I. Robbery Cases: Criminal Law Review Case Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria C. Garcia
REVISED PENAL CODE: BOOK TWO

TITLE TEN (Articles 293-332): Crimes Against Property
I. ROBBERY CASES
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ARNEL BALUTE

GR No. 212932 | January 21, 2015
TICKLER: Nokia 3210
DOCTRINE: To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must
prove the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property belonging to another;
(2) with intent to gain;
(3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and
(4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its
generic sense, was committed.
FACTS:
Prosecution’s Version:
At around 8 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 2002, SPO1 Raymundo B. Manaois
(SPO1 Manaois) was on board his owner-type jeepney with his wife Cristita and
daughter Blesilda, and was traversing Road 10, Tondo, Manila. While the vehicle was
on a stop position at a lighted area due to heavy traffic, two (2) male persons, later on
identified as Balute and a certain Leo Blaster (Blaster), suddenly appeared on either
side of the jeepney, with Balute poking a gun at the side of SPO1 Manaois and saying
"putang ina, ilabas mo!" Thereafter, Balute grabbed SPO1 Manaois's mobile phone, a
Nokia 3210, from the latter's chest pocket and shot him at the left side of his torso.
SPO1 Manaois reacted by drawing his own firearm and alighting from his vehicle, but
he was unable to fire at the assailants as he fell to the ground. He was taken to Mary
Johnston Hospital where he died despite undergoing surgical operation and medical
intervention.
Defense’s Version:
Balute denied having any knowledge of the charges against him. He maintained, inter
alia, that on March 22, 2002, he was at the shop of a certain Leticia Nicol (Nicol)
wherein he worked as a pedicab welder from 8:00 o'clock in the morning until 10:00
o'clock in the evening, and did not notice any untoward incident that day as he was
busy working the entire time. Nicol corroborated Balute's story, and imputed liability
on Blaster and a certain Intoy.
CRIME CHARGED: Robbery with Homicide

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
RTC: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Robbery with

Homicide with the aggravating circumstance of treachery
CA: AFFIRMED however it no longer considered treachery as it was not alleged in

the information
ISSUE: Did the CA correctly uphold Balute's conviction for Robbery with Homicide?
RULING: YES. The CA correctly upheld Balute's conviction for Robbery with
Homicide.
The Court exhaustively explained that "[a] special complex crime of robbery with
homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the
occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must prove the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property belonging to another;

(2) with intent to gain;
(3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and
(4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its
generic sense, was committed.
A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and [the]
objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before,
during or after the robbery."
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for
instance, it was committed:
(a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit;
(b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot;
(c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or
(d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.
In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC's finding that the prosecution
was able to establish the fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the
latter's mobile phone, and thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death despite surgical
and medical intervention. This is buttressed by Cristita and Blesilda's positive
identification of Balute as the one who committed the crime as opposed to the latter's
denial and alibi which was correctly considered by both the RTC and the CA as weak
and self-serving, as it is well-settled that "alibi and denial are outweighed by positive
identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part
of the [eyewitnesses] testifying on the matter."This is especially true when the
eyewitnesses are the relatives of the victim such as Cristita and Blesilda who are the
wife and daughter of SPO1 Manaois, respectively since "[t]he natural interest of
witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in securing the conviction of the guilty
would actually deter them from implicating persons other than the true culprits."
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated

February 3, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
05649 finding accused-appellant Arnel Balutey Villanueva GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide defined and penalized
under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and is ordered to pay the heirs of
SPO1 Raymundo B. Manaois the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P140,413.53 as actual damages, and P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six
percent(6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until full payment.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v CHARLIE OROSCO

GR No. 209227 | March 25, 2015
TICKLER: Insufficient change, 500 bill vs 100 bill
DOCTRINES:
1. The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of
personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with animo
lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide
(used in its generic sense) is committed.
2. Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of
robbery if it is committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the
culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the
commission of the crime.
3. In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to
commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life.
The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery.
FACTS:
Albert M. Arca (Arca)testified that on May 16, 2006, about two o'clock in the
afternoon, he went to the store of Lourdes Yap (Yap) at Purok 4, Barangay Rawis,
Legazpi City. After purchasing the ice, he noticed there was a verbal tussle between
Yap and two male customers. The men were arguing that they were given insufficient
changeand insisting they gave a P500 bill and not P100. When Yap opened the door,
the two men entered the store. From outside the store and thru its open window grills,
he saw one of the men placed his left arm around the neck of Yap and covered her
mouth with his right hand while the other man was at her back restraining her hands.
He recognized the man who was holding the hands of Yap as Charlie Orosco
(appellant), while he described the man who covered her mouth as thin, with less hair
and dark complexion. The latter stabbed Yap at the center of her chest. When they
released her, she fell down on the floor. Appellant then took a thick wad of bills from
the base of the religious icon or "santo" at the altar infront of the store's window, after
which he and the man who stabbed Yap fled together with two other men outside who
acted as lookouts. Arca went near the bloodied victim but also left and went home
afraid because he was seen by one of the lookouts.
Yap was brought to the Aquinas University Hospital but she was declared dead
on arrival. Later, at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Legazpi City District
office, Arca gave descriptions of the faces of appellant and the dark thin man who
stabbed Yap ("John Doe"). From a surveillance digital photo and video clip shown to
him, Arca positively identified Abner Astor (Astor) as one of the two men sitting beside
the store as lookouts. Consequently, warrants of arrest were issued against appellant
and Astor. But only appellant was arrested as Astor, John Doe and Peter Doe
remained at large.
For his defense, appellant testified that on the date and time of the incident, he
was at his house in Bigaa taking care of his three-year-old child while his wife was
washing clothes. He stayed in the house until his wife finished the laundry at past
3:00 p.m. He denied knowing Yap and his co-accused Astor. While he admitted that
he was a resident of Purok 4, Bgy. Rawis, his family transferred to their other house
at Bigaa. He denied knowing Arca and he does not know of any motive for Arca to
testify against him. He worked in a copra company in Lidong but stopped reporting for
work after May 16, 2006 as he was selling fish. He was arrested by the police at the
rotunda in Legazpi when he was buying medicine for his sick child.
CRIME CHARGED: Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the RPC
RTC: The accused Charlie Orosco was found GUILTY of the crime of robbery with
homicide
CA: AFFIRMED THE DECISION of the RTC
On appeal to SC, appellant reiterates the arguments he raised before the CA that the
trial court erred in giving credit to the uncorroborated eyewitness testimony of Arca
who could not point to him during the trial, and that even granting that criminal
charges may be imputed against him, it should only be robbery and not the complex
crime of robbery with homicide considering the fact that it was not him who stabbed
Yap
ISSUES:
1. Did CA err in giving credit to the uncorroborated eyewitness testimony of Arca?
2. Should Orosco be held liable for Robbery with Homicide?
RULING:
1. No. It is settled that witnesses are to be weighed not numbered, such that the
testimony of a single, trustworthy and credible witness could be sufficient to convict
an accused. The testimony of a sole witness, if found convincing and credible by the
trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the
suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been
inaccurate. In this case, both the trial and appellate courts found the testimony of the
lone eyewitness, Arca, convincing notwithstanding that he was quite slow in narrating
the incident to the court and that he initially desisted from physically pointing to
appellant as the one who held Yap's hands from behind and took her money at the
store after she was stabbed by appellant's cohort (John Doe).
2. Yes. The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of
personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the
property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with animolucrandi; and (4)
by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic
sense) is committed. Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the
occasion of robbery if it is committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the
culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the
commission of the crime. In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the
malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of
human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery.
The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly showed that appellant acted in
conspiracy with his co-accused. The appellant played a crucial role in the killing of the
victim to facilitate the robbery. He was behind the victim holding her hands while John
Doe grabbed her at the neck. His act contributed in rendering the victim without any
means of defending herself when John Doe stabbed her frontally in the chest. Having
acted in conspiracy with his co-accused, appellant is equally liable for the killing of
Yap.
In the case of People vs. Baron, the Supreme Court held that when a homicide takes
place by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be
guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually
participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavor to prevent
the killing.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
In the award of damages, the trial court was correct in sentencing appellant to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the fact of death and P75,000.00 as moral damages, conformably with
prevailing jurisprudence. The award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00 proper due to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of treachery
and abuse of superior strength, though these were not alleged in the information.
While an aggravating circumstance not specifically alleged in the information (albeit
established at trial) cannot be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of the
accused, the established presence of one or two aggravating circumstances of any
kind or nature entitles the offended party to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of
the Civil Code because the requirement of specificity in the information affected only
the criminal liability of the accused, not his civil liability. The aforesaid sums shall earn
the legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
judgment until full payment.
DECISION: Appeal DISMISSED. CA Decision AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v JUAN CABBAB

GR No. 173479 | July 12, 2007
TICKLER: WINNER SA SUGAL. Loser in life. Nagsugal, natalo. Napikon. Pinatay

yung nanalo sa sugal para mabawi ang taya.
DOCTRINES:
1. In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob,

the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. It is immaterial
that death would supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons
are killed. Once a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery, the felony committed is the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide.
2. Attempted homicide or attempted murder committed during or on the occasion
of the robbery is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is
a special complex crime that remains fundamentally the same regardless
of the number of homicides or injuries committed in connection with the
robbery.
FACTS:
Father and Son Vidal and Winner Agbulos, cousin Eddie Quintalan, and family friend
(PO) William Belmes started the day fine.
The four were off to a pista in nearby San Isidro, Abra. They were looking forward to
the fine company and fine food they would enjoy in the pista. Unfortunately, when
they got there the pista was over.

As they were very hungry, they stopped over at a nearby barangay (Barangay
Kimmasalag) were they ate lunch, and ended up playing PEPITO (SUGAL, a card
game) with the two accused: Juan Cabbab, and Segundo Calpito.
The son, Winner and Cousin Eddie were the ones who played with Cabbab and
Calpito. And because WINNER ang pangalan ni WINNER, he won.
The four went home. While walking, William saw the accused Calpito and Cabbab
running towards them from the hill. Suddenly, a volley of gunshots was heard and
WINNER and COUSIN EDDIE were sprawled on the ground; hit by multiple bullets.
During the barrage of bullets, Tito William had to dive to the nearest canal to
avoid getting shot.
Calpito and Cabbab then took Winner’s P12,000 winnings from his dead body.
Winner died on the spot.Cousin Eddie was rushed to the hospital, but he succumbed
to his wounds the next day.
NB: If asked what kind of gun was used: the answer is IT WAS NEVER FOUND.
CRIME CHARGED: Double Murder and Attempted Murder with Robbery

(Attempted Murder because of the ‘attempt’ on Tito William)
RTC:
He was found guilty of two crimes:
1. Robbery with DOUBLE HOMICIDE
2. Attempted Murder
RTC appreciated aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place.
CA: AFFIRMED THE DECISION of the RTC
Issues:
1. Are Cabbab and Calpito guilty of Robbery with Homicide?
2. Are they guilty of the separate crime of attempted murder?
RULING:
1. YES.
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties.
Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against any person shall
suffer:
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of

the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or
arson.
Thus, to warrant conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the prosecution is
burdened to prove the confluence of the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation
against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animo lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is
committed.
In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the
killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. It is immaterial that death
would supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is other than
the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is the
special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Here, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant, having
lost to Winner Agbulos in the game of poker, intended to divest Agbulos of his
winnings.
2. NO. The two courts below erred in convicting appellant of the separate crime of
attempted murder for the shooting of PO William Belmes. Attempted homicide or
attempted murder committed during or on the occasion of the robbery, as in this
case, is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is a special
complex crime that remains fundamentally the same regardless of the
number of homicides or injuries committed in connection with the robbery.
DECISION: CA Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ALVIN ESUGON

G.R. No. 195244 | June 22, 2015
TICKLER: Muymoy saw Nonoy and his knife
DOCTRINE: The fact that the appellant was armed with the long-bladed weapon,
which was undoubtedly a deadly weapon, competently proved the presence of
violence or intimidation against persons that qualified the offense as robbery instead
of theft.
FACTS:
Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident,
he, his younger sister and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of
their house. He saw appellant, whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab her
mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a chair. Although there was no
light at the ground floor, there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed, his
father chased the appellant. Carl saw blood come out of his mother’s lower chest. His
father then brought her to the hospital but the latter later died. Carl positively identified
the appellant, a neighbor who often goes to their house, as the one who stabbed his
mother. On cross-examination, he related that the assailant took money from his
father’s pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see very well the perpetrator
because there was no light.
Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although there was no light when
his mother was stabbed, he was sure of what he saw since there was light at their
second floor, which illumined the ground floor through the stairway.
Appellant denied the accusation. According to him, he had frequented the victim’s
billiard hall, which was situated only four houses away from where he lived, and, on
the evening in question, he had been the last to leave the billiard hall at 11 o’ clock
p.m. and had then gone home. He recalled that he had been roused from slumber by
screams for help around two o’clock a.m., prompting him to ask his mother for the key
to the door; that he had then gone outside where he learned of the killing of the victim;
that police officers had later on approached him to inquire what he knew about the
killing because they told him that Carl, the young son of the victim, had pointed to him
as the perpetrator, making him the primary suspect; that he had replied that he had
had nothing to do with the crime; and that he had assured the police officers that he
had never been involved in any wrongdoing in his years of living in the neighborhood.
The appellant’s mother corroborated his version.
CRIME CHARGED: Robbery with homicide
RTC: Robbery with homicide
CA: Robbery with homicide
ISSUE: Is accused is guilty of Robbery with Homicide?
Appellant’s contention, among others, is that the prosecution did not prove that
violence or intimidation was employed in the course of the robbery
SC: YES. He is guilty of Robbery with homicide.
Appellant’s contention lacks persuasion.
➢ To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the Prosecution must prove
the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the taking of personal
property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of
violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) the crime of homicide, as
used in the generic sense, was committed on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main objective
of the malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.
The CA has indicated that the appellant carried a long-bladed weapon. The
fact that the appellant was armed with the long-bladed weapon, which was
undoubtedly a deadly weapon, competently proved the presence of violence or
intimidation against persons that qualified the offense as robbery instead of
theft. For sure, too, the patent intent of the appellant was originally to commit
robbery, with the homicide being committed only in the course or on the
occasion of the perpetration of the robbery.
As the records show, Dennis was awakened by someone shouting "

Magnanakaw!" The shout was most probably made by the victim, whom the
appellant then stabbed in order to facilitate his escape. Considering that the
original criminal design to rob had been consummated with the taking of the
money amounting to ₱13,000.00, the killing of the victim under the
circumstances rendered the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
robbery with homicide.
DECISION: Petition was DENIED.
The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime are not appreciated to

raise the penalty to be imposed because the information did not specifically allege
them.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v RODOLFO SUYU @ RUDY, WILLY SUYU,

FRANCIS CAINGLET and ROMMEL MACARUBBO @ ROMMEL
G.R. No. 170191 | August 16, 2006
TICKLER: Bf &Gf in pick-up truck, Gf left with 3 guys
DOCTRINE: The intent to rob must precede the rape. In robbery with rape, the
intention of the felony is to rob and the felony is accompanied by rape. The rape must
be contemporaneous with the commission of the robbery. Even if sexual assault and
another rape was committed in the instant case, nevertheless, there is only one single
and indivisible felony of robbery with rape and any crimes committed on the occasion
or by reason of the robbery are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible
felony of robbery with rape.
FACTS:
Version of the Prosecution:

At around 7:15 in the evening on January 13, 1996, Clarissa, a college student from
St. Paul University, was with her boyfriend William. They were eating inside a pickup
truck parked near the DepEd and COA in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. A tricycle passed by
on its way to the COA building, then subsequently Clarissa saw the shadows of
persons nearing the truck. Clarissa told his boyfriend to leave, while William opened
the window to check if anybody was around. Suddenly, Macarubbo appeared in front
of the truck, pointed a gun at them, and declared a holdup. Willy also appeared and
lifted the lock on the driver’s side where William was seated, and entered the pick-up.
Clarissa told William to give everything in their possession so that they would not be
harmed. Willy took William’s wallet with P150 in cash. Cainglettook Clarissa’s jewelry
(gold earrings and gold ring)worth P2,500.00 and cash amounting to P10.00. Willy
clubbed William then dragged him out of the truck. William escaped the vicinity and
went to the police station to report the incident.
Willy opened the lock on Clarissa’s side, then he and Macarubbo dragged her.
Macarubbo and Willy held her by the arms, while Cainglet poked a fan knife at her.
She was then brought to a house near a muddy place, where Rodolfo, Willy’s half-
brother, met the party. Rodolfo then said to Clarissa, “You stay there because I will be
the first one.”Rodolfo then started embracing and kissing Clarissa and fondling her
breast. Rodolfo removed his pants. As Rodolfo was embracing her, Clarissa felt a
knife, pliers, and flashlight on Rodolfo’s back. She took the knife, then struggled with
Rodolfo until she kicked his groin. Rodolfo loosened his grip on her, then she was
able to run. However, she stumbled, and Rodolfo was able to grab her hair. She
pleaded for help, but the other perpetrators did nothing.
Rodolfo passed Clarissa to Cainglet. She pleaded for mercy and subsequently asked
for the knife to commit suicide instead. Cainglet kissed her until she bit his tongue,
causing it to bleed down her shirt. The three companions came back and warned
Cainglet that police were coming. Clarissa was unable to shout for help because one
of the perpetrators thrust a knife against her. She was forced to lie on her back as
Cainglet punched her at the thighs. Cainglet pinned her on the ground, then Rodolfo
removed her pants and underwear, as well as spread her legs apart. Rodolfo went on
top of her. He tried to insert his penis, but Clarissa kicked her. Rodolfo pushed his
tongue inside her mouth but Clarissa bit it. He then inserted two of his fingers inside
her vagina, then commented to Cainglet that she was still a virgin. With the aid of his
fingers, he successfully inserted his penis into his vagina.
Rodolfo told Cainglet that the latter was next. Cainglet went on top of her, then
Rodolfo held her. Clarissa kicked Cainglet. He continued to move on top of her.
Cainglet was able to insert half an inch of his penis into her vagina. Willy and
Macarrubo served as lookouts. They warned Rodolfo and Caingletthat the police were
coming.
She was allowed by the culprits to leave after promising to not report them to the
authorities. She fled to a house where an old man and his children attended to her.
The police then brought her to the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital. The nurses,

however, merely examined her bruises. Upon arrival at the police station, she told the
authorities that there was merely an attempt to rape her.
On January 17, 1996, Clarissa underwent a physical and gynecological examination

at the CVRH. The examining physician, Dr. Elsie A. Pintucan, found hematoma and
contusions, sustained five days before.On January 19, 1996, Clarissa signed and filed
a criminal complaint for robbery and rape against Rodolfo, Suyu, Cainglet and
Macarubbo) with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tuguegarao City.
Version of the Defense:
Rodolfo’s defense was an alibi. He declared that on that night he was in their house at
Alimannao, Tuguegarao City taking care of his 3 children. He also added that on
January 16, 1996, he was shot by an unknown assailant on the left thigh while
gathering cogon. He was then arrested in the hospital where he was treated and
subjected to a police line-up.
Cainglet declared that he was a security guard on duty in Corinthian Gardens,

Quezon City during the night of the incident. He claimed that he went to Tuguegarao
only on January 21, 1996. The next day, he claimed that he was arrested by 12 men,
and his personal properties worth P10,000 were taken by them. He also alleged that
the policemen tried to torture him to secure a confession from him. He was brought
before Rodolfo, who said that he did not know him. Clarissa then pointed at him as
the perpetrator in a line up.
Macarubbo denied knowing any of the co-accused. He said that he went to San
Pablo, Isabela, from Tuguegaraoin January 12, 1996 to visit his aunt. On January 17,
he went to a drinking spree where one of the drunk guests shot at his leg. He was
brought to the hospital where he was subsequently arrested by police.
Willy admitted that Rodolfo was his half-brother. However, he was at Dodan,
Peñablanca, Cagayan, at the time of the rape. He gathered firewood during the day
then returned home at 6pm. He had dinner at 8pm then had a beer with a friend. He
went to bed at 9 pm. He also alleged that he only Clarissa at the police station for the
first time when she asked for him.
CRIME CHARGED: Robbery with Rape
RTC: Robbery with Rape – conspiracy, reclusion perpetua for each of the accused
CA: AFFIRMED, but modified the penalty of Rommel Macarubbo to 8 years and 1
day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion
temporal, in its medium period, as maximum
ISSUE: Did the CA err in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of robbery with rape?
SC: NO, the CA did not err in convicting the accused of robbery with rape.
After going over the voluminous records, We find no error in the aforesaid
observations of the trial court as affirmed by the CA. Courts generally view the
defenses of denial and alibi with disfavor on account of the facility with which an
accused can concoct them to suit his defense. Again, these weak defenses cannot
stand against the positive identification and categorical testimony of a rape victim.
Clarissa, in this case, as aforesaid, passed the test of credibility in her account of her
ordeal; positively identified her assailants; and had no ill-motive to falsely implicate
them to the commission of a crime, other than her desire to seek justice for a wrong.
Where an alleged rape victim says she was sexually abused, she says almost all that
is necessary to show that rape had been inflicted on her person, provided her
testimony meets the test of credibility.
Conspiracy to commit the crime was also correctly appreciated by the trial court.
Indeed, “at the time of the commission of the crime, accused acted in concert, each
doing his part to fulfill their common design to rob the victim and although only two of
them, through force and intimidation, raped Clarissa, the failure of Macarubbo and
Willy Suyu to prevent its commission although they were capable would make their
act to be the act of all.” We have previously ruled that once conspiracy is established
between several accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would all be
equally culpable for the rape committed by any of them on the occasion of the
robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the other from
committing rape.
The conviction thus of appellants for robbery with rape defined and penalized under
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code is correct. The law provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the

robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall
have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
To be convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements must concur: (1) the
taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to
gain or animus lucrandi; (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape.
The intent to rob must precede the rape. In robbery with rape, the intention of the
felony is to rob and the felony is accompanied by rape. The rape must be
contemporaneous with the commission of the robbery. We note that aside from
raping the victim, appellant Rodolfo Suyu inserted his finger in her sexual organ.

Appellant Suyu, thus, committed sexual assault as defined and penalized in Article
266-A, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 8353. Also, aside from Rodolfo Suyu,
Cainglet raped the victim. Nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible felony
of robbery with rape and any crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible felony of robbery with
rape.
DECISION: The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH THE
MODIFICATION that all the appellants are also ordered to, jointly and severally, pay
Clarissa Angeles P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for
the rape by Rodolfo Suyu; P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the rape by Francis Cainglet; and P30,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the sexual assault by Rodolfo Suyu. No costs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v JOSEPH BARRA

G.R. No. 198020 | July 10, 2013
TICKLER: No money in my possession – shot dead
DOCTRINE: The crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim

refused to give his money to appellant and no personal property was shown to have
been taken. It was for this reason that the victim was shot. Appellant can only be
found guilty of attempted robbery with homicide, thus punishable under Article 297 of
the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Ricardo de la Peña testified that he knew appellant for a long time. He stated that he
was on his way home to the neighboring barangay, when, at around 9:00 p.m. in the
light of a bright moon, he saw appellant enter the house of Lagdaan, which was lit
with a lamp, and poked a gun to the victim’s right forehead and demanded money.
De la Peña hid behind a tree ten meters away. When the victim stated that the
money was not in his possession, appellant shot him. He went home and reported the
incident the following morning.
Asor testified that on the night of October 9, 2003, he was on his way to the victim’s
house to collect his daily wage when he saw appellant in the yard of the victim’s
house. He inquired from appellant if the victim was around. Appellant responded that
the victim was not around. Asor went home. It was while Asor was in his house that
he heard a gunshot. It was the following morning that he learned that the victim died.
Asor then proceeded to report the incident.
In his defense, appellant denied the charges against him. Appellant claimed that he
was in Batangas City, with his brother Benjamin, visiting his sister when he was
arrested and brought to Camarines Sur and charged with the crime of “robbery with
murder.” Appellant’s brother, Benjamin, tried to corroborate his testimony.
CRIME CHARGED: Special complex crime of robbery with homicide
RTC: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY

WITH HOMICIDE and sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA. To pay the surviving heirs of Elmer Lagdaan, the sum of Php50,000.00
as civil indemnity for his death, as actual damages in the amount of Php55,579.80, as
moral damages in the sum of Php50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
It stated that the affirmative testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses deserved more
weight than the appellant’s defense of denial and alibi.
CA: The Court of Appeals ONLY FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY OF ATTEMPTED

ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.
As correctly observed by the OSG, the only evidence introduced by the government
to establish robbery is the statement of De la Peña that when accused-appellant
reached the victim’s place, the latter barged into the said residence, poked a gun at
the victim’s forehead, demanded money and when the victim refused to accede to his
demand, fired a gun and shot the victim. Indeed, no iota of evidence was presented to
establish that accused-appellant took away the victim’s money or any property, for
that matter.
The fact of asportation must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Since this fact
was not duly established, accused-appellant should be held liable only for the crime of
attempted robbery with homicide as defined and penalized under Article 297 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides –
“When by reason of or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide

is committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed
shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.”
The appellant is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide only when he commenced
the commission of robbery directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of
execution which would produce robbery by reason of some causes or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance.
The claim of the defense that accused-appellant should be convicted only of the crime
of homicide is bereft of merit. The killing of the victim herein was by reason of or on
the occasion of robbery.
The attendant circumstances clearly show accused-appellant’s intent to rob the

victim. That motive was manifested by accused-appellant’s overt act of poking a gun
at the victim’s forehead demanding money from the latter. When the victim refused to

accede to the demand, accused-appellant shot the former. The killing was an offshoot
of accused-appellant’s intent to rob the victim. Accused-appellant was bent on
resorting to violent means to attain his end. Due to the victim’s failure to give his
money, the crime of robbery was, however, not consummated.
ISSUE: Did CA correctly find Barra guilty of attempted robbery with homicide?
SC: YES.
In People v. Quemeggen, this Court gave the requisites to be proven by the

prosecution for appellant to be convicted of robbery with homicide, to wit:
1. The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation

against persons;
2. The property taken belongs to another;
3. The taking is animolucrandi; and
4. By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
(Citation omitted.)
In the case before us, appellant’s intention was to extort money from the victim. By
reason of the victim’s refusal to give up his personal property - his money - to
appellant, the victim was shot in the head, causing his death. We, however, agree
with the Court of Appeals that the element of taking was not complete, making the
crime one of attempted robbery with homicide as opposed to the crime appellant was
convicted in the RTC. Appellant is, therefore, liable under Article 297 of the Revised
Penal Code, not under Article 294 as originally held by the RTC. Article 297 of the
Revised Penal Code states:
Article 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain

circumstances. — When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated
robbery a homicide is committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished
by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the
homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.
The elements to be convicted under Article 297 were discussed in People v.

Macabales, to wit
The elements of Robbery with Homicide as defined in Art. 297 of the Revised Penal
Code are: (1) There is an attempted or frustrated robbery. (2) A homicide is
committed.
In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the
victim refused to give his money to appellant and no personal property was shown to
have been taken. It was for this reason that the victim was shot. Appellant can only
be found guilty of attempted robbery with homicide, thus punishable under Article 297

of the Revised Penal Code. Since the RTC and the Court of Appeals found
appellant’s crime to be aggravated by disregard of dwelling, the Court of Appeals
correctly imposed the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the February 11, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04155 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of
exemplary damages shall be increased to P30,000.00 and all monetary awards for
damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of
this Decision until fully paid.
AURORA ENGSON FRANSDILLA v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 197562 | April 20, 2015
TICKLER: 1 female (pretended to be from POEA) plus 4 male conspirators sa

robbery ng isang bahay
DOCTRINE: The State could rely on direct as well as circumstantial evidence in

establishing conspiracy when the felonies of Robbery in an Inhabited house and
Robbery with violence against or intimidation of a person are committed, the penalty
for the most serious offense, in its maximum period, should be imposed.
FACTS: This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the decision of the CA affirming
the decision of the RTC which affirmed the conviction of petitioner, Aurora Engson Fransdilla, and
her co-accused for robbery on basis of conspiracy. Petitioner representing herself as one who
came from Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) went to the house of private
complainant, Lalaine Yreverre. Inside the house, when they were already having a
conversation, Aurora asked Lalaine if she could use the telephone, which the latter acceded to.
Thereafter, appellant Aurora asked for a cigarette. After Lalaine gave Aurora the cigarette, the four
(4) other men outside the gate, who were with Aurora, suddenly came inside the house. Later,
Aurora asked Lalaine if she could use the comfort room, which the latter again permitted. When
Aurora came back, she sat down again but in crossed-legs as she said she was having a
menstrual period. Afterwards, one of the accused poked a gun at Lalaine’s neck and
announced that it was a hold-up.
They were able to get a vault, jewelries and other things they saw before they left the house.
Investigations ensued in order to look for the accused. Fransdilla and her co-accused were
eventually charged and convicted with robbery. The RTC ruled that several facts and
circumstances either proved by the Prosecution or admitted by the Defense established
Fransdilla having conspired with her co-accused in committing the offense charged. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the conviction of all of the accused, but modified the penalty imposed. Petitioner
still insists on her innocence, protesting that the CA erred in affirming the conviction despite the
failure to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator in robbery.
CRIME CHARGED: COMPLEX CRIME of robbery in an inhabited house (Art 299) by

armed persons and robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons (Art 294)
RTC: Convicted Fransdilla and her co-accused of robbery. Conspiracy was present
CA: Affirmed the conviction of all of the accused
ISSUE: Did the CA err in affirming the conviction despite the failure to establish her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator in robbery?
RULING: NO, the Court Affirms the decision of the CA. The Crime committed was
the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed men under Article 299
of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.
We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, when the elements of
both provisions are present, that the crime is a complex one, calling for the imposition
— as provided in Art. 48 of said Code — of the penalty for the most serious offense,
in its maximum period, which, in the case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period. This penalty should, in turn, be imposed in its maximum period - from nineteen
(19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal - owing to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime. xxx. 20
Napolis v. Court of Appeals is controlling in this case. To start with, the information
fully alleged the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299,
Revised Penal Code, and robbery with intimidation or violence under Article 294,
Revised Penal Code by averring that "the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, and by means of violence and
intimidation upon person rob the residence x x x." And, secondly, the Prosecution
competently proved the commission of the complex crime by showing during the trial
that the accused, after entering the residential house of the complainants at No. 24-B
Mabait St., Teacher's Village, Quezon City, took away valuables, including the vault
containing Cynthia's US dollar currencies, and in the process committed acts of
violence against and intimidation of persons during the robbery by slapping and
threatening Lalaine and tying her up, and herding the other members of the
household inside the bodega of the house.
Conspiracy of Fransdilla with

her co-accused was established
beyond reasonable doubt
It bears stressing that Fransdilla opted not to present evidence in her defense during
the trial. On appeal, the core of her contentions in the CA was that the Prosecution
did not establish her having conspired with the other accused in committing the
robbery. She reiterates such contentions here, stating that the State's formal offer of
evidence did not include any reference to any evidence specifically incriminating her.

The Court rejects Fransdilla's contentions. Our review of the records of the trial
reveals that contrary to Fransdilla's contentions, the State competently and credibly
established her active participation in the execution of the robbery through Lalaine's
testimony. For an accused to be validly held to have conspired with her co-accused
in committing the crime, her overt acts must evince her active part in the execution of
the crime agreed to be committed. The overt acts of each of the conspirators must
tend to execute the offense agreed upon, for the merely passive conspirator cannot
be held to be still part of the conspiracy without such overt acts, unless such
conspirator is the mastermind. Here, Fransdilla was satisfactorily shown not to have
been a mere passive co-conspirator, but an active one who had facilitated the access
into the house by representing herself as an employee of the POEA. In that respect, it
is not always required to establish that two or more persons met and explicitly entered
into the agreement to commit the crime by laying down the details of how their
unlawful scheme or objective would be carried out. 14 Conspiracy can also be deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense is perpetrated, or can be inferred
from the acts of the several accused evincing their joint or common purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interest. 15 Once conspiracy is established,
the act of each conspirator is the act of all.
DECISION: The Crime committed was the COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY IN AN

INHABITED HOUSE BY ARMED MEN UNDER ARTICLE 299 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE AND ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION OF
PERSONS UNDER ARTICLE 294 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

II. THEFT CASES

ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 160188 | June 21, 2007
TICKLER: SM Supermarket, “Tide” detergent, No crime of “frustrated theft”
DOCTRINE: Under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft. The
Court in this case abandoned the Diño/Flores rulings that convicted the accused of
frustrated theft. The Revised Penal Code provisions on theft have not been designed
in such fashion as to accommodate said rulings. There is no language in Art. 308 that
expressly or impliedly allows that the "free disposition of the items stolen" is in any
way determinative of whether the crime of theft has been produced. Diño itself did not
rely on Philippine laws or jurisprudence to bolster its conclusion, and the later Flores
was ultimately content in relying on Diño alone for legal support. These cases do not
enjoy the weight of stare decisis, and even if they did, their erroneous appreciation of
our law on theft leaves them susceptible to reversal.
FACTS: Valenzuela (petitioner) and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale
Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lago,
a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the
supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the
mark "Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of detergent
of the well-known "Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking
space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket,
and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again
unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space.
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and
directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded
the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts
were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking
area. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and
Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow
security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the
scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered. The stolen items seized from the two
were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3)
additional cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of ₱12,090.00.
In their defense, petitioner and Calderon both claimed having been innocent
bystanders within the vicinity of the Super Sale Club when they were arrested by
Lago and his fellow security guards and brought to the Baler PNP Station.
CRIME CHARGED: Theft

RTC: Guilty of consummated theft
CA: Affirmed the RTC decision. Petitioner (only Valenzuela appealed to the CA)
argued, before the CA, that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the
time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the
articles stolen, however the CA rejected this contention and affirmed petitioner’s
conviction.
ISSUE: Should petitioner only be convicted of frustrated theft?
RULING: No, petitioner should be convicted of consummated theft. In arguing

that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft, petitioner cited two decisions
rendered many years ago by the Court of Appeals: People v. Diño and People v.
Flores.
Art. 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three alternative and highly
idiosyncratic means by which theft may be committed. In the present discussion, we
need to concern ourselves only with the general definition since it was under it that
the prosecution of the accused was undertaken and sustained. On the face of the
definition, there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─
the taking of personal property of another. It is also clear from the provision that in
order that such taking may be qualified as theft, there must further be present the
descriptive circumstances that the taking was with intent to gain; without force upon
things or violence against or intimidation of persons; and it was without the consent of
the owner of the property.
Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Art.
308 of the RPC, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said
property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the
taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things.
On the critical question of whether it was consummated or frustrated theft, we are

obliged to apply Art. 6 of the RPC to ascertain the answer. Following that provision,
the theft would have been frustrated only, once the acts committed by petitioner, if
ordinarily sufficient to produce theft as a consequence, "do not produce [such theft] by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator." There are clearly two
determinative factors to consider: that the felony is not "produced," and that such
failure is due to causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The second factor
ultimately depends on the evidence at hand in each particular case. The first,
however, relies primarily on a doctrinal definition attaching to the individual felonies in
the RPC as to when a particular felony is "not produced," despite the commission of
all the acts of execution.
So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is

necessary to inquire as to how exactly is the felony of theft "produced." Parsing
through the statutory definition of theft under Art. 308, there is one apparent answer
provided in the language of the law — that theft is already "produced" upon the
"taking of personal property of another without the latter’s consent."
A problem clearly emerges with the Diño/Flores dictum. The ability of the offender to
freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft.
It finds no support or extension in Art. 308, whether as a descriptive or operative
element of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the felony. Such factor runs
immaterial to the statutory definition of theft, which is the taking, with intent to gain, of
personal property of another without the latter’s consent. While the Diño/Flores dictum
is considerate to the mindset of the offender, the statutory definition of theft considers
only the perspective of intent to gain on the part of the offender, compounded by the
deprivation of property on the part of the victim.
For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the

frustrated stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There
would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is
deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed
from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender,
once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely
dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already
ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice
Aquino’s commentaries, as earlier cited, that "[i]n theft or robbery the crime is
consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to
appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated."
Insofar as we consider the present question, "unlawful taking" is most material in this
respect. Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the
element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time,
without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted
theft, if at all. With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Art. 308 of
the RPC, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or
consummated.
DECISION: Petition is denied. RTC’s conviction of consummated theft and sentence

against petitioner to an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years of prision
correccional as minimum to seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum is affirmed.
HERNAN MEDINA v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182648 | June 17, 2015
TICKLER: Jeep involved in an accident. Lost parts.
DOCTRINE: AS to TAKING --only requirement for a personal property to be the

object of theft under the penal code is that it be capable of appropriation and it need

not be capable of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying away." To appropriate
means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word "take"' in RPC includes any
act intended to transfer possession which may be committed through the use of the
offenders' own hands, as well as any mechanical device.
FACTS: Lim is a resident of Calao West, Isabela. Lim is the registered owner of
Sangyong Korando Jeep with Plate no. WPC-207 which was involved in an accident
that caused damage to its roof and door. Lim engaged the services of Hernan
Medina, who is a mechanic and maintains a repair shop in Buenavista, Isabela. At the
time the jeep was delivered to Medina's shop, it was still in running condition and
serviceable because the under chassis was not affected and the motor engine,
wheels, steering wheels and other parts were still functioning. Reasonable time
elapsed, but no repairs were made on jeep. SO Purita Lim, Lim's sister, instructed
Beltran to retrieve the jeep from Medina's shop. Beltran, however was not able to get
the jeep since the alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims (all valued
at 22,500) could not be found.
DEFENSE: Upon inquiry, Medina told Beltran that he took and installed them
on Lim's another vehicle (Isuzu pick-up). Beltran was able to get the jeep, but without
the missing parts, and reported the incident to Purita. Complaint for SIMPLE THEFT
was filed by Purita.
CRIME CHARGED: SIMPLE THEFT
RTC: Guilty of SIMPLE THEFT; Trial Court was not convinced that Medina installed
the Jeep's missing parts to pick-up.
CA: AFFIRMED Trial Court's decision. CA agreed that Medina admitted that the jeep
is more valuable than the pick-up; that unlike the pick-up, the needed repairs on the
jeep is only minor in nature; that Medina failed to prove that the pick-up was
completely repaired and was placed in good running condition; and that he failed to
prove that the pick-up is owned by Lim.
ISSUE: Is petitioner guilty of crime of theft?
RULING: YES!
Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property
of another without the latter's consent. The ELEMENTS of the crime are:
(1) there was taking of personal property;
(2) the property belongs to another;
(3) the taking was done with intent to gain;
(4) the taking was without the consent of the owner; and
(5) the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against, or

intimidation of persons or force, upon things.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from

the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Although
proof as to motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the theft is
circumstantial, the intent to gain is the usual motive to be presumed from all
furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another, unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator.
As to the concept of "taking" —The only requirement for a personal property

to be the object of theft under the penal code is that it be capable of appropriation.
It need not be capable of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying away." To
"take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation or
carrying away. To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing.
The word "take"' in RPC includes any act intended to transfer possession which x
x x may be committed through the use of the offenders' own hands, as well as
any mechanical device.
IN THIS CASE, Medina acknowledged without hesitation the taking of the

jeep's alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with magwheels, but he put up
the defense that they were installed in the pick-up owned by Lim. With such
admission, the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove that the missing parts
were indeed lawfully taken. The Court finds that Medina unsatisfactorily discharged
the burden. He failed to substantiate, through the presentation of supporting
documentary evidence or corroborative testimony, the claims that: (1) Lim was
the owner of the pick-up; (2) the missing parts of the jeep were exactly the same
items that were placed in the pick-up; (3) Lim consented, expressly or impliedly, to the
transfer of auto parts; and (4) Mendoza witnessed the removal of the spare parts
from, the jeep and their placement to the pick-up.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT: Medina identified purported

acknowledgment receipt. According to Medina, Mendoza came to his place and the
auto parts while being transferred from jeep to the pick-up and that Medina even
called Brgy officials and let them sign a document to bear witness on the matter. The
Acknowledgment receipt was not recognized by Trial Court because it was not
formally offered in evidence.
DECISION: The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if
the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph,
and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
Medina to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) years, Six (6) months

and Twenty-One (21) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years,
Eight (8) months and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
ANITA MIRANDA v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 176298, January 25, 2012
TICKLER: Video City.
DOCTRINE: In the determination of the penalty for qualified theft, note is taken of the
value of the property stolen, which is P797,187.85 in this case. Since the value
exceeds P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods to be imposed in the maximum period, that is, eight (8) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor.
FACTS: Video City Commercial, Inc. (VCCI) and Viva Video City, Inc. (Viva) were
sister companies which managed a chain of stores known as Video City. These
stores, some company-owned while others were operated in joint ventures with
franchisees, were engaged in the sale and rental of video-related merchandises.
During the period of April 28, 1998 to May 2, 2002, petitioner was the accounting clerk
and bookkeeper of VCCI and Viva. One of her duties was to disburse checks for the
accounts she handled. She was assigned to handle twelve (12) Video City store
franchise accounts, including those of Tommy Uy, Wilma Cheng, Jefferson Tan and
Sharon Cuneta. As regards the franchisee Jefferson Tan, who was out of the country
most of the time, Tan pre-signed checks to cover the store’s disbursements and
entrusted them to petitioner. The pre-signed checks by Jefferson Tan were from a
current account maintained jointly by VCCI and Jefferson Tan at BPI Family Bank,
Sta. Mesa. There was also an existing agreement with the bank that any
disbursement not exceeding P20,000.00 would require only Tan’s signature.
Taking advantage of Tan’s constant absence from the country, petitioner was able to
use Tan’s joint-venture bank account with VCCI as a clearing house for her
unauthorized transfer of funds. Petitioner deposited VCCI checks coming from other
franchisees’ accounts into the said bank account, and withdrew the funds by writing
checks to her name using the checks pre-signed by Tan. It was only after petitioner
went on maternity leave and her subsequent resignation from the company in May
2002 that an audit was conducted since she refused to turn over all the financial
records in her possession. The audit was made on all the accounts handled by
petitioner and it was discovered that she made unauthorized withdrawals and fund
transfers amounting to P4,877,759.60.
CRIME CHARGED: QUALIFIED THEFT
RTC: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF QUALIFIED THEFT

CA: AFFIRMED Trial Court's decision
ISSUE: Did the CA correctly affirm petitioner’s conviction for qualified theft?
RULING: YES. The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
amount of P797,187.85 taken does not belong to petitioner but to VCCI and that
petitioner took it without VCCI’s consent and with grave abuse of confidence by taking
advantage of her position as accountant and bookkeeper. The prosecution’s evidence
proved that petitioner was entrusted with checks payable to VCCI or Viva by virtue of
her position as accountant and bookkeeper. She deposited the said checks to the
joint account maintained by VCCI and Jefferson Tan, then withdrew a total of
P797,187.85 from said joint account using the pre-signed checks, with her as the
payee. In other words, the bank account was merely the instrument through which
petitioner stole from her employer VCCI.
However, notwithstanding the correctness of the finding of petitioner’s guilt, a

modification is called for as regards the imposable penalty. On the imposition of the
correct penalty, People v. Mercado is instructive. Pursuant to said case, in the
determination of the penalty for qualified theft, note is taken of the value of the
property stolen, which is P797,187.85 in this case. Since the value exceeds
P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to
be imposed in the maximum period, that is, eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor.
To determine the additional years of imprisonment to be added to the basic penalty,

the amount of P22,000.00 is deducted from P797,187.85, which yields a remainder of
P775,187.85. This amount is then divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount
less than P10,000.00. The end result is that 77 years should be added to the basic
penalty. However, the total imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed 20
years. Thus, had petitioner committed simple theft, the penalty would be 20 years of
reclusion temporal. As the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the trial
court, as well as the appellate court, should have imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the

conviction of petitioner Anita L. Miranda for the crime of qualified theft is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is increased to reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v MERA JOY ELEUTERIO NIELLES

G.R. No. 200308 | February 23, 2015
TICKLER: Sub-guarantors, 15 checks, cashier.
DOCTRINE: The accused’s act was accomplished without the use of violence against
or intimidation of persons or force upon things, but rather by the use of abuse of
confidence reposed [by] private complainant [upon] her. Therefore the crime is
qualified theft.
FACTS:
Appellant Mera Joy Eleuterio Nielles @ Mera Nielles Delos Reyes was
charged with the crime of Qualified Theft.
Private complainant Juanita Flores (Flores) was engaged in the business of

guaranteeing purchase orders and gift checks of Shoemart and Landmark and
disposing, selling or transferring them for consideration. Appellant initially worked as
Flores’ househelp but was eventually hired to work at Flores’ office performing clerical
jobs like sorting invoices. When Flores’ business grew, appellant was assigned to bill
and collect from sub-guarantors, and to encash and deposit checks (CASHIER). On
July 15, 2004, appellant collected P640,353.86 from the sub-guarantors. However,
appellant did not remit the amount to Flores or deposit it in her (Flores’) account.
Instead, she issued 15 personal checks totaling P640,353.86 and deposited them to
Flores’ account. All the checks were dishonored upon presentment due to “account
closed.” Appellant thereafter absconded.
CHARGE: Qualified theft
RTC: Qualified theft
Given the foregoing, accused Nielles took P640,353.86 belonging to private

complainant Juanita J. Flores, without the latter’s consent. The taking was done with
intent to gain because when the accused’s checks bounced, she failed to remit or
return the amount. The accused’s act was accomplished without the use of violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, but rather by the use of abuse
of confidence reposed [by] private complainant [upon] her. Thus, the elements of
theft, as well as the circumstances that made the same as qualified theft, are present
in the instant case.
CA: Qualified theft
In her Brief, appellant asserted that since private complainant Flores was abroad on
July 15, 2004, she could not have personally known whether appellant indeed
collected amounts from the sub-guarantors. She posited that mere issuance of the 15
checks is not proof that she received/collected payments from the sub-guarantors or
that she failed to remit the monies belonging to Flores. She insisted that the
prosecution failed to establish that she indeed collected monies from the sub-
guarantors amounting to P640,353.86. Appellant also theorized that she might have
issued the checks in favor of the sub-guarantors for whatever transactions they have
between them; and that thereafter, when she went to these sub-guarantors to collect
their dues for private complainant, these sub-guarantors used the same checks she
previously issued as their payment for private complainant. For that reason her
personal checks were deposited in private complainant’s account.
The CA held that the fact that Flores was out of the country during the commission of
the offense is irrelevant since the prosecution has satisfactorily established that upon
her arrival in the Philippines, she immediately investigated the matter and talked to
the sub-guarantors. Flores also confirmed that indeed appellant issued 15 personal
checks in lieu of the amounts collected and deposited the same to Flores’ account but
were all dishonored upon presentment. Significantly, the CA noted that aside from
her bare denial, appellant did not present any evidence to support her claim that she
did not steal the amount of P640,353.86 from Flores. In fine, the CA found all the
elements for the crime of qualified theft to be present.
ISSUE: Is Nielles guilty for qualified theft?
RULING: She is guilty of qualified theft.
DECISION: GUILTY of QUALIFIED THEFT.
ENGR. ANTHONY ZAPANTA v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 170863 | March 20, 2013
TICKLER: Steel beams
DOCTRINE: In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) That the property
was lost by the owner; and (2) That it was lost by felonious taking.
FACTS:
Prosecution: Petitioner was a Project Manager of the Porta Vaga Building

Construction, a project being undertaken then by the Construction Firm, ANMAR,
Inc., under sub-contract with A. Mojica Construction and General Services.
His position was filled with trust and confidence because it entailed receipt, audit and
checking of all construction materials delivered at the project site. Petitioner and a
certain “Jun” (a crane operator), conspiring with one another, took and carried away
from the project site wide steel beams of different sizes amounting to Php 2M.
Eyewitnesses contend that on two separate occasions, Petitioner instructed a truck

driver and some welders to unload 15-20 pieces of steal beams on Anmar Inc.’s
alleged new contract project along Marcos Highway.
When an inventory was conducted in the project site, it was found that the steel
beams were missing and were unloaded along Marcos Highway:
Defense: Denial.
CRIME CHARGED: Qualified Theft
RTC: Charged with Qualified Theft; gave credence to prosecution witnesses’

straightforward and consistent testimonies and rejected the petitioner’s bare denial
CA: Affirmed RTC decision;
Upon elevating the matter to the Supreme Court, Petitioner contends that the
prosecution failed to establish the fact of the loss of the steel beams since the corpus
delicti was never identified and offered in evidence.
ISSUES:
1. Is Petitioner guilty of Qualified Theft?

2. Was failure to present the alleged stolen beams fatal to the case of the
prosecution?
RULING:
1. YES, the Petitioner is guilty of Qualified Theft.
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308
and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are:
(a) The taking of personal property;
(b) The said property belongs to another;
(c) The said taking be done with intent to gain;
(d) It be done without the owner's consent;
(e) It be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor
of force upon things; and
(f) It be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC,
i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution’s evidence proved, t
upon the petitioner’s instruction, several pieces of wide steel beams had been
delivered, twice, along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner
betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him when he, as project manager,
repeatedly took construction materials from the project site, without the authority and
consent of the owner of the materials.
2. NO, the failure to present the alleged stolen beams was not fatal to the case of the
prosecution.
Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body
or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in
the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered" or, in this
case, to the stolen steel beams.
Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled
that even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove
it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by
circumstantial evidence.
In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely:

(1) That the property was lost by the owner; and
(2) That it was lost by felonious taking
In this case, the testimonial and documentary evidence on record fully established
the corpus delicti. The positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses stating that
the petitioner directed them to unload the steel beams along Marcos Highway and
Mabini Street on the pretext of a new Anmar project, were crucial to the petitioner’s
conviction. The security logbook entry, delivery receipts and photographs proved the
existence and the unloading of the steel beams to a different location other than the
project site.
DECISION: AFFIRMED; Guilty of Qualified Theft
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ISABELO PUNO

G.R. No. 97471 | February 17, 1993
TICKLER: Robbery by the husband’s driver inside the Mercedes benz.
DOCTRINE:
1. For the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention to arise, there must be
indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the
offended party of her liberty.
2. PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by
outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways
and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular
victim.
FACTS:
On January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who
is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao
purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop
in Araneta Ave, QC.
He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an
emergency so Isabelo will temporarily take his place. When it was time for Mrs.
Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her husband's Mercedes
Benz with Isabelo was driving.After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it
stopped and a young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the
driver.
Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get
money" from her. Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the
accused but the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more.
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs.
Sarmiento to issue a check for P100,000. Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two
P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check. Isabelo then turned the car around towards
Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned the car again towards
Pampanga.
According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side
of the superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had
blood because according to her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when
she jumped out of the car.
The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that
according to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs.
Sarmiento to step out of the car. He said he even slowed the car down as he drove
away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride. He claimed that she fell down
when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway.
CRIME CHARGED: KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM UNDER ARTICLE 267 RPC
RTC: Principals of ROBBERY WITH EXTORTION COMMITTED ON A HIGHWAY

punishable under PD 532
CA: No judgment from CA. Appeal agad sa Supreme Court

.
ISSUE: What crime is committed? – SIMPLE ROBBERY
RULING:
The crime committed is SIMPLE ROBBERY.
For the crime of kidnapping with ransom to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty
and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders, in this case the
appellants had no intention to deprive Mrs. Sarmiento of her liberty, they merely
wanted to extort money from her neither can we consider the amounts given to
appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom, considering the immediacy of
their obtention thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal
law, is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a
captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. It can hardly be
assumed that when complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from
her at gun point, what she gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated
with or was in the concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping. These were merely
amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of
which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the
crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject
the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the highway robbery
contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.
PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of
robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, the mere fact
that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating on a
highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case in this case there was an
intended victim and it was Mrs. Sarmiento.
DECISION: Simple Robbery only.
ADDITIONAL INFO:
Brigandage VS. Robbery
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of
robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than
three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient
to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a
prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed
robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is
proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are
contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band,
whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery
or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply
because robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it
would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands.
The purpose of brigandage is indiscriminate highway robbery, if the purpose is only a

particular robbery then the crime committed is only robbery or robbery by a band if
there are more than 4 armed participants.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG

G.R. No. 199208 | July 30, 2014
TICKLER: Cashier at Wyeth.

DOCTRINE: Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, “must be
the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance,
between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of
confidence between them which the appellant abused.”
FACTS:
Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and
Loan Association, Inc. (WPESLAI). She was tasked with handling, managing,
receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI.
It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made
withdrawals from the funds of WPESLAI and appropriated the same for her personal
benefit. Cahilig would prepare disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the
WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in order to withdraw funds from one of
WPESLAI’s bank accounts then transfer these funds to its other bank account. The
withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as
WPESLAI cashier. This procedure for transferring funds from one bank account to
another was said to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not
actually transfer the funds. Instead, she made it appear in her personal WPESLAI
ledger that a deposit was made into her account and then she would fill out a
withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital contribution.
She did it 30 times in the total amount of Php6,268,300.00.
CRIME CHARGED: 30 counts of QUALIFIED THEFT
RTC: Guilty of 30 counts of Qualified Theft
CA: Affirmed RTC
ISSUE: Was Cahilig guilty of 30 counts of qualified theft?
RULING:
YES. The elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of

confidence, are as follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, nor of force upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
All the elements are present in this case.
Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her
position. Her intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately
executed scheme to commit the theft.
Grave abuse of confidence, defined
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, “must be the

result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between
the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence
between them which the appellant abused.”
Cahilig’s position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering
that it involves “handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing” money from
WPESLAI’s depositors and other funds of the association. Cahilig’s responsibilities as
WPESLAI cashier required prudence and vigilance over the money entrusted into her
care.
However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board
of directors into authorizing disbursements for money that eventually ended up in her
personal account, a fact that Cahilig did not deny.
DECISION: CA Decision AFFIRMED.
ERNESTO PIDELI v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 163437 | February 13, 2008
TICKLER: Brother Shark
DOCTRINE:
Elements of theft are as follows:
1. That there be taking of personal property;
2. That said property belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things.
FACTS:
Placido and Wilson entered into a verbal partnership agreement to subcontract a rip-
rapping and spillway project. Petitioner Pideli, brother to Wilson and neighbor and
friend to Placido, offered the duo the use of his credit line with the Mt. Trail Farm
Supply and Hardware (MTFSH) in La Trinidad, Benguet. With the said arrangement,
Wilson and Placido, with the assistance of petitioner, were able to secure an
assortment of construction materials for the rip-rap and spillway contract. After the
completion of the project, Placido, Wilson and petitioner computed their expenses and
arrived at a net income of P130,000.00. Placido, as partner, claimed one-half (1/2) or
P65,000.00 of the net amount as his share in the project. Petitioner, however, advised
the two to first settle their accountabilities for the construction materials taken from the
hardware store. Placido and Wilson did as told and entrusted the full amount to
petitioner, with express instructions to pay MTFSH and deliver the remaining balance
to them. The following day Placido attempted but failed to contact petitioner. He had
hoped to obtain his share of the partnership income. Placido got hold of petitioner the
next morning. Unexpectedly, petitioner informed Placido that nothing was left of the
proceeds after paying off the supplier.Despite repeated demands, petitioner refused
to give Placido his share in the net income of the contract.
Alarmed over the sudden turn of events, Placido lodged a complaint for theft against
petitioner Ernesto Pideli.
CRIME CHARGED: THEFT
RTC: CONVICTED ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF THEFT and hereby sentences

him after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and to reimburse the private
complainant the amount of P49,500.00 plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per
annum.
***Upon evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses, the court finds the lone
testimony of the private complainant more credible than the testimony of the defense
witnesses. The testimony of the private complainant is positive and credible, sufficient
to sustain a conviction even in the absence of corroboration. The testimony of
defense witness Wilson Pideli was glaringly inconsistent and contradictory on material
points.
CA: AFFIRMED the conviction.
ISSUE: Did the RTC err in finding petitioner guilty of theft?
RULING:
No. Accordingly, the elements of theft are as follows: That there be taking of personal
property; That said property belongs to another; That the taking be done with intent to
gain; That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and That the taking
be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things. There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner
received the final payment due the partners Placido and Wilson under the pretext of
paying off their obligation with the MTFSH. Under the terms of their agreement,
petitioner was to account for the remaining balance of the said funds and give each of
the partners their respective shares. He, however, failed to give private complainant
Placido what was due him under the construction contract.
Although there is misappropriation of funds here, petitioner was correctly

found guilty of theft. As early as U.S. v. De Vera, the Court has consistently ruled that
not all misappropriation is estafa.Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, in his commentary
on the Revised Penal Code, succinctly opined: The principal distinction between the
two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the
property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if
the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the material
or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the
same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his
conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa. The record bears out
that private complainant originally claimed P65,000.00 as his share in the partnership.
However, he admitted receiving the total amount of P15,500.00, on two separate
occasions, from Wilson Pideli. Verily, only P49,500.00 is due private complainant.
DECISION: Appealed Decision is AFFIRMED in full.

III. CASES ON RA 6539, AS AMENDED (ANTI-CARNAPPING

LAW)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENATO LAGAT AND JAMES PALALAY

G.R. No. 187044 | September 14, 2011
TICKLER: Qualified Carnapping
DOCTRINES:
• The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the Anti-

Carnapping Act of 1972 are the following:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that
the taking was committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and
4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.
• When a person is killed or raped in the course of or on the occasion of the

carnapping, the crime of carnapping is qualified and the penalty is increased
pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539.
FACTS:
Accused-appellants Lagat and Palalay were charged with the crime of Carnapping as
defined under Section 2 and penalized under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539..
The accusatory portion of the Information, reads:
That on or about the 12th day of April 2005, at Santiago City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, conniving with each other, and mutually helping one another and
with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) unit
YASUKI tricycle bearing Engine No. 161FMJ41535420 and Motor No.
LX8PCK0034D002243 then driven and owned by JOSE BIAG, valued at ₱
70,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof.
That in the course of the commission of carnapping, or on occasion thereof,

the above-named accused, conspiring, conniving confederating and helping
each other, and with intent to kill, did then and there assault, attack and wound
the said JOSE BIAG with sharp and pointed instrument directing blows against
the vital parts of the body of the latter thereby inflicting upon him multiple stab
and hacking wounds which directly caused the death of the said JOSE BIAG.
Police Officer 2 (PO2) Arthur Salvador, a member of the PNP in Alicia, took the
witness stand next. He testified that on April 13, 2005, he was on duty along with
other colleagues at the Alicia PNP Station, when they received a report from Esteban
that the cavans of palay stolen from him were seen at Alice Palay Buying Station in
Alicia, Isabela, in a tricycle commandeered by two unidentified male persons. PO2
Salvador said that upon receipt of this report, their Chief of Police composed a team,
which included him, PO2 Bernard Ignacio, and PO2 Nathan Abuan, to verify the
veracity of the report. At Alice Palay Buying Station, they saw the tricycle described to
them by their chief, with the cavans of palay, and the two accused, Lagat and Palalay.
PO2 Salvador averred that he and his team were about to approach the tricycle when
the two accused "scampered" to different directions. After "collaring" the two accused,
they brought them to the Alicia PNP Station together with the tricycle and its contents.
PO2 Salvador asseverated that when they reached the station, they asked the two
accused if they had any papers to show for both the tricycle and the palay, to which
the two accused did not answer. They allegedly kept silent even after they were
informed of their rights not only to remain as such, but also to have counsel, either of
their own choosing, or to be assigned to them if they cannot afford one. PO2 Salvador
then continued that when they unloaded the tricycle, they discovered bloodstains
inside and outside the sidecar. He also personally found a wallet containing the
tricycle’s Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt issued by the Land
Transportation Office in the name of Jose Biag. When they asked the two accused
about their discoveries, Lagat and Palalay voluntarily answered that the name in the
papers is that of the owner of the tricycle, whom they killed and dumped along
Angadanan and San Guillermo Road, when they carnapped his tricyle. PO2 Salvador
alleged that upon hearing this revelation, they again informed Lagat and Palalay that
anything they say would be used against them, and that they had a right to counsel.
Thereafter, they coordinated with the PNP of Angadanan Police Station, and together
with the two accused, they proceeded to Angadanan-San Guillermo Road, where they
found Biag’s body in a ravine just after the bridge near the road
After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss on
Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court on the ground that the prosecution failed
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Lagat and Palalay averred that their
constitutional rights on custodial investigation were grossly violated as they were
interrogated for hours without counsel, relatives, or any disinterested third person to
assist them.
The accused also claimed that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution was not sufficient to convict them. They averred that aside from the
alleged admissions they had made, the prosecution had nothing else: they had no
object evidence for the bloodstains allegedly found in the tricycle; the murder weapon
was never found; and no eyewitness aside from the police officers was presented to
show that they were in possession of the tricycle at the time they were arrested. Lagat
and Palalay argued that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of
events that showed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, thus, they were entitled to
enjoy the constitutional presumption of innocence absent proof that they were guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
As the accused filed their Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court, they in effect
waived their right to present evidence, and submitted the case for judgment on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
CRIME CHARGED: Carnapping
RTC: Guilty of QUALIFIED CARNAPPING
After evaluating the evidence the prosecution presented, the RTC agreed with the
accused that their rights were violated during their custodial investigation as they had
no counsel to assist them. Thus, whatever admissions they had made, whether
voluntarily or not, could not be used against them and were inadmissible in evidence.
However, the RTC held that despite the absence of an eyewitness, the prosecution
was able to establish enough circumstantial evidence to prove that Lagat and Palalay
committed the crime.
The RTC convicted Lagat and Palalay of the crime of carnapping, qualified by the
killing of Biag, which, according to the RTC, appeared to have been done in the
course of the carnapping.
CA: AFFIRMED the RTC with modification as to actual damages.
In affirming the conviction of the accused, the Court of Appeals held that the elements
of carnapping were all present in this case. The Court of Appeals pointed out that
Lagat and Palalay were in possession of the missing tricycle when they were
apprehended by the Alicia PNP. Moreover, they failed to offer any explanation as to
how they came to be in possession of the tricycle.
ISSUE: Are the appellants guilty of qualified carnapping?
RULING:
YES, they are guilty of qualified carnappping.
Lagat and Palalay have been charged and convicted of the crime of qualified
carnapping under Republic Act. No. 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. Section
2 of the Act defines "carnapping" and "motor vehicle" as follows:
"Carnapping" is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things.
"Motor vehicle" is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power

using the public highways, but excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-sweepers,
sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts, amphibian trucks, and cranes
if not used on public highways, vehicles, which run only on rails or tracks, and
tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used exclusively for agricultural
purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be
propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be classified as separate motor
vehicle with no power rating.
The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the Anti-Carnapping Act
of 1972 are the following:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking
was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things; and
4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.
The records of this case show that all the elements of carnapping are present and
were proven during trial.
The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as evidenced by the
registration papers, was found in Lagat and Palalay’s possession. Aside from this, the
prosecution was also able to establish that Lagat and Palalay fled the scene when the
Alicia PNP tried to approach them at the palay buying station. To top it all, Lagat and
Palalay failed to give any reason why they had Biag’s tricycle. Their unexplained
possession raises the presumption that they were responsible for the unlawful taking
of the tricycle. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states that:
[A] person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent

wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing
which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by
him.
In Litton Mills, Inc. v. Sales, we said that for such presumption to arise, it must be
proven that: (a) the property was stolen; (b) it was committed recently; (c) that the
stolen property was found in the possession of the accused; and (d) the accused is
unable to explain his possession satisfactorily. As mentioned above, all these were
proven by the prosecution during trial. Thus, it is presumed that Lagat and Palalay
had unlawfully taken Biag’s tricycle. In People v. Bustinera, this Court defined
"unlawful taking," as follows:
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without

the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the
moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same.
Lagat and Palalay’s intent to gain from the carnapped tricycle was also proven as
they were caught in a palay buying station, on board the stolen tricycle, which they
obviously used to transport the cavans of palay they had stolen and were going to sell
at the station. In Bustinera, we elucidated on the concept of "intent to gain" and said:
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful
taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may
be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of
the thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.
Thus, all the elements of carnapping are present in this case.
A careful and exhaustive examination of the evidence presented, excluding those that
are inadmissible, show that the circumstantial evidence, when viewed as a whole,
effectively establishes the guilt of Lagat and Palalay beyond reasonable doubt. We
considered the following pieces of evidence as convincing:
First, Lagat and Palalay were found in possession of the tricycle the same day
that it, together with its owner Biag, was reported missing.
Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a palay buying station, with the
stolen tricycle packed with cavans of palay allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.
Third, Lagat and Palalay who were then on board the tricycle, jumped and ran
the moment they saw the Alicia PNP approaching them.
Fourth, Lagat and Palalay could not explain to the Alicia PNP why they were in
possession of Biag’s tricycle.
Fifth, Biag’s wallet and his tricycle’s registration papers were found in the
tricycle upon its inspection by the Alicia PNP.
Sixth, Biag’s body bore hack wounds as evidenced by the post-mortem

autopsy done on him, while his tricycle had traces of blood in it.
The foregoing circumstantial evidence only leads to the conclusion that Lagat and
Palalay conspired to kill Biag in order to steal his tricycle. Direct proof that the two
accused conspired is not essential as it may be inferred from their conduct before,
during, and after their commission of the crime that they acted with a common
purpose and design. The pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution are
consistent with one another and the only rational proposition that can be drawn
therefrom is that the accused are guilty of killing Biag to carnap his tricycle.

When a person is killed or raped in the course of or on the occasion of the
carnapping, the crime of carnapping is qualified and the penalty is increased pursuant
to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended:
Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of
carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective
of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less
than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and
four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation
of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the
carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor
vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or
on the occasion thereof. (As amended by R.A. No. 7659.)
As there was no aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime,

the RTC properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the October 8, 2008

decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02869. Accused-appellants
Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED CARNAPPING and are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs
of the victim Jose Biag the following: (a) ₱ 50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱
50,000.00 as moral damages; (c) ₱ 25,000.00 as temperate damages; (d) ₱
876,000.00 as loss of earning capacity; and (e) interest on all damages awarded at
the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v JOEL AQUINO

G.R. No. 201092 | January 15, 2014
TICKLER: Black Kawasaki tricycle; simple carnapping
DOCTRINE: When the carnapping is merely an afterthought when the killing of the
victim is already accomplished, it cannot qualify the crime to carnapping with
homicide. It is only simple carnapping.
FACTS:
On September 5, 2005, at around 8:30 pm, the victim Jesus Lita, accompanied by his
ten-year old son, Jefferson, went out aboard the former’s black Kawasaki tricycle.
Upon reaching San Jose del Monte Elementary School, appellant Joel Aquino
together with Noynoy Almoguera a.k.a. Negro, Rodnal, Bing, John Doe and Peter
Doe boarded the tricycle. Noynoy instructed the victim to proceed to the nipa hut
owned by appellant Aquino.
Upon reaching the said nipa hut, Jesus Lita, appellant and his companions had a
shabu session while Jefferson was watching TV. After using shabu, Noynoy
demanded from the victim to pay ₱500.00, but the victim said that he had no money.
Appellant shouted at the victim demanding him to pay. Bing suggested to her
companions that they leave the nipa hut. Thus, the victim mounted his tricycle and
started the engine. Noynoy and John Doe rode in the tricycle behind the victim while
appellant and Rodnal rode in the sidecar with Jefferson sitting at the toolbox of the
tricycle. Inside the tricycle, appellant pointed a knife at Jefferson while Noynoy
stabbed the victim’s side. After the victim was stabbed, he was transferred inside the
tricycle while appellant drove the tricycle to his friend’s house where they again
stabbed the victim using the latter’s own knife. Then they loaded the victim to the
tricycle and drove to a grassy area where appellant and his companions dumped the
body of the victim. Thereafter, they returned to appellant’s residence. Jefferson told
the sister of appellant about the death of his father but the sister of appellant only told
him to sleep. The next day, Jefferson was brought to the jeepney terminal where he
rode a jeepney to get home. Jefferson told his mother, Ma. Theresa Calitisan-Lita,
about the death of his father.
Appellant denied the accusations against him. Appellant does not know either Ma.
Theresa Lita, his son Jefferson, or the victim Jesus Lita. Also, he does not know a
certain Noynoy Almoguera and alias Rodnal. Likewise, he denied using shabu.
CRIME CHARGED: 2 INFORMATIONS were filed. One for MURDER of Jesus Lita;
the other one for the VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6539 otherwise known as
the Anti-Camapping Act of 1972
RTC: Guilty of Murder and violation of RA 6539. For violation of RA 6539, the
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment pursuant to Section
14 of the said R.A. 6539.
CA: AFFIRMED RTC RULING WITH MODIFICATIONS particularly as to the penalty

imposed for violation of RA 6539. Instead of life imprisonment, the CA sentenced
appellant to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8)
months, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months, as maximum.
ISSUE: Is the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals correct?
RULING: The Court concurs with the modification made by the Court of Appeals with
respect to the penalty of life imprisonment for carnapping originally imposed by the
trial court. Life imprisonment has long been replaced with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659. Furthermore, the said penalty is
applicable only to the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide which is not

obtaining in this case.
Jurisprudence tells us that to prove the special complex crime of carnapping with
homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but
also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was
perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof.The appellate court correctly observed that the killing of Jesus cannot qualify
the carnapping into a special complex crime because the carnapping was merely an
afterthought when the victim’s death was already fait accompli. Thus, appellant is
guilty only of simple carnapping.
DECISION: Guilty of MURDER AND VIOLATION OF RA 6539 (Simple Carnapping).

For violation of RA 6539, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8) months, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years
and Four (4) months, as maximum plus the total amount of the installment payments
made on the motorcycle.

IV. CASES ON PD 1612 (ANTI-FENCING LAW)

JAIME ONG y ONG v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 190475 | April 10, 2013
TICKLER: 44 Firestone truck tires, buyer and seller of tires
DOCTRINE: The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime
of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should
have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one
accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.
FACTS:
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires,
described as T494 1100 by 20 by 14. He acquired the same for the total amount
of P223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation, a domestic corporation
engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of Firestone tires. Private complainant's
acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated November 10, 1994 and
an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically described by their
serial numbers. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before
storing them inside the warehouse in 720 San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St.,
Barangay San Antonio Valley 1, Sucat, Parañaque, owned by his relative Teody
Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the warehouse, was in charge of the tires.
After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires
remained inside the warehouse.
On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal
that all thirty-eight (38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which
was forcibly opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the
robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from

numerous business establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On
February 24, 1995, private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store
selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by appellant. Private complainant
inquired if appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires,
to which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the
description, which private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his
warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon. Private
complainant asked appellant if he had any more of such tires in stock, which was
again answered in the affirmative. Private complainant then left the store and reported
the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern Police District.
On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a
buy-bust operation on appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was composed of
six (6) members, led by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero and supervised by Senior Inspector
Noel Tan. Private complainant's companion Tito Atienza was appointed as the
poseur-buyer.
On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination
with the Western Police District, proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The
team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in the afternoon. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza
proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted themselves across the street.
Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone truck tires
available. The latter immediately produced one tire from his display, which Atienza
bought for P5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any more in stock.
Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from
his warehouse, which was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires
were brought in, private complainant entered the store, inspected them and found that
they were the same tires which were stolen from him, based on their serial numbers.
Private complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the buy-bust team confirming
that the tires in appellant's shop were the same tires stolen from the warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust
team went inside appellant's store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the
confiscation of the stolen truck tires be witnessed by representatives from the
barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it was already past 10:00 in the evening
when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the police station for
investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was able to confiscate thirteen
(13) tires, including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires
were confirmed by private complainant as stolen from his warehouse.
For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had
been engaged in the business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years
and denying that he had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong
Marketing. He further averred that on 18 February 1995, a certain Ramon Go (Go)
offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly from Dagat-dagatan,
Caloocan City, for P3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for P45,500, for which he
was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with the letterhead Gold Link
Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold Link).
Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his
bodega. The poseur-buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and came back to
ask for more tires. Ten minutes later, policemen went inside the store, confiscated the
tires, arrested Ong and told him that those items were stolen tires.

CRIME CHARGED: Violation of P.D. 1612 or the ANTI-FENCING LAW
RTC: CONVICTED of violation of P.D. 1612
CA: AFFIRMED the ruling of the RTC
Argument of Defense: In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued
to him by Go.
ISSUE: Is accused guilty of violating P.D. 1612?
RULING: No. First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar
(Azajar), whose testimony was corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the
warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were stolen testified that the crime of
robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able to prove
ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 4565dated 10 November 1994 and
an Inventory List. Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that robbery was
reported as evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay taken at the Southern Police
District at Fort Bonifacio. The report led to the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong
Markerting, Paco, Manila on 27 February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery,
he never denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his
possession. The facts do not establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an
accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight (38) missing
tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial numbers of stolen
tires corresponds to those found in Ong's possession. Ong likewise admitted that he
bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of 245,500 where he
was issued Sales Invoice No. 980.hanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
The words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and
intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would
govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Ong, who was in the
business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24) years, ought to have
known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller.
Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did
not even ask for proof of ownership of the tires. The entire transaction, from the
proposal to buy until the delivery of tires happened in just one day. His experience
from the business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the
tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and the manner it was
sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.
Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-
bust operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong
Marketing.
Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go. Logically, and for all
practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate
transaction and may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that
defense is disputable. In this case, the validity of the issuance of the receipt was
disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its address were
fictitious. Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and to
prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie
presumption under Section 5 of P.D. 1612.
DECISION: Petition DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED.
MEL DIMAT v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 181184 | January 25, 2012
TICKLER: Anti-fencing, Nissan Safari
DOCTRINE:
The elements of fencing are
1) a robbery or theft has been committed;
2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that
robbery or theft;
3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing was
derived from that crime; and
4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.
FACTS:
Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez
and Ruben Familara, testified in substance that in December 2000, Delgado’s wife,
Sonia, bought from accused Mel Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate number
WAH-569 for P850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicles engine number as
TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.
On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group
(TMG) spotted the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a
suspicious plate number. After stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered
that its engine number was actually TD42-119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-
YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles.
They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that it had been
stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla. The latter confirmed that it was his
car stolen from Robinsons Galleria’s parking area.
Dimat’s Defense:
First, the engine and chassis number are different as evidence by the deed of sale
evidencing the transactions and; second, he has no criminal intent.
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
RTC: Guilty. Sentenced him to an imprisonment of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of

prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal. The court also ordered him to pay
P850,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, as well as
the costs of suit.
CA: Affirmed the RTC. But modified the penalty to imprisonment of 8 years and 1
day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, and 1
day of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum.
ISSUE: Did CA correctly rule that Dimat knowingly sold to Sonia Delgado for gain the
Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from Mantequilla?
RULING: YES. The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been
committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article or object taken during that robbery or theft; 3) the
accused knows or should have known that the thing was derived from that
crime; and 4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.
Here someone carnapped the car of Mantequilla and was later on sold by Dimat to
Delgado. Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the
latter gave the car to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him
the old certificate of registration and official receipt of the vehicle and even
promised to give him a new certificate of registration and official receipt already
in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Based on this, Dimat knew
that the car he bought was not properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed
him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly could not be
true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to
show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new
documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the car came from an illicit
source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Delgado.
As to the defenses raised: First, the engine and chassis number are the same when
inspected by the police. Second, the Anti-Fencing Law is malum prohibitum requiring
no proof of criminal intent.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals.


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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests

Outline by Fiscal Victoria C. Garcia

REVISED PENAL CODE: BOOK TWO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ARNEL BALUTE

TICKLER: Nokia 3210

CRIME CHARGED: Robbery with Homicide

RTC: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Robbery with

CA: AFFIRMED however it no longer considered treachery as it was not alleged in

(1) the taking of personal property belonging to another;

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v CHARLIE OROSCO

TICKLER: Insufficient change, 500 bill vs 100 bill

CA: AFFIRMED THE DECISION of the RTC

DECISION: Appeal DISMISSED. CA Decision AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v JUAN CABBAB

TICKLER: WINNER SA SUGAL. Loser in life. Nagsugal, natalo. Napikon. Pinatay

1. In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob,

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

CRIME CHARGED: Double Murder and Attempted Murder with Robbery

RTC appreciated aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place.

CA: AFFIRMED THE DECISION of the RTC

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of

DECISION: CA Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ALVIN ESUGON

TICKLER: Muymoy saw Nonoy and his knife

CRIME CHARGED: Robbery with homicide

RTC: Robbery with homicide

CA: Robbery with homicide

ISSUE: Is accused is guilty of Robbery with Homicide?

SC: YES. He is guilty of Robbery with homicide.

Appellant’s contention lacks persuasion.

As the records show, Dennis was awakened by someone shouting "

DECISION: Petition was DENIED.

The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime are not appreciated to

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v RODOLFO SUYU @ RUDY, WILLY SUYU,

TICKLER: Bf &Gf in pick-up truck, Gf left with 3 guys

Version of the Prosecution:

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

On January 17, 1996, Clarissa underwent a physical and gynecological examination

Version of the Defense:

Cainglet declared that he was a security guard on duty in Corinthian Gardens,

CRIME CHARGED: Robbery with Rape

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v JOSEPH BARRA

TICKLER: No money in my possession – shot dead

DOCTRINE: The crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim

CRIME CHARGED: Special complex crime of robbery with homicide

RTC: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY

CA: The Court of Appeals ONLY FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY OF ATTEMPTED

“When by reason of or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide

The attendant circumstances clearly show accused-appellant’s intent to rob the

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

In People v. Quemeggen, this Court gave the requisites to be proven by the

1. The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation

Article 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain