Conflicts Of Laws Case Digest: Saudi Arabian

Airlines V. CA

G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998

Laws Applicable: Art 19 and 21 of Civil Code

Lessons Applicable: Conflict of Laws, factual situation, connecting factor, characterization, choice of
law, State of the most significant relationship

FACTS:
 Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA), foreign airlines corporation doing business in the
Philippines and may be served summons in agent in Makati, hired Milagros P. Morada as a
flight attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
 April 27, 1990: While on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, Morada went to a disco dance with
fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals.  It was
almost morning when they returned to their hotels so they agreed to have breakfast together
at the room of Thamer.  Shortly after Allah left the room, Thamer attempted to rape Morada.
Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued
her.  Indonesian police arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
 When Morada returned to Jeddah, SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the Jakarta
incident and requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and
Allah.  In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officers negotiated with the police for the immediate release
of the detained crew members but did not succeed.  Afraid that she might be tricked into
something she did not want because of her inability to understand the local dialect, Morado
refused to cooperate and declined to sign a blank paper and a document written in the local
dialect.  Eventually, SAUDIA allowed Morada to return to Jeddah but barred her from the
Jakarta flights.
 Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah and they were again put in
service.  While, Morada was transferred to Manila.
 January 14, 1992: Morada was asked to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA,
in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.  He brought her to the police station where the police took her
passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident.  The police pressured her to drop the
case against Thamer and Allah.  Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her
passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
 June 16, 1993: Morada, while in Riyadh Saudi Arabia, was not allowed to board the plane to
Manila and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy.  Khalid of the
SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written
in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah
 but it was actually a notice for her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993.  Plaintiff then
returned to Manila.
 June 27, 1993: SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, assured Morada that the
investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her so she reported to Miniewy in
Jeddah for further investigation.  She was brought to the Saudi court.
 June 28, 1993: Saudi judge interrogated Morada through an interpreter about the Jakarta
incident for an hour and let her go.  SAUDIA officers forbidden her to take flight.  She was told
to go the Inflight Service Office  where her passport was taken and they told her to remain in
Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders.
 July 3, 1993: She was brought to court again and to her astonishment and shock, rendered a
decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286
lashes.  The court tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, and found her guilty of (1)
adultery (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws
and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
 Failing to seek the assistance of her employer, SAUDIA, she asked the Philippine Embassy
in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal.  She continued to workon the domestic
flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the international flights.
 Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her
and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia.  Before her return to Manila, she was terminated from
the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause.
 November 23, 1993: Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-
Balawi, its country manager.
 January 19, 1994: SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss on following grounds: (1)
that the Complaint states no cause of action against SAUDIA (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is
not a real party in interest (3) that the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has been
waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished and (4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to
try the case.
 After opposition to the motion to dismiss by Morada and reply by SAUDIA, Morada filed an
Amended Complaint dropping Al-Balawi.  SAUDIA filed its Manifestation,  Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint, subsequently motion for reconsideration which were all denied.
 SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals.  TRO
was granted but Writ of Preliminary Injunction was denied.
 CA: Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaint's basis for
recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of
respondent Court. It further held that certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a
Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in case of
an adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal.
 SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order:
o    It is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the outset:
  Morada's claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
  Existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule.
 Morada: Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code which is a
matter of domestic law

ISSUE: W/N the RTC of Quezon City has jurisdiction over the case and it is the proper forum for
recovery of damages under Art. 21 of the Civil Code which should govern.

HELD: YES. petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. REMANDED to RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 89 for further proceedings
 Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, the
problem could present a "conflicts" case
 A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or
more states is said to contain a "foreign element".
o    Morada is a resident Philippine national
o    SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation
o    by virtue of the employment of Morada with the SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire
during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a "conflicts" situation to arise
 Forms of foreign element:
o    Simple: one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between
nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State
o    Complex
 Violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the
municipal forum.  RTC of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit.
 Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in
favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction:
o    private interest of the litigant
o    enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained
o    relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial
  Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, "vex", "harass", or "oppress" the defendant, e.g.
by inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance. but unless the balance is strongly in favor of
the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.
 Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in
the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff
(private respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a
fundamental unfairness to her.  Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no
unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties.
 Trial court possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties
o    By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent has voluntary
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court
o    SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial court's jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the
Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
 As to the choice of applicable law, it seeks to answer 2 important questions:
o    (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in
two or more states
o    (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation
 Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both notions of justice
and predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with the problem of
deciding which of these two important values should be stressed.
 Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a
certain set of facts or rules fall
o    "characterization" or the "doctrine of qualification”
  process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule
  purpose: to enable the forum to select the proper law
 Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of: (essential element of conflict rules)
o    factual situation/relationship or operative fact (such as property right, contract claim); and
  starting point of analysis
o    test or connecting factor or point of contact (such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the
place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing) – could be:
  (1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin
  (2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation
  (3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the
lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved
  (4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has
been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly
important in contracts and torts
  (5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual
duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised
  (6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci
intentionis;
  (7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori — the law
of the forum — is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of "procedure" not
going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies
whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given
case for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
  (8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and
of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of
affreightment
 Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the
determination of the applicable law.
  Based on pleadings on record, including allegations in the Amended Complaint:
o    Morada was made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic
laws and tradition
o    SAUDIA may have acted beyond its duties as employer by handing over the person of Morada to
Jeddah officials which contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused additional humiliation,
misery and suffering.  It also took advantage of the trust, confidence and faith in the guise of authority
as employer.
o    Conviction and imprisonment was wrongful but injury or harm was inflicted upon her person and
reputation which must be compensated or redress for the wrong doing
 Complaint involving torts
 "connecting factor" or "point of contact" - place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci
actus occurred = Philippines where SAUDIA deceived Morada, a Filipina residing and
working here.
 "State of the most significant relationship" – applied
o    taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue:
  (a) the place where the injury occurred
  (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred
  (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties
  (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered
  private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working here
  a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage

Bellis vs Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5
legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd
wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.

Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be
divided in trust in the following order and manner:

a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.

Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in
the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest
therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy
of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3
illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the
executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.

Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to
the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.

The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.

RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.

Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under
the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the
Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.

GOVERNMENT VS. FRANK

MARCH 28, 2013  ~ VBDIAZ

THE GOVT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. FRANK

G. R. No. 2935
March 23, 1909
FACTS: In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, Frank entered into a contract for a
period of 2 years with the Plaintiff, by which Frank was to receive a salary as a
stenographer in the service of the said Plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid
in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of Chicago to Manila,
and one-half salary during said period of travel.
Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of
Frank, he should become liable to the Plaintiff for the amount expended by the
Government by way of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and the
one-half salary paid during such period.

Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and was paid half-salary from the
date until the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands.

Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to make a further
compliance with the terms of the contract.

The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-Manila to recover from Frank the sum
of money, which amount the Plaintiff claimed had been paid to Frank as expenses
incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half-salary for the period
consumed in travel.

It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and No.
224 should constitute a part of said contract.

The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in his special
defense that
(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224
and had thereby materially altered the said contract, and also that
(2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore not
responsible under the law.
the lower court rendered a judgment against Frank and in favor of the Plaintiff for the
sum of 265. 90 dollars

ISSUE:
1. Did the amendment of the laws altered the tenor of the contract entered into between
Plaintiff and Defendant?
2. Can the defendant allege minority/infancy?

HELD: the judgment of the lower court is affirmed

1. NO; It may be said that the mere fact that the legislative department of the
Government of the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by
Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the
contract made between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The legislative department of
the Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1902
from altering or changing the terms of a contract. The right which the Defendant had
acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not been changed in any respect by
the fact that said laws had been amended. These acts, constituting the terms of the
contract, still constituted a part of said contract and were enforceable in favor of the
Defendant.

2. NO; The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore
the contract could not be enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the time
the contract was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of
that State and had full authority to contract. Frank claims that, by reason of the fact
that, under that laws of the Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, made
persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they had attained the age of 23
years, he was not liable under said contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine
Islands governed.

It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is admitted — that at the time and place
of the making of the contract in question the Defendant had full capacity to make the
same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution,
interpretation and validity of a contract are determined b the law of the place where the
contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law
prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the
bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the
law of the place where the suit is brought.

CADALIN VS POEA238 SCRA 721Facts:On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and
Donato B. Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers (OCWs)
instituted a class suit by filing an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by
BRII .BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction;
while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy
Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.The amended complaint
principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was
terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and
Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits;
refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR;
penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the
accreditation of BIssue:Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the POEA, as well as the decision
that is the subjectof these appeals, conformed with the requirements of due process.Whether or not
what is the prevalent law to be applied in this case, Art. 291 of Labor Code or Art.1144 of Civil
Code.Ruling:Wherefore, all the three petitions are dismissed.The three petitions were filed under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court on the grounds that NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. We find no such abuse of
discretion.NLRC believed money claims-all money claims arising from employer-employee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of
action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred. This is embodied in the Article 291 of Labor Code
which the petitioners failed to comply. It applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides for
greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of
the belief that "where the laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers,
then the laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment contract."Its interpretation
is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared form containing the stipulations
of the employment contract and the employees merely "take it or leave it." The presumption is that
there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the employees signed the contracts out
of necessity that reduced their bargaining power.

HSBC VS. SHERMAN

MARCH 28, 2013  ~ VBDIAZ

HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION (HSBC) vs.

SHERMAN et al
G.R. No. 72494
August 11, 1989
FACTS: It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd.
(COMPANY), a company incorporated in Singapore applied with and was granted by
HSBC Singapore branch an overdraft facility in the maximum amount of Singapore
dollars 200,000 with interest at 3% over HSBC prime rate, payable monthly, on
amounts due under said overdraft facility.
As a security for the repayment by the COMPANY of sums advanced by HSBC to it
through the aforesaid overdraft facility, in 1982, both private respondents and a certain
Lowe, all of whom were directors of the COMPANY at such time, executed a Joint
and Several Guarantee in favor of HSBC whereby private respondents and Lowe
agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on demand all sums owed by the COMPANY to
petitioner BANK under the aforestated overdraft facility.

The Joint and Several Guarantee provides, inter alia, that:

This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be
construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of
the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall have
jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee. …

The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded payment and
inasmuch as the private respondents still failed to pay, HSBC filed A complaint for
collection of a sum of money against private respondents Sherman and Reloj before
RTC of Quezon City.
Private respondents filed an MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. The trial court denied the motion. They then filed before the respondent IAC a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or prayer for a restraining
order. The IAC rendered a decision enjoining the RTC Quezon City from taking
further cognizance of the case and to dismiss the same for filing with the proper court
of Singapore which is the proper forum. MR denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Do Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit, vis-a-vis the Guarantee
stipulation regarding jurisdiction?
HELD: YES
One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does
not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether
the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the
jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice
The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in
Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove,
that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble, damage, or
expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the action
here just to harass private respondents.
**

In the case of Neville Y. Lamis Ents., et al. v. Lagamon, etc., where the stipulation was
“[i]n case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the Court of Davao City.” We
held:

Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the venue, suffice it to say that
a stipulation as to venue does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of
plaintiff or defendant under Section 2 (b), Rule 4, ROC, in the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words in the agreement which would indicate that the place named is the
only venue agreed upon by the parties.
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the parties did not thereby stipulate that only
the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the
clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In International
Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a State to exercise authority over
persons and things within its boundaries subject to certain exceptions. Thus, a State
does not assume jurisdiction over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic
representatives of other States, and foreign military units stationed in or marching
through State territory with the permission of the latter’s authorities. This authority,
which finds its source in the concept of sovereignty, is exclusive within and
throughout the domain of the State. A State is competent to take hold of any judicial
matter it sees fit by making its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds
of cases brought before them

NOTES:
The respondent IAC likewise ruled that:
… In a conflict problem, a court will simply refuse to entertain the case if it is not
authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction. And even if it is so authorized, it may still
refuse to entertain the case by applying the principle of forum non conveniens. …
However, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the
principle of forum non conveniens depends largely upon the facts of the particular case
and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus, the IAC should not
have relied on such principle.
AZNAR VS GARCIA
MARCH 28, 2013  ~ VBDIAZ

AZNAR vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963
FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by
Executioner Aznar according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to
HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY
Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it
deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared by Us an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier
case.

As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when
he resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he executed his will he declared that he was a citizen
of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California
citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the
Philippines.

ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California
law?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term “national law” is used therein.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under
the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form
and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil
Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the
State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case,
should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the State of California of which
Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should
be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi,
the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred
back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while
the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the
conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended
and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens
living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the
law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should
govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out
as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of
California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein
and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.

It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there is no law
to the contrary in the place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the California
Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to
the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law
of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained.

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code,
i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of
the testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the
law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can
not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back
and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a
citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as
directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to
be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no
legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California,
is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged
natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the
domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law
of California..

NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary

provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law
applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The “national law”
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly
mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private
law of the State of California.

BANK OF AMERICA VS.

AMERICAN REALTY
MARCH 28, 2013  ~ VBDIAZ

Bank of America vs American Realty Corporation

GR 133876 December 29, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As security, the latter mortgaged a
property located in the Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third
party mortgagor who pledged its own property in favor of the 3 debtor-foreign
corporations.

The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to
enforce the loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially
foreclose the said mortgage, which was granted.

On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an
action for damages against the petitioner, for the latter’s act of foreclosing extra-
judicially the real estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign
courts for the collection of the principal loan.

Issue:
WON petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the
recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of
foreclosure.

Held: Yes.
1. Loan; Mortgage; remedies:

In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute

against the mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose
the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both.
By such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two
remedies is complete in itself.

In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed
alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a
waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the
suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of
mortgage. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the
mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the
Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.

In the case at bar, petitioner only has one cause of action which is non-payment of the
debt. Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and exercise.
Petitioner then may opt to exercise only one of two remedies so as not to violate the
rule against splitting a cause of action.

Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the expediency
of filing four civil suits before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to
foreclose the real estate mortgages constituted over the properties of third-party
mortgagor and herein private respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing the four civil
actions and by eventually foreclosing extra-judicially the mortgages, petitioner in
effect transgressed the rules against splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in
jurisprudence and our statute books.
2. Conflicts of Law

Incidentally, petitioner alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is
the governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose
its security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money.

We rule in the negative.

In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our
jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be
properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local or domestic or internal
law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were
properly pleaded and proved in said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall
not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded
in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the
most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously
unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
 Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

G.R. No. 137000, Aug. 9, 2000

o Principle of jus sanguinis

o How Philippine citizenship is acquired
o Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: express renunciation of other citizenship

FACTS:

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and
an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle
in the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in
the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998
elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as
candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

HELD:

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a
child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her
birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on
the basis of place of birth.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect
and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal
organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine
Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the
Jones Law.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine
citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in
Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws,
which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of
jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood
relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus,
the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her
losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most,
private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of
dual citizenship.

G.R. No. 137000               August 9, 2000

CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.

DECISION

PURISIMA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the
herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May
1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to
the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines.

On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic
Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a
voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental.
Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed
as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no
sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on
Elections en banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:

"A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows that
respondent was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father... and
consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the
perorations of the petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding.

On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other evidence
substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian
citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under
Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance
and consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that
respondent contemplated renunciation of her Filipino citizenship". 1
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of
Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA
No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said
petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.

The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election
as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the
herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.

On July 17, 1998, the COMELEC’s First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition,
and disposing as follows:

"Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the instant case on the
merits trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new
evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The present petition
merely restates the same matters and incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in
1995 Resolution but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any new
evidence and matter substantial in nature, persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to
compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the present petition follows as a matter of
course.

x x x           x x x          x x x

"WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues tendered, We find
no convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb and reverse the Resolutions promulgated
by this Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby
RESOLVES to DISMISS the present petition.

SO ORDERED." 2

Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The
same was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning the citizenship
of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.

The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino
citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a
Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987
Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino
citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her
Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian
Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and
SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of
Davao Oriental governor.

Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing
reliance on the admitted facts that:

a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an

Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated
September 19, 1988;
 b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR),
and

c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.

Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent had
renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate of
registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent expressly declared under oath
that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship,
and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.

As regards the COMELEC’s finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship
on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had
her Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy
here in Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not automatically restore the status of private
respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire
Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under
Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration
of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled with her
alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a stateless
person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.

Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the principle of res
judicata to the case under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, that:
3 

"xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative

case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand. xxx"

The petition is unmeritorious.

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows
the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the
doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome,
Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines
Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution
took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal
organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July
1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. The
Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:

SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the
Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:

SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day
of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of
some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States if residing therein. (underscoring ours)

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private
respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a
fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen.
By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter,
herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent,
4  5 

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her
being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows
the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship
resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen,
she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited
private respondent’s application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian
passport on March 3, 1988.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:

(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;

 (2) By express renunciation of citizenship;

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign

country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;

(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;

(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;

(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed
forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted:
and

(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in
her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.

In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioner’s
contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her
Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs.
COMELEC and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.
6  7

In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a
certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an
application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.

And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an
American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-
mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his
American citizenship.

Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian
passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation
of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to
effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this court in the
8 

aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an
express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of the herein private
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the
case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she
effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was
an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another
country has not been included as a ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private
respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent
must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.

Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual
citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic
Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:

"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
 x x x           x x x          x x x

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

x x x           x x x          x x x

Again, petitioner’s contention is untenable.

In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in the
Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution
on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act,
9 

and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of
another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with
dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:

"xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be
understood as referring to ‘dual allegiance’. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification."

Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her
from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is
enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed
10 

to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so
11 

because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she
will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992,
such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration
of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian
passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro
of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts
were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her
renunciation was effective, petitioner’s claim that private respondent must go through the whole
process of repatriation holds no water.

Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative
proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any
subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner
of Immigration. He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.
12 

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally
does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs.
Republic, an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order
13 

that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:

1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a

party;

2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof, and
 3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the
weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these
antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. Indeed,
14 

there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No.
95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private
respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in
these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a
reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the
merits, the petition cannot prosper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17,
1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao
Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., abroad on official business.

Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26,

1999]
FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on
the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was
reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of
majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.
RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the
Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.  It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship.  That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any
other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with.  The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts.  The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the
legislative department of the Republic.  No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he
betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings.  In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of
entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national.  A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 

BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ

MARCH 28, 2013  ~ VBDIAZ

BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ

G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of
Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA.
As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act
Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired
(1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other,
“rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country.”

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased
by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the
U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA

2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who
Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the
Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over
petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent
HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he
is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring
Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still
be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:

1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due
to:

1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status
as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered
the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-
born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

NORTHWEST VS. CA AND SHARP

MARCH 28, 2013  ~ VBDIAZ

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. vs. CA and C.F. SHARP &

COMPANY INC.
G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995
FACTS: Petitioner Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. (NORTHWEST), a corporation
organized under the laws of the State of Minnesota, U.S.A., sought to enforce in the
RTC- Manila, a judgment rendered in its favor by a Japanese court against private
respondent C.F. Sharp & Company, Inc., (SHARP), a corporation incorporated under
Philippine laws.
factual and procedural antecedents of this controversy:

On May 9, 1974, Northwest Airlines and Sharp, through its Japan branch, entered into
an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the former authorized
the latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket
sales made by defendant on behalf of the plaintiff under the said agreement, plaintiff
on March 25, 1980 sued defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted
proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for damages.
On April 11, 1980, a writ of summons was issued by the 36th Civil Department,
Tokyo District Court of Japan against defendant at its office at the Taiheiyo Building,
3rd floor, 132, Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Yokohoma, Kanagawa Prefecture. The
attempt to serve the summons was unsuccessful because the bailiff was advised by a
person in the office that Mr. Dinozo, the person believed to be authorized to receive
court processes was in Manila and would be back on April 24, 1980.

On April 24, 1980, bailiff returned to the defendant’s office to serve the summons. Mr.
Dinozo refused to accept the same claiming that he was no longer an employee of the
defendant.

After the two attempts of service were unsuccessful, the judge of the Tokyo District
Court decided to have the complaint and the writs of summons served at the head
office of the defendant in Manila. On July 11, 1980, the Director of the Tokyo District
Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to serve the summons through diplomatic
channels upon the defendant’s head office in Manila.
On August 28, 1980, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the
writ of summons (p. 276, Records). Despite receipt of the same, defendant failed to
appear at the scheduled hearing. Thus, the Tokyo Court proceeded to hear the
plaintiff’s complaint and on [January 29, 1981], rendered judgment ordering the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of 83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at the
rate of 6% per annum from August 28, 1980 up to and until payment is completed (pp.
12-14, Records).

On March 24, 1981, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the
judgment. Defendant not having appealed the judgment, the same became final and
executory.

Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan, hence, on May 20, 1983, a suit
for enforcement of the judgment was filed by plaintiff before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila Branch 54.

defendant filed its answer averring that the judgment of the Japanese Court: (1) the
foreign judgment sought to be enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction and (2)
the said judgment is contrary to Philippine law and public policy and rendered without
due process of law.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. It agreed with the latter
in its reliance upon Boudard vs. Tait wherein it was held that “the process of the court
has no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the
defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state.” To support its position,
the Court of Appeals further stated:
In an action strictly in personam, such as the instant case, personal service of summons
within the forum is required for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant
(Magdalena Estate Inc. vs. Nieto, 125 SCRA 230). To confer jurisdiction on the court,
personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant not extraterritorial service
is necessary.

ISSUE: whether a Japanese court can acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine

corporation doing business in Japan by serving summons through diplomatic channels
on the Philippine corporation at its principal office in Manila after prior attempts to
serve summons in Japan had failed.
HELD: YES
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the
proceedings and the giving of due notice therein. 6
The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.(See Sec. 50, R 39)

Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had
the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment.

It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service
of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the
forum. 8 In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was
rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on
SHARP. As to what this law is is a question of fact, not of law.
It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese
procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is
invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the
service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must
stand.
Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the
presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption may be
invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the
Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business
in the Philippines.

Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its resident
agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if there is no such
resident agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect; or (3) on
any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.

Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government
official designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a
foreign insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign
banking corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of
other foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines.

Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a resident agent authorized
to receive court processes in Japan.
While it may be true that service could have been made upon any of the officers or
agents of SHARP at its three other branches in Japan, the availability of such a
recourse would not preclude service upon the proper government official, as stated
above.
As found by the respondent court, two attempts at service were made at SHARP’s
Yokohama branch. Both were unsuccessful.
The Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to cause the delivery
of the summons and other legal documents to the Philippines. Acting on that request,
the Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons together with the other legal documents
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan which, in turn, forwarded the same to the
Japanese Embassy in Manila . Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the
Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, then to the Executive
Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who
forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its
principal office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service on the proper
government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Hence, SHARP’s contention that such manner of
service is not valid under Philippine laws holds no water.

We find NORTHWEST’s claim for attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary
damages to be without merit. We find no evidence that would justify an award for
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses under Article 2208 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Nor is an award for exemplary damages warranted.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the challenged decision
is AFFIRMED insofar as it denied NORTHWEST’s claims for attorneys fees,
litigation expenses, and exemplary damages but REVERSED insofar as in sustained
the trial court’s dismissal of NORTHWEST’s complaint in Civil Case No. 83-17637
of Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and another in its stead is hereby
rendered ORDERING private respondent C.F. SHARP L COMPANY, INC. to pay to
NORTHWEST the amounts adjudged in the foreign judgment subject of said case,
with interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint therein until the
said foreign judgment is fully satisfied.

    
 

G.R. No. L-54204 September 30, 1982

NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC., petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M. TORRES,
REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C. ABORDO, respondents.
Bito, Misa & Lozada Law Offices for petitioners.

The Solicitor General and Jose A. Rico for respondents.

RELOVA, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, petitioners pray that the order dated June 20, 1979 of the National
Seamen Board, and the decision dated December 11, 1979 of the Ministry of Labor be nullified and
set aside, and that "if petitioners are found liable to private respondent, such a liability be reduced to
P30,000.00 only, in accordance with respondent NSB's Standard Format of a Service Agreement."

Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo, was the
Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his
employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a
vessel of Singaporean Registry. The late Napoleon B. Abordo at the time of his death was receiving a
monthly salary of US$850.00 (Petition, page 5).

In her complaint for "death compensation benefits, accrued leave pay and time-off allowances,
funeral expenses, attorney's fees and other benefits and reliefs available in connection with the death
of Napoleon B. Abordo," filed before the National Seamen Board, Restituta C. Abordo alleged that
the amount of compensation due her from petitioners Norse Management Co. (PTE) and Pacific
Seamen Services, Inc., principal and agent, respectively, should be based on the law where the
vessel is registered. On the other hand, petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be
applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the
Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they offered to pay private respondent
Restituta C. Abordo the sum of P30,000.00 as death benefits based on the Board's Memorandum
Circular No. 25 which they claim should apply in this case.

The Hearing Officer III, Rebene C. Carrera of the Ministry of Labor and Employment, after hearing
the case, rendered judgment on June 20, 1979, ordering herein petitioners "to pay jointly and
severally the following:

I. US$30,600 (the 36-month salary of the decreased)) or its equivalent in Philippine

currency as death compensation benefits;

II. US$500.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency as funeral expenses;

III. US$3,110 or 10% of the total amount recovered as attorney's fees.

It is also ordered that payment must be made thru the National Seamen Board within
ten (10) days from receipt of this decision.

Petitioners appealed to the Ministry of Labor. On December 11, 1979, the Ministry rendered its
decision in this case as follows:

Motion for reconsideration filed by respondents from the Order of this Board dated 20
June 1979 requiring them to pay complainant, jointly and severally, the amount of
Thirty-four thousand and two hundred ten dollars ($34,210.00) representing death
benefits, funeral expenses and attorney's fees.

The facts in the main are not disputed. The deceased, husband of complainant
herein, was employed as a Second Engineer by respondents and served as such in
the vessel "M.T. Cherry Earl" until that fatal day in May 1978 when, while at sea, he
 suffered an apoplectic stroke and died four days later or on 29 May 1978. In her
complaint filed before this Board, Abordo argued that the amount of compensation
due her should be based on the law where the vessel is registered, which is
Singapore law. Agreeing with said argument, this Board issued the questioned Order.
Hence this Motion for Reconsideration.

In their motion for reconsideration, respondents strongly argue that the law of
Singapore should not be applied in the case considering that their responsibility was
not alleged in the complaint that no proof of the existence of the Workmen's
Insurance Law of Singapore was ever presented and that the Board cannot take
judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they
offered to pay complainant the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as
death benefits based on this Board's Memorandum Circular No. 25 which, they
maintained, should apply in this case.

The only issue we are called upon to rule is whether or not the law of Singapore
ought to be applied in this case.

After an exhaustive study of jurisprudence on the matter. we rule in the affirmative.

Respondents came out with a well-prepared motion which, to our mind, is more
appropriate and perhaps acceptable in the regular court of justice. Nothing is raised in
their motion but question of evidence. But evidence is usually a matter of procedure
of which this Board, being merely a quasi-judicial body, is not strict about.

It is true that the law of Singapore was not alleged and proved in the course of the
hearing. And following Supreme Court decisions in a long line of cases that a foreign
law, being a matter of evidence, must be alleged and proved, the law of Singapore
ought not to be recognized in this case. But it is our considered opinion that the
jurisprudence on this matter was never meant to apply to cases before administrative
or quasi-judicial bodies such as the National Seamen Board. For well-settled also is
the rule that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound strictly by
technical rules. It has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long
line of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death
while in the course of employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is
registered shall be considered. We see no reason to deviate from this well-considered
policy. Certainly not on technical grounds as movants herein would like us to.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied and the Order of tills
Board dated 20 June 1979 affirmed. Let execution issue immediately.

In Section 5(B) of the "Employment Agreement" between Norse Management Co. (PTE) and the late
Napoleon B. Abordo, which is Annex "C" of the Supplemental Complaint, it was stipulated that:

In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course of his
employment and not due to his own willful misconduct and occurring whilst on board
any vessel to which he may be assigned, but not any other time, the EMPLOYER win
provide employee with free medical attention, including hospital treatment, also
essential medical treatment in the course of repatriation and until EMPLOYEE's
arrival at his point of origin. If such illness or injury incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to
the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as determined by a
qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such illness or injury
was not due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct compensation
shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the
Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's
Insurance Law of registry of the vessel whichever is greater. (Emphasis supplied)
In the aforementioned "Employment Agreement" between petitioners and the late Napoleon B.
Abordo, it is clear that compensation shall be paid under Philippine Law or the law of registry of
petitioners' vessel, whichever is greater. Since private respondent Restituta C. Abordo was offered
P30,000.00 only by the petitioners, Singapore law was properly applied in this case.

The "Employment Agreement" is attached to the Supplemental Complaint of Restituta C. Abordo and,
therefore, it forms part thereof. As it is familiar with Singapore Law, the National Seamen Board is
justified in taking judicial notice of and in applying that law. In the case of VirJen Shipping and Marine
Services, Inc. vs. National Seamen Board, et al (L41297), the respondent Board promulgated a
decision, as follows:

The facts established and/or admitted by the parties are the following: that the late
Remigio Roldan was hired by the respondent as Ordinary Seamen on board the M/V
"Singapura Pertama," a vessel of Singapore Registry; that on September 27, 1973,
the deceased Remigio Roldan met an accident resulting in his death while on board
the said M/V "Singapura Pertama" during the performance of his duties; that on
December 3, 1973, the respondent Virjen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. paid the
complainant Natividad Roldan the amount of P6,000.00 representing Workmen's
Compensation benefits and donations of the company; that the amount of P4,870
was spent by the respondent company as burial expenses of the deceased Remegio
Roldan.

The only issue therefore remaining to be resolved by the Board in connection with the
particular case, is whether or not under the existing laws (Philippine and foreign), the
complainant Natividad Roldan is entitled to additional benefits other than those
mentioned earlier. The Board takes judicial notice, (as a matter of fact, the
respondent having admitted in its memorandum) of the fact that "Singapura Pertama"
is a foreign vessel of Singapore Registry and it is the policy of this Board that in case
of award of benefits to seamen who were either injured in the performance of its
duties or who died while in the course of employment is to consider the benefits
allowed by the country where the vessel is registered. Likewise, the Board takes
notice that Singapore maritime laws relating to workmen's compensation benefits are
similar to that of the Hongkong maritime laws which provides that in case of death,
the heirs of the deceased seaman should receive the equivalent of 36 months wages
of the deceased seaman; in other words, 36 months multiplied by the basic monthly
wages. In the employment contract submitted with this Board, the terms of which
have never been at issue, is shown that the monthly salary of the deceased Remigio
Roldan at the time of his death was US$80.00; such that, 36 months multiplied by $80
would come up to US$2,880 and at the rate of P7.00 to $1.00, the benefits due the
claimant would be P20,160. However, since there was voluntary payment made in the
amount of P6,000 and funeral expenses which under the Workmen's Compensation
Law had a maximum of P200.00, the amount of P6,200.00 should be deducted from
P20,160 and the difference would be P13,960.00.

WHEREFORE, the Board orders the respondent Virjen Shipping and Marine
Services, Inc. to pay the complainant Natividad Roldan the amount of P13,960.00
within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision. The Board also orders the
respondent that payment should be made through the National Seamen Board.

The foregoing decision was assailed as null and void for allegedly having been rendered without
jurisdiction and for awarding compensation benefits beyond the maximum allowable and on the
ground of res judicata. This Court in its resolution dated October 27, 1975 and December 12, 1975,
respectively dismissed for lack of merit the petition as well as the motion for reconsideration in said
G.R. No. L- 41297.
Furthermore, Article 20, Labor Code of the Philippines, provides that the National Seamen Board has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases including money claims, involving
employer-employee relations, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino
seamen for overseas employment. Thus, it is safe to assume that the Board is familiar with pertinent
Singapore maritime laws relative to workmen's compensation. Moreover, the Board may apply the
rule on judicial notice and, "in administrative proceedings, the technical rules of procedure —
particularly of evidence — applied in judicial trials, do not strictly apply." (Oromeca Lumber Co. Inc.
vs. Social Security Commission, 4 SCRA 1188).

Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation
of the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor.

For lack of merit, this petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-66006 February 28, 1985

BAGONG FILIPINAS OVERSEAS CORPORATION and GOLDEN STAR SHIPPING,

LTD., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, DIRECTOR PATRICIA SANTO TOMAS and PROSERFINA
PANCHO respondents.

Elizer A. Odulios for petitioners.

Pedro L. Linsangan for respondent P. Pancho.

AQUINO, J.:

The issue in this case is whether the shipboard employment contract or Hongkong law should govern
the amount of death compensation due to the wife of Guillermo Pancho who was employed by
Golden Star Shipping, Ltd., a Hongkong based firm.

The shipboard employment contract dated June 1, 1978 was executed in this country between
Pancho and Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation, the local agent of Golden Star Shipping. It was
approved by the defunct National Seamen Board. Pancho was hired as an oiler in the M/V Olivine for
12 months with a gross monthly wage of US $195.

In October, 1978, he had a cerebral stroke. He was rushed to the hospital while the vessel was
docked at Gothenberg, Sweden. He was repatriated to the Philippines and confined at the San Juan
de Dios Hospital. He died on December 13, 1979.

The National Seamen Board awarded his widow, Proserfina, P20,000 as disability compensation
benefits pursuant to the above-mentioned employment contract plus P2,000 as attorney's fees.
Proserfina appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission which awarded her $621 times 36
months or its equivalent in Philippine currency plus 10% of the benefits as attorney's fees. Golden
Star Shipping assailed that decision by certiorari.
We hold that the shipboard employment contract is controlling in this case. The contract provides that
the beneficiaries of the seaman are entitled to P20,000 "over and above the benefits" for which the
Philippine Government is liable under Philippine law.

Hongkong law on workmen's compensation is not the applicable law. The case of Norse
Management Co. vs. National Seamen Board, G. R. No. 54204, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 486
cannot be a precedent because it was expressly stipulated in the employment contract in that case
that the workmen's compensation payable to the employee should be in accordance with Philippine
Law or the Workmen's Insurance Law of the country where the vessel is registered "whichever is
greater".

The Solicitor General opines that the employment contract should be applied. For that reason, he
refused to uphold the decision of the NLRC.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the National Labor Relations Commission is reversed and set aside.
The decision of the National Seamen Board dated February 26, 1981 is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PIA VS OPLE
MARCH 28, 2013  ~ VBDIAZ

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES (PIA) CORPORATION vs HON. BLAS

F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in
his capacity as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and MARIA
MOONYEEN MAMASIG
G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990

FACTS: On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation

(PIA), a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in
Manila 2 separate contracts of employment, one with private respondent Farrales and
the other with private respondent Mamasig. 1 The contracts, which became effective
on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent portion as follows:
5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the mutual consent of
the parties.
xxx xxx xxx
6. TERMINATION
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to
terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in
advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the
EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month’s salary.
xxx xxx xxx
10. APPLICABLE LAW:
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan,
and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any
matter arising out of or under this agreement.

Farrales & Mamasig (employees) were hired as flight attendants after undergoing
training. Base station was in Manila and flying assignments to different parts of the
Middle East and Europe.

roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts of employment,
PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA,
sent separate letters, informing them that they will be terminated effective September
1, 1980.
Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of
Labor and Employment (MOLE).

PIA’s Contention: The PIA submitted its position paper, but no evidence, and there
claimed that both private respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in the
habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of “personal effects”; and that PIA
personnel at the Manila International Airport had been discreetly warned by customs
officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed
that the services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the
provisions of the employment contract.

Favorable decision for the respondents. The Order stated that private respondents had
attained the status of regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of
continued service; that the stipulation limiting the period of the employment contract
to 3 years was null and void as violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules and regulations on regular and casual employment; and that the
dismissal, having been carried out without the requisite clearance from the MOLE,
was illegal and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.
Decision sustained on appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari

ISSUE: (Relative to the subject) Which law should govern over the case? Which court
has jurisdiction?
HELD: Philippine Law and Philippine courts
Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which
specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and,
secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection
with the agreement “only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan”.
We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public interest
and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered
illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship.
the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at
least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while
petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually
doing business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were
based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and
Europe. All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative
agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the
parties.
Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be
given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon
them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake
to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be
presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the
applicable provisions of Philippine law.
[DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION, eh?]
Petition denied.
Torts And Damages Case Digest: Triple Eight
V. NLRC (1998)

G.R. No. 129584  December 3, 1998

Lessons Applicable: Moral Damage for Labor Cases (Torts and Damages)

Laws Applicable: Art. 284 of the Labor Code, Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code
 

FACTS:

 August 1992: Osdana was recruited by Triple Eight Integrated Services Inc. for

employment as "Food Server" for 36 months with Gulf Catering Company
(GCC) based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for 36 months.  She was required to
pay P11,950 placement fees.  Subsequently, she was asked to sign a contract for a
salary of $280 which was approved by POEA.
 September 16, 1992: Osdana commeced work as staff to College of Public
Administration made to wash dishes, cooking pots, and utensils, perform janitorial
work and other tasks which were unrelated to her job designation as waitress on a
12-hour shift without overtime pay
 Because of the long hours and the strenuous nature of her work, she
felt numbness and pain in her arms so she was confined at the Ladies Villa
during June 18 to August 22, 1993 for which she was not paid her salaries
 August 22 to October 5, 1993: She worked as a Food Server and Cook at the
Hota Bani Tameem Hospital for which she was not compensated
 October 6 to October 23, 1993: She was confined at the Ladies Villa for no reason
and was not paid her salary
 October 24, 1993: She was assigned at Oleysha University to wash dishes and do
other menial tasks at long hours
 January 1994 and April 23, 1994: She underwent operation because of her pains and was not
given work during the period even though her doctor advised that she can do light work.  She did not
receive any compensation.
 April 27, 1994: She was discharged from work without separation pay on the
ground of illness
 labor arbiter: favored Osdana holding Triple Eight liable for US$2,499.00 as
salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract, and US$1,076.00 as unpaid salary
and salary differential, or its equivalent in Philippine Peso and P50,000 moral
 damages, P20,000 exemplary damages and 10% of the monetary award as
attorney's fee
 NLRC: affirmed
 Triple Eight filed a petition for certiorari for awarding without legal basis
ISSUE: W/N Osdana is entitled Moral Damages

HELD: YES.  AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award to private respondent
Osdana should be one thousand two hundred sixty US dollars (US$1,260), or its
equivalent in Philippine pesos, as salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment
contract, and one thousand seventy six US dollars (US$1,076), or its equivalent in
Philippine pesos, representing unpaid salaries for seven (7) months and underpaid
salary for one (1) month, plus interest.  Petitioner is likewise ordered to pay private
respondent P30,000.00 in moral damages, P10,000.00 in exemplary damages and 10%
attorney's fees.

 In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the
dismissal is for a just cause.
 Osdana's continued employment despite her illness was not prohibited by law nor
was it prejudicial to her health, as well as that of her co-employees. Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome" is not a contagious disease and her medical report indicated that she had
very good improvement of the symptoms
 The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code
cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary
determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee's illness and
thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor.
 lex loci contactus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in
this jurisdiction.  Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not
enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy
 employment contract approved by the POEA was only for a period of twelve
months, Osdana's actual stint with the foreign principal lasted for one year and
seven-and-a-half months. It may be inferred, therefore, that the employer renewed
her employment contract for another year. Thus, the award for the unexpired
portion of the contract should have been US$1,260 (US$280 x 4 1/2 months) or its
equivalent in Philippine pesos, not US$2,499 as adjudged by the labor arbiter and
affirmed by the NLRC.
 As for the award for unpaid salaries and differential amounting to US$ 1,076
representing seven months' unpaid salaries and one month underpaid salary, the
same is proper because, as correctly pointed out by Osdana, the "no work, no pay"
rule relied upon by petitioner does not apply in this case. In the first place, the fact
 that she had not worked from June 18 to August 22, 1993 and then from January 24
to April 29, 1994, was due to her illness which was clearly work-related. Second,
from August 23 to October 5, 1993, Osdana actually worked as food server and cook
for seven days a week at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, but was not paid any
salary for the said period. Finally, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, she was
confined to quarters and was not given any work for no reason at all.
 award of moral and exemplary damages, the same is likewise proper but should
be reduced. Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are recoverable where
the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an
act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs,
or public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was
effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. Since the employer is
deemed to have acted in bad faith, the award for attorney's fees is likewise upheld
 it does not appear that petitioner took steps to have its principal included as co-
respondent thus, it is the only one liable.  The POEA, and later the labor arbiter, did
not acquire jurisdiction over the foreign principal.

SANTOS VS NORTHWEST
MARCH 28, 2013  ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 101538 June 23, 1992

AUGUSTO BENEDICTO SANTOS III, represented by his father and legal
guardian, Augusto Benedicto Santos vs. NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES and
CA
FACTS: The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent
Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in
Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the
Philippines.
On October 21, 1986, the petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San
Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back.
The scheduled departure date from Tokyo was December 20, 1986. No date was
specified for his return to San Francisco.
On December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at the NOA counter in the San
Francisco airport for his scheduled departure to Manila. Despite a previous
confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his
flight from Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed.

On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in the RTC of Makati. On
April 13, 1987, NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, citing Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, reading as follows:

Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile
of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business
through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of
destination.

The private respondent contended that the Philippines was not its domicile nor was this
its principal place of business. Neither was the petitioner’s ticket issued in this country
nor was his destination Manila but San Francisco in the United States.
Lower court granted the dismissal, CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WON the Philippines has jurisdiction over the case. (Issue raised by the party
is WON the provision of the Warsaw convention was constitutional)
HELD: No jurisdiction (the provision is constitutional)
The Convention is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine
government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country. The
petitioner’s allegations are not convincing enough to overcome this presumption.
Apparently, the Convention considered the four places designated in Article 28 the
most convenient forums for the litigation of any claim that may arise between the
airline and its passenger, as distinguished from all other places.

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Sabena vs. Court of

Appeals
Sabena Belgian World Airlines vs. CA
(GR 104685, 14 March 1996)
FACTS:

Private respondent MA. PAULA SAN AGUSTIN was a passenger on board

Flight SN 284 of defendant airline originating from Casablanca to Brussels,
Belgium on her way back to Manila. She checked in her luggage which
contained her valuables all amounting to $4,265.00, for which she was
issued Tag No. 71423. She stayed overnight in Brussels and her luggage
was left on board Flight SN 284. Upon Arrival in Manila, she learned that
her luggage was missing and was advised to accomplish and submit a
property Irregularity Report which she submitted and filed on the same day.

Upon follow up, it remained missing; thus, she filed her formal complaint
with the office of Ferge Massed, petitioner’s Local Manager, demanding
immediate attention.

Two weeks later she was notified that her luggage was found. But
unfortunately plaintiff was informed that the luggage was lost for the second
time. She demanded payment but the airline refused to settle the claim.

The trial court ruled in favor of Ma. Paula San Agustin. The appellate court
affirmed in toto the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner airline company, in contending that the alleged negligence of

private respondent should be considered the primary cause for the loss of
her luggage, avers that, despite her awareness that the flight ticket had
been confirmed only for Casablanca and Brussels, and that her flight from
Brussels to Manila had yet to be confirmed, she did not retrieve the luggage
upon arrival in Brussels. Petitioner insists that private respondent, being a
seasoned international traveler, must have likewise been familiar with the
standard provisions contained in her flight ticket that items of value are
required to be hand-carried by the passenger and that the liability of the
airline or loss, delay or damage to baggage would be limited, in any event,
to only US$20.00 per kilo unless a higher value is declared in advance and
corresponding additional charges are paid thereon. At the Casablanca
International Airport, private respondent, in checking in her luggage,
evidently did not declare its contents or value. Petitioner cites Section 5(c),
Article IX, of the General Conditions of Carriage, signed at Warsaw, Poland,
on 02 October 1929, as amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955, generally
observed by International carriers, stating, among other things, that:
“Passengers shall not include in his checked baggage, and the carrier may
refuse to carry as checked baggage, fragile or perishable articles, money,
jewelry, precious metals, negotiable papers, securities or other valuables.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the airline is negligent? Whether respondent’s negligence is

the sole and proximate of the loss?

HELD:

Yes.

Fault or negligence consists in the omission of that diligence which is

demanded by the nature of an obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the person, of the time, and of the place. When the source
of an obligation is derived from a contract, the mere breach or non-
fulfillment of the prestation gives rise to the presumption of fault on the part
of the obligor. This rule is not different in the case of common carriers in the
carriage of goods which, indeed, are bound to observe not just the due
diligence of a good father of a family but that of “extraordinary” care in the
vigilance over the goods. The appellate court has aptly observed:

“x x x Art. 1733 of the [Civil] Code provides that from the very nature of their
business and by reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported
by them. This extraordinary responsibility, according to Art. 1736, lasts from
the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of and
received by the carrier until they are delivered actually or constructively to
the consignee or person who has the right to receive them. Art. 1737 states
that the common carrier’s duty to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods transported by them ‘remains in full force and
effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit.’ And
Art. 1735 establishes the presumption that if the goods are lost, destroyed
or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they had observed
extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733.

The above rules remain basically unchanged even when the contract is
breached by tort although noncontradictory principles on quasi-delict may
then be assimilated as also forming part of the governing law. Petitioner is
not thus entirely off track when it has likewise raised in its defense the tort
doctrine of proximate cause. Unfortunately for petitioner, however, the
doctrine cannot, in this particular instance, support its case. Proximate
cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces injury and without which the result
would not have occurred.

The above findings, which certainly cannot be said to be without basis,

foreclose whatever rights petitioner might have had to the possible limitation
of liabilities enjoyed by international air carriers under the Warsaw
Convention .

The Warsaw Convention however denies to the carrier availment ‘of the
provisions which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his
wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the
law of the court seized of the case, is considered to be equivalent to wilful
misconduct,’ or ‘if the damage is (similarly) caused x x x by any agent of the
carrier acting within the scope of his employment.’

The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the

instances of an airline’s liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that
liability.
 
Japan Airlines vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 118664)
Facts: Private respondents boarded a JAL flight in San Francisco, California bound for Manila. It
included an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan at JAL’s expense. Due to the Mt. Pinatubo
eruption, private respondents’ trip to Manila was cancelled. JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound
passengers and paid for the hotel expenses of their unexpected overnight stay. The flight of
private respondents was again cancelled due to NAIA’s indefinite closure. JAL informed the
respondents that it would no longer defray their hotel and accommodation expense during their
stay in Narita. The respondents were forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses
for 5 days.

Issues:

1. Whether or not JAL has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal expenses even if the
delay was caused by force majeure
2. Whether or not the award of damages was proper
Held:

1. When a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the general rule
is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. When JAL was
prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of the eruption, whatever
losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred
cannot be charged to JAL. The predicament of the private respondents was not due to the
fault or negligence of JAL. JAL had the duty to arrange the respondents’ flight back to
Manila. However, it failed to look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers
when it made the passengers arrange their flight back to Manila on their own and after
waiting in the airport for a whole day.
2. Yes, the award of nominal damages is proper. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order
that a right of a plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying any loss suffered by
him.

CONFLICT OF LAWS UNITED AIRLINES INC VS CA

G.R. No. 124110 April 20, 2001UNITED AIRLINES, INC.,Petitioner vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA,

in his personal capacity and in behalf of hisminor son

MYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Aniceto Fontanilla bought from United Airlines,through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila,

three “Visit the U.S.A.” tickets from himself, his wife and his minors on, Mychal, to visit the cities of Washington DC,
Chicago and Los Angeles.All flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines.

Having used the first coupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles Airport, Anice to changed their itinerary,
paid the penalty for rewriting their tickets and was issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the
words: “Check-in-required.” They were then set to leave but were denied boarding because the flight was
overbooked. The CA ruled that private respondents’ failure to complywith the check-in requirement will not defeat his claim asthe denied
boarding rules were not complied with applying the laws of the USA, relying on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales of  the USA

ISSUE: WON the CA iscorrect in applying the laws of USA.

HELD:  No.

According to the doctrine of “lex loci contractus”, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and
validity, obligation and interpretation shall govern.This has been said to be the rule even though the place where the contract was made is different
from the place where it isto be performed.Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued, where the
passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket isissued in such State by the defendant airline. Therefore, although, the contract
of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were purchased through petitioner’sagent in Manila. It istrue that the tickets were
"rewritten" in D.C.,however, such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage entered Into bythe parties in Manila.

SPOUSES ZALAMEA VS. CA

MARCH 28, 2013  ~ VBDIAZ

SPOUSES ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA vs. CA and TRANSWORLD

AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana
purchased 3 airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines,
Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All
three tickets represented confirmed reservations.

On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in but were placed on the wait-list
because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken
all the seats available on the flight. Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22
names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner
Cesar Zalamea. The two others were not able to fly. Those holding full-fare tickets
were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was
holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his
wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not
be accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to
book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines. Upon their
arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of
contract of air carriage before the RTC- Makati. The lower court ruled in favor of
petitioners . CA held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated
upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is
a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of
airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal
Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed
on respondent TransWorld Airlines. Thus petitioners raised the case on petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE;
WON TWZ acted with bad faith and would entitle Zalameas to Moral and Examplary
damages.
RULING:
The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.
Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such
officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its
customer service agent, in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of the
Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. No official publication of said code was
presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court’s finding that overbooking is
specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not
applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus
which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be
applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and
the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold
and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.

Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling
the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court
of Appeals, where passengers with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the
last minute, this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger
confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the
passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If
he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage.
Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive
some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for the check in. For
the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute,
said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages.

For a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty — a duty to
provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to
self-interest or enrichment.

Respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers beforehand
that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there
was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations on
overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its passengers about these
policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or would have the
choice to ride with another airline.

Respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy
of giving less priority to discounted tickets. Neither did it present any argument of
substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of
the flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is
evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA,
thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented confirmed
seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them
 when it could easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as
passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA
placed its self-interest over the rights of petitioners under their contracts of carriage.
Such conscious disregard of petitioners’ rights makes respondent TWA liable for
moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion in
the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.

In the case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, this Court explicitly held that a
passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he had to buy for a
flight to another airline. Thus, instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the
unused TWA tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of their flight from
New York to Los Angeles.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED

G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994

o PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident

Aliens
o PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Reprobate of Foreign Wills: Requirement of
Notices

FACTS:

Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing
provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of
the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife).
Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was
named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.

Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael
opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended
that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further
argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as
such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two
wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to
prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the
wills.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed

HELD:

Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens

The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be
effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of
the Philippines:

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according
to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code
prescribes.

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or
by Philippine laws is imperative.

Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been
probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in
accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country
and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4)
the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country
on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court,
1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil.
610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the
needed evidence.

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the
foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice
of them.

On Lack of Notice to Jose’s Heirs

This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact -
petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and
because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably
failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition,
she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being
assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA
876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice
thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules
of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad
should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for
the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require
publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees
of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner,
are required.

The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are
entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76
of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time
and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow
petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate
of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the
probate proceedings.

SO ORDERED.