ARTICLE 147

MARIETTA N. BARRIDO v. LEONARDO V. NONATO, GR No. 176492, 2014-10-20

Facts:

In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta
N. Barrido, they were able to acquire a property... consisting of a house and lot

On

March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused.

Thus,... Nonato... filed a Complaint for partition

Barrido claimed... that the subject property had already been sold to their children

MTCC rendered a Decision... ordering the conjugal property... adjudicated to the defendant
Marietta Nonato,... the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to
remain.

RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC

It found that even though the MTCC aptly applied Article 129 of the Family Code (Art. 129.
Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall
apply: ... (2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts
and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset
thereof.), it nevertheless made a reversible error in adjudicating the subject... property to
Barrido.

ordering the parties

(1) to equitably partition the house and lot

(2) to reimburse Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato of the amount advanced by them
in payment of the debts and obligation

(3) to deliver the presumptive legitimes of Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato
pursuant to Article 51 of the Family Code... the CA affirmed the RTC Decision

Issues:

THE LOT
IS CONJUGAL AFTER BEING SOLD TO THE CHILDREN,... OF THE FAMILY CODE HAS
NO APPLICATION IN THE PRESENT CASE

ARTICLE 129 OF THE FAMILY CODE HAS NO APPLICATION IN THE PRESENT CASE,

Ruling:

The records reveal that Nonato and Barrido's marriage had been declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 36[10] of the Family Code.

During their marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property
relations.

Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses' property
relations.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work
and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.

Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint... efforts.

The rules which are... set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-
law spouses or spouses of... void marriages.

Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.

Barrido, however, claims that the ownership over the property in question is already vested
on their children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the property still
being registered in the names of the former spouses, said document of sale does not... bear
a notarization of a notary public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a document
remains to be private and cannot be converted into a public document,[21] making it
inadmissible in evidence unless properly authenticated.[

Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido,
which should be... divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.

Principles:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property... acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
The rules which are... set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-
law spouses or spouses of... void marriages.

CARPIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision dated 14 September
2011[2] and Resolution dated 1 March 2013[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 93786.

The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of land known as Lot 5506 of the Cadastral
Survey of Batangas plan (LRC) SWO-2817, L.R. Case No. N-445, L.R.C. Record No. N-
22499. The land, situated in Barrio Alangilan, Batangas City, contains an area of 484 square
meters under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-24660.[4] The land was previously
owned by spouses Anastacio Manuel and Mariquita de Villa (Spouses Manuel) under
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-2840.

On 4 May 1979, petitioner Luis Uy (Uy) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pallocan West, Batangas City, Branch 4, a Complaint[5] for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents with Damages against respondents Petra Rosca (Rosca), and spouses
Jose Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana).

In the Complaint, Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that
they lived together as husband and wife from the time they were married in 1944 until
1973 when they separated and lived apart. Uy and Rosca had eight children.

Uy alleged that on 29 January 1964,[6] he and his wife acquired a 484 square meter
residential land for a consideration of P1,936 evidenced by a Deed of Sale[7] from the
Spouses Manuel. The sellers' OCT No. 0-2840 was cancelled and TCT No. T-24660 was
issued in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy."

On 15 June 1964, Uy and Rosca allegedly purchased, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute

Sale,[8] another residential land adjacent to the 484 square meter land from the spouses
Felix Contreras and Maxima de Guzman (Spouses Contreras). The second purchase
consisted of 215 square meters, as declared under Tax Declaration No. 61724, for a
consideration of P700. Thereafter, a split level house with a floor area of 208.50 square
meters was constructed on the 484 square meter land.

Uy further alleged that Rosca, in gross and evident bad faith, executed and signed a false
and simulated Deed of Sale[9] dated 18 April 1979 on the 484 square meter land, together
with the house erected thereon, for a consideration of P80,000 in favor of Spouses
Lacsamana.
Uy prayed that (1) the Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979 executed by Rosca in favor of
Spouses Lacsamana be declared null and void with respect to his rights, interest, and
ownership; (2) that defendants be directed to pay, jointly and severally, to Uy the amounts of
P100,000 as moral damages, P10,000 as attorney's fees, P2,000 as expenses incident to
litigation, plus costs of suit; (3) upon declaration of the nullity of the Deed of Sale, the
Register of Deeds of Batangas City and the City Assessor be directed to register Uy as the
sole owner of the real properties; (4) if defendant Spouses Lacsamana are found by the
court to be buyers in good faith, Rosca be ordered to turn over to Uy the entire proceeds of
sale of the properties and be adjudged to pay the damages; and (5) that the sum of
P600,000 taken by Rosca from Uy be collated into the mass of the conjugal partnership
properties.

In her Answer with Counterclaim dated 22 May 1979, Rosca denied the allegations of Uy
and claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject real properties using her paraphernal
funds. Rosca added that she was never married to Uy and prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit. In her Counterclaim, Rosca prayed that the court award her (1)
P200,000 as moral damages; (2) P100,000 as exemplary damages; (3) P12,000 as
attorney's fees; (4) P3,000 as incidental litigation expenses; and (5) costs of suit. Spouses
Lacsamana also filed their Answer with Counterclaim dated 21 May 1979 claiming that they
were buyers in good faith and for value and that they relied on the Torrens title which stated
that Rosca was the owner of the subject property.

In the meantime, Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of Sale before the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Batangas City. The Register of Deeds elevated the matter, on consulta,
[10] with the Land Registration Commission (LRC) because of an affidavit subsequently filed
by Uy contesting the sale and alleging, among others, that the property was conjugal in
nature and sold without his marital consent.

In a Resolution[11] dated 7 November 1979, the LRC decided in favor of registration stating
that since the property in question was registered in Rosca's name, such circumstance
indicated that the property belonged to Rosca, as her paraphernal property. The LRC added
that litigious matters, such as a protest from the other party based on justifiable and legal
grounds, were to be decided not by the Register of Deeds but by a court of competent
jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the Resolution states:

WHEREFORE, this Commission is of the opinion that the subject document should be
admitted for registration.

SO ORDERED.[12]

On 18 February 1981, Uy died.[13] His two daughters, Lydia Uy Velasquez (Lydia) and
Shirley Uy Macaraig (Shirley) substituted him in the case. Fifteen years later or on 10 May
1996, Rosca also died.[14] Earlier, respondent Jose Lacsamana died on 20 March 1991.[15]

Meanwhile, on 24 December 1982, Spouses Lacsamana sold the property to Corazon

Buena (Buena) through a Deed of Absolute Sale.[16] Thus, both Rosca and the Spouses
Lacsamana were substituted by Buena as respondent in this case.
During the trial, Uy presented the testimonies of his two daughters, Lydia and Shirley, as his
own witnesses, as well as Rosca, as an adverse witness.

Lydia testified that the Uy family lived in the house built on the land acquired by Uy and
Rosca. She alleged that the house existed until it was demolished by Buena's agent
sometime in 2006. Lydia also stated that the funds used to construct the family dwelling
came from Uy's business. Shirley corroborated the testimony of Lydia on all material points.

Rosca, on the other hand, testified that sometime before or during World War II, she and Uy
cohabited and settled in Batangas. The couple attempted to formalize their marital union with
a marriage ceremony. However, the celebration was not consummated because of the
bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they were unable to secure
a marriage contract.

Rosca stated that on 29 January 1964, she alone purchased, as sole vendee, with money
coming from her own personal and paraphernal funds, the land covered by OCT No. 0-2840
and owned by Spouses Manuel. Thereafter, on 15 June 1964, she again purchased, using
her own personal and paraphernal funds, the land adjacent to the first purchased property
owned by Spouses Contreras and covered by Tax Declaration No. 61724. Immediately after,
she caused the construction of a split level house on the land using her own paraphernal
funds which became their family dwelling.

Rosca alleged that Uy had an affair with another woman and sired children with her which
led to their physical separation before the year 1973. On 17 September 1976, Rosca
obtained a real estate loan in the amount of P50,000 from Philippine Banking Corporation
(PBC) using the house and lot as collateral. In support of this loan, Rosca executed an
Affidavit of Ownership[17] dated 27 September 1976, stating that (1) she was the lawful and
sole owner of the 484 square meter land, together with the building erected thereon, and (2)
the land was registered under her name and that the phrase "Petra Rosca, married to Luis
G. Uy" in TCT No. T-24660 was merely a description of her status.

Defendants offered the testimony of Rosca, Atty. Teodulfo Dequito, Jr., Rosaura Mendoza,
and Buena.

Atty. Teodulfo Dequito, Jr. testified that Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of Sale
before the Office of the Register of Deeds of Batangas City. The Register of Deeds elevated
the matter on consulta with the LRC, which issued a Resolution dated 7 November 1979
recognizing Rosca as the sole registered owner of the property.

Rosaura Mendoza testified that she and her husband purchased, in the amount of P80,000,
the 484 square meter property of Rosca on 18 April 1979 through a Deed of Absolute Sale
of House and Lot.[18] The Registry of Deeds of Batangas City cancelled TCT No. T-24660
and issued TCT No. T-35[19] in favor of the spouses. Then, Spouses Lacsamana mortgaged
the property to PBC for P48,000. Upon full payment of the mortgage debt on 15 April 1982,
PBC issued a Release of Real Estate Mortgage.

Buena testified that she purchased the same property under TCT No. T-35 from Spouses
Lacsamana on 24 December 1982 for a consideration of P80,000. Consequently, the
Registry of Deeds of Batangas City cancelled TCT No. T-35 and issued TCT No. T-3244[20]
in her name. Likewise, the Assessor's Office of Batangas City issued Tax Declaration No.
90210.[21]

Before the resolution of the case, Shirley and Lydia filed a Motion for Issuance of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. They claimed that Buena entered the
property and caused the construction of structures without any court order. Consequently,
the RTC issued an Order dated 21 September 2007 granting the preliminary injunction.
Thereafter, the case was submitted for resolution.

In a Decision[22] dated 21 April 2009, the RTC decided the case in favor of respondents.
The lower court found that (1) there was no valid marriage between Uy and Rosca; (2) the
Deed of Sale executed by Rosca over the house and lot in favor of Spouses Lacsamana
was valid; and (3) both parties were not entitled to their respective claims for damages. The
dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the instant Complaint filed by plaintiff Uy is hereby
DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction and bond are cancelled and are rendered of no
force and effect. The claims for damages of both parties are hereby DENIED. Cost against
both parties.

SO ORDERED.[23]

Uy filed an appeal[24] with the CA. In a Decision[25] dated 14 September 2011, the CA
affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court found that respondents were able to
overthrow the presumption of marriage and that the subject property was Rosca's
paraphernal property. The appellate court also upheld the validity of the sale. The dispositive
portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 21, 2009 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[26]

Uy then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the appellate court in a
Resolution[27] dated 1 March 2013.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue

The main issue for our resolution is whether the Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979, executed
by Rosca alone, without Uy's consent, in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Uy contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for being simulated or
fictitious for lack of consideration and consent. Uy states that no proof was presented by
Spouses Lacsamana to show that they actually paid P80,000 to Rosca for the purchase of
the property. Uy also insists that he did not give his consent to the sale which prejudiced his
rights and interest. Uy argues that Rosca did not give physical possession of the house and
lot to the alleged buyers. Further, Uy adds, without admitting that the sale is valid, that the
consideration paid was unreasonably low and unconscionable such that it constitutes an
equitable mortgage. Uy insists that Spouses Lacsamana and Buena cannot be considered
buyers in good faith.

Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the contentions of Uy rely on the re-examination
and re-evaluation of the evidence of the parties which had previously been passed upon
exhaustively by both the trial and appellate courts. Respondents added that only questions
of law may be raised under Rule 45. Since the findings of fact of the trial and appellate
courts were supported by substantial evidence and none of the recognized exceptions
allowing this Court to exercise its power to review is present, then the petition should be
dismissed.

We agree with respondents.

The issues raised by Uy had been thoroughly passed upon by the trial and appellate courts.
We find no reason to disturb their factual findings. In petitions for review on certiorari as a
mode of appeal under Rule 45, like in the present case, a petitioner can raise only questions
of law. Here, Uy would like us to review again the factual circumstances surrounding the
Deed of Sale executed by Rosca with the Spouses Lacsamana and to declare the Deed of
Sale invalid for being simulated due to lack of consideration and consent. Clearly, these are
questions of fact which are within the purview of the trial and appellate courts to determine.
Also, the issues raised do not come within the purview of the recognized exceptions[28] for
this Court to take cognizance of the case. We have reiterated time and again that this Court
is not the proper venue to consider factual issues as it is not a trier of facts.

Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is
anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption
established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage."[29] Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio —
Always presume marriage.[30] However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party
and overcome by other evidence.

Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias,[31]
we held that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to
the marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has
been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.

Documentary evidence may also be shown. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,[32] we held

that the best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself. Under Act
No. 3613 or the Marriage Law of 1929,[33] as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114,[34]
which is applicable to the present case being the marriage law in effect at the time Uy and
Rosca cohabited, the marriage certificate, where the contracting parties state that they take
each other as husband and wife, must be furnished by the person solemnizing the marriage
to (1) either of the contracting parties, and (2) the clerk of the Municipal Court of Manila or
the municipal secretary of the municipality where the marriage was solemnized. The third
copy of the marriage contract, the marriage license and the affidavit of the interested party
regarding the solemnization of the marriage other than those mentioned in Section 5 of the
same Act shall be kept by the official, priest, or minister who solemnized the marriage.

Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have
sourced from his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where
the marriage allegedly took place. Even the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not
show a single relevant evidence that he was actually married to Rosca. On the contrary, the
documents Uy submitted showed that he and Rosca were not legally married to each other.
The pertinent portions of the RTC Decision state:

x x x In the case under consideration, the presumption of marriage, on which plaintiff Uy

anchored his allegations, has been sufficiently offset. Records reveal that there is plethora of
evidence showing that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca were never actually married to each
other, to wit:

First. In his Petition for Naturalization as a Filipino citizen filed before the then Court of First
Instance of Batangas on 12 November 1953, plaintiff Uy himself stated in the fifth paragraph
of his Petition, to quote: "I am married (not legally)."

Second. The Sworn Statement of no less than the Governor of the Province of Batangas
executed in support of the plaintiff Uy's Petition for Naturalization categorically states, in
Nos. 2 and 4 thereof, that plaintiff Uy was married (not legally).

Third. The Immigrant Certificate of Residence shows that as late as 9 October 1951, plaintiff
Uy also known by his Chinese name of Uy Suan Tee, regarded himself as "single" when
filling up his civil status therein.

Fourth. The Alien Certificate of Registration No. 83758 establishes that plaintiff Uy was an
alien duly registered with the Bureau of Immigration of the Philippines and that his civil status
was single.

Fifth. The Affidavit of Vicente J. Caedo, a prominent citizen of Batangas, establishes in Nos.
2 and 4 thereof that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to defendant Rosca.

Sixth. The testimony of defendant Rosca as an adverse witness reveals that plaintiff Uy was
not legally married to her because their marriage was not consummated.

For his part, plaintiff Uy tried to justify the non-presentation of their marriage certificate by
presenting public documents, namely:

First. Decision in the case entitled: "In the matter of the Petition of Uy Suan Tee alias Luis G.
Uy, to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines";
Second. Certificate of Live Birth of Violeta Uy, daughter of plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca
and the descriptive word "legitimate" showing that Violeta Uy was legitimate;

Third. Death Claim under SSS Employee Compensation executed and signed by defendant
Rosca, stating that she is the wife of plaintiff Uy;

Fourth. Various pictures of the plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca with their children;

Fifth. Special Power of Attorney executed by defendant Rosca dated 19 July 1985 wherein
she admitted being the wife of plaintiff Uy;

Sixth. Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3 August 1982 executed by defendant Rosca admitting
she is the widow of plaintiff Uy which was not testified to nor identified by Rosca;

Seventh. Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 signed by defendant Rosca

admitting her status as married;

to establish the fact of his marriage with defendant Rosca. Likewise, plaintiff Uy presented
defendant Rosca as an adverse witness purportedly to elicit from her the fact of his marriage
with the latter. However, this presumption had been debunked by plaintiff Uy's own evidence
and most importantly, by the more superior evidence presented by the defendants.

While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and wife,
defendant Rosca's testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her
because their marriage was not consummated. In People vs. Borromeo, this Court held that
persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. Consequently, with the
presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca
shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and
defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to
submit additional proof to show that they were legally married. He, however, dismally failed
to do so.[35]

Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their property
relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple
living together were not incapacitated from getting married. Article 147 provides:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.

The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned
unless there is proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and appellate courts that
Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is not co-owned but is paraphernal.

First, in the Resolution dated 7 November 1979 of the LRC in LRC Consulta No. 1194,
Rosca was recognized as the sole registered owner of the property.[36]

Second, in the Deed of Sale dated 29 January 1964 between Spouses Manuel and Rosca
covering the 484 square meter land, Uy served as a mere witness to Rosca's purchase of
the land as evidenced by his signature under "signed in the presence of."[37] This could only
mean that Uy admitted the paraphernal nature of Rosca's ownership over the property.

Third, in the Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 executed by Rosca in support
of her real estate loan application with PBC in the amount of P5 0,000, Rosca stated that
she was the sole and lawful owner of the subject property and that the land was registered
under her name and that the phrase "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" in TCT No. T-
24660 was merely a description of her status.[38]

Last, the title to the property in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" was notice
to the world, including her heirs and successors-in-interest, that such belonged to Rosca as
her paraphernal property.[39] The words "married to" were merely descriptive of Rosca's
status at the time the property was registered in her name.[40] Otherwise, if the property was
conjugal, the title to the property should have been in the names of Luis Uy and Petra
Rosca.[41]

In Ruiz v. Court of Appeals,[42] the property subject of the mortgage was registered in the
name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos." This Court ruled
that the title is registered in the name of Corazon alone because the phrase "married to
Rogelio Ruiz" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Corazon and should not be
construed to mean that her husband is also a registered owner.

Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to sufficiently overcome the
presumption that any property acquired while living together shall be owned by the couple in
equal shares. The house and lot were clearly Rosca's paraphernal properties and she had
every right to sell the same even without Uy's consent.

Uy further contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for being simulated
or fictitious for lack of consideration. Uy states that no proof was presented by Spouses
Lacsamana to show that they actually paid P80,000 to Rosca for the purchase of the
property or even if there was consideration, such was unreasonably low and
unconscionable. Thus, Spouses Lacsamana and Buena cannot be considered as buyers in
good faith.

We disagree.

Uy did not present any proof to show that Rosca did not receive any consideration for the
sale. Neither did he submit any evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, showing the
fair market value of the property at the time of the sale to prove that the purchase price was
unreasonably low or unconscionable. It was even mentioned by the appellate court that
"appellants failed to prove that on April 18, 1979, the property might have been worth
millions of pesos." Thus, Uy's allegations lack sufficient substantiation.

Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court carry great weight and are binding on
this Court when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court will not
weigh the evidence all over again since payment of the purchase price and the consideration
for the sale are factual issues which cannot be raised in this petition.

In sum, we find that the Deed of Sale, executed by Rosca on her paraphernal property in
favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14 September 2011
and Resolution dated 1 March 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.

SO ORDERED.
DIÑO V. DIÑO

G.R. No. 178044, [January 19, 2011]

DOCTRINE:

Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. In this case, petitioner’s
marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not
under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.

ARTICLE 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended
by Executive Order 227)

ARTICLE 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n).

ARTICLE 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at
the time of the marriage:

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was
eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized
without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one,
such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and
wife;

(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue
influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the
other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or

(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be
serious and appears to be incurable. (85a)
ARTICLE 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43
and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are
declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had
been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.

In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.

FACTS:

Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño(respondent) got married on 14 January
1998 before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City. (Conjugal Partnership of Gains)

On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent
was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was incurable and deeply
ingrained in her system since her early formative years.

The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of
the marriage and declared their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code.

Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner, modified its decision holding
that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that adecree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.

HELD:

Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with modification. Decree of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.

RATIO:

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article
147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage,
but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case
before the Court.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.

The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued
only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply
to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule
provides:

Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court
only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the
Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a
complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage.
Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes,
the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on
co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance
with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
“[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.”
It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
Valdes vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.
Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on
the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed
under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which
they prefer.

*Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage ,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.(
As amended by E.O. No.227, dated July 17, 1987)

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered
as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family.

*prima facie- based on the first impression; accepted as correct until proved otherwise
Manila Surety & Fidelity Company, Inc. vs. Vicente S. del Rosario, et al.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10056 April 30, 1957

MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VICENTE S. DEL ROSARIO, JUAN C. ZAMORA and VICENTE TORRALBA LIM,
defendants. VICENTE S. DEL ROSARIO, defendant-appellant.

De Santos and Herrera for appellee.

Pedro Lopez and Epifanio B. Montoro for appellant.

PADILLA, J.:

The Court of Appeals certified this case to this Court because the appeal involves only a
question of law.

The plaintiff corporation, engaged in the surety and bonding business, appointed the
defendant Vicente S. Del Rosario as its branch manager and attorney-in-fact in the province
of Cebu (Exhibits A & C). To guarantee the faithful performance of the obligations required of
him as branch manager and attorney-in-fact, the said defendant together with his co-
defendants Juan C. Zamora and Vicente Torralba Lim executed in favor of the plaintiff an
indemnity agreement (Exhibit B).

On 9 February 1950, the plaintiff filed a complaint, amended on 10 July 1951, against the
defendants in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover various sums of money, to wit:
(1) un remitted balance of the plaintiff's share in the amount of premiums collected on bonds
issued by the defendant Del Rosario — P3,245.16; (2) the latter's share in the losses due to
forfeiture of surety bonds as agreed upon in paragraph 9 of the agreement (Exhibit A) —
P9,751.35; (3) unremitted balance of premiums collected by the defendant Del Rosario on
insurance — P751.15; (4) litigation expenses incurred as a result of the unauthorized
issuance of a surety bond in favor of Aida Young to guarantee the payment of a loan
obtained from her by Jose Guevarra — P1,193.02; and (5) unremitted shares of the plaintiff
in the unreported amount of premiums of the fidelity and two surety bonds mentioned in the
complaint and 50 per cent of the gross liability that the plaintiff might incur as a result of the
issuance of said three bonds by the defendant Del Rosario, the same to be determined and
paid after rendition of account by the said defendant, costs of the suit, and to secure and be
granted such other remedy as may be just, equitable and proper.
On 7 August and 6 September 1950 the defendants Vicente S. Del Rosario and Juan C.
Zamora, respectively, filed separate answers denying the plaintiff's claim. In addition, the
defendant Del Rosario set up affirmative defenses and counterclaim in the sum of P50,000
as damages suffered by him as a result of his unjustified discharge or removal from office by
the plaintiff. Both defendants did not answer the amended complaint. The defendant Vicente
Torralba Lim failed to answer the original and amended complaint.

On 5 September, 1952, the first date set for the hearing of the case, the defendants and
their respective counsel did not appear notwithstanding due notice. The plaintiff presented its
evidence and thereafter submitted the case for decision.

Upon motion of the defendant Zamora, by an order entered on 21 October 1952, the Court
reopened the case to afford him and his co-defendants an opportunity to cross-examine the
plaintiff's witnesses and present evidence in their behalf, and set resumption of the hearing
of the case on 27 and 28 November 1952, which was transferred to 16 January and 9 May
1953. On the last mentioned date the defendant Zamora appeared assisted by counsel and
the case as to him was heard. Attorney E. G. Gochico also appeared for the defendant Del
Rosario and moved for continuance. Again, the hearing as to him was transferred to 14 May
1953. On this date the defendant Del Rosario dated 15 May the case was reopened by order
of 27 May 1953. On the last mentioned date the defendant Del Rosario appeared and cross-
examined the plaintiff's witnesses who had already testified on 5 September 1952 and 9 and
14 May 1953. The case was set for continuance the next day but transferred to 23 June
1953. On this date neither the defendant Del Rosario nor his Attorney appeared. Whereupon
the plaintiff moved that the case be deemed submitted for decision.

In 14 July 1953 the defendant Del Rosario, represented then by Attorney Pedro Lope, in a
pleading dated 13 July 1953, moved for the reopening of the case alleging that on 16 June
1953 he sent from Cebu to his attorney in Manila, through the Philippine Air Lines, Inc., a
letter together with a draft on an amended answer requesting him to file it in court; that
believing that by the filing of the said amended answer, the resumption of the hearing of the
case on 23 June 1953 could not take place for the reason that the motion to allow the said
amended answer had to be considered and decided by the court, he (defendant Del
Rosario) did not appear at the resumption of the hearing of the case on said date; that on 11
July 1953 Attorney Pedro Lopez received a letter from the defendant Del Rosario informing
him that the letter together with the amended answer had been sent to him five days before
the resumption of the trial of the case set for 23 June 1953; that up to the time he (the
attorney) had not yet received the envelope containing the letter and the amended answer;
that immediately upon receipt of the defendant's letter on 11 July 1953, the attorney sent
one of his clerks to the office of the Philippine Air Lines, Inc. in Manila to inquire about and
claim the envelope containing the letter and amended answer of the defendant Del Rosario;
that it was only then that he (the attorney) received them; and that the defendant Del Rosario
had a good and valid defense. The motion was sworn to by the attorney for the defendant
Del Rosario. The plaintiff objected to the motion.

On 29 September 1953, the Court denied the motion for the reopening of the case. The
defendant Del Rosario filed a motion for reconsideration of the last order which was not
acted upon. On 28 October 1953 the Court rendered judgement —
. . . in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter to pay the former
jointly and severally the sum of P14,940.68 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid.

The defendant, Vicente S. Del Rosario, is ordered to submit his accounting on the premiums
he has collected on the surety bonds mentioned in paragraph 23 of the complaint under the
fifth cause of action, within thirty days from date of the entry of this judgement. With costs
against the defendants.

Only the defendant Vicente S. Del Rosario has appealed.

The appellant confines his appeal to assailing the refusal of the trial court to reopen
the case to afford him the opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense
and to prove his counterclaim. He contends that his failure to appear at the
resumption of the hearing of the case on 23 June 1953 was due to accident, mistake
or excusable neglect. He says nothing about the judgement on the merits of the case
rendered against him and his co-defendants.

The "motion for reopening" of the case, which may be deemed for relief under Rule 38, filed
by the attorney for the appellant in the court below, does not satisfy and comply with the
requirements of the Rule, because it is not enough to state in the motion sworn to and filed
by the attorney that the defendant had a good and valid defense. The facts constituting the
movant's or petitioner's good and substantial defense, which he could prove if his petition
should be granted must be pleaded under oath pursuant to section 3, Rule 38.1 Also
appellant's failure to appear on several dates set for hearing and resumption's of the hearing
of the case does not bolster up the claim that such failure was due to excusable neglect. The
trial court was too lenient and generous to the appellant's motions for continuance. It twice
reopened the case to afford the appellant the opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff's
witnesses who had already testified.

The order denying the reopening of the case appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
the appellant.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes. A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Paz vs. Inandan, 75 Phil., 608, 42 Off. Gaz., 174.

Juaniza vs Jose

Case Doctrines:

● When a man and woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership (Article 144, New Civil Code). The co-
ownership contemplated, however, requires that both parties are not in anyway
incapacitated to contract marriage.

● It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public service
vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its
operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein.

Facts: Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney
involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that
took place on November 23, 1969 which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical
injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At the time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legally
married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-appellant, Rosalia
Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife. The trial
court rendered a decision in a civil case for damages arising from the vehicular accident,
ordering Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo to jointly and severally pay damages to the
victims of the accident. Rosalia claims that it was error for the trial court to consider her a co-
owner of the said jeepney, just because she had cohabited for many years as wife of
Eugenio Jose, a legally married man.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code (now Article 148 of FC) is applicable in a case
where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry.

2. Whether or not Rosalia can be held jointly and severally liable for damages with Eugenio.

Held:

1. No. The co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man
and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.
Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to
contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code,
Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo
for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of
the jeepney which figured in the collision.

2. No. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public service
vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its
operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein. (Juaniza vs Eugenio Jose,
G.R. Nos. L-50127-28. March 30, 1979)
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY v. CARLINA V. PALANG, GR No. 116668, 1997-07-28

Facts:

Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 when he took private
respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic
Church in Pangasinan.

A few months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii. Miguel and

Carlina's only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950.

Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the Philippines was in 1964 and during
the entire duration of his year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother, not in
Pangasinan with his wife and child. The trial court found evidence that as early as 1957,...
Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii

When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with private respondents, but stayed
alone in a house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.

On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second marriage with
nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner.

Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of
Sale, jointly purchased a... parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan,
Pangasinan with an area of 10,080 square meters.

said rice land was issued in their names.

A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23, 1975,
allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. TCT No. 143120 covering said property was later
issued in her name.

On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of
compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter.[3] The parties therein
agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to... their only child,
Herminia Palang.

Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on December
6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina's
complaint
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein
private respondents, instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan

Private respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot both located at
Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.

Issues:

first and principal issue is the ownership of the two pieces of property subject of this action.

Ruling:

The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The
provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of
cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with... each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage.

While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void
because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by
the... latter's de facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions.

If the actual... contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares

In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store... but failed to persuade us that she
actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the... fact that on the
date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and
Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering
her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00... as her
share in the purchase price of subject property,... there being no proof of the same.

Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda
actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to
exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code.

In any case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the
rules of... co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be
essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the
riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel
over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of
Appeals,... revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private
respondent Carlina Palang.

With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on
September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public
who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim.
Atty.

Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price
and directed that Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee.

The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was
clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between
persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the
Civil Code.

Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against
donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage,... for otherwise, the condition of... those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
Borromeo v. Descallar

May 24, 2018

Civil Law. Sales. Rights of an alien who acquired real properties.
Camilo Borromeo v. Antonietta Descallar
G.R. No. 159310, February 24, 2009
Puno, C.J..:

FACTS:
Petitioner appealed the reversal by the CA of the trial court’s ruling in his favor which
declared the titles of respondent as null and void.

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, and respondent fell in love and decided to live together.
Eventually, however, they went their separate ways as respondent found a new boyfriend
while Jambrich began to live with another woman. Jambrich met petitioner who was
engaged in the real estate business and built and repaired speedboats as a hobby. Jambrich
purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he
became indebted to the latter. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the
Agro-Macro properties to petitioner as evidenced by a “Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment.”
When petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the
three lots have been transferred in the name of the respondent and that the subject property
has already been mortgaged.

Petitioner imputes error on the judgment of the CA for holding that Jambrich has no title to
the titles in question and may not, therefore, transfer and assign any rights or interests in
favor of the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm
Jambrich, what now is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent?

HELD:
In the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to
Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not
Jambrich conveyed the properties to the petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. While the
acquisition and the purchase by Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation were
void ab initio since they were contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, the acquisition of
these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the
original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid. As the property in dispute is
already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public
policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in
Filipino hands has been achieved.
Cariño v. Cariño

G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001

FACTS:

SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had
two children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no
children in their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.

He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City
the claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a
total of P21,000.

Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively
denominated as “death benefits.” Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place
during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the
marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became aware of
the previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased.

In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.

RULING:

No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cariño falls under the Article 148 of the
Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages,
adulterous or concubinage relationships.

As regards to the First marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 Santiago:

Article 147 Family Code-Property Regime of Union without Marriage.

“When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired
by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.”

As regards to the Second marriage between Yee and SPO4 Santiago:

Article 148 Family Code – Rules on Co-ownership regarding polygamous/ bigamous

marriages, adulterous or combuniage relationships.

“In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed
to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If
the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited
in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.”

Article 40 of the Family Code – Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

“The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”

Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the
deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the
deceased through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his
legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them.

As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void
due to absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the
deceased even if she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in
respect thereto, entitling Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of
bad faith in the first marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and the
other half to the deceased’ to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.

The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been
solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and
SPO4. Under Article 40, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second
marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void,
before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would
be void. However, for purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial
declaration of nullity is necessary.
Manacop vs CA
Manacop vs. CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992

FACTS:

Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a
bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant
to a deed of assignment signed between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent
herein (FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money
with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the former. Consequently, the
corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of
a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the
petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a family home having been
occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment.

ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

HELD: FH is prospectively applied.

The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under
Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed
to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since
petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is
therefore not exempt form attachment.

The petition was dismissed by SC.

Modequillo v. Breva

GR. No. 86355, 31 May 1990

FACTS:

The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur
on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land
located at DalagbongBulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A
motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the
family home is built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities
mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the
family home is not one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged
that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and
applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the present case
became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.

ISSUE:

WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home in as much as it does not fall
under the exemption from execution.

RULING:

No. The subject property is deemed to be a family home but it does not fall under the
exemption from execution of the money judgment aforecited.

Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that “the provisions of this Chapter shall
also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.” It does not
mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply
means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectively of the Family
Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of
the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising there from was
rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988. Therefore, this case does not fall under the exemptions
from execution provided in the Family Code.

As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on
whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.

SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA, et al. v. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR., et

al. G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, J.)

It is incumbent upon the debtor to invoke and prove that the subject property is his family
home within the prescribed period, otherwise laches will set in. Claudio D. Acero Jr., being
the highest bidder, acquired the ownership of a parcel of land formerly owned by petitioners
Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto S. De Mesa (Spouses De Mesa). The property was sold
at a public auction after Spouses De Mesa failed to pay the loan they secured from Acero.

Thereafter, respondents Acero and his wife Rufina (Spouses Acero) leased the subject
property to its former owners who then defaulted in the payment of the rent. Unable to collect
the rentals due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) against Spouses De Mesa. The MTC ruled in Spouses Acero’s favor. In their
defense, Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to
nullify TCT No. T-221755 (M) on the basis that the subject property is a family home which is
exempt from execution under the Family Code, and thus, could have not been validly levied
upon for purposes of satisfying their unpaid loan.

However, the RTC dismissed their complaint. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s
Decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the family home is exempted from execution

HELD: Petition DENIED.

Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished
memories that last during one’s lifetime. It is likewise without dispute that the family home,
from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. The family home is a
real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. It cannot be seized by
creditors except in certain special cases.

However, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove
the status of the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time
thereafter. For all intents and purposes, the negligence of Petitioners De Mesa or their
omission to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they
have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it.

Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent
upon the De Mesa to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not
the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home.
FELICITAS L. SALAZAR v. REMEDIOS FELIAS, GR No. 213972, 2018-02-05

Facts:

private respondent Remedios Felias, representing the heirs of Catalino Nivera (Heirs
of Nivera) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages
against the Spouses Romualdo Lastimosa (Romualdo) and Felisa Lastimosa
(Fe1isa). The former sought to recover from the latter four parcels of land located in
Baruan, Agno, Pangasinan (subject property).

On March 16, 2004, the RTC Branch 55 rendered a Decision,[5] declaring the Heirs
of Nivera as the absolute owners of the parcels of land in question, and thereby
ordering the Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate the lands and to surrender possession
thereof.

Issues:

Felicitas claims that the execution cannot proceed, as the subject property is her
family home and is therefore exempt from execution.

Ruling:

The movant's claim that his/her property is exempt from execution for being the
family home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the
execution of a final and executory ruling. It is imperative that the claim for exemption
must be set up and proven.

Indeed, the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated. It
confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties.[34] It cannot be
seized by creditors except in certain special cases

However, the claim that the property is exempt from execution for being the movant's
family home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the
execution of a final and executory ruling. It must be noted that it is not sufficient for
the claimant to merely allege that such property is a family home. Whether the claim
is premised under the Old Civil Code or the Family Code, the claim for exemption
must be set up and proved.

In addition, residence in the family home must be actual. The law explicitly mandates
that the occupancy of the family home, either by the owner thereof, or by any of its
beneficiaries must be actual. This occupancy must be real, or actually existing, as
opposed to something merely possible, or that which is merely presumptive or
constructive.
it becomes all too apparent that Felicitas cannot conveniently claim that the subject
property is her family home, sans sufficient evidence proving her allegation. It bears
emphasis that it is imperative that her claim must be backed with evidence showing
that the home was indeed (i) duly constituted as a family home, (ii) constituted jointly
by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family, (iii) resided in by the
family (or any of the family home's beneficiaries), (iv) forms part of the properties of
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of
either spouse with the latter's consent, or property of the unmarried head of the
family, and (v) has an actual value of Php 300,000.00 in urban areas, and Php
200,000.00 in rural areas.

Felicitas adduced no proof to substantiate her claim that the property sought to be
executed is indeed her family home.

Interestingly, Felicitas admitted in her Motion for Reconsideration dated December

23, 2013, and her Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated June 22, 2006, that she
is, and has always been a resident of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija.[41] Similarly, the address
indicated in Felicitas' petition for review on certiorari is Muñoz, Nueva Ecija... the
Court takes judicial notice of the final ruling of the RTC Branch 55 in the case for
recovery of ownership, that the subject property has belonged to the Heirs of Nivera
since the 1950s.

This automatically negates Felicities' claim that the property is her family home.

Felicities' argument that the property subject of the writ of execution is a family home
is an unsubstantiated allegation that cannot defeat the binding nature of a final and
executory judgment. Thus, the Writ of Execution and Demolition issued by the RTC
Branch 55 must perforce be given effect.
Case Digest: Patricio vs Dario
PERLA G. PATRICIO, Petitioner,
vs.
MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Second
Division, Respondents.
G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006

FACTS: Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner
Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent
Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a
residential house and a pre-school building built thereon.

On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent,

extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Thereafter, petitioner and
Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the
subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to
partition the property claiming that the subject property, which is the family home
duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario, cannot be partitioned while a
minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the
grandson of the decedent.

ISSUES: Whether or not partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-
owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still
resides in the said home.

Whether or not Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent,
can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code

RULING:
1. No. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the
value allowed by law.

2. No, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV can’t be considered as a beneficiary.

Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of
Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live
in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of
the family.

In this case, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from
his grandmother, but from his father.
Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino
V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary
contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being
dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is
dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home
separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.
Gomez vs. Sta. Ines
473 SCRA 25, G.R. No. 132537 October 14, 2005

Doctrine:
Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale, or attachment except for, among other things, debts incurred
prior to the constitution of the family home.

Facts:
Mary Josephine Gomez and Socorro Gomez-Salcedo filed a complaint against
Marietta Sta Ines on 17 June 1986 to seek redress for damages suffered by them
due to acts and omissions committed by Marietta as early as 1977 when she
assumed management and supervision of their deceased mother’s rice land.

Sta. Ines was declared in default on Jan 24, 1989. After judgement became final and
executory, RTC issued a writ of execution by virtue of which a parcel of land
registered in the name of Sta Ines was levied upon by the sheriff of Nueva Vizcaya
to satisfy the damages awarded in the civil case.

In August 1992, property registered in the name of Marietta Sta Ines was sold at
public auction.
Marietta’s husband, Hinahon Sta Ines, and their children filed a complaint for
annulment of sale on the ground that the house and lot sold during auction is their
family residence and thus exempt from execution under Section 12(a), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, and under Article 155 of the Family Code.

Hinahon and Marietta claimed the property was their family home from the time they
occupied the same as a family residence in 1972 and that under Section 153 of the
Family Code there is no longer any need to constitute the said property as family
home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, because it became such by operation of
law.

Respondents also assert that the money judgment against Marietta was rendered by
the trial court in January 1989 long after the constitution of the said family home.

Issue: Whether or not herein husband and children of the owner of the levied
property may validly seek the annulment of the sale of said property?

Ruling: No.
In the case at bar, the house and lot of respondents was not constituted as a family
home, whether judicially or extra-judicially, at the time Marietta incurred her debts.
Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as such only upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on 03 August 1988, thus, the debts were incurred
before the constitution of the family home.
SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY v. PLANTERS
PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA [G.R. NO. 172263 : July 9, 2008
FIRST DIVISION]

PONENTE: CORONA, J.:

MAIN FACTS:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on
consignment from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther’s
failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 (RTC Makati City). After trial on
the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of
execution. Pursuant thereto, respondent sheriff Jorge A. Ragutana sold on execution
real property covered by TCT No. 15079 located in Naga City. A certificate of sale
was issued in favor of PPI as the highest bidder.
After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris
A. Kelley (Doris) filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC
Makati City on the ground that the subject property was their family home which was
exempt from execution. Petitioners’ motion was denied for failure to comply with the
three-day notice requirement.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of levy and sale
of the alleged family home with damages against Ragutana and PPI in the Regional
Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19 (RTC Naga City). The case was, however,
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. The dismissal was
upheld by the Court of Appeals (CA).

ISSUE: Is the subject property subject to execution?

COURT’S RULING:
Petitioners anchor their action on their contention that TCT No. 15079 is the Kelley
family home.
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code
(August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family
residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as
such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover,
the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred
after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988),
the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or
extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for
the following exceptions:
Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such
constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and
others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the
building.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 160. When a creditor whose claim is not among those mentioned in Article
155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that
the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article
157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing
the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the
actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of
the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum
amount allowed by law in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary
improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by
the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule
and procedure shall apply.
xxx xxx xxx
We grant the petition only to the extent of allowing petitioners to adduce evidence in
the trial court that TCT No. 15079 is in fact their family home as constituted in
accordance with the requirements of law.
WHEREFORE, Civil Case No. 2000-0188 captioned Spouses Auther G. Kelley, Jr.
and Doris A. Kelley v. Planters Products, Inc. and Jorge A. Ragutana is hereby
REINSTATED and this case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Naga City, Branch 19 for determination whether or not the property covered by TCT
No. 15079 is a duly constituted family home and therefore exempt from execution.