MODULE 2 CASE DIGEST STATCON

LIDASAN VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

RA No. 4790 entitled “ An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao del
Sur ‘, was signed into law and came to light later that barrios mentioned in the body of that statue
are within the municipalities of the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur only. Prompted
by the coming elections, COMELEC adopted its resolutions for the purposes of establishments of
precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes. The Office of the President
recommended the COMELEC that the operation of the statue be suspended until “ clarified by
correcting legislation”. COMELEC stood by its own interpretion, hence this motion by Bara
Lidasan as a resident, taxpayer and a qualified voter of Parang Cotabato.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the title of the statue conforms with the constitutional requirement.

HELD:

No. The title of RA No. 4790 projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is
affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in
the adjacent Province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. Such title did
not inform the people in towns in Cotabato and the province itself that part of their territory is
being taken away and added to the adjacent province of Lanao del Sur. Transfer of sizable
territory from one province to another is as important as the creation of a municipality, yet, the
title did not reflect this fact. The legislative purpose is not expressed in the title, hence RA No.
4790 is null void.
Giron VS Comelec

FACTS:

Petitioner Henry Giron (Giron) and petitioners-in-intervention assail the constitutionality of

Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No.
(R.A.)9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act.
Giron asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section
26(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically requires: Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. He avers
that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the
political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates
after the official ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67
(Candidates holding elective office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns the ipso facto resignation of elective
officials immediately after they file their respective certificates of candidacy for an office other
than that which they are currently holding in a permanent capacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the one subject-one title rule?

HELD:

The petition must fail.

POLITICAL LAW: one subject-one title rule
It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of the
constitutionality of a legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just
law.

Because of this strong presumption, the one who asserts the invalidity of a law has to prove that
there is a clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the
petition must fail.

The Court finds that the present case fails to present a compelling reason that would surpass the
strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act.
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth.
The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.

Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its
provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice,
action and study of the legislators and the public.
Petition DISMISSED.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
Arturo Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 115455; October 30, 1995

FACTS:

The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision dismissing the
petitions for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the
several petitioners.

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as
well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or
gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the... gross receipts
from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue
Code.

These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 7716 on various grounds summarized in the resolution of July 6, 1994 of this Court, as
follows:

Issues:

Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution? Does it violate Art. VI, 26(2) of
the Constitution? What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee?
Does the law violate the following provi-sions in the Bill of Rights (Art. III)?

Ruling:

The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded Value-
Added Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had
originated in the House of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply
consolidated with the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the
bill which the President signed into law. The following provisions of the Constitution are cited in
support of the proposition that because Republic Act No. 7716 was passed in this... manner, it
did not originate in the House of Representatives and it has not thereby become a law:

Art. VI, § 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with... amendments.

Id., § 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President... certifies to the necessity of
its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill,
no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the

Journal.

This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is
required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is
important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo... such
extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility
of a third version by the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is
important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may... be produced. To
insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would
be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments"... but also to "propose
amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of
Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

Second. Enough has been said to show that it was within the power of the Senate to propose S.
No. 1630. We now pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three
readings on separate days as required by the

Constitution[8] because the second and third readings were done on the same day, March 24,
1994. But this was because on February 24, 1994
The Philippine Judges Association, etc., petitioners
vs Hon. Pete Prado, etc., respondents
Ponente: Cruz

Facts:

The petitioners are members of the mower courts who feel that their official functions as judges
will be prejudiced by the Section 35 of RA No. 7354 through Circular No. 92-98 withdrawing the
franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTCs and Land Registration of Deeds and other
government offices.

Petitioners assails the constitutionality of RA No. 7354 on the grounds: (1) its title embraces more
than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in
both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among
the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence
of the Judiciary.

Issue: the independence of the Judiciary.

Held:

(1) We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is
germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation
of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature
as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

(2) Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and
that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House.
Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e.,
in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least,
a becoming courtesy.

(3) The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid
classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has
been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute
of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; etc.

(4) We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a
valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find
its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the
law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between
the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.
Bolinao Electronics Vs. Brigido Valencia

Facts:

This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with preliminary injunction filed
by the Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc., and Monserrat
Broadcasting System, Inc., owners and operators of radio and television stations enumerated
therein, against respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Acting Chief of
the Radio Control Division. Later the Republic of the Philippines, as operator of the Philippine
Broadcasting Service, sought and was allowed to intervene in this case, said intervenor having
been granted a construction permit to install and operate a television station in Manila.

Issues:

(1) whether the investigation being conducted by respondents, in connection with petitioners'
applications for renewal of their station licenses, has any legal basis;
(2) whether or not there was abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle Broadcasting
Network (CBN) of Channel 9 in favor of PBS; and
(3) whether or not Philippine Broadcasting Service can legally operate Channel 9 and is entitled
to damages, for CBN's refusal to give up operations thereof.

Ruling:

The writ prayed for by petitioners is hereby granted. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore
issued by this Court is made permanent.

1. The violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and, hence, there is no reason nor need for
the present investigation. Its continuation will serve no useful purpose in contemplation
of the law authorizing investigations in connection with applications for renewal of
permit. NO authority to condone or pardon violations of the radio control regulations
cannot be upheld: Firstly, by specific provision of law,[1] the respondent Department
Secretary is given the discretion either to "bring criminal action against violators of the
radio laws or the regulations and confiscate the radio apparatus in case of illegal
operation; or simply suspend or revoke the offender's station or operator licenses or
refuse to renew such licenses; or just reprimand and warn the offenders." The cited
circular specifically approved by the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications
(who has not been shown to have acted beyond his powers as such in representation of
the Secretary of the Department) warning the offenders, is an act authorized under the
law. Secondly, the circular having been issued by respondents themselves, the latter can
not now claim its illegality to evade the effect of its enforcement.
2. The next issue is whether there was abandonment or renunciation by petitioner CBN of its
right to operate on Sec. 3(m), Act 3846, as amended by Rep. Act 584. Channel 9. It is
admitted that there was no express agreement to this effect. The only basis of the contention
of the respondents that there was such renunciation is the statement "Channel 10 assigned
in lieu of Channel 9", appearing in the construction permit to transfer television station
DZXL-TV from Quezon City to Baguio City, issued to petitioner. This statement alone,
however, does not establish any agreement between the radio control authority and the
station operator, on the switch or change of operations of CBN from Channel 9 to Channel
10. As explained by petitioner, it was made to understand that the assignment of Channel
10, in connection with the planned transfer of its station to Baguio, was to be effective upon
the final transfer of the said station. This was necessary to avoid interference of its
broadcast with that of the Clark Air Force base station in Pampanga which is operating on
Channel 8. In other words, Channel 10 would be assigned to petitioner only when the
Baguio station starts to operate. When the plan to transfer DZXL-TV to Baguio had to be
abandoned, it did not mean abandonment by the station of its right to operate and broadcast
on Channel 9 in Quezon City. '
 3. Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular item or items
of an appropriation bill. However, when a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or
more items of the same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same
time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates. (Art. VI, Sec. 20).

It may be observed from the wordings of the Appropriations Act that the amount appropriated
for the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service was made subject to the condition that
the same shall not be used or expended for operation of television stations in Luzon where there
are already existing commercial television stations.

STATCON CONNECTION:

This gives rise to the question of whether the President may legally veto a condition attached
to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.

This ruling, that the executive's veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases.

It the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever, and the
restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains. Any expenditure made by the
intervenor PBS, for the purpose of installing or operating a television station in Manila, where
there are already television stations in operation, would be in violation of the express condition
for the release of the appropriation and, consequently, null and void. It is not difficult to see
that even if it were able to prove its right to operate on Channel 9, said intervenor would not
have been entitled to reimbursement of its illegal expenditures.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS , the writ prayed for by petitioners is hereby
granted. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent.
Without costs. So ordered.
ABAKADA Guro Partylist v. Purisima (G.R. NO. 166715)

Facts:

RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to encourage their officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund and Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.

The Boards in the BIR and BOC to be composed by their respective Commissioners, DOF, DBM,
and NEDA, were tasked to prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and
release of the fund, to set criteria and procedures for removing service officials and employees
whose revenue collection fall short of the target; and further, to issue rules and regulations. Also,
the law tasked the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the CSC to promulgate and issue the IRR of
RA 9335, subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created solely
for the purpose of approving the formulated IRR. Later, the JCOO having approved a formulated
IRR by the agencies, JCOO became functus officio and ceased to exist.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the constitutionality
of RA 9335 and sought to prevent herein respondents from implementing and enforcing said law.

Petitioners assail, among others, the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the
ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, as it permits legislative participation
in the implementation and enforcement of the law, when legislative function should have been
deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment of the law. Respondents, through the
OSG, counter this by asserting that the creation of the congressional oversight committee under
the law enhances rather than violates separation of powers, as it ensures the fulfillment of the
legislative policy.

Issue:

Whether the creation of the congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of
separation of powers under the Constitution

(As for the other issue on constitutional principles of bicameralism and rule on presentment, click
this link)

Ruling: YES.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 having approved the IRR formulated by
the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC on May 22, 2006, it became functus officio and ceased
to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing
and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.

This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the issue of
the constitutionality of the Joint Congressional.

Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes
an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional
separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the
over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,”
the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself,
any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it
exercises its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedures” specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment
of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should
be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined
to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to

present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or
through a committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional
oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which
Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure
of the Constitution‘s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing,
applying or implementing its own laws.

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the

law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect.
Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by
subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers
established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based
on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress
arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or
any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the
principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision
that requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has
already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its
members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch
charged with the implementation of the law.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby partially granted. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the
law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the
remaining provisions of RA 9335 is upheld.
ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL petitioners vs. JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL,

Facts:

This is a petition to prevent the enforcement of a congerssional resolution designated Resolution

of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended
as an ordinance thereto.
Three of the plaintiff senators were suspended by the Senate shortly while the eight of the
plaintiff representatives had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part on
the election of Speaker, both on account of alleged irregularities on thier ellection.

As a consequence the petitioners did not take part in the passage of questioned resolution nor
was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote
which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constititution. If these members had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would had been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.

Issue:

Whether the Court has jurisdiction.

Held:

No. The political questions are not witihin the province of the judiciary except to the extent that
power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutionality or statutory provision.

If ratification of an amendment is a politcal question, a proposal which leads to ratification has

to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve
a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section 1 of Article
XV of the Philippine Constitution consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification.

There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the
other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is highly political function performed by Congress in
its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The
exercise of this power is even independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on
grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public
interest, there is less reason for judiciary inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into that of
ratification.
ARROYO VS. DE VENCIA

Facts:

RA 8240 which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-
called ”sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes were challenged by
Representative Joker Arroyo. The bicameral committee after submitting its report to the House,
the chairman of the committee proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech and was
interpellated. Arroyo also interrupted to move to adjourn for lack of quorum. His motion was
defeated and put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor proceeded and the bill was
approved on its third reading.

Issue:

Whether or not Arroyo should have been heard for his call to adjourn for lack of quorum?

Decision:

Petition dismissed. It is unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department of the

Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a
rematch in the judicial forum when the petitioners can find their remedy in their own
department.

\
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA v. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS

Facts:

On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of
Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964.
Forthwith the hill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was... referred to the Senate
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M.
Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested
by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President

Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's
incapacity to act as Mayor.

When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964,
substantial amendments to Section 1[1] were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those
amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The... amendment recommended by Senator
Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.

On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that
House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments."
Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended
by

Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the
Senate. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as
sent hack to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed... copies were then
certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the
Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the... bill to the President of the
Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill
thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065.

The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by
respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964
issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the
President... of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate
because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor.
As a consequence the Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter...
dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of House
Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding-officers thereof
was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered his signature... on the enrolled
bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further
clarification that the invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on
which his signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate... and therefore the fact
that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.

Issues:

whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the (1935)
Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called parity rights provision) had
been passed by "a vote of three-fourths of all the members of... the Senate and of the House of
Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.

Ruling:

The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel V.
Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question
which was not within the province of the judiciary in view of the principle of separation... of
powers in our government. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling
on the jurisdictional question, the reasoning being that "if a political question conclusively binds
the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly... certified law or resolution also
binds the judges under the 'enrolled bill rule' born of that respect,"

Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses, namely,
by the signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the
approved bill.[2] It has been held that this procedure is... merely a mode of authentication[3] to
signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by
Congress and is ready for his approval or rejection.[4] The function of an attestation is therefore
not... of approval, because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both Houses. Even
where such attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities are divided its to whether
or not the signatures are mandatory such that their absence would render the statute...
invalid.[5] The affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in effect giving the presiding officers
the power of veto, which in itself is a strong argument to the contrary.[6] There is less reason to
make the attestation a requisite... for the validity of a bill where the Constitution does not even
provide that the presiding officers should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President.

It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and
independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been... stated in other
cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute,
the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due
enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a... number of decisions,[10] although they
are silent as to whether the journals may still he resorted to if the attestation of the presiding
officers is present.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of
misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this... case. This Court is merely asked to
inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text
passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this
Court can do this and resort to the

Senate journal for that purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments
were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to... incorporate
such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking,[13] but to
declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as
indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief

Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error
committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive,
for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and... holding that the
erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic Act No.
4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE
CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF
REPUBLIC ACT

NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED

CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did
not become law. The temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made
permanent. No... pronouncement as to costs.