MODULE 2: STATUTES AND THEIR ENACTMENT

I. Title of Bills

1.Lidasan v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496

LIDASAN VS. COMELEC

FACTS
RA No. 4790 entitled “ An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the province of
Lanao del Sur ‘, was signed into law and came to light later that barrios mentioned in
the body of that statue are within the municipalities of the Province of Cotabato   and not
of Lanao del Sur only. Prompted by the coming elections, COMELEC adopted its
resolutions for the purposes of establishments of precincts, registration of voters and for
other election purposes. The Office of the President recommended the COMELEC that
the operation of the statue  be suspended until “ clarified by correcting legislation”.
COMELEC stood by its own interpretion, hence this motion by Bara Lidasan as a
resident, taxpayer and a qualified voter of Parang Cotabato.

ISSUE
Whether or not the title of the statue conforms with the constitutional requirement.

HELD
No. The title of RA No. 4790 projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao
del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent Province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao
del Sur town. Such title did not inform the people in towns in Cotabato and the province
itself that part of their territory is being taken away and added to the adjacent province
of Lanao del Sur. Transfer of sizable territory from one province to another is as
important as the creation of a municipality, yet, the title did not reflect this fact. The
legislative purpose is not expressed in the title, hence RA No. 4790 is null void.

2. Giron v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner Henry Giron (Giron) and petitioners-in-intervention assail the constitutionality
of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of
Republic Act No. (R.A.)9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act.
Giron asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates
Section 26(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically requires: Every bill
passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof. He avers that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair
Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the
votes cast for substituted candidates after the official ballots have been printed, while
Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67
of this law concerns the ipso facto resignation of elective officials immediately after they
file their respective certificates of candidacy for an office other than that which they are
currently holding in a permanent capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act
violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the one subject-one title
rule?
HELD: The petition must fail.
POLITICAL LAW: one subject-one title rule
It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of the
constitutionality of a legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid,
sensible, and just law. Because of this strong presumption, the one who asserts the
invalidity of a law has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the petition must fail.
The Court finds that the present case fails to present a compelling reason that would
surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair
Election Act.
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not
be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an
abstract or index of the Act.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill
should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature
and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have
not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public.
Petition DISMISSED.
II. Formalities

1. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630

Facts:

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen
the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending
the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in
fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by
the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) ofthe Constitution

Held:

The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear
analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a
revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House
bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but
also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public
debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute
bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the
Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings
on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third
readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had
certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on
separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by
the weigh tof legislative practice.

2. PHILJA v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 203

FACTS:

Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 (AN ACT CREATING THE
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, DEFINING ITS POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES,
PROVIDING FOR REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES CONNECTED
THEREWITH. Sec. 35 All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or
parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly. All
franking privileges authorized by law are repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth
Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue
the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President,
under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof ) which
withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the
Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and
the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain
other government offices.

The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its
title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did
not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the
bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and
(3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

RULING:
 No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.

1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof."

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that
if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies
is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which
is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is
that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be
expressly included in the title of the said law.

2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal
of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882
and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House
Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report,
its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also
invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences
thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.

Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals
like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also
binding on the Supreme Court.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No.
7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of
each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure
was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We
are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government,
to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution

providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled
corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the
public service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot
excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange
for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys
under its charter. 14 Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage
of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the
discharge of their own public functions.

III. Approval of Bills

1. Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20740, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486

READ ONLINE

2. Abakada Guro Party-list v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562
SCRA 251

FACTS: The petition for prohibition was filed to prevent respondents from implementing
and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to
optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR
and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system
of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status. Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines
for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for
removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short
of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the
Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions,
including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to
Congress. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing
a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best
only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives
invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials
and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.Petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue
targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section
7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the
service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does
not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue
targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore
be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss
BIR or BOC personnel.Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional
oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the
enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the
law.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection.

2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the
President

. 3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the
creation of a congressional oversight committee.

HELD: 1. NO. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.With
respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the
law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the
incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said
agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the
common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government
through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges. Both the BIR and the
BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being
the instrumentality through which the State exercises one of its great inherent
functions–taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately
related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to
the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

2.No. RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in
fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of
the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act.Moreover, the Court has recognized the
following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public
convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.

3.The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules
and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On
May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and
ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function
of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic. The
petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations
of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The
constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section
13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.

IV. Evidence of Enactment of Laws

a.) Enrolled Bill Theory

1. Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, L-1223, March 5, 1947, 78 Phil. 1 (1947)

FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were
suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not
allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House
Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in
determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as an
enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals
of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been
otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted,
the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the
prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution.
Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court
is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or
not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from
each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of
the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the
enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in
either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC
found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother
itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It
did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into
the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter,
and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with
each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents
and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it
would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly
certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.”

**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses,
signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the
secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210,
provides: “Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the
Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the
Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house
thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of
secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed
by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of
the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the
legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of
the journals.

2. Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997, 277 SCRA 268

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the
House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House
which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo
made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the
Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.
Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano
moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair
called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none,
approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What
is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the
Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both
Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
.rules of the House

Held:

Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject
to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they
are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite
number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in
character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with
which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum
but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a
quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House.

b.) Journal Entry Rule

1. Astorga v. Villegas, G.R. No. 23475, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 714

FACTS: RA 4065 was passed which amended the Revised Charter of the of the City of

Manila and provided for the power, duties and rights of the vice-mayor of the city. It
tumns out that the bill which was signed into law contained amendments different form
those approved by the Senate, The President of the Philippines after learning of such,
had already withdrawn his signature therefrom. This being the case, the Mayor of
Manila issued circulars to the various departments of the local govemnment unit to
disregard the provisions ofthe said law. thus, the petitioner, then vice-mayor of Manila
filed a petition for Mandamus, lnjunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory
and Prohibitory Injunction to compel the necessary parties to comply with the law.
Respondents alleged, hovever, that the bill never became a law as it was not the bill
approved by Senate, and in such a case, the entries in the journal, and not the enrolled
bill itself should be the basis for the decision of the Court.
RULING:
ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE
The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the respect due to coequal and independent
departments. which requires the judicial department to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated. If the attestation is absent and
the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals
and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment.
That attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of due
enactment of the law cannot apply in this case because the Senate President himself
had already declared his signature on the bill to be invalid. Thus, the enrolled bill
doctrine cannot apply.
CERTIFICATION OF BILLS
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification
made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication.The lawmaking
process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the
certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present
upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures
of the presiding officers that is essential.
LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS
While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of
misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. The Court is merely
asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the chief Executive
was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for
the purpose.

MODULE 3: CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

I. Constitution, Definition and Characteristics

1. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 408

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MhHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the
MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS
has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).

ISSUE:

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

II. General Principles of Construction

1. Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938) read online

III. Aids to construction

1. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)

FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet
members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive department
to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations and to receive additional
compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII
prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or employment.
Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor
General, the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated “unless
otherwise allowed by law” which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII,
section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet
member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.

ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the
constitution.

RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional
provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self
enrichment which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is
meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase “unless otherwise provided by the Constitution” in Section
13, Article VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to
the legislative intent of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies
only to particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice
as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void.

2. Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA

51 (1990)

Facts:

On 10 June 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines, which includes, among
others, the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.

Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, avers that it would be
adversely affected by the enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law. Hence, it
prayed that the said law be declared unconstitutional. The mentioned sections of the law provies, among
others, the product-sharing plan, including those engaged in livestock and poultry business.

Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with crop or tree farming. That
the land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than 5% of the total
investments of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. That the land is incidental but not the principal
factor or consideration in their industry. Hence, it argued that it should not be included in the coverage
of RA 6657 which covers “agricultural lands”.

Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of RA 6657 is unconstitutional for including in its definition of
“Agriculture” the livestock and poultyr industry?

Ruling:

The Court held YES.

Looking into the transcript of the Constitutional Commission on the meaning of the word “agriculture”, it
showed that the framers never intended to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government.
Further, Commissioner Tadeo pointed out that the reasin why they used the term “farmworkers” rather
than “agricultural workers” in the said law is because “agricultural workers” includes the livestock and
poultry industry, hence, since they do not intend to include the latter, they used “farmworkers” to have
distinction.

Hence, there is merit on the petitioner’s argument that the product-sharing plan applied to “corporate
farms” in the contested provisions is unreasonable for being consficatory and violative of the due
process of aw.

3. Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957)

FACTS: Petitioners pray that a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed to
respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio
and Placido Reyes, restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the
said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to
respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action. Petitioners likewise prayed
that judgment be rendered ousting respondents from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the preliminary injunction
permanent.

Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the
legality, and validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said respondents
Senators. Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is
without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the
members of the Electoral Tribunal

ISSUE: Was the dispute regarding the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal in the nature of a political question that will divest the Court of jurisdiction?

HELD: NO.

[T]he term “political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to “those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch
of the Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to
decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having
the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the
constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen “upon
nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes” in the Senate, and hence, is null
and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary authority” in
the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate
prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.

“.. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover,
where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the
judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and,
particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional
or statutory rights ..” (16 C.J.S., 439).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and
determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein.

4. Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 (1985) read online

IV. Ordinary Sense v. Technical Sense

1. Ordillo v. Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1992)

Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and
Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No.
6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.”

The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the
Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly
rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.

Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic
Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of
Ifugao.

the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the
Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one
province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of
more than one constituent unit.

Issue: The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only
province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally
and validly constitute such Region.

Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords — provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is
supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become
part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other
units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this
case.

Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to
be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local
government units. It further provides that:

“SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper
governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the
Autonomous Region . . .”

From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may
constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having
two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their
executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.

2. Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947)

Facts: An alien bought a residential lot and its registration was denied by the Register of Deeds on the
ground that being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. When the former brought the case
to the CFI, the court rendered judgement sustaining the refusal of the Register of Deeds.

Issue: WON an alien may own private lands in the Philippines.

Held. No. “Public agricultural lands” mentioned in Sec. 1, Art. XIII of the 1935 Constitution, include
residential, commercial and industrial lands, the Court stated:
‘Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,’ and with
respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional
purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the
Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens.

Thus Section 5, Article XIII provides:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural lands will be transferred or assigned except
to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.

V. Self-Executing vs. Non-Self-Executing

1. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, 3 February 1997.

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the
MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS
has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implmeenting legislation(s).

ISSUE:

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:
Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

3. Pamatong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC
declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a
national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses
all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a
national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the
capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a
platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access"
provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves
much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service"
are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not
the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the
burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a
certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the
limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling
interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the
State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the
number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the
increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an
election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no
serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process.
This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke.
The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most
probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the
part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of
the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of
further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to
determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

VI. Mandatory v. Directory

1. Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957)

FACTS: Petitioners pray that a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed to
respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio
and Placido Reyes, restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the
said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to
respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action. Petitioners likewise prayed
that judgment be rendered ousting respondents from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the preliminary injunction
permanent.

Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the
legality, and validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said respondents
Senators. Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is
without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the
members of the Electoral Tribunal

ISSUE: Was the dispute regarding the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal in the nature of a political question that will divest the Court of jurisdiction?

HELD: NO.

[T]he term “political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to “those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch
of the Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to
decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having
the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the
constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen “upon
nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes” in the Senate, and hence, is null
and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary authority” in
the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate
prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.

“.. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover,
where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the
judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and,
particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional
or statutory rights ..” (16 C.J.S., 439).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and
determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein.

2. Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 28196, November 9, 1967

FACTS: On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed resolutions No. 1, 2 and
3 – i.e. to increase the seats of the Lower House from 120 to 180; to convoke a Constitutional
Convention of 1971; and to amend the Constitution (Section 16, Article VI) so they can become delegates
themselves to the Convention.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became
Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general
elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

Two cases were filed against this act of Congress: One an is original action for prohibition, with
preliminary injunction by Ramon A. Gonzales, in L-28196, a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He
claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and
voters similarly situated. Another one is by PHILCONSA, in L-28224, a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan organization the
objective of which is to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against
erosions or onslaughts from whatever source.

ISSUES:
Whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly — violates the
Constitution?

May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?

HELD: The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly — violates
the Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review.

In the cases at bar, notwithstanding that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of three-
fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, said
resolutions are null and void because Members of Congress, which approved the proposed
amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de
facto Congressmen (based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, no apportionment has been
made been made by Congress within three (3) years since 1960. Thereafter, the Congress of the
Philippines and/or the election of its Members became illegal; that Congress and its Members, likewise,
became a de facto Congress and/or de facto congressmen);

However, As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally.

Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a
constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification to the people on November 14, 1967,
depends — in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this phase of the case,
constitute the minority — upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fairly
apprise the people of the gist, the main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is — under R. B.
H. No. 1 — the increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives, from 120 to
180, and — under R. B. H. No. 3 — the authority given to the members of Congress to run for delegates
to the Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to discharge the duties of such delegates,
without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We — who constitute the minority — believe that Republic Act
No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.

One of the issues raised in this case was the validity of the submission of certain proposed constitutional
amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular elections. Petitioners argued that
this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposal to the people who would be
more interested in the issues involved in the election.

HELD: Pursuant to Art 15 of the ’35 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision to
indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that
the previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special
elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It
does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
**J Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite should be scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate “Fair submission,
intelligent consent or rejection”. They should be able to compare the original proposition with the
amended proposition

VII. Prospective v. Retroactive

1. Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 (1996) read online

2. Co v. Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692 (1991)

Facts:

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was held.Among the candidate is herein
respondent Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second
district of Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned the citizenship of respondent Ong since Ong’s father
was only a naturalized Filipino citizen and questioned Ong’s residence qualificationsince Ong does not
own any property in Samar.

ISSUE/s:

1.) Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;

2.) Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines; and

3.) WhetherOng is a resident of Samar.

RULING:

1.) Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective members. In the case at bar, the Court finds no
improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the
exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.

2.) Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose OngChuan, respondent’s father, an immigrant from China was declared
a Filipino citizen by the CFI of Samar. At the time Jose OngChuan took his oath, the private respondent
then is a minor of nine years, was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. Hence,
there is no ground to deny the Filipino citizenship of respondent Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of
a natural-born Filipino mother, thus the issue of citizenship is immaterial.

3.) Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word residence
which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. The domicile of origin of the private
respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners'
imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the
present. Hence, the residency of respondent Ong has sufficiently proved.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

MODULE 4: EFFECTIVITY OF STATUTES

I. When the Constitution Becomes Effective

1. Alfredo M. de Leon v. Hon. Benjamin B. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the
other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in
a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of
1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but
signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent
Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of
Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared
null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen.

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their
terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace
them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were
abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional
Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the
Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have
been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the
one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987
designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution
must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer
rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of
6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

II. When Statute Becomes Effective

1. Civil Code, Article 2

2. Administrative Code, Book I, Chapter 5, Section 18
3. Administrative Code, Book I, Chapter 6, Sections 24 – 25
4. Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, 29 December 1986

Facts:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided,” as when the
decrees themselves declared that they we to become effective and immediately upon their approval.

The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not, that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be
made forthwith the Official Gazette.

Issue:

Whether or not the Presidential decrees are covered by the provisions of Article 2 of the New Civil Code,
on the necessity of publication for its effectivity.

Held:

The clause “unless otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen day period shall be shortened or extended. The term “laws” should refer to
all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws related to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be

5. Philippine Veterans Bank v. Vega, G.R. No. 105364, 28 June 2001

FACTS:

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted R.A. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of Philippine
Veterans Bank. It was published in the Official Gazette in February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed
with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening the
bank.

In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the
late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of
the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its
publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.

RULING:

Yes. RA 7169 expressly provided that it should take effect upon its approval. Aquino signed it into law on
January 2, 1992. Thereafter, said law became effective on said date. Its subsequent publication was not
necessary for its effectivity. RA 7169 is of internal nature and not have general application thus it took
effect on the date provided for and hence was rightfully invoked by the petitioners. The Supreme Court
upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the
authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause “unless otherwise provided”.

Categories: Constitutional Law 1, Philippine Civil Code

III. When Statute Becomes Effective

 1. Administrative Code, Book VII, Sections 2 – 9
2. Tanada vs. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
3. Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579, 1 February
2012

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc., G.R. No.

150947, 15 July 2003

FACTS:On 1991, the CIR issued Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 15-91, which was clarified by
RMO No. 43-91 imposing a 5% lending investors tax on pawnshops. It held that the principal activity of
pawnshops is lending money at interest and incidentally accepting personal property as security for the
loan. Since pawnshops are considered as lending investors effective, they also become subject to
documentary stamp taxes.

On 1997, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued an Assessment Notice against Lhuillier demanding
payment of deficiency percentage.

Lhuillier filed an administrative protest with the Office of the Revenue Regional Director contending that
neither the Tax Code nor the VAT Law expressly imposes 5% percentage tax on the gross income of
pawnshops; that pawnshops are different from lending investors, which are subject to the 5%
percentage tax under the specific provision of the Tax Code; that RMO No. 15-91 is not implementing
any provision of the Internal Revenue laws but is a new and additional tax measure on pawnshops,
which only Congress could enact, and that it impliedly amends the Tax Code, and that it is a class
legislation as it singles out pawnshops.

On 1998, the BIR issued Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy against Lhuilliers property for the enforcement
and payment of the assessed percentage tax.

When Lhuiller's protest was not acted upon, they elevated it to the CIR which was also not acted upon.
Lhuiller filed a Notice and Memo on Appeal with the CTA.

On 2000, the CTA held the the RMOs were void and that the Assessment Notice should be cancelled.

The CIR filed a motion for review with the CA which only affirmed the CTA's decision thus this case in bar.

ISSUE: Whether pawnshops included in the term lending investors for the purpose of imposing the 5%
percentage tax under the NIRC.

RULING:

No.
The held that even though the RMOs No were issued in accordance with the power of the CIR, they
cannot issue administrative rulings or circulars not consistent with the law sought to be applied. It should
remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the law.

In the NIRC, the term lending investor includes all persons who make a practice of lending money for
themselves or others at interest. A pawnshop, on the other hand, is defined under Section 3 of P.D. No.
114 as a person or entity engaged in the business of lending money on personal property delivered as
security for loans.

While it is true that pawnshops are engaged in the business of lending money, they are not considered
lending investors for the purpose of imposing the 5% percentage taxes citing the following reasons:

1. Pawnshops and lending investors were subjected to different tax treatments as per the NIRC.

2. Congress never intended pawnshops to be treated in the same way as lending investors.

3. Section 116 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended by E.O. No. 273, subjects to percentage tax dealers in
securities and lending investors only. There is no mention of pawnshops.

4. The BIR had ruled several times prior to the issuance of the RMOs that pawnshops were not subject to
the 5% percentage tax imposed by Section 116 of the NIRC of 1977. As Section 116 of the NIRC of 1977
was practically lifted from Section 175 of the NIRC of 1986, and there being no change in the law, the
interpretation thereof should not have been altered.

IV. When Local Ordinance Takes Effect

1. Local Government Code, Sections 54 – 59

2. Municipality Of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 127820, 20 July 1998

Facts:

Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Parañaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint
for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000
square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the property but VM didn’t accept.

The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take possession of the
subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair
market value based on its current tax declaration.

According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant
to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b)
the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Petitioner claimed that res
judicata was not applicable.

The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioner’s MFR was denied. The CA affirmed.

Issues:

1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an
ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.

2. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when public
interest is primarily involved.

Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

1. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating
an expropriation case “substantially complies with the requirements of the law” because the terms
“ordinance” and “resolution” are synonymous for “the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local
government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain.

To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides: “If the LGU fails to acquire a private
property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property
through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation
proceedings.”

Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may
delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore
exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the
latter’s control and restraints, imposed “through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.

Sec 19, RA 7160

A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise
the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws.

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent
domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf
of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a
particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution,
and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to
a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the
mayor be authorized through an ordinance.

We are not convinced by petitioner’s insistence that the terms “resolution” and “ordinance” are
synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter.
An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have
simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear
divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that
the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.

Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private
right of the people.[35] Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language -- from “resolution”
under BP 337 to “ordinance” under RA 7160 -- demands a strict construction.

When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of
an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful
interpretation.

Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to
authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling
and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation.

Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but
“inferior” domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes only
of a share in eminent domain.

2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, all the requisites for the application of
res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior
expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.

Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all
cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property.

Eminent Domain can reach every form of property which the State might need for public use whenever
they need it.

While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain,
it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case.

In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent
domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be
expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent may still
subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once all legal requirements are
complied with.

3. Bagatsing v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 41631, 17 December 1976

FACTS:

Sometime in 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, “An Ordinance
Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees for the Rentals of Stalls and Providing
Penalties for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes.” City Mayor Bagatsing approved the ordinance 3
days later.

On 17 February 1975, respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. commenced a civil case
before the CFI of Manila seeking declaration of the said ordinance mainly because the publication
requirement under the Charter of Manila has not been complied with. Judge Ramirez rendered its
decision declaring the nullity of the ordinance on the primary ground of non-compliance with the
requirement of publication under the City Charter, which requires the ordinance to be published in two
daily newspapers of general circulation in the city before its enactment. Neither was it published after
its approval, although it was posed in the legislative hall and in all city public markets and city public
libraries.

For the petitioners’ part, they claim that only a post-publication is required under the Local Tax Code.

ISSUE:

What law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the
Revised City Charter, which requires publication of the ordinance before its enactment and after its
approval, or the Local Tax Code, which only demands publication after its approval?
HELD:

There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act, whereas the Local Tax
Code is a general law because it applies universally to all LGUs. The rule commonly said is that the fact
that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered.
However, the rule yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general which the
general statute treats in particular. This exactly is the circumstance in this case. The Revised Charter of
the City of Manila refers merely to “ordinances,” while the Local Tax Code refers to “ordinances levying
or imposing taxes, fees and other charges” in particular. Thus, in the realm of “ordinances levying or
imposing taxes, fees and other charges” the Local Tax Code governs. This is especially true since the
Local Tax Code was enacted later than the Charter

V. Manner of Computing Time

1. Civil Code, Article 13

2. Administrative Code, Book I, Chapter 8, Section 31
3. Administrative Code, Book I, Chapter 7, Section 28
4. National Marketing Corp. v. Tecson, G.R. No. 29131, 27 August 1969
5. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., G.R. No. 162155,
August 28, 2007

Facts:

On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, the Vice President of Primetown (respondent), applied for refund of the
income tax which they have paid on 1997. According to Yap, the company accrued losses amounting to
P/ 71,879,228. These losses enabled them to be exempt from paying income tax, which respondent paid
diligently. Respondent was therefore claiming a refund. Respondents submitted requirements but the
petitioners ignored their claim. On April 14, 2000, respondents filed a review in the Court of Tax Appeals.
The said Court, however, denied the petition stating that the petition was filed beyond the 2-year
prescriptive period for filing judicial claim for tax refund.

According to Sec 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code, “no suit or proceedings shall be filed after
the expiration of 2-yearsfrom the date of the payment of the tax regardless of any supervening cause
that may arise after payment. Respondents paid the last income tax return on April 14, 1998. Article 13
of the New Civil Code states that a year is considered 365 days; months 30 days; days 24-hours; and
night from sunset to sunrise. Therefore, according to CTA, the date of filing a petition fell on the 731st
day, which is beyond the prescriptive period.

Issues:

Whether the two-year/730-day prescriptive period ends on April 13, 2000 or April 14, 2000 considering
that the last payment of tax was on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year.
Whether or not Article 13 of the New Civil Code be repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 Chap 8 Book 1 of the
Administrative Code of 1987.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that when a subsequent law impliedly repeals a prior law, the new law shall apply. In the
case at bar, Art 13 of the New Civil Code, which states that a year shall compose 365 days, shall be
repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year shall be
composed of 12 months regardless of the number of days in a month. Therefore, the two-year
prescriptive period ends on April 14, 2000. Respondents filed petition on April 14, 2000 (which is the last
day prescribed to file a petition.

6. PNB v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 134 (1993)

FACTS: The spouses Chua were the owners of a parcel of land covered by a TCT and registered in their
names. Upon the husband’s death, the probate court appointed his son, private respondent Allan as
special administrator of the deceased’s intestate estate. The court also authorized Allan to obtain a loan
accommodation from PNB to be secured by a real estate mortgage over the above-mentioned parcel of
land, which Allan did for P450,000.00 with interest.

For failure to pay the loan in full, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage. During the
auction, PNB was the highest bidder. However, the loan having a payable balance, to claim this
deficiency, PNB instituted an action with the RTC, Balayan, Batangas, against both Mrs. Chua and Allan.

The RTC rendered its decision, ordering the dismissal of PNB’s complaint. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTC decision by dismissing PNB’s appeal for lack of merit.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: The WON it was error for the CA to rule that petitioner may no longer pursue by civil action the
recovery of the balance of indebtedness after having foreclosed the property securing the same.

HELD: petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

No

Petitioner relies on Prudential Bank v. Martinez, 189 SCRA 612, 615 (1990), holding that in extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage, when the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee
has the right to recover the deficiency from the mortgagor.

However, it must be pointed out that petitioner’s cited cases involve ordinary debts secured by a
mortgage. The case at bar, we must stress, involves a foreclosure of mortgage arising out of a settlement
of estate, wherein the administrator mortgaged a property belonging to the estate of the decedent,
pursuant to an authority given by the probate court. As the CA correctly stated, the Rules of Court on
Special Proceedings comes into play decisively. The applicable rule is Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Revised
Rules of Court ( which PNB contends is not.)

In the present case it is undisputed that the conditions under the aforecited rule have been complied
with [see notes]. It follows that we must consider Sec. 7 of Rule 86, appropriately applicable to the
controversy at hand, which in summary [and case law as well] grants to the mortgagee three distinct,
independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage
creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them:

(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary
claim;

(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and

(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by
prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency.

Clearly petitioner herein has chosen the mortgage-creditor’s option of extrajudicially foreclosing the
mortgaged property of the Chuas. This choice now bars any subsequent deficiency claim against the
estate of the deceased. Petitioner may no longer avail of the complaint for the recovery of the balance of
indebtedness against said estate, after petitioner foreclosed the property securing the mortgage in its
favor. It follows that in this case no further liability remains on the part of respondents and the
deceased’s estate.

NOTES:

Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, which states that:

Sec. 7. Rule 86. Mortgage debt due from estate. — A creditor holding a claim against the deceased
secured by mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in
the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he
may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or
administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the
mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the
security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he
may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone and foreclose the same at any time within the period
of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no
share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the
executor or administrator from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged by paying the debt for
which it is hold as security, under the direction of the court if the court shall adjudge it to be for the
interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made.

To begin with, it is clear from the text of Section 7, Rule 89, that once the deed of real estate mortgage is
recorded in the proper Registry of Deeds, together with the corresponding court order authorizing the
administrator to mortgage the property, said deed shall be valid as if it has been executed by the
deceased himself. Section 7 provides in part:

Sec. 7. Rule 89. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate – The
court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to
sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these
rules when it appears necessary or beneficial under the following regulations:

(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real estate thus sold,
mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered is situated, a certified copy of the order of the court, together
with the deed of the executor or administrator for such real estate, which shall be valid as if the deed
had been executed by the deceased in his lifetime.

Yapdiangco v. Buencamino, G.R. No. 28841, 24 July 1983 READ ONLINE

VI. Effectivity of Laws Until Repealed

1. Concept of Temporary Statutes

2. Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5, 17 September 1945

Facts:

Respondent Judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in petitioner’s civil case
on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the
effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines
under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during the
Japanese military occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.

Issues:

1. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained so even
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces;

2. Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in
Chief of the United States Army, in which he declared “that all laws, regulations and processes of any of
the government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without
legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control,” has invalidated all
judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts; and
3. If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by said proclamation, whether the
present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to, and continued
during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in
said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino
forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.

Ruling:

1. YES. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The question to be
determined is whether or not the governments established in these Islands under the names of the
Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation
or regime were de facto governments. If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those
governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
American and Filipino forces.

2. NO. The proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944, which declared that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control,” has not invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings, which are not a political
complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines that were continued by the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that said
judicial acts and proceedings were good and valid before and now good and valid after the reoccupation
of liberation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.

3. YES. It is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, “Law once established continues until
changed by the some competent legislative power. It is not changed merely by change of sovereignty.”
(Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary Section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman,
13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise on the Conflict on Laws (Cambridge, 1916, Section
131): “There can no break or interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into existence with the
first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of human society.
Once created, it persists until a change take place, and when changed it continues in such changed
condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to an
end; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign by
legislative acts creates a change.”

It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment, the
proceedings in cases, not of political complexion, pending therein at the time of the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government.

3. William F. Peralta v. The Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-49, 12 November 1945
Facts: Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the
supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries
was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined and penalized by section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 of the
National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines. He was found guilty and sentenced to life
imprisonment by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. The petition for habeas corpus
is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance
No. 7 “was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and
purposes of which are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America, and therefore, null and void ab initio,” that
the provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines and “the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional rights”; that the petitioner
herein is being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in
the Philippines, and “that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided
for in the Revised Penal Code.”

The Solicitor General states that, in his own opinion, the acts and proceedings taken before the said
Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which resulted in the imprisonment of the petitioner,
should now be denied force and efficacy, and therefore the petition for habeas corpus should be
granted. Reasons are: that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created, and the
summary procedure prescribed therefor, by said Ordinance No. 7 are tinged with political complexion;
that the procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. 7 does not afford a fair trial, violates the Constitution of
the Commonwealth, and impairs the Constitutional rights of accused persons under their legitimate
Constitution.

The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, assailed by the petitioner and the
Solicitor General as impairing the constitutional rights of an accused are: that court may interrogate the
accused and witnesses before trial in order to clarify the points in dispute; that the refusal of the
accused to answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to him; that if from the facts admitted
at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the defendant is guilty, he may be immediately
convicted; and that the sentence of the court is not appealable, except in case of death penalty which
cannot be executed unless and until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the Supreme Court
composed of three Justices.

Issues:

1) WON of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction was valid

2) WON of the sentence which imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation was valid

3) If they were then valid, WON, by the principle of postliminy, the punitive sentence which petitioner
is now serving fell through or ceased to be valid from the time of the reoccupation of the

Ruling: Before proceeding further, and in order to determine the law applicable to the questions
involved in the present case, the question involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light of
the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government; because the belligerent occupant was totally
independent of the constitution of the occupied territory in carrying out the administration over said
territory. The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither be applied, since the
validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of the same
occupant, whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of
nations.

(1) Yes. Valid. It is well established in International Law that “The criminal jurisdiction established by the
invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered
state, — it is drawn entirely form the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The authority thus
derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in
the military code of the conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied
district. The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the
belligerent occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of political
complexion, for it is mere a governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases
falling within its jurisdiction.

With respect to the Summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, there is also no question as to the
power of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. A belligerent
“occupant may where necessary, set up military courts instead of the ordinary courts; and in case, and in
so far as, he admits the administration of justice by the ordinary courts, he may nevertheless temporarily
alter the laws, especially the Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is administered as well as the
laws regarding procedure. The only restrictions or limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent
occupant to alter the laws or promulgate new ones, especially the criminal law as well as the laws
regarding procedure are those imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized
nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience. It is obvious that the summary
procedure under consideration does not violate those precepts.

(2) Yes. Valid. Although the crimes covered are defined in the Revised Penal Code, they were altered and
penalized by said Act No. 65 with different and heavier penalties, as new crimes and offenses demanded
by military necessity, incident to a state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the
belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and
the success of its operations.

The criminal acts penalized by said Act No. 65 are those committed by persons charged or connected
with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of foods and other
necessaries; and the penalties imposed upon the violators are different from and much heavier than
those provided by the Revised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. The acts penalized by said Act
were taken out of the territorial law or Revised Penal Code, and referred to what is called martial law by
international jurists in order, not only to prevent food and other necessaries from reaching the
“guerrillas” which were harassing the belligerent occupant but also to preserve the food supply and
other necessaries
(3) Yes. It did cease. We have already held in our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez
Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, that all judgments of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese
regime, ceased to be valid upon the reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of
postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the present case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of
a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the
reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur. It may not be amiss to say in
this connection that it is not necessary and proper to invoke the proclamation of General Douglas
MacArthur declaring null and void all laws, among them Act No. 65, of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines under which petitioner was convicted, in order to give retroactive effect to the nullification of
said penal act and invalidate sentence rendered against petitioner under said law, a sentence which,
before the proclamation, had already become null and of no effect.

4. Anastacio Laurel v. Eriberto Misa, G.R. No. L-409, 30 January 1947

Facts:
In G. R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on
the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on the theory that a
Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the
Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and
penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the sovereignty
of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative
allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended.

Issue:
            Whether or not the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines
was then suspended

Held:
            No.

Ratio:
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied
by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed
by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de
jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to the occupant
it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty
vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a body
politic or society which constitute the state).