period. In an impressive dis¬
playofunity,allgovernmentemployees(includingtheJudgesof
theHighCourt)absentedthemselvesfromtheirofficesandprom¬
ised to continue to do so for as long aperiod as Mujib chose.
At this point Mujib’s residence became the new Secretariat of
Bangladesh.
After the first two days of boycott, during which the army s
attempt to restore normal administrative functioning met with
total non-cooperation from all officers of the government and
stiff resistance by the rebellious people, the army, on orders of
the General-in-Charge of the Eastern Command, withdrew to its
barracks. From March 4,1971 policy directives designed to res¬
tore normalcy began to be issued from “the Bangladesh Secret¬
ariat” at Sheikh Mujib’s house. These directives, issued in the
name of Bangladesh on March 4, March 7, March 9, March
m o v -
11, and March 15 helped to keep the Bangladesh economy
ing and to maintain law and order.^''
From this point too. Radio Pakistan, Dacca was renamed
DaccaBetarKendra(DaccaRadioCentre)byBengalibroadcast¬
ers. It began issuing news bulletins about revolutionary happen¬
ings in Bangladesh, and to broadcast regularly the song A/nar
Sonar Bangla (My Golden Bengal), already declared as the
national anthem of Bangladesh by the Central Students’ Action
Committee. It also played patriotic and revolutionary Bengali
s o n g s .Meanwhile the Karachi station of Radio Pakistan main-
tained atotal silence about the happenings in Bangladesh.
When, at amammoth public meeting in Dacca on March 7,
1971, Sheikh Mujib demanded a) withdrawal of Martial Law;
b) transfer of power to elected representatives and c) withdraw¬
al of troops to the barracks, he actually called for the
“juridical of troops to the defacto situation in Bangladesh.”
Maulana Bhashani, in his public meeting in Chittagong on March
17 stated flatly that Bangladesh had already become indepen¬
dent and urged Sheikh Mujib to form acare-taker government
for the purpose of dividing the assets and liabilities of the two
wings of Pakistan. 18
Wliilst the establishment of ade facto government by Sheikh
Mujib was one dimension of the first phase of the revolution
in Bangladesh, the other unique aspect of this phase was the
militant mood of the common people. Everyday from March
1to March 15, 1971, innumerable processions chanting like
“Joi Bangla (Glory to Bengal) or Swadhin Bangladesh Zinda-
bad” (Long Live Independent Bangladesh) paraded the streets
of Dacca. These usually ended at Road 32 Dhanmandi (Mujib’s
home),wherethecrowdsreceivedassurancesfromSheikhMujib
that Miikti (emancipation) of Bangladesh would be achieved.
Similar demonstrations took place in all other cities and towns
of Bangladesh.
Demonstrators were not confined to middle class people.
They were dominated by students, the lower middle classes and
hiistee (slum) dwellers. The various student organisations, AL
volunteers, and even the Mahila Sangram Parishad (Women’s
Resistance Committee) began to form peoples militias and para¬
de through the streets in cities and towns all over Bangladesh.
Militant students took away explosives from Dacca University
laboratories and began to collect arms from whatever s o u r c e s
they could.
The common man spontaneously put up resistance to the
Pakistan forces, Food supplies to their bases were stopped.
Peasants began to block roads and place barricades on the
rail lines. In Joydevpur (near Dacca) people refused to r e m o v e
the barricades on aroad where aBrigadier and some other high-
ranking military officers were travelling in an army van; they
also tried to seize weapons from the army officers. In this fray,
several persons were killed.
Chittagong port workers, on their own initiatives refused to
unload arms and ammunition from the N.V. Swat, aship
carrying reinforcements from West Pakistan. At the behest of
the Central Students’ Action Committee of Independent Bang-
ladesh, people all over Bangladesh observed aResistance Day
on March 23rd (a day that had for 24 years been observed as
Republic Day in Pakistan) by raising from their rooftops the
flag of Bangladesh. These spontaneous symptoms of popular
revolt made it clear that any attempt to re-establish the autho¬
rity of Islamabad in Bangladesh would “require the re-conquest
of the whole Province piece by piece.’’^® This phase of the revolu¬
tion was well summed up in an editorial, “Rebirth of aPeople”
in the Dacca weekly Forum:
For the first time since the Battle of Plassey Bengal is free.
This is not freedom in the juridical sense. Not does it ig¬
nore the guns which remain pointed at us. But today, for
the first time in two centuries, decisions are made by the
People of Bangladesh, directing the course of their politics
and economy without reference to the vested interests of
alien ruling groups has been restricted to fortified enclaves
within Bangladesh. Here they remain islands in ahostile
sea with not afriendly face to run to. To re-impose their
will on Bangladesh will, for all practical purposes, represent
to the people an act of aggression,....If the people were cow¬
ards, aspray of bullets would tranquillze any movement.
But today millions are there to replace the thousands who
have fallen, and this must hunt their leaders as much as
their oppressors.^®
Second Phase of the Revolution
The events of January-February 1971, which led to amass non¬

cooperation movement and the establishment of ade facto Mu-
jib government for about three weeks in March, drew aseries
of desperate response from the military rules led by General
Yahya Khan. Yahya first recalled the then Governor of “East
Pakistan,” S.M, Ahsan, as well as the Martial Law Administra¬
tor, Lieutenant-General Shahibzada Yakub, since neither of
them were willing to take military action to suppress popular
uprising in Bangladesh.®^ In their places, the hawkish General
Tikka Khan took over as both Governor and Martial Law
Administrator of “East Pakistan”. In aradio broadcast in late
February 1971 General Yahya Khan warned that “the armed
forces would
ensure the integrity, solidarity and security of
Pakistan, aduty in which they never failed.”
When General Yahya Khan flew to Dacca from Islamabad
to make abelated personal appearnce on March 15, it was
already clear that he had only two alternatives before him:
eithertoacceptSheikhMujib’sdefactogovernmentandprocl¬
aim it legally constituted as the government in aconfederal
arrangement with West Pakistan or to use armed force to crush
theBengalirevolution.Fromeveryavailablepieceofevidence
ItseemscertainthatYahyaandhisadvisorshadalreadydecided
on the second alternative. While AL leaders continued discuss¬
ionswithYahyainapparentgoodfaithoverseveraldays,Yah-
ya’sadvisors,armyotBcersandpoliticalleaderswereprepar¬
ingforamilitarycrackdown.22Troopsweredispatchedtoseve¬
raldistricttowns.TankspreviouslydeployedinRangpurfor
thedefenceoftheborderwerebroughttoDacca.Onthenight
ofMarch23aBengaliofiicercommandingabrigadeofsoldiers
atChittagongcantonmentwassuddenlyremovedfromhiscom¬
mandandflowntoDaccaunderarmedescort.Hewasreplaced
immediately by aWest Pakistani.
Inadditiontothesemilitaryactivities,thenon-Bengalicivilian
populationintheMohammadpurandMirpurareas,thebulkof
whichunreservedlysupportedPakistanwasarmed.TheSpecial
ServiceGroup(SSG),consistinglargelyofcommandosfrom
thePakistanarmy,v/assenttostrategicpointstoriotsbetween
Bengalisandnon-Bengalis.DirectivesweregiventotheInspec¬
tor-General of Police in Dacca to disarm the police force.
InJoydevpur,attemptsweremadebysomeseniorWestPakis¬
tanofficersofDaccacantonmenttodisarmtheBengaliofficers
and(soldiers) of the Second East Bengal Regiment. The
families of West Pakistan officers and big businessmen w e r e
flown to West Pakistan.
Duringthisperiod,ALleadersappearedtobesobeguiled
byYahyaKhanandhisadvisorsthatSheikhMujibgavethe
impressiontopressmenevenaslateasMarch22ndthattalks
wereprogressingwell.Thiscreatedthefeeling,notonlyamong
thepeopleofB-angladeshbutalsoinforeigndiplomaticcircles
in Dacca, that talks would be successful. Even the Indian High
Commission in Dacca reported to New Delhi that anegotiated
23
settlement was in the offing. n i m s e l f

Factsareoftenstrangerthanfiction.Theauthorhimelf
couldnothavebelievedtheextentandhorroroftheatrocities
committedbyWestPakistantroopsafterMarch24,197
he not been present in Bangladesh during the
periodoftheoccupation.AtmidnightonMarch25
tan army launched avirtual slaughter on
ofDaccaandothercitiesandtownsofBangladesh.InDacca
thefirsttargetsofthearmyweretheBengaliofficers
at
Kurmitola
cantonment,
thestudents’
residences
and
teacners
quarters
of
Dacca
University,
thepolice
headquarters
at
Raj
bagh,
the
East
Pakistan
Rifles
(EPR)
headquarters
Pdkha^
at
and the Hindu areas of the old part
e of
politicised
students
had
already
fled
from
the
University
le
iden-
tial halls before the crackdown, but anumber
u of inno
t
dents
(particularly
those
living
at
Iqbal
Hall,
where
the
Central
Students’ Action Committee of Independent^
tod
opened an office, and Jagannath Hall, f
siidents) were
entireTantiBazar killed
and on
the
night
Shankhari of
March
Bazar 25^
areasofOld fI- were
Dacca
setonfireandmostoftheirresidentskilledwhilemanyofthe
bastuharas(the
rootless
pavementand®hin>dwe lers)
were
exter
minated.ThepoliceforceatRajarbaghandtheEPRmenat
Pilkhanamanagedtoputsomeresistance,butthearmysoo
overpowered themwiththeir
use of
sophisticated
weapons (in¬
cluding
tanks).
Theinitial
armyoperations in
Daccacontiniied
without interruption from midnight of the 25tn un i
in" of the 27th.2* Similar mass killings were
WestPakistantroopsinChittagongonthenightofMarch25th.
In other district towns where West Pakistan troops were garriso¬
ned,
soldiers
were
assisted
by
non-Bengalis
msearching
out
prominent
Hindus,
AL leaders
and
workers,
killing
all
of
those
who were found during those first few days.
OnMarch1,1971therewereaboutone-and-a-halfdivision
ofthePakistanarmyinBangladesh.Onthistotal,thestrength
of
the
East
Bengal
Regiment
(EPR),
consisting
Pnmardy^
BengaliofficersandJawans,wasaboutfour-and-a-halfbat
lions.ThefourwerelocatedatJessore,Joydevpur,Rangpurand
devolution by Phases 85
Comiila. In Chittagong there was half abattalion of EBR and
another one thousand or so new EBR recruits under training
at the EBR Recruitment Centre. According to the most reliable
estimates, the total strength of the EBR was about 4,000, while
West Pakistan troops numbered between 28,000 and 29,000. The
total strength of the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), the vast majo¬
rity of whom were Bengalis, was about 15,000. The strength of
the Bengalis in the police force was about 40,000.^^
The Bengalis in the EBR, EPR, and police force had over
time become sympathetic to the AL demand for autonomy. In¬
deed, the postal ballot vote in the 1970 general elections showed
that the Bengalis in these forces voted en masse for AL can¬
didates. After March 1, 1971 jawans in the EBR, EPR and the
police were in arebellious mood. From the middle of February
it was clear to officers of the EBR that the Pakistan army High
Command was preparing to suppress the independence move¬
ment of Bangladesh. West Pakistan officers then began to hold
secret meetings, excluding Bengali officers. In the last week of
February 1971 the first battalion of reinforcements from West
Pakistan arrived in Dacca. Major Khaled Musharraf, aBengali
who, as Brigade Major at Dacca cantonment was holding a
staff' job, was not even consulted about this reinforcement of
troops. Major Musharraf became suspicious and confided in some
of the other Bengali officers.^s
On February 27, while addressing the second EBR at Joydev-
pur, Lieutenant-General Yakub hinted openly at the possibility
of an imminentmilitary crackdown upon theBengalis.^? Here again
the younger generation responded more eagerly to the compul¬
sion of rebellion than did the older generation. Some of the mid¬
dle-level officers of the EBR and EPR, together with Group
Captain A.K. Khandker of the Pakistan Air Force base at Dacca
established contact with Sheikh Mujib in the second week of
March. The latter asked the officers to meet Colonel Ataul Gha-
ni Usmani (52), aretired army officer recently elected to the
National Assembly on an AL ticket, who later became Comman-
der-in-Chief of the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Army).
Colonel Usmani reportedly was not very enthusiastic about
an armed revolt. However, adecision was taken that if the West
Pakistan army launched an attack on the Bengalis, EBR and
EPR would defend themselves. The EBR and EPR offiicers
therefore requested theALleaders to send them amessage about
the outcome of their talks with Yahya.^^ Howeever, the AL
leaders either deluded themselves into believing as late as March
24 that Yahya was going to announce an agreement on the
transfer of power, or they feared that arevolt by the Bengali army
officers might result in the displacement of the civilian AL lead¬
ership of the nationalist movement by the Bengali armed forces.
In any case, no message from the AL leaders ever reached the
EBR and EPR men.
The gruesome operations carried on by the West Pakistan
forces during the two days following March 25 revealed that
their strategy was to kill armed Bengalis in Bangladesh and to
use terror on such amassive scale as to frighten the rest into
submission. Ironically enough, it was the attacks on the EBR,
EPR and police on March 25 that forced these groups to join
the newly formed People’s Sangram Parishads (Resistance Com¬
mittees), designed physically to resist West Pakistan military
forces. The formation of these committees ushered in the second
phase of the Bangladesh revolution.
Chittagong District
Some idea of hov/ fast resistance spread outside Dacca can be
gainedbyanalysingeventsinChittagong,wheretensionsbetween
Bengalisandnon-BengalishadbeengrowingfromMarch1.Short¬
ly after the army crackdown, AL leaders of Chittagong contac¬
ted the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts,
who released some guns for AL volunteers. Anumber of Bur¬
m e s e rebel groups that had taken shelter in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts also supplied weapons to the AL.
On the night of March 25 West Pakistan troops in Chittegong
destroyed the Recruitment Centre of the East Bengal Regiment,
killing almost all of the trainees stationed there. The Deputy
Commissioner (DC) of Chittagong went into hiding, the Super¬
intendent of Police (SP) wavered, and AL leaders in Chittagong
were unable to establish contact with Major Ziaur Rahman, who
at the time commanded abattalion of EBR troops in the area.
At 11 p.m. on March 25 the Commanding Officer of the West
Pakistan Army Brigade in Chittagong telephoned Major Ziaur
Revolution by Phases 8?
Rahmanandinstructedhimtogototheport,whereportwork¬
ers were resisting the unloading of arms and ammunition from
Pakistan. On his
way to the port. Major Ziaur Rahman w a s
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warned by some of his troops that the West Pakistan soldiers

intended to kill him at the port. At that point the young Bengali
Major returned to camp and declared his intention to lead arevolt.
88theBangladeshRevolutionandItsAftermath
While the West Pakistan troops remained isolated in the can¬
tonment after the operations on the night of March 25, waiting
for re-inforcements for Dacca, Major Ziaur Rahman’s troops
and AL volunteers occupied the city of Chittagong. For more
than 6days AL volunteers rampaged through the city, killing
manyofthenon-Bengalis.Therebelsalsooccupiedtheradio¬
station in Chittagong and Major Ziaur Rahman (Major Zia)
madeabroadcastonMarch27declaringtheindependenceof
Bangladesh.3“
In the subdivision of Cox’s Bazar (in Chittagong district)
and in the subdivisions of Bandarban and Ramgar (in the
district of the Chittagong Hill Tracts), there were no Pakistan
troops.InCox’sBazarthesubdivisionalofficer(SDO)remained
indifferent to government orders and the AL-led resistance com¬
mittee took over the administration from March 1. In Bandar-
ban subdivision the SDO co-operated with AL volunteers and
carried on civil administration for some time in the name of the
Bangladeshgovernment.InRamgar,wheretheSDOalsorem¬
ained indifferent, AL volunteers took over administration. In
Rangamati, the district headquarters of the Chittagong Hill
Tracts, there were anumber of Bengali EPR men, commanded
by afew Punjabi officers. These Punjabi officers were killed.
The DC cooperated fully with the rebels and was able to main¬
tain orderly civil administration.
Noakhali District
In the district headquarters of Noakhali there was no Pakistan
army garrison, and here too resistance was led by AL volun¬
teers. In the subdivisional town of Feni there was aplatoon of
West Pakistan troops, but the SDO, aWest Pakistan CSP officer,
had fled his post. ABengali Flight-Lieutenant who had defec¬
ted from Pakistan air force base at Dacca organised resistance
forces of local police, members of the University Officers’ Train¬
ing Corps (UOTC) and anumber of Ansars and Mujahids,^^ and
forced the West Pakistan platoon to surrender. The DC of Noak¬
hali then lent full support to the Mukti-Bahini (Liberation
Army) and maintained orderly civil administration until
April 20.
Comilla District
At Comilla cantonment there was one brigade of Pakistan soldi¬

ers including one battalion of the EBR. The Brigade Comman¬
der as well as the officer-in-charge of the EBR battalion were
West Pakistanis. Major Khaled Musharraf who, as stated earlier,
had been aBrigade Major at Dacca cantonment, was transferred
to Comilla cantonment on March 22 as the second-in-command
of the EBR battalion. The West Pakistan commanders in Comilla
became suspicious of Major Musharraf and asked him to go to
Shamshernagar, aborder town of Sylhet district with acompany
of EBR to guard against “Indian intrusion”. Major Musharraf
left for Shamshernagar on March 24 and on reaching there
found no trace of alleged ‘‘intrusion”. Meanwhile in Comilla,
the remaining soldiers of the EBR battalion were killed on the
night of March 25, stiffening all resistance. The Bengali DC as
well as the Bengali SP were arrested and executed within a
week.
On the evening of March 26 Major Musharraf contacted by

wireless Major Shafat Jamil, who was at Brahmanbaria with
an EBR company. Both Majors had already overheard on their
wireless sets the orders of the Pakistan army high command to
sort out” the Bengalis. Since the troops under them had bec¬
ome restive, the two majors decided to act. Major Musharraf
and his troops proceeded towards Brahmanbaria, reaching there
on the morning of March 27. In the meantime, agroup of West
Pakistan soldiers had been sent to Brahmanbaria from Comilla,
most probably for the purpose of making asurprise attack on
the EBR Bengali troops at Brahmanbaria. Majors Musharraf
and Jamil attacked the Pakistan soldiers, imprisond them, and
liberated Brahmanbaria.
The Bengali SDO at Brahmanbaria cooperated with Major

Musharraf’s rebel forces and with AL volunteers. Together they
maintained civil administration until April 14.
Sylhet District
In the subdivision of Habiganj there were no Pakistan soldiers
on permanent duty. AL leaders nevertheless organised for possi¬
ble future resistance, and the SDO, aBengali, cooperated with
the Sangram Parishad in maintaining civil administration on
behalf of the rebels. At Maulvi Bazar subdivisional town apla¬
toon of West Pakistan troops had been stationed on aperman¬
ent basis. AL volunteers from Habiganj, armed with 500 guns
supplied by their SDO, and fighting in conjunction with Ansars,
Mujahids and ex-servicemen from Maulvi Bazar launched an
attack on West Pakistan troops at Maulvi Bazar. In the ensu¬
ing struggle, the Punjabi SDO of Maulvi Bazar fled with them.
However, the second officer in command at Maulvi Bazar re¬
fused to cooperate with the resistance groups, with the result
that there was hardly any semblance of civil administration there
during the next month or two.
Asmall group of West Pakistan troops was stationed at
Sunamganj subdivisional town under the command of aBengali
officer. The EPR men at the border of Sunamganj subdivision,
together with AL volunteers, surrounded West Pakistan
troops, killing most of them. The remainder, together with their
Bengali captain, fled towards Sylhet (the Bengali captain later
killed by West Pakistan soldiers). When the SDO of Sunamganj
did not cooperate with the resistance groups and was assaulted
AL volunteers, civil administration at Sunamganj was taken over
by the EPR men and AL volunteers.
In the district town of Sylhet itself, Mohammad Nuruzzaman
aformer junior officer of the Pakistan army and oire of those
accused in the Agartala conspiracy case, organised the resis¬
tance.'*^ However, AL leaders in Sylhet fled away, enabling a
battalion of West Pakistan troops stationed at Sylhet temporarily
to establish their control over the town. When the DC also fled,
civil administration in Sylhet was taken over by the SP, on beh¬
alf of the Pakistan army.
Mymensingh District
In Netrokona, Jamalpur and Kishoreganj subdivisions there
were no Pakistan army units and AL-led resistance committees
easily took over the administration. While the Bengali SDO of
Netrokona wavered, the West Pakistan SDO of Jamalpur coop¬
erated with AL volunteers. In Kishoreganj subdivision the SDO,
aCSP officer, led the resistance movement himself.
Small detachments of EPR and EBR, under West Pakistan
officers, were stationed in Mymensingh town. On March 26 the
Revolution by Phases $1
West Pakistan EPR officers asked the Bengali jawans to their
barracks for ‘‘rest and relaxation.” While the Bengali EPR men
were resting, the West Pakistan officers attacked them, killing
^most of the troops under their command. In the meantime, the
Bengali EBR men at Mymensingh had sensed the designs of the
WestPakistanofficersandmanagedtoescape.
Bengali troops from Joydevpur arrived in Mymensingh on
March 27, as aresult of arevolt by Major Mohammad Safiullah
the second in command of the 2nd EBR at Joydevpur. Early in
the morning of March 27, Saliullah’s troops killed most of the
WestPakistanofficersandjawansatJoydevpur,andbyearly
evening of the 27th most of the arms and ammunition of the
Joydevpur regiment had been transferred to Mymensingh. On
March 28 Safiullah’s troops occupied Mymensingh, killing the
majority of the West Pakistan officers and jawans that had been
in control there. Major Safiullah forced the SP of Mymensingh
to hand over all arms and ammunition from the police magazine
(approximately 1,500 rifles and 300,000 pieces of ammunition)
to his troops.
Having liberated Mymensingh and ordered the wavering DC
to maintain civil administration. Major Safiullah divided his battal¬
ion into two columns. One column was sent towards Tangail
and the other led by Safiullah himself, proceeded towards
Dacca. The aim of the second column was to destroy Dacca
airport. In the meantime, Khaled Musharraf had established
contact with Safiullah by wireless and had persuaded him to
give up his plan. Musharraf’s argument being that Dacca airport
was too heavily fortified with Pakistan forces. Major Safi¬
ullah then withdrew to Kishoreganj with his troops. The SDO of
Kishoreganj arranged atrain to send Major Safiullah and his
group to Brahmanbaria. As stated earlier. Major Shafat Jamil
and Khaled Musharraf had already liberated Brahmanbaria. With
the arrival of Major Safiullah and his troops, Brahmanbaria
became astrong centre of resistance for forces now generally
known as the Mukti Bahini.
Tangail District
In Tangail district there was acompany of EPR troops under a
Bengali officer. The Bengali EPR men had already killed the
few Punjabi soldiers in the company before the column sent by
Major Safiullah reached Tangail. Since the DC of Tangail was
wavering, civil administration was taken over by aCSP officer
who was on leave at that time.
Dacca District
In Munshiganj subdivision there was aspontaneous revolt by

AL volunteers. The SDO, aCSP officer, cooperated with the
AL-Ied Sangram Parishad. In Manikganj, aretired Pakistan
army officer, together with anumber of AL volunteers, revolted,
with the cooperation of the civil administration. In the city of
Narayanganj there was hardly any resistance. The SDO was
arrested by the Pakistan army. There was aspontaneous
popular uprising in Raipura, Narshingdi and other outlying
areas. The fleeing EPR men and police from Narayanganj and
Dacca offered resistance but were badly mauled by Pakistan
troops.
Faridpur District
The Pakistan army was not present in any part of the district.
Two Bengali officers of the Pakistan army, there on leave, orga¬
nised resistance in cooperation with the AL-led Sangram Parish¬
ad. In Faridpur town the civil administration fully cooperated
with the resistance groups. In Goalando, some EPR troops
from Kushtia mobilised resistance with the help of AL volun¬
teers. The SDO, aCSP officer, cooperated with the resistance
groups and maintainad civil administration. In Madaripur peo¬
ple spontaneously revolted under the Parishad, and the SDO, a
CSP officer, lent full cooperation to the resistance committee.
In Gopalganj aWest Pakistan SDO fled away and an AL-led
resistance committee virtually took over civil administration.
Barisal and Patuakhali Districts
Here too there were no West Pakistan troops. In Barisal subdivis¬
ion Major M.A. Jalil of the Pakistan army on leave at the time,
organised resistance with the help of some EPR men, the police
and the AL-led Sangram Parishad.®^ In Patuakhali subdivision,
the AL leaders and volunteers revolted the DC, aCSP officer,
cooperated with the rebellious groups.
Khulna District
In Khulna subdivision there was one battalion of Pakistan tro¬

ops. During the week following March 25, sporadic fighting
took place between Pakistan soldiers and the resistance forces,
consisting mainly of police and labourers of Khulna industrial
belt. In this unequal fight, most of the rebels were killed. Khul¬
na subdivision, therefore, remained firmly in the hands of the
West Pakistan army. In Bagerhat and Satkhira subdivisions there
were no West Pakistan soldiers and the administration was taken
over by AL-led resistance committees.
Jessore District
In Jessore cantonment there was abrigade of Pakistan troops,

including one battalion of EBR soldiers. Most of the EBR soldi¬
ers were disarmed and killed on March 26. There was, however,
massive popular resistance elsewhere in the district. In the
subdivision of Narail, the SDO, aCSP officer, had personally
hoisted the flag of Bangladesh, thus giving the lead to the police
and AL-led resistance committee. In Magiira subdivision the
SDO revolted and organised resistance, together with AL volun¬
teers and police. In Jhenidah subdivision, the West Pakistan
SDO was on leave, and the police revolted. The subdivisional
officers of Narail and Magura and the subdivisional police offi¬
cer (SDPO) of Jlienidah established contact with each other and
formed aMukti Bahini contingent, consisting of police, Ansars,
Mujahids and some teachers, and students of Jhenidah Cadet
College. Two Bengali army officers who were on leave at Gopal-
ganj inFaridpur district were contacted and they also joined
the resistance force.
This force of about 2,000 armed men,eventually moved tow¬
ards Jessore, being joined en route by EPR men who had come
from the border posts. This raggle-taggle detachment of the
Mukti Bahini faced agroup of 200 West Pakistan soldiers on
its way to Jessore and captured all of them.®* Unfortunately,
the detachment also killed almost all of the able-bodied Biharis
(non-Bangalis) of the Bihari colony on the Narail-Jessore Road,
thus exacerbating communal tensions in that area. Nevertheless,
these “successes of the Jessore Mukti Bahini enthused Bengalis
throughout the province.
On March 31, the Jessore detachment of the Mukti Bahini,

together with about 300,000 civilians, surrounded Jessore can¬
tonment. West Pakistan troops responded by firing heavy guns
from inside the cantonment area. Hundreds of civilians and
most of the Mukti Bahini men were killed. By the end of the
first week of April, the Mukti Bahini leaders had ordered agene¬
ral retreat, while the West Pakistan troops remained entrenched
in the cantonment, waiting for reinforcements. Not surprisingly,
administration in Jessore collapsed.
Kushtia District
In Kushtia subdivision there was acompany of West Pakistan

troops. During the first two days following March 25, these
troops took over the administration of Kushtia town. But the
EPR men from the border posts banded together and, along
with police and AL volunteers, soon wiped out the company.
With the help of the DC, the rebel forces established civil
administration and kept Kushtia liberated for about afortni¬
ght. In Meherpur subdivision there were no West Pakistan
troops. The SDO himself led the resistance and maintained
civil administration for about three weeks.
In Chuadanga subdivision West Pakistan troops v/ere pres¬
ent. Under pressure from AL volunteers and the local Awami
League MPA the EPR men at the border posts revolted. The
rebels killed the West Pakistan SDO and his wife and establis¬
hed asemblance of civil administration with the help of the
s e c o n d o f fi c e r o f t h e s u b d i v i s i o n .
Rajshahi District
In Rajshahi subdlvison, where there was abattalion of West
Pakistan troops, some prominent local leaders (including an
AL MNA) were killed in the first two days. The police, in
cooperation with AL volunteers, soon began to organise resist¬
ance. Atruce between the police and the Pakistan army was arr¬
anged by the Deputy Commissioner of Rajshahi, aCSP officer.
However, the West Pakistan troops betrayed this agreement,
launching asudden attack on the police barracks when the poli¬
cemen were having their meal. Most of the policemen were kill¬
ed. In the meantime, agroup of EPR men arrived in Rajshahi,
The officers and trainees of the Police Academy at Sarda,

near Rajshahi. also joined the EPR forces and brought with
them alarge amount of arms and ammunition from the academy.
The resistance forces occupied Rajshahi town in the first week
of April and kept it under their control up to April 14.
At Natore there was aplatoon of West Pakistan soldiers. The
SDO himself led the revolt there and the resistance forces—com¬
prising the police, Ansars and AL volunteers—wiped out the
West Pakistan soldiers in the week following March 26 and kept
the town liberated up to the middle of April. In Naogaon subdi¬
vision the EPR revolted and killed the West Pakistan SDO and
took over the administration. The West Pakistan SDO of Nawab-
ganj Subdivision fled to Rajshahi to take shelter in the canton¬
ment, and the administration in Nawabganj was taken over by
the AL-led Sangram Parishad.
Pahna District
In Pabna subdivision there was one company of Pakistan troops.

There the DC himself led the resistance movement. He opened
up the police magazine and distributed arms to students, Ansars,
AL workers and various groups of the NAP. He also released
the leaders of the East Bengal Communist Party (EBCP)®® from
jail and allowed them to join the Mukti Bahini. The Mukti
Bahini exterminated the West Pakistan troops, who had run out
of ammunition. Thus Pabna town was liberated.
In Sirajganj subdivision of Pabna district there were no West
Pakistan troops. The SDO, aCSP officer, himself led revolt
there and organised the Mukti Bahini comprising police, Ansars
and AL volunteers. Some EPR men were also sent from other
places to Sirajganj to strengthen the Mukti Bahini there. The
wrath of the Mukti Bahini fell on the Biharis, who were first
kept in Sirajganj jail and later killed.
Bogra District
In Bogra subdivision there was aplatoon of West Pakistan sol¬
diers, but the DC nevertheless wavered. Volunteers of the AL,
various groups of NAP, and students, in cooperation with the
police, quickly organised resistance and wiped out the Pakistan
troops. In Jaipurhat subdivision there were no West Pakistan
troops.Again,theSDOinJaipurhatwavered,whileanAL-led
resistance committee took over the administration.
Rangpur District
InRangpursubdivisiontherewasonebrigadeofWestPakistan
troops. The Bengali officers mi. jawans of the Third EBR in
Rangpurcantonmentwerecaughtunawares,mostofthembeing
killed on March 25 and 26. The West Pakistan troops kept
Rangpurtownundereffectivecontrol.InGaibandasubdivision
there were no detachments of the West Pakistan army. The EPR
men revolted while the SDO cooperated with the EPR and AL-
led resistance committee and carried on civil administration m
thenameoftheBangladeshgovernment.InNilphamarisubdivi¬
sion the SDO wavered, but the EPR men revolted and an AL-
led resistance committee took over the administration.
In Dinajpur subdivision there was aplatoon of Pakistan
army. They established control in the first few days following
March 25. But the EPR revolted and killed some of the West
Pakistan soldiers. The rest of the West Pakistan soldiers fled
towards Rangpur. The DC in Dinajpur cooperated with the
EPP. men and the AL-led resistance committee to maintain civil
administration. In Thakurgaon subdivision there was no Pakis¬
tan army. The SDO of Thakurgaon wavered but the EPR men
revolted and together with the AL-led resistance Committee
took over the administration.
The Counter-offensive by Pakistan Forces

The extent and depth of popular and armed resistance unnerved
the Pakistan forces and they quickly withdrew to their safest
points—thecantonmentareasinDacca,Chittagong,Comilla,
Sylhet, Jessore, Khulna and Rajshahi—to protect those canton¬
ments from attack by the rebellious EBR, EPR and police
accompanied by furious mobs. Militarily, the tactics of the
Pakistan forces were to wait for reinforcements, to regroup
troops and to clear communication lines already blocked by the
defiant students and angry mobs during the period of non¬
cooperation with the Pakistan regime.
Reinforcements which had been pouring in from the last
weekofFebruarywerefurtheracceleratedafterMarch25.For
several days astream of PIA commercial jets with Pakistan
soldiers
Lanka.ss A
on board landed at Dacca Airport via Colombo, Sri
convoy of ships carrying soldiers, arms and am¬
munitionalsoreachedChittagongPort,whichhadbeensecured
bythegunsofthePakistanNavy.Withthesetwooperationsthe
PakistanarraymanagedtomovetwofulldivisionstoBangladesh.
Bymid-AprilPakistanforceswerereadytoundertakeacoun-
ter-offensive.
AlaigenumberoftroopswereflownfromDaccatoChitta¬
gong on April 15. There were two-pronged attacks on the rebel
forces mChittagong, from Naval ships and from cantonment
areas.TheAwamiLeagueleadersfledaway.AgroupofEBR
men,underMajorZia,fledtowardsRangamati.Anothergroup
oEBR, under Major Mir Shaukat Ali, fled towards Cox’s
Bazar.MajorZia’sgrouptookawayaone-kilowattradio-trans¬
mitter and tried to broadcast from Kalurghat. Fighting took
placetherebetweenMajorZia’stroopsandPakistantroopsand
about100BengaliEPRwerekilled.TheKalurghattransmitter
wasbombedanddestroyedbyPakistanAirForceplanes.Major
ZiaandhistroopsthenhidinthejunglesoftheChittagong
HillTractsandwithgreatdifficultyeventuallyreachedtheIndi¬
an border.
The other group of EBR men ted by Major Mir ShaukatAli

avoidedencounterswiththePakistanforces,fearingheavy
losses. They also hid in the jungles of the Chittagong Hill
Tracts.Herefreshdifficultiesaroseforthem.Foryearsthe
Pakistan government had given shelter to about 1,000 Mizo
rebels in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, aform of support for the
Mizo attempt to secede from India. The Mizo rebels were train¬
ed by Pakistan army officers and the provisional government
ofLaldanga,theMizoleader,wasalsointheChittagongHill
Tracts. The Indian Army stationed at Aijol, the capital of the
Indian state of Mizoram, bordering the Chittagong Hill Tracts,
hadalreadybeguntosupplyarmstorebelliousgroups,inthe
ChittagongareasandhadpressedtheMuktiBahinitowipeout
the Mizos.®^
Fighting took place between the Mizos and the Mukti Bahi¬
ni, partly because the IndianArmy did not move in to help the
MuktiBahiniwhenMajorShaukatAli’scompanywassurround-
ed by Mizos. During this fighting, one o f fi c e r a n d a f e w
soldiers were killed. The rest of Major Shaukat Ali sgroup
somehowmanagedtofleetoIndia.TheMizoslaterextended
help to the Pakistan Army and the Mukti Bahini then had to
withdrew completely from Chittagong Hill Tracts, despite its
beingthemostsuitableareainBangladeshfortraining,recruit¬
ment and sanctuary.
HavingdrivenouttheMuktiBahinifromChittagong,Pakistan
forces moved in separate columns towards Rangamati, Ramgar
and Bandarban.There was hardly any resistance to the advanc¬
ing Pakistan columns. TheALleaders and workers who had
formedSangramParishadsindifferenttowns,togetherwiththe
DC of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, fled to India.
AboutsixcompaniesofPakistantroopswereliftedbyheli¬
copter to the Brahmanbaria area.Another battalion of Pakis¬
tan forces arrived there by river. These troops began to shell
thepositionstakenbytheMuktiBahini,atthattimeunder
the command of Major Safiullah. The Mukti Bahini positions
werealsosubjectedtobombingandshellingbyPakistanAir
Forceplanes.MajorSafiullahandhistroopsquicklyvacated
Brahmanbaria,takingupdefensivepositionsinthemorenorth¬
ernborderareasofSylhetdistrict.ThePakistanforcespursued
Major Safiullah’s troops and ultimately drove them into India.
AfullbrigadeofPakistansoldierswereairliftedfromDacca
toSylhet.FromSylhetonecolumnmovedEasttowardsZaki-
ganjandanotherWesttowardsMaulviBazar.TheBrahman¬
baria column reached Habiganj and met the Sylhet column
at Maulvi Bazaf. These advancing columns encountered hardly
a n y resistance. Those who did organise some resistance princi-
pally at Habiganj and Maulvi Bazar soon fled towards India.

One column of Pakistan troops v/as sent from Dacca to An-
chainmid-April.ThisadvancewasresistedatNagarbariGhat
and at the Jalmalia bridge (near the Sarda PoliceAcademy).
But the EPR-led Mukti Bahini was no match for the West Pakis¬
tanarmywhichpossessedrockets,machine-guns,mortarsand
heavyguns.TheadvancingPakistancolumnreachedRajshahi
onApril14.HavingreconqueredRajshahi,apartofthecolumn
movedtowardsBogra.ThisgroupofPakistanforceswasresisted
intwoplacesatDabBaganandBagabariGhatontheBogra
road, but the Mukti Bahini lost with heavy casualties. From
Bogra, Pakistan forces established alink with Saidpur and
Rangpur.
Similarly,afterhavingbeenreinforcedthroughanairliftof
soldiersfromDacca,onecolumnofPakistansoldiersfromJes-
soremovedouttoKushtia.TheMuktiBahiniofferedresistance
othecolumnmovingtowardsKushtia—atBhishakali,near
ar inge Bridge and at Kagar Pukur—but lost with heavy
casualties.AnothercolumnofPakistansoldiersfromJessore
Khulna. This column was also resisted by
tneMuktiBahiniatseveralplaces,buttheresistancewaseasily
overcome by Pakistan columns equipped with superior arms,
With the Mukti Bahinisuffering
l„" heavy casualties, most of its
members fled towards India,
armed rebellion in Bangladesh
hadbeenatleasttemporarilysuppressed.Pakistantroops,having
re-establishedlinksbetweenthemajorcantonmentareasand
havingclearedtheroadandrailwaycommunicationsnetwork
ot armed rebels, re-established their control over almost all of
Bangladesh.BytheendofMay,onlyapartofTetuliathana
oinajpur distiict, Patgram and Raumari thanas of Rangpur
district(ontheeasternsideoftheriverJamuna),twosmall
pockets of Sylhet district (one in Maulvi Bazar sub-division
and another in Sylhet sub-division)-a total area of about 400-
500 square miles-remained inaccessible to the Pakistan a r m y.
Conclusions
While the first phase of the Bangladesh revolution- the non-

cooperation movement and establishment of ade facto govern-
raent under Sheikh Mujib-was led by the top leaders of the Aw-
amiLeague,thesecondphasewasledbysecond-rankingjunior
cadres of the AL and middle-level and junior officers of the EBR
and EPR, almost all in their twenties and thirties. As has been
stated above, inmost of the sub-divisions and district towns civil
servants actively cooperated with theAL-Ied resistance commit¬
tees.InRajshahi,Naogaon,Kurigram,Dinajpur,andNilpha-
mari the EPR and police were pressed by students, localAL
leaders, and the general public to revolt. So far as the EBR
was concerned, the officers were hesitant and were not in a
-mood to revolt. But the troops continuously pressed them to
revolt.
ItwasonlyaftertheEBRofficers’overheardthewireless
messagesofPakistanofficerstotheirtroops-to“smasheve^-
thing”--andonlyaftertheybegantoapprehendthattheythem¬
selves would be killed, that they submitted to the pressures o
theirtroopsandrevolted.Onesignificantaspectoftherevolu¬
tionwasthat,wherevertheMuktiBahiniengagedPakistantroops,
it fou id massive spontaneous support from ordinary people,
usuallyarmedwithlathis(bamboosticks),swordsandother
typesofprimitiveweapons.Therealheroesoftheseco
phaseoftherevolutionwerestudents,juniorcadresoftheA,i
ordinarypeople,thejawansoftheEBR,andpolicemen.Itwas
apeoples’revolutionintheliteralsenseoftheterm.
was that it
Why did this revolution fail? The first reason
wasentirelyunplanned.Mostoftheprominentleadersofthe
ALwereconfinedbycircumstancestoDacca.Manyfled,helter-
skelter,tosavetheirownlives,withsomeofthemsomehow
managingtoreachneighbouringprovincesinIndia.Nocoher¬
entpoliticalleadershipwasgiventotherevolutionaries.
In addition, there was no coordination among the ’va.ricws gro¬
upsofMuktiBahiniunderthecommandofEBRandEPRoni-
cers.Asaresult,nocommonstrategywasevolved.Major
KhaledMusharrafandMajorMohammadSafiullahdidestablish
contact,butonly10daysaftertheinitialcrackdownbyPakis¬
tan.MajorZiaandMajorKhaledMusharrafcameintocontact
twodayslater.MajorJalilinBarisal,CaptainHaliminManik-
ganj.MajorOsmaninChuadanga,MajorGhiasuddmmR^-
shahi,CaptainNazrulHuqinDinajpur,CaptainNawazesh-
uddinin Kurigram— each of whom led an armed revolt a
acted in isolation. Colonel Usmani, who later (on April 18,19/1)
w a s appointedastheCommander-in-ChiefoftheMukti
bytheBangladeshGovernment-in-exileinCalcutta,reached
AgartalainTripurastateofIndiainthefirstweekofÂpril,
but he did not know what was happening all around him and
hadtoacceptarideinanIndianhelicopterinordertogamfirst¬
hand knowledge of what was going on.
The initial reverses of the Pakistan forces and their with¬
drawal into fortified enclaves created aeuphoria of success. For
Bangladesh leaders this euphoria was accompanied by the e x ¬
pectation of immediate recognition from India and Indian military
help. Conflict arose between different factions of the AL when
Indian help was not immediately forthcoming, and this faction¬
alism percolated down to AL units at the local level. The AL
leaders were distrustful of EBR and EPR officers, fearing that
they might seize power after defeating the Pakistanis. The AL
local leaders also became distrustful of other political parties.
Conflicts for leadership were present too among army offi¬
cers. It was especially common to have quarrels between those
who had troops under their command and those who had fled
without troops. In the melee looting of banks took place in
many miifassil In some places non-Bengalis were haras¬
sed or killed. As the Mukti Bahini and the people supporting
them were in disarray, the reinforced Pakistan forces struck
hard, in accordance with aplanned strategy and using far supe¬
rior arms and ammunition. As Pakistan forces moved swiftly
in different directions, crushing the resistance of the Mukti
Bahini, most of the junior AL leaders fled to India in panic.
The result was that there was no planned transfer of r e s o u r c e s
to India. Most of the treasuries, food and jute supplies were left
behind for Pakistan forces.
Engels, in one of his letters to Karl Marx, wrote; “Terror
consists mostly of useless cruelties perpetrated by frightened
people in order to reassure themselves. 3“ The West Pakistan
troops, after their initial fright at the awe-inspiring wrath and
fury of the Bengalis, resorted once again to ablood-curdling
massacre of Bengalis, receiving reinforcements from West Pakis¬
tan. Moving out in separate columns toward district and subdi-
visionaltowns,theyburnedhousesandkilledindiscriminately,
wherever there was the slightest resistance. As the Pakistan
troops approached atown or bazar, most people would flee away
to the villages. Having entered atown, the Pakistan troops
generally took non-Bengalis as their guides and burned the
shopsandhousesbelongingtoBengalis,especiallythosebelong¬
ing to AL supporters and Hindus. In some areas they urged
the poor people to loot the shops and, while the people engaged
lOl The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath
themselves in looting, the Pakistan forces would take photogra¬
phs of the looting and later kill the “looters” indiscriminately.
After these ‘‘operations” in April, Pakistan forces tried to
seal the borders between Bangladesh and India, killing in the
who were flee-
process thousands of unarmed men and women
ing to India. By July, killings inside Bangladesh had become
systematised.MembersoftheJaraaat-i-Islami,variousfactions
of the Muslim League, the Nizam-i-Islam and the Jamaat-e-
Ulema-e-Pakistan formed collaborating ‘peace’ committee in the
districts, subdivisions, thanas, and at the village level. In these
activities politicians were joined by adventurers who sought
only plunder and loot. Some of the members of the peace com¬
mittees, as well as some of the non-Bengalis and adventurers,
provided the intelligence network for the Pakistan army.
Whenever the Pakistan forces would receive information from
their intelligence men about the presence of Hindus, AL work¬
ers, and educated youth or sympathisers of the liberation move¬
ment,Pakistansoldierswouldgoouton“operation”,encircling
agivenareaandkillingallthosewithinsight.These“operations”
created such anightmare among the people that every village
maintained aseries of vigils day and night to watch out for the
Pakistan army. At the very sight of the army people would be
advised to flee to other villages.^ On occasion the army would
arrest suspected AL workers, intellectuals and educated youth
and bring them to torture chambers in the cantonment areas
for the purpose of wresting information from them. Having
tortured some of these people to death, the Pakistan forces
would throw them into mass graves.
ByAugust, however, trained guerrillas began to pour back
into Bangladesh from India in large numbers, and they imme¬
diately set to work to destroy bridges, railway lines and other
communication facilities, while ambushing army patrol parties.
In an attempt to counter the guerrillas, the Pakistan army recr¬
uited more than 100,000 razakars (helpers) whose names were
recommendedbythepeacecommittees,providingthemwithtrain¬
ing and arms to protect bridges and rail lines. Indiscriminate
killings then became the order of the day. Indeed, Pakistan
soldiers were now instructed to loot and burn everything in
sight wherever the guerrillas were active.
InSeptember-Octobertviôothergroups—theAlBadar(sol¬
diers of the first battle for Islam) and the Al-Shams (the Sun)
were armed by the Pakistan army. These two groups w e r e m a n -
ned by members of the Islamic Chhatra Sangha (Islamic Stu¬
dents Organisation), the fanatical student wing of the Jamaat-i-
Islami. They began to exterminate leading left-wing professors,
journalists, litterateurs, and even doctors.î
NOTES
1. Of the total registered voters in East Bengal in 1970, 57.69 per cent
cast their votes in the National Assembly election on December
7, 1970. The percentage figures of votes cast and votes obtained
by different parties in East Bengal were released to the press by
the Election Commission. See (Dacca), January 23, 1971.
In the provincial elections held on December 17, the Awami
League again won almost total victory in East Bengal. The results
of the provincial assembly elections are given below:
Name of the Seats won Percentage of votes

party secured of total
votes cast
Awami League 288 89.00

Jamaat-i-IsIami 1 3.00
PDP 2 1.00
PML (Council) X 0.05
PML (Convention) X 1.00
PML (Qayyum) X 0.05
Independent and others 9 5.90
To t a l 300 100.00
The percentage of votes secured by each party in the provincial

elections in East Bengal is based on the constituency-wise results
published in tho Morning .Vorj (Dacca), December 18 and Decem¬
ber 19,1970.
2. S-iQ Election Manifesto of the Pakistan People’s Party 1970 (Karachi,
Vision Publications, 1970)
3. The percentage of votes secured by various parties in West Pakistan
in the general elections for National Assembly held on December
7, 1970 was tabulated from constituency-wise results published
in Ittefag (Dacca) on December 8, 9, 10, 1970. The percentage of
votes secured by various parties in East Bengal in the same elec-
tions Were also tabulated by the author from the same paper. The
1G4 The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath
figure for each party in East Bengal thus tabulated did not differ
substantially from the figures later released by the Election Com¬
mission Office in Dacca. So the percentage of votes secured by
various parties in West Pakistan given in Table 5, can be regarded
-as reasonably accurate. In the provincial elections in West Pakis¬
tan, the PPPwonll3 out of 180 seats in the Punjab, 34 out of 60
seats in Sind, 4out of 40 seats in NWFP and none of 20 seats
in Baluchistan.
4. Bhutto, while giving his version of the causes of the Bangladesh
revolution, blamed the Yahya Khan regime for allowing the Awami
League to campaign on the Six-Point programme, despite the
Legal Framework Order, See Z.A. Bhutto, The Great Tragedy,
(Karachi ;Vision Publications Ltd., 1971) pp. 59-60.
5. The figures were presumably supplied to the AL leaders by ex¬
perts in the party and tallied well with the figures mentioned by
professional political scientists who wrote on Pakistan such as
K. B. Sayeed, R. Jahan and others. SecK. B. Sayead, The Political
System of Pakistan, (Karachi :Oxford University Press, 1967)
pp. 191-203 and R. Jedam, Pakistan: Failure in National. Integration,
(Dacca: Oxford University Press, 1973) pp. 79-85.
6. The Pakistan Observer, (Dacca), December 6,1970.
7. See Chapter VIII below.
8. Morning News (Dacca), January 4, 1971.
9. Ibid.
10. See Chapter II, pp. 25-26.
11. The Pakistan Observer, (December 21, 1970.)
12. Holiday (Dacca), December 27, 1970.
13. Morning News, February 16, 1971.
14. February 18,1971.
15. 7Wrf., March 1, 1970.
16. See Report ofTajuddin Ahmed, General Secretary of Awami League
to the Council Session of Bangladesh Awami League, April 7-S, 1972
.(published by Abdul Momin, Publicity-Secretary-of the Awami
League, 1972), p. 3.
17. According to Bhutto, an application was also sent to the Secre¬
tary-General of the United Nations for admission to the world
body. See Z.A. Bhutto, op. cit.,p. 34.
18. Sec The Pakistan Observer, March 18,1971.
19. For avivid description of the revolutionary mood of the people
o f B a n g l a d e s h i n t h e fi r s t t h r e e w e e k s o f M a r c h , s e e F o r u m ,
March 13 and 20, 1971.
20. Ibid., March 13, p. 3. See also, “Mujibur ;Virtual Ruler of East
Pakistan”,' TAe Washington Post, March 21, 1971.
21. Vice-Admiral S:M. Ahsan, 50, came from Hyderabad, Deccan,
India. From 1964 to 1966 he served as the Chairman of the Inland
Water Transport Authority, East Pakistan. During this period
lie developed friendship with anumber of intellectuals in

Dacca who were originators of the idea of greatly extended auto¬
nomy for East Pakistan. Later, as Governor of “East Pakis¬
tan”, ho was also able to internalise, the feelings of the Bengalis.
L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l Ya k u b w a s a s c h o l a r l y g e n e r a l a n d h a d a
sense of historical perspective. He mastered the Bengali lan¬
guage within three months of his appointment as Martial Law
Administrator of “East Pakistan” and came to admire Bengali
language and culture. He thought that military repression could
not suppress the Bangladesh revolution.
22. As many as 22 generals (including Hamid, Gul Hasan, Omar,
Akbar Khan, Mitha—all members of the “inner cabinet” of Yahya
were in Dacca during the third week of March, for the purpose
of preparing plans to ‘fix the whole situation within 72 hours’.
23. Rumours about asettlement were reported in foreign newspapers
like The New York Times, March 25, 1971; The Washington
Post, March 25, 1971. Ihave not gone into the details of the Mujib-
Yahya-Bhutto negotiations, held during the period January
12-March 24, 1971, as agreat deal has already been written on
this subject. See David Dunbar, “Pakistan: The Failure of
Political Negotiations,” Asian Survey, XII :5(May, 1972) pp.
444-461 :R. Jahan, “Elite in Crisis :The Failure of Mujib-Yahya-
Bhutto Negotiations”, Orbis, XVII ;2(Summer 1973), pp. 575-
597 ;G.W. Choudhruy, The Last Days of United Pakistan (London,
C. Hurst &Company, 1974), pp. 132-179 ;H. Feldman, The End
and the Beginning Pakistan 1969-1971 (Karachi; Oxford University
Press, 1976), pp. 98-137. While these scholars differ in apportion¬
ing blame for the failure of negotiations all of them agree that the
talks failed because Sheikh Mujib would not submit to the com¬
bined pressure of the military Junta and Bhutto and modify the
six-point formula on which his party had been elected. In the last
phase of the negotiations in Dacca—from March 15 to March 24
G e n e r a l Ya h y a a d o p t e d “ t h e m o s t c o n c i l i a t o r y p o s t u r e i n h i s
talks with Mujib”, possibly to probe into the depth of Sheikh
Mujib’s intentions. When he found out that Sheikh Mujib would
accept nothing less than aconfederal solution with West
Pakistan, he left Dacca at an undisclosed hour on March 25,.
having already ordered his military advisors to carry out the pre¬
pared plan to suppress the Bengali nationalists movement.
24. The author himself was in Dacca from March 24 to March 29,
after which he fled from the city to the rural areas. Expelled from
Dacca, an American journalist reported from Hong Kong :“The
cyclone might not have taken its full toll yet”. This revealing
remark Was made by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto during aMarch-4 inter¬
v i e w. I t s h o w e d t h a t P a k i s t a n ’ s m i l i t a r y - b u r e a u c r a t - l a n d l o r d
elite Was willing to shed blood to keep control of East Pakistan.
106 The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath
Three Weeks later—last Thursday—the bloodshed began. The
Evening Star, Washington, March 29, 1971. Sslig Harrison des¬
cribed the operation as the “bloody blitz of Dacca”, The Washing¬
ton Post. March 28, 1971. See also the editorial. The New York
March 31, 1971.
25. These figures Were quoted to the author by Colonel (later Major-
General) Safiullah, Chief of Staff, Bangladesh army, on July 12,
1972.
26. Interview With Khaled Musharraf on August 24, 1973. Musharraf

was at that time aColonel. Musharraf came back to Dacca in
in
mid-February 1971 having finished atraining programme
Germany and England in aCommando Special Service Group.
He Was then appointed aBrigade Major at Dacca Cantonment.
27. Interview with Colonel Safiullah on July 12, 1972.
28. Interview With Tajuddin Ahmed on August 29,1973, With Colonel
Khaled Musharraf on August 8,1973, and With Colonel Safiullah on
July 12,1972.
29. Details of the second phase of the revolution given below Were
culled from various sources. These include interviews With soma
of the civil servants in charge of subdivisions and districts
in Bangladesh in March-April 1971 and Who Want to r e m a i n
unnamed here ;also important are my interviews With Colonel
Khaled Musharraf, Tajuddin Ahmed, and Colonel Safiullah, all
referred to previously. See also aseries of interviews With
Colonel Usmani, published in Dainik Bangla (Dacca) dated Decem¬
ber5,6,8,and9,1972,andspecialinterviewsWithKaderSiddiqui,
publishedlaDainikBangladatedDecember10,1972,WithColonel
Zaman, published in Bichitra (Dacca Weekly), September 28,
1972. Aspecial article on “Z” Force and Colonel Safiullah appeared
in Bichitra (August 10, 1972). See also “Sammuk Samare Bangali”
(Bengalis in Front-Fighting), by Major Amin Ahmad Choudhury,
published in Bichitra (August 8, 1973), “Mukti-Sangrame
Tangail” (Tangail in the Liberaton War), published in Desk
(Calcutta Monthly), dated Aguust 4, 1972 ;Joy Bangla, Special
issue 1972 ;Major M.S. Bhuiyan, Mukti-Juddhe Noy Mash (Nine
Months of Liberation War) (Dacca: Ahmed Publishing House,
1972).
30. In his first broadcast on March 27, Major Ziaur Rahman atmo-
unced himself as the Head of State of Independent Bangladesh.
This declaration created great resentment among AL leaders
and Workers and among students in Chittagong. In his second
broadcast. Major ZiaUr Rahman declared that ha Was proclaim¬
ing independence on behalf of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman, the Father of the Nation. See Major M.S. Bhuiyan,
op. cit., p. 29.
31. Ansars and Mujahids w&re raised as auxiliary forces in the early
1950s by the Pakistan Government. They were given some
military training and could handle ordinary guns and rifles.
32. Nuruzzaman was the Chief of the Jatio Rakkhi Bahini (National
Defence Force) which was raised after the liberation of Bangla¬
desh for the maintenance of internal security.
33. Major Jalil later became the President of Jatio Somajtantric Dal
(JSD), or National Socialist Party (See Ch. VIII below).
34. The captured soldiers were kept in Narail jail for afew days and
later executed by the firing squads of the Mukti Bahini.
35. For details of EBCP see Chapter III, pp. 45-46.
36. An event of great historic and strategic significance took place
on January 30, 1971, when two Kaslimiri Muslims hijacked an
Indian Airlines Fokker Friendship aircraft and ordered it to land
at Lahore. On February 3the hijackers destroyed the aircraft and
the Indian government announced that until the question of
compensation was satisfactorily settled flights over India by Pak¬
istan would be prohibited. While the Pakistan Government anno¬
unced that the hijacking and the destruction of the aircraft was
an Indian plot to justify the scaling off of Pakistan’s overflights.
Sheikh Mujib described the whole event as “a conspiracy by the
Pakistan government to postpone the transfer of power”. The
truth surrounding this mysterious event Will possibly never be
revealed, but the ban on overflights by India did force Pakistani
aircraft to fly via Sri Lanka, adding 2,000 miles to the normal
flight route. See H. Feldman, The End and the Beginning: Pak¬
istan 1969-1971, (Karachi; Oxford University Press, 1976),
pp. 158-160, 202.
37. At the time of the Bangladesh resistance there was adivision of
Indian soldiers stationed at Aijol.
38. Some of the looted money was later deposited in the account of
the Bangladesh Government-in-exile in Calcutta, but most of the
money was misappropriated by adventurers.
39. Quoted in “Mujib—Sovereign in Bangladesh”, in Joy Bangla
Special issue (Calcutta :1972). p. 26.
40. Asurvey of Rajshahi University students, conducted in the first
fortnight of July, 1972, showed that 71 per cent of students’ families
had left their homes for safety during the eight-month period
of the liberation struggle. See A.H. Talukder, Rajshahi University
Students and Bangladesh Liberation Struggle; ASurvey Report
(Rajshahi: Modern Printing Press, 1973) p. 36.
41. The Al-Badar killed 10 professors of Dacca University, five leading
journalists (including the BBC Correspondent), two litterateurs
and 26 doctors in Dacca alone. The names and professions of
these victims were published in the Dainik Bangla (Dacca), Decem¬
ber 22, 1971.
CHAPTER VI
G U E R R I L L A WA R A N D T H E I N D I A N R O L E
MachiavelU warned the Prace centuries ago: “When once the

people have taken arms against you, there will never be lack¬
ing foreigners to assist them.”^ Given the strained relationship
between India and Pakistan, and given present-day ‘‘great
power” rivalries, support to Bangladesh rebels from neighbour¬
ing India and some of the great powers was perhaps inevitable.
At the governmental level, some of the Awami League lead¬
ers contacted atop official of the Indian Deputy High Commis¬
sioner’s office at Dacca in the first week of March 1971, when
they began to apprehend the use of military force to suppress
the non-cooperation movement. The official concerned then
went to Delhi, on the pretext of his daughter’s illness, and came
back on March 8after having consulted the “appropriate autho¬
rities.” He assured the AL leaders that some help in terms of
food-supply at the border and political asylum for AL leaders
would be available.2
Soon after the military crackdown on March 25, Indira Gan¬
dhi called ameeting of her Political Affairs Committee, consist¬
ing of Y.B. Chavan, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, Jagjivan Ram,
and Swaran Singh. D.P. Dhar, Chairman of the Policy Plan¬
ning Committee of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government
of India and the three chiefs of the Indian defence services
attended the meeting by invitation. The meeting discussed the
propriety of Indian military intervention in support of the
Bangladesh rebels. The Chiefs of the Indian defence services
reportedly argued that the Indian armed forces were un¬
prepared at the moment for military intervention, which could
lead to all-out war with Pakistan.
Guerrilla War and the Indian Role 109
The Chinese might also have created trouble for India on

the Tibetan border and North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA)
regions in the East. The Five-Year Defence Plan launched by
the Indian government in 1964, to modernise and expand India’s
defence forces in order to be able to cope with simultaneous
attack by Pakistan and China, was not yet fully implemented.
Moreover, about four divisions of the Indian army in Eastern
Command were engaged in meeting the demands of internal
security. Several additional divisions were to be raised and a
new operational and logistical infrastructure was to be built
before the Indian armed forces could launch a“lightning camp¬
aign” in Bangladesh.
On the recommendati on of the Service Chiefs, the Political
Affairs Committee decided against military intervention at that
moment. The Border Security Force (BSE) of India was given
permission to lend all possible help to the Mukti Bahini, then
engaged in pitched battles with Pakistan army columns in var¬
ious areas. The BSE was, however, given strict order not to con¬
front the Pakistan forces directly. In the second phase of the
revolution, the BSP men entered Chuadanga, Meherpur, Rajsha-
hi, Dinajpur and Sylhet to support the EBR/EPR from the
rear. At that time the BSE supplied arms and ammunition to
the Mukti Bahini in places where there were no trained EBR or
EPR. When the Mukti Bahini later met with reverses, the BSE
supplied large amounts of explosives to the Mukti Bahini soldi¬
ers for the purpose of destroying bridges and road communica¬
tions. The BSP also provided expert services in some places and
gave artillery support to the Mukti Bahini, while the latter re¬
treated towards the Indian border.^
Formation of the Government-in-Exile
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested on the night of March 25,

1971 by the Commandos of Special Service Group (SSG) under
General Osman Mitha, the head of SSG, and taken to West
Pakistan, where he was kept in solitary confinement in adistrict
town until January 1972. At the time of his last meeting with
other AL leaders, on the night of March 25, he was reportedly
pressed by Tajuddin Ahmed to flee. One EPR Major also came
and requested Sheikh Mujib to escape.
Sheikh Mujib’s decision not to flee was probably influenced

by his past experiences. He may have expected that the army’s
ruthless attempts to suppress the movement for autonomy
would be only temporary. Then, as in 1969, his arrest would
initiate another massive popular movement and he would again
be released to ride the crest of anew wave of popularity. He
might also have thought that while fleeing he might be killed,
either by extremist students displeased with his temporising on
the issue of independence or by the Pakistan forces who would
then put the blame on the extremists. He might have also felt
that if he fled, the Pakistan army would in its fury resort to
massive killing and destruction of property in Dacca. However,
while he stayed on at home, Sheikh Mujib asked his colleagues
either to hide themselves or to flee.*
Tajuddin Ahmed, General Secretary of the AL, together with
another AL leader, Amirul Islam, fled together from Dacca.
They crossed the Kushtia border on March 30 and contacted a
BSF sentry who sent amessage to Calcutta. Ahelicopter was
sent to take them to Calcutta where Lt. General Rustamjee and
Gokul Majumder of the BSF welcomed them on behalf of the
Indian government. They were later flown to Delhi on April 2,
where Tajuddin met Mrs. Indira Gandhi to explain his plans to
form agovernment-in-exile.
With Mrs. Gandhi’s assurance of all possible help, Tajuddin
came back to Calcutta on April 4. In the meantime, most of the
AL leaders and elected members of the National Assembly of
Pakistan (MNA) and the Provincial Assembly of East Bengal
(MPA) had fled from the country. They were finally able to
meet in Calcutta, where they formed the Constituent Assembly
of Bangladesh in exile. The formal meeting of the Constituent
Assembly was held on April 17 on Bangladesh soil in amango-
grove at Baddayanattala (named “Mujibnagar” by the govern¬
ment-in-exile), avillage in Meherpur sub-division bordering West
Bengal.5 With aDeclaration of Independence, the Constituent
Assembly proclaimed the sovereignty of Bangladesh, electing
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as President and Syed Narrul Islam
as Vice-President. According to the terms of this Declaration,
the Vice-President was empowered to act as President of Bangla¬
desh in the absence of Sheikh Mujib.®
After Syed Nazrul Islam’s elevation to the position of Acting

President, Tajuddin as Prime Minister formed acabinet from
among the seniormost office-bearers of the AL, consisting of
Khandokar Mushtaq Ahmed, Mansur Ali and A.H.M. Kamruz-
zamanJ The government was deliberately kept small so that
there could not be too many aspirants for ministership and
disappointed members could not create fissures within the AL.
The cabinet appointed Colonel Ataul Ghani Usmani, 52, afor¬
mer officer of the Pakistan army and an AL MNA, Comman-
der-in-Chief of the liberation armed forces. Some prominent
officers of the “East Pakistan” government, including 13 CSPs,
fled to India and joined the Bangladesh Government-in-exile.
The AL Government-in-exile had initially afund of Rupees
135 million ($19 million). This fund consisted of the money loot¬
ed from the banks and treasuries of “East Pakistan” during the
second phase of the revolution and deposited into aBangladesh
government consolidated fund. Rupees 40 million of this fund
was converted into Indian currency and the rest of the money
consisted of currency notes which were demonetised by the
Pakistan government. Rupees 15 million were received by the
exile government from voluntary organisations and state govern¬
ments in India.8 All foreign tours of the nominees of the Gov¬
ernment-in-exile were financed by the Indian government. Those
Bengali officers in the foreign service of Pakistan who defected
to Bangladesh were financed by voluntary contributions of Ben¬
galis living abroad and by Indian diplomatic missions.
There was, of course, adegree of factionalism within the
Government-in-exile and among those AL leaders who were in
Calcutta. One section, headed by Khandokar Mushtaq, Minister
in charge of foreign affairs, was reportedly in favour of some
sort of compromise with the Pakistan rulers on the basis of an
agreement that would ensure the release of Sheikh Mujib and
the autonomy of Bangladesh in the context of one Pakistan.
Such agreement was to be brought about through the good offi¬
ces of the United States government. Mushtaq Ahmed was re¬
ported to have maintained contact with the Consul-General of
U.S.A. in Calcutta for this purpose. Tajuddin Ahmed, being
opposed to the idea, therefore, adopted apolicy of by-passing
Mushtaq Ahmed. He made Abdus Samad, aformer member of
NAP (pro- Moscow), political advisor to the cabinet and
Samad performed the functions of ade facto Foreign Minister.
Samad headed the Bangladesh delegation sent to the World
Peace Conference held in Budapest in April 1971. Mushtaq
Ahmed’s name was announced in the Press as the leader of the
Bangladesh delegation to the United Nations General Assembly
session of 1971, blithe was finally omitted from the team and
Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury was selected to lead the delega¬
tion instead.9 Tajuddin Ahmed was thus able to isolate Mushtaq
Ahmed and pursue atough line toward Pakistan. He was also
able to establish aclose relationship with the Indian government.
Siddhartha Sankar Roy, later Chief Minister of West Ben¬
gal and at that time aMinister in the Indian government, was
the main liaison between the Bangladesh Government-in-exile
and the Indian government. A.K. Roy, Joint Secretary, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Government of India, was stationed in
Calcutta to coordinate day-to-day contact with the Bangladesh
government. For any serious issue, direct contact was mainta¬
ined between Tajuddin and Indira Gandhi, either through Siddh¬
artha Sankar Roy or D. P. Dhar.i“
Building up the Mukti Bahini

From May 15 the Indian army began to help build the Mukti
Bahini. Major-General Sarkar of the Indian army was appointed
as the Chief Liaison Officer between the Bangladesh Govern¬
ment-in-exile and the Indian army, with Brigadier Das on con¬
stant duty at the Bangladesh Government Headquarters. In the
meantime Major Safiullah, Major KhaledMusharraf and Colonel
Usmani met at Teliapara, aplace in Sylhet district bordering
India, and prepared abasic paper on the strategy of the
l i b e r a t i o n w a r.
When contemplating alternative strategies. Colonel Usmani
relied on his background of active participation in the South-
East Asia sector during the Second World War. There he had
noticed and been impressed by the .Japanese tactic, as used in
Indonesia and Burma, of atwo-pronged attack, by regular troops
and guerrillas, on allied forces. According to Usmani’s formula¬
tions, regular forces could attack the enemy positions from the
front while locally-manned guerrillas attacked from the rear.
Khaled Musharraf, whose previous training had been with the

commandos, argued that as weaker force in the partisan war the
Mukti Bahini would have to turn itself into aguerrilla’force.
Colonel Usmani insisted, however, that the activities of the guer¬
rillas would be made effective if they could be supported by a
number of sector troop units who would keep the Pakistan army
units engaged in frontal fights while the guerrillas attacked the
enemy units from the flank and the rear.
Following ideas developed by Mao Tse-tung aird Che Guev¬
ara, most Bengali army leaders realised that guerrillas must
get the support of astrong regular formation to defeat awell-
entrenched army like that of Pakistan.'^* Therefore, the strate¬
gy of the liberation war, as spelled out in amilitary paper called
the Teliapara Document, was as follows. First, alarge guerrilla
force would be raised and trained. The task of this force would
be to liquidate collaborators of the Pakistan army, destroy com¬
munication lines to immobilise the Pakistan forces, and engage
in “hit-and-run” operations against convoys and isolated posts
of the Pakistan forces to create perpetual tension for them. Sec¬
ond, the regular units of the Mukti Bahini would be enlarged,
divided into sector troops, and placed in different areas to give
cover to guerrilla operations. Third, the best material among
the regular units of the Mukti Bahini and guerrillas would be
recruited to form aregular force which would launch full-scale
direct attacks on the Pakistan army strongholds once guerrillas
and sector troops had demoralised them and cut off their lines
of logistic support.i2
Once the Teliapara Document was approved by the Bangla¬
desh Government-in-exile, as well as’by Indian staff officers, a
massive programme of recruiting and training of guerrillas was
undertaken. The Indian government’s decision to help the
Bangladesh liberation struggle was conditional on its being led
by the Awami League, whose general ideological position was
similar to that of India’s ruling Congress party. Both the Indian
government and the AL had an interest in ensuring that the
guerrillas or freedom-fighters being recruited were ideologically
loyal to the AL and that young men affiliated to other parties
(especially the various Maoist groups) were prevented from in¬
filtrating into the force. Acarefully considered procedure for
recruitment was therefore devised. Several hundred youth recep¬

tion camps were set up along the border areas to recruit young
men from Bangladesh. Since educated young men were afavour¬
ite target of Pakistan soldiers, alarge number of school, college
and university students, especially those living in the border
areas, crossed into India. Eventually more than 250,000 volun¬
teers reported to the camps for training. At these camps, which
were run by Awami League MNAs and MPAs with the help of
officers of the Bangladesh Government-in-exile, those with loyal¬
ties to parties other than the AL were screened out.
After screening and aperiod of indoctrination, those re-com¬
mended by the AL were accepted by the Indian Army for train¬
ing at centres in West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya
Pradesh, Tripura and Meghalaya. Here they were instructed in
the use of light automatic weapons, mortars and explosives.
Initially the training period was for two weeks only, but this
was found inadequate and soon extended for another three
weeks. Six weeks special training at Chakulia in Bihar was given
to those who were to act as guerrilla leaders. By the end of
November some 100,000 guerrillas had been sent back to Ban¬
gladesh while another 100,000 were still being trained in Indian
camps. The vast majority of the guerrillas recruited to the Mukti
Bahini were students, drawn primarily from lower middle class
and middle class families. Some portion of the guerrillas came
from industrial labour,i3 while others were from the families of
small businessmen and cultivators.
After the second phase of the revolution about 8,000 armed
EBR and police took shelter in the border areas of India, provi¬
ding the nucleus of the sector troops and brigade forces of Muk¬
ti Bahini. There was of course an acute shortage of officers at
first. This was partly compensated for by the arrival of 20 Ben¬
gali officers who had managed to escape from West Pakistan,^*
partly by the utilisation of afew retired army officers, and partly
by requisitioning the services of some Air Force officers. In
addition, about 100 battle-hardened guerrillas were selected to
undergo short-course officers’ training and were commissioned
i n O c t o b e r.
In order to administer the new army, aregular Armed For¬

ces Headquarters, with ten officers under Commander-in-Chief
Guerrilla War aad the Indian Role 115
Colonel Usmani, was established. Lieutenant-Colonel M.A. Rab

was appointed Chief of Staff and Group Captain A.K. Khando-
kar Deputy Chief of Staff. While Colonel Usmani had his office
in India, the Chief of Staff was able to locate his office within
Bangladesh.
To implement the Teliapara strategy, Bangladesh was divi¬
ded into 11 sectors. By the end of November the total number of
sector troops was about 10,000. The sector-commanders were as
follows;SectorOne—atfirstMajorZiaurRahman,thenMaj o r
M. Rafiq, Sector Two—at first Major Khaled Musharraf, then

Major M. Haider, Sector Three—at first Major Safiullah, then
MajorMohammadNuruzzaman,SectorFour—MajorChittaran-
janDutta,SectorFive—MajorMirShawkatAli,SectorSix—
WingCommanderM.K.Bashar,SectorSeven—MajorNuruz-
zaman.SectorEight—atfirstMajorOsmanChoudhury,then
Lieutenant-ColonelMohammadManzur,SectorNine—Major
M.A.Jalil,SectorTen—-MajorJoinalAbedin,andSectorEle¬
ven Major Abu Taher. The Sector Troops were armed with
ordinaryinfantryweaponssuppliedbytheIndianarmy.InSec¬
tor One, for example, there were one light machine-gun, some
mediummachine-guns.Rifles,grenades,2-inchand3-inchmor¬
tars, and anti-tank guns. The sector commanders in general were
helpedbyIndianarmybrigadiersinchalkingouttheirplansof
campaign.
By October, three brigade force—Z force, Kforce and S
force,ledrespectivelybyMajorsZiaurRahman,KhaledMush¬
arraf and M. Safiullah—were raised, for the purpose of launch¬
ing frontal attacks on the Pakistan strongholds. The brigades
were formed by the EBR battalions. Recruitment was made
fromthebestmaterialamongtheEPRand.police,. whiley o u n g
m e n
were also selected from among the battle-hardened guerril¬
las in an attempt to raise the strength of the EBR from five
battalions to eight. The fire-power of the Brigade Forces was
heavierthanthatordinarilysuppliedtosectortroops.Twoartil¬
lery batteries were also raised. The first battery was armed
with some old wartime guns.The second battery was armed
with better quality heavy guns, also supplied by the Indian
a r m y.
Anaval wing of the Mukti Bahini, consisting of 400 naval

commandos,wasraisedfromamongBengalinavalofficers,
warrantofficersandjawans(navalratings)whohaddefected
from the Pakistan Navy. For self-defence the naval commandos
w e r e additionally equipped with grenades. For operations they
were trained in underwater sabotage and in the use of gun-boats

and limpet mines. By October atiny air force had also been
created. Two helicopters, an Otter aircraft, and aone-engme
Dakota were provided by the Indian Air Force. The two air¬
crafts were fitted with guns, bombs and rockets. Those Bengali
air force officers who were working with the regular units of the
liberation army, as well as fifty other Bengali airmen, were
giventrainingatDimapurairportinNagaland.Toescapedetec¬
tion by Pakistan’s radar the BangladeshAir Forcemen had to
be trained to fly small aircraft at an altitude below 300 feet.’^
Mujib Bahini
Because of the massive popular support that the guerrillas recei¬
ved, the new recruits to the Mukti Bahini often emerged as exc¬
eedinglypopularheroesinBangladesh.Thisledtoanapprehen¬
sion,especiallyamongsttheAL,thattheleadershipwould_be
taken over by the Liberation Armed Forces. This possibility
would become more real if Sheikh Mujib did not return from
prison.Withthisinmind,fourcloseconfidantsofSheikhMujib
(TofaelAhmed,SheikhFazlulHuqMoni,SerajulAlamKhan,
and Abdur Razzak) formed the Mujib Bahini, an armed force
organisedexplicitlytopreservetheinterestsofSheikhMujiband
hisclosestsupporters.Collegeanduniversitystudentsbelonging
exclusivelytotheStudents’LeaguewererecruitedtotheMujib
Bahinifromyouthreceptioncampsthroughout1971,untiltotal
strengthwasreportedtohavereached7,000-8,000inNovember.
These units were given training by the Indian army in Dehra
m
Dun (in Uttar Pradesh) and in Haphlong (in Assam)
India.'® The training period was 45 days. Besides being trained
in guerrilla warfare, these men were also given political
coures on Mujibism”—projected as Sheikh Mujibur Rahman s
ideas on nationalism, secularism, socialism, and democracy.
The Mujib Bahini with its own wireless system and special
code for communication maintained aseparate existence outside
Guerrilla War and the Indian Role
the command of Bangladesh Government-in-exile and Mukti

Bahini.i^
Kader Bahini
While the Mukti Bahini and Mujib Bahini were trained and
equipped mainly by the Indian Army, there were afew forces
organised within Bangladesh and equipped primarily with w e a -
pons snatched from the Pakistan Army. The most effective
among these forces was the Bahini (army) organised by Abdul
Kader Siddiqui—popularly known as the Kader Bahini. Kader,
25 in 1971 and son of apractising Miiktear (lawyer of subord¬
inate courts) of Tangail town, was aformer Non-Commissioned
Officer in the Pakistan Army and an active participant in the
1966 war on the West Pakistan front. He had left the Pakistan
Army soon after the war and was astudent of the Intermediate
Arts class in Karatia College near Tangail in March 1971.
On April 19, when acolumn of the Pakistan Army moved
towards Mymensingh, an EPR-led force put up resistance u n s u c -
cessfully near Kalahati. Kader, who had participated in the
Kalahati battle with afew of his young friends, then moved a r o -
und in rural areas and began to collect arms and to organise a

resistance force. In the meantime the young men of Tangail,
who were special targets of the Pakistan forces, began to p o u r
into Mahanandapur (a jungle terrain between Madhupr Ghar
and Bhawal Ghar where Kader and his friends had taken shel-
ter).i® It was the pressure of these young men flocking to
Mahanandapur that encouraged Kader further; he began to
build alarge force in aplanned manner.^®
Kader Bahini men created astir among the people of Tangail
i n
June when they killed 16 Pakistan soldiers by making a
surprise attack on aPakistan outpost. Another event that fur¬
ther increased people’s confidence in Kader Bahini took place
on August 11 when aKader Bahini group attacked aPakistan
boat, carrying alarge number of arms and ammunition to
North Bengal, with sten-guns, light machine-guns and mortars.
The commander of the boat and about 100 soldiers on board
v/ere killed. Before Pakistan reinforcements could arrive, Kader
Bahini men took away aconsiderable number of arms and
ammunition and set fire to the rest. The blaze of the burning
il8 The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath
boat could be seen and the sound of the burning arms and
ammunition could be heard for quite afew days, even in dist¬
ant villages.
After this spectacular operation, the numbers of the Kader
Bahini swelled further. In the meantime, Kader established
contact with the Government-in-exile and the Indian Army and
received from the latter some wireless sets. Ultimately the
Kader Bahini became an organised force of some 17,000 young
men, consisting of school and college students of the age-group
14-24, mostly of peasant origin. In addition, the auxiliary
volunteer force of the Kader Bahini numbered over 72,500,
consisting mostly of rural school students. The majority of the
95 company commanders of the Kader Bahini were college stu¬
dents in the age-group 20-24.
Liberation War
Although the Bengali rebels had the advantage of training in

India, with weapons supplied by the Indian armed force,5“
there were certain disadvantages in launching guerrilla warfare
in Bangladesh. In the literature on modern guerrilla warfare
great emphasis is put on the depth of territory of acountry in
which guerrilla warfare is to be waged. Thus Paret and Shy have
written:
Adetermining factor in Arab,Russian and Chinese guerrilla

( <
warfare—which also applied to Russian partisan operations

during World War II—was the unlimited space available.
Gradually, as the enemy’s lines extended, he grew more
vulnerable to attrition and attack. In such theatres of war,
guerrillas traded ground for time. Indeed, Mao declared that
since guerrilla warfare requires space for manoeuvreing, it
” 2 1
would not be feasible in asmall country such as Belgium.
Bangladesh, acountry of only 55,126 square miles, does
not have the space ideally required for guerrilla manoeuvres.
On the contrary, Bangladesh is what Che Guevara would call
an “unfavourable terrian”-^ for irregular operations. With the
exception of low ranges in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and afew
forest areas, Bangladesh comprises avast plain. The major for¬
ested area—the Sundarbans—is the habitat of poisonous snakes
Guerrilla War and the Indian Role
and tigers, criss-crossed by numerous rivulets with man-eating
crocodiles,anareavirtuallyunusablebyguerrillasasaplacefor
retreat. 23
Aflatdeltaicterritory,Bangladeshhasapopulationdensity
0over 1,300 per square mile. The difficulties that guerrillas
mightexperienceinadenselypopulatedareaareobvious.The
greatnumberofpotentialinformers,togetherwithmilitarysur¬
veillance,identitycards,securitycheckpostsatworkplacesand
streets,wouldhandicapthemovementofarmedgroups.More¬
over, guerrilla operations would bring in their wake massive
retaliation which, in adensely populated area, would result in
civiliancasualties.Guerrillascouldthereforebeeasilyalienated
from those civilians whose support is crucial for their success.
Moreover,theassumptionthatthePakistanforceswouldremain
immobilisedduringtherainyseasonprovedwrong.Byusing
gun boats,thePakistanarmybecamemoremobilethantheguer¬
rillas during the summer ’
r a m s .
PakistanwasalsofavouredbecauseitcouldenticesomeMus¬
limstoItssupportbyreligiousappeals.Moreover,whilethe
guerrillas,fortheimmediatefutureatleast,couldofferonly
sweat,bloodandtears,thePakistanforcescouldofferthepros¬
pectofashareinthelootofHindushopsandpermanentpos¬
sessionofHinduhomesandland.Moreover,theexceedingly
youthfulagestructureoftheBangladeshguerrillasalsomitigat¬
edagainstthelaunchingofaprotractedwar.Practitionersand
theoristssuggestthattheageofguerrillasshouldideallybebe¬
tween25and35sothattheyarematureenoughtobethoroughly
andcoollyconsciousofwhattheyaredoing,yetyoungenough
to“beartheextraordinaryphysicalandpsychicburdensofani¬
malexistence”.TheoverwhelmingmajorityoftheBangladesh
gurrillaswerebelow25yearsofage.These“romanticguerrillas”
were susceptible to two “politico-military” dangers. The first
wasthegreatpenchantforheroism—“desperadoism as Mao
Tse-tungcallsit—whiletheotherwasthepossibilityofbeing
easilyfrustratedand,therefore,ofgivinguptoo s o o n .
Despitetheselimitingfactors,theBangladeshguerrillasdid
manage not only to survive but also effectively to immobilise
thePakistanarmy.Themainreasonforthesuccessofguerrilla
operationsinBangladeshwasthealmosttotalsupportgivenby
120TheBangladeshRevolutionanditsAftermath
as Guevara has
the people of Bangladesh. Guerrilla warfare,
stated, is astruggle of the people.^'* Political mobilisation in the
words of Mao:
“is the most fundamental condition for winning the war.
Mao gives the reasons in asimile:
‘‘The people are like water and the army is like the fish.”
‘‘With the common people of the whole country mobilised,
we shall create avast sea of humanity and drown the enemy
in it...”25
Successinguerrillawarfareis,essentially,aconcomitantof
politicalconversion.“Waristhecontinuationofpoliticsby
” 2 6
other....means. , -c
The ideological war had already been won on March 25. rrom
thenonwardsthePakistanarmywascaughtinaviciouscircle.
Iftheyhadusedterroronaminimumscaletheycouldnothave
s uppressedtherevolution.Butastheyunleashedindiscriminate
terroronamassivescale,theybrokedownanysenseofsecurity
thatpeopleinBangladeshmightpreviouslyhavepossessed.Be¬
sides,brutemilitarysuppressionconfirmedwhattheAwami
Leaguehadbeenproclaimingsincethe1960s,thattherela¬
tionshipbetweenWestPakistanand“EastPakistan”wasoneof
oppressiverulersandoppressedcitizenry.Boththepeople
andtheguerrillashadbeenfiredwithnationalisticfervourand
had
developedacommon psychological
predisposition.Theyhad
in common love of the country, hatred of the Occupation Army
amixture of fanaticism, and an unrelieved sense of insecurity.
Theguerrillasthereforerepresentedthe“realproblems,real
hopesandrealfears”ofthepeopleofBangladeshandwere,in
the literal sense, “merely the fighting vanguard” of arebellious
people.
The attempt by the Pakistan forces to build acounter¬
guerrillaforce,byrecruitingabout100,000razakars,proved
as abortive as the several French-inspired operations in Algeria.
AlthoughthenamesofRazakarsweresuggestedbythepeace
committees,guerrillascouldeasilyinfiltratetheRazakarBahini.
ExceptforrecruitsfromthecadresoftheJamaat-i-Islami,the
razakars did not have the fanaticism and commitment to the
Pakistan cause which could help develop in them the under-
Guerrilla War and the Indian Role 12l
ground mentality necessary for counteracting underground guer¬

rillas. Most of the razakars, when ecountering Mukti Bahini
guerrillas, either fled leaving behind their weapons, or simply
raised their hands in surrender. Some of them even joined the
Mukti Bahini.
While the guerrillas could derive intelligence easily from the

people, Pakistan’s forces had to depend on such methods as air
observation and informers from the peace committees. Here
again, excepting the zealous members of the Jamaat-i-Islami,
who unquestionably acted on ideological conviction, most peace
committee members were fortune-hunters whose only aim was to
share the plunder and loot these could easily be frightened by
selective use of terror by guerrillas. As far as possible, guerrillas
were sent to their home areas, charged initially with ‘‘weeding
out open and hidden traitors”. By the end of October an esti¬
mated 20,000 ‘‘collaborators” and their families had been liqui-
dated.2’ The remaining “collaborators” in the rural areas fled
to the towns and cities, which were under relatively more effect¬
ive control by Pakistan forces.
The result was that most of the rural areas now became secure
enough to be used by the guerrillas and sector troops providing
support to the guerrillas as areas for concealment and retreat.
By November the guerrillas and sector troops could establish
their bases deep inside Bangladesh territory. For example, there
were about 30,000 guerrillas and sector troops around Daccn.^®
The whole of Rupganj thana in Narayanganj subdivision and
Savar thana in Dacca North subdivision were by then turned
into virtual guerrilla camps. In Sector Eight, to take another
example, the ofiicers of the sector troops of the Mukti Bahini
had established their bases within Bangladesh territory—in Chua-
danga, Magura, Narail, Gopalganj, Madaripur, Faridpur, Jes-
sore, Satkliira, in the Sundarbans, in Patuakhali, and in Barisal.^®
From the liberated areas the guerrillas subsequently launched
commando raids on the convoys and isolated posts of the Pakis¬
tan military and police forces,^® capturing weapons and creating
perpetual tension. The extent of the success of the guerrilla ope¬
rations can be gauged from the fact that, by August, 280 of the
400 police stations in Bangladesh had been raided and destroyed
by the guerrillas. In Sector Two—comprising the districts of
Dacca, Comilla, Noakhali and Faridpur—all the police stations

had by then been raided.^*
Pakistan troops, numbering more than 25,000 (including the
Punjab police and militia) were killed by the guerrillas and their
supporting forces during the period from March 25 to December
3, 1971, when war between India and Pakistan finally broke
out.®2 xhe guerrillas captured between 500 and 600 West Pakistan
soldiers and several hundred razakars. Guerrilla operations car¬
ried out in Dacca helped particularly to sustain the morale and
to secure support of the Bangladesh people for the Mukti Bahini.
From June 1971 several “crack” platoons of guerrillas
launched surprise attacks at regular intervals on West Pakistan
army patrol groups, killing people like Abdul Monem Khan,^®
destroying industrial plants belonging to people like Hamidul
Huq Choudhury,®"* or simply exploding agrenade in the heart
of the city and running away without being caught. On the very
day that news of the movement of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in
the Bay of Bengal was broadcast from Radio Pakistan, two
guerrillas blasted the American Centre in Dacca with abomb.^s
News of the Mukti Bahini was blacked out from the censored
newspapers of “East Pakistan”, and from news bulletins broad¬
cast from Radio Pakistan, but broadcasts from the BBC,
enjoyed ahigh degree of credibility and increased the confidence
of people in the efforts of the Mukti Bahini.®®
Rapid communications are the enemy army’s greatest weapon

against rebels in less rugged areas. Writers on guerrilla warfare
have therefore put great emphasis on the need for destruction
of this weapon.®^ The main aim of the Bangladesh guerrillas was
to disrupt the communication systems so that Pakistan forces
could not feed, regroup and reinforce their ranks. By the end
of November the guerrillas were able completely to paralyse
communications by destroying bridges and railway lines. The
Kader Bahini alone, whose areas of operation included the
whole of Tangail district and some parts of the districts of
Dacca, Mymensingh and Pabna were reported to have had
over 350 engagements with Pakistan forces. They also claimed
responsibility for killing more than 1,000 West Pakistan soldiers
and militiamen, destroying 17 bridges between Dacca and
Guerrilla War and the Indian Role l23
Tangail, and later mining the diversion roads opened by the

West Pakistan forces around those bridges.^®
While the guerrillas disrupted road and rail communications,
the Mukti Bahini frogmen, who started their operations from
August 14, made the two ports of Bangladesh—Chittagong and
Chalna—almost totally inactive. They sank more than 20 ships,
some of which had brought arms and ammunition from West
Pakistan. Mukti Bahini gunboats also disrupted enemy river
communications, especially in the estuary regions.®?
These disruptions brought the export of jute, jute goods and
tea—the commodities which had previously earned valuable for¬
eign exchange and sustained the West Pakistan economy—to a
standstill. When more than 100,000 guerrillas and almost 10,000
supporting sector troops became fully active in Bangladesh in
October-November, almost all movement of Pakistan troops
had stopped, there was virtually no administration in rural areas,
no industry could function and the ports remained idle.
At this point, Pakistan troops, suffering from near-paralysis
of action and of will, tactically adopted hedge-hog positions,
confining themselves within pill boxes and other fortified encla¬
ves surrounded by concrete bunkers or moats built or dug at
enormous expense. Seldom did they emerge at night. Even in
daytime they appeared only in large numbers. That the n e r v e s
ofPakistanarmyofficerswereshatteredwasmadeevidentby
the fact that they started moving their families to West Pakistan
from the beginning of October.Then PresidentYahya himself
became unnerved and sought frantically to internationalise the
conflict by proposing U.N. observers on the borders of Bangla¬
desh and India throughout October and November.*? These
moves created panic among West Pakistan police and militia and
undermined the morale of the rank and file of the Pakistan a r m y .
According to Mao’s model of the unfolding of protracted
guerrilla warfare (the defensive, stalemate and counter-offensive
stages)**BangladeshguerrillawarfarebyNovemberhadalready
passed the stage of stalemate and was poised for counter-offen¬
sive. In this last phase of war, the guerrilla, according to Mao,
istoplayasupplementaryrole,whileregularformations,aided
by guerrillas in the rear and flank, are to launch frontal attacks
on the hedge-hog strongholds of demoralised enemy troops.
l24 The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath
With completion of the training and development of three infan¬

try brigades, two artillery batteries and asamall airforce, the
Mukti Bahini by November was itself prepared to launch the
final counter-offensive. These regular formations, together with
the guerrillas and their supporting troops, could possibly have
liberated Bangladesh even if Indian forces had not intervened.
Before the war between India and Pakistan started, the Mukti
Bahini in Sector 6had already liberated the territory north of
Thakurgaon, Nilphamari and Kurigram and was still advan¬
cing. With Mukti Bahini scoring victories, the military junta in
Pakistan began to show signs of cracking. Agroup of Colonels
reportedly pressed General Abdul Hamid Khan, Chief of Staff
of the Pakistan Army to seek apolitical solution in view of the
heavy losses that the army was incurring especially among its
officers. Rumour spread that General Hamid might replace Yah-
ya, so that the former could bypass Bhutto and get Sheikh
Mujib released to secure apolitical settlement.*^ Moreover, Paki¬
stan could no longer afford the costly military operations in
Bangladesh. As early as April 1971, Yahya declared asix-month
moratorium on payment of external and bilateral debts. The cost
of maintaining a70,000-man Pakistan force in Bangladesh was
estimated at $2 million per day.*^ By August-September, it was
clear that the Pakistan government would be entirely without
foreign exchange reserves in the near future if the “suppression
expenses were not halted.** To add to the difficulties of the fac-
tion-ridden Pakistan military junta, political movements erupted
in Baluchistan and NWFP threatening further disintegration of
Pakistan. In the light of all these circumstances, there is some
justification in the claims made by the officers of the Mukti
Bahini that “if the Indian forces had not come into the war dir¬
ectly, the Mukti Bahini itself would have liberated the country
within six months,”*^ or alternatively, that “the Indian Army
just walked in when we (the Mukti Bahini) had already finished
the job.”*«
The Indian Military Intervention

The Indian government’s commitment to the liberation of
Bangladesh was implicit in its decision to keep the border open
after March 25, allowing Bangladesh evacuees to move into
India’s eastern provinces. If the Indian government had pre¬

vented the entry of the evacuees, 80 to 90 per cent of whom
were Hindus, they would simply have been liquidated, since
Pakistan forces were determined to kill all the Hindus of
former East Pakistan.*’ It was not that the Indian government
inveigled the evacuees by opening up the border, as the Pakistan
government alleged. Any government believing in basic demo¬
cratic values and democracy rather than a‘‘demographic solu¬
tion” to problems would have done the same. As Indira Gan¬
dhi told President Nixon, the vast number of refugees on her
hands was “the price India was paying for the tradition of an
” 4 8
open society.
Once the evacuees began to stream into India’s eastern prov¬
inces the Indian government had no alternative but to see that
Bangladesh was liberated. Unless Bangladesh became an in¬
dependent sovereign state the evacuees could never go back
to their homes. If the evacuees were to stay permanently in
India, it would have been difficult for the Indian government
to prevent serious communal riots between Hindus and Mus¬
lims in Eastern India. In Assam and Tripura, where tension
between Bengalis and non-Bengalis had long existed, fresh settle¬
ments of refugees would probably have renewed the movement
of “Bengali Kheda” (rounding up of Bengalis) on amassive
scale. Moreover, the uprooted Bengali evacuees would have
provided avast reservoir for recruitment of new activities by
the radical parties of West Bengal, bent on the destruction of
India’s “bourgeoisie-landlord’’ dominated political system.
Obviously, other factors—humanitarian considerations, “the
century’s greatest opportunity” to humble Pakistan creation of
aquiet frontier in Eastern India, and the tremendous economic
burden of maintaining and of the ultimate settlement of re¬
fugees—played their parts in the Indian government’s decision
to intervene in favour of Bangladesh. But the most important
factor was that the creation of an independent Bangladesh was
necessary for the protection of the political system of India. As
Indira Gandhi stated during her tour of the United States in
November 1971, the Bangladesh crisis was “a real treat to Indian
democracy and Indian stability.”*’
The Indian government began to train and equip Bangladesh
guerrillas in order to keep the Bangladesh movement alive, all

the while putting pressure on the Pakistan government to rele¬
ase Sheikh Mujib. India also advocated apolitical settlement
“on terms acceptable to the elected representatives of East Ben¬
gal, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.” That the Pakistan govern¬
ment was not willing to come to terms with Awami League
leaders was clear from the fact that Yahya already in Septem¬
ber 1971 declared vacant the seats of National Assembly mem¬
bers held by prominent AL leaders, arranged “farcical” by-elec¬
tions, and, finally, convened asession of the “purged” National
Assembly for December. Besides, there were predictions—both
in the Indian and Western press—that if the war continued for
long, the leadership of the liberation struggle would pass from
the centrist AL to more radical groups in Bangladesh. From
November 13 Indira Gandhi, therefore, began to assert that
time was running out for anegotiated settlement. In the mean¬
time she had made all of the preparations—diplomatic as well
as military—to launch afull-scale war with Pakistan.
The Soviet Union had already been displeased with Pakistan
because of its continued friendship with China, its cold response
to Brezhnev’s plan for Asian collective security, and its rejection
of Kosygin’s scheme for aregional economic grouping. The
Soviet Union was the first among the major powers to urge the
Pakistan government “to stop bloodshed and repression against
the population in East Pakistan and to turn to methods of peace¬
ful political settlement.”®** The People’s Republic of China, on
the other hand, declared her firm support for the Pakistan gov¬
ernment and people “in their just struggle to safeguard state
sovereignty and national independence.”®*
Although the Western press in general gave detailed reports
about the gruesome happenings in Bangladesh, the government
of President Nixon continued to support Pakistan, the “most
allied ally” of the United States in Asia. During the middle of
1971 dramatic developments had taken place in Sino-American
relations. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to President Nixon
for National Security Affairs, visited China via Rawalpindi
during the summer of 1971 and Nixon soon after announced his
plan to visit China. Dr. Kissinger reportedly stated to the Indian
Ambassador in Washington, after his trip to Peking in July,
thatChinawould“intervene”ifIndiaattackedPakistanandthat
theUnitedStatesmightnotcometoIndia’shelp,asithadin
when it had warned China against intervention.
All these developments had influenced the political climate in
India.Indiahad,sinceindependence,beenattachedtoapolicy
ot nonalignment with the super powers, but the Indira Gandhi
government had moved increasingly close to Russia.
InresponsetoAmerica’spolicyonBangladesh,IndiraGan¬
dhihadacceptedatwo-year-oldstandingofferfromtheSoviet
UniontoenterintoatreatywithIndia.OnAugust9,1971the
TreatyofPeace,FriendshipandCo-operationbetweenIndiaand
Soviet Russia
was signed in New Delhi. Article Nine of the
Treaty stated:
“Each high contracting party undertakes to abstain from

giving any assistance to any third party that engages in an
armed conflict with the other party. In the event of either
beingsubjectedtoattackorthreatthereof,thehighcontract¬
ing parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultation
TOthaveiwtoeliminatingthisthreatandtakingappropriate
effective measurestoensurethepeaceandsecurityoftheir
countries. ”52
_AtthetimeofsigningtheTreaty,Gromyko,theSovietFo¬
reignMinister,offeredIndiaanimmediatesupplyofadvanced
weapons, which according to American estimates, reached a
valueof$500millionbyDecember15,1971.53
FromApriltoSeptemberIndianstaffofficerswerebusilyen¬
gagedinmakingpreparationsincasetheywerecalleduponto
liberateBangladeshinaquickandshortcampaign.Exceptfor
one infantry division stationed near Calcutta, the rest of the
forces of her Eastern Command were oriented towards the de¬
fence of the Himalayan border or were intended for internal
security operations in Nagaland at the Mizo Hills. Most of In¬
dia sEastern Command divisions were mountain divisions, armed
with light weapons and possessing no bridging or other river
crossing apparatus. These forces were re-equipped with Russia-
suppleamphibiantanksandotherweaponsnecessaryforlaun¬
chingasuccessfulcampaigninriverineBangladesh,wherethe
Pakistanarmyhadadoptedthedefensivetacticsoffightingwith
51
heavyautomaticweaponsfrompillboxesandfortifiedbunkers.
The Chief of Staff of the Indian Army sent two divisions from
his reserve mountain divisions to strengthen forces on the West
Bengal—“East Pakistan border and had raised anew Corps
Headquarters(IICorps)forthecontrolofthesedivisionsunder
Eastern Command. Two divisions of Indian soldiers in Naga¬
land and Mizoram were made available for Bangladesh opera
tionsunderCorpsHeadquarters(IVCorps),thesealsobeing
broughtfromthenorthernfront.Theartillerydeficienciesot
Eastern Command were made up by diversions from other
fronts.Tworegimentsoflighttanks(TP76Russianamphibians)
were put under Eastern Command.
The inter-Services Command in Eastern India, which has
always
beenoriented
towards
Himalayan
operations,
wasalso
re¬
organised.
AnAdvance Headquarters
of
Eastern
Air
Command,
underanAirCommodore,andanAdvanceIndianNavalHead¬
quarters,representingtheFlagOflacer-in-ChiefoftheEastern
Naval Command at Visakhapatnam, were placed under the
headquartersofEasternCommandtoensurethehighestdegree
of coordination between the Army, Air Force and Navy in
Bangladeshoperations.Theoperationalinfrastructureincluding
thewideningandsurfacingofroadswasattendedtoundermon¬
soon conditions in Silchar and Tripura on the eastern side of
Bangladesh.Lastly,massivebridgingresourcesweremadeavail¬
able to Eastern Command so that it could lay 10,000 feet ot
bridging at any time.®®
It seems thatbyOctobertheIndiangovernmenthadtaken
the decision to intervene militarily. As already indicated, full
preparationshadbeenmadebytheIndianarmedforcesto
launch acampaign in Bangladesh. Now another crucial
the suc-
condition was met which could open the way to war:
cessfultalksbetweenIndiraGandhiandPremierKosygintowar¬
dstheendofSeptember.ThejointSoviet-Indianstatementot
September 29 stated :
“The Soviet side took into account the statement by the
PrimeMinisterthatthegovernmentofIndiaisfullydeter¬
minedtotakeallnecessarymeasurestostoptheinfluxof
refugeesfromEastPakistanintoIndiaandensurethat
those refugees who are already in India return to their

homeland without delay’’.^®
From the last week of September the Soviet press began to
detailandcondemnPakistanatrocitiesinBangladesh.”OnOc¬
tober27,afterfive-daytalksbetweenaSovietteamheadedby
Soviet Deputy Minister Nickolai Firyubin and top officials of
the Indian foreign office, India and the Soviet Union invoked
the crucialArticle Nine of the Indo-Soviet Treaty.
The Indo-Soviet Treaty, coupled with Soviet support to the
Bangladeshliberationmovement,createduneasinessamong
Chineseleaders,withtheresultthatadefiniteshifttookplacein
Chineseattitudes.PresidentYahyaKhansentahigh-powered
delegation,headedbyZulfikerAliBhutto,toChinainthefirst
week of November. China, however, gave it acool reception;
the Chinese leaders made it clear to Bhutto that China would
notintervenemilitarilyinanewIndo-Pakistanwarandurgeda
negotiated settlement of the Bangladesh crisis.ss The fact that
nojointcommuniquewasissuedafterthetalkswasdulynoted
by Indian decision-makers.
Duringherthree-weektourabroad—inBelgium,Austria,Great
Britain,theU.S.,FranceandWestGermany—inOctober-Nove-
mber 1971, Indira Gandhi got the feeling that none of the West-
tern powers would directly help Pakistan in the event of an Indo-
PakistanconflictoverBangladesh.*'®Indirathendecided,seems
it
to provoke Pakistan to launch attack on India, in order to pro¬
videherwithanopportunitytoliberateBangladeshthroughdir¬
ect military intervention. From the day of her return from abr¬
oad,IndiraGandhibecameincreasinglyaggressiveinherspee¬
ches. On November 13, talking to pressmen at Delhi airport,
she stated that while she was on the whole satisfied with her talks
withworldleaders,shecouldnotsayhoweffectiveanyinterven¬
tion by them would be in solving the Bangladeh issue with¬
o u t a w a r. « ®
On November 30, Indira Gandhi told the Indian Parliament

that India would not withdraw its troops from the border areas
unlessPakistantroopsvacatedBangladesh.®ÔnDecember2she
told Congress party workers in Delhi that India had reached
“the point of no return” and repeated her demand that the Pak-
istanarmyvacateBangladesh®^Finally,atamammothgather¬
ing in Calcutta, Indira Gandhi on December 3declared that
Pakistan troops in Bangladesh were athreat to India s
securityandwarcouldbeavoidedonlyifPakistanwithdrewits
troopsfromBangladesh.®®Indeedthewarhadalreadybegun.
Within aweek of her return to India, Indira Gandhi had al¬
readygivenpoliticalclearancetoIndianforcestocrossthebor¬
ders of “East Pakistan” for “self-interest” or “self-defence.”®^
From November 20 the Indian army, together with regular
units of the Mukti Bahini, launched attacks in anumber of areas
inJessore,Sylhet,Rangpur,DinajpnrandComilladistricts.®®On
November 21 afierce tank and artillery battle took place around
BoyraontheborderofJessoredistrict,betweenIndianand
Pakistan forces. Pakistan and Indian Air Force planes were
engagedincombatandthreePAFSabreJetswereshotdown
by lAF Gnats.
By November 23, when President Yahya proclaimed an
emergency in Pakistan, the village of Chaugacha, five to six
milesinsideBangladeshterritory,wasunderthecontrolof
Indian and Mukti Bahini troops. On the same day Indian 130-
mmgunsofSovietoriginbeganshellingJessoreAirport.Indian
and Mukti Bahini troops were also holding pockets of territory
inSylhetandComilladistrictsbythistime.AstheIndianand
Mukti Bahini forces continued their offensive in several areas.
PresidentYahyaindesperationorderedfullscalewaronIndia.
On December 3the formal war between India and Pakistan
started.
India, having no significant military objective on the West¬
ernFront,tookonly“defensive-offensive”actionsthere.Onthe
Eastern Front seven divisions of Indian forces, under the com¬
mand of Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora, launched an
attack on Pakistan forces from several directions just before
daybreakonDecember4.IntheCalcuttaregionIICorpsmade
thrusts into Kushtia, Jessore and Khulna areas. From the
NorthXXXIICorpsadvancedthroughRuheaândHiliand
DinajpurdistrictsandLalmonirhatinRangpurdistrict.Abrig¬
ade from Tura in Meghalaya moved towards Jamalpur in Mym-
ensingh.OntheeasternsideofBangladesh,IVCorpsmounted
an offensive in Sylhet, Comilla andNoakhali districts. By Decern-
forces in Bangladesh had
ChiCngVorf" « » » , d e d
NIAIN THRLISTS OK THE INDIAN ARNO
DECEMIIER 1971
iSvN'trtAl. p|^*5f i'

«»f MAIN rilkl'vrs OF IHK INOMN
—- SrAIF llOlINDARA
-.- INliRNAIIONAL IKH'NIIAliV
V. -
-1AA.Ai.am5.
■t l H A '!eoHAuvA
!AnJig'llAT -
\n fi A H ' P k - ;
Oacca
W f J T 8 ! H b AV >1A
^
C*'ajit I
I \ ¥
I
}
U AV C p p f - l O A L \< 'V'
1» 5b IIHt
\S
A Mii.r.s
r
rl4W ?F'AT® ^“Sladesh had only one squadron

bv th/onH '■ d e s tremaining
r o aircrafts
y ewered
air c o n t i n u o u s
arattacksonDecember4and5theIndianAirForcemade
‘_11airportsofBangladeshunworkableandthreeofthere¬
mainingSabreJetsofthePakistanAirForceremainedintheir
hangerslAFplanesalsodestroyedriverg/ia/s(docks)andfer¬
riesusedbythePakistanarmyalloverBangladesh.
Once Bangladesh’s air space had been liberated, Indian
forces used the
,, ,, tactics as the Pakistanis had used during
thesecondphaseoftheBangladeshrevolution.Theyresorted
oparachutedrops,helicopterferryingoftroopsacrossrivers
andairstrafingofenemyconcentrations.GeneralManeckshaw’s
repeatedbroadcaststhatalllinesoflogisticsupportforPakistan
forcesfromoutsidehadbeencompletelycutoffandthatthere-
fore Pakistan forces had better surrender, destroyed their alrea¬
dyflaggingmorale.Aftersomeinitialhesitation,Lieutenant-
General A.K. Niazi, C-in-C of the Pakistan Army in “East
Pakistan”andhissubordinateofficersdecidedtosurrenderafter
11 days of war.
DuringtheDecemberwartheSovietUnionextendedsub¬
stantiallogisticsupporttotheIndianarmedforces.31Soviet
manned aircraft were flown from Egypt to India during the
war.Anumber of Soviet technicians were also sent to India to
repairsophisticatedweaponspurchasedbyIndiafromtheSoviet
Union.«8Ontheotherhand.PresidentNixonwho,asrevealed
in theAnderson Papers, wanted to “left the balance in favour
ofPakistan”,broughtseverediplomaticandpsychological
pressureonIndiaduringthewar,bothtobringaboutaceasefire
and to save Pakistan from disintegration. On December 5, at
thespecialrequestoftheU.S.A,aSecurityCouncilsessionwas
convened and the U.S.A, supported by China, proposed an iin-
mediate ceasefire. Here again Soviet Russia came to India s
rescueandvetoedtheproposal.TheNixongovernmentthen
took the issue to the General Assembly. As most of the states
hadsub-nationalisticproblems,theAmericansponsoredmove,
ostensivelymadetopreventthebreak-upofanation,received
thesupportof104statesintheGeneralAssembly.Enco¬
uragedbyalmosttotalsuppotintheGeneralAssembly,the
NixongovernmentonDecember10orderedafewshipsote
US.SeventhFleetincludingthenuclear-poweredaircraftcarrier
USS Enterprise, to move fromuthe Tonkin Gulf towards the
-
Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union then deployed some 35 ships
andsubmarines—thelargestnumbertheSovietUnionhadever
sentintotheIndianOceanatanyonetime—toeffectivelycoun¬
teractthepresenceofeightshipsoftheSeventhFleet.Moscow
alsothreatenedtoopenupadiversionarymilitaryactioninSink-
l a n g - 44 Soviet Divisions were posted along or close to Sino-
Soviet border- ifthe Chinese moved to interfere militarily in
favour of Pakistan.®’
Role of The Mukti Bahini

SomeIndianandforeignjournalistscomparedtheIndianadvance
inBangladeshwiththeGermanBlitzkriegacrossFrancein1940.
Pakistan’s mistakes, they argued, were the same as those of

France. The Pakistan Army relied on the Maginot line strategy,
sticking doggedly to prepared bunkers, concrete defence works
and barbed wire entanglements across the main roads. The
Indians almost invariably attacked through the fields, along dust
tracks or along rivers. They used small tanks, armoured per¬
sonnel carriers, jeeps and gunboats. The Indian forces also
commandered tiny rickshaws and motorised trishaws (motorised
scooter rickshaws). Small field-guns and rocket launchers w e r e
screwed into vehicles and raced into position. A.K. Niazi, a
‘‘poor general”, never seemed to have expected this. The Pakis¬

tan army, mistaking rapid and bewildering movements for large
forces, tamely surrendered.
However, the quick success of the Indian Army was made
possible by the work already done by the Mukti Bahini and the
share of fighting undertaken by them in the December war.
As has been stated above, the Mukti Bahini guerrillas and sector
troopshadalreadyimmobilisedthePakistanforcesinBangladesh
before the full-scale war between India and Pakistan started.
Moreover, aJoint Command of the Indian Armed Forces and
Mukti Bahini was formed before the war between India and
Pakistan broke out.®*
The Joint Command had already worked out aco-ordinated
plan to bring about aquick end to the war. The Indian forces
with tanks, artillery and airforce would launch direct attacks o n
the main bases whlie the Mukti Bahini guerrillas and sector troops
would “outflank” and attack from the sides or rear. Since the
latter was alight force, familiar with the territory, and with
strong political motivation, it could work with speed, ferocity and
flexibility.
Thisstrategy,basedonUsmani’sTeliaparaproposals(vide
p.l 12), was effective in isolating the strong points of the Pakistan
forces and prevent their reinforcement by men, arms and ammu¬
nition.
To cite one of many examples, in Ashuganj asingle battalion

of EBR and some Mukti Bahini guerrillas encircled and rendered
ineffective the entire 14th Division of the Pakistan Army. This
strategy likewise prevented the strategic retreat of Pakistan
troops from outlaying posts to the “Dacca Bowl” to fight alast.
iM The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath
long-drawn battle. It also helped the main columns of the Indian

army to bypass many of the Pakistan strongholds and reach
Dacca within the shortest possible time.'^'’ Apart from its vital
role in outflanking and encircling the Pakistan bases, the Mukti
Bahini furnished reliable intelligence as to the exact positions of
Pakistan bunkers, ambushes and road blocks, thus enabling
Indian attacks to be accurate and very swift. In areas which it
liberated unaided, the Mukti Bahini followed solely its own
plans. These areas included Kurigram and Lalmonirhat in north
Bengal; Sunamganj and Habiganj in Sylhet, Comilla, Akhuara
and the northern side of Brahmanbaria; “axes of advance” in
Koberhat, Hayaki and Hathajari in Chittagong; Alamdanga,
Chuadanga and Meherpur in Kushtia; Manirumpur and Abhoy-
nagar of Jessore; Bagerhat, Satkhira and Kaliganj in Khulna;
Madaripur, Gopalganj and Faridpur in Faridpur district; Bari-
sal and Patuakhali, and “axes of advance” in Brahmanbaria,
71
Bhairab and Narsingdi areas in the final stages of the war.
Joint action was evident in asmall but significant respect even
in the war from the air. The very first air attack on Bangladesh
was launched by the Bangladesh air force. On December 1,
Group Captain Chanden Singh, lAF base Commander of Jorhat,
flew to Dimapur, where the Bangladesh airmen were being
trained. Group Captain Singh told the Bangladesh airmen
that Pakistan had planned an attack on India for December 3.
The Indian government had decided that the Bangladesh air
force would start the war in the Eastern Front so that the Big
Powers and other nations could not pin the blame on the
Indians. The first targets of the Bangladesh air force would be
the Chittagong fuel dump and theGoldai fuel dump at Narayan-
ganj. The Bangladesh air force officers responded enthusias¬
tically to the proposal. Flight Lieutenant Shamsul Alam was
selected for the Chittagong mission with Captain M. Akram
as co-pilot.
These officers started their “operation kilo” in two small
aircrafts at 0100 hours on the night of December 3. Flying at a
very low altitude to avoid Pakistan radar, the Bangladesh air¬
men hit the exact positions of the fuel dumps at Chittagong and
Narayanganj, causing them to burst into flames. The Pakistan
anti-aircraft guns barked in vain and the Bangladesh aircrafts
returned safely to Dimapur. Besides these two first missions,

the Bangladesh air force gave support to advancing Mukti Bahi-
ni in several areas and intercepted communications among e n e -
my troops. As the Bangladesh airmen knew the exact positions
of Pakistan airbases, airfields, the river ghats in Bangladesh,
one Bengali officer was taken as co-pilot in each of the lAF
planes for every sortie.’^
The Mukti Bahini and the Indian forces thus played equally
important and complementary roles in bringing the liberation
war to aswift end. The Indian armed forces performed the role
which, according to Teliapara document, was to be played by
the regular formations of the Mukti Bahini. On December 16,
1971, General Niazi surrendered on behalf of Pakistan forces
in Bangladesh then numbering about 93,000 including West
Pakistan police and militia. The surrender was formamlised at
Ramna Race Course in Dacca, the very place where Sheikh
Mujib had declared on March 7, 1971 that the struggle of the
Bengalis
dence.”
thistimewasfor“completeemancipationandindepen¬
NOTES
1. N. Machiavalli, The Prince and the Discourses (New York: Modern

Library,1940),p.81.quotedinC.Johnson,RevolutionaryChange,
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 90.
2. Interview With Tajuddin Ahmed on 29 August 1973.
3. Based on interviews with K. Subrahmanyan!, Director, The Insti¬
tuteforDefenceStudiesandAnalyses,NewDelhi,on’l3February
1973, and Tajuddin Alimed on 28 March 1973.
4. According to Tajuddin Alimed, aDeclaration of Independence
was prepared by himself and KamalHossain on March 25, 1971.
But Sheikh Mujib did not sign it (Interview with Tajuddin Ahmed
on 29 August 1973). Afew days before March 25, Sheikh Mujib
told one of the intellectuals, an old associate of the Awami
League, that he did not expect large-scale genocide by the Pakis¬
t a n a r m y.
5. Taufiq Elahi Choudhury, CSP and SDO, Meherpur, who himself

led the resistance movement in that subdivision and maintained
civil administration for some time in the name of Bangladesh,
arranged the ceremonial function at “Mujibnagar”. He later joined
the regular units of the Mukti Bahini.
6. For the full text of the Declaration of Independence see Bangla¬
desh Documents (Madras, The BNK Press, 1971) pp, 281-282.
7, The portfolios of the Ministers were as follows: Mansoor Ali,
Finance; Khandokar Mushtaq Alimed, Foreign Affairs; A. H. M.
Kamruzzaman, Relief and Rehabilitation.
8. These figures were quoted to the author by aDeputy Secretary of
the Bangladesh Governnient-in-exile.
9. Justice Abu Sayeed Choudhury Was Vice-Chancellor of Dacca
University, and Was in Europe attending aconference when the
military crackdown took place in Bangladesh. Justice Chowdhury
defected in favour of the Bangladesh Government-in-exile.
10. Interview with Tajuddin Ahmed on 29 August 1973.
11. Thus, Mao Tsc-tung had written: “Of the three strategic stages
(the defensive, the stalemate and the counter-offensive.) in the
entire process of the war in the country as awhole, the first and
last arc stages in which regular warfare is primary and guerrilla
warfare supplementary. In the intermediate stage guerrilla War¬
fare Will become primary and regular warfare supplementary H
we take the War as awhole, therefore, regular warfare is primary
and guerrilla warfare supplementary”. Selected Military Writings
of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), pp.
279-280. According to Che Guevara: “Guerrilla combat is aphase
of warfare that cannot of itself attain complete victory When
the guerrilla army acquires aregular status, then it will be ready
for dicisive attacks on the enemy and thus secure victory. Ihe
triumph will always be the product of the regular anny, even
See
though the regular army had its origins in aguerrilla force/’ T.
Ernesto “Che” Guevara, “La Guerra dc Guerrillas,” in X.F.M.
Osaka (cd.). Modern Guerrilla Warfare (New York: The Free
Press, 1962\p. 338.
12. This paragraph is based on interviews with Colonel Saliullali,
Chief of Staff, Bangladesh Armed Forces on 12 July 1972 and
with Colonel Khaled Musharraf on 28 August 1973.
13. Abdul Manuan, General Secretary of the Jatio Sramik League,
claimed that 30,000 Workers belonging to the Sramik League
fought as Freedom-Fighters. Sec Doinik Iktngla (Dacca), January
1, 1972.
14. There Were about 1,100 Bengali ollicers and 28,000 Bengali
soldiers in West Pakistan during the period of occupation.
15. See special interview With Air Commodore A.K. Khandker, Chict
of Staff, Bangladesh Air Force, in the Dainik Bangla, December
3, 1972.
16. Interviews With several members of Mujib Bahini in March
1972. See also special interview with Sheikh Fazlitl Huq Moni,
Dainik Bangla (Dacca), December- 4, 1972.
Guorriila War and the Indian Role 13?
17. It is an intriguing phenomenon of the liberation war that the Indian

government allowed the Mujib Bahini to work outside the autho¬
rity of the Bangladesh Government-in-exile. It is also significant
that Major-General Sujan Singh Ovan (Retired), Who had been in
overall charge of the training programme of the Mujib Bahini,
w a s t h e o n l y s e n i o r r e t i r e d o f fi c e r d e c o r a t e d W i t h t h e P a r a m -
Ati-Vishishta-Seva medal by the Indian government after the libera¬
tion war. See Lieutenant-Colonel Nuruzzaman, “The Government
and the People: Some Vital Questions,” Holiday (Dacca), June 18,
1972. Nuruzzaman was commander of Sector 7of the Mukti
Bahini during the war.

18. Madhupur Ghar (jungle) is in Mymensingh district, bordering
Tangail district and Bhawal Ghar is in Dacca district, bordering
Ta n g a i l d i s t r i c t , M a h a n a n d a p u r u l t i m a t e l y b e c a m e t h e h e a d ¬
quarters of the Kader Bahini.
19. Interview with Abdul Kader Siddiqui on 30 August 1973.
20. It was alleged by some that arms supplied to the Mukti Bahini
wore given by the governments of Russia and East European
countries, With the permission of the Indian government.
21. P. Paret and J.W. Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960s (New York: Frederic
A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 28-29, Mao Tse-tung has written: “Given
an extensive area, guerrilla warfare can be developed and sus¬
tained even in the plains, not to mention the river-lake-estuary re¬
gions. By and large, the vastness of China’s territory and enemy
shortage of troops provided guerrilla Warfare in China with this
condition. This is an important, even aprimary condition, as far as
the possibility ofwaging guerrilla warfare is concerned and small
countries like Belgium, which lack this condition, have few or
no such possibilities.” Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung
(Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966), p. 173.
22. See Guevara, “La Guerra de Guerrillas”, pp. 345-348.
2 3 . S o o n a f t e r t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e G o v e r n m e n t - i n - e x i l e , Ta j u d d i n
Ahmed asked one of his officers in the Ministry of Defence, who
himself had led popular resistance during the second phase of the
revolution in his subdivision, to make astudy and report on the
feasibility of guerrilla warfare in Bangladesh. After reading
various classics on the general subject including Clausewitz,
Lawrence, Mao and Guevara, the officer himself felt pessimistic.
He reported to Tajuddin that there was no prospect of success
of guerrilla warfare in Bangladesh mid advised that it would be
belter to Work for the intervention of the Indian Aririy.
24. E. C. Guevara, op. cit.,p. 337.
25. Quoted in Katzenbach, E. L. and Hanraphan, G. Z., “The
Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-tung,” in Osaka, op. cit.,
pp. 136-137.
138 the Bangiadest ^Revolution and its Aftermath
26. Lenin was quick to see Clausewitz’s point. See Lenin’s Collected
Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), Vol. XXI, p. 304.
27. R. Sobhan, “Bangladesh’s Liberation War: An Analysis,” Afor«-
ing News (Dacca), January 10,1972.
28. Interview with Brigadier Khaled Musharraf on 28 August 1973.
29. See special interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Manzur in Dainik
Bangla (Dacca), December 10,1972.
30. About 10,000 Punjab police and militia were brought from West
Pakistan around the middle of 1971. They were first deployed in
police stations raided by Mukti Bahini. Later they were deployed
in border areas to check the infiltration of guerrillas.
31. Interview with Brigadier Khaled Musharraf on 28 August 1973.
32. This figure of 25,000 is quoted by General Usmani. See The People
(Dacca), April 23, 1972. Major-General Safiullah and Brigadier
Khaled Musharraf also quoted the same figure when the author
interviewed them. According to them, the figure is based on the
receipts of insurance money sent from Dacca post office to the
families of killed soldiers, militia and policemen in West Pakistan.
The total casualties of the Mukti Bahini, including the casualties
during the war from December 3to December 16, Were only
2,000 or so.
33. Abdul Monem Khan was the Governor of East Pakistan for 7
years under the Ayub regime.
34. Hamidul Huq Choudhury, aleading lawjer of Dacca and aformer
Foreign Minister of Pakistan, reportedly Worked against the
Bangladesh movement and kept contact with General Yahya
Khan.
35. For details of the guerrilla operations in Dacca seoH.H. Morshsd.

Daccaye Gerrilla Operation [GuerrillaOperation in Dacca],(Dacca:
Nowroz Kitabistan, 1972).
36. During the last years of the Ayub decade, the government
arranged for the import of large numbers of transistors from
abroad in order to step up the publicity campaign about the
t (
development decade”. These transistors particularly helped the

politicisation of rural people. Who commonly listened to BBC,
All-India Radio and Radio Peking.
37. See for example, E.C. Guevara, op. c(V.,p. 371.
38. See special interview with Kader Siddiqui, Dainik Bangla, Decem¬
ber 8, 1972.
39. See General Usmani’s statement in The People (Dacca), April 23,
1972.
40. See G. W. Choudhury, “The Emergence of Bangladesh and the

South Asian Triangle,” Year Book of World Affairs, 1973 (London,
Stevens and Sons, 1973), p. 79.
41. Seo “The Three Stages of Protracted War”, in Selected Military

Writings , p p . 2 1 0 - 2 1 9 .
42. Lawrence Ziring, “Militarism in Pakistan: The Yahya Klian-
Interrcgnum,” W.H. Wriggings (cd.) Pakistan in 7Vww;7(o« (Islama¬
bad, Islamabad, University Press, 1975), p, 211.
43. Robert La Porte, Jr., “Pakistan in 1971: The Disintegration of a
Nation”,/fiifl/i Survey, XII, No. 2, (February 1972), p. 102, Foot-
ncte 37, p. 106.
44. G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan,Bangladesh and the Major Powers;
Politics of aDivided Subcontinent (New York, The Free Press, 1975).
p. 208.
45. See special interview with General Usmani, Dainik Bangla (Dacca)
December 8,1972.
46. This was the concluding sentence of Brigadier Khaled Musharraf
when the author interviewed him on 28 August 1973 at his resi¬
dence in Kurmhola cantonment.
47. About 6.8 million evacuees were maintained in 896 temporary

camps, established and maintained by aspecial organisation
headed by Colonel N.P. Lutlira, under the Ministry of Relief and
Rehabilitation, Government of India. The remaining evacuees
(about 3million) who found shelter With friends and relatives
Were also registered with Colonel Luthra’s organisation and pro¬
vided with rations and medical assistance from the camps. See
M.F. Franda, “Refugees and Migration Patterns in North-eastern
India and Bangladesh,”/I f/FY F/eWi*# Reports, XVI: 3(1972),
pp. 6-7.
48. Py.yiMWicis., Indira speaks on Geiioicde, IVar and Bangladesh Calcutta
Academic Publishers, 1972), p. 52.
49. Ibid., p. 55.
50. ScQ Supplement to Soviet Review, IK :3(January 8,1972), pp. 8-9.
51. Seo M. Ayoob and K. Subrahmanyam, The Liberation War (New.
Delhi :S'. Chand and Co., 1972),pp. 153-154.
52. The Pakistan Observer (Dacca), October 23, 1971.
53. The Christian Science Monitor, Tiecember 16, 1971.
54. See F/o//tmr (Calcutta), IV: 19 (August 21, 1972) p. 3.
55. For adetailed and professional discussion of the “feverish”
preparations made by the Indian forces during the period April-
September see Major General D.K. Palit, The Lightning Campaign;
Indo-Pakistan War JP77 (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1972). PP.
63-75.
56. Supplement to Soviet FeviVw, IX :3(January 18,1972).

57. “Articles from The Soviet Press,” in 76tW., pp. 26-42.
58. G. W. Choudhury, “The Emergence of Bangladesh ” , o p . c i t .
pp. 76-77.
59. During the time of Indira Gandhi’s tour of the United States.
Secretary of State William Rogers made astatement that the US
Would keep itself out of any Indo-Pakistan conflict. See Mullick,
op. ci7.,p. 61.
60. toe. cit.
61. Ibid.,-p. 63.

62. /6irf.,pp. 66,68.
63. Ibid., pp. 10,12.
64. G.W. Choudhury, op. cit.,p. 80.
65. D. H.Bayley, “India; War and Political Assertion,” S W v e y
XII, 2, (February 1972), pp. 93-94.
66. See Frontier (CeAcvdid), IV :36 (December 18, 1971).
67. R.C. Thornton, “South Asia: Imbalance in the Subcontinent”-
Orbis, XIX, 3(Fall, 1975), pp. 868-869.
68. For this line of analysis see, for example, Majcr-General D.K. Palit.
op. cit., see also The Sunday r/mes(London),December 12, 1971,
Frontier (Calcutta) IV :37 (December 25,1971).
69. The Joint Command worked on informal basis until December 6
when the Indian Government extended formal recognition to the
Government of Bangladesh. The Joint Command Was given a
formal shape soon after the recognition. Syed Nazrul Islam and
Tajuddin Ahmed, Acting President and Prime Minister of the
Bangladesh Government-in-exile respectively, signed the docu¬
ment of the Joint Command on behalf of Bangladesh. General
Maneckshaw and D.P. Dhar signed it on behalf of the Indian
government. In that document the Indian forces were described
as “supporting forces”. See special interview with General
Usmani, Dainik Bangla (Dacca) December 5, 1972.
70. Ibid
71. Ibid.
72. See Group Captain Bashar, “The Unsung Heroes ’and Flight
Lieutenant Shamsul Alam, ‘‘Operation Kilo,” in The Bangladesh
Observer, Air Force Day Supplement, September 28, 1972.
CHAPTER VII
ROLE OF THE LEFT
The EPCP (pro-Moscow)

The Indian government channelled all its aid and support for
the liberation struggle exclusively through theBangladesh Govern-
ment-in-exile in Calcutta. The result was that the leftist party
leaders and cadres who sought shelter in India could play only
asecondary role in the liberation war. The pro-Moscow CP of
Bangladesh and its front organisations—the pro-Moscow NAP,
Students’ Union, Krishak Samity and the Trade Union Center—
lent full support and cooperation to the liberation war, and ap¬
proximately 6,000 of its workers were reportedly recruited to the
liberation army despite the AL’s policy of excluding other party
cadres.' The formation of the Mujib Bahini as aspecial political
force distinct from the Mukti Bahini and beyond the control of
the Government-in-exile created resentment among the leaders
of the pro-Moscow communists. Tajuddin Ahmed, the Prime
Minister of the Government-in-exile, also saw in this force apot¬
ential challenge to the older AL leadership from the young AL
turks. As Tajuddin Ahmed told the author, the growth of the
Mujib Bahini was the beginning of awar of succession.^
To counterbalance the Mujib Bahini, Tajuddin felt the neces¬
sity of forming political commando units from among the pro-
Moscow leftist. Tajuddin thus encouraged the pro-Moscow lead-
res to open reception camps exclusively for the pro-Moscow
cadres and, with the cooperation of the Communist Party of
India (CPI), helped organise aseparate guerrilla unit of pro-Mos¬
cow leftists. This force reportedly consisted of about 2,000 guer¬
rillas who later became active in Dacca and Comilla.
In aparty thesis dated May 21, 1971, analysing and evaluat-
ing the liberation struggle from an overall perspective, the cen¬

tral committee of the pro-Moscow CP characterised the nature
of domination and exploitation of Bangladesh by the reactionary
ruling elite of Pakistan as colonial, and saw the Bangladesh
struggle as awar of national liberation. The Bangladesh move¬
ment was viewed as anti-imperialist since it was directed against
the imperialist-supported Pakistan and as astruggle for democr¬
acy since democracy was also ademand of the movement.
According to the pro-Moscow theoreticians, the Bangladesh
liberation struggle was to be supported on the following grounds:
1) its success would strengthen the forces of peace and dem¬
ocracy in South Asia; 2) this would indirectly weaken the
forces of imperialism; 3) it would lead to the elimination of
communalism in Bangladesh and help establish friendly rela¬
tions with India; and 4) it would help improve Bangladesh’s
relations with other countries.®
According to this thesis, the main weakness of the Bangla¬

desh liberation struggle was its leadership, concentrated in the
Awami League, which represented the rising bourgeoisie of
Bangladesh. While afundamental contradiction existed between
this leadership and the ruling elite of Pakistan, who represented
the monopoly capitalists of Pakistan, it lacked revolutionary firm¬
ness and did not have enough confidence in the organised force
of the people. This leadership, therefore, was not reluctant to
achieve freedom with the help of abig state. At that moment it
was entirely dependent on India, but it had no inhibitions about
obtaining American imperialist support.
To overcome this weakness of the leadership and to trans¬
form the Bangladesh liberation struggle into an “anti-colonial,
anti-imperialist national democratic revolution,” the central
committee of the pro-Moscow CP of Bangladesh argued for the
formation of aNational Liberation Front, consisting of the AL,
the pro-Moscow CP, the pro-Moscow NAP and other parties
participating in the liberation struggle. The formation of such a
national liberation front would secure the support of the progr¬
essive forces of the pro-Moscow world, and especially the social¬
ist bloc. On the insistence of the pro-Moscow CP and the pro-
Moscow NAP, and to ensure greater help from Soviet Russia
Role of the Left 143
and to counteract the pro-American lobby in the AL, Tajuddin

Ahmed in September 1971 finally agreed to form aconsultative
committee, consisting of 1) Maulana Bhashani, President of
NAP pro-Peking; 2) Moni Singh, President of the pro-Moscow
Bangladesh CP; 3) Professor Muzaffar Ahmed, President of the
pro-Moscow NAP; 4) Manoranjan Dhar of the Bangladesh
Congress; 5) Tajuddin Ahmed, Prime Minister of the Bangla¬
desh Government-in-exile, and 6) Mushtaq Ahmed, Foreign
Minister of the Bangladesh Government-in-exile.
According to the original agreement, the consultative com¬
mittee was formed to conduct the liberation struggle of Bangla¬
desh accepting no solution except complete independence.'* In
September-October, however, asection of the AL had reportedly
tried to arrive at some sort of acompromise with General Yahya
Khan on the basis of an agreement that would ensure the rele¬
ase of Sheikh Mujib and the autonomy of Bangladesh in the
context of one Pakistan, such agreement to be brought about
through the good ofiBces of the government of the United States
in response to rumours about such negotiations, the pro-Mos¬
cow weeklies—Natun Bangla (New Bengal) and Mukd Juddho
(Liberation War)—immediately launched acampaign against
these alleged “CIA-sponored moves to foil the liberation struggle
of Bangladesh”.® In this atmosphere the cooperation of the lea¬
ders of the pro-Moscow camp was important in maintaining
unity, and in securing international support for the liberation
struggle. Professor Muzaffar Ahmed, President of the pro-Mos¬
cow NAP, was included in the delegation that was sent to the
UN General Assembly, and before that Dewan Mahboob Ali
(another leader of the pro-Moscow NAP) was sent to the World
Peace Conference in Budapestin April 1971. In addition. Com¬
rade Abdus Salam (alias Comrade Biren Datta) of the pro-Mos¬
cow CP was reported to have visited Soviet Russia.®
The EPCPML (pro-Peking)

In March 1971, when the people of East Bengal revolted
against West Pakistan rule, the East Pakistan Communist Party,
Marxist Leninist (fiPCPML)’ had come out with the thesis that
the conflict between Yahya and Bhutto on the one hand and
Sheikh Mujib and his lieutenants on the other, was astruggle bet-
ween the “two boot-licking dogs of the American imperialists”.

According to the EPCPML theoreticians, Yahya, Bhutto and
their supporters were the representatives of monopoly, comprad-
ore capitalists, landlords and jagirdars (landholders) of West
Pakistan who, under the protection of the US imperialist and
with the help of their guns, wanted to perpetuate their hold on
the Bangladesh market. Sheikh Mujib and his supporters, as
representatives of the rising Bengali compradore capitalist, lan¬
ded and money-lending classes similarly wanted to attain supre¬
macy in East Bengal under the umbrella of American imperialists.
EPCPML leaders, therefore, considered both groups as enemies
of the exploited people of Bangladesh and had urged theiri cadres
to resist the ‘‘so-called” non-cooperation movement initiated by
Sheikh Mujib. They also called on people to take up arms,
form guerrilla squads and start Mukti Juddho (liberation war)
against both the Pakistan army and AL cadres. The EPCPML
leaders also started an underground paper, Mukti Juddho, to
propagate and organise the liberation war.
During the period of non-cooperation, the cadres of the
EPCPML had acquired some arms and ammunition by looting
gun shops in several towns. During this period anumber of
prisoners of the various jails in Bangladesh, including some
EPCPML leaders and cadres were able to escape, thus streng¬
thening the EPCPML. In the second phase of the revolution,
EPCPML cadres secured alarge amount of arms and ammuni¬
tion from the retreating EBR/EPR forces. During the first few
months, when the Mukti Bahini guerrillas were being trained
in India, the EPCPML cadres established bases in some areas
in the districts of Noakhall, Chittagong, Jessore, Khulna, Farid-
pur, Sylhet and Kushtia. In Ramgati, in Noaknali district,
EPCPML leader Mohammad Toaha collected about 10,000 “red
guerrillas”. The news of activities of the ‘‘red guerrillas” was
broadcast from BBC and Voice of America. This created the
impression in India and abroad that the Bangladesh liberation
war would ultimately lead to the emergence of radical leadership
in liberated Bangladesh.
The poorly equipped guerrillas of the EPCPML came into
head-on collision with Mukti Bahini and Mujib Bahini guerrillas,
as well as the Pakistan army. One of the programmes of the

EPCPML guerrillas was to “liqaidate” class enemies, which
led them to kill landholders and money-lenders on the grounds
that they were simultaneously fighting “the counter-revolution¬
ary forces of both the Awami League and Pakistan.” The alien¬
ated ordinary people whose support was essential to maintain
s e c r e c y.
The EPCPML, therefore, began to lose in large numbers their

cadres, generally to the Mukti Bahini and Mujib Bahini, who,
according to EPCPML leaders, were given orders by the AL
Government-in-exile and the Indian army to crush the ‘red guer¬
rillas’ as well as to fight Pakistan forces.* Two of the leaders
of the EPCPML—Amal Sen and Nazrul Islam—who crossed to
India and started aCentre for Communist Unity there, publish¬
ed an open letter to the leaders of the EPCPML fighting within
Bangladesh, requesting the latter to abandon their self-annihila¬
ting policy of waging simultaneous war against two ‘‘class enem¬
ies”. These two leaders wanted to come out openly in favour of
the national liberation struggle at that stage and to reach a n
understanding with the Mukti Bahini.®

Besides being badly mauled by the Mukti Bahini, the Mujib
Bahini and Pakistan force, the EPCPML suffered another set¬
back: after the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty in August 1971
the party underwent asplit. One faction, led by Abdul Huq
put forward the thesis that the Indo-Soviet Treaty had qualita¬
tively changed the character of the Bangladesh struggle making
Bangladesh adirect colony of “social imperialists”. Huq him¬
self argued that to resist the global design of the ‘‘social imperi¬
alists”, which according to him was to encircle China, Bangla¬
desh revolutionaries should support China and prevent the Indian
Government (“the agent of social imperialists”) from conquer¬
ing East Pakistan. Another faction of the EPCPML, led by
Mohammad Toaha argued that the original plan of creating a n
‘‘independent, sovereign peoples democratic republic of East
Bengal” by liquidating “class enemies” and defeating the Mukti
Bahini and Pakistan forces simultaneously would have to be
continued.^
In the face of the popular nationalist upsurage for inde¬

pendence and the huge number of Mukti Bahini guerrillas fired
withBengalinationalism,theaimsofbothfactionsoftheEPC-
PML were foredoomed to failure. By the time Bangladesh
became free they had lost most of their cadres.
The EBCP
The pro-Peking East Bengal Communist Party (EBCP), in its

founding document in the late 1960s, advocated liberation of
East Bengal under the leadership of the party and pin-pointed
the colonial relationship of Bast Bengal and West Pakistan as
the main point of contradiction between the people of East Ben¬
gal and outside forces.Some of the leaders of the party inclu¬
ding Deben Sikdar, the president, were arrested in early 1970.
The party then came under the control of M.A. Matin, Moham¬
mad Alauddin, M. Amjad, Mohammad Manik and others. These
leaders came under the spell of Charu Mazumdar’s Naxalite
line,i^ and accepted the conflict between the peasantry and feu¬
dal classes as the main point of contradiction. They then began
to “liquidate class enemies” in the rural areas.
In the second phase of the revolution the EBCP cadres in
Pabna(oneoftheirmainstrongholds)wereledbyTipuBiswas,
who became carried away by the nationalist upsurge. Along with
thepoliceandALvolunteers,EBCPmemberswereequippedwith
rifles supplied by the East Bengal police. They eventually killed
o v e r 100 Pakistan soldiers posted in Pabna. They also issued
apamphletsupportingthearmedliberationstruggle,advocating
a n alliance of all nationalist classes, including the national bour¬
geoisie.ButsoontheotherleadersofthepartycontactedTipu
Biswas, urging him to follow the Naxalite line adopted earlier
by the party.
In the meantime, Deben Sikdar escaped from Rajshahi jail
on April 6, 1971. He soon contacted the other leaders of EPCP
and urged them to participate in the struggle for the indepen¬
dence of Bangladesh. But the Pabna-based leaders of EBCP—
Matin and Alauddin—stuck to the theory of “flght between the
two dogs, Like the EPCPML, Matin and Alauddin adopted the
line of simultaneous killing of “two class enemies ,the Mukti
Bahini and the Pakistan army. They separated themselves from
the other leaders of the EBCP and formed anew party, calling it
theEastBengalCommunistPartyMarxist-Leninist(EBCPML),
and raised the slogan, Chairman Mao is our Chairman, Charu
Mazumdar is the leader of the EBCPML”. Like the EPCPML,
they also lost most of their cadres during the liberation w a r .
On March 2, one of the leaders of the E8CP,Abul Bashar,
contacted the party cadres of Dacca district and decided to parti¬
cipate in the armed struggle against the Pakistan forces. The
decision was soon supported by the EBCPcadres of Chittagong,
Noakhali, Comilla, Sylhet, Mymensingh, Rajshahi, Bogra ICush-
tia, Faridpur and Barisal. Deben Sikdar and Bashar crossed the
border and opened amilitary training centre for their cadres at
Srinagar near Agartala, with the help of some Indian leftist
groups. They also claim to have opened atraining centre within
Bangladesh and trained atotal of about 15,000 guerrillas. 1 3
The EBCP guerrillas had been particularly successful in the

Attrai areas of Rajshahi district. Here one of the EBCP leaders.
Ohiduf Rahman, had collected alarge number of workers for
EBCP before the liberation war started and created astir by
reaping harvests from the lands of some landholders, distributing
them among the landless peasants. Ohidur Rahman and his cadres
were carried away by the nationalist upsurge. As he lost contact
with the central leaders of EBCP, he formed the Attrai Commu¬
nist Party and joined the liberation movement. At this the Attrai
police, who had been trying to arrest him, joined his group and
supplied it with arms. Later, Ohidur’s cadres snatched away s o m e
weapons form Razakars and Pakistan forces. Some weapons
also came to him from India through sympathetic EBR/EPR

officers. Ohidur’s group developed the theory of “unity sturggle”
i.e. unity with Mukti Bahini and struggle against the national
enemies and soon established ahold on several thanas of Raj¬
shahi district (Attrai, Bagmara, Manda, Raninagar and Niamat-
pur). He claimed that his partymen killed over 1,000 Pakistan
soldiers and several hundred ‘‘national enemies.”''*
The East Bengal Workers Movement (EBWM)

From the very time of its formation in January 1968, the
EBWM had maintained the thesis that the fundamental
contradiction in Pakistan was the conflict between the ruling
clique of West Pakistan and the colonially exploited masses of
East Bengal.‘5 They also considered American imperialism, So¬
viet social imperialism, and Indian expansionism as the second
most important group of enemies of the people of East Bengal.
The young militant leaders of the EBWM were the first to have
declared anational war of liberation against the West Pakistan
military junta. Their leaflet (urging anational liberation war)
was quoted in the “white paper” issued by the Yahya regime as
“proof” of the Awami League’s revolt against the Pakistan
I S
government.
In that leaflet they argued that Sheikh Mujib had only two
alternatives before him: either to surrender to the Pakistan
military junta or to join an armed struggle against them. The
EBWM leaders urged Sheikh Mujib to form anational libera¬
tion front, with all of the patriotic elements of the country, on
the basis of aminimum programme of launching anational libe¬
ration war. In another leaflet issued around the same time, they
urged all leftist groups to unite in acommon front to fight West
Pakistan colonial power. In the second phase of the revolution,
the EBWM cadres were active in several thanas of Barisal, Patua-
khali, Dacca, Munshiganj, Faridpur, Tangail and Pabna.
As the liberation war unfolded in subsequent months the EB¬
WM leaders developed the thesis that East Bengal would have
to fight against West Pakistan forces, using the strength of her
o w n people under the leadership of the part of the proletariat
s o that she could telescope the two revolutions of national libera¬

tion and peoples’ democracy into one. They argued at the same
time that the Chinese stand on the Bangladesh crisis—urging the
“Indian expansionists and Soviet social imperialists” not to in¬
terfere in the struggle, thus giving the people of Bangladesh the
opportunity to decide their own future—was wholly correct. The
EBWM leaders, mainly intellectuals from the petty bourgeois
class, believed that they had become “declassed” by their expe¬
rience during the first months of the liberation struggle, certainly
during this period they had recruited to EBWM alarge number
of workers and peasants and indoctrinated them with Marxist-
Leninist-Maoist ideas.
Using Mao’s words, the EBWM leaders, holding that the
gap between intellectuals and peasant-workers had been closed,
thought that the time had come to transform the EBWM into a
‘party of the proletariat; the Purbo Bangla Sarbohara Party,
commonly known as Sarbohara. formally appeared, on June 3,
1971. Under the leadership of this party, an armed liberation
army was built up with its headquarters at Peara Bagan n e a r
Barisal. During the period before the Mukti Bahini guerrillas
poured into Bangladesh, the guerrilla squads of Sarbohara estab¬
lished their bases in Jhalakati, Swarupkati, Gournadi. Pathar-
ghata, Mehdiganj, Udipur, and Khegapur in Putuakhali, Bhola
and Barisal districts, and in anumber of thanas of Madaripur,
Narshingdi, Munshiganj, Tangail, Dacca and Pabna. In the
middle of June Pakistan forces in large numbers attacked the
Sarbahara headquarters at Peara Bagan. Most of the guerrillas
there escaped but, like the EPCML, Sarbohara were also distru¬
sted by the Mukti Bahini. and especially by the Mujlb Bahini.
Under attack by both Pakistan forces and Mujib Bahini, many
of the guerrillas of the Sarbohara party lost their lives by the
time that Bangladesh became free.^^
Bangladesh Mukti Sangram Somonnoy Committee

Several groups of pro-Chinese communi.sts who fled to India dur¬
ing the period of occupation formed the Bangladesh Mukti San¬
gram Somonnoy Committee (the coordination committee of the
Bangladesh liberation struggle). These Included 1) the Coordina¬
tion Committee of the Communist Revolutionaries (CCCR),i*
2) the EBCP, led by Deben Sikdar and Abul Bashar, 3) the EP-
CPML, led by Amal Sen and Nazrul Islam, 4) some indepen¬
dent communists of Khulna, led by the Dr. Maroof Hossain
and Dr. Sayeddur Dahar, and 5) some of the communists of
Dacca ted by Nasim Ali.^® The Committee was backed and fina¬
nced by the Communist Party of India Marxist (CPM) of West
Bengal, which collected alarge amount of money to assist the
Bangladesh liberation struggle. Maulana Bhashani’s name was
announced as the chairman of this committee, but Bhashani him¬
self disowned his connection with it, opting Instead for aposi¬
tion of full support to the Bangladesh Government-in-exile and
its liberation army.
In its thesis, the committee discarded the theory of “two
dogs fight” as put forward by the EPCPML and EBCPML and
argued that since Pakistan established its colonial rule over

Bangladesh, the present struggle was essentially anational libe¬
ration struggle like the Irish liberation struggle of the late 19th
century and early 20th century.^" Quoting Lenin, who lent
support to the Irish national liberation struggle, and Stalin, who
supported the Finnish demand for national self-determination,
the Somonnoy Committee put forward the view that, since the
entire people of Bangladesh were waging awar against West
Pakistan colonial rule, the Bangladesh liberation struggle had to
be supported by communist revolutionaries.
On the point much emphasised by the EPCPML and EBCPML
leaders—that the leadership of the Bangladesh liberation struggle
was in the hands of the bourgeoisie—the Somonnoy Committee
argued that, like the 1905 Russian revolution, the revolution in
Bangladesh, despite all of its defects, was paving the way for the
emancipation of the exploited classes of Bangladesh. On this view
Chinese policy had been guided by considerations of Chinese
national interests rather than of world revolution. From their
one-sided angle, the Chinese had found in the Bangladesh crisis
only the machinations of India and Soviet Russia, but they had
not seen the heroic struggle of the colonially exploited Ben¬
galis. Furthermore since most of the guerrillas were drawn from
the patriotic classes—middle, lower middle and peasant—the
very process of the liberation war would lead to the higher stage
of “people’s war”. Communist revolutionaries should join the
Mukti Bahini in large numbers and transform the liberation
struggle.
The Somonnoy Committee demanded that the Bangladesh
Government-in-exile arrange for the training of members of all
political parties without discrimination, and that the Indian army
should not directly intervene in the Bangladesh crisis. However,
except for the EBCP which, as stated earlier, opened acentre at
Agartala for the military training of its cadres, the groups of
pro-Peking communists that made up the Somonnoy Committee
could do little but infiltrate the Mukti Bahini to asmall extent.
It has already been pointed out (see Chapter III) that, al¬
though the leftists helped create the atmosphere for socialist and
secular nationalist appeals in East Bengal, they remained outside
the mainstream of politics in the 1960s because they failed to
take into account the force of Bengali nationalism, which steadily

grew in East Bengal during the decade of the Ayub regime. In the
late 1960s they became divided into so many mutually hostile
factions that, even though all the factions came out in favour of
establishing an ‘‘independent sovereign peoples’ democratic re¬
public of East Bengal”, they could not mount aserious challenge
to the nationalist AL leadership. The factionalism among the
revolutionary leftist continued during the period of the liberation
struggle.
The two largest pro-Peking groups, EPCPML and EBCP were
divided in their analysis of the character of the Bangladesh libera¬
tion struggle and identification of the main enemy. The majority
in the EPCPML and some of the EBCP doggedly followed Charu
Mazumdar’s line of taking feudalism as the main enemy of the
Bangladesh people. This distanced them from the current of
tremendous nationalists upheaval that swept Bangladesh during
the occupation period. While they quoted Mao Tse-tung and Ho
Chi Minh extensively in their literature, they failed to take into
account that both Mao and Ho used nationalists appeals along
with Marxism-Leninism to bring about the revolutions in their
countries. The other pro-Peking communist groups, whose analy¬
ses of the liberation struggle were closer to the realities in Bangla¬
desh, could not play an effective role, because of the Indian
government’s policy of bringing about the independence of the
country under AL leadership.
The indirect influence of the communist revolutionaries, how¬
ever, was quite substantial. For fear of losing the initiative to
the leftists, the AL leadership dared not come to acompromise
with the military junta of West Pakistan by modifying the 6-point
programme in March 1971. During the period of the liberation
struggle, again in apprehension of the Mukti Bahini guerrillas
switching their loyalties to the leftists, the AL leaders garnished
their liberation movement with revolutionary and socialist ideo¬
logies, and took policy stances close to the left revolutionaries.
Moreover, after the liberation of Bangladesh, the Awami League
government continued to insist on nationalism, democracy, secu¬
larism and socialism as the main pillars on which the new state
of Bangladesh was to be built.
NOTES
1. The statement of Muzaffar Ahmed appeared in Daitiik Bangla

December 22, 1971.
2. Interview With Tajuddin Ahmed on August 29,1973.

3. Central Committee, East Pakistan Communist Party, Bangla-
deiher Swadhinata Sangramer Midlayon (Evaluation of the Liberation
Struggle of Bangladesh) (Calcutta, Bangladesh Communist Party,
May 21,1971).
4. The leaflet issued by the pro-Moscow NAP on the formation and

resolution of the consultative committee, dated 9lh September,
1971.
5. Natun Bangla, September 16, October 18, 1971; see also Mukti
Juddho, Ocioher 3and 17,1971.
6. Mukti Juddho. October 17,1971.
7. See above. Chapter III, p. 45.
8. Gana Shakti. September, 1972.
9. An Open Letter to the EPCPML. by Amal Sen and Nazml Islam, dated
October 1971, and published by Mohammad Osman.
10. See, Jono Juddho, No. 7, January 1973.
11. See Chapter in, p. 45.
12. Charu Mazumdar Was the leader of the pro-Peking communist

party of West Bengal popularly known as Naxalite Party. Mazum¬
dar advocated the use of peasant uprising as the primary tech¬
nique for bringing about communist revolution in South Asia.
13. See Mukti Shapath. 1:5 (1972). pp. 4-5.
14. Letter of Ohicur Rahm.an to Abul Bashar, published in Ibid, pp.
1 0 - 11 .
15. See Chapter HI. p. 47.

16. Purbo PakistanSankat Somparke Shetpatra (White Paper on the
Crisis of East Pakistan), August 1971, published by Films and Publi¬
cations Division, Government of Pakistan, pp. 38-49.
17. For the role of the Purbo Bangla Saibchara Party in the liberation
War Report Placed Before the First National Congress of the Purbo
Bangla Sarbohara Party, January 1972, publisher not mentioned.
18. See above. Chapter in, p. 46.
19. These communists Were formerly miombers of the pro-Moscow
CP but dissociated themselves from the parent party in early
1969, and formed aseparate communist party. This party started
an underground paper, (Weapon) from April 4, 1969 and

propagated atheoretical position in between the pro-Moscow
and various pro-Chinese groups. It lent full support to the seces¬
sionist movement from March 1, 1971.
20. Bangladesher Mukti Juddho OAntra (Our Stand on the Bangladesh

Liberation War), cyclostyled paper published in 15 September,
1971, by the Coordinating Committee of the Bangladesh Libera¬
tion Struggle. Reprinted in Bangladesh on 29 February, 1972.
CHAPTER VIII
THE MUJIB REGIME AND POLITICAL

P O L A R I S AT I O N
The extraordinary process of her birth affected almost all

aspectsofpoliticaldevelopmentinBangladeshduringthe
firstyearsofherexistenceasanindependentstate.Sheikh
MujibonhistriumphantreturnfromWestPakistanonJanuary
10,1972,'establishedaparliamentaryformofgovernment.But
theideas’spawnedbytherevolutionof1971hadalreadydisru¬
ptedthepre-revolutionconsensusamongtheBangladeshleaders
about the adoption of parliamentary government. The groups
espousingtheviewthatthesalvationofthepoverty-stricken
massescouldbeaccomplishedonlythroughasocialrevolution
on the Chinese model had acquired arms and ammunition
during the liberation war. After having recruited cadres
from the frustrated young Mukti Bahini members, these groups
emergedasstrongforceschallengingtheSheikhMujibgovern¬
mentandquestioningthesuitabilityoftheWesternparliamen¬
tarysystemasacatalystforradicaleconomicreforms.Thesucc¬
essfulmassarmedrevolutionof1971alsoweakenedpeoples’res¬
pectforauthority,lawanddiscipline.Thesocial,economicand
politicaldisorderthatfollowedhelpedtheleftiststostiruppublic
sentimentforatrulysocialrevolution.Moreover,theideological
andpoliticalbattlesinBangladeshwerecomplicatedbythema¬
trixofrelationshipsthatIndiaandSovietRussiadevelopedwith
Bangladeshduringtheperiodof1971struggle.Theresulting
regroupingofpoliticalforcesinBangladeshledtothecollapse
of the Mujib regime. .. . , .
However, at the start, the legend of Sheikh Mujib, his charis¬
maticappealandhishypnoticholdovertheBengaliswereenor-
The Mujib Regime and Political Polarisation 155
mous assets for the Awaini League government. On the day follow¬
ing his arrival in Dacca, Sheikh Mujib. as President of Bangla¬
desh, promulgated aProvisional Constitution Order providing
for aparliamentary form of government. He then stepped down
from the office of the President. Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury,
aformer judge of the Dacca High Court and Vice Chancellor of
Dacca University became the new President. Disregradlng the
appeal of the leftists to form a“national government” with re¬
presentation from all the political parties. Sheikh Mujib formed a
23-member AL cabinet which included all the five members of
the government in Calcutta.^ The extent of Mujib’s success in
establishing authority was indicated by the withdrawal of all
Indian troops from the country by March 12, 1972.
Sheikh Mujib then acted quickly to facilitate the framing of a
formal const! ution for Bangladesh. Presidential Order 22 w a s
promulgated on March 23, 1972, providing for the establish¬

ment of aConstituent Assembly made up of members elected
in 1970 from East Bengal to the National Assembly of Pakistan
and to the Provincial Assembly of East Pakistan. The Constituent
Assembly enacted the first Constitution of independent Bangla¬
desh only seven months later.^
While the Constitution provided for aunitary parliamentary
system, itspreamble declared that “the high ideals of nationalism,
socialism, democracy and secularism which inspired our heroic
people to dedicate themselves to, and to sacrifice their lives, in
the national liberation struggle, shall be the fundamental princi¬
ples of the Constitution.” The Constitution makers attempted to
facilitate the transition to socialism through parliamentary demo¬
cracy by providing that nationalisation and requisitioning of
property could not be challenged in acourt of law.'*
Part II of the Constitution dealt with the Fundamental
Principles of State policy, and Part III with Fundamental Rights.
Part II stated that the basic responsibility of the state was to
provide food, clothing, shelter, education, health care, jobs, and

social security for its citizens through planned growth. No
law expressly declared by Parliament to implement this basic
responsibility could be declared unconstitutional simply be¬
cause it conflicted with the fundamental rights listed in Part
I1I.5 The AL leaders argued that the Constitution provided the
mechanism by which the Parliament, democratically elected by a

politically conscious people, could determine priorities on the
basis of the objective conditions obtaining in the country at a
particular time.®
The new Constitution took effect from December 16, 1972 and
general elections were called for March 7, 1973. As can be seen
in Table 8, the Awami League, the party of independence, won
the 1973 elections overwhelmingly.’
Ta b l e 8
RESULTS OF THE FIRST GENERAL ELECTION HELD

IN BANGLADESH ON MARCH 7, 1973
Name of the Party Number of Number of Percentage

Seats Con- Seats o f Vo t e s
tested W o n Secured
300 292 73.17

Awami League
National Awami Party
223 8.59
(pro-Moscow)
Jatio Samajtantric Dal
(National Socialist
236 1 6.48
Party)
National Awami Party
169 5.42
(Bhashani)
Independents and
150 6 6.34
others
To t a l 1078 299® 100
aThe election in one constituency was postponed due to the death

of one of the candidates. This seat was later won by an AL can¬
didate.
Source: The number of seats won and percentage of votes secured by

each party ware counted from the constituency-wise results published in
The Bangladesh Observer, March 8-10, 1973.
The election manifesto of the AL had stated that it would

regard the elections as areferendum on the four fundamental
principles of state policy—nationalism, socialism, democracy,
and secularism. It had also stated that an AL victory would be
taken as amandate to Mujib to build the new state on the basis
of those principles. Because of Mujib’s appeal, his vigorous

campaigning in most of the towns and cities of Bangladesh and
the AL’s leadership of the nationalist movement, the party’s
victory was aforegone conclusion. As one foreign journalist
wrote, “Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would have won handsomely
even if the election had been conducted by the United Nations
and supervised by the Red Cross.”
However, the legitimacy of Mujib’s electoral mandate was
compromised by some zealous AL workers who resorted to
strong-arm methods and the procurement of false ballots in their
desire to win all the seats. In some of the closely contested con¬
stituencies, prospective opposition candidates were kidnapped
by AL workers even before they could file their nomination pap¬
ers. In several constituencies in Barisal, Tangail and Chittagong
where opposition candidates were leading during the voting it¬
self. the counting of ballots was suddenly halted, the ballot box¬
es were stuffed with fake papers and AL candidates were dec¬
lared elected under the watchful eyes of AL volunteers.*
The elections did not bring about significant changes in either
the executive or the legislature. Sixty six per cent of the members
of the new Parliament were former members of the Constituent
Assembly.® After the elections Justice Chowdhury was re-elected
as President unopposed. Only one new Cabinet Member was
designated after the election and one other was moved to ano¬
ther Ministry. In October 1973, 14 additional State Ministers
were appointed, with the same sort of professional backgrounds
as the other cabinet members.'®
Anumber of achievements can be attributed to the AL regi¬

me during its first two years in office, all of which helped to r e s -
tore some semblance of stability to the polity and the economy,

Aconstitution was framed within nine months of independence
and elections were held six months later. Large-scale famine
which threatened was avoided in 1972 and 1973 and the ten mil¬
lion people who had migrated to India during the occupation
were rehabilitated. Communications were restored by repairing
about 300 railway bridges and 274 road bridges and the six air¬
ports damaged during the war; Chittagong harbour was cleared
of mines and wrecks with the help of 11 Russian warships.ii
The Politics of Patronage

However, the appearance of stability presented by these attain¬
ments concealed the reality of agradual but steady drift towards
political and economic crisis. One of the factors leading to the
impending collapse was the reliance of Sheikh Mujib’s government
for support on the distribution of patronage.
Sheikh Mujib had little experience of administration. He had
served for less than ayear as Minister in the AL-led government
in East Pakistan in 1956-57.i^ Moreover his lack of administrative
experience was not balanced by deep intellectual convictions or
knowledge about the problems of the new and problem-ridden
states of Asia and Africa. In deciding policy matters, he was
guided more by his political instincts than anything else. Sheikh
Mujib had all along astrong attachment to his party supporters.
In 1956-1957, when the AL-led coalition vtas in power. Sheikh
Mujib came into conflict with the AL Chief Minister, Ataur
Rahman Khan, on the issue of the relation of party officials to
the.generaladministrativeprocess.AtaurRahmanKhanfavoured
an administrative system free from the influence of party workers
while Sheikh Mujib argued that party loyalty should supersede
administrative neutrality and the administration should be carried
on in such amanner as to strengthen the influence of AL work-
ers. Sheikh Mujib argued that the party system could not
develop without anetwork of patronage.^® Ataur Rahman Khan
did not submit to Sheikh Mujib’s pressure but the standing and
influence of Sheikh Mujib with the party workers rose as aresult
of this conflict. During his short term of office as Minister for
Indurtries in 1956-1957 and through his influence on his succes¬
sor, Sheikh Mujib did help some AL supporters to get various
types of government assistance and bank loans.*'* In subsequent
years Sheikh Mujib helped his party workers by various means-
direct monetary assistance, arranging for jobs, helping their
professionaladvancementthroughhisinfluenceamongadminis¬
trators and the like. He used to assure party workers repeatedly
that he would always stand by them in bad as well as good days.
Thus while nsembers of the AL suffered at the hands of the
Pakistan government before and during the liberation struggle the
AL had not imbued its leaders or members with idealism to work
15
selflessly for the reconstruction of the war-ravaged country.
Soon after his assumption of power in independent Bangladesh

Sheikh Mujib government started to distribute benefits to leaders
and workers of the AL in return for “their sufferings for the
cause of the nation.”*®
Patronage under the Sheikh Mujib government took various
forms. First, because of the extreme radicalisation of the political
atmosphere during the liberation war, the government quickly
decided to nationalise all banks, insurance companies, jute, textile
and sugar mills, amajor portion of inland and coastal shipping,
airways and foreign trade and to put aceiling of Taka 2.5 million
on private investment. The majority of those appointed to high
posts in the nationalised industries were ALactivists who grew
rich overnight by smuggling spare parts and raw materials to
India. Secondly, the distribution of both locally produced and
imported goods was carried on by licensed “dealers”, most of
>vhomwereAL workers rather than professional traders. The
AL licensees sold their permits to professional at high prices.’’
Most of the permits for opening indenting (import-export) firms
were given to AL workers and sympathisers. In addition, about
60,000 houses abandoned by non-Bengalis were appropriated by
AL leaders and workers.’® Lastly, large scale smuggling of rice,
jute and relief goods to India was carried on mostly by AL work¬
ers or people having connections with the AL leaders. The result
of all of this was the mushroom growth of anouveau riche class,
living off the economy rather than investing in it—and having
controlling influence in the ruling party. As one political docu¬
ment put it;
‘ I
Pakistan’s 22 families had become Bangladesh’s 2,000. Such
people can hardly provide the leadership for asocialist trans¬
” 1 9
formation of the Bangladesh economy.
Soon some of the closest associates and family members of
Sheikh Mujib became involved in blatant corruption and smug¬
gling operations. Gazi Gulam Mustafa, one of Sheikh Mujib’s
trusted political associates, earned international notoriety for
misappropriating Red Cross and United Nations relief goods.
Sheikh Abu Nasser, Mujib’s only brother, was one of the ring
leaders of jute smuggling operations to India. Each of Sheikh
Mujib’s nephews—Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni (Sheikh Moni),
Abul Hasanat and Sheikh Shahidul Islam—not only made quick

advances in politics but also amassed much personal wealth by
illegalmeans.SheikhKamal,Mujib’seldestson,wasalsoinvol¬
ved in extralegal ways of accumulating wealth. One foreign
journalist wrote on August 30, 1974.
“Corruption is certainly not new. but for many in Dacca the
relative scale and open character of the plunder holds few
historical comparisons. One, perhaps, is China during 1930s
and 1940.”20
Some political scientists argue that corruption and patronage

have functional role in promoting and strengthening political
partiesandothercivilianinstitutions.LaPalombaraandWeiner
write:
“It may very well be that from the standpoint of long-range

democratic development abureaucracy subject to party pat-
r o n a g e , e v e n to acertain amount of political corruption.
IS
preferred to one which, while it nicely conforms to the We¬

berian requisites of alegal-rational authority system, is also
by this very reason in aposition to distort the development
of political parties and interest groups and even to subject
them to bureaucratic domination.”^*
The formulation of Nye is, perhaps, closer to reality. Under

some circumstances,
. Nye argues, corruption can have beneficial
effects on development problems and under certain other conditi¬
ons.thecostofcorruptionwillbehighowingtoitsexacerbationof
theproblemsofsteadydevelopment.^^Post-liberationBangladesh
w a snot the place where the type of corruption resorted to by
the AL regime could have beneficial effects on economic and
politicaldevelopment.Thecreationofaparasiticaffluentclass, on con-
divorced from production and squandering easy money
spicuousconsumption,onlyaggravatedtheeconomicproblems
while the political damage to the regime was irreparable. With
thepeople’sswollenaspirationsandtheveryunfavourablere¬
source/population ratio, government patronage satisfied onty a
few but alienated many. Moreover, in view of the heavy price
that the people had paid in blood and gold for the emergence
of Bangladesh and in view of the promises of socialism and
equalitarianism made by the AL leaders, the ‘‘undaunted, in¬
satiable and audacious” corruptions pervading all tiers of the
AL government generated among the people adeep feeling of
betrayal by the AL leadership. Sheikh Mujib’s charisma w o r e
thin. The regime lost the greatest asset with which it started—
legitimacy. One can argue that the incidence of the loss of legi¬
timacy may not be serious to aregime if the powerful groups of
the state are not alienated. But the Mujib regime lost legitimacy
not only in the eyes of the people in general but also with two
important catalysts of political change in most developing na¬
tions—the students and the armed forces.
The primarily agricultural economy of Bangladesh, depen¬
dent on nature’s vagaries, is hardly able to sustain her tee.ning
millions. That the country might not be economically viable
had been afavourite argument of the detractors of her cause.
The international community as awhole, however, had been
sympathetic to Bangladesh and, up to December 31, 1973, provi¬
ded atotal of about SI,373 million as loans and grants.This
massive aid propped up the economy in the initial two-year per¬
iod. With the winding up of the United Nations Relief Organisa¬
tion in Bangladesh (UNROB) on December 31, 1973, the e c o n -
omy began to show increasing signs of crisis for several reasons.

First, the global inflation that hit the world in 1972 also affjcted
Bangladesh. Second, since the newly appointed officials in the
nationalised industries (who, as stated earlier, were mainly the
products of patronage) had hardly any managerial skills, produc¬
tion in most of the industries fell to 9per cent of the total
capacity.24 Third, as some experts estimate the illegal trade with
India drained out about 15 per cent of Bangladesh total pro¬
duction of jute (which had earned 85 percent of the country’s
total foreign exchange prior to 1971) and rice (staple food of
Bengalis.)’®
Coupled with the damage to food and cash crops caused by
severe dislocation of 1971 war,^® the factors mentioned above
soon brought the country to the brink of an economic disaster.
Meanwhile circulation of paper money by the government conti¬
nued to increase, resulting in an inflationary spiral of 300 per cent
or more in the prices of consumer goods between 1969 and 1973.
After the termination of UNROB operations in 1973 there was
little inflow of foreign aid, except that which was already in the
pipeline. In addition, there was huge shortfall in projected govern¬
ment revenue. In June 1974, Finance Minister Tajuddin Ahmed
stated publicly that the implementation of the development plan
of 1973-1974 would be impossible and that the economy of the
country had almost broken down.^’
While the economy of Bangladesh was on the point of col¬

lapse, the situation was aggravated by ‘‘the worst floods in our
history” in July and August 1974, which, according to an esti¬
mate of the Planning Commission, caused damage to more than 1
million tons of foodgrains and 10 to 15 million dollars worth of
jute exports. During the floods, prices of essential goods began
to rise rapidly and by September had risen (from 1969-70) by
700-800 per cent. According to official figures, 27,500 persons
had died of starvation by November 22, 1974.^8 Unofficial
estimated the number of deaths at 100,000 by the
s o u r c e s
end of October. International emergency assistance of about

$400 million (in cash and kind) and $145 million in loans
during the period August-November 1974 gave the Bangladesh
economy atemporary lease of life for the immediate future.
Fear of India and the Growth of Opposition

In foreign policy. Sheikh Mujib’s early projection of the vision
of Bangladesh as the “Switzerland of Asia” turned into the
reality of Bangladesh being aclient state of India. As mentioned
previously. Sheikh Mujib was able to persuade Mrs. Indira Gan¬
dhi to withdraw all Indian troops from Bangladesh by March 12,
1972. But on March 12, 1972, Sheikh Mujib signed a25-year
Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Peace with India which
in substance was similar to the Treaty signed by India with
U.S.S.R. in August 1971. At the “request” of the government of
Bangladesh the Soviet government sent anaval fleet to salvage
the war-ravaged Chittagong port. Thus, Sheikh Mujib brought
his brand new country into international entanglements with In¬
dia and Soviet Russia. The relation of Bangladesh with India and
Soviet Russia became successively entangled in the public mind in
virtually every domestic issue. The romantic visions of solidarity
created in the Bangladesh liberation struggle of 1971 were soon
replacedbythewidespreadfearofdominationofBangladeshby
an “expansionist” India.
Soon
after
theemergence
of
Bangladesh,
Indian
leaders
began
to assert that India was now the dominant power in South Asia
andthat“theforeignersshouldwithdrawfromthisregion. ’»29
This Indian attempt to develop a“Monroe doctrine” for South

AsiacreatedageneralfearofIndianhegemonismamongthe
smallerstatesinthesub-continentincludingBangladesh.Butthe
Bengalifeargraduallygrewinintensityandvolumeforspecial
reasons. First, the Indian Army, before they were withdrawn from
Bangladesh,
.. a m o took
u n t to India
o f the vast
arms and ammu¬
nitionleftbythesurrenderingPakistanarmyandkeptthenas-
centBangladesharmyvirtuallydisarmed.^"Secondly,theIndian
governmentimposedatradeagreementonBangladeshproviding
forfreetradewithintenmilesofthebordersThroughthisbor¬
deragreement(whichwasterminatedattheendofthefirstyear
ofindependenceinthefaceofstiffpublicprotestinBangladesh),
IndiasiphonedofffromBangladeshalargepartoftheforeign
grants in kind and huge quantities of jute, rice and other essen¬
tialcommodities.TheIndiangovernmentalsoslackenedtheanti¬
smuggling operationalongtheIndianborders,assuchsmuggling
went in favour of India.®i
IndiaalwaysdefaultedonitsexportstoBangladeshofitems
provided for in the annual trade
,^ .. agreement, while Bangladesh
exceededtargetsinitsexportstoIndia.India’sfailuretoexport
coalparticularlyhitBangladeshindustry.*^Despiteanumber
ofconcessionsmadetoIndia,theMujibgovernmentcould n o t
get what Bengalis considered afair share of water from the
Gangesriversystem.BylateMarch1975,whenthe“fifthround”
oftalksaboutthesettlementofmaritimeboundarybetween
BangladeshandIndiahadbeentakingplace,theIndiannavy
physicallypreventedanAmericanoilcompanyvesselfrom
exploring,onbehalfofBangladesh,“adisputedarea.”
InadditiontohelpingIndiatomakeBangladeshasubservi¬
entstate.SheikhMujibraisedaspecialparamilitaryforcecalled
iheJatioRakkhiBahini(NationalSecurityForce)(JRB)atthe
costofthepoorlyequippedregulararmedforces.Theformer
membersoftheMujibBahinP»andKaderBahini^*andthose
membersofMuktiBahiniwhowereespeciallyloyaltoSheikh
recruited to the JRB.
Mujib and his nephew, Sheikh Moni, were
JRBstrengthwasestimatedatabout25,000inJanuary1975.
ItwastrainedbyIndianmilitaryofficersanddressedintheolive
green battle dress of the Indian army.®*^ Thus, when Sheikh
Mujib began in 1975 to step up rhetoric about eternal friendship
between India and Bangladesh, suspicions grew t h a t h e w a s
surrenderingBangladeshnationalinterestforthesakeofprotec¬
tion of his regime by the India-trained JRB. With the annexa¬
tion of Sikkim by India in April 1975, Bengali fear of Indian
expansionismbecamealmostuniversal.
Violence,whichhadbeenrampantthroughoutBangladesh
since the liberation, was partly aresponse to economic unrest
and politicaldisenchantment.ThegeneralpolicyoftheAL
governmentregardingpoliticalinterferencewiththeadministra¬
tiveprocesswasalsoresponsibleforthedeteriorationoflaw
and order. The predilection of Sheikh Mujib to identify state
withpartyledlocalALleaderstoactassupervisorsofcivilserv¬
ants,placingthecivilservantsinunaccustomedrolessubordi¬
nate to local political bosses. Moreover, the tenure of govern¬
ment servants was made insecure by the Preddent’s Order No. 9
providing for the dismissal, without right of appeal, of any
in the interest of the People’s Republic of
government officer “in
Bangladesh”.Civilservants,therefore,begantoplaysafeanddo
the minimum in face of violations committed mostly by the
3 8
Newspapers
armed supporters of various political groups,
carried daily reports of secret killings, “suicides ,hijackings,
dacoities and mob lynchings. In afive-month period in 1973,
60policestationswerelootedforarms.ThePrimeMinisterin
his broadcast to the nation on the eve of Victory Day (December
16,1974)statedthatmorethan3,000ALleadersandworkers,
including 4members of Parliament, had been killed by terrori-
sts.^'’ The economic crisis, people’s disillusionment with the cor¬
ruption-riddenandextremelypro-IndianSheikhMujibgovern¬
mentandtheatmosphereoflawlessnesswerecompoundedbya
politicalcrisisprimarilycausedbytheactivitiesoftheradical
revolutionary parties and by factionalism within AL government
and party.
It was an extraordinary fact—and one which illustrates dra¬
matically the radicalising influence of the armed struggle that
the major post-independence revolutionary party grew out of

dissidenceintheAwamiLeagueanditsaffiliatedorganisations.
(The splits and reorganisations of the political parties in post¬
liberationBangladeshareshowninDiagram3.)Sincetheearly
1960s, some members of the AL students wing—the Students Lea¬
gue (SL)—had been arguing for an independent socialist Bangla¬
desh and for armed rebellion against West Pakistan. This group,
under the leadership of Serajul Alam Khan, A.S.M. Abdur Rab,
and Sahjahan Siraj, continued agitating for apeople’s move¬
ment after the elections of 1970.^® The same group took the lead
in declaring Bangladesh to be independent after postponement of
the National Assembly by Yahya Khan on March 1, 1971. Rab
first raised the flag of independent Bangladesh under the famous
banyan tree in the Dacca University Campus on March 2. On
the following day Siraj read aproclamation of independence in
the presence of agathering that included Sheikh Mujib,
The Rab-Siraj group continued to pressure Mujib to declare
Bangladesh independent and to stop negotiating with Yahya
Khan because this was thwarting the popular will to revolt.®^
During the liberation struggle, Rab, Siraj, and S. A. Khan w e r e
high-ranking members of the Mujib Bahini, but they were not at
all enthusiastic about the personality cult developing around the
“Father of the Nation, Instead their pressure was towards a
genuinely revolutionary government to serve the peasants and
workers.
Another group of the Student League, led by Nur e-Alam

Siddiqui, then President of the League, advocated transition to
socialism through parliamentary means under “Mujibism”. Al¬
though both groups were at first loyal to Sheikh Mujib, eventu¬
ally he chose to support the Siddiqui group. On the same day
in 1972 when Mujib was inaugurating the annual conference at
the Students’League under Siddiqui at the Ramna Race Course,
the Rab-Siraj group was holding its annual conference at the
Paltan Maidan, proclaiming aclassless society and acommitment
40
to armed struggle to change the status quo. The latter group
soon defeated the other students organisations in students’ union
elections in all the six universities and major colleges in Bangla¬
desh.
0 \
The left puriionx of (lie Diagrutii arc sn ctmllnualion of Diagram O N
Iabove p.40
*Indicates the name/ncmes of Ihe leader/leaders of the political
p a r t y. CD
E F T A L ISLAMIC RIGHT w
E P C P A L M L 3
1549-50
(re
CL
rro-Moscovir Non-pro-Moscew O
V )
T c r
1949-70 I
N A P B C ? N A P EPCP EBCP C C K E B W M A L M L PDP Jamaal Jamaat-i CD
!MauEana M L M L <
!M. !Mori !J. !Siraj !Sheikh Three !Nuru! Lkma-e O
Ahmad Bhavhani !Md. !A. A h m s d SiUdar factions A m i n Lslami Islam
Singh Mujib c
To a h a Matin !A. !Abdur St
Sabur Rahim Nizam-e- O

Khan Islani 3 !
F . A . !Farid P
3
Cho«dhury Ahmed CL
S. Islam
1971 War
>
Eariy I97S BCP N A P EPCP Sammo- BCP B C P BCPL Sarboharu JSD &BCL Banned 3 ^
O
N A P !Moni !Mauiarut M L badi *Deven M L !Anial. !S. Alam ! 1
!M. Singh Bhashani !A. Dai Sikdar !A. Sen Sikdar Khan A L 3
Ahmad (died/ !Sheikh P
Huq !M. Matin *J. !M. A.
To a h a killed)
Ahmad iaSil Mujib 3 *
party ! A .
split
Rah
after
January
£975
The1972-splitintheALstudentsfrontwassoonfollowedby
splits in ^he AL Labour front and also in the AL-a9iliated Asso¬
ciation of Freedom Fighters (Mukti Joddha Sangsad). Out of
the latter the Jatio Mukti Joddha Sangram Parishad was formed
insupportoftherebelstudentsgroup,andsoonapeasantfront
was established. Finally, on October 31, 1972, anew party, Jatio
Samajtantric Dal (JSD) was set up, with AS.,V[. Abdur Rab
and Major M.A. Jalil as General Secretary and President respec¬
tively of the party. Jalilwhowas on leave fron the Pakistan
armywhenthecrackdowntookplaceinMarch1971,hadorga¬
nised resistance against the military in several districts and w a s
chief of one of the guerrilla sectors. Jalil was the only leader of
theJSDwhohadnotbeenaleaderoftheWorkersLeague o r
the Students’ League of theAL, and at the age of 38 in 1972,

was among the older JSD leaders.
The JSD, which believed that the Bangladesh liberation w a r
stopped just as it was about to become areal people’s war, opp¬

osed the nationalistAL leadership during the 44 months (Decem¬
ber1971-August1975)thatitwasinpower.TheAL,itargued,
represented only 8per cent of the people but owned 85 per cent
ofthenationalwealth.'*Îtconsidereditselftobethesupporting
or mass front of a“correct” proletarian organisation—the Bangla¬
desh Communist League (BCL). The BCL was an underground
party led by the former Students’ League leader, Serajul Alam
Khan. Khan managed to get most of his followers trained in
guerrilla warfare during the liberation war, and, after the war,
worked behind the scenes to bring about those key splits in the
Awami League that led to the formation of the JSD. Until Janu¬
ary 1975 (when it was banned) the BCL published adaily n e w s -
paper, Ganakantha (Voice of the People), edited by awell-known

radical poet, Al-Mahmud.
The platform of the BCL dealt with the samequestions Ten a s
most of the other revolutionary parties, for which it tred to s e r v e

as an example. The platform was made public as the annual re¬
port of the Bangladesh Chhatra League, which was the students’
front of the BCL.^2 xhe report, like the documents of other
Bangladesh communist groups, analysed the political situation
in terms of its inherent contradictions and then put forward the
strategies by which revolution would end the contradictions.
The BCLsaw three stages in the struggle for socialism, of
which the first two had been achieved by the end of'the 1971
liberation war. The third stage, in which the contradiction be-
t.w e e n __ the ruling elite- theAL and other agents of imperialism—
and the proletariat would be resolved by aviolent revolution,

as ameans of
was yet to come. Parliamentary politics was seen
perpetuatingtheroleoftheexploitingclasses,includingfeudal
elements, intermediaries, and the rising middle class. Before the
second revolution the people would be exploited from the outside
aswell,sincetheALwaswillingtoallowBangladeshagaintobe
madesubjecttoimperialism.AccordingtotheBCL,imperialist
designsstemmedprimarilyfromtheUnitedStatesintheformof
foreignaid,butalsofromRussiaandIndiathroughanexploi¬
tativeeconomicrelationshipexemplifiedbytheestablishmentof
theheadquartersoftheIndo-BangladeshJuteExportingCor¬
poration in Delhi rather than in Dacca.
The BCL hoped that at acertain stage China would come to
sympathise with Bengalis, and while, it resisted following any
particularcommunistinternationalline,usedafriendlytonein
its references to pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist Parties. It was
attemptingtoexpanditsmembership,andwassupposedtohave
recruited most of the company commanders of the Mukti Bahini
and the district and subdivisional commanders of the Mujib
Bahini.The BCLalso began to penetrate the regular armed forces
ofBangladesh.BCLmemberssoonstartedtoformcells,linked
byanundergroundnewspapar,LaiIshteher(“RedBulletin).
TheJSD,BCLandJatioSramikLeague(JSD’slabourfront)
jointly called for ageneral strike on January 20, 1974 to protest
againstAmerican,IndianandSovietinfluenceonBangladesh
economyandpolity.DuringthestriketheJSDalsodemanded
higherwagesforteachersandindustrialworkers,andsoughtthe
redress of grievances in Bangladesh society (corruption, the Spe¬
cial Powers Act, and the giving of the permits primarily to
AL workers). The strike was acomplete success. The JSD also
threatened agherao if its demands were not accepted by the
Government by March 14, and on March 17, the Home Minister
found himself confined to his home by the JSD. The gherao was
broken by apolice firing, which killed three and injured eighteen,
andbythearrestof40otherdemonstrators.**ÂlthoughMajor
Jalil, Abdur Rab, and other officers of the JSD were arrested,
the underground leaders, including Serajul Alam Khan, escaped
and intensified their activities in rural areas.
Another radical opposition party was the Bangladesher Com¬
munist Party-Leninbadi (BCPL). This party originated by a
merger of four of the five groups of pro-Chinese communists
which made up the Somonnoy Committee, formed in Calcutta
during the period of liberation. These groups were ;I) The Co¬
ordination Committee of the Communist Revolutionaries; 2) The
East Pakistan Communist Party Marxist-Leninist, or EPCPML,
led by Amal Sen and Nazrul Islam ;3) some Communists
of Khulna led by Mr. Maroof Hossain and Sayedur Dahar ;and
4) some Communists led by Nasim Ali Khan.'*^ The leaders of
these groups thought that the existence of so many communist
parties in East Bengal had prevented the left from playing the
leading role in the liberation of Bangladesh. They, therefore,
issued acall for unification to complete their country’s “trunca¬
ted revolution.order to do so they formed anew party, the
BCPL.
The BCPL adopted the strategy of working partly as an

Open organisation and partly as asecret party. The BCPL
also formed astudent front, the Bangladesh Biplobi Chhatra
Union (Revolutionary Students’ Union), and alabour front, the
Bangla Sramik Federation (Bengal Labour Federation). At the
beginning, some of its members worked through the National
Awami Party (Bhashani group). But later the BCPL formed its
own mass front—the United Peoples’ Party. 4 8
The ideology of the BCPL has much in common with that
of the BCL. Both believed that the revolution in Bangladesh was
unfinished because the bourgeoisie had been able to assume leader¬
ship of the nationalist struggle. Both also believed that Russian
communism was revisionist and Russia’s intentions in Bangla¬
desh imperialistic, and that India was apotentially imperialist
power as well. However, the BCPL opposed violence such as
that used by the Naxalites in India, whom it considered anti-
Leninist because they were so undisciplined.'” The mass front of
BCPL was not as strong as the JSD, and its student and labour
fronts were weak. Its appeal was not as extensive as that of
the BCL.
Athird group which had belonged to the original Somonnoy

Committee but did not join the BCPL was the East Bengal Com¬
munist Party (Marxist-Leninist), ted by Deven Sikdar and Abul
Bashar. Although they agreed with the manifesto of the BCPL
on most important points, there were afew differences of empha¬
sis. For example, the Sikdar-Bashar group saw the oppression
of Bangladesh by West Pakistan as more direct, the present posi¬
tion of India as more dominant within the country, and the
Chinese Communist Party as more apotential leader of Bangla¬
desh’s struggles than did the BCPL members.^s The Sikder-Bash-
ar group, now called the Banglar Communist Party (Communist
Party of Bengal) or BCP, also had an open and an underground
section, astudent front and alabour front, and it regarded
parliamentary politics as acceptable if only as amatter of strat¬
e g y.
The Bangladesh Communist League, the BCPL, and the BCP
adopted the tactics of working both through party cells and
mass front organisations. However, there were four more revolu¬
tionary parties that worked only through their underground
cells and underground armed fronts. Of these, two were factions
of the EPCPML; athird was afaction of the East Bengal Com¬
munist Party, from which Sikder and Bashar split to form the
BCP; the fourth was apparently quite separate in its origins
from any of these.
This last party—the Sarbohara Party (Purbo Bangla Sarbohara
Party, or East Bengal Communist Party)—grew out of the East
Bengal Workers’ Movement'*® and was led by Siraj Sikder until his
death at the hands of the Awami League government in January
1975. The leadership of the Sarbohara Party was generally uni¬
versity educated, which might account in part for the fact that
the party had been the most prolific of all Bangladesh revolution¬
ary parties in publishing party literature. In addition to Lai
Jhanda (Red Flag) and Sangbad Bulletin (News Bulletin), the
party regularly published the proceedings of the meetings of its
Central Committee and numerous other pamphlets. Most of this
material was written by Sikder himself when he was alive and the
widespread availability of Sarbohara newspapers and pamphlets
during his leadership indicated the efficiency of the party’s com¬
munications net work at that time.
The Sarbohara Party agreed with the others that the revolu¬
tion was stopped too soon, with the AL serving as apuppet
government of India which had since plundered East Bengal.ô !
During the AL regime, India was criticised for maintaining its
military presence by arming, training, and even clothing Mujib’s
security force, the JRB, Russian and American imperialism were
also seen as threats. Thus, even nationalist revolution had not
been completed; the JSD was held to be making aTrotskyist
error in trying to complete the socialist revolution before the
nationalist one. However, the bourgeois leadership of the AL
could not be truly nationalist, as they drew their support from
imperialist powers and semi-feudal countries. According to Sar¬
bohara Party, only the party of the proletariat could pursue the
revolution correctly.®^ In order to accomplish the revolution, the
Sarbohara Party formed aNational Liberation Front, including
peasants, workers, and oppressed linguistic and national mino¬
rities, as well as Biharls and members of the Chakma and Santal
tribes.
Because Bangladesh is surrounded on three sides by India,

the Sarbohara theoreticians were convinced that no outside help
would be available for the revolution and that the Liberation
Front would have to depend on its own resources. Sarbohara
accordingly launched a“liberation war,” procuring funds and
arms forcibly from pro-government sources. Maulana Bhashani
at one stage gave his approval to Sikdar’s effort in this respect.®*
By late 1974 the Sarbohara Party appeared to have recovered
from its heavy losses of fighters to both the Pakistan army and
the Mujib Bahini, and, prior to Sikdar’s death, it claimed that
most of the police stations looted, the bank robberies commit¬
ted, and tt>e river docoities (armed hold-ups) were its responsi¬
bility. It also claimed to have taken the lives of several AL work¬
ers, smugglers, betrayers of party secrets, and some Hindus
who were said still to be oppressing Muslims. Sarbohara guer¬
rilla units lay low during the winter and were most active during
the rainy season, when government troops were at asevere dis¬
advantage. Sarbohara activity definitely declined after Sikdar’s
death.
The Communist Party of East Bengal, Marxist-Leninist was

another undergroud revolutionary party, more commonly known
as the Sammobadi Dal. It was led by Mohammad Toaha and
Sukhendu Dastidar, the two leaders who brought about the split
’in the original East Pakistan Communist Party in 1968 and for¬
med its pro-Peking wing.^® Toaha collected anumber of red
guerrillas to fight both the Pakistan army and the Mukti Bahini,
but these were decimated in 1971.5'* After the liberation, the Sam-
mobadis were, therefore, unable to set up their projected Peo¬
ple’s Democratic Republic of Bangladesh. Their newspaper,
Gana Shakti, or “People’s Power” began to subscribe to the
Common theory that Bangladesh had not really been liberated
but was headed by apuppet government responsible to India
and Moscow. Like the Sarbohara Party, the Sammobadi Dal
regarded the JRB as essentially an Indian array in Bangladesh,
receiving arms and ammunition from the Indian government and
taking direct aid from Indian armed forces in suppressing rebels
in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and other areas. Also like the
Sarbohara Party, the Sammobadi Dal formed anational libera¬
tion front and aguerrilla force recruited from among frustrated
freedom fighters.®® Its main centres of activity were in the dis¬
tricts of Rajshahi, Pabna, Dacca, Mymensingh, Faridpur and
Noakhali.
Some of the differences among the Leftist parties of Bangla¬
desh could be seen from the ways in which they criticised each
other. The Sammobadi Dal criticised the BCPL and BCP for
their stands on imperialism, since the latter two parties had sup¬
posedly given support to the AL by saying that it was “depen¬
dent” on India, rather than terming it a“puppet government”.
The Sarbohara Party was dismissed as amere terrorist group,
misled by the “upstart” Sikdar into seeing the most important
contradiction as that between East Bengal and India, rather than
between socialist and anti-socialist forces.®® Similarly, the JSD,
which was regarded as amere falling out over patronage among
junior AL members, was thought to be supported by India as a
counter-weight to keep supporters of Mujib under strict control.®’
While most of the members of the East Pakistan Communist
Party (Marxist-Leninist) formed the Sammobadi Dal under
Toaha and'Dastidar, asmallsectionunder Abdul Huq retained the
old name of the party and aseparate organisation. This group
was the most extreme in its interpretation of the liberation strug-
The Mujifa Regime and Political Polarisation 173
gle, for it did not recognise the existence of Bangladesh at all,

preferring to see the war for independence as an expansionist
move by India and the country now as acolony of India. The
EPCPML, therefore, launched its own peoples’ war against the
counter-revolutionary forces to resurrect East Pakistaa.®* It was
the target of the strongest government action because of its con¬
tinued use of the name “East Pakistan,” and most of its cadres
were killed or jailed, though Abdu! Huq remained at large.
The East Bengal Communist Party, Marxist-Leninist (EBC-
PML) was the last of the underground parties. The analysis of
Bangladesh’s political situation by EBCPML theoreticians is
similar to that of the Sainmobadi Dal, but the former put more
emphasis on the contradiction between peasants and feudal ele-
ments,59 and they also seek collaboration with revolutionaries in
India, especially the Naxalites, who were distrusted by the other
revolutionary parties of Bangladesh. The EBCPML was active in
Atrai, and in parts of Rajshahi, Dinajpur, Pabna, and Kush-
tia districts.
The left revolutionary parties of Bangladesh were all agreed
that the war of independence left the revolution unfinished. Some
believed that the next step would have to be aclass war
while others thought that even the nationalist phase was not com¬
plete. All were convinced that the AL government allowed the
economy of Bangladesh to be dominated by India, Russia, and/
or the United States.
The leftist forces in Bangladesh had become amuch more

powerful force than they had been in the former East Pakistan.
Several reasons accounted for this development. First, the emer¬
gence of Bangladesh through abloody revolution disproved the
earlier argument of the AL that the rights ofBangladesh could
be secured through democratic means, instead political power
did indeed spring from the barrel of agun as had been asserted
by the leftists all along. Second, the utter failure of the AL gov¬
ernment to alleviate the sufferings of the people made it easier
than before to believe that in adeveloping country socialism
could not be achieved through western democratic methods and
that the Salvation lay in asocial revolution engineered and led by
aparty of the proletariat. Third, the pro-Indian stance of the
AL government also drove the generally anti-Indian Bangladesh
into the fold of the leftists who had been most vocal against
Indian hegemonism. The appeal of the leftists among the stu¬
dent, former members of Mukti Bahini and armed forces increas¬
ed dramatically.
One aspect of the post-liberation leftist movement was striking.
The leftist parties having most influence—JSD and Sarbohara—
were led by younger leaders who had no connection with the
senior communists, or long associated with the original leftist
movement in East Bengal. It was the new political atmosphere
and fresh and dynamic leadership that helped spread quickly the
influence of the leftists.
The older leftist (in BCPL, BCP, Sammobadi Dal, EPCPML,
EBCP-ML) remained as factionallsed as they had been in the pre-
liberation East Bengal. The reasons for their more recent fragmen¬
tation were the same as those of the past. The failure to capture
the leadership of the Bangladesh revolution (which, according to
their own theories, should have been in their hands) created among
the senior leftists asense of lack of political efficacy. This sense
of inadequacy in turn led them again to doctrinal disputes
rather than to organisational work. Moreover, the mutual sus¬
picion and personal incompatibility usually characterising under¬
ground communists was exacerbated by the differing roles which
these leftists played and their varying experiences in encounters
with the Pakistan army and Mukti Bahini. While the younger
JSD and Sarbohara leaders went aggressively out for support,
the older leftists remained confined within their previous limited
circles engrossing themselves in bitter and “infantile” debates
about theoretical correctitude of their roles in the 1971 struggle.
They thus failed to take advantage of the radical climate of
post-liberation Bangladesh."®
Government Response to the Left

Despite its overwhelming victory at the polls it was clear that
the AL faced sharp challenges from the left during the years
that it ruled the country (December 1971-August 15, 1975). In-
itiallyithadalso been most hostile towards the Islamic nationalist
parties, having banned them shortly after independence while set¬
ting up special tribunals to try “collaborators”. During the years
1972-1973, about 40,000 people were arrested under aspecial
order. However, as the pressure from the radical/revolutionary

leftists (who wanted to overthrow the AL government by force)
increased. Sheikh Mujib decided to release the collaborators,
hoping that, if set free, these workers and leaders of the Islamic
parties would counteract the activities of the radical left. On No¬
vember 30, 1973, the AL government granted ageneral amnesty
to collaborators, although the ban on the Islamic parties was not
formally withdrawn.®*
The Awami League government had already coopted the less
radical (pro-Moscow) left and in October 1973 formed the peo¬
ple’s unity front (Gana Oikkay Jote or GOJ) with the pro-Mos-
cow NAP and the BCP pro-Moscow). The main aim of GOJ
was to fight the more radical or revolutionary parties, now des¬
cribed as “miscreants”, “anti-state elements,” and “agents of fore¬
ignpowerswhoarenotreconciledtotheindependenceofBang-
ladesh.”®^
Sheikh Mujib did not make any attempt to win over and coopt
the revolutionary leftists. Shortly after his inauguration as Prime
Minister, Sheikh Mujib publicly warned that Naxalites”would
be shot dead. Anumber of special ordinances, obviously direct¬
ed against the radical leftists, were promulgated by the President
or passed by Parliament during the 44 months of AL rule. These
included the following; I) establishment of special tribunals exclu¬
sively to try offences such as concealing, storing, possession, use
of or membership in organisations for acquiring, arms and amm¬
unition or explosive substances (incitement to interfere with the
laworadministrationofthelawwasalsocauseforprosecution);
2) arrest without warrant on suspicion of having committed the
aboveoffences;3)removalofanygovernmentofficer,including
Police, from service without stated reason and without right of
appeal; 4) exemption of the above laws from unconstitutionality;
5) extension of the permitted period between sittings of the Parli¬
ament from 60 to 120days, during which the President could pro¬
mulgatelaws:6)givingtothePresidentpowertodeclareaproc¬
lamation of Emergency when the security or economic life of
Bangladesh or any part thereof is threatened by external w a r o r
internaldisturbance(duringtheEmergency,fundamentalrights
wouldremainsuspendedandwouldnotbeenforceableinany
court), 7) enablingthe officers of the JRB to arrest or search with‘
outwarrantorcause,withnoappealagainsttheseactions;8)em¬
poweringthegovernmenttosuspendtheactivitiesofassociations
includingunionsandpoliticalparties,foraperiodnotexceeding
six months if their activities were “prejudicial to the national in¬
terest”; 9) detention of aperson to prevent him or her from
committingany“prejudicialact”,and10)noactiontakenunder
the Special PowersAct of 1974 (covering Provisions 8and 9
above)orpurportingtohavebeensotakenweresubjecttopro¬
secution or question in any court.”
Using its special powers and the JRB, theALgovernment
attempted to comb out all “extremists and miscreants”. In July
1973 about 200 ultra-leftists were arrested and alarge store of
armsrecoveredinanoperationagainsttheSammobadiDalandthe
EBCPML in Rajshahi district; again, in December agovernment
operation resulted in the killing of anumber of “alleged" c o m ¬
munists. Ganakantha reported that 500 workers of JSD were kill¬

ed in Sirajganj, and the JSD leaders asserted that theALhad
killed about 60,000 and arrested about 86,000 in the two years
following the liberation.*’'*TheALclaimed on its side that most
of the victims of killings by “miscreants” and “anti-state ele¬
ments” were AL workers.”
Clearly,theALgovernmentwasnottomeetthechallengeof
therevolutionaryleftistseitherwithspecialpowersorwithviol¬
ence. As in most former colonial countries, its solution was to
offer amakeshift ideology, centred around one nationalist leader,
as with Nasser or Nkrumah. In Bangladesh, of course, the leader
wasMujib,andtheideologywasMujibism(knowninBengalias
Mujibbad).FormulatedfirstduringtheliberationwarbyMujib’s
nephew.SheikhFazlulHuqMoni,Mujibbadwasrationalised
in the 687-page volume by Khandokar Mohammad Illias, aform- |J
e s
er leftist of pro-Moscow persuasion.
According to this interpretation, Mujibbad was aprogressive
ideologythatcouldbringsocialismtoBangladeshwithoutfurther
bloodshed. Unlike fascism, Bengali nationalism was ademocratic
and anti-imperialist force which had already destroyed class clea¬
vagesandreligiouscommunalism.SinceBengalisfoughtforde-
m o c r a c y andself-representationagainstPakistan,theypreferred
to obtain socialism gradually, through their elected representa¬
tives. This ideology offered little that was new, especially to the
The Mujib Regime aad Political Polarisation 177
intelligentsia.
Nationalism,
socialism,
secularism
and
democracy
had long been part of Congress platform in India. On the other
handthemajorityofintellectualssawMujibbadasacultofper¬
sonality and anti-socialist ideology. The AL leaders themselves
gradually became less enthusiastic about Mujibbad and in the
laterdaysof44monthsofALruletookalessideologicalappr¬
oach to the nation’s many problems.
The weakness of Mujibbad as an ideology was reflected in the
factionalism of the AL immediately after the liberation war. In
theparliamentarypartyoftheAL,TajuddinAhmedledagroup
that opposed accepting aid from the “imperialist nations”, parti¬
cularly U.S.A., and took agenerally pro-Indian and pro-Soviet
stance. The Tajuddin group believed that the policy of mixed
economy should be abandoned in favour ofapure socialist one, ‘
since the nationalisation of industries and foreign trade without
the nationalisation of the distribution system had created. e c o -
nomic uncertainty and inflation.Another parliameitary group,
underSyedNazrulIslamandKhandokarMushtaqAhmed,was
less anti-American and was willing to accept foreign aid as well
as to continue the mixed economy. Sheikh Mujib forced Tajuddin
AhmedtoresignonOctober26,1974,makinghimascapegoat
fortheeconomiccrisis.ButMujibcontinuedhissingle-minded
pro-Indian and pro-Soviet policy, although he reportedly encou¬
raged Mushtaq Ahmed in private to use his influence with U.S.^
Embassy in Dacca to secure the continuation of U.S. e c o n o m i c
aid.
Divisions among the younger party members w e r e m o r e s e n

ous, as was exemplified in the split in the Student League that
led to the establishment of the JSD. Another cleavage occurred
within the AL Working Committee, which was made up almost
exclusively of men in their thirties. Abdur Razzak, Organising
Secretary of the Awami League and Tofael Ahmed, Political
Secretary to the Prime Minister, led one faction, with alarge
followingintheStudents’League.TheotherwastedbyMujib's
nephew. Sheikh Fazlul Httq Mbni, who founded the rlvar./i<&&
(youth) League. In March 1974 the Razzak-Ahmed group laun-i
ched acampaign against the “corrupt elements and exploiters of
society”, referring to Moni and his associates in the/uô League.
Tensions between the two groups resulted in the killing of sevem
students on the Dacca University Campus in April 1974 and the
subsequentclosingoftheuniversityfortwomonths.Incidents
atRajshahiandChittiigonguniversitiesalsoresultedintheirclo¬
sures.*'^
In addition to the intellectual hollowness of Mujibism and
factionalism within the party, the AL was able neither to steady
theeconomynortoeffectanyrealstepstowardssocialismduring
its 44 months in office. As has been stated previously, the AL
leaders resorted to the distribution of perquisites such as licenses
andhousestoretainsupportfortheregime.Thisinturncreated
dissatisfaction, even among former AL supporters, who were
now fragmented. It also provided fuel for revolutionary argu¬
ments.Theviolentsuppressionofopponentsoftheregimeand
theextraordinarypowersthegovernmentgranteditselftoeffect
thissuppressionfurtheralienatedthepoliticallyrelevantsection
of the people.
Insum,theindependencemovementunleashedforcesofre¬
volution that were not content with mere independence. 'Within
two years of the emergence of the separate nation there was a
polarisation of the politics, with the AL and its pro-Moscow
andrightistsupportersontheonehand,andthesevera.1openand
undergroundcorbmunistpartiesontheother.Thefailureofthe
economy to revive, the ostentatious living of theALlicensees,
therepressivelaws,andthegeneralarmingofanyapparently
pro-governmentcitizen,allservedtoincreasetherevolutionary
potentialofthesociety,apotentialthatthevariouscommunist
parties were able to exploit.
Mujib’s “Second Revolution” and the 1975 Coups
The underground revolutionaries intensified their activities in the
later half of 1974. “In view of the grave situation created by hos¬
tile elements, acting in collusion with the collaborators of the
Pakistan army, enemy agents in the pay of foreign powers, a s
theHomeMinistryspokesmanputit,thegovernmentonDecem¬
ber28,1974proclaimedaStateofEmergencyandsuspended
all fundamental rights conferred by the constitution for an in¬
definite period.** In earlyJanuary1975,the governmentannoun¬
ced that Siraj Sikdar, the leader of the Sarbohara Party had been
arrested and later shot dead by the police as he tried to escape
from the police custody.®® In spite of the State of Emergency and

the death of Siraj Sikdar, the government fears of aleftist take¬
over persisted.
The political and economic crises constituted astrong impe^-
tus for Sheikh Mujib to try the one-party solution. As has been
stated earlier in this Chapter, Sheikh Mujib’s own political in¬
stinct had always been to equate the state with his political par¬
ty and to subordinate government administrators to party wor¬
kers. If democracy had not been one of the sa,lient themes of the
Bangladesh revolution of 1971, Sheikh Mujib would have intror
duced aone-party system much earlier. The beneficiaries of the
AL regime, fearful of losing their privileges also began to press
Sheikh Mujib to give up the facade of parliamentary government
and resort to the device of one-party dictatorship and totalitarian
control. From September 1974, Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni began
to advocate publicly the view that the parliamentary system had
failed in Bangladesh and another revolution was inevitable. Sheikh
Moni suggested that this “second revolution” should also be led
by Mujib.®® From the beginning of November 1974 the leaders
of the pro-Moscow parties had also been advocating the aboli¬
tion of parliamentary system. The embassy of the most powerful
socialist state in Dacca was reported to have encouraged Man-
soor Ali, Sheikh Mujib’s trusted Home Minister, to opt for the
single-party system. The pressures of the radical opposition,
constant prodding by Sheikh Moni, Mansoor Ali and pro-Mos-r
cow leaders, Mujib’s own proclivity to identify the state with
the party—all of these propelled Mujib to introduce aone-party
system.
In the third week of January 1975, aproposal to this effect
was placed before ameeting of the parliamentary party of the
AL. On the first unofficial count, the proponents of the new
system found themselves in aminority. Hints were then thrown
out among the members of the AL parliamentary party to the
effect that, if the parliamentary party did not approve Mujib’s
scheme for aone-party system, Mujib might either resign or call
a“rump parliament” to amend the constitution. The party sub¬
mitted to the threat and gave full authority to Sheikh Mujib to
take such measures as were necessary for the national interest.”
Finally, on January 25, 1975 the constitution was amended to
provide for apresidential form of government and the president
was authorised to form one national party and suspend the acti¬
vities of all political groups opposed to joining it. The amend¬
ment further provided that “Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rah¬
man, the Father of the Nation,” would be the President of the
country for five years from the date of the constitutional amend¬
ment.
Prior to January 1975 the judges of the Supreme Court had

defied the government by releasing political prisoners held under
various special powers acts. The Court had been particul3.rly
critical of the activities of the JRB. In one case aSupreme Court
judgement stated that “the Jatio Rakkhi Bahini is functioning
without any rules of procedure or code of conduct....” The Court
held further that “it is extremely doubtful that the functioning
of the Jatio Rakkhi Bahini... has the necessary legal founda¬
tions.”’* Sheikh Mujib, therefore, decided to destroy the inde¬
pendence of the judiciary; his January 1975 amendment bill pro¬
vided that “The Chief Justice and other Judges shall be appoint¬
ed by the President” and “A Judge may be removed from his
office by order of the President on the ground of misbehaviour
9 9
or incapacity.
The rights of citizens to move the Supreme Court for the en¬
forcement of fundamental rights were also taken away. The
amendment bill provided: “Parliament may by law establish a
Constitutional Court, Tribunal or Commission for enforcement
of rights conferred by this part (Part III: Fundamental Rights).
But Parliament never did.
The constitutional amendment bill was passed without any
reading and discussion in Parliament, with normal rules of pro¬
cedure of the House suspended. The whole process of amend¬
ment was completed within ahalf hour. Thus, as has been the
case with many one-party states, the power of the single party
was seized, not granted by the voters.’^
Sheikh Mujib announced on June 6, 1975 anew constitution
for his new national party, the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik
Awami League (Bangladesh Peasants, Workers and People’s
League) or BAKSAL. At this time he also nominated the mem¬
bers of the Executive and Central Committees of the party, as
well as Executive Committees for the party’s five wings. In
spite of Sheikh Mujib’s repeated appeals to all political parties

to join BAKSAL, the radical parties abstained. The pro-Mos¬
cow groups did hail the formation of BAKSAL in their litera¬
ture, though only afew of their leaders were included in the
115-memberpartyCentralCommittee.TheSupremeBodyof
BAKSAL—The Executive Committee-consisted of Sheikh
Mujib as Chairman and 14 other members who were all close
followersofMujib.Withoneexception,allmemberswerepromi¬
nent leaders of the former AL. The General Secretaries and the
majority of the members of the Executive Committees of the five
wings of the party—all nominated by Sheikh Mujib—were leaders
oftheformerALandAL-affiliatedlabour,student,youth,pea¬
sant and women’s organisations. BAKSAL, in fact, remained the
ALunder adifferent name. Significantly, the all-powerful Exe¬
cutiveCommitteeofBAKSALincludedtheubiquitiousSheikh
Moni and Gazi Gulam Mustafa, the notorious Red Cross Chief.
The most important of the five wings of BAKSAL—Jatio Chatra
League (National Student’s League)—was headed by Sheikh
Shahidul Islam.’®
The formation of BAKSAL was followed by other authori¬

tarian measures. On June 16, 20 daily newspapers in the four
majorcitiesofBangladeshwerecloseddown.Ofthe4surviving
dailies,two.TheBangladeshObserverandDainikBangla,were
alreadyingovernmenthands,havingbeendeclaredasabandoned
Pakistanpropertyafter1971war.Theothertwo.TheBangladesh
Times founded by Sheikh Moni ayear earlier and Ittefaq, the
largest-selling Bengali language paper, were nationalised. Several
hundred other newspapers, including the outspoken political
weekly,i/o/Wa;;,whoseeditor,EnayetullahKhan,hadbeenjail¬
ed in May, were banned.
ByaPresidentialOrdinanceonJune21,1975,61werecreated
bybreakingupthehithertoexisting19districts.OnJuly16,
SheikhMujibannouncedthenamesof61governors-designate]
who were to take over district administration on September L
Not surprisingly, 44 governors-designate, were AL leaders and
activists (including 27 sitting members of Parliament).’'* These
governors-designate were given special “political training” which
was to continue until August 16. The plan was to put half a
battalion of JRB under each governor, with governors being
directlyunderthecontrolofthePresident;Planswerealsomade
forannualincreasesinthenumberofJRBupto1980,atwhich
timeitstotalstrengthwouldbe130,000.OneregimentofJRB
would then be put under each governor.
'SheikhMujib’sblueprintfortotalcontrolhadonelacuna.He
completelyoverlookedthepossiblereactionofthearmedforces
tothenewsystem.Withhisinflatedself-imageandhisobsession
withtheleftists,hebrushedasidethesuggestionofbothpro¬
Ivl oscowleaders and Shiekh Moni that precautionary measures
be taken against apossible army coup.
There are three schools of thought regarding the military
intervention in the politics of the developing countries. First,
the“organisations”focusonthespecialcharacteristicswhichare
generallyattributedtomilitaryorganisations,suchascentralised
command,hierarchy,discipline,cohesion,nationalismandauste-
rity which impel them to take over and save the nation from the
gripofthe‘‘unpatrioticself-seeking”and‘‘corrupt”“politicians.
Second, the “praetorianists” view the military intervention as a
functionoftheweaknessesofthepoliticalsystem,suchasfragi¬
lityofpoliticalinstitutions,legitimacyvacuum,lowlevelofpoli¬
tical culture, which pull the armed forces into the arena.' Thud,
stress the internal dynamics ot
the sepcial “behaviouralists
military hierarchies, cliques within the army, corporate interests
and personal ambitions and idiosyncracies of the men in the
armed forces.’® .
■The systemic weaknesses of the Bangladesh p
ousenough.Thespiritednationof1971hadturnedintothe
“softest” state in the world in 1974. If military intervention
weremerelyanautomaticresponsetopoliticaldecay,armytake¬
overwouldhavebeenimminent.TheBangladesharmy,however,
‘didnothavethecohesionanddisciplineattributedtothemili¬
taryorganisationbythe“organisational”theorists.
TheBangladesharmedforcesconsistedofabout55,000per¬
sonsin1975.About28,000(including1,100officers)were“repa¬
triates”fromWestPakistan;theremainderconsistedofthe
oldEastBengalregimentandselectedrecruitsfromamong
the guerrillasandSector-troopsoftheliberationarmyof1971.
The“repatriates”didnotgothroughtheexperienceofthelibe-
ration war and retained the conservative outlook which charac-
The Mujib Regime aad Political Polarisation 183
terised the former Pakistan army. The senior “repatriate” officers

were either retired without pension or were placed in subordina¬
tion to those officers who had been junior to them in the former
Pakistan Army but had received accelerated promotions for par¬
ticipating in 1971 liberation struggle. This “discrimination’ e r e -
ated discontent among the ‘‘repatriate” officers and strained the

command structure.
The officers and jawans fsoldiers) who fought the liberation
war were divided into two camps. One group advocated the ret¬
ention of the conventional army patterned on the British India
and Pakistan armies. The other group had been deeply influen¬
ced by the pro-Peking leftists during the period of liberation war
and argued for the transformation of the army into what they
called a“productive” army. They argued for the removal of bar¬
riers between officers and jawans by abolishing officers privileges
inherited from the colonial army. Moreover, according to them,
soldiers would not only carry guns but also work in fields and
factories as in Communist China.” The majority of this group
joined the underground wing of the JSD and formed cells of
Biplobi Shainik Sangstha (Revolutionary Soldiers’ Association)
on the pattern of the “Soviet of Soldiers” developed in the Rus¬
sian army before the communist revolution. The growth of this
army leftist group was an unprecedented development in South
Asia. The two known proponents of the “productive army”.
Colonel Abu Taher and Colonel Ziauddin, were retired from the
army in late 1972. Colonel Taher joined the underground mili¬
tary organisation—Biplabi Gana Bahini (People’s Revolutionary
Army) consisting of the Biplobi Shainik Sangstha and those
guerrillas of former Mukti Bahini who later joined the JSD. Col¬
onel Ziauddin became amember of the Sarbohara Party to head
its military wing.
Despite these cleavages within the army, all the groups in the
army shared acommon anti-Indian orientation for anumber of
reasons. Almost all men of the armed forces belonging to the
liberation army had the feeling that the Indian army-to quote a
common saying among them—‘‘just walked into Bangladesh
when we (the Bangladesh liberation armyl had already finished
the job.” Moreover, the poorly equipped armed forces were bit¬
ter about the fact that the Indian army took away to India all of
the sophisticated weapons and vehicles left by the surrendering
78
Pakistan army once the war was over.
The anti-Indian sentiment of the armed forces was gradually
compounded into anti-Mujib orientation. Already, soon after
liberation, Colonel Taher and Colonel Ziauddin had stated pub¬
licly that the government-in-exile had signed a“secret treaty”
with the Indian government, detrimental to the sovereignty of
Bangladesh. The Foreign Minister grudgingly admitted the exist¬
ence of the “secret treaty”.'® Men of the armed forces believed
that Sheikh Mujib was not strengthening the armed forces beca¬
use of this “secret treaty” with India.
In early 1974, the armed forces were ordered to collect un¬
authorised arms and prevent smuggling. But many ofiBcers and
ymvnnj found to their dismay that, as was indeed widely belie¬
ved, most of the holders of unauthorised arms and the ring-lea¬
ders of smuggling operations were proteges of powerful AL lea¬
ders including the brother of Sheikh Mujib. As they began to act
against these AL supporters, the Mujib government urged the
army officers to see that pro-AL groups were not disturbed. In
short, they were asked to recover arms and ammunition only
from the cadres of the underground parties. The arms recovery
and anti-smuggling operations, therefore, ended in afiasco, only
serving to increase the army’s hatred for the Mujib regime.
The army had other corporate grievances. The annual budga-
tary provision for the armed forces was quite slim. In successive
budgets after liberation, only about 13 per cent was allocated to
defence. The officers and soldiers re-patriated from Pakistan
complained that they were not given salaries for the 20 months
(December 1971 until September 1973) that they had spent in
“concentration camps” in Pakistan before being repatriated.
The army as awhole resented the raising of aparallel force
in the shape of JRB whose officers were being trained by the
Indian army. Resentments were further heightened by the plans
of the Mujib government to increase the strength of the JRB
Trom 25 000 in 1974 to 130,000 in 1980, while recruitment to the
regular armed forces was virtually to be stopped. There were also
persistent rumours emanating from high places that Sheikh
Mujib was about to draft his son, Sheikh Jamal, who had return¬
ed from afour-month crash course at Sandhurst, into the army
as aLieutenant-Colonel and place him in akey position. Rumours

also spread that, like the bureaucracy, the army would also be
placed under the control of BAKSAL. Such changes would have
given Sheikh Mujib afirmer grip over the army.
However, the “accelerator” or the “precipitating factor”
of army intervention was the personal grievances of the coup
leaders. The lightning and bloody coup, which was staged in
the early morning hours of August 15, 1975 and eliminated al¬
most every member of Sheikh Mujib’s family, was engineered by
three majors who had developed bitter personal animosity agai¬
nst Sheikh Mujib. The key plotter was Major Shafiqur Rahman
Dalim. Dalim’s wife was insulted by two sons of Gazi Gulam
Mustafa (who, as has been stated earlier, was one of the closest
associates of Sheikh Mujib) at awedding reception in Dacca.
Dalim and his wife complained to Sheikh Mujib about the beha¬
viour of Mustafa’s sons. Instead of giving ahearing to Dalim’s
complaint. Sheikh Muiib rebuked Dalim for not having c o m e
through proper channels and threatened disciplinary action
against him. Dalim returned back to the barracks and vowed
to avenge the insult to his wife. Later, when Sheikh Mujib o r -
dered the army to conduct acrackdown against economic offen¬
ders, Dalim arrested some Awami Leaguers, including a m e m -
ber of parliament. When Sheikh Mujib asked Dalim to set his
party-men free, Dalim protested. Dalim was sacked in October
1974. Two other leading ploters. Majors S.J. Noor and M.
Shahryer, who reportedly traced Sheikh Abu Nasser’s illegal
trade channels with India, were also dismissed from the army
along with Dalim.®® These-three dismissed Majors, in collabora¬
tion with their peers (20 to 30 majors or captains, all in their
late 20’s and early 30’s) belonging to two battalion (tanks and
artillery) of the armoured corps of the Bangladesh army with
astrength of only about 1,400 men,®' carried out the sudden,
swift and brutal operation and presented the nation with afait
accompli.
There is as yet no conclusive evidence of collusion between
this tiny minority of the army and civilian political group. Besi¬
des Majors Dalim, Noor and Shahryar, two other leaders of the
coup were Major Syed Faruk Rahman and Major Khandokar
Abdur Rashid of the Tank Regiment. The latter two were related
to one another as brothers-in-law and Khandokar Abdur Rashid
was adistant relative of Khandokar Mushtaq Ahmed (Mushtaq).
The relationship of Mushtaq to one of the coup leaders and the
emergence of Taheruddin Thakur, minister of State for Informa¬
tion and Broadcasting in the Mujib government, as the second
most important man, led to wide speculation that the pro-West-
e r n and anti-Indian faction of the AL led by Mushtaq was invol¬
ved in the coup.®^ According to Mushtaq’s own version, neither

Mushtaq nor Taheruddin knew anything at all about the coup
plan. The Majors contacted Mushtaq after having killed Sheikh
Mujib and Mushtaq accepted their request to assume the Presi¬
dency because any delay in the formation of the new government
would have brought Indian intervention.*^
Mushtaq was widely known for his pro-Western sympathies,
anti-India attitude and liberal democratic values. Whether Mush¬
taq was involved in the coup or not. Sheikh Mujib’s killing and
Mushtaq’s assumption of the Presidentship clearly indicated the
end of Indo-Soviet influence in Bangladesh and the interested
foreign powers quickly recognised the new government. Pakis¬
tan was the first country to recognise the Mushtaq government on
the first day of the coup.®* Saudi Arabia, which had withheld re¬
cognition of Bangladesh for nearly four years after the liberation,
recognised the new government on the second day of the
coup.
85
Chinese and Indian forces clashed in the wake of the
August 15 coup, after China had re-inforced its Sino-Indian bor¬
der garrisons on hearing the news of the move against Sheikh
Mujib. When the anti-Mujib forces swiftly consolidated their
grip on Bangladesh, Dacca and Peking established diplomatic
relations.®® Twelve days after the coup India became the 39th
nation to recognise the new regime, several days after most other
major nations (including the United States, Japan, Iran and the
Soviet Union) had done so. 8 7
Ten of the eighteen Ministers and eight of nine Ministers

of State of the Mujib cabinet joined the new government of
Mushtaq. The pro-Mujib and pro-Moscow groups were comple¬
tely bewildered and terrified by the killing of Sheikh Mujib and
offered no resistance at all. All the radical parties of Bangladesh
welcomed the change of government effected by the coup and
congratulated the “patriotic section of the armed forces” which

had brought about the fall of the Mujib regime.
The Mushtaq government dropped the scheme of 61 district
Governors and ordered continuation of the original 19 districts,
with Deputy Commissioners as the heads of district administra¬
tion. President Mushtaq promulgated an ordinance banning poli¬
tical parties, repealing the part of the constitution that had pro¬
vided for one national party, and declared the dissolution of
BAKSAL. Thirty two persons—6 Ministers of the Mujib govern¬
ment, 10 MPs (including Tajuddin Ahmed), 4civil servants,
one educationist and 12 businessmen—were arrested under Mar¬
tial Law Regulations, on charges of misusing power and corrup¬

tion. On October 3President Mushtaq declared that aparlia¬
mentary system of government would be restored, political acti¬
vities would be revived from August 15, 1976, and general elec¬
tions would be held on February 28, 1977.
However, the August 15 coup added anew axis of cleavage
in the already fragmented army—the conflict between the junior
and senior officers. The “Majors” who led the coup stayed with
President Mushtaq at Banga Bhavan, the official residence of
the President; guarded by tanks, they refused to submit to the
command of the Army Headquarters. In the second week of
the coup, aMajor reshuffle took place within the army. Major
General Ziaur Rahman, Deputy Chief of Staff, replaced Major
General Shafiullah as Chief of Staff of the army. Some of the
senior officers still remained dissatisfied as the Major would not
bring the tanks back to the cantonment nor leave Banga Bhavan.
After having failed to persuade Major General Ziaur Rah¬
man (Zia) to action against the “arrogant” Majors, these senior
officers, ledley Brigadier Khaled Musharraf staged acounter-coup
on November 3,1975. The leaders of this coup, after negotiating
with President Mushtaq, allowed safe passage to Bangkok for
15 military officers who were widely known to be connected with
the August 15 coup.®® Brigadier Khaled Musharraf promoted him¬
self to rank of Major-General and became the Chief of Staff of
the Army. Zia, former Chief of Staff, was put under house arrest
and Mushtaq was forced to handover Presidency to the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, A.S.M. Sayem.
The unrestrained glee which All-India Radio and Indian
press expressed over the November 3coup portended ill for

K h a l e d M u s h a r r a f . To m a k e m a t t e r s w o r s e , o n N o v e m b e r 4
Khaled Musharraf’s mother and brother joined asmall procession
taken out by the pro-Moscow leaders from Dacca University
Campus to Sheikh Mujib’s former residence. Soon the rumour
spread about Indian and Russian complicity in the coup and
this created an explosive situation in Dacca. The leaders of the
November 3coup and their supporters began to lose heart when
the news spread on the evening of November 4, that the four
surviving leaders of BAK.SAL (Tajuddin Ahmed, Syed Nazrul
Islam, Mansoor Ali, and A.H.M. Kamruzzaman) had been found
dead in Dacca Central Jail.
In the meantime, leaflets were circulated among the Jawans
of the army at the Dacca Cantonment by the JSD and Sammo-
badi Dal, accusing Khaled Musharraf of being apaid agent of the
Indian government. These groups explained the November 3coup
as an attempt by the Delhi-Moscow axis to re-establish its con¬
trol over Bangladesh. They urged the jawans to revolt against Kha¬
led Musharraf. The JSD had already established some cells within
the army. The jawans belonging to these cells—Biplobi Shainik
Sangsthas (Revolutionary Soldiers Associations)—took the lead
on the night of November 6in organising the Sepoy (Soldiers)
Revolt, when ihe jawans of Dacca Cantonment in abody revolted
against Khaled Musharraf and his associates.
During the Sepoy Revolt, Khaled Musharraf was killed
while trying to flee from the cantonment. The jawans freed Gen¬
eral Zia and came out in the city on tanks, trucks, jeeps and
buses, firing blank shots in the air and celebrating the victory of
“nationalist forces”. Hundreds and thousands of people from all
strata of society greeted the jawans with wild jubilation and
joined them in shouting the slogans “Bangladesh Zindabad”
‘‘General Zia Zindabad” and “Sepoy Revolution Zindabad”.
By the evening of November 7things took organised shape.
Major General Ziaur Rahman (Zia) was reinstalled as the Chief
of Staff of Bangladesh Army. Mushtaq, in aradio broadcast, prai¬
sed the ‘‘unparalleled revolution in defence of independence and
sovereignty of Bangladesh” and urged the continuation of Justice
Sayem as “non-political and non-partisan” President of the coun¬
try. President Sayem became the Chief Martial Law Administrator
and three Chiefs of Services were appointed as Deputy Chief

Martial Law Administrators. President Sayem, in his address to
the nation, declared that elections would be held according to
the schedule earlier announced by Mushtaq. Brought back to
power by the general body of soldiers and supported by the vast
majority of the people Zia soon emerged as a“strong man” and
has been wielding effective power since then.
Since the JSD played alarge part in organising the Sepoy
Revolt, Zia released M.A. Jalil, A.S.M. Abdur Rab and other
leaders of JSD who had been imprisoned during the Mujib
regime. The JSD leaders, however, immediately made plans for
what they called the ‘‘second phase” of the revolution. The
members of the JSD cells in the army—Biplobi Shainik Sangstha
(Association of Revolutionary Soldiers)—soon presented a12-
point demand to Zia for implementation. The opening declaration
of the I2-poiut demand read: “This revolution is for one pur¬
pose—the interest of the oppressed classes.” The demands inclu¬
ded: immediate release of political prisoners; creation of aclass¬
less army by abolishing the principle of recruitment of the offi¬
cers from the country’s privileged elite via special cadet schools
and instituting instead selection of officers from among the
ranks of the common soldier; abolition of the ‘‘batman” system
which compelled the jawans to serve as household servants to
the officers; improved wages for soldiers and ending of rent
payments for their accommodation; formation of revolutionary
committees in each army unit with aCentral Committee in Dacca
for deciding all policy matters concerning the armed forces.®*
This type of radical expression of the jawans' demands had
not been seen before in any regular army in South Asia. The 12-
point demand was also too revolutionary for Zia andhe had to join
the anti-JSD forces within the army to counteract the Biplobi
Shainik Sangsthas (BSS). The JSD-sponsored leaflets soon accu¬
sed Zia of “betrayal” and of joining‘‘the rightist reactionaries
and pro-U.S.A. elements.” The activities of BSS and inflamatbry
language of the JSD-sponsored leaflets excited the jawans and
about 40 army officers were killed in Dacca and Rangpur can¬
tonments. On November 23 and 24 the government rearrested
19 JSD leaders including M.A. Jalil and A.S.M. Abdur Rab, all
of whom had previously been released. Colonel Abu Taher, the
chief of the underground military front of JSD and, according to
JSD sources, the main architect of the Sepoy Revolt of Novem¬
ber 7, was also arrested. In ahard-hitting speech over the radio
in the early hours of November 25, Zia warned of “foreign age¬
” 9 0
nts engaged in conspiracy against our independence.
All the other radical parties issued leaflets accusing the JSD
leaders of being covert Indian agents. The JSD was also accused
of destroying the Bangladesh front line of defence by killing tra¬
ined army officers and creating dissension among the soldiers.
JSD leaders retorted that Bangladesh could not be defended by
its armed forces. According to JSD theoreticians, Bangladesh
could be defended only through the revolutionary unity of the
oppressed classes, who formed 95 per cent of the people of the
country. Accusations and counter-accusations apart, the Sepoy
Revolt of November 7and consequent demands raised hy jawans
were, as the Calcutta weekly Frontier put it, “the fruit of acon¬
ventional army turned into aguerrilla force during 1971 coming
” 9 1
ripe after four years of subterranean gestation.
NOTES
1. After his anest on the night of March 25, 1971, Sheikh Mujib
was taken to West Pakistan and kept in detention. Later he was
tried by aspecial military court for “waging war against the Pakis¬
tan government.” After the liberation of Bangladesh, the autho¬
rities in Pakistan released Sheikh Mujib and sent him to London
by special plane. Frcm there he flewto Bangladesh. See Morning
News (Dacca), January, 9,1972.
2. Of these 23 members, 8Were in their early 50s. 13 in their 4th
and one in his 30s. The oldest Minister and the only Hindu in the
cabinet, Was 70. The group consisted of 13 lawyers, 4business¬
men, 3professional politicians, acollege professor, alandholder,
and aformer Pakistan Army cflBcer, Biographical sketches of
Ministers were published in The Bangladesh Observer (Dacca)
January 20, 29 and April 14,15,1972.
3i For adetailed discussion of constitution-making in Bangladesh
see Huq, A. F. “Constitution-Making in Bangladesh,”PflCj;^c Affairs,
46:1 (1973), pp. 59-76.
4. Section 1of Article 42 in Part m.
5. Articles 42 and 47.
6. See the Constituent Assembly Debates, October 30, 1972, pub¬
lished in O b s e r v e r, O c t o b e r 3 1 , 1 9 7 2 .
7. According to Election Commission, of the total 3,37,78,638

registered voters, nearly 55 per cent voted in the elections held on
March 7,1973.
8. See Walter Schw'arz, “How Bangladesh Lost its Political Virgi¬

nity”, Guardian (London), reprinted in The Wave (Dacca), March
31, 1973; see also Serajul Hossain Khan, “Electoral Democracy
Buried,” (Dacca), March 18, 1973.
9. R. Jahan, “Members of Parliament in Bangladesh,” Legislative
Studies Quarterly, 1: 3, August 1976. p. 361.
10. Nine Were in their 40s and 5in their 30s; all had been long asso¬
ciated With the AL. Seven Were lawyers, 2journalists, 2college
professors, one doctor and one landholder.
11. See Mustafa SarWar, “Why you vote for AWami League”, The
Bangladesh Observer, March 3,1973.
12. Only one other member of Sheikh Mujib Ministry had previous
experience as Minister for two years.
13. See Abul Mansur Ahmed, Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchas Basar
(Fifty Years of Politics as Isaw it )(Dacca, Nowroj Kitabistan,
1968). pp. 260-285.
14 Some of these beneficiaries entered industry and later contri¬

buted to AL funds.
15. It was no wonder that the majority of the AL members of Parlia¬

ment Were more interested in acting as chairmen of relief com¬
mittees, With control over patronage funds that could be used,
for the benefit of party hangers-on, than they were in strengthen¬
ing the institution of Parliament by insisting on frequent sessions
and vigorous participation in debates on policy matters. See
R. Jahan, op. c/t., pp. 365-368.
16. If anybody complained to Sheikh Mujib about corruption in high
places. Sheikh Mujib usually dismissed the complaint with the
typical comment that the people about Whom the allegations Were
made had undergone great sacrifices for Bangladesh’s independence.
17. See the reports published in the pro-government, Banglar Bani,
September 30, November 12, 1973 and January 2, March 4, 1974.
According to A.H.M. Kamruzzaman, the Commerce Minister, of a
total of 25,000 import permit holders, 15,000 were “fake”
importers. See Ganakantha (Dacca), January 3. 1974.
18. G ana k a n t h a ,
19. Nirbachani Ishtehar (Election Manifesto), NAP (Bhashani), pub¬
lished by Qazi Zafar Ahmad, 1973, p. 3. The manifesto dubs the
Awami League ‘Lut Pat Saraity’(Association of Looters).
20. Lawrence Lifschultz, “Bangladesh: AState of Siege”, Far Eastern
Eco/tomic Rev/fiM', August 30, 1974, p. 51. ■
21. Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner, (ed.), PoliticalIârties

and Political Deyelopment (Princeton, Princeton University Press,
1966), p. 434.
22. See J. S. Nye, “Corruption and Political. Development: ACost-

Benefit Analysis.” American Political Science Review, 61 (June,
1967), pp. 417-427. ,
23. As of December 31, 1973, Bangladesh had received food assist¬
ance Worth $173 million and multilateral aid worth $350 million
through the United: Nations Relief Operations in Bangladesh
and other international agencies. In addition, friendly countries
provided atotal of $850 millicn as grants and credits during the
same period. The United State stopped the list of donor countries.
The Bangadesh Observer, March 26,1974.
24. See the special report in Banglar Bc/j/ (Dacca), Ncvember 13,
1974. See also Q.K. Ahmad, “Aspects of the Management of
Nationalised industries in Bangladesh,” Bangladesh Development
Studies, U-B (July 1974).-PP. 678-679.
25. The Financial Times, August 16, 1975.
26. Bangladesh had an annual deficit of about 2,000.CC0 tens of rice
priorto 1971. The deficit doubled after 1971, For adiscussicn ef the
serious disruption caused 'to the rural economy of Bangladesh by
1971 crisis see, Peter J. Bertccci, “Bast Pakistan: The Harvest
of Strife”, South Asian Review, Vcl. 5, No. 1October 1971,
pp. 11-18.
27. Holiday, Jmo. 9,1974.
28. The Bangladesh Observer, November 23, 1974.
29. See A. H, Syed, “Pakistan’s Security Problems: ABill of Cons¬
traints,” in W.H. Wriggins. Pakistan in Transition (Islamabad,
University of Islamabad Press, 1975), pp. 249-252.
30. See, Enayetullah Khan, “Captured Military Hardware: Arms and
the Dues”, Holiday, August 5,1973.
31. See Holiday, May 21,1972.
32. See Special Correspondent. “Bangla’s Trade With India Fouled
Vp\\ Holiday, April 1,1975.
33. See Chapter VI, pp, 115-ll6.
34. See Chapter VI,i pp. ,116-117. .Abdul Kadex S former com¬
mander of Kader Bahini. vtus abeneficiary of ,enormous patronage
by the Mujib government
35. JRB officer's until July .1974 were trained by Ihdian army officers
in their headquarters at Savar;near Dacca, Because of anti-
Indian sentiment the venue of training for JRB officers Was
changed to Dehra Dun, .India’s Sandhurst, The first group of
officers were flown to Dahra Dun in July 1974, Far Eastern Econo¬
mic Review, January 10,1975.
36. For an excellent discussion of the problem ofreadjustment of the
former East Pakistan bureaucracy wiih theALregime in the post¬
liberation Bangladesh, see Rahman, A.T.R. Administration and
its Political Environment in Bangladesh,” Pacific Affairs, XLVn, 2

(Summer, 1974), pp. 171-191.
37. The tPeeAr/y (Calcutta), December 21,1974.
38. Sea Chapter V, p. 76.
39. See Ghoshona Patra (Manifesto), Bangladesh Chhatra (Students)
League, published by Mohammad Ekramul Huq, Publicity Secre-
tary, Bangladesh Chhatra League, July 1972, pp. 9-10.
40. See Holiday (Dacca), July 23, 1972.
41. Goshona Patra (Manifesto), Jatio Samajtantric Dal, January 1973,
pp. 7-11,14.
42. See A. F. M. Mahbubul Huq,SarjA/A:Karjobiborani, 1972-73. (Annual

Report, 1972-73) published by Central Committee, Bangladesh
Chhatra League, 1973, pp. 1,4,6,7.
43. See The Bangladesh Observer, March 13,1974.
44. See Chapter Vn.pp. 149-150.
45. See Ekti Monolithic Communist Party Gore Tulun (“Build UD one
Monolithic Communist Party”), published by Bangladesh Commu¬

nist Sanghati Kendra (Solidarity Centre of Bangladesh Communists),
February 1972.
46. Interview with Nasim Ali Khan on February 21,1974.

47. See Ghoshona (Manifesto), Bangladesher Communist Party (Lenin-
badi), published by Comrade Amal Sen, Secretary BCP(L), 1972
pp. 11-12,25-33 34-5, 38-44.
48. For the arguments and counter-arguments on these issues put
forward by BCP (Leninist) and BCP, see Banglar CommunistPartir
Abedon (“Appeal of the Communist Party of Bengal”), published
by Solidarity Centre of Bangladesh Communists (n. d.) and
Biplobi Party Gore Tulun (“Build up aRevolutionary Party”),
published by BCP, January 1972.
49. See Chapter III, p. 46.
50. The Sarbohara Party, like its predecessor. East Bengal Workers’
Movement, used ‘East Bengal’ instead of Bangladesh. “Bangla-
desh” in its literal sense means the land of Bengalis and, thus,
includes West Bengal. Sarbohara leaders argued that East Bengalis,
within their own territory and With their own language, economic
and social system, and distinctive culture, had evolved historically
as adistinct nation different from other nationalities of the Indian
sub-continent. See Purbo Banglar Ashomapto Jatio Ganatantrik
Biplob Sampanna Karar Karmamchi (“Prc gramme to Complete
the Unfinished National Demccratic Revolution of East Bengal”),
published by the Central Committee, Purbo Bangla Sarbchara
Party (n. d.), pp. 1-3.
51. See Siraj S'kdar, Saniajtantm Shreni Sangram OSamajik Biplob
Praiflnge (“On Socialism, Class Struggle and Sccitl Revolution”);
Bibhinna Akritir Songsodiwnbad Prashange Koekti Rochona (“A
Few Articles on the Various Kinds of Revisionism”), (n. p., n. d.).
52. Maulana Bhashanir Bibriti (Maulana Bhashani’s Statement), Decem¬
ber 2, 1973, fn.p.).
53. For adetailed discussion of the split ofEPCPinl966 between pro-
Moscow and pre-Peking leftists see above Chapter III, pp. 38-43.
54. See above Chapter VII, pp., 144-146.
55. See Purbo Banglar Poristhilir Upor Purbo Bcngla Sanmobadi Dal
{ATarxbadi-Leninbedi), Dvitio Jatio Congress Grihito Siddbanta
(“Resolu.ions Reached at the Second Congress of the Corrirunist
Party of Erst Bengfl(Marxisi-Leninist) Corceinir.g the Situation
in East Bengal”), Jaruny 17. 1973 (n. p.)pp. 2-5.
56. Sea Bortoman Paristhititc Pi rba Banglar Senimebadi Del {Marxbadi-
Leninbadi) Ki Cbai (“What Does the Communist Party (Marxist-
Leninist) Want in the Present Situation?”) October 1973, (n. p.):
“Ek Bhuiphor B’plcbi Srmprrke” (On an Upstart Revolutionary”?)
Gana Shakti. Vol. II (2, 1973), pp. 4-28.
57. Sae ‘Jasod”(JSD) in Gana Shakti^VoX. 11(4 and 5, 1973), pp. 6-32.
58. See the editorial “Shashastra Jatio Biplobi Juddher Parichtlsk
Ispath KathinSramik SrenirBiplobi Partike Gore Tulim” (“Build
up the Steel-like Revolutionary Party of the Workers—The Leader
of Armed Natirna 1Revolutionary War”) in yuna(“People’s
War”) No. 7(1973), p. 7. Jana Jiiddho, the underground paper of
EPCM (ML), is edited by Abdul Huq.
59. See Editorial, Purbo Bangla Vol. IV (2. 1973), pp. 2-3, and Sadhan
Karmckar (probably apseudonym clone of the leaders of EBCP)
“Bharater Biplobi Sangrame Chiner Nirabata: Ke Kon Drishtite
Dhekhe” (STonce of China on the Revolutionary Struggle in
India; ‘Who Sees From What Angle”) in rWo/..pp. 6-8.
!60. The author asked some of the leftist leaders about the reasons for
the fragmentation of the lefiist movement. The answers were
similar. These leaders argued that fragmentation was inherent,
in any- ideological movement. They cited the casuof Russia before
the Revolution -when dozens of communist parties co-existed, as
precedent for their activities. Acccicir.g to all of them the party
-led by Lenin, With the correct revolutionary theory, ultimately led
the revolution. In this manner, they argued, so would the party
that espoused the correct theory for Bangladesh take command
during the revolution and overcome all the other parties.
61.
The Bangladesh OAjerver^December 31,1973,
62. See Banglar Bani, October 15,1973.
63.Italicsadded.SeeTheBangladeshObserver,January29and30,
1974, for the proceedings of the Jatio Sangsad (Parliament)
concerning these laws. On December 24, 1973, President Abu
SayeedChoudhuryresignedfromhisofficereportedlyforhis
disagreementWiththeALgovernmentoverthe“specialpowers
acts” and the strong-arm methods used by the AL against the
opposition. See Ganakantha, December 25, 1973, Muhammad-
ullah,theSpeaker,JatioSongictl,waselectedasthenewPresident
unopposed.
64.Ganakantha, December19and26.1973;TheBangladeshObserver,
July 19, 1973.
65. The Bangladesh Observer. Febniary 9,1974.

66. See Khandokar Mohammad Illias, Mujibbad (Dacca, National
Publ.cations)1972.SeealsoBanglarBaniMay10and16,June4,
July10,16and17,August2,20,24and30,September12,23,27
and 30, and October 6,1972.
67. For ah account of this splitsee J//o/o^,March 31 and April 1,1974.
For the University incidents see Banglar Bani, April 6, 1974 :and
Holiday, April 7,1974.
68.SeeTheBangladeshGazetteExtraordinary.December28,1974.
69.ThisgovernmentversionofSir;jSikdar’sdeathwashardlytaken
as fact by political circles in Dacca. The popular belief Was that
soon after his arrest Sikdar was killed without trial at the behest
of the AL leaders.
70.
SeeSheikhMoni’sspeechesinthevariousmeetingsoftheAJL,
71.
publishedinBanglarBani,September24,October12,1974.
See “Power to Muj’b’s Private Army.’’Far Faj/ern Economic Re¬
view. Vol. 87, No. 2(January 10, 1975).
72.Theauthorandoneofhiscolleaguesweretheonlytwopersons
present in the visitors’ gallery during the session of Parliament o n
January 25, 1975.
73. The nam.es of the members of the Executive Committee, Central

Committee and five wings of BAKSAL were published in The
Bangladesh Times, June 7th, 1975.
74. Also included
among the governor-designate were 7former
Civil. Service
- - of Pakistan officers,
P a k 6former
i s t a n East Civil,
Service officers, Kader Siddiqui, commander of Kader Bahini in
1971 war, acolonel in the Bangladesh army and two tribal chiefs
of the Chittagong HillTracts. Bio-data of the Governors-desig-
nate Was published in Dainik Bangla, July 23, 25, 26 and 27,
1975.
75 For asuccinct analysis cf the crganisaticnel and praetorian theories

of mliiary intervention see Thomas S. Cox. Civil-Military
Relations in Sierra Leone: ACase Study of African Soldiers in
Politics(Cambridge,HarvardUniversityPress,1976).pp.6-12.
76. For acogent presentation of the behavicurslist point of view,
,1,SamuelDecalo,CoupsandArmyRuleinAfricaStudiesinMilitary
s e e
Style(NewHaven,YaleUniversityPress,1976),pp.7-22.
77. See Lawrence Lifschuliz. Abu Taher’s Last Testament: Bangla-
desh—The Unfinished Revolution, Economic and PoliticalL i Weekly
fschuhz
(Bombay) Special Number, August 1977, p. 1328.
correct ly emphasises that this growth of radical ideas in the
B a n g l a d e s h a r m y Wa s a n unprecedented development in South
Asia. See ibid., p. n09.
78. See Lifschuhz, op. ci7.,p. 1327.

79.See76/rf.,p.1329.Seealso,“WhatisinthePact?”77o/Way,January
21st, 1973.
80. See ‘AnatomyofDaccaCoup”,Sunday(Calcutta),September7,

“
1975.
81 The Bangladesh Army had only 33 tanks. Three were leftovers of

the Pakistan army and 30 Were Soviet-made tanks lately brought
from Egypt. The artillery had only some World War II heavy
guns,givenbyIndiainresponsetothedemandoftheBangladesh
governmenttoreturnthearmsleftbythePakistanarmyandtaken
as “booty to India by the Indian forces after December 16,
1971.
82.LewisM.SimonciTheWashingtonPostKpcrtcdthatTaheruddin
Thakur attended the first meeting cf the “Majors” held at Dalim’s
residence on August 6and played akey role in bringing Mushtaq
into the coup. See The Night of Vengeance in Bangladesh,”
The Washington Post, August 23. 1975.
83. Interview With Khandckar Mushtaq Ahmed by the author on
20.3.76.
84. rae'Dc//y7//o/o.?.August16,1975,Pakistansoonafterwardsdona-
ted $50 million Worth of rice and cloth.
85. The Bangladesh Times, 1 7 , 1 9 7 5 .
86.FarEasternEconomicReview,October31,1975,p.5.
87. Franda,M.F.“The Bangladesh Coup,” XIX, 15,
(September 1975), p. 10.
88. These officers. With one exception, went to Libya.
89. For the 12-point demand of the Biplcbi Shainik Sangsthas, s e e
Lifschulz, “Bangladesh: The Crisis has not Passed,” For Eastern

Economic Fevieiv. December 5, 1975. p. 33.
90. The Bangladesh Times, November 25, 1975.
91. See “Bangladesh: State and Revolution, 9 9
Frontier (Calcutta),
December 13.1975.
CHAPTER IX
G E N E R A L Z I A’ S R E G I M E
As has been emphasised by Henry Bienen, “military regime

is amisnomer as all “military regimes” have large civilian comp-
onents.i^fjertakingover,militarycoupleadersusuallyestablish
a“cabinet” or Executive Council” which consists of alarge
number of civilians. This development occurs primarily for two
reasons.First,themilitaryleaderswanttogiveadegreeofcivi¬
lian colour to the new regime. Secondly, although in some of
the recent literature on the subject the military is depicted as a
highlymodernforceabletotransferitsorganizationalandtech¬
nical skills to the art of government," yet confronted with the
practicaltaskofrunningthegovernmentthemilitaryrulersfind
few of their comrades possessing the requisite skills. They are
forced to recruit appropriate talents from the civilian sectors.
Thusthepost-November1975regimeinBangladeshalso
becam.ea'mixedregime”ledbyGeneralZiaurRahman(Zia).
At the core of the new governmental system was aCouncil of
Advisors to the President, which was established on Novem¬
ber26.ByJune1976theCouncilcametoconsistof12members,
includingthreeDeputyChiefMartialLawAdministrators.Of
the 9civilian Advisors of the President, one was awife of the
former chief of the Chakma tribe in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
Thisselectionwaspossiblymadetogivesomesenseofrepresen¬
tation to the tribal people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts who
hadbeenrestivesincethetimeoftheindependenceofBangladesh.
The other 8civilian Advisor were elderly men (average being 63)
with wide experience in administration.
Two of the new Advisors originally belonged to the Indian
policeservice.Oneofthemendedhiscareerasthechairmanof
the East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation and later
General Zia’s Regime 199
served as Minister in the government ofYahya (1969-71). The

other retired as Chief Secretary of East Pakistan Government in
1961-63 and later worked as Minister in the Ayub Government
for some time. Another Advisor was aretired Colonel of the
medical corps of the Pakistan Army who served as Secretary of
the Ministry of Health in the Government of Eist Pakistan in
1969. Other Advisors included two former Vice-Chancellors, for¬
mer Principal of aMedical College in Dacca and aProfessor of
Economics of Dacca University who was Minister of Finance and
Planning in the Government of East Pakistan (1965-1969). The
youngest Advisor was 53-year old and had along career in the
Department of Industries and in the Academy for Rural Deve¬
lopment at Comilla. Thus, except for the female member, the
civilian Advisors chosen were all technocrats or bureaucrats
rather than political figures. Since Zia at the beginning tried to
maintain aposture of political neutrality, the exclusion of politi¬
cians from the Council of Advisors was easily understandable.
In contrast to the civilian Advisors, the military Advisors were
much younger, reflecting the youth of Bangladesh armed services.
Both the Chief of Naval Staff and Chief of Air Staff were 45.
The former served in the Pakistan Navy for 20 years and com¬
pleted naval courses at Greenwich Royal Naval College in Eng¬
land and National Defence College in Rawalpindi. The latter was
trained in the Pakistan Air Force Staff College and took some
military courses in the United States and West Germany. Al¬
though General Zia, the key figure of the Council of Advisors,
was only 40, he had already acquired varied experience.
Zia joined the Pakistan Army in 1953 and was Commissioned
in 1955. He received training in aspecial intelligence course and
served in the intelligence branch from 1959 to 1964. During the
Indo-Pak War of 1965, Zia was the commander of aCompany
of the First Bengal Regiment and fought gallantly in the Khem-
karan Sector. In 1966, he was appointed instructor in Pakistan
Military Academy at Kakul and later in the same year he joined
the Staff College, Quetta. In 1969 he had been to West Germany
for training and later spent afew months with British Army. In
March 1971, he was with the newly raised Eighth East Bengal
Regiment at Chittagong and, as stated earlier, on March 27, 1971
he revolted and made the historic announcement of independence
of Bangladesh. During the liberation war Zia formed the firs
Brigade of the Bangladesh Army with the jawans of First,
Second and Eighth Bengal Regiments. It was popularly known
as “Z-Force.”3
The post-coups situation in Bangladesh would have tested the

capabilities of statesmen anywhere in the world. The Indian
government declared publicly more than once that India could
not remain unconcerned over the developments in Bangladesh.
Indiagave shelter to die-hard supporters of Sheikh Mujib, inclu¬
ding Kader Siddiqui, the tough guerrilla leader of 1971 libera¬
tion war who crossed the borber soon after the coup of August
15, 1975. India also opened 30 to 35 camps along the border and
trained armed pro-Mujib young men for guerrilla warfare and
subversion. From January 1976, these Bangladeshi dissenters
began to launch raids on border posts with the support of the
Indian Border Security Force. In the latter part of the year some
of the dissenters infiltrated into Bangladesh in order to carry on
sabotage activities.
India had already diverted water from the Ganges river
through the Farakka Canal into India, violating the temporary
agreemient of April 18, 1975 which stipulated that the diversion
of water of the Ganges at Farakka after May 1975 would be
effected only after afresh and permanent accord between Bangla¬
desh and India.'* The diversion of Ganges water during the dry
season (November 1975 to 1976) adversely affected the irrigation
system, navigation, industry, power generation, intrusion of sali¬
nity, fisheries, forestry, livestock, drinking water, and public
health in 37 %of the total area of Bangladesh with 33 %of the
population.® It was widely believed in diplomatic circles in Dacca
that Moscow had made it clear to Zia that Bangladesh should
be satisfied with “limited sovereignty” and should accommodate
itself to Indian desires.
Indian pressure and subversion was not the only problem.
The JSD and its military front, Biplobi Gana Bahini (People’s
Revolutionary Army) launched all-out efforts to oust the govern¬
ment of Zia, who according to them had betrayed the cause of
the “Sepoy Revolution” of November 7. JSD theoreticians
argued that the military junta would never transfer political power
voluntarily and the government could be overthrown only by a
people’s united movement. Zia, however, tried to negotiate with

the JSD leaders for apolitical settlement. M.A. Awwal, who
for sometime had been connected with the JSD, claims that he
tried to arrange meetings between the military government and
the JSD leaders. But the underground leaders of JSD remained
adamant. Following Lenin’s dictum that there can not be acom¬
munist revolution in acountry unless half of the country’s army
is converted into communist first JSD leaders continued their
clandestine attempts at proselytisation within the ranks of the
Army.
In addition to JSD, there were some other opposition parties
still active. Aminority group within BAKSAL openly accused
the Zia government “of usurping power from the legally constitu¬
ted government of ‘‘Bangabandhu” Sheikh Mujib and sought to
overthrow it with the help of Kader Siddiqui’s group in India.
They began to spread disaffection among the tribal people in
order to foment arebellion.
After the killing of Siraj Sikdar, the Sarbohara Party became
divided into two factions. One was led by Colonel Ziauddin who
joined Manabendra Narayan Larma, aformer Member of Parlia¬
ment, in an armed movement to secure ‘‘autonomy” for the
Chittagong Hill Tracts. Another faction led by Kamal Haider
saw the Zia regime as the agent of “American imperialism” and
indulged in sporadic bombings in urban areas.
Besides these external and internal threats to the regime, the
Zia government inherited acollapsing economy, and indiscipli-
ned army and ademoralised and faction-ridden bureaucracy.
Zia’s experience in army intelligence, at the Staff College as De¬
puty Chief of Staff had helped him acquire considerable admini¬
strative skill. Through his active participation in the liberation
war, he also came to understand well the nature both of Bangla¬
desh internal politics and of the influence of big powers in a
weak state’s political crises. As his declaration of Independence
on March 27, 1971 showed, he could also take bold initiatives.
All these qualities stood him in good stead as he emerged as the
strong man after the November coup. The activities of the
Indian government—stoppage of the Ganges water and support
to thepro-Mujib dissenters—also helped to stabilise Zia’s regime,
they increased Bangladeshis, anti-Indian sentiment and consoli-
dated support for the “natioualist” government. Zia also got
s o m e support both from the left (excepting JSD and Sarbohara)
and from the Muslim League who considered the Zia regime less
harmful than one of AL or JSD or Sarbohara.
Stability and Dependence

In the face of external and internal threats to the regime, the
Ziagovernmentfirstconcentratedonstrengtheninginternalsecu¬
rity and the armed forces.The budget of 1974-1975, as framed by
the Mujib government, was revised andtheallocation for Defence
and Internal Security Force was raised from Taka 750 million
(13 percent of the total revenue budget) in 1974-1975 to Taka
2062.7 million (32 per cent of the total revenue budget) in 1975-
76. In the budget of 1976-77 the allocation for Defence and
Internal Security Forces was Take 2194 million (29 per cent
of the total revenue budget.)® The strength of the Bangladesh
Rifles was increased, with some recruits drawn from the loyal
tribes of Mymensingh and Chittagong Hill Tracts. The strength
of police force was increased from about 40 thousand to about
70 thousand. This included acombat-ready Special Police Force
of 12,500 men, trained to counteract the guerrilla raids. Anew
a r m y division (9 Division) was raised under the Command of
Major General Mir Shawkat Ali, former comrade of Zia in the

early phase of the liberation war of 1971. Defence Forces’ Intel¬
ligence and National Security Intelligence were strengthened
under the respective directorships of Air-Vice Marshal K.M.A.
Islam and A.B.S. Safdar, both men with long training and ex¬
perience in Pakistan Intelligence Services.
General Zia w'as also able to overcome to alarge extent the
serious problem of dissidence in the armed forces. In November
1975, General Zia consolidated his position among the jawans,
by accepting the non-political demands of the 12-point charter of
demands of the Jawans, circulated by the Biplobi Shainik Sangs-
tha (Revolutionary Soldiers’ Association) during the Sepoy Rev¬
olt on November 7.’ Most important, he accepted the demands
relating to increased salary and fringe benefits. The officers,
terrified by the jawans’ wrath against them, rallied around Zia,
the only officer acceptable to the jawans.
Yet occasional army rumblings still continued. In February

somesepoysinChittagongrebelledandsomeelementsamonga
section of forces in Dacca called for the restoration of service to
those who had been connected with the shortlived coup led by
KhaledMusharrafTheBengalLancerstankregiment(whose
officers were responsible for killing of Sheikh Mujlb and later
sent to Libya) were also disgruntled. In amajor decision directed
at avoiding concentration of potentially dissident elements of
the army, aregrouping and replacement of troops was carried
out in March-April, 1976. The regiments of Dacca Brigade
were divided into several groups and sent out to different regi¬
onal cantonments and 9Division was given the responsibility
of maintaining security in the capital.
Zia faced particular difficulty in sending the Bengal Lancers
tank regiment from Dacca to Bogra, but he finally succeeded
after the then Air Force Chief, Air Vice-Marshal M.G. Tawab,
threatened air action against the tank regiment. Later on, in a
surprise move in the last week of April 1976, Air Vice-Marshal
Tawab brought back the August coup “Majors” from Libya and
tried to trigger off another coup to dislodge Zia. Zia forced
Tawab to resign and sent back the “Majors” to Libya again.* Zia
then disbanded the Bengal Lancers’ tank regiment, the power
base of the “Majors” and placed nearly half of its 500 members
on charges.’ The JSD-sponsored leaflets claimed that 1500
jawans and officers were dismissed from the army or tried for
their sympathy for Biplobi Shainik Sangsthas.
With the restoration of discipline in the Armed Forces, Zia
was pressured by the “hawkish” officers to act against the recalci¬
trant JSD leaders and their associates. In the last week of June
1976, aSpecial Tribunal headed by Colonel Yusuf Haider held a
secret trial of the JSD leaders for their alleged attempts to ex¬
pand the original mutiny of November 7towards agoal of “soci¬
alist revolution” and the killing of some of the army officers.
Colonel (Retired) Abu Taher(who lost aleg in 1971 liberation
war), the commander of Biplobi Gana Bahini (the military front
of the JSD) was sentenced to death. Thirteen other leaders of
the JSD, including Major M.A. Jalil, Abu Yusuf Khan, Major
Ziauddin, A.S.M. Abdur Rab, Hasanul Huq (Inu), Professor
AnwarHossainandSirajulAlamKhan,weresentencedtounder
gorigorousimprisonmentforvaryingterms.Taherwasexecuted
in Dacca central jail on July 21, 1976.
Soon after this, in another secret trial, Peter Casters, aDutch
national and journalist, and 6JSD leaders were sentenced to
14yearsimprisonment.ThePresident,however,pardonedPeter
Custers and he was deported to his country immediately.'o The
JSD and its affiliated organisations called for ageneral strike on
July31,1976inprotestagainsttheexecutionofLieutenantColo¬
nel Abu Taher and the conviction of other JSD leaders. There
w a shardly any response among the people to the strike call."
The government followed a“stick and carrot” policy to con¬
trol the disaffection of the tribal people. Security forces were
greatly strengthened in tribal areas of Mymensingh and in the
whole of Chittagong Hill Tracts. The government also under¬
took amassive uplift programme in the hitherto neglected tribal
a r e a s , introduced asystem of monthly allowances for the tribal
leaders, seeking their participation in local development planning.
As aresult, none of the insurgent groups was successful in devel¬
oping permanent shelters in the tribal areas. Because of the
almost rabid anti-Indianism prevailing all over Bangladesh,
Mujibites working within the country or infiltrating from India
received little sympathy and no shelter from the people at large
and were easily caught by the government security forces. Village
Defence Committees formed by government in which people
joined spontaneously (in contrast to the ‘‘Peace Committees”
imposed by the Occupation Army during 1971) were particularly
helpful to the government in its arrests of infiltrators and reco¬
very of unauthorised arms.*^
In the first few months of 1976, the Bangladesh government
took the initiative for bilateral talks with India about the Ganges
Water dispute and border incidents. The Bangladesh government
also used back-door negotiations through mutual friends of the
two countries to have asettlement of India-Bangladesh disputes.
But these attempts at reconciliation failed. The Indian Govern¬
ment argued that there had been no adverse effect because of
the diversion of Ganges Water at Farakka and completely denied
the Bangladesh charge that India was harbouring and training
the “miscreants”.
In desperation, the military government of Bangladesh deci¬

ded to internationalise the issue. After having secured unani¬
mous support of the 42-nation Islamic Foreign Ministers’ Con¬
ference in Istambul in the middle of May 1976,'3 and after hav¬
ing aroused widespread sympathy at the 82-nation non-aligned
Summit Conference held in August, 1976 in Colombo.'* Bangla¬
desh finally raised the issue of Ganges Water dispute in the U.N.
General Assembly. The issue was included in the agenda of the
Special Political Committee in spite of Indian and Soviet protest
against including a“bilateral” issue.
Ultimately, and largely through the efforts of non-aligned
nations, aconsensus resolution was passed at the Special Poli¬
tical Committee, later adopted by the General Assembly, which
stated that:
both parties agreed that the situation called for urgent solu¬
tion and to that end, have decided to meet urgently at Dacca
...with aview to arriving at afair and expeditious settlement”
and that
‘‘it is open to either party to report to the General Assembly

at its thirty second session on the progress achieved in the
settlement of the problem.”
In pursuance of this resolution, the ministerial negotiations

were held in Dacca for three days in the second weak of Decem¬
ber. The negotiations were adjourned with the statement by
leaders of both delegations that the difference had been narrowed
down. However, no agreement could be reached at subsequent
negotiations until the replacement of the Congress government
by the Janata Party government following the March 1977 elec¬
tions in India.
The military government improved its relations with the other

countries of the third world particularly China, in order to coun¬
teract any undue dependence on India. Peking officially condem¬
ned Indian attitudes on the Ganges Water and border disputes
since February, 1976.*® Two goodwill delegations from Bangla¬
desh visited China in May and June 1976 and China gave full
support to Bangladesh on the Farakka issue at the U.N. In
November 1976, China initialled atwo-year trade and payment

agreement with Bangladesh envisaging agreater volume of imports
and exports between the countries. In December 1976, aChinese
technical delegation visited Bangladesh to help with small irriga¬
tion projects. Finally Zia himself led aprestigious delegation to
China from January 2to 6, 1977. During the visit Zia and Hua
Kuo-feng, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China and the Premier of the State Council “had asin¬
cere and friendly conversation in acordial atmosphere.”'® Dur¬
ing the visit, an economic and technical co-operation agreement
and atrade and payment agreement between the Government of
China and Bangladesh were signed in Peking. According to the
Peking Renew, “Though short, the visit achieved completely
successful results.”'’ The Press Communique issued simultaneous¬
ly from Dacca and Peking at the end of four-day goodwill visit
by Zia stated inter alia:
‘‘The government and the people of China noted with joy the
great efforts made and the marked success achieved by the
Government and people of Bangladesh in opposing interfere¬
nce from outside, defending national independence and state
sovereignty and developing the national economy. The govern¬
ment and the people of China reiterated their firm support
for the just struggle of Bangladesh in this regard.”'®
Relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh also improved
considerably. In response to pressure from some of the leaders of
the Middle Eastern countries, Sheikh Mujib was invited to, and
attended, the Islamic Summit Conference hosted by Bhutto in
Lahore in 1974. Because of the same pressure. Sheikh Mujib
also gave up his plan for putting on trial on charges of genocide
committed in 1971 some of the ofiicers of Pakistan army taken
prisoner by India. But the ice did not thaw and Mujib-Bhutto
negotiations in Dacca later failed. It was some months after
the fall of the Mujib government before Pakistan government
signed an agreement of any kind with Bangladesh. The trade
links between the two parts of former United Pakistan were first
restored in May 1976 by athree-year trade agreement.
After 1975 Bangladesh economic and woodwill. delegations
visited most of the Islamic countries to strengthen relations. Zia

paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia in July 1977.
‘‘The talks (between General Zia and King Khaled) were
held in an atmosphere of trust symbolising the relationships
between the two countries...The two countries discussed the
problems arising out of the Farakka barrage and expressed
their satisfaction with the efforts made by the People’s Repub¬
lic of Bangladesh to arrive at apeaceful and just solution of
the problem and also expressed their hope that afinal solu¬
tion to the problem will be achieved without delay.”'®
As aresult of the intense diplomatic activities undertaken
personally by Zia, Bangladesh somewhat diminished its early
dependence on India. On August 1, 1977, Zia, while addressing
the officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claimed that:
i t
the most significant development in the field of foreign pol¬

icy of Bangladesh was that Bangladesh was now in aposi¬
tion to make her own decisions and formulate her own inde¬
pendent policy to serve her national interests.”®®
Perhaps because of the international support that Bangladesh

gained for itself on the Ganges Water issue, or perhaps because
of the bad press that India received for encouraging subversion in
Bangladesh, India began to adopt amore statesmanlike attitude
towards its most populous neighbour.
In contrast to his predecessor, Indian Prime Minister Morar-
ji Desai took the initiative in improving relations. Immediate¬
ly after his assumption of office in March 1977, Desai sent to
Dacca ahighpowered delegation headed by Jagjivan Ram, Mini¬
ster of Defence, to sort out the Farakka dispute. While the
ministerial talks that were held on April 16-17 apparently ran in
to deadlock, athree hour meeting between Zia and Jagjivan
Ram on April 18th led to apreliminary understanding between
the two governments.®' After afew rounds of further talks at
various levels, the two governments signed an agreement on
November 5, 1977. The agreement contained short-term as well as
long-term provisions. According to the short-term arrangements
(which would run for five years and could be extended further
for aspecified period by mutual consent), every year from Janu-
208 The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftennath
ary 1toMay 31-~the period when water would be in short supply

India would receive roughly 40 per cent of the total flow of
water in the Ganges at Farakka The remaining 60 per cent would
go to Bangladesh. This apportionment of water would mean a
sharing of shortages by India and Bangladesh. Under the long¬
term provisions, the agreement stipulated that the Joint Rivers
Commission (which had been set up in 1972) would be reactivat¬
ed and asked to report on the viability of the long-term projects
proposed by the two countries to augment the flow of the Gan¬
ges water during the lean period. Thus, because of the willing¬
ness of both parties to share sacrifice, along-standing dispute
between Bangladesh and India was amicably resolved.^-
Another irritant in Indo-Bangladesh relations—^the Indira
Government’s policy of giving shelter to Bangladesh dissenters
and arming them to carry on sabotage within Bangladesh—was
also solved. During the Conference of Heads of Governments of
Commonwealth States held in Britain in the second week of June
1977, acouple of out-of-the-Conference meetings between Zia
and Morarji Desai produced an agreement that Bangladesh exiles
in India would be given the choice of either remaining in India
or going back to Bangladesh, but those who chose to remain in
India would not be allowed to use Indian territory for the pre¬
23
paration of activities hostile to the government of Bangladesh.
On June 24, 1977, the Baltimore Sun reported that about
600 guerrillas, who had sought refuge in India after the coup of
August 15, were made to surrender to Bangladesh military au¬
thorities. The paper further stated that civilian refugees number¬
ing more than 2,000 were denied aliving allowance within India
and had to come back to Bangladesh. On August 6, 1977 three
former Members of Parliament who had fled to India surrender¬
ed to law-enforcement agencies in Bangladesh. It seemed that a
new chapter in the history of Bangladesh and India was being
opened on the basis of the principle of equal sovereignty and
non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.
Restoration of Bureaucratic Power

In almost all countries where the military has taken over, the
civil service has been the net gainer. Adeveloping society is
more complex than an army and military officers cannot by
themselves manage the civilian administration. Moreover, the
army cannot afford to second large numbers of officers to the
civilian sector without impairing its own discipline and efficiency.
Thus, in most countries under military rule only alimited number
of regional and ministerial posts are held by military officers
and it is top civil servants who occupy most of the policy-making
and administrative positions. Some scholars, therefore, refer to
military regimes as coalition regimes of the military personnel
and civil servants.®'*
The Bangladesh military regime was no exception to this gen¬
eral pattern. The military-technocratic Council of Advisors esse¬
ntially restored the nower of abureaucratic elite. The President’s
Order Number 9of 1972, which had provided for dismissal of
officials without assigning any reasons, was annulled. Officers of
the former Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) were placed in most
of the top positions in the Secretariat, Public Corporations and
in District headquarters.A new Planning Commission, consist¬
ing of “technocrats of action” (in place of the professional eco¬
nomists appointed by the Sheikh Mujib government) was set up.
Shafiul Azam, the seniormost Bengali formerly in the Civil
Service of Pakistan was made first head of the Planning Com¬
mission and S.A. Khair, another senior member of the CSP,
was appointed as amember. The Government of Zia re-organis¬
ed the Bangladesh Secretariat, (the hub of administration and the
main centre of policy-making), into 24 ministries and 39 divisi¬
ons, manned by 28 Secretaries and 11 Additional Secretaries.®®
Of these Secretaries, one was aretired military officers, one
belonged to the former Police Service of Pakistan, one was a
member of Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service and the rest be¬
longed to the former Civil Service of Pakistan. In the formula¬
tion of economic policies, the Secretaries of the Ministry of Fin¬
ance, Industries, Agriculture and the External Resources Divi¬
sion played crucial roles. All of these posts were held by former
CSP officers.2®
While the key role in the sphere of economic development

policy-making was performed by the Secretariat and Planning
Commission, public corporations also shared significantlyinover-
all policy formation. There were 33 public corporations in
Bangladesh. Of the 33 chairmen or managing directors of these
corporations, 11 were former CSP officers, 2were police officers,
one was aformer Professor of Engineering who had been work¬
ing as head of several corporations since the mid-1960s, and the
rest belonged to former central and other services. The chair¬
manships or managing directorships of important corporations—
Power Development Borad, Water Development Board, Agricul¬
tural Development Corporation, Textile Mills Corporation, and
Small Industries Corporation were mostly held by former CSP
o f fi c e r s .
Former CSP officers alsocame to dominate the administration

at Division and District levels. In three out of four Divisions,
Divisional Commissioners wereformer CSP officers. In 12 of 19
districts, the Deputy Commissioners were former CSP officers.
The elite civil servants of Bangladesh, who began to domi¬
nate the economic policy-making bodies as well as the adminis¬
trative system were the lineal discendants of the Civil Service of
Pakistan, with all of the values and orientations this implied.^®
Under the genera! guidance of advisors like Dr. M.N. Huda (in
charge of the Ministry of Planning), A.K.M. Hafizuddin (in
charge of the Ministry of Industries until he resigned on health
grounds on July 12, 1977), Kazi Anwarul Huq(in charge of the
Ministry of Rural Development and Co-operatives), Azizul Huq
(in charge of the Ministry of Agriculture) all of whom were con¬
nected with development policy of the former united Pakistan—
the former C.S.P. officers developed aclear and unambiguous
development strategy for Bangladesh. This strategy discarded the
socialistic pretensions of the Mujib regime.
The development strategy adopted by the Zia regime followed
the model of the Ayub Khan government in encouragement of
private enterprise, in emphasison export-oriented industries within
the private sector, and in the boosting of exports through private
foreign trade. The additional dimension that the new strategy had
over the strategy of the Ayub model was the greater emphasis on
agricultural production, through large-scale government subsidies
and heavily village-oriented self-help development programmes
with which General Zia identified himself. The development policy
also seriously attacked what General Zia rightly called the num¬
ber one problem facing the nation, the population explosion.
Geaeral Zia’s Regime 211
Private foreign and indigenous traders already entered into

the formerly nationalised jute trade. Some of the nationalised
industries,inparticularthemedium-sizeones,weregiventopri¬
vate entrepreneurs. The ceiling of Taka 30 million fixed by the
Mujib government for private investment was raised to Taka 100
million. To attract foreign investment, the government announc¬
ed apolicy of non-nationalisation and tax holidays for all new
industriesandhomeremittancesofnetprofitsbyforeigncom¬
panies.
^Theeffectofthesepolicieswasamarkedimprovementinthe
private sector. As against the total investment of Taka 200.9
million in the two financial years of 1973-74 and 1974-75, there
was atotal private investment of Taka 850.9 million in 1975-76.
On November 27, 1976 the Bank of Credit and Commerce Inter¬
national,aninternationalbankprimarilyownedbytheArabs,
openeditsbranchinDacca.Accordingtopressreports,foreign
investors from Japan, South Korea, Thailand, U.S.A., U' . K . .
India and Pakistan began to show considerable interest in
Bangladesh.
The government launched amassive programme of manual
diggingandexcavationofcanals,andthebuildingofroadsand
embankments under aFood for Work Project (FWP) of the Uni¬
ted Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In return for
labour used to move large quantities of earth, the otherwise u n -
employed are given three seers (a seer is about 2tbs.) of wheat in
return for 70 cubic feet of earthmoving work. The wheat comes
through UNDPfrom the surplus stocks of affluent nations. By
November 1976, 2,200 mites of embankment and 900 miles of
roadhadbeenconstructedand2,200milesofnewcanalsexcavat¬
ed under the FWP programme. The rationale for FWP is that
the greatest assets of underdeveloped countries are its millions of
unemployedandunderemployedwhocanbeprofitablyemployed
in building anational infrastructure with minimum capital
outlay.
The government has been promoting agricultural production
through large-scale subsidies to the agriculturists, in the form of
aprice guarantee scheme, supply of credit, and subsidies o n
modern inputs like seeds and high-yielding varieties of wheat
and rice, fertilisers, pesticides and irrigation facilities. The
212TheBangladeshRevolutionandItsAftermath
governmenthasappointed12,000familyplanningofficersto
popularisethefamilyplanningprogramme.Accordingtopress
reportseventheruralpopulaceisrespondingpositivelytothis
latter programme.
Coupled with good harvests during two successive years
(1974-75
and
1975-76)
and
the
fairly
effective
checking
of
smuggling
across the border (largely due to aloss of patronage for smug¬
glersbypowerfulcirclesintheformerMujibgovernment),the
cumulative effect of current government policies has been some
improvementintheBangladesheconomyasawhole.Boththe
AnnualReportsoftheBangladeshBankandtheWorldBank
reveal that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose by 11.4 per cent
in197576asaganist2precentintheprecedingyear.Industrial
outputincreasedby5percentduringthissameperiod.Forthe
first time since liberation, production in the all-important jute
industrywentupby7.3percentin1975-76.Improvingtrends
in the economy continued in the financial years 1975 77 and
1977-78.29
Aself-reliant Bangladesh is still adistant prospect. The year¬
lytradedeficitisestimatedatover1,000milliondollarswhich
hastobemadeupbyforeignloansandgrants.^®Sinceagricul¬
ture,whichcontributes60percenttoGDP,isstillmainlyde¬
pendentonthevagariesofnature,amajorfailureofcropsdueto
natural calamities in any single year would bring about anear¬
collapse of the economy.
Accordingtomanyeconomists,Bangladeshcandevelopa
largelyself-relianteconomybytheendofthecenturyonlythro¬
ughtheimplementation(andnotmereproclamation)ofacare¬
fullyandcomprehensivelydrawnperspectiveplan(heavilyorient¬
edtowardsagriculturaldevelopmentandagainstanypopulation
explosion)forthenext20to30years.®'Whatisofcriticalimpor¬
tance,therefore,isthedevelopmentofastablepoliticalsystem
capableofcarryingthroughsuchaperspectiveplaninthenext
quartercentury.Politicaldevelopmentis,intheultimateanaly¬
sis,thekeytotheeconomicviabilityofBangladesh.
Zia’s Policy of Political Development
As Edward Feit has argued, the military-bureaucracy coalition
regime can force only ashort-term “cohesion without consen-
Geaeral Zia’s Regans 213
sus.*’32 Such acohesion of the polity can hardly inspire sustained

mass mobilisation either for economic developmeni or political
institution building. It is no wonder that the most recent empiri¬
cal researches on the performance of military regimes have shown
negative or zero order correlations between the presence of
officer-politicians and economic growth or progressive political
change.'*® And Dankwart Rustow concludes, ‘‘the ultimate suc¬
cess of amilitary regime depends on its skill in allowing or pro¬
moting the rise of effective civilian leadership.”®'*
What policy of civilianisation has Zia been following? It
seems that Zia has been acutely aware of the necessity of aself-
sustaining political process. He, however, started very cautious¬
ly and thrashed out gradually his political programme partly in
response to the developments within the armed forces and part¬
ly in consonance with the degree of political base that he could
establish.
Khandokar Mushtaq Ahmed as well as Justice A.M. Sayem

as Presidents pledged that political parties would be allowed to
function from August 1976 and fresh elections would be held in
February 1977. As August 1976 approached, politicians began to
come out with differing statements about the wisdom of hold¬
ing elections in February 1977. The leaders of some of the pro-
Peking leftists—the Bangladesh Sammobadi Dal, the United
Peoples’ Party,®5 the Bangladesh Communist Party (Marxist-
Leninist)—argued that the main task before the nation was to
develop united resistance movements against “Indian expansion¬
ism and hegemonism abetted by Social Imperialism.” According
to these parties, election campaigns would only divide the nation
providing the ‘‘Indian expansionists” an opportunity to fish in
troubled waters.
Maulana Bhashani, until his sudden death on November 17,
1976, also argued against holding elections and urged a“national
movement of resistance.” Khandokar Mushtaq Ahmed and his
associates (who later formed the Democratic League) and the
Islamic rightist parties thought that the current anti-Indian wave
would work in their favour and argued that only agovernment
representative of the people could fight the menace of the Indian
threat. The Awami League and pro-Moscow Communist forces
maintained aprudent silence on the question of elections.
Since President Sayem was insistent on having elections held
on the date pledged, the army leaders at first decided to hold
eleciions under ‘‘the rules of game” framed by them. Consequ¬
ently, the President promulgated the Political Parties Regulation
(FPR) which provided that before political parties could resume
the first phase of politics—indoor politics—they would have to
gettheirprogrammesapprovedbythegovernment.®*Theearly
hopesoftheenthusiasticrank-and-fileoftherightistforcesfaded
awayastheformerIslamicpartiesandthefollowersofKhando-
kar Mushtaq Ahmed failed to evolve acommon platform, prim-
a i ilybecauseofaclashofpersonalitiesamongthetopleaders.
As many as 60 political groups submitted their application to
get a“licence” to operate as political parties and 21 of them
(includingtheAwamiLeague)receivedgovernmentpermission
to operate. There was tittle difference among the programmes
submitted to the government by different parties, since all of
themthoughtitappropriatetoadvocatethemoderateeconomic
policiesalreadyfollowedbythegovernment.Thehardcoreofthe
military elite (Zia and other senior officers of the armed forces)
decided in November 1976 not to hold national elections,
largelybecauseofpressuresontheborderandsubversiveactivi¬
ties among some of the leaders of the Awami League who were
trying to arouse emotions by reviving “the cult of Sheikh
Mujib”atindoormeetingsofpartyworkers.Themilitaryelite
suggestedthatthehostilegovernmentofIndiraGandhimighten¬
courageALleaderstocreateviolenceatthetimeofelectionsand
withadegreeofdissidencestillprevailingamongthearmedfor-
ces. the military regime might not be able to control the situation,
Elections were thus postponed because, an early election
might jeopardise national unity and solidarity. K h a n d o k a r
IVIushtaqAhmedandhisassociatesbecameparticularlybitterover
thepostponementoftheelections.Mushtaqreportedlybeganto
contact army officers coming from his own district (Comilla)
and aminority of other top leaders of the armed forces favour¬
ablydisposedtowardshim.Zia,however,movedswiftlyagainst
Mushtaq’s manoeuvres. In order to by-pass the vacillating Pre¬
sidentSayem,ZiahimselftookoverthepowersofChiefMartial
Law Administrator on November 30, 1976, leaving President
Sayem with only ceremonial functions (hitherto Zia had been
only of the three Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators

along with the two other Service Chiefs). On the same day Mush-
taq and 10 other political leaders were arrested for “prejudicial
activities against the state.”®^
Although Zia suppressed the JSD attempt to bring about a
communist revolution and later forestalled the bid of the “Ma¬
jors” of August 15 coup for afresh takeover, he could not be
sure about his grip on the army which had produced the “genie
of Sepoy Revolt”. In the first year after Movember 7, 1975, Zia
concentrated his attention on consolidating his position within
the army. By the end of 1976, the army seemed to have o v e r -
come the fissures produced in it by coups and counter-coups and
to be united under Zia. The move taken by Zia to postpone
general elections and his assumption of the office of Chief Martial
Law Administrator (CMLA) were not challenged by any section
of the armed forces. This encouraged Zia to take over as Presi-
dent of Bangladesh on April 21, 1977, succeeding President
Sayem, who had resigned earlier on “grounds failing health.”®®
In his nationwide radio and television address on April 22,
1977, President Zia pledged that general elections on the basis of
adult franchise would be held in December 1978. President Zia
also told the nation:
“I and my government believe in full democracy and are de¬

termined to restore the government of the elected representa¬
tives of the people in due time.”®*
This was the first public and personal commitment of Zia

about restoration of democracy. Zia in his address also anno¬
unced that he would seek peoples’ consent on his assumption of
the office of President through areferendum under universal
adult franchise to be held on May 30, 1977. He promised that
certain fundamental principles and provisions of the Constitu¬
tion® against which ‘‘there is muchresentmentamong the people”
would be amended. The amendments, by way of aPresidential
proclamation, came almost instantaneously and included the
following: (a) dispensing with “secularism” as afundamental
principle of the Constitution and its substitution by “absolute
trust and faith in Almighty Allah”; (b) defining socialism, ano¬
ther fundamental principle of the Constitution, as “meaning eco-
nomic and social justice”; (c) guaranteeing that there will be no

nationalisation, acquisition or requisition of private property
without compensation; (d) the addition of clauses in the Fun¬
damental Principles of State Policy, seeking solidarity with Mus¬
lim states, the promotion of local government institutions and
the participation of women in national affairs.'*^
On April 30, 1977, Zia announced his 19-point progarmme
which included the constitutional amendments he had already
effected and policies like promotion of the private sector, achiev¬
ing self-sufficiency in food, strengthening the rural economy,
and checking the population explosion.4- Having announced his
programme, Zia launched a4-week mass contact tour throughout
the country, during which he addressed 60 public meetings and
innumerable wayside gatherings, preaching mainly his ideas of
rural development and self-help.
In the referendum held on May 30, 1977, the country’s 38
million electorate were asked only one question: ‘‘Do you have
confidence in President Major General Ziaur Rahman and in
the policies and programmes enunciated by him ?” Almost all
political parties, representing all shades of opinion, came out
publicly for Zia. Their workers in the villages were instructed
to return averdict in favour of Zia. The Awami League main¬
tained silence, but the pro-Moscow CP and pro-Moscow NAP
directed their members to participate in the referendum. The
only party that opposed the referendum was the JSD. While
its entire leadership was in jail, the younger cadres of JSD
placed posters on the walls in Dacca and in some other places,
dubbing the referendum as ‘‘political bluff”.
The JSD-affiliated Students League organised processions
on the Dacca University Campus, protesting against the holding
of areferendum. The Students League also planned to create
disturbances in Dacca on the day of referendum, but even so
the referendum was smoothly conducted by civil officers in Dacca
and all over the country and the police and the army were not
deployed to prevent possible disturbances.
When the results of the referendum were announced, they
seemed hardly credible. The final tabulation showed an un¬
precedented 88.5 per cent turnout of voters and a98.88 per cent
affirmative vote for Zia.''^ The Economist (London) dubbed
thereferendum“electoraloverkill”andobserved;“Luckilyfor
PresidentZia,Bangladeshdoesnothaveamilitantopposition
tocarrytheBhuttoparallelanyfuriher.”^*Withinthecountry,
JSD-sponsoredleafletsasked;
“When turnout of voters in crucial elections like the 1970
general elections was 57.69 per cent, how can one believe
that 88.5 per cent of the voters cast their votes in the
referendum
Obviously, Zia wanted to give his rule an aura of legitimacy

throughthereferendum.Buttheinflatedfiguresreleasedbythe
government weakened the referendum as alegitimising device.
Itbecamejustoneofthose‘‘99percentapprovals”usually
procured by military dictators. This is not to deny the massive
popularity r)f Zia when the referendum took place. Most
Bangladeshis, tired of political disorder and uncertainty after
1971,feltrelievedwhenZia,seenasanhonestandstrongman,
tookoverasPresident.AsTheStatesman(Calcutta) w r o t e i n
an editorial:
“There is no warrant for the belief that the vote would not
have gone unmistakably in General Zia’s favour if freedom
of choice had been presented in more convincing fashion
there is no alternative to his rule that is both obvious and
widely acceptable.”***
Instead of being complacent over the result of the referen¬

dum, Zia worked steadily to build apolitical base for himself.
First he tried to win over the rural elite in favour of his regime
and its developmental philosophy. Elections at the village level
were held in January 1977. Zia met the newly-elected chairmen
of all the Union Councils (numbering 4362) in conferences in
Dacca. He impressed upon them that the developmental pro¬
cess in the villages where “Bangladesh lives”, could be accela-
rated only by involving people at the levels of planning and
implementation. The government soon granted the Union Coun¬
cils more powers including the allotment of “excess” lands
to cultivators. The honorarium of each chairman was raised
from Taka 100 to Taka 3000 per month. The government c o m -
pletedaprogrammeoftrainingUnionCouncilchairmentoplan
and carry on developmental work in the villages. Some of the
chairmen were sent to countries like Japan, North Korea and
Iran to gain first-hand knowledge about agricultural and rural
development processes in those countries.
The government also arranged atraining programme in
Urban development for the chairmen and members of the
municipalbodieselectedinAugust1977.AnewMuktiJoddha
Sangsad(FreedomFightersAssociation)wasorganisedunder
thepatronageofZiawhopromisedtoredressthe“neglectofthe
freedom fighters in the past.”
Zia could hardly be oblivious of student power in Bangla-
desh politics. He sanctioned Taka 40 million for a w o r k
company”programmetocreateinterestamongthestudentsin
He also made
‘‘development and social service activities,
liberal grants to social and cultural organisations in the localities
he visited.
In the middle of 1977 many observers thought that Zia had
But
n o w set the stage for floating apolitical party of his own.
he realised that aparty launched by him would be much smaller
than the broad platform he needed to lead the nation. While he
encouraged his Vice-President, Justice Abdus Sattar,'*’ to orga-
nise anew party, he exchanged views with leaders of each of the
political parties about the future shape of Bangladesh politics
in aseries of informal meetings.
At first Zia pinned much hope on Ataur Rahman Khan, an
elder politician who had been Chief Minister of East Pakistan in
1956-58, as afuture political comrade. But the two leaders dif¬
fered strongly on the form of government most suitable for
Bangladesh. Ataur Rahman Khan argued that, since the people
had some experience of aparliamentary form of government, it
had agreater chance of success than any other form of Western
democracy. Zia, on the other band, argued that as the country’s
politics had always been ridden with factionalism, aDe Gaulle-
type of government would provide much-needed governmental
stability.
Some of the pro-Peking leftists indicated to Zia that they
would join hands with him to defeat the AL and pro-Moscow
leftists. The Muslim League and orthodox Islamic party leaders
also thought it prudent to strengthen the hands of Zia against

“the pro-Indian” AL. These leaders, however, insisted on the
maintaining of separate identities of theirown political parties.
This led Zia to think of forming a“political front” consisting
of anumber of political parties including the one to be launched
by Justice Sattar under his ‘‘inspiration’’.
While political realignment were taking place informally de¬
velopments within the armed forces served to speed up the proc¬
ess. In September 1977, rumour spread in the cantonments that
new scales of pay proposed by the Pay and Services Commission
for the armed forces had been heavily weighted in favour of the
officers and that the interests of the jawans (privates) had been
neglected. This rumour created dissatisfaction among the jawans
and various politicised groups within the armed forces tried to
utilise the sentiments of the jawans for their own political ends.
In the third week of September 1977, when all attention of
the government was on the Japanese Red Army terrorists who
had hijacked aJapan Air Lines plane and landed at Dacca Air¬
port, adisaffected section of the army thought that the moment
was opportune to strike at the Zia regime. In the early morning
of September 30, 1977, atiny section of the jawans of the can¬
tonment at Bogra urged the rest of the privates to join them in
arevolt against the government. The response to the rebels call
was very poor, but in the melee three officers were killed and
three others were injured. The rebels then went out of the cant¬
onment to Bogra Town, broke open the jail and freed some of
their friends. Later, they looted some shops and went away. A
small report of the Bogra incident was published in Dacca news¬
papers on October 1and many in Dacca ignored the Bogra event
as aminor trouble of akind usual in the Bangladesh armed
forces.
But events on the night of October 2/3 in Dacca showed how

deep and serious had been the dissensions in the armed forces.
On that night, the rebels attacked Zia’s office at martial law
headquarters. They also took control of the Dacca radio station
for ashort time and announced the take over of power through
‘‘an armed revolution by the Army, Air Force, Navy, Students
and Ansars (a para-military force)”. Most of the senior officers
of air force were at Dacca Airport on duty. The Chief of Air
Staffhimselfwasconductingnegotiationswiththehijackers,
The rebels
. entered theAirport building. While the Chief of /Mr
air force offi-
Staff somehow managed to hide himself, 11 senior
cerswerekilledbeforeforcesloyaltothegovernmentarrivedand
overpoweredtherebels.Intheconfrontationbetweentherebels
andloyaltroops,severalhundredmenwerekilledinDaccaCan¬
tonment. Although the coup attempt lasted only afew hours
it almost toppled the government. 11 air force officers killed
werepilotofficerandtheresultwasavirtualgroundingofair
forceplanes.Inhisaddresstothenationsoonafterthesuppres¬
sionoftherevolt,PresidentZiaaskedfortheco-operationofthe
people “at this critical hour of the country and the Armed
” 4 8
Forces.
It is difficult to determine the identity and political philoso¬
phyofthegroupwhichattemptedthecoup.Therehadbeen
at least three identifiable groups in the armed forces since
GeneralZia’stake-overonNovember7,1975—onegroupsolidly
behind Zia, another that identified with the “Majors” who killed
Sheikh Mujib and his family and finally, athird belonging to
theundercoverBiplobiShainikSangsthas(AssociationsofRevo¬
lutionary Soldiers) affiliated to JSD. Since the rebels in Bogra
raised slogans in favour of Major Faruk, one of the “Majors
of August 15, 1975 coup who had just returned from Libya
incognitoandhadbeentriedandjailedbytheZiagovernment,
theBograincidentmighthavebeentheworkofthe“Majors”
group.ButtheabortivecoupinDaccaseemedtohavebeenled
bytheBiplobiShainikSangsthas(BSS).TheBSSspreadthe
philosophyofthe“peoples’army,withthejawansastheultimate
arbiters.”Theymanagedtoachievesomeinfluenceamongthe
sergeantsandsergeant-majorswhoarethebackboneofthenon¬
officer ranks. The abortive coup was led by an airforce sergeanL
major.Therebelsurgedonlythejawanstocomeoutintheir
support.Alltheseindicatedthatthecoupattemptmighthave
been instigated by the JSD.'*®
Although Zia owed his life and office to asimilar revolt on
November 7, 1975, he could now easily see the dangers of a
systeminwhichthejawansweretheultimatearbiters.The
officers had been the main targets of the jawans in both the
Sepoyrevolts.TheofficersnowpressedZiatospeedupthe
process of civilianisatioii of the regime and to keep the armed

forces out of political embroilments. When Zia invited the leaders
of the political parties for consultation on the situation in the
armed forces, the political leaders called for open politics and
50
use of political means for dealing with political questions.
The response of Zia to the abortive coup was varied. The
immediate punitive action was terrible and swift. Several hundred
men were tried by secret military tribunals and more than 250
were shot or hanged. Amajor reshuffle of the army command
was carried out. Major General Shaukat, G.O.C., 9division,
Dacca and Major General Manzur, Chief of General Staff—the
two aspirants for the post of Chief of Army Staff—were shifted
to other commands out of Dacca. Major General Dastagir, Chief
of Bangladesh Rifles (the border security force) was retired and
51
given adiplomatic post abroad.
Zia instructed all officers that his name should be prefixed
by “President” rather than “Major-General” for all purposes.
The posts of Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator were
abolished. The incumbent Chiefs of Air and Naval Staffs were
asked either to retire from their military posts or resign from the
Council of Advisors. The Chief of Naval Staff chose to keep
his post in the Navy. The Chief of Air Staff retired from air force
and remained in the Council of Advisors. When eight senior
air force ground officers were passed ever in appointing apilot
officer as the Chief of Air Staff, all of the former resigned from
the air force.
Thirteen active men (younger than the incumbent Advisors)

with political interests were appointed as members of the Council
of Advisors. They were given minor portfolios and were advised
by Zia to help Vice-President Justice Abdus Sattar in launching
anew political party. Zia himself announced publicly in the
Victory Day speech on December 16, 1977, that he would shortly
be forming a“political front” to contest the forthcoming elections.
In the last week of February 1978, Vice-President Justice
Abdus Sattar launched anew political party—Jado Gana-
tantric Dal (National Democratic Party). Of the 16 members of
the central convening committee of Jatio Ganatantric Dal
(JGD), 13 were recently appointed members of the Council of
Advisors. Of the remaining 3, one was ayoung barrister recently
elected as the Chairman of Dacca Municipality and 2others

were political unknowns.®^ Aformer President of the Supreme
Court Bar Association and current President of Bangladesh-China
Friendship Society, some prominent lawyers and doctors, one
former Minister and another former Minister of State of the
Mujib Cabinet, some industrialists and atrade union leader
were soon included in the convening committee,®*
As expected, the manifesto of JGD advocated apresidential
form of government with anational assembly having exclusive
legislative power. The manifesto also envisaged aPrime Minister
and Ministers to help the President in his executive functions. In
the economic field, the nationalisation was to be confined to
heavy industries only, with encouragement of private enterprise
in all other industrial fields. The manifesto also emphasised
agricultural and rural development.®**
On April 18. an Election Ordinance was proclaimed by the
President providing rules and regulations for the presidential elec¬
tion. On April 21, President Zia announced that this would be held
on the basis of adult franchise on June 3, 1978 and the necessary
constitutional amendment would be effected through Martial Law
Proclamations. Restrictions on political parties were withdrawn
with effect from May 1, 1978.
Soon the nation became divided into two political camps. One
was called Nationalist Front (NF)and consisted of six political par¬
ties—the newly-formed JGD, NAP (pro-Peking), United Peoples’
Party (front organisation of BCPL), Bangladesh Muslim League,
Scheduled Caste Federation and Bangladesh Labour Party. The
other camp was named Democratic United Front (DUF) and com¬
posed of Bangladesh Awami League, NAP (pro Moscow), Janata
(led by General. M.A.G. Usmani). Two very small parties, Bang¬
ladesh Peoples League and Gono Azadi League, also joined the
Democratic United Front.
The one-month period available for campaigning was fully uti¬

lised by the two fronts. Both Zia and General Usmani. chosen as
candidates by NF andDUF respectively, addressed public meetings
in all the major cities and towns. In his campaign speeches Usmani
stated repeatedly that his sole purpose in contesting the election
was to secure the restoration of parliamentary democracy and rule
of law in the country. Zia’s campaign themes were several. He
stressed Bangladesh nationalism and condemned all forces having

inspiration from alien sources. He promised to establish “stable
democracy” which would guarantee economic progress. He remind¬
ed the people of the 1974 famine and alleged that the AL leaders,
while in power, had made Bangladesh aclient state, drained out
the resources of the country and unleashed areign of terror.
Besides the political parties in theNF, former members of Jaraa-
at-i-lslami who formed anew political party, the Islamic Demo¬
cratic League (IDL), also supported Zia“ as did the Sammobadi
Dal and East Bengal Communist Party.®’ With their senior leaders
in jail, the junior leaders of JSD at first took the stand that an
election under aMartial Law regime was ameaningless exercise.
But as the election fever rose high, they gave negative support to
Zia by asking the voters not to strengthen the AL.®®
Afew small parties formed athird Front under the leadership
of Ataur Rahman Khan. Initially this Front announced aboycott
of the elections on the ground that presidential form of government
had been thrust upon the nation. Later, the Front leaders urged
the voters not to support the Awami League leaders who had “kil¬
led” democracy in Bangladesh.®® The Mukti Joddha Sangsad (Free¬
dom Fighter’s Association), the Ulema (persons educated in ortho¬
dox Islamic education), business and trade associations—all active¬
ly supported Zia.
According to the figures released by the Election Commission,
53.59 per cent of the registered voters voted in the presidential
elections. Of the total votes cast, Zia secured 76.67 per cent and
Usmanigot 21.70 per cent. The remaining 1.63 per cent votes went
to eight other politically nondescript candidates.®® At apress con¬
ference held after the elections Usmani complained about malprac¬
tices resorted to by the supporters of President Zia but accepted
the results by stating that he would not demand fresh elections.®^
Formal legitimacy for the regime had now been won and Zia
soon formed a28-man Cabinet.®® Sixteen Ministers of the Cabinet
were former members of the Council of Advisors. Some of the old
and senior Advisors were considered to be “indispensable techno¬
crats”. Some of the younger Advisors were made members
of the Cabinet as they now belonged to Jatio Ganatantric
Dal(JGD). One business executive was also brought into the
Cabinet. The political affiliations of the other members of the
Cabinet were as follows: 3-NAP (pro-Peking), 2-Muslim League,

1-ScheduIed Caste Federation, 2-UPP, 3-JGD-Mashiur Rahman,
the 54-year old president of the NAP (pro-Peking), was desig¬
nated as the Senior Member of the Cabinet, with the status of
P r i m e M i n i s t e r. ® *
Soon after the presidential elections, the Awami League be¬

came formally split into two separate organisations. Agroup of
AL leaders and workers separated themselves from the major
section of the party accusing the latter of still upholding the “phi¬
losophy of one-party system introduced by Sheikh Mujib but
rejected by the nation.”®* The DUF was also dissolved leaving,
Usmani to head his own small party. While his opponents be¬
came fragmented, Zia worked to integrate his support through
amerger of the Constituent units of the Nationalist Front into
one broad-based political party. The JGD, formed with Zia’s
blessings, and Scheduled Caste Federation readily agreed and
Zia was also able to win over the major part of NAP (pro-
Peking) and asizeable section of the ML. In early September
1978, Zia launched his new political party—Bangladesh Nation¬
alist Party (BNP).®®
An indefatigable campaigner, Zia again toured the length
and breadth of Bangladesh for several months soliciting votes for
his party candidates in the assembly elections in February 1979.
As shown in Table 9, the elections held on February 18, 1979
gave BNP an overwhelming majority of seats.
Nevertheless it secured only about 44 per cent of votes cast.
Its nearest rival AL (major faction) procured 25 per cent of votes
polled. The rest of the votes went to minor parties (31 political
parties of various types contested in the elections) and indepen¬
dent candidates. All the opposition parties accused the govern¬
ment of rigging the elections. The AL (major faction) called for
amass movement against the Zia government with aview to cre¬
ating asituation similar to the anti-Bhutto agitation that erupt¬
ed in Pakistan after 1977 elections. There was, however, no pub¬
lic response.
Looking at the official figures one can detect apattern of
voting in both presidential and legislative assembly elections. As
stated above, in the presidential elections Usmani supported by
Conclusion 225
ALand pro-Moscow parties received 21.70 per cent of votes cast.

In the assembly elections the votes secured by the major faction
of AL were 25 per cent of the total. The two elections thus seem¬
ed to indicate that some one quarter of the electorate were still
steady supporters of AL. BNP’s 44 per cent compares poorly
Ta b l s 9
number of seats contested, won and percentage

OF VOTES SECURED BY POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE NATION¬
AL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS HELD IN FEBRUARY 1979
Name of the party No. of Seats No. of Seats Percentage
contested Won o f Vo t e s
Secured
BNP 298 207 44

AL (Major Faction) 295 39 25
ML-IDL 265 20 8
AL (Minor Faction) 183 2 2

JSD 240 8 6
Other parties 419 8 6

Independents 425 16 9
To t a l s 2125 300 100
Sources: For no. of seats contested: Bangladesh Today (Fortnightly, Ban¬

gladesh High Commission, London, February 15, 1979).
For no. of seats won: Dainik Bangla (Dacca, March 8,1979).
Percentage of votes :Derived from the constituency-wise results
publshed in Janomat (Bengali Weekly, London, March 4and
March 11, 1979).
with 76.67 per cent gained by Zia for presidency mainly because
the parties (ML, IDL, .TSD and the pro-Peking groups) which had
given negative support for Zia to prevent the AL-backed candi¬
date from winning the presidential elections, fought the assembly
elections separately. Some of the large number of independent
candidates may also have lent support to Zia in the presidential
elections.
But more significant was another trend reflected in the voting

result—a general decline in the politicisation of the people. 57.69
per cent and 55 per cent respectively of total voters Imd turned
out to vote in the 1970 and 1973-elections. Butin the presiden-
tial elections in 1978 and in the assembly elections in 1979 the

percentage dropped to 53-59 and 50-94 respectively.*® According
to both domestic and foreign observers, there had not been
much public interest or enthusiasm in the assembly elections.
As Crane Brinton observes, every revolution has its Thermi-
dor. After enduring the extreme strains and stresses of revolu¬
tionary fever people tend to become apathetic towards politics
and settle for peaceful stability.*’ It seemed that by early 1979
the Bangladesh revolution had reached the stage of Thermidor-
ean reaction. Though it may sound paradoxical, this post-revo¬
lution depoliticisation can led either to despotism or apolitically
constructive period. The rise of Cromwell, Bonaparte and Stalin
in the wake of revolutions in England, France and Russia res¬
pectively provides the disheartening examples.
An imaginative statesman of apresent-day third world coun¬
try can, however, make use of the Thermidorean period for poli¬
tical institution building. In developing countries, the break¬
down of political institutions is caused not by the apathy of the
common folk but by the over-politicisation of the politically
relevant section of the people. As the only values respected in
developing countries are those generated by political authority,*®
and as political power is the lever for economic power in these
lands of scarcity, the politically relevant section of the people
in such states carry on Hobbesian struggle for political power.
This constant and bitter scramble impedes the steady growth of
political institutions.
Acertain degree of depoliticisation of the people can thus be
conducive to the development of durable political institutions.
Fortunately for Bangladesh, Zia seemed to show possession of
that particular double vision which enables apolitical leader to
combine and balance short-run imperatives of political survival
with long-term development of political institutions. But how
long can the Thermidor last in acountry like Bangladesh with
abject poverty and hungry millions to feed ?
NOTES
1. See Henry Bienen, “Military Rule and Political Process: Nigerian

Example,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 10, No. 2, January 1978, pp.
205-225 ;Henry Bienen and Martin Fitton, “Soldiers, Politicians
and Civil Servants,” in Keith Panter-Brick, Soldiers and Oil: The
Political Transformation of Nigeria (London, Frank Cass, 1978), pp.
27-57.
2. See, for example, Lucian W. Pye,‘‘Armies in the Process of Political

Modernisation”, in John J. Johnson (ed.). The Role of the Military
in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, Princeton University Press,
1962), pp. 69-89.
3. The bio-data of the members of the Council of Advisors were
published in Bichitra Barsha Patra: Bangladesh ’77 (Year-end issue
ofBichitra; Bangladesh ’77) (Dacca, Dainik Bangla Prakashani,
1977),pp. 42-48. The Advisors were given the rank of Ministers and
the President allocated responsibilities of Ministries and divisions
among them.
4. See ‘‘Farakka may be Internationalised,” Holiday, February 15,1976.
5. Even aRussian expert. Dr. Valery A, Krashininnikov (Deputy Direc¬
tor, Institute of Geology of the US.S.R Academy of Science), main¬
tained that the continuous interference in the normal flow of the
Ganges water would upset the ecological balance of the Ganges-
Brahmaputra Basin and the eastern parts of the Indian Ocean, and
the cumulative effects of diversion of the Ganges water on Bangla¬
desh would be disastrous. Sec The Bangladesh Times (Dacca), March
31,1976.
6. See General Zia’s budget speech, The Ittefaq, June 27, 1976.
7. For the 12-point demand of the jawans, see L.awrence Lifschullz,
“Bangladesh: The Crisis has not passed”. Far Eastern Economic
Review, December 5, 1975, p. 33.
8. Excepting Major Syed Faruk Rahman and M.ajor Khandokar Abdur
Rashid, other “Mujib killers” were later rehabilitated in various
diplomatic assignments. See Patriot (New Delhi), August 18, 1976. In
early January 1977, Major Syed Faruk Rahman flew back to Dacca
via Bangkok incognitio, possibly to attempt another coup against
General Zia. Major Rahman Was aircstcd by the officers of the
Defence Forces’ Intelligence at the Dacca Airport. He Was later tried
by aSpecial Martial Law Court and was given five years imprison-
ment for impersonation, possession of unauthorised arms and papers
prejudicial to the security of state. Major Rashid is till at large
abroad.
9. A.ir Vice-Marshal M.K. Bashar replaced Tawab as Chief of Air

Force. Bashar later died on September 1,1976 in an air accident and
Air-Vice Marshal A.G. Mahmood, 42, was appointed Chief of
Air Force. Mahmood had his training in the Pakistan Air Force Staff
College and attended air force training courses in the U.S.A. He Was
an active participant in Indo-Pak war in 1965.
10. The Economist (London), September 25, 1976,reported on the trials:
“The adverse publicity in the West over the trials has stung the
regime which clearly had not expected it. Asenior officer snapped
angrily to this correspondent: ‘The Courts are too lenient and open
to exploitation by these people.’ But one man who attended the
first trial claimed that most of the evidence presented was so thin
and suspect that it would have been embarrassing to the regime
) >
if made public.
11. The JSD also failed in its eftbrts to organise amassive public protest
When Serajul Alam Khan (regarded as the main brain of JSD), Who
had been tried in absentia, was arrested on November 26, 1976. Kamal
Haider, the leader of one faction of the Sarbohara Party was arrest-
ted on December 6,1976.
12. According to Bangladesh press reports, from January to Novem¬
ber (1976), the “miscreants” (presumably the armed wings of the
JSD, Sarbohara Party, and Mujibites) killed about 409 persons,
mostly in rural areas, the victims being mainly Union Council
Chairmen and members, and Wealthy peasants. According to the
reports, the law-enforcing authorities arrested over 1,000 miscreants
and the Summary Martial Law Courts convicted about 600 persons
for “keeping illegal arms, distributing prejudicial literature and sabo¬
tage activities.” The JSD-sponsored leaflets, however, alleged that
the government arrested more than 10,000 political workers and
that the army liquidated some of them without trial.
13. The Joint Communique i.ssued by the conference expressed deep
concern over the problem of equitable distribution of the interna¬
tional river Ganges resulting in the aggravation of economic hardship
and retardation of the process of national reconstruction in Bangla¬
desh, See the Bangladesh Observer May 17, 1976. General 7ia him¬
self led the Bangladesh delegation at the conference.
14. While there could not be any direct reference to the Farakka problem
in the Communique issued after the Summit Conference becau.se of
India’s objection, the sentiments expressed by the Bangladesh leaders
at the conference found their echo in the speeches of leaders like Mrs.
Bandamaikeof Sri Lanka and President Tito of Yugoslavia. See The
Bangladesh Times, August 17, 18, 20, 1976. Although President
Sayem led the delegation at the Colombo Summit Conference General
Zia did the major lobbying at the conference.
15. See Peking Review, No. 8, February 20, 1976, p. 22 and No. 9, Feb¬
ruary 27,1976, p. 21.
16. Peking Review, No. 2, January 7,1977, p. 3.
1 7 . f t W. , p . 4 .
18. For the full text of the Press Communique, see The Bangladesh Times,
January 7, 1977.
19. See full text of the Bangla-Saudi joint communique issued on the
conclusion of General Zia’s visit to Saudi Arabia, The Bangladesh
Times, J\i\y 30, 1977.
Goaeral Zia’s Regime 229
20. Ibid., August 3, 1977. Until his assumption of the office of Presi¬
dentonApril21,1977,GeneralZiahimselflookedaftertheMinis-
Uy of PoreignAffairs, although the Ministry Was formally under
PresidentSayem.OnMarch25,1977,ProfessorMuhammad
bhamsulHuq,67,WasappointedAdvisorinchargeofForeign
Affairs.ProfessorHuqWasformerVice-Chancellor,Universityof
Rajshahi,1965-1969.HeWasMinisterofEducationintheYahya
Cabinet,1969-1971.Heistheauthorofseveralinternationally
known works on Education and Development.
21. Holiday, April 24, 1977.
22. See K.P. Misra, ‘The Farakka Accord”, World Today, Voi.34,No.2,
February, 1978.
23. The Bangladesh Times, Juno 11, 1977; New Herald (New Delhi),
August 2, 1977.
24. See Henry Bienen with Martin Fitton, Soldiers, Politicians
99
and
Civil Servants, in Keith Panter-Brick, op.cit., pp. 28-29.
25. From 1949 to 1970, 191 CSPofficers Were recruited from East
Bengal,180ofthemarenowWorkingforthePeople’sRepublic
ofBangladesh.See,GradationListoftheEx-CivilServiceofPakistan
{Correcteduptothe15thJune1976),GovernmentofthePeople’s
RepublicofBangladesh,CabinetSecretariat,EstablishmentDivision,
SectionS-m.TWoCSPofficerswerekilledbythePakistanArmy
duringtheliberationwar.Someofthetopmostcivilservants—Shafiul
Azam,formerChiefSecretary,“EastPakistan”government,beingthe
mostprominentamongthemwhoWoredismissedbytheSheikhMujib
government for “collaboration” with the Pakistan Army, ware reinstated
aftertheAugust15coup.ThenumberofBengaliofficersformerlyin
otherCentralServicesofPakistanandnowinBangladeshgovernment
service was approximately 265 in 1976.
26.
E.Ahmed, The Role of Bureaucratic Elite in Segmented Economic
Growth: ACase Study of Pakistan and Bangladesh (Ph. D. Thesis
Queen’s University, Kingston, June 1977), p. 401. During the Sheikh
Mujib regime, there were 29 ministries and 47 divisions in the
Secretariat.
27. The Governor of (the State) Bank of Bangladesh is also aformer

CSP officer.
28. Emajuddin Ahmed, who conducted in-depth interviews in January

1976 With 25 senior former CSP officers now serving Bangladesh
government found that there had been little change in the values
and attitudes With 'which these officers Were inculcated ai s mem-
bsrs of the elitist Civil Service of Pakistan. See E. Ahmed I o p , cit..
pp. 408-426.
29. See the speech of Zia on the annual budget, 1977-78. The Bangla¬
desh Times, June 26, 1977. See also the speech of Zia on the annual
budget, 1978-79, lttefaq,5w\y 1, 1978.
230 The Baagladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath
30. Bangladesh received foreign economic assistance to the tune of
4.7 billion US dollars from December 1971 to March 1978. Of this,
2.S billion US dollars was received in the first three years
o v e r
of independence. See the post-budget statement of the Secretary,

External Resources Division in The Azad, July 2, 1978, Also see
A.Lindquist,“MilitaryandDevelopmentinBangladesh”,IDSBulletin,
IX ;1,1977, p. 14.
31. See, for example, R. Reveille, “Possible Futures of Bangladesh”,
Asia,No.29(Spring1973),pp.34-54;J.FaalandandJ.R.Parkinson,
“A Development Perspective for Bangladesh”, Tite Bangladesh
Development Studies, IV. 1(January 1976), pp. 49-66.
32.EdwardFeit,TheArmedBureaucrats:Military-AdministrativeRegimes
and Political Development (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company,
1973), pp. 18-19.
33 See Eric A. Nordlinger, “Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Militaiy
Rule upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western
States”,American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, 1970, pp. 1131-
1148;R.D.McKinlayandA.S.Cohan,“AComparativeAnalysis
of the Political and Economic Performance of Military and Civilian
Regimos: Across National Aggregate Study,” Comparative Poli-
t/cj, Vol.8, 1975,pp.l-30.
34. D. RustoW, “The Military in Middle Eastern Society and Politics
in S.N. Fisher, r/ie Military in the Middle Fajt (Columbus, Ohio State
University Press, 1963), p. 19.
35,TheUnitedPeople’sPartyisthefrontorganisationofBangladesh
Communist Party Leninist (BCPL). For adiscussion on BC'PL see
Chapter VIII, pp. 169-170.
36. The PPR prohibited the formation of any foreign-aided parly,
any underground political activity, and the maintenance of an
armed cadre by any party. The regulation also prohibited the pro¬
pagationofany“personalitycult.”Theregulationrequiredparties
to maintain and operate their funds through ascheduled bank and
subjectfundstoperiodicaudit,ameasureostensiblyintendedto
eliminate funds from undisclosed foreign sources. The PPR also
stipulated that any party that fails to win 10f per cent of the scats
unction as aparlia-
in an election Will automatically cease to
mentarypartyandthatseatsWonbysuchpartiesWillbedeclared
vacantandrecontestedatby-elections.ForthedetailsofthePolitical
PartiesRegulationanditssubsequentamendmentsseeBangladesh
Times, July 29, August 5and October 25, 1976.
37. Mushtaq Was later tried by aMartial Law Court for corruption
and misuse of power while he Was in office and given three years
imprisonment.
38. President Zia continued to hold the offices of Chief Martial LaW
Administrator and Chief of Army Staff.
39. For the Mil text of President Zia’s speech, SCO The Bangladesh Obser¬
ver, A^n\ 23, 1977.
40. The country Was being ruled by Martial Law which gave effective
p o w e r t o C h i e f M a r t i a l L a w A d m i n i s t r a t o r. A C o n s t i t u t i o n W i t h a
presidential form of government had been kept in force since 1975
which made the President the Chief Executive. General Zia’s assump¬
tion of Presidentship brought the authority of governance to asingle
point.
41. For the full text of the Proclamation (Amendment) Order, 1977 see
The Bangladesh 77/ner, April 23, 1977.
42. See The Bangladesh Observer, May 1, 1977.
43. The Bangladesh Times, 1, 1977.
44. The Fconowr/(London), June 4, 1977, p. 80.
45. In the elections held in March 1973 by Sheikh Mujib government,
about 55% of the registered voters cast their votes. The JSD con¬
siders the 1973 election also to have been rigged.
46. The Statesman (Calcutta) Weekly Overseas Edition, June II, 1977.
47. Justice Abdus Sattar, 71, Was appointed as Vice-President by President
Zia on June 3, 1977. Justice Sattar had been amember of Second
Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and Minister of Education, Govern¬
ment of Pakistan, before he Was appointed as aJudge of the High
Court of East Pakistan. In his political life, he had been an associate
of A.K. Fazlul Huq. See The Bangladesh Times, June 4,1977.
48. See The Bangladesh Observer, October 3, 1977. For details of the un¬
successful coup, sec Naya Jug (a Dacca Weekly) October 9, 1977
and The (London) December 24,1977.
49. Bryan Boswell, “Bangladesh: Where the army private is the ‘ultimate
arbiter’ of acountry’s political leadership,” The Australian, October
3,1975.
50. See The Bangladesh Times, Oao\yiV \2,\9n.
51. Sec The Economist, December 24, 1977.
52. See The .4zarf (Dacca), February 24,1978.
53. Sec The /Izarf, March 16, April 17, 1978.
54. For the full text of the manifesto of JGD see TheAzad, March 2, 3
and 4, 1978.
55. For the extensive coverage of speeches of both General Usmani
and President Zia, see The (Dacca),all issues in May, 1978.
56. See, the resolution of the central committee of Islamic Demo¬
cratic Party published in r/ie Azad,May 20, 1978.
57. See text of the statement by Mohammad Toaha, leader of Sammo-
badi Dal in The Azad,May 13, 1978.
58. See the resolution of the JSD-sponsored public meeting in Dacca
published in The Azad, May 22,1978.
59. See text of the statement by Ataur Rahman Khan and other leaders
in The Azad, May 28,1978.
60. The Azad, June 6, 1978.
61. The Azad,]\im 7,1978,

62. The Amd, June 30, 1978.
63. The life-sketches of the Ministers Were published in Ittefaq, Julyl,
1978.
64. See the statement of Mizanur Rahman Clioudhury, loader of the

gioup which forced the split, in Ittefaq, August 13, 1978. As had
been usual With Bangladesh political parties undergoing splits, both
the factions of AL claimed the name of the party.
65. The platform of BNP Was same as that of JGD given above, p. 223.
66. Both figures were officially released by the Election Commission.
See The Azad June 6, 1978 and Dainik Bcmgla, March 9, 1979.
67. See C. Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York, W.W.
Norton &Company Inc. 1938), pp. 244-247.
68. See E. Shils, “The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma:
Their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries”,
World Politics, XI ;2,1958, p. 2.
CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION
Few psopls have paid such ahigh price—in both blood and
gold—forindependenceasBangladeshis.PravdaonJanuary3,
1972 reported that about 3million unarmed Bangladeshis w e r e
killedbyPakistantroopsandtheiragentsin1971.TheTimes,
The Guardian and Le Monde quoted the figure as 1million.' A
professor of Statistics at Rajshahi University in asurvey con¬
ducted among the students of Rajshahi soon after liberation,
found that one in every ten students lost at least one member of
his family.2 Even an impressionistic study suggests that almost
allfamiliesinmostpartsofBangladeshsufferedsomedamage
to property.
But tragedy was only apart of the Bangladesh story. The

year 1971 was also ‘their hnest hour’ in that year. Bangladeshis
added another chapter to the history of “the great efforts of
free human spirit”. They enacted arevolution.
By revolution is here meant, first, the total withdrawal by the
vast majority of the people of their support for “the constituted
government” and secondly, the replacement of that government,
thusdeniedlegitimacy,bymeansofamassarmedupheaval.
Broadlyspeaking,revolutionsareoftwotypes.Whenapeople
filedwithnationalistaspirationschallengesthelegitimacyofrule
whichtheyperceiveasalien,takeuparrasanddefeattheforeign
rulers, anational revolution takes place. When apeople resort
to violent means and bring about the destruction of existing
political as well as social and economic structures, asocial revolu¬
tion is effected.
Thus, while the American revolution was anational revolu¬
tion, the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions were social
revolutions. Sometimes, national and social revolutions take
placesimultaneouslyaswasthecasewiththeVietnameserevolu¬
tion.TheBangladeshrevolutionin1971wasdefinitelyanational
revolution, but it also generated forces which could have brought
asocial revolution to successful fruition.
Astudy of the political changes in East Bengal from 1947
clearly shows the Bangladesh emerged as an independent state
throughaspontaneousnationalrevolutionthatincubatedduring
23 years of West Pakistan domination and burst forth with ex¬
plosiveenergyinMarch1971.Thelinguistic,social,economic
and political grievances that had accumulated over the years
manifested themselves in aseries of mass movements directed
againstWestPakistan.Thearchetypicaleventwasthegreatlan¬
guage agitation of 1952. After 1952, the Shahid Minar (Martyrs
Memorial)inDaccabecamethefocusofaseriesofnationalpil¬
grimages for all Bengalis, where thousands marched annually on
February 21, to celebrate martyrs’ day. ‘Out of the languap
movement came the leaders and idioms of Bengali political life
and anew pride in Bengali culture.’®
Thelanguagemovementof1952ledtoa1954movementwhich
produced the 21-point programme of East Bengal’s autonomy,
and this subsequently became the seminal document of Bengali
secular nationalism. Later movements—the anti-Ayub movement
in 1962, the six-point movement of 1966, the mass upheaval of
November 1968 to March 1969 and their attendant repressions
progressively reinforced the spirit of Bengali nationalism. The
great non-cooperation movement that began on March 1and cul¬
minated on March 25, 1971, and as well the armed revolution that
started on March 26, 1971, were the climatic events of along
revolutionary struggle. At every stage of this revolutionary devel¬
opment in East Bengal, students and the continuously expanding
politicised section of the people moved ahead of political leaders
and made the Bangladesh revolution, in the literal sense, a
people’s revolution.
The Bangladesh revolution had its gestation and birth within
East Bengal. The argument of Pakistani rulers and pro-Pakistan
writers that India fostered seeessionist sentiments in Bangladesh
is clearly false. G.W. Choudhury is possibly right when he argues
that “under Yahya the Pakistan government made the first and
last attempt to remove thelegitimate grievances of the Bengalis.”*
Conclusion 235
But this only confirms the classical insight that arevolution takes
place when an ancien regime tries to reform itself.
The reactive forces of Bengali nationalism were not always
spontaneous: organisation and motivation helped to bring these
forces together and give them direction. Although the Awami
League (AL) was agrassroots organisation, its main platform and
strength stemming from its ability to champion the Bengali cause
against West Pakistan, it cannot take the entire credit for creating
revolutionary consciousness, nor for motivating the forces of na¬
tionalism. Rather, the leftist parties initiated thinking in terms of ■
nationalist revival. Later, when the involvement of the revolu¬
tionary left in factional and doctrinal disputes eroded its political
support, the AL, now abroad-based organisation, became the
sole voice of Bengali nationalism. Still later, the mass upheaval
of November 1968 to March 1969^brought radical students, labou¬
rers and other lower class people into the streets of the urban
centres in East Bengal to demand not only the emancipation of
East Bengal but also the establishment of Krishak-Sramik Raj
(rule of peasants and workers).
The AL leader. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, fearful of losing leader¬
ship of the jnovement, soon added aprogramme of radical econ¬
omic reforms to his plank of secular Bengali nationalism. Thus,
the dynamics of revolution brought about aconfluenee of both
radical and secularnationalisniand;madeSheikh Mujibur Rahman
the veritable symbol of the spirit of the revolution. Sheikh Mujib
—by his spell-binding oratory, political entrepreneurship and
fanatic devotion to Bengali nationalism—in turn, reinforced the
revolutionary proeess.
Sheikh Mujib’s temporisingwith the issueof independence only
indicated his inability to lead an armed revolution. The Pakistan
rulers could easily see the Achilles heel of Sheikh Mujib and re¬
sorted to massive violence to suppress the Bengali aspiration for
independence. But neither Sheikh Mujib’s hesitations nor Pakis¬
tani brutality could stem the tide.
All successful nationalist wars beginning with the revolu¬
tion of the “first new nation”, U.S.A., down to the recent ones
like those of the Algerians and Vietnamese received varying
degrees of external help. So the Indian help to the Bangladesh
revolutionaries was not without precedent. Without Indian arms
236 The Baugladesh Revolution and its Aftermath
and ammunition and without the benefit of using Indian

territory for training and shelter, the Bangladesh guerrillas
could not have complete immobilised the Pakistan army in
Bangladesh by November 1971. But the Bangladesh revolution
underwent qualitative changes when the Indian army directly inter¬
vened and turned the Bangladesh revolution into an international
conflict.® One result was quicker termination of the sufferings of
Bangladeshis. But this was only temporarily soothing to Banglade¬
shis. The other effects of Indian intervention had along-run
impact. First, the prestige of Mukti Bahini suffered and they
came to believe that the Indian army had robbed them of the
glory of liberating the country. This created almost rabid anti-
Indianism in the Bangladesh armed forces. Secondly, Indian inter¬
vention aborted the possibility of the growth of radical leadership
which the dialectics of aprotracted guerrilla war usually brings
about. The radical groups in Bangladesh saw Indian intervention
as an interference in the free flow of internal political development
within Bangladesh and came to feel deep resentment against India.
Indian military intervention also resulted in the development
of aclient-patron relationship between Bangladesh and India.
This hurt the pride of the new nation and sharp anti-Indian feel¬
ings grew quickly among the Bangladeshis as awhole.
The groat sacrifices made in the revolutionary war in 1971
have not gone in vain. The revolution created anation of gallant
men who wrested independence from the most brutal perpetrators
of genocide. This traumatic birth of the nation is possibly the
greatest force ensuring its continuity. The revolution has created
its heroes, myths, and vision of 5'o/wr Bangla (Golden Bengal).
Bangladeshi “generations yet unborn” will continue to be proud
of the nation born of an heroic revolution, and this will sustain
them in their attempt to complete the unfinished task of realising
aGolden Bangladesh.
The radical aspect of the revolution has not yet been realised.
Sheikh Mujib was not aradical leader, nor did he build up the
AL as asocial revolutionary party. The pressure of events, rather
than force of conviction, led Sheikh Mujib and his party to add
the slogan of socialism to their platform. Sheikh Mujib’s govern¬
ment of course nationalised industries. But these industries
were mostly used as sources of spoils by the party. The Mujib

Conclusion 237
government did not make any attempt to alter the pattern of

landovvnershipinBangladeshastheruralupperclasswasoneof
the principal pillars of the AL.
Theincongruitybetweenpromiseandperformancewasnot
peculiar to Sheikh Mujib among the nationalist leaders of the
third-world.Whatwasuniquewashisjfallfromthehighpedestalof
anational hero within the very short span of 44 months. Even if
one takes into account the enormous difficulties of running a
countrywhichhasjustundergoneanarmedmassrevolution,
SheikhMujib’sswiftfallfrompowerwasanextraordinaryevent.
Thispossiblyunderscoresqualityofleadershipasanindependent
variableinpoliticalchange.Someofthepoliticalstylesthat
helpedSheikhMujibsuccessfullytoleadthenationaliststruggle
broughtabouthisunpopularityasagovernmentalleader.His
intense loyalty to his closest associates helped him to build a
party Uiat could serve as vehicle for the nationalist revolution;
inaPrimeMinisterandPresident,thissameloyaltytooldasso¬
ciatesledtothedevelopmentofapersonalisticpatronagesystem.
Again, Sheikh Mujib’s inclination to distrust those whom he s a w
a s
enemies”ofBengaliemancipationservedafruitfulpurposein
building solidarity within his party; after liberation his resort to
old confrontation politics and his dividing the political world
intocampsoffriendsandenemiesonlyacceleratedandsharpen¬
ed political cleavages.^
As Sheikh Mujib was totally unconnected with the revolution¬
ary war of March 26—December 25, 1971, he could not fully
grasp the radicalisation of Bangladesh politics that had taken
place and he failed to create or to adopt apolitical style in c o n -
gruence with the changed atmosphere. Moreover, m a s s i his

ve
popularity at home and the plaudits received from the interna¬
tionalpressgavehimadelusionofomniscienceandgrandeur
andmadehiminsensitivetoanynewideaorsuggestion.Sheikh
Mujibwrotehisownepitaphwhenhetoldthenewsmennotlong
after he came to power:
‘‘Maybeittakesonemantoleadthispeopletoindepen¬
dence and another to build that nation afterward.”?
But the radical ideas generated by the revolution of 1971 have
notbeenwithoutsubstantialinfluenceinBangladeshpolitics.
The issue of “social revolution and total change of the status
quo” brought about the split in the Awami League and led
t o the growth of Jatio Samajtantric Dal (JSD) who raised
theslogan,“RevolutionBetrayed”.Withinashortperiodoftwo
years the JSD became areal threat to the Mujib regime. The
radicalatmospherecreatedbytherevolutionalsohelpedspread
the influence of other leftist parties who promised to “complete
the unfinished revolution.”
Radical ideas also penetrated the armed forces. The guerrilla
w a r of 1971 broke the barrier between civilians and military
m e n developed by the conventional army of Pakistan. The
jawans . and the officers of the army fought side by side with
politicalactivistsandpoliticallyconsciousstudents.Theywereall
equallyactivepartnersinthewarandtheysharedequalhard¬
ship. In this war, guns alone would not bring success; more
importantwasthepoliticalweapon—thesupportofthepeople.
Involvement in such awar itself had aradicalising effect on the
participants. In this atmosphere it was not difllcult for the left
activists to sell to jawans and army officers the idea of “a demo¬
cratic and productive army” which would participate in the
social,economicandpoliticalreconstructionofthecountry.The
developmentofsuchradicalviewsamongthemenofthearmed
forceswasanunprecedentedeventinSouthAsia.Itprovided
muchofthedynamicsofpoliticsinpost-liberationBangladesh.
It is likely to do so even in the coming years, thus making poli¬
tical stability adifflcult thing to achieve.
Moreover, the radical ideas expounded by JSD and other
leftist parties captured the imagination of the majority of the
students of Bangladesh universities. Because of the prominent
role played by students in all past political movements m
EastBengalandintheliberationwar,thestudentsofBangla¬
desh consider it their “manifest destiny” to guide the nation,
Because of this and also because of the institutionalisation of
student political organisations, atradition of student participa¬
tion in politics is likely to continue and radical views are not
destined to die out soon.
In asserting its national identity acommunity may adopt a
number of symbols like language, religion, territory or colour.
Conclusion 239
In order to create internal cohesion, the leaders of the com¬

munity have to bring one symbol into central focus through
conscious effort and manipulation.* While making the choice,
these leaders pick up that particular symbol which most sharply
differentiates the community from the group against whom the
national assertion is made. In the forties, Bengali Muslims made
religion the central symbol of their separate identity because the
immediate threat as perceived by them came from adifferent
religious community.
In asserting separate nationhood vis-a-vis Pakistan, the
students and political leaders of East Bengal had to choose a
secular symbol. The policy of the power elite of Pakistan forced
them to choose aprimordial one-language. This did not mean
that Bengali Muslims became less Islamic and would merge their
identity with others who had similar language. Neither did it
imply that an obscurantist Islamic ideology would emerge as a
major factor in Bangladesh. In the secularised politics of Bangla¬
desh, religion would not have the degree of salience it had in for
mer united Pakistan. Although the constitution was amended by
Presidential Proclamation to give it an Islamic tone, the amend¬
ments concerned do not have substantial content.
In contrast to developments in former Pakistan, there has
not been any declaration of the romantic goal of building an
Islamic state nor has there been any provision to the effect
that all existing laws will be brought in conformity with the
Quran and Sunnah. The insertion of Islamic provisions of
symbolic value in the constitution only indicates the anxiety
of the present government to develop “a multi-symbol con¬
gruence” in the Bangladesh nation differentiating it from India
just as language differentiates it from Pakistan.
For the immediate future, the growth of astable policy in
Bangladesh is clearly dependent on the political development
strategy of President Zia. Since there is now overwhelming evi¬
dence of failure of military government to bring'about long-run
economic and political development,® the critical issue in Bangla¬
desh is the way in which Zia civilianises his regime and builds
up acivilian base of power.
The attempt at demilitarisation is generally spurred by the
growth of fissures in the armed forces.^ In Bangladesh the anta-
gonism between the radical jawans (privates) and officers took
such fratricidal character that the officers became anxious to get
out of political involvement and make the armed forces atruly
of professional and non-political institution. Zia has no other
choice than to develop an alternate civilian base of power.
The process of civilianisation of military regimes usually take
three forms. First, if the army concerned is the ‘arbiter’ type, it
holds elections and hands over power formally to an elected
civilian leader. Secondly, if the army disintegrates in the face of
spontaneous mass upsurge, the civilian leaders take over. In the
third process, the military leaders transforms himself into an
elected head of the government,” Zia chose the third method.
Kemal Ataturk exemplifies best the personal transformation
of amilitary hero to acivilian leader.^^ Few military rulers
have proved successful in following the Kemalist model. Persona-
list transformation requires avery subtle alchemy. The military
ruler must be able to command deep respect from his peers in the
armed forces. In addition, he must be endowed with political
and leadership skills necessary to lead acivilian political process.
Can Zia bring about aKemalist transformation in Bangladesh?
Zia has gone through an almost Darwinian process of selec¬
tion through the war with Pakistan and coups in Bangladesh. He
has never denigrated politicians as aclass—which is itself atypi¬
cal of the present day military rulers of many third-world coun¬
tries. On the contrary, he has shown adroit political skills in
bringing together diverse political groups and accumulating poli¬
tical power through coalition-building. However, Zia will have
to work within the overall political milieu in Bangladesh. For the
long-run development of viable civilian institutions, the other
political leaders of Bangladesh would also have to practise self-
restraint, conduct themselves according to the rules framed for
political participation and forsake their penchant for “winner
take-all” games.
NOTES
Orient
1. See K. Choudhury, Genocide in Bangladesh (New Delhi,
Longman Ltd., 1972), p. 22.
2. Sea, A.H. Talukder, Rajshahi University Students and Bangladesh
LiberationStruggle:ASurveyReport(Rajshahi,ModernPrintingPress,
1973).
Conclusion 241
3. W. Wilcox, “Pakistan: ADecade of Ayub”, Asian Survey,IX-.2.

1969, p. 92.
4. G. W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan (London:
C. Hurst and Company, 1974),p. 230.
5. In this regard India perpetrated afabrication that Pakistan
started the war on December 3, 1971. As amatter of fact, India
started the War when, on Indira Gandhi’s clearance, the Indian
army crossed into “East Pakistan territory on grounds of “self-
defence” on November 20, 1971.
6. See M.F. Franda, “The Bangladesh Coup”, American Field Staff
Reports, XIX: 15, 1975, p. 5.
7. A. Krebs, “Mujib led long fight to free Bengalis”, The New York
r/wM, August 16, 1975.
8. See, Paul R. Brass, Ethnic Groups and Nationalities; The Formation,
PersistenceandTransformationofEthnicIdentitiesOverTimes,Paper
presented in the Conference on Language, Religion and Political
Identity at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London.
9. See R.p. McKinlay andA.S. Cohan, “AComparativeAnalysis of
the Political and Economic Performance of Military and Civilian Re¬
gimes:ACrossNationalAggregateStudy”,ComparativePolitics,Vol.
8, No. 1, 1975, pp. 1-30, E.A. Nordingcr, “Soldiers in Mufti: The
Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the
Non-Western States, ‘ American Political Science Review, Vol. 64.
1970, pp. 1131-1148.
10. See C.E. Welch, “The Dilemmas of Military Withdrawal from Politics:
Some Considerations from TropicalAfrica”,African Studies Review,
Vol. XVII, No. 1,1974, pp. 213-227.
11 .
Sea V.P. Bennet, “Patterns of Demilitarisation in Africa,” Quarterly
Journal of Administration, NoX.lX, No. 1974, p. 6.
12. See D. Lerner and R. D. Robinson, “Swords and Ploughshares:
The Turkish Army as aModernizing Force”, World Politics, Vol.
XII, No. 2, October 1961, pp. 19-44.
Appendix
SELECT LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED
Mohammad Abdullah: Aleader of the Students’ League affiliat¬

ed to JSD, interviewed on numerous occasions, 1975-1977.
Abdul Mansur Ahmed: Author and journalist, former vice-presi¬
dent EPAL (1953-1956); Minister in Suhrawardy cabinet,
1956-1957. Interviewed several times in June 1970.
Aftabuddin Ahmed: Aleader of the Students’ League affiliated
to the JSD. Afreedom fighter during the period 1969-1972.
Interviewed on November 11, 1972.
Muzaffar Ahmed: President, EPNAP (pro-Moscow). Interviewed
on November 11, 1969.
Khandokar Mushtaq Ahmed: Former Minister, Bangladesh Go¬
vernment-in-exile; former Minister, Government of Bangla¬
desh; President, People’s Republic of Bangladesh from August
15, 1975 to November 6, 1975. Interviewed on March 20,
1976.
Tajuddin Ahmed: Former Finance Minister, Government of

Bangladesh; former Prime Minister, Bangladesh Government-
in-exile; former general secretary, EPAL. Interviewed on
August 29, 1973.
Tofael Ahmed: Vice president, DUCSU, and convener, SCA
(1968-1969).Interviewedonseveraloccasions,July1969.
Altab Ali: General Secretary, EPNAP (pro-Moscow). Interviewed
on August 15, 1970.
Ashraf Ali: Chief reporter, Bangla, former publicity
secretary, Ganatantri Dal. Interviewed on May 31, 1970.
Nasim Ali: Aleader of the BCP (Leninist). Interviewed on
February 18, 1974.
Akhtaruzzaman (pseudonym): Aleader of the Purbo Bangla
Sarbohara Party. Interviewed on April 4, 1973.
Appendix 243
Nurul Amin; Former Chief Minister, East Pakistan* Interviewed

on December 24, 27, 1967.
Mohammad Abdul Awwal: Former secretary, EPSL, one of the
founding members of the JSD, now leader of atiny pro¬
government faction of JSD. Interviewed several times in
1976-1977.
Bashir Ahmad Khan Bakhtiar: Alabour leader, Lahore, West

Pakistan. Interviewed on November 27, 1969.
Afzal KhanBangash: Leader of Sarhad Mazdoor Kishan Party
(NWFP). Interviewed on November 24,1969,
Jyoti Basu; CPM leader and Chief Minister, West Bengal govern¬
ment. Interviewed on February 19, 1973.
Amina Begum: Former acting general secretary, EPAL. Inter¬
viewed on December 22,1967.
Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani: Former President,
EPNAP (pro-Peking). Interviewed on June 6, 1970.
FatehMohammadChoudhury;GeneralSecretary,WestPakistan
Krishak Samity. Interviewed on November 16,1969.
Kaniz Fatima: Labour leader, Karachi. Interviewed on Novem¬
ber 17. 1969.
Osman Gani: Member, Mujib Bahini. Interviewed on April 5,

1972.
Ashok Ghosh: General Secretary, Forward Bloc, West Bengal.

Interviewed on February 17, 1973.
Mirza Golam Hafiz: Former leader. Ganatantri Dal. Interviewed
on May 30,1969.
Dr. Mubashir Hasan: Afounding member of PPP. Interviewed
on November 16 and 17.1969.
AbulHashim:FormerGeneral-Secretary,BengalMuslimLeague,
1946-1947;convener,EPML(Conventiongroup),1963-1964.
Interviewed on June 2, 1970.
Sohrab Hossain: Member, Somonnoy Committee. Interviewed
on May 18, 1972.
Dr. A. W. Abdul Huq; Member of Parliament; former Dean,
Faculty of Law, Rajshahi University. Interviewed on Janu¬
ary 24, 1974.
M. Ibrahim: Member, NAP (pro-Moscow), Interviewed o n
March 12, 1972.

Dr. Javed Iqbal: Aleader of Muslim League (Council Group)

Lahore. Interviewed on November 19, 1969.
M. Ishaque:Aleader of the Baluchistan Students’ Organisa¬
tion. Interviewed on December 8,1969.
A.Q.M.ShafiqulIslam:GeneralSecretary,EPML(Council
Group). Interviewed on May 29, 1969.
Golam Kabir: Member, Mao Research Centre, Dacca. Inter¬
viewed several times in .Tuly-August 1970 and on March 1,
1971,
Abdul Karim, Meber, Executive Committee, EPNAP (pro-

Peking). Interviewed several times in July 1970
Mahmud Ali Kasuri: Aleader of .NAP (pro-Moscow), West
Pakistan. Interviewed on November 6, 1969.
AmirHyderKazmi;Studentleader,pro-MoscowNSF,Karachi,
Interviewed on December 7, 1969. _ ^
Abdul Khaleque: General Secretary, East Pakistan Jama at-i-
Islami. Interviewed on July 18, 1969.
Abu Zafar Enayetullah Khan: Former student leader; former
editor.Holiday;Editor,TheBangladeshTimes.Interviewed
often in 1975-1977.
Amanullah Khan: PPP leader, Lahore. Interviewed on Novem¬

ber 15, 1969.
Akbar Ali Khan: Former CSP; former Deputy Secretary, Minis¬
try of Education, Government of Bangladesh; former Deputy
SecretaryofDefence,BangladeshGovernment-in-exile.Inter¬
viewed several times, December 1972,
Arbab Sikander Khan: NAP (pro-Moscow) leader. Interviewed
on November 25,1969.
Mohammad Ayiib Khan' Former President of Pakistan, Inter¬
viewed on November 22, 1969.
Bahadur Khan: NAP (pro-Moscow) leader. Interviewed o n
November 24, 1969.

Iqbal Ahmad Khan: Joint Secretary, Punjub Muslim League
(Council Group). Interviewed on November 17, 1969.
KhizirHayatKhan:Secretary.PunjabMuslimLeague(Conven¬
tion Group), Interviewed on November 14,1969.
ZiaullahKhan: Labour leader, Lahore. Interviewed on Novem¬
ber 27, 1969.
Appendix 245
Abdul Matin; Former student loader, Leader, EBCP. Interviewed
on March 14, 1970.
Ajoy Mukherjee: Congress leader; Calcutta. Interviewed o n
February 19, 1973.

Colonel Khaled Musharraf: Leader of the Coup of November 3,
1975. Interviewed on August 24, 1973.
K.G. Mustafa: Leader, EPCPML. Interviewed several times,
July 1969.
Bijoy Singh Nahar: Congress leader, Calcutta. Interviewed o n
February 19, 1973.

Ruhul Amin Pramanik: Member NAP (pro-Moscow). Inter¬
viewed on March 12, 1972.
Bazlur Rahman: Publicity Secretary, EPNAP (pro-Moscow);
Assistant Editor, Sangbad (Dacca). Interviewed several times,
June-July 1969.
Hanlf Ramy: Member, PPP, Lahore; editor, Nusrat. Interviewed
on November 15, 1969.
Mizanur Rahman; AL student leader. Interviewed several times,
February 1972.
Obaidur Rahman; Former Minister of State, Government of
Bangladesh. Interviewed on June 21, 1969.
Pir Habibur Rahman; Member, EPNAP (pro-Moscow). Inter¬
viewed on November 11, 1969.
Fakir Abdul Mannan: General Secretary EPML, 1952-1954.
Interviewed on May 31, 1970.
Nurul Amin Maznu: Aleader of Students’League, affiliated to
JSD. Interviewed on February 2, 1974.
Samar Mazumdar: Treasurer, Indo-Bangladesh Friendsip Society,
1971, Calcutta, Interviewed on February 18, 1973.
Salahuddin Mohammad; Dacca correspondent oi The Pakistan
Times (Lahore), former leader of EPCPML (later expelled
from the party). Interviewed on June 2, 1970.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman: Former Prime Minister and President,
Government of Bangladesh. Interviewed on July 23, 1969.
Ajit Roy; Secretary, Association for Friendship of East and
West Bengal, 1968-1971. Interviewed on February 15, 1972.
Abu Sayeed: Former student leader and Member of Parliament
1973. Interviewed on July 3, 1970.
246 Tho Bangladesh Revolution aud its Aftermath
G. M. Syed: Leader of Sind United Front. Interviewed on

December 5, 1969.
NirmalSen; Member, Sramik Krisliak Samajbadi Dal (Workers
and Peasants Socialist Party). Interviewed on June 1, 1969.
Abdul Kader Siddiqui: Leader of tho Kader Bahini in 1971.
Interviewed on August 30,1973.
KamalUddin Siddiqui: Former CSP; former Deputy Secretary,
Ministry of Education, Government of Bangladesh. Inter¬
viewed on January 30, 1973.
Colonel Safiullah: Former Chief of Staff, Bangladesh Army.
Interviewed on July 12, 1972.
Dr. K. Subrahmanyum; Director, Institute for Defence Studies
and Analyses, New Delhi. Interviewed on February 13, 1973.
Mohammad Tarik: Students’ League leader affiliated to JSD
Interviewed many times in 1975-1977.
Mohammad Toaha: Top leader of Bangladesh Sammobadi Dal.
Interviewed on June 21, 1969.
Mahmudul Huq Usmani: Leader, NAP (pro-Moscow). Inter¬
viewed on December 7, 1969.
Qazi Mohammad Zahur: Leader of Sammobadi Dal. Interview¬
ed several times in 1975-1977.
I
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Students’ Union), Dacca, Publicity Secretary, East Pakistan Students’
Union (pro-Moscow), 1969.
Goshona Patra: Purbo Pakistan Cbatra Union (Manifesto; East Pakistan
Students’ Union), Publicity Secretary, East Pakistan Students’ Union
(pro-Poking) N.D.
Gothontantra: Pakistan Islamic Cbatra Sangha (Constitution: Pakistan
Islamic Students’ Front), Dacca, Islamic Cbatra Sangha Prokashani, 1967.
Amader Kormo Paddhoti (Our Methods of Work), Dacca, Islamic Chatra
Sangha Prokashani, 1966.
Amader Paigam (Our Massage), Dacca, Islami Chatra Sangha Prokashani,
1966.
Ghoshona Patra: Bangladesh Chatra Lengne (Manifesto: Bangladesh Stu¬

dents’ Lnague), Publicity Secretary, Bangladesh Chatra League (Affiliated
to Jatio Samajtantric Dal—JSD), 1972.
A.F.M. Mahbubul Huq, General Secretary, Barshik Karjobiboroni 1972-73
(Annual Report, 1972-73) Dacca, Bangladesh Chatra league (Affiliated
to JSD), 1973.
Bangladesh Awami Jubo Leaguer Prothom Jatio Congresse Commission
Somuher Report (Report of the Commissions submitted to the First
National Congress of Bangladesh Awami Youth Iveague.), February, 1974,
Dacca, Publicity Secretary, Awami Jubo League, 1974.
5. Public Documents
Assembly Proceedings, East Bengal Legislative Assembly, Official Reports

{1948-1952), Dacca, East Bengal Government Press.
Report of the East Bengal League Committee. \949, Dacca. East Pakistan
Government Press, 1958.
The East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act. 1950 (As modifiedupto
31st May 1964), Dacca, East Pakistan Government Press, 1965.
Assembly Proceedings, East Pakistan Assembly. Official Reports, 1955-1958,
Dacca, East Pakistan Government Press.
Constituent Assembly Debates of Pakistan. Official Reports, 1949-1954,
Karachi, Manager of Publications, Govemment of Pakistan Press.
Constituent Assembly Debates of Pakistan. Official Reports, 1955-1956,
Karachi, Manager of Publications, Gcverr.mxnt cf Pakistan Press.
National Assembly of Pakistan, Parliamentary Debates, Official Report,
1956-1958. Karachi, Manager of Publications, Government of Pakistan
Press.
Report of the Land Reforms Commission for West Pakistan, Lahore, Go¬
vernment Printing, 1959.
C'owHi/i.s/o/ionNationalEducation.1959,Karachi,Manager
ofPublications,GovernmentofPakistanPress,1960.
ReportofthePressCommission,1952,Karachi,ManagerofPublications
Government of Pakistan Press, 1959. ’
PresidentialElectionResult,1965,Rawalpindi,ElectionCommissionPak-
istan, 1965.
NationalAssemblyofPakistanDebates,OfficialReport,1965-1968Karachi
Government of Pakistan Press.
WhnePaperonEastPakistanCrisis,Dacca,DepartmantofFilmsand
Publications, Ministry of Information and National Affairs, Government
of Pakistan, August 1971 (In Bengali).
President’sOrderNo.8of1972:GovernmentofBangladesh{Services)
Order,1972,Dacca,TheBangladeshGazetteExtraordinary,January24,
1972.
President’sOrderNo.9of1972:BangladeshCollaborators{Special T r i -
bunals) Order,1972,Dacca,TheBangladeshGazetteExtraordinaryJa n u -
ary 24, 1972.
ImportoftheConstitutionDraftingCommittee,Dacca,TheBangladesh
Gazette Extraordinary, October 12,1972.
ConstitutionofthePeople’sRepublicofBangladesh,Dacca,TheBangla¬
desh Gazette Extraordinary, December 14,1972.
BangladeshDocuments,NewDelhi,PublicationsDivision,Ministryof
Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1971.
BangladeshandIndo-PakWar:IndiaSpeaksAttheU.N.,NewDelhi,
PublicationsDivision,MinistryofInformationandBroadcasting,Govern¬
ment of India, January, 1972.
The 14-day War, New Delhi, Publications Division, Ministry of Information
and Broadcasting, Government ofindia, 1972.
Report, 1971-72, New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of
India.
Soviet Union and the Struggle of the Bangladesh People,

D o c u - Official
ments and Articles from the Soviet Press. Soviet Review Supplement Vol IX
January, 1972.
6. Books on Pakistan and Bangladesh

Ahmad, A.M.
Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchas Basar (Fifty
Years of Politics As Isaw it), Dacca, NoWroz
Kitabistan, 1968.
Ahmad, Col. M.
My Chief, Lahore, Longmans Green &Col,
1960.
Ahmad, Kamruddin ASocial History of East Pakistan, Daccd, Cres¬
cent Book Centre, 1967.
Choudhury, G.W. Constitutional Development in Pakistan, London,

Longman, 1969.
Callard, Keith P a k i s t a n : A P o l i t i c a l S t u d y, L o n d o n , G e o r g e
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957.
Jahan, Rounaq Pakistan: Failure in National Integration New
York, Columbia University Press, 1972.
K h a n , F. M . A y u b Friends Not Masters: APolitical Autobiography,
Karachi, Oxford Uhiversity Press, 1967.
Khan, Major-General The Story of the Pakistan Army, Karachi, Ox¬
F. M . ford University Press, 1963.
Maniruzzaman, I. The Politics of Development: The Case of Pak¬
istan {1947-1958), Dacca, Green Book House,
1971.
Sayeed, K.B. Pakistan: The Formative Phase, Karachi, Pak¬

istan Publishing House, 1960.
The Political System of Pakistan, Karachi, Ox¬
ford University Press, 1967.
Sobhan, Rehman Basic Democracies, Works Programme and Rural
Development in East Pakistan, Dacca, Oxford
University Press, 1968.
U m a r, B . Purbo Banglar Bhasha Andolon OTathkalin
RaJniti{Tho. State Language Movement of East
Bengal and Contemporary Politics), Dacca,
Mowla Brothers, 1970
7. Books and Documents on Bangladesh Liberation Struggle
Ay o o b , M . & The Liberation War, New Delhi, S. Chand &

Subrahmanyam Co. 1972.
Bangladesh Mukti Swadhin Bangladesh Ketiol (Why Independent

Sangram Shayak Samity Bangladesh),
(Association for the
Assistance of Bangladesh
Struggle) Calcutta, 1971
Bangladesher Mukti Sangram OAmadher Daitto
(Bangladesh Liberation Struggle and Our Res¬
ponsibility).
Birth of aNation: The Story of How East
Pakistan Turned into Bangladesh.
Bangladesh Shahid Sriti Bangladesher Swadhinata Sangram Prashange
Samiti (Association for (On Bangladesh Liberation War).
the Remembrance of
Bangladesh Martyrs) Cal¬

cutta, 1972
Bhattacharjse, A. Dateline Mujibnagar, Delhi, Vikas Publishing

House, 1973.
Bhuiyan, Major, M.S.A. Mukti Juddhe Nay Mash (Nine Months in
Liberation War), 1972.
Kalikata Bisswabidhalay Bangladesher Mukti Juddho (Bangladesh Libera-
Bangladesh Sahayak tion War)
Samity (Calcutta Univer¬
sity Association for the
Assistance of Bangladesh)
Bangladesh: The Truth
Bleeding Bangladesh, Bangoldesh Through the

Lens
Report {From April to December 1971).

Bangladesh: Classified and Annotated Biblio¬
graphy in English and Bengali.
Chaudhuri, K. Genocide in Bangladesh, New Delhi, Orient
Longman, 1972.
Chowdhury, A.G. (ed.) Bangladesh Kotha Koy (Bangladesh Speaks),

Calcutta, Swadhin Bangla Sahitya Parishad,
1971
Communist Party of The Party and the Struggle of Bangladesh, Cal¬

India (Marxist) cutta, Desraj Chandha, 1972.
Mascarenhas, A. The Rape of Banglade.sh, Delhi, Vikas Publi¬

cations, 1971.
Monisha Gronthalay Bangladesher Mukti Songrame Soviet Unioner
Private Limited, Bhumika (The Role of Soviet Union in the
Calcutta. Liberation Struggle of Bangladesh), 1972.
Morshsd, H.H. Swadhinatar Sangram: Dacca ai Guerrilla
Operation (Liberation War: Guerrilla Opera¬
tions in Dacca), Dacca, Nowrcz Kitabistan,
1972.
Mullick, D. Indira Speaks on Genocide War and Bangla¬

desh, Calcutta, Academic Publishers, 1972.
Mukherjee, A. Swadhin Bangladesh Songramer Patavumi (Back¬
ground of Struggle for Independent Bangladesh)
Dacca, Swadhesh Prokashani, 1972.
Mukherjee, S.K. Bangladesh and International Law, Calcutta,
West Bengal Political Science Association, 1971.
Nicholas, M.R. & Bangladesh; The Birth of aNation, Madras,
Oldenburg P. M. Seshachalam &Co. 1972.
Palit, Major-General The Lighting Campaign: Indo-Pakistan fVar

D.K. 1971, New Delhi, Thomson Press Limited, 1972.
Q u a d e r i , F. Q . Bangladesh Genocide and World Press, Dacca,
Begum Dilaroz Choudhury, 1972.
Roy, B. Tikka-Niaziir Bangalee Hattya (Killing of Ben¬
galis by Tikka-Niazi), Vol. II, Dacca, Sulekha
Prakashani, 1972-
Sayed, A. Bangladesher Guerilla Jnddho (G\iern\ia War of

Bangladesh), Clacutta Swadhin Bangla Sahitya
Parishad, 1971.
Sen, S. Protirodh Songrame Bangladesh (Bangladesh in
Resistance War), Calcutta, Swadhin Bangla-
Sahitya Parishad, 1971.
Swadhin Bangla Raktakto Bangla (Blood Stained Bengal), 1971.
Sahitya Parishad,
Clacutta
Swapto Bahnni Joy Bangla: Joy Mukti Fouj: (Long Live Ben¬
SWapto Bahini gal, Long Live Liberation Army) Calcutta^
Mowsumi Sahitya Mandir, 1971.
Verma, S.P. Bangladesh and The Emerging Intermtional
Political System, Ahmedabad, Harold Laski
Institute of Political Science, 1972.
8. Articles on Pakistan and Bangladesh
Alavi, H.A. “Bangladesh; Background and Prospects— A

Review Article”, Journal of Commonwealth
Political Studies, Vol. XI, No. 1.1973. pp. 79-82.
Pakistan Votes— 1970” Asian Survey, Vol. XI,
f t
Baxter, C.
No. 3,1971, pp. 197-218.
Bsrtocci, P.J. “East Pakistan: The Harvest of Strife”, 5oW/t
Asian Review, Vol. .5. No. 1, 1971, pp. 11-18.
i t
F r a n d a , M . F. Aid Dependence and the Many Futures of

Bangladesh”, Field Staff Reports, Vol. XVT,
No. 12, October 1972.
H u q , A . F. “Constitution-Making in Bangladesh”, Pacific
Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1973, pp. 59-76.
( (
M a n i n i z z a m a n , T. Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bang¬

ladesh”, Radical Politics in South Asia, The
MIT Press, 1973, pp. 223-277.
Rashiduzzaman, M.
t
Leadership, Organization, Strategies and Tac¬

t
tics of the Bangladesh Movement”, Asian Sur-

vey,Vol.XII, No. 3. 1972, pp. 185-200.
Suhrawardy, H.S. ( (
Political Stability and Demccrecy in Pakistan”,

Foreign Affairs,\o\. XXXV, 1956-57, pp. 422-
431.
Sayeed, K.B. < <
The BreakdoWii of Pakistan’s Political Sys¬

tem”, International Journal, Vol. XXVTI, No. 3,
1972, pp. 381-404.
Sobhan, R, "Negotiating for Bangladesh: AParticipants’
View”, South Asian Review, Vol. 4, No. 4,1971.
pp. 315-326,
NAME INDEX
Abadin, Major Joinal, 115 Altbach, P.G., 67n.

Ahmad, Jamail-ud-din, 67n. Amin, Nurul, 50n., 56, 57
Ahmad, Mohammad, 15n. Amjad, M., 146
Ahmad, Mushtaq, 34 Ataturk, Kemal, 242
Ahmad, Q.K., 192n. Aurora, Lieutenant-General Jagjit
Ahmad, Qazi Zafar, 191 n. Singh, 130
Ahmed, Abul Mansur, 22, 33, 191n. Ayoob, M., 139n.
Ahmed, Alauddin, 51n. Awwal, M.A.,201
Ahmed, Emajuddin, 229n. Azam, Professor Golam, 35n.
Ahmed, Fakhruddin Ali, 108 Azam, Shafiul, 209, 231n.
Ahmed, Khandokar Mushtaq, 25, 111,
112, 136n„ 143, 177, 186, 187, 189,
196n„ 213, 214, 230n. Bandarnaikc Mrs.,
230n.
Ahmed, Mohiuddin, 51 n. Barkat, Abul 56
Alimed,Muzaffar,51n„65,143,152n.Bashar,Abul,149,152n.
Ahmed, Rafiquddin, 56 Bashar,WmgCommanderlaterAm
Ahmed, Tajuddin, 25, 104n„ 106n„ Vice Marsha )M. K„ 115, 140n,
109, 110, 111, 135n„ 136., 137n., Bayley, D.H., 140n.
140n.,141,143, 152n„ 162, 177, Bertocci, Peter J192n
jgy jgg Bhashani, Maulana Abdul Hamid
Ahmed, Tofael, 65, 116,177 Kân,asPresidentofAL,21;and
Ahsan, S. M., 82,104n. foreign policy, 23; early life and
Akram, Captain M„ 134 education of, 37-38; and imperial-
Alam, Flight-Lieutenant Shamsul, 134, ism and autonomy, 38, 40-41; as
founder of NAP, 39; as leader of
Alauddin, Mohammad, 146 revolutionaries, 47; as Chairman
Ali, Chaudhri Mohammad, 6, ISn. Committee
of Action,
of 1952,
55;
Ali, Chaudhury R.ahmat, 35n. boycottofRTCby;65,demand 99
Ali, Khaled Mohammad, 30 of independence by, 77; “gherao

Ali, Major (now Major-General) Mir movementby,66;supportto
Shaukat, 97,115,202,221 Siraj Sikdar by, 171; and post-
Al-Mahmud, 167 p o n e m e n t o f e l e c t i o n s , 2 1 3 ; a s
Ali, Mahboob, 143 member of consultative commit-
Ali, Mansoor, 25, 111, 179,188 tee, 143
Ali, Mohammad, 54 Bhuiyan, Major M.S., 106n.
Ali, Nasim, 149, 169 Bhuiyan, Ruhul Amin, 30
Ali, Tofazzal, 54 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 72, 79,104n.,
Name ludex 261
lOSn., 124, 129,144 Felt, Edward, 212, 230n.
Bienen, Henry, 198,226n., 229n. Feldman, H„ 68n., 107n.
Biswas, Tipu, 146 Fitton, Marlin, 226n.
Bonaparte, 226 Fisher, S. N., 230n.
Boswell, Bryan, 231n. Franda, Marcus F., 49-50n., 139n,
Brass,. Paul R., 49, 240n. 196n.
Brinton, Crane 226, 232n. Firyubin, Nickolai, 129
Ciiavan, Y.V., 108 Gandhi, Indira, 14, 108, 110, 112

Clioudhury, Abu Sayeed, 112, 136n„ 125, 126,128, 129, 162, 214
155, 157
Gandhi, Mahatma, 3
Choudhury, Amin Ahmed, 106n. Ghiasuddin, Major, 100
Choudhury, G.W., 105n,, 138n., Gromyko, 127
139n., 234, 241n.
Guevara,Che,113,136u.,137,138.
Choudhury, HamidulHuq, 122,138n,
Choudhury, K., 240n.
Choudhury, Osman, Major, 115 Hafizuddin, A.K.M., 210
Choudhury, Taufiq Elahi, 135n. Haider, Kamal, 201, 230
Haider, Major M., 115
Choudhury, Zahur Ahmad, 25
Clausewitz, 138n. Haider, Colonel Yusuf, 203
Halim, Captain, 100
Cohan, A.S.,230n.
Cox, Thomas S., 196n. Hamid, General M.A., 105n., 124
Custers, Peter, 204 Hanraphan, G.Z., 137n.
Hasan, Fida, 69n.
Hasan, General Gul, 104n.
Dahar, Dr. Sayeddur, 149, 169 Hashim, Abul, 67n.
Dalim, Major Shafiqur Rahman, 185, Ho Chi Minh, 151
186 Harrison, Selig, 18n.
Das, Brigadier, 112 Hossain, Dr. Kamal, 135n.
Dastagir, Major General, 221 Hossain, Lieutenant Commander
Dastidar, Sukhendu, 43, 50n., 172 Moazzem, 62
173 Hossain, Dr. Maroof, 149, 169
Deane, Philip, 18n. Hossain, Professor Anwar, 204
Decalo, Samuel, 196n. Hua Kuo-feng, 206
Desai, Morarji,207, 208 Huda, Dr. M.N., 210
Deutsch, K.W., 4n. Huq, Abdul, 51n., 145,172,173
Dhar, D.P., 108,112,140n. Huq, A.F., 190n.
Dhar, Manoranjan, 143 Huq, A.F. Mahbubul, 193n.
Dunbar, David, 105n. ' Huq, A.K. Fazlul, 23, 231n.
Dutta, Major (Later Brigadier) Huq, Azizul,210
Chittaranjan, 115 Huq Dr. A.W., 243
Huq, Gaziul, 67n.
Emmerson, D.K., 67n. Huq, Kazi AnWarul, 210
Engels, 101 Huq, Major Nazrul, 100
Huq, Mohammad Ekramul, 193n.
Huq, Professor Muhammad Shamsul
Faalaud, J., 230n. 229n.
Bias, Khandokar Mohammad, 176 ,Khan, General Tikka, 26, 82
196n. Khan, General Yahya, 11,17n., 26,
Inu, Hasanul Huq, 203 27, 79, 82, 86, lOSn., 124, 129,
138n., 143, 144, 165
Iqbal, Dr. laved, 34n.
Islam, Air-Vice Marshal, K.M.A., 202 Khan, Haider Akbar, 52n.
Islam, Amirul, 110 Khan, Liaquat All, 5,6
Islam,Nazrul,145,149,152n.,169Khan,Major-General
FazalMoqueem,
16
Islam, Nurul, 16n.
Khan, Maulana Akram, 20
Islam, Sheikh Shahidul, 160
Khan, Nasim Ali, 193n.
Islam, Syad Nazrul, 110, 111, 140n.
177,188 Khan, Sirajul Alam, 30, 116,165,167,
169, 204,228n.
Islam, Tamizul, 51n.
Khan, Sirajul Hossain, 191n.
Khandokar, Group Captain (later Air
Jabbar, Abdul, 56 Vice-Marshal) A.K., 85,115,136n.
Jahan, Rounaq, 17n., 104n, 191n. Kissinger, Dr. Henry A. 126
Jalil, Major M.A., 92,100, 107,115, Krashininnikov, Dr. Valery A., 227n.
167, 169, 189, 203 Krebs, A., 241n.
Jamal, Sheikh, 184
Jamil, Major Shafat, 89
Jinnah, Fatima, 10 La Palombara, Joseph, 160,192n.
Jinnah,MohammadAli,5,6,54,55,LaPorte,Jr.,Robert,17n.,139n
75 Larma, Manebendra Narayan, 201
Johnson, J.J., 227n. Lenin, 19, 138n., 150
Lifschultz, Lawrence, 137n.,196n.
Lindquist, A., 230n.
Kamal, Shaikh, 160 Lipset, S.M., 4n., 67n.
Kamruzzaman, A.H.M., 111, 136n ! 5
Luthra, Colonel P.N., 139u.

188,191n.
Karim, Abdul, 44
Katzenbach, E.L., 137n. Machiavelli, N., 135u.
Kenyon, Thomas R., 16n. Mahboob, Kazi Golam, 55

Khair, S.A., 209 Mahmud, Air Vice-Marshal A.G.,
227n.
Khaled, King, 207
Khaleeli, Abbas, 11 Majumder, Gokul, 110
Khaleque, Abdul, 35n. M a l i k , D r. A . M . , 5 4
Khan, Abdul Monem, 122, 138n. Manik, Mohammad, 146
Khan, Ataur Rahman, 33, 59, 77, ManckshaW, General, 131,140n.
158,218,223,23111. Mannan, Abdul, 30,136n.
Khan, Enayetullah, 192n. Manzur, Lieutenant-Colonel (later
Khan, Field-Marshal Mohammad Major-General) Mohammad, 115,
Ayub, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15n. 16n., 138n.,221
17n., 18n., 25, 26, 39, 41, 42, 59, Mao Tso-Tung, 113, 119, 120, 123,
65, 69n., 75 1 3 6 n . , 1 3 7 , 1 4 6 , 1 5 1
Khan, General Habibullah, 11 Marx Karl, 101
Khan, General Mohammad Akbar, Matin, M.A., 5!n., 146
26, 105n. M a u d u d i , M a u l a n a , 5 8
Name Index 263
Mazumdar, Cliaru, 147, 151, 152u. Pare!, P., 118, 137n.

McKitilay, R.D., 230n„ 241n, Parkinson, J.R., 230n.
Mirza, Iskander, 6,9, 13, 15n. Pye, L.W., 227n.
Misra, K.P.,229n.
Mitha, General, 105n,, 109
Mohammad, Ghulam, 6,15n. Rab, A.S.M.A., 165, 167, 169, 189,
203
Mohammadullah, 195n.
Molla, Hasan All, 51n. Rab, Lieutenant Colonel Abdur, 115
Morain, Abdul, 104n. Rafiq, Major, M., 115
Moni, Sheikh Fazlul Huq, 30, 68n. Rahim, J.A., 17n.
116,159,176,177,179, 181 Rahman, Anisur, 17n.
Morris-Jones, W.H., 4n. Rahman, A.T.R., 193n.
Morshed, H. H., 138n. Rahman, Bazlur, 44
Mullick, D., 139n. Rahman, Major Syed Faruk, 185,
220, 227n.
Musharraf, Khalcd, 85, 89, 91, 100,
106n., 112, 115, 138n„ 139n., Rahman, Mashiur, 224
187, 188, 203 Rahman, Obaidur, 35n.
Mustafa, Gazi Golam Mustafa, 159, Rahman, Ohidur, 29, 72, 147, 152n.
181,185 Rahman, Sayedur, 30
Mustafa, K.G.,44, 50n. Ram, Jagjivan, 108,207,208
Myrdal, Gunner, 9, 16, 17 Rashid, Major Kliandokar Abdur,
185,186,227n.
Rashiduzzaman, M., 33n,, 50n.
Nasser, 176
Razzak, Abdur, 30,116, 177
Nasser, Sheikh Abu, 159, 185 Revelle, R., 230n.
Nawazeshuddin, Major, 100 Robinson, R.D., 241n.
Nazimuddin, KhaWaja, 20, 54, 55 Roy, A.K., 112
Niazi, General A.K., 132, 133, 135 Rustamjee, Lieutenant General, 110
Nixon, President, 126, 132
R i i s t o w, D . , 2 3 0 n .
Nuruzzaman, M., 32
Nuruzzaman, Major Mohammad,
107n.,115, I37n. Safdar, A.B.S., 202
Nkriimah, 176 Safiulla, Major (latei Major General)
Noor, Major S.J., 185 Mohanunad, 91, 98, 100, 106n.;
Nordlinger, Eric, A., 230n. 112, 115, 136, 138n.
Nye, J.S., 192n. Salahuddin, Mohammad, 56
Salam, Abdus, 56, 143
Samad, Abdus, 51n.
Omar, General, 79,105n.
Sarkar, Major-General, 112
Osanka, X.F.M., 136n., 137ii.
SarWar, Mustafa, 191n.
Osman, Major, 100
Sattar, Justice Abdus, 218, 231n.
Ovan, Major-General Sujan Singh, Sayeed K.B., 15n„ 35n., 104n.
137n,
Sayem, Justice A.S.M., 187,188, 189,
213,214
Palit, D.K., 139n.,140n. Schwarz, Walter, 191n.
Panter-Brick, Keith, 227n., 229n. Sen, Amal, 145, 149,152n., 169, 193n.
Papanek, Gustav F., 16n. Shahryer, Major M., 185
Shamsuzzoha, Dr. Mohammad, 64 Singh, Moni, 42, 43, 143

Sheikh Mujib (Sheikh Mujibiir Singh, Swaran, 108
Rahman), as founder-member of Siraj, Sahjahan, 165
EPMSL, 20; as leader of six-point Smith, Wilfred C„ 17n.
movement, 23-25; and 1970 elec¬ Sobhan, R., 138n.
tions, 27; as principal leader of Stalin, 226
opposition, 41; as principal accused Subrahmanyan!, K., 135n., 139n.
of Conspiracy Case, 62; as Banga- SuhraWardy, H.S., 8, 9,20,21, 23,
51 n.
bandltu,6S', and RTC, 65, 66; as
symbol of Bangali nationalism, 75- Syed, A.H., 192n.
76; election campaigns of, 76-77;
and non-violent non-cooperation Togore, Rabindra Nath, 61
movement, 80; as leader of de Taher, Major Abu, 115, 183, 184,
facto government, 80, 81,98,99; 203, 204
as President in abstentia, 110; Talukder, A.H., 107n„ 240n.
interests of, 116; Indian pressure TaWab, Air Vice-Marshal M.G., 203,
227n.
for release of, 126; EPCPML’s
views on, 144; EBWM’s attitude Thakur, Taheruddin, 186, 196n.
to, 148; return of, 154; as framer Thornton, R.C., 140n.
of constitution‘155-156; and 1973 Tito, President, 228n.
elections, 157; and experience in Toaha, Mohammad, 50n., 145, 172,
administration, 158; strategy of 173, 231n.
party building by, 159-160; cha¬
risma of, 161; Bangladesh-India Usmani, Colonel (later General) Ataul
relationship under, 162-164; and Ghani, 85, 100, 106n., Ill, 112,
Rakkhi Bahini, 163; and Special 115,138n., 139n., 140n., 222 224,
Powers Acts, 175-176; and “se¬ 231n,
cond revolution” 178-182; as
“FatheroftheNation”, 180; and Vorys, Karl Von, 16n.
armed forces, 184-186; killing of,
186; and Islamic Summit Confe¬ Weiner, Myron, 160, 192n,
rence, 206; cult of, 214; and We l c h , C . E . , 2 4 1 n .
radical economic reforms, 235;
W i l c o x , W. , 2 4 1 n .
and armed revolution, 235; call
Wriggins, W.H., 139n„ 192n.
for independence struggle by, 135;
reason for failure of, 237-238
Yakub, Lieutenant-General Shahib-
Shils, E., 232n.
zada, 82, 85
Shy, J.W., 137n.
Siddiqui, Abdul Kader, 106n., 117,
118, 137n., 138n,,192n.,195n., Zafar, Syed, 51n.
200n. Zia, Major (later Lieutenant-General
Siddiqui, Nur-e-Alam, 165 and President), decision to revolt
Sikdar,Deven, 147, 149 by, 86-88; declaration of indi-
Sikdar, Siraj, 46, 170, 171, 172, 179, pendenceby, 88; as an early free¬
194n„ 201 dom fighter, 100; as Sector and Z
Simon, Lewis M., 196n force commander, 115; as Chief of
Name Index 265
Staff of the army, 187; and coup of philsoophy of, 210 ;and civilia-
November 3, 1975, 187; and coup nisation. 213; as CMLA and
of November 7, 1975, 188-190; president, 215; and referendum,
as Deputy Chief Martial Law Ad¬ 215-217; and Presidential elec¬
ministrator, 198; early experiences tions, 222-224; as leader of BNP,
of, 199-200 and problem of dissi- 224; and demilitarisation, 239-
dence in the armed forces, 202- 240
203, 218-221; and trial of JSD- Ziring, Lawrence, 139n.

leaders, 203-204; and foreign re- Ziauddin, Colonel, 183, 184, 201,
lations, 204-208; developmental 203
SUBJECT INDEX
Agarlala Coasp iracy Casa, 26, 62, Awami League), 165, 167; divi¬
64,65 sions in, 177
Ansars, 88, 93, 95, 219 Bangladesh Chattra League (pro-
armed rebellion, by Sangnm Pari- JSD), origins of, 165-167 ;joint
shad (Resistance Committees), action With JSD, 168, 169; and
86-99 referendum, 216-217
Army of Pakistan, 7; proportion of Bangladesh Communist League
Bengali Officers in, 10; leadership (BCD, 167-169
of, 78; atrocities by, 84,101-103; Bangladesh Krishak Sramik AWami
places of recruitment for, 7 League (BAKSAL),Way of intro¬
autonomy, demand for, 19, 21, 23; duction of ;179-180; composition
movement for, 23-25 of, 179-180; dissolution of. 187;
Awami Jubo (Youth) League, 177 killing of leaders of, 188
Awami League, origins of, 20-22; Bangladesh Mukii Sangram Somon-
base of support of, 30; first draft 149-150,1 7 0
noy Committee,
manifesto of, 21: united front With
Bangladesh Revolution, 3, 234
KSP in 1954, 23; party elite of,
Bangladesher Communist Party
23,29; 1970 manifesto of, 27-28;
(Leninbadi) (BCPL), origin of,
victory in 1970 elections by, 72; 169,ideology of, 169
factionalism in, 177-178; split of,
Banglar Communist Party (BCP),
22, 224; and radical economic 169-170
programme, 27-28, 235 Barisal, armed rebellion in, 92
Biplabi Gana Bahini (People’s Revo-
balance of trade, between West lutionary Army), 203
Pakistan and East Pakistan, 11-12; Biplobi Sliainik Sangstha (Associa¬
of Bangladesh, 212 tion of Revolutionary Soldiers),
Bangabandhu, 65,180 12-point demand of, 189. 202
Bangladesh Armed Forces, strength
of, 182; cleavages in, 183,187,188; armed rebellion in, 95-96
anti-Indian and anti-Mujib orienta- ggcurityForce(BSF),109
tion of, 183-184 ;corporate grie¬ Breznev plan, 126
vances of, 184-185; reshuffle in, British Indian Army, 7
187,221, 223; restoration of dis¬ Bustee (slum), 81
cipline in, 203; cleavage reappear¬
ed in, 218-222
Bangladesh Chattra League (pro. Chakma, 171
Subject Index 267
China, and Bangladesh struggle 126 (EBCP), 45-46, 95

129, 132-133; post-coup Bang¬ East Bengal Communist Party,
ladesh government’s relations Marxist-Lcninist (EBCPML), 173-
with, 186, 205-206 ;clash of 174, 176
Indian border forces With, 186 East Bengal State Acquisition and
Chittagong, armed rebellion in, 86-88 Tenancy Act, 7
Chittagong Hill Tracts, armed move¬ East Bengal Regiment (EBR), 84, 85,
ment in, 201; tribese in, 202 93, 96, 99,100
civilianisation, of military regimes. East Bengal Workers Movement
213, 240 ;by General Zia, 240 (EBWM), 47, 170
Combined Opposition Parties (COP) East Pakistan Communist Parly
41 (EPCP), 36-37
Communist Party of Bangladesh East Pakistan Communist Party.
(CPB), 143, 175, 218 Marxist-Leninist (EPCPML), 43,
Communist Party of India (CPI), 36 45, 169, 172,173
Congress Party, 7 East Pakistan Muslim S t u d e n t s
Constituent Assembly of Bangla¬ League (EPMSL), 54

desh, 155, 157 East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), 85, 86,
Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 6 90,91,92,94,95,99, 100, 109
Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972, East Pakistan Students eugaeL
155-156; amendments of, 179- (EPSL), 59, 61, 63, 68n.
180, 215-216 East Pakistan Students U n i o n
Constitution of Pakistan, 1956, 8-9 (EPSU), 37, 58, 59, 63

Constitution of Pakistan, 1962,10 elections of 1945-46, 4n., 20
consultative committee, of exile elections of 1954, 23
government, 143 elections of 1962, 1965, 10
Coordination Committee of Com- elections of 1970, 70-75
munist Revolutionaries (CCCR) eleven-point programme, 63-64, 70,
46,169 77, 78
corruption, and political develop¬
ment, 159-161 Farakka dispute, 163-164, 200, 204-
coup of August 15, 1975, 185-186 206
coup of November 3, 1975, 187-188 Father of the Nation”, 75, 180
coup of November 7, 1975, 188-189 foreign aid, and Pakistan, 11 ;and
Bangladesh, 161, 162, 192n., 212,
230n.
Dacca, armed rebellion in, 84, 92
Dacca University Central Students’
Union (DUCSU),63 Gonotaiitric Oikya Jote (GOJ), 175
Defence Forces Intelligence, 202 Guerrilla War, 108 ;strategies of Mao
Democratic United Front (DUF), and Che Guevara on, 118, 119,
222
120,123,124; in Bangladesh, 119-
district governors, scheme of, 181- 124, impact of, 238
182
India, and Bangladesh liberation

East Bengal Communist Party struggle, 109-118, 124-132, 235-
236, Bangladesh’s relation with, Mahajans, 70

162-164, 207-208; Soviet treaty Martial Law, of 1969, 26; of 1965,222
mass upheaval, 11, 62
with, 127
mass upsurge, 79
Industrial class, in Pakistan, 8, 11
Islami Chattra Sangha (CS), 58, 103 military intervention, theories of, 182;
in Bangladesh, 185-186
military junta, 78
Jamaat-i-IsIami, party elite of, 32; Mujibbad, 176-177
ideology and membership of, 31- Mujib Bahini, 116-117,163
33; student Wing of, 59, 103 Mujibites, 204
Jatio Mukti Joddha Sangram Pari- Mujibnagar, 110
shad, (National Committee of Mujahids,S8,93
Action of Freedom Fighters), 167 Mukti Bahini, 3, 85, 88, 93,109;
Jatio Rakkhi Bahini~JRB (National recruitment and training of, 113;
Security Force), origin of, 163, and December 1971 War, 132-
164; suppression of opposition 135
by, 176 Mymensingh, armed rebellion in,
Jatio Samajtantric Dal (JSD) origin 90-91; tribal people in, 202, 204
of, 165-167; ideology of, 167-169; Muslim Leage, All-India, 5;various
gheraohy, 168; and Sepoy revolt, groups of Pakistan, 31
188-190, 200-201
Jatio Sramik League, 30, 136n.,168
nation-building, strategies of, 13-14
Jatiotabadi Gonotantric Dal
National Assembly, 27; elections to,
(JAGODAL), 221-223
Jawms, 4, 83, 84, 85, 91, 96; revolt 70, 72, 73, 156-157, 224-226;
boycott of, 79
by, 188-190: charter of demands National Awami Parly (NAP), origin
of, 202, 219, 220,238
and programme of, 38-39 ;break
Jessore, armed rebellion in, 93-94
up of, 39-42 ;party elite of, 43-44
JoiBangla, 81
National Awami Party (pro-MoscoW),
theoretical formulations of, 42;
Kader Bahini, 117-118, 163 leadership of, 42-43, 66
Khulna, armed resistance in, 93 National Awami Party (pro-Peking),
Kushtia, armed resistance in, 93 theoretical formulations of, 40-42;
Krishak Sramik Party (KSP), 23 leadership of, 42, 43, 66
National Progressive League, 59
Lai Danga 97 National Security Council, of Pakis-
landreforffis,in West Pakistan, 7,11; „ . ,, - r , ,
in Bangladesh, 236-237 National
SecurUy
Intelligence,
202
language movement, of 1948,54-55; ^
of 1952, 55-58, 75, 234 Noakhali,armedrebellionin,88
leftistmovement,failureof.48-49;non-cooperationmovement.80
growth of, 173-174, 182, 239
Legal Framework Order, 26-27 One party system, causes and methods
legitimacy doctrines, 12 ;challenges of introduction of, 179
to, 28
Subject Index 269
Pabna, armed rebellion in, 95 Sepoy Revolt, 188-189
Pakistan, Bangladesh’s relation with, santals, 171
186, 206-207 Sarbohara Party, 171-172, 201
Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), Sepoy Revolt, 188-190, 215
Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP), in six point, programme, 24, 65, 70, 77,
1970 elections, 72, programmatic 78; movement, 23-25
and ideological orientation of, 73, Sonar Bang la, 77, 236
74, political development, impact Soviet Union, and December 1971
of revolution on, 154 ;Zia’s stra¬ War, 132
tegy of, 239-240 Special Police Force, 202
Peace Committee, 204 Special Powers Act, 176
Police Academy, 95 Special Service Group, (SSG), 83
Political Parties Regulation (PPR) Students Committee of Action (SCA),
214,230n. 63-64
power elite, of Pakistan, 5, 8, 10, 12 Swadhin Bangladesh Kendrio Chha-
Presidential Order No. 9,164 tra Sangram Parishad (Central
Provisional Constitution Order, 155 Students’ Committee of Action
for Independent Bangladesh), 80
Rajshahi, armed rebellion in, 94-95 Sylhet, armed rebellion in, 89-90
Ramna, Race Course, call by Sheikh
Mujib for independence struggle Tangail, armed rebellion in, 91,92
in, 135 ;surrender by the Pakistan Teliapara Document, 112, 115, 135
army in, 135; Sheikh Mujib in¬ twentyone-point programme,23, 234
augurating Students League Con¬ Ulema 12, 223
ference on, 165
U . S . A . , a n d D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 1 Wa r,
razakars, 102, 120-122, 147 132
revolution, 1, 75, 82, 169-171,233
Round Table Conference (RTC)
65-66 Victory Day, 164, 221
Village Defence Committee, 204
Violence, causes of, 164-165
Sammobadi Dal, 172-173, 176; and
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THE

Talukder Maniruzzaman here provides areliable

The American Political Science Review

OTHER BOOKS FROM UPL

f■!i’ ■ .!' '1 ui.a

Red Cross Building

First published 1980

(g) Tahikder Maninizzaman

Published by Mohiuddin Ahmed, The Universily Press Limited,

who shared my quest to understand

In his preface to the second edition of The Eighteenth Brim-

The book was first published in December 1980. It went but

January 1988 Ta l u k d e r Maniruzzaman

During the last few years Ihave often thought of something

After the liberation of Bangladesh—on 16 December 1971 —

Preface to the Second Edition v

List of Tables, Diagrams and Maps X I

Glossary of Terms XIV

The Original Power Elite and its Problems 5

Legitimacy Doctrines of the Power Elite 12

II. THE POLITICS OF AUTONOMY 19

The Awami League and the Demand for Autonomy 19

III. REGIONAL POLITICS AND THE LEFT IN EAST BENGAL 36

The Growth of the Bengali Left 36

Factionalism and Doctrinal Disputes among the

IV. STUDENT POLITICS AND MASS UPHEAVAL 53

The Organisation of Student Politics and the COA 53

Mass Upheaval in East Bengal (November 1968-

Students and the 11-Point Programme 63

First Phas e of Re vo lut i on 75

Mass Upsurge and the de facto Government

Second Phase of the Revolution 82

Counter-Offensive by Pakistan Forces 96

Formation of the Government-in-exile 109

Indian Military Intervention 124

Role of the Mukti Bahini 132

VII. ROLE OF THE LEFT 141

Zia’s Policy of Political Development 212

1. Demographic Characteristics of the Party Elite

Results of the First General Election in Bangladesh

1. Splits in East Bengal Communist Movement, 1948-1970 40

1. Political Map of Pakistan Before 1971 X V I

2. Bangladesh Districts, 1971 87

3. Main Thrusts of the Indian Army, December 1971 131

M N A Member of National Assembly

Al-Badar Soldiers of the first battle fought by Prophet

Amar Sonar Bangla My Golden Bengal

Char Silted islet of ariver

Hazong Name of atribe in the district of Mymensingh

Joy Bangla Glory to Bengal

Mahajans Money lenders

Quran The holy book of the Muslims revealed to

Sangram Parishad Resistance Committee

Seer Weight of about 2lbs

Thana Police Station

decisions.”)! The traumatic birth of Bangladesh will be are¬

The Muslims of Bengal had given almost as much support in

dents brought about revolution and supplanted Pakistan n a -

Chapter Vfirst analyses the implications of the result of the

Chapter IX brings the story up to early 1979. It shows that

In short, this study tries to explain both the varied roots of

1. See, Chapter 1in S.M. Lipest, Revolution and Counter-revolution,

THE POWER ELITE IN PAKISTAN