Seismic Response of Critical Interdependent Networks: Leonardo Due Nas-Osorio, James I. Craig and Barry J. Goodno

EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING AND STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS
Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn. 2007; 36:285–306

Published online 27 September 2006 in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/eqe.626
Seismic response of critical interdependent networks
Leonardo Dueñas-Osorio1, ∗, † , James I. Craig2 and Barry J. Goodno1

1School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332-0355, U.S.A.
2School of Aerospace Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332-0150, U.S.A.
SUMMARY
During the last decade, critical infrastructure systems such as electric power, water distribution, trans-
portation and telecommunications have been stressed by significant natural hazards and human errors
leading to malfunction. Earthquakes, blackouts and satellite failures have evidenced the vulnerability of
these growing networked systems threatening the continuity of the United States’ economy. The potential
for malicious perturbations to these systems is also an important current concern. However, the underlying
susceptibility of these networks to disruptive events is in large part due to the increasingly complex pattern
of interdependencies that tie these civil infrastructures together. This paper mainly investigates the effect
of seismic disruptions on the performance of real interdependent networks. Maintenance-induced mal-
functions and coordinated attacks are also studied for completeness. Several degrees of interconnectedness
are explored. Interdependent network fragility curves are introduced to display the effect of these different
strengths of coupling. Characterization of the performance displayed by the networks is utilized to propose
mitigation actions and study propagation of their effects. It is shown that minimal strategic interventions
propagated through the network can generate a more resilient interdependent entity. Copyright q 2006
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Received 20 July 2005; Revised 29 March 2006; Accepted 5 July 2006
KEY WORDS: interdependent networks; seismic fragility; infrastructure systems; cascading failures;
network functionality; seismic mitigation
1. INTRODUCTION
A collection of unforeseen modes of failure observed in large technological infrastructures have

demonstrated the need to understand the response of networked systems to external disruptions.
Examples of significant cascading failures are the blackouts of the United States’ electric power
system in 1996 and 2003 [1, 2]. Both revealed a critical dependence of the economic sectors on
∗ Correspondence to: Leonardo Dueñas-Osorio, 325473 Georgia Tech Station, Atlanta, GA 30332-1060, 6100 Main
Street, MS-318, Houston, TX 77005-1827, U.S.A.
†
E-mail: leonardo.duenasosorio@ce.gatech.edu
Contract/grant sponsor: National Science Foundation; contract/grant number: EEC-9701785
Copyright q 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

286 L. DUEÑAS-OSORIO, J. I. CRAIG AND B. J. GOODNO
reliable and constant supply of power. However, the event of 2003, besides increasing the awareness
to possible deliberate attacks, pointed out another serious problem: incomplete understanding of
the interdependencies among different infrastructures.
Recent advances have been made to characterize the topological properties (i.e. those that solely
depend upon their geometric layout) of complex independent networks. Some examples include
the western US power grid [3], general communication systems [4], railroad networks [5], Internet
routes [6], and the World Wide Web [7, 8]. Other studies focus on finding optimal flow patterns
within the networks when exposed to external disruptions and constrained by situational factors,
for instance in highway systems [9, 10]. In the context of perturbed systems, characterization of the
seismic response of independent civil infrastructures such as power and water distribution systems,
has followed two major approaches. The first approach relies upon numerical methods such as
Monte Carlo simulation [11–13] while the second approach relies on analytical seismic reliability
frameworks [14]. Although these studies represent important advances in the networks approach
to lifeline analysis, modelling interdependent networks is still an open research field. Awareness
of interdependencies has increased within several academic disciplines and institutions, including
emergency management and governmental organizations [15].
Current modelling attempts to capture network interdependencies include the use of economic
input–output frameworks [16], or complex-adaptive simulations (CAS) [17, 18]. Approaches based
on CAS treat network nodes as agents with location, capacities and memory. This paper addresses
the response of interdependent networks from another perspective. It uses geographical immediacy
as a proxy for interconnectedness, and defines the network performance based upon topological
measures derived from graph theory. Several disruption mechanisms, including earthquakes, random
failures and induced malfunctions are investigated under different network coupling strengths. Also,
recovery of network functionality is investigated based upon optimal intervention actions.
This paper is divided into seven sections. Section 2 contains fundamental definitions from
graph theory, as well as definition of the parameters used to characterize the importance of net-
work elements and their role in cascading failures. Section 3 includes the description of various
parameters for measuring network performance. These parameters depend on either network topol-
ogy or network flow. Section 4 includes the characterization of two simplified real networks for
fragility analysis. The seismic vulnerability of network elements is presented, as well as network
interconnectedness based upon geographical proximity. In Section 5 the effects of network interde-
pendencies on functionality due to seismic hazards are investigated. Random-malfunctioning and
intentional perturbations are also studied. In Section 6 a set of mitigation actions are implemented to
reduce the potential detrimental effects of complex interconnectedness. Finally, Section 7 presents
the main conclusions of this study.
2. DEFINITIONS AND CASCADING FAILURES
Standard graph theory terminology used throughout the paper is introduced in this section. A set

A = {A1 , . . . , Ak } of disjoint subsets of a set A is a partition of A if A = ik = 1 Ai . A set of
all k-element subsets of A is denoted by [A]k . A graph or network is a pair G = (V, E) of sets
satisfying E ⊆ [V ]2 ; thus, the elements of E are 2-element subsets of V . The elements of V are
the vertices (i.e. nodes) of the graph G, whereas the elements of E are its edges (i.e. links). The
number of vertices of a graph G is its order denoted by |G| or n, and the number of edges is its
size denoted by G or m [19, 20].
Copyright q 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn. 2007; 36:285–306
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
SEISMIC RESPONSE OF CRITICAL INTERDEPENDENT NETWORKS 287
Several parameters can be calculated to characterize the topology (i.e. geometric configuration)
of a network. Two parameters are introduced to rank order the importance of a particular vertex
v ∈ V (G) for the connectivity of the entire network. This rank ordering is relevant because networks
tend to display avalanches or cascading failures after disruption of high rank vertices. In general,
the cascading phenomenon occurs when a particular element of a network ceases to provide its
intended function—due to either internal or external hazards. The flow traversing that node has
to be redistributed to adjacent nodes, which usually function close to their maximum capacity.
This is due to flow demand increasing faster than the expansion of the infrastructures. Some of
those adjacent nodes may be operating so close to their capacity that the additional inflow from
the redistribution can induce a failure. This process repeats itself until either the network absorbs
the disruption locally, or if the set of initial conditions are all unfavourable, until a large-scale
disruption propagates compromising a significant portion of the network and its functionality.
2.1. Vertex degree rank ordering

The simplest of all the rank ordering strategies is based upon the vertex degree, d(v), of a vertex
v ∈ V (G). This parameter counts the number of incoming and outgoing edges connected to vertex
v. This parameter d(v), computed for all v, permits determination of its frequency distribution,
which for most networks in nature such as social, informational and biological, has tails that
can be described by power laws (i.e. linear relationships in logarithmic scales) [7, 21]. However,
some of the man-made technological networks exhibit vertex degree distributions that fit Poisson
distributions with tails that decay exponentially. A relevant example is the power grid of the western
US [3, 22].
Regardless of the shape of the histogram of vertex degrees, the most connected vertex is
represented by the vertex with maximum d(v). Rank ordering by vertex degree provides a strategy
that prescribes which vertices to remove, and which neighbour w need to be removed once a
disruption occurs in initial vertex v.
2.2. Vertex betweenness rank ordering

Vertex betweenness, Bv , for vertex, v, is defined as the total number of shortest paths between all
pairs of nodes (wi , w j ) ∈ V (G) that pass through vertex v, which is not an end for any path [23].
In the context of technological networks, such as electric power or water distribution, the vertex
betweenness can be measured for paths going from generation subset g of G, to distribution subset
d of G through transmission subset k of G [24]. Assuming that network flows are routed through
the most direct path, the betweenness of a vertex represents the load or total flow that traverses it.
Its calculation reduces to finding every shortest path from g to d and keeping score of the nodes
traversed. This operation as a function of order n takes time O(n 4 ) with conventional shortest
path algorithms. Rank ordering by vertex betweenness takes into account information beyond
network topology. In this case it accounts for the potential flow patterns within the network. After
a disruption is induced in initial vertex v, the next vertex w to be removed in the avalanche
sequence will correspond to the neighbour node with the next highest load or betweenness Bv .
In addition to rank ordering vertices according to their importance and role to propagate
avalanches, it is important to consider failure of nodes due to lack of maintenance or unfore-
seen malfunction. Random removal captures these events, and is investigated in addition to the set
of rank-ordered vertex removal strategies.
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
3. NETWORK PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Independent of the nature of the disruption, network functionality needs to be characterized by

performance measures capable of distinguishing network damage states. These parameters could
depend on just network topology, or can combine topology with flow patterns. Network characteri-
zation given its underlying architecture and layout distribution is essential to understanding failure
modes, cascading mechanisms, growth patterns, and mitigation spread.
3.1. Inverse characteristic path length, L

The characteristic path length, L, of a graph is the mean of the means of the shortest path lengths,
d(vi , v j ), connecting each vertex v ∈ V (G) to all other vertices [25, 26]. This parameter can be
regarded as a global indicator of efficiency in network connectivity. It represents the ease with
which any two vertices can communicate or share flow. Its calculation can be adapted to account
for infinite shortest path lengths when two vertices are disconnected. This is simply done by using
the inverse of d(vi , v j ). The parameter can be referred to as the inverse characteristic path length,
L , where now 0L 1, low L indicates low connectivity, n is the graph order, and the expression
is for directed or undirected graphs (i.e. links with unidirectional or bidirectional flow).
1 1
L = (1)
n(n − 1) i j=i d(vi , v j )
3.2. Connectivity loss, CL

The concept of connectivity loss, CL , is useful to quantify the average decrease of the ability of
distribution vertices to receive flow from the generation vertices. In other words it quantifies the
decrease in the number of generators connected to a distribution vertex [24]. The calculation of
this parameter relies on the topological structure of the network, and to some extent relies on
possible optimal flow patterns. Hence, this parameter does not depend on physics-based models
but still captures supply and demand of flow constraints. Denoting n g the order of the generation
subset g of G at the unperturbed state of the network, and n ig the number of generation units able
to supply flow to distribution vertex i, CL can be calculated as

n ig
CL = 1 − (2)
ng
i
where the averaging · is done over every distribution vertex i of the distribution subset d of G.
Performance measures to capture network recovery time and long-term reliability after disruption
require modelling network dynamics beyond topology and optimal flow. Ongoing time-dependent
studies by the authors aim to capture interdependent network dynamics using physics-based models.
Such models utilize mass and energy conservation principles, in the case of water networks, and
circuit equations, in the case of electric power.
4. INTERDEPENDENT NETWORKS
Two real infrastructure networks are approximated in this study to track their interdependent
response. Networks of electric power P, and water distribution W , are selected as a sample of
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
Figure 1. Topological structure of selected networks: (a) electric power; and

(b) potable water distribution networks.
critical infrastructures for modern society. The water network is simplified so that the distribution
system covers the entire area, but having removed portions of its dense end-user delivery grid. It
retains enough links to reasonably represent arterial water mains and major secondary feeders. The
networks are located in Central US in Shelby County, Tennessee, on the banks of the Mississippi
River [11–13]. The order of the systems is n p = 59 and n w = 49 for the power and water networks,
respectively. The order of the generation node subset g of P and W is n pg = 8, and n wg = 15. The
topology of the power and water networks resembles a two-dimensional grid with quadrilaterals
as fundamental building blocks or network motifs. Ideal square grids tend to be resilient network
layouts for flow distribution because there is no node more important than other nodes. Figure 1(a)
shows the physical layout of the streamlined power grid, and Figure 1(b) shows the architecture
of the streamlined water distribution network.
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
Figure 2. Geographical distribution of electric power service areas. Selected water pumping plants and
water storage tanks are highlighted as service area end-users.
4.1. Physical interdependence

Real networked systems exhibit continuous multi-network interactions to perform their intended
functions. Power grids depend on gas networks to fuel generation units. Water networks provide
cooling and help controlling emissions of coal-based power generators. Water and gas networks are
heavily dependent on power for pumping stations and control systems. Therefore, characterization
of network performance can be enhanced by explicitly accounting for their interconnectedness. In
this study the approach for establishing network coupling is based upon geographical immediacy.
For the case of dependence of water network elements on electric power, a set of conditional
probabilities of failure is established.
If their directed strength of coupling is represented by a conditional probability of failure, the
interdependence can be expressed as follows:
P(Failure W j |Failure Pi ) = pW j |Pi for all j ∼ i (3)
where W j represents failure of the jth element of the water network; Pi is failure of the ith element
of the power network; pW j |Pi is the value of the conditional probability of failure of element W j
given failure of element Pi ; and ∼ indicates node adjacency between every W j element and every
Pi element. The conditional probability, P(W j |Pi ), can be tuned to represent any strength of
network coupling, ranging from independence P(W j |Pi ) = P(W j ) to complete interdependence
P(W j |Pi ) = 1. Interdependent adjacencies are established from the geographical immediacy be-
tween network elements. An illustration of this geographical proximity is shown in Figure 2. For
clarity this figure only contains 23 kV substations, storage tanks, and large pumping plants. The
highlighted area is served by one 23 kV electrical substation that transforms power to its end
users. Among its users there is a large pumping station that fills the tank in the service area, and
contributes to three storage tanks in the borders. In general, one substation provides power to one
assigned service area. Each service area is an aggregation of administrative and political subdi-
visions referred to as census tracts. These tracts tend to aggregate homogeneous demographics
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
within jurisdictions. The population size of the service areas is on average 25 000 people. As an
example, if power substation P25 fails (i.e. power service area No. 25), it conditions with proba-
bility pW j |P25 the failure of pumping station W12 , and storage tanks W7 , W10 , W14 , W15 . Elements
W7 , W10 , and W15 are included because their water comes from the highlighted service area. For
instance, failure of P25 implies that approximately 9% of the county population, according to the
1990 US census data [27], has the potential to experience impaired water delivery service. Reasons
include not only the typical failures in the water distribution system, but also the failures induced
by dependence on faulty power grid elements. Consequences of this scenario event will leave the
water systems incapable of fulfilling basic objectives: meeting water needs, accommodating fire
fighting, and equalizing grid operating pressures.
4.2. Vulnerability of network elements

Each element of a networked system (i.e. infrastructure) has an inherent vulnerability to seismic
hazards. These elements (i.e. systems) are in general composed of several subsystems, units and
parts. For instance, a typical system of the power grid, such as an electric substation, contains
several subsystems and units such as transformers, disconnect switches, circuit breakers, regulators,
control equipment, and lightning arrestors. Failure of any or several of these units compromises the
functionality of the entire substation. Conditional probabilities of failure given an intensity of the
seismic hazard are the customary tool to represent system vulnerability. These fragility curves are
used for other subsystems such as power generation plants and different voltage electric substations
(i.e. high voltage >350 kV; medium voltage, 350 kV>voltage>150 kV; and low voltage <150 kV).
The vulnerability of systems of other networks is represented in analogous fashion. Water distribu-
tion network elements include large (>10 mgd) and medium (<10 mgd) pumping plants, elevated
storage tanks (∼ 2 mgd), and brittle or ductile delivery pipelines. Estimates of current network
system fragility relationships are available in the updated tool for loss estimation from disasters,
HAZUS-MH [28]. Since the objective of this study is to explore network interdependencies, the
fragilities of individual systems and subsystems are deemed reasonable if taken from published
studies. Most of the data for calibration of these damage functions comes from studies of network
elements on the west coast of the US where the seismic activity is larger than in the central/eastern
part of the country. Figure 3(a) shows the fragility curves for the power grid elements. Figure 3(b)
contains the fragility relationships for the water distribution network elements. Both figures rep-
resent the fragility of the systems to exceed an extensive damage state. This limit state implies
damage beyond short-term repair, leaving the network systems under consideration as completely
non-functional.
Damage functions for buried pipelines without soil susceptibility to liquefaction, have empirical
evidence to follow power laws. These functions usually estimate the rate of repair or expected
number of repairs per unit of length. Equation (4) shows a sample relationship in terms of peak
ground velocity (PGV), developed by using post-disaster data from past United States and Mexican
earthquakes [29]:
1
Rrate = (PGV)2.25 (4)
10 000
where the repair rate, Rrate , corresponds to the number of repairs per kilometer of brittle pipelines,
and PGV is in cm/s. Repair rates include a broad range of damage mechanisms such as breaks
or leaks. In general, 15–20% of those mechanisms result in breaks or ruptures, while the rest
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
0.8
P(DS > ds = Extensive | PGA)
0.6
0.4
0.2
High voltage substation
Medium voltage substation
Low voltage substation
0
0 0.5 1 1.5
(a) PGA (g)
0.9
0.8
0.7
P(DS > ds = Extensive | PGA)
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
Small pumping plant
0.1 Large pumping plant
Elevated steel tank
0
0 0.5 1 1.5
(b) PGA (g)
Figure 3. Fragility curves of network elements (systems) for an extensive damage limit state: (a) electric
power grid; and (b) potable water distribution networks.
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
represent leaks [11]. The diameter of the pipelines ranges from = 0.15 to 1.22 m in order
to include transmission and distribution links. Rrate is useful to characterize the probability of
having pipeline ruptures since it allows estimation of the mean occurrence rate of breaks. This
characterization is done by introducing a spatial Poisson process to define the probability that the
number of pipe breaks Br equals r within a given pipeline segment length L:
(Rrate ∗ L)r −Rrate ∗L
P(Br = r ) = e (5)
r!
In this study, it is assumed that the occurrence of at least one break will impair the functionality
of a pipeline segment. Therefore, the probability of pipeline break occurrence simplifies to
P(Br >0) = 1 − P(Br = 0) = 1 − e−Rrate ∗L (6)
Equation (6) permits simulation of failure of pipeline intersections given a PGV level of seismic
hazard. These intersection nodes are a fundamental part of the topological characteristics of the
network in the graph theory approach of this study. In essence these junctions lump the incident
pipeline fragilities. Non-functionality or failure, Fv , of a junction, v, is reached when all pipeline
segments of v have at least one break. This is analogous to the probability of failure as prescribed
by the reliability of parallel systems:
P f = P(Fv ) = P(Fv1 ∩ Fv2 ∩ . . . ∩ Fvd(v) ) (7)
1
d(G) = 2, <L> = 10 km
d(G) = 4, <L> = 10 km
0.8 d(G) = 2, <L> = 5 km

d(G) = 4, <L> = 5 km
P( At least 1 break/segment | PGV )
d(G) = 2, <L> = 1 km
d(G) = 4, <L> = 1 km
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
PGV (m/s)
Figure 4. Fragility curves for brittle pipeline junctions as a function of PGV, average vertex degree d(G),
and average pipeline segment lengths L.
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
where the vertex degree, d(v), corresponds to the maximum number of incident segments of the
intersection under consideration. This relationship, along with the fragility curves of Figure 3, fully
characterize the vulnerability of the constitutive elements of the introduced networks. Samples of
generic pipeline junction fragility curves for a non-functional junction damage state DS (i.e. at least
one break per pipeline segment) are presented in Figure 4. Typical main water distribution system
parameters (e.g. length and vertex degree) are utilized to develop their fragility. The network used
in this study has a vertex degree d(v) that ranges from 1 to 5, with an average of d(G) = 3, where
G is an entire graph. Also, pipeline segment lengths, L v j , consistent with Figure 1, vary from 1
to 15 km, with an average L = 6.9 km.
5. SEISMIC HAZARD AND NETWORK VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
In order to develop fragility curves for interdependent networked systems, it is necessary to

evaluate the network performance under several levels of seismic hazard. Since the constitutive
network elements are distributed over a large geographical area, the levels of seismic hazard to
which they are subjected are different depending on their location. Therefore, it is necessary to
describe the temporal and spatial characteristics of the disturbance (i.e. hazard). In the present
study, PGA and PGV contours for Shelby County are established for several earthquakes and
return periods using HAZUS-MH. This hazard definition uses as input the most significant events
from a de-aggregation exercise of probabilistic seismic hazards. Details of this methodology have
been discussed by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) [30]. The methodology for the
Central/Eastern US uses parameters such as magnitude, distance and return period to determine
the contribution to the hazard from different seismic sources. These sources include historical
seismicity, large background sources, and specific fault sources. Figure 5 presents a sample of the
de-aggregated seismic hazard in PGA and PGV for Shelby County, TN. The maps display seismic
hazard contours for the most significant event at a hazard rate consistent with 10% probability
of exceedance in 50 years. Similar contours can be obtained for other hazard rate levels. The
PGA and PGV contours are matched with the boundaries of the census tracts, and the main
elements of the water and power networks are displayed without transmission or distribution links
for clarity.
5.1. Independent network response

The geographical distribution of PGAs and PGVs as the hazard propagates to the southeast
portions of the county decreases relative to the maximum observed values in the northwest-
ern part of the county. This trend is similar for all return periods under consideration (i.e.
100, 250, 500, 750, 1000, 1500, 2000, and 2500 years). The expected PGA and PGV values are
recorded for each seismic hazard return period at the location of each network element. Since the
probabilities of each network element to exceed extensive or complete damage are conditioned
on these PGA or PGV values, a Monte Carlo simulation routine is implemented to determine
whether a particular network element fails or not given a level of seismic hazard. Each element
has a probability of failure associated with its location and its dynamic characteristics (i.e. fragility
curve) but independent of other elements. This study does not consider statistical dependence
among elements of a single network. Introduction of geographical immediacy, correlation induced
by soil characterization, and dynamic properties of network elements are ongoing research efforts.
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
Figure 5. Hazard contours for most significant event of de-aggregated probabilistic seismic hazard in
Shelby County, Tennessee, U.S.A. Plots are presented in: (a) PGA; and (b) PGV.
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
Complement CDF of Connectivity Loss
0.8
Power
0.6 Water at 0.3g

Water at 0.6g
Water at 1.0g
Water at 0.3g | Pw|p = 1.0
0.4
Power at 0.3g
Water
0.2
0
0 0.5 1
Connectivity Loss
Figure 6. Complement of interdependent CDFs for the water and power connectivity
loss CL at different PGA levels.
The objective here is to understand the fundamentals of infrastructure fragilities and their interde-
pendent effect—across networks and not within them.
The probability of failure of a particular network element given a seismic hazard intensity level
is then compared with a uniform random variable X ∼ U (0, 1). If the value of X is larger than the
probability of failure of the element, then the element is removed. This is done for all elements
at each hazard level and repeated 10 000 times to determine the distribution of the response of
the networks. The performance of the network after each trial is measured by the connectivity
loss, CL —which is a proxy for electric circuit modelling and mass and energy conservation. The
complement of the cumulative distribution is displayed in Figure 6, where each point of a hazard
level comes from integrating the distribution of the response, CL , obtained from the Monte Carlo
simulation. After all trials are completed for a particular hazard level, the proportion of trials
that exceed certain network damage state, DS (e.g. DS>20%CL , DS>50%CL , or DS>80%CL )
is the limiting probability of network failure given a seismic intensity value PGA or PGV. This
process is performed at several levels of PGA and PGV (e.g. reflecting various hazard rates)
allowing construction of infrastructure fragility curves. In this study the response data from the
simulations leads to the development of fragility curves in terms of the CL response metric. This
parameter is chosen because of its compromise between computational complexity and ability to
capture network flow distribution. The worst-case running time as a function of n and m for CL
is O(n 2 m).
Figure 6 presents a revealing plot for the complement of the cumulative distribution functions
of CL . This figure shows that the water network CL displays different behaviour depending on the
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
hazard level (i.e. approximately 10, 5 and 2% probability of exceedance in 50 years). The behaviour
changes from a power law for low PGA hazard levels, to a linear relation for medium PGA levels, to
a logarithmic function for high PGA levels. The effect of interdependencies induces an analogous
behaviour. The curve for the water network at low seismic hazard, but with 100% interdependence
with the power grid or P(W j |Pi ) = 1.0, highlights the potential that interconnectedness has for
inducing extra fragility. The complement CDF for the power CL at low seismic hazard levels
is superimposed in the plot. These observations on water and power networks strengthen the
notion that both network topology and network element vulnerability have a significant role on
the performance of the systems.
The power grid proves to be highly vulnerable, despite being the backbone of modern produc-
tivity. One of the reasons is that electrical substations which are composed of numerous vulnerable
subsystems have a steep fragility relationship. Also, as compared to the water network, the order of
the power grid generation subset n Pg ⊆ G P is smaller and its sparseness is higher. Power demand
and generation have experienced a significant growth in the last 25 years, whereas, transmission
lines (i.e. edges), growing at slower rates, have been forced to be used beyond their original
design capacities. These factors have the effect of reducing the reliability of the power system,
and of increasing the potential for massive blackouts due to transmission overload and subsequent
cascading failures [1, 31].
The distributions of the network performance connectivity loss, CL , for several hazard levels
provide sufficient information to establish network functionality levels. Fragility curves for the net-
works can be established fitting the probabilities of exceeding specific limit states (i.e. functionality
levels) to a lognormal distribution. Connectivity loss levels of CL = 20, 50 and 80% represent three
limiting states to measure the ability of the network to function properly. More precisely, they
quantify the likelihood of the distribution nodes to decrease their capacity to be connected to
generation nodes given a particular seismic hazard. Figure 7 presents the fragility curves for the
potable water and power grid infrastructure systems as a function of the maximum expected PGA
in the area and expressed in term of their connectivity loss, CL .
The fragility of the power grid, and to some extent the fragility of the water network, reflect
the response of a system that undergoes a phase transition: it either functions or not. Under
disturbances, these transmission and distribution systems try to maintain their global functionality
by maximizing the size of the remaining connected portions of the network. As elements fail, this
global functionality becomes more and more dependent on fewer links. Once those few links are
gone, the network suddenly fragments. This phenomenon is also observed in the growth of abstract
random graphs [3].
5.2. Interdependent network response

The next step is to construct system fragility curves after taking into account the effect of network
interdependencies. This is done by performing again the Monte Carlo simulation routines of
element survival. However, this time for every network element, the algorithm not only compares
the probability of failure with a uniform random variable to decide if the element fails or not, but
it also compares the strength of the coupling among interacting elements with another random
variable. This new uniform random variable Y ∼ U (0, 1) is used to determine if the nodes need
to take into account the effect of the nodes that condition their performance (i.e. when Y is
less than the strength of coupling). The strength of the coupling, denoted by the value pW j |Pi ,
constitutes the matrix of conditional probabilities of failure of the interdependent infrastructures.
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
0.8
P(Water DS > dsi | PGA)
0.6
0.4
0.2
20% Connectivity loss
0
0 0.5 1 1.5
(a) PGA (g)
0.8
P(Power DS > dsi | PGA)
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 0.5 1 1.5
(b) PGA (g)
Figure 7. Infrastructure fragility curves for: (a) the water distribution network; and (b) electric power grid.
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
P(Water DS > 20% CL | PGA and Pw|p)

0.8
0.6
0.4
P(Wj | Pi) = P(Wj)

0.2 P(Wj | Pi) = 0.2
P(Wj | Pi) = 0.5
P(Wj | Pi) = 1.0
0
0 0.5 1 1.5
(a) PGA (g)
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
P(Wj | Pi) = P(Wj)

0.2 P(Wj | Pi) = 0.2
P(Wj | Pi) = 0.5
P(Wj | Pi) = 1.0
0
0 0.5 1 1.5
(b) PGA (g)
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
P(Wj | Pi) = P(Wj)

0.2 P(Wj | Pi) = 0.2
P(Wj | Pi) = 0.5
P(Wj | Pi) = 1.0
0
0 0.5 1 1.5
(c) PGA (g)
Figure 8. Interdependent fragility curves for water network at different performance levels:
(a) CL = 20%; (b) CL = 50%; and (c) CL = 80%.
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
1
Random P(Wj|Pi) = P(Wj)
Random P(Wj|Pi) = 0.2
Connectivity Loss, CL- Water

0.8 Random P(Wj|Pi) = 0.5
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
10-2 10-1 10
0
(a) Fraction of Randomly Removed Power Grid Elements
0.25
Interdependent Effect on CL- Water
Power Random Removal

Power Vertex Degree Removal
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
(b) Fraction of Removed Power Grid Elements
Figure 9. Interdependent network response for random-induced malfunctioning and intentional disruptions:
(a) connectivity loss CL ; and (b) interdependent effects on CL .
The plots in Figure 8 introduce a set of interdependent fragility curves. They display the effect that
seismic-induced failures on the power grid have on the water distribution network. Four different
values of the strength of coupling are considered (i.e. magnitude of the interdependence). These
values range from independence where P(W j |Pi ) = P(W j ) to complete interdependence where
P(W j |Pi ) = 1.0. Figure 8(a) shows the interdependent effect for a connectivity loss, CL = 20%.
Other performance levels are presented in Figure 8(b) for CL = 50%, and in Figure 8(c) for
CL = 80%.
These plots clearly show the increase in system fragility as the strength of coupling grows
larger. This effect is amplified as the monitored network performance level, CL , increases. For
P(W j |Pi ) = 0.20 the median value of the fragility distribution decreases approximately 60% with
respect to the median of the independent system at CL = 20%. The decrements in the median are
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
65 and 70% for the damage states CL = 50 and 80%, respectively. The maximum interdependent
effect is Ie = 100%. This parameter is defined as the absolute difference between the independent
and interdependent response, normalized by the maximum independent response. Accounting for
interdependencies increases the complexity of the systems. This adds new combinations to the
possible failure modes inducing a substantial increase to the overall infrastructure fragility.
Seismic hazards are extreme events that expose the potential for detrimental interdependent
effects. However, simple random malfunctioning can also reveal that interconnectedness is able to
induce unforeseen responses. Power and water networks are more often subjected to other hazards
such as lightning, vehicle collisions, falling trees, equipment failure, or vandalism. For those
cases, network performance can be measured and the effects of their interconnectedness quantified.
Figure 9(a) displays the connectivity loss CL of the water network as its elements and the power grid
elements fail at random. Hence, this plot is a function of the fraction of randomly removed nodes
of the power grid. Different levels of interconnectedness are considered. The strength of coupling
accelerates the loss of connectivity between distribution and generation nodes. Figure 9(b) presents
the interdependent effects of the power grid failures on the water network functionality in terms of
its connectivity loss, CL . Results are shown for the cases where both networks experience random
failures, and where the water experiences random failures while the power grid undergoes vertex
degree induced malfunctions. The effect of the interdependencies on the response is significant for
removal fractions less than 40%. The magnitude of the interdependent effect at its peak amounts
for 22% of the independent response. This is a non-negligible percentage, and it occurs where the
fraction of removals is low. This is precisely the range in which the networks operate and where
common failures generate element malfunctions—which are a small number as compared to the
order n of entire networks.
An interesting outcome of the interdependent effect plot comes from the targeted removals in
the power grid (i.e. vertex degree based). Picking the most connected nodes of this system appears
to cause no significant interdependent effects on the water network. This is because the most
connected nodes of the power grid are not necessarily the nodes that facilitate the interaction with
other systems. At the interacting interface, the water network depends on power grid nodes which
are not necessarily highly connected.
6. MITIGATION ACTIONS
Evaluation of the effectiveness of competing mitigation actions on infrastructure systems requires

exhaustive exploration of available alternatives. The same analysis approach used for estimating
network performance after disruptions can be utilized to monitor network improvement after
implementation of mitigation actions. Common methods for effective consequence minimization
after disruptions rely upon optimization techniques. Researchers tend to look for the best mitigation
alternative to improve network service right after any disruption takes place. These alternatives are
constrained to the areas where they are needed the most: in regions with high-expected number of
victims (i.e. fatalities and injuries). In general, these areas also have low lifeline service reliability
[32]. Other studies focus on intensive search for the critical retrofit strategy regardless its location.
This strategy must result from trying an exhaustive set of retrofit alternatives, and selecting the
one that produces the best possible improvement [33].
This study attempts to explore mitigation alternatives that simultaneously account for improve-
ments in network flow patterns and in network topology stability. Therefore, the retrofit strategy
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
starts with local modification of network topology by adding bypasses or alternative routes around
congested nodes. The objective is to induce a less vulnerable flow regime in network performance
as measured by the connectivity loss, CL . The location for re-meshing the network is obtained from
the vertex betweenness, Bv , rank ordering. This sorting criterion assesses the amount of load or
total flow that passes through the nodes at an unperturbed network state. The vertices to select for
lessening their congestion are those where more than 65% of all possible flow paths pass through.
Flow paths go from the generation set, g, to the distribution set, d. For the power grid, being one
of the core enabling systems for network interdependencies, its intact flow state indicates that ele-
ments P2 , P5 , and P6 have the highest betweenness. Hence, these nodes are selected for remedial
actions. The fundamental premise is to create bypasses around the most heavily loaded nodes to
decongest them. The new edges used for the bypass and subsequent decongestion are constrained
in their length by edge expansion limitations. Growth of the US high voltage transmission lines
for the 2002–2011 period is projected to be 5% of the existing line-miles, despite the growth in
demand of 20% [34]. Approximately 17% of the transmission lines of the power grid of this study
are high-voltage lines (e.g. >350 kV). This leads to exploration of two network growth scenarios
(i.e. bypasses), consistent with observed power grid growth trends. The first scenario corresponds
to approximately 10 km (i.e. 5% growth) of new lines around element P2 and partially around P5 ;
and the second scenario is approximately 40 km (i.e. 20% growth) of new lines around elements
P2 , P5 , and P6 .
Local mitigation actions increase the redundancy of networked systems. This is because new
edges around congested vertices introduce additional cycles, which diversify the path portfolio
used in flow transfer. To test this observation the network is subjected to a seismic hazard of 10%
probability of exceedance in 50 years. Figure 10(a) presents the impact of bypasses on the power
grid for two transmission line growth levels. The response improves but not as significantly as
expected. The steep fragility curves of the power grid have the explanation: for the seismic hazard
under consideration (i.e. 475 year return period, which induces a PGA ∼ 0.30 g), the vulnerability
of electric substations prevents new edges to be more effective, because failure occurs prematurely
at most network nodes. This calls for seismic retrofit of vertices.
The effect of seismic retrofit is reported in the same figure. Improvements are introduced
to the three identified vertices P2 , P5 , and P6 , which are high voltage electrical substations.
The fragility of an electrical substation can be reduced by providing adequate anchoring of
its various subelements. It is assumed that the mean and the standard deviation of the LN
(PGA) increase by 15% after anchoring of their subsystems. This results in a new median
PGAm = 0.25, and a new dispersion = 0.4, as compared to the original PGAm = 0.20, and
= 0.35 of Figure 7(a). Network improvements are more significant when seismic retrofit is
implemented. However, this result provides an unfair view on the significance of node bypass-
ing. For more modest disruptions such as lighting, vandalism, or aging, the nodes involved in
the disruption can be effectively avoided through the new bypasses. They enhance local absorp-
tion of the perturbation. They contain it in a space that does not compromise large portions of
the system.
Power network growth for the seismic perturbation under consideration is not sufficient to
propagate visible benefits to the water network (Figure 10(b)). The performance of the water
system is also reported when the interdependency is set to be P(W j |Pi ) = 0.5. If the power grid
is retrofitted, then the beneficial effects on the water network response are more evident. This
indicates that a good mitigation policy must combine reduction of the vulnerability to external
hazards, and reduction of the internal congestion around funneling nodes.
DOI: 10.1002/eqe

1
0.8
0.6 0% Growth
5% Growth
20% Growth
0.4 20% + Retrofit
0.2
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
(a) Connectivity Loss
0.8
0% Growth
0.6 5% Growth
20% Growth
20% + Retrofit
Water | 0%
0.4
Water | 20%
Water | 20% + R.
0.2
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
(b) Connectivity Loss
Figure 10. Impact of growth and seismic retrofit on: (a) power grid response;
and (b) water network response.
6.1. Effective mitigation actions

An approach to better reduce the fragility of interdependent networks requires prioritization of
the mitigation actions based upon a vertex rank ordering that accounts for the importance of each
node to their multiple roles, and their susceptibility to multiple hazards. Each node has a role
in network connectivity, flow traversal, flow transfer at the interface with other infrastructures,
and network vulnerability. This single-role vertex rank ordering concept can be generalized to a
weighted average of vertex importance. If the possible roles that a node, v, can take for maintaining
interdependent network performance are denoted by H = 1, 2, . . . , h, then the formulation of the
interdependent rank ordering of a vertex, IROv , follows:
1 h
IROv = ai vi (8)
h i=1
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
where ai is the weighting factor given to each criterion of node importance, and vi is the rank
of node v in each criterion. Sorting the IROv for all v ∈ V (G) in ascending order provides a
simple prioritization list to implement mitigation actions. This strategy is expected to propagate
improvements through the networks as an inverse avalanche in the same way some disruptions can
generate cascading failures after exceeding a particular threshold of stability [35, 36].
7. CONCLUSIONS
Infrastructure systems are entities whose networked nature makes them suitable for mathematical
analysis using concepts and tools from graph theory. One of the first tasks to understand networks
is to measure their properties in terms of global connectivity, local clustering, and overall shape.
These parameters aid in the characterization of networked systems. Their rank ordering ranges
from pure topological metrics to parameters that simultaneously account for topology and flow
patterns.
The response of networked systems is investigated for two types of disruptions: simultaneous
removal of several elements and systematic removal of network elements—one at a time. The
explicit modelling of network interdependencies poses a challenge on the selection of the parameters
that capture the phenomenon. This study proposes a framework to capture the interdependence
among infrastructures in a single entity by using conditional probabilities of failure. This matrix
of conditional probabilities accounts for the location of the interdependency, the direction of the
interaction, and the magnitude of the strength of coupling, pW j |Pi , which can be tuned from
independence to interdependence. Geographical immediacy is the key aspect for defining the
locations where the interfaces of the networks interact.
The response of the networks to widespread initial failure, as induced by earthquakes, shows a
particular type of behaviour as the intensity of the hazard increases. Their observed probabilistic
response resembles a step function. As the hazard increases, there is a critical moment in which some
of the remaining elements have the responsibility of connecting various fragments of the disrupted
network. If they are absent, the entire network collapses. This sudden change in response is observed
in both independent and interdependent networks. The effect of the strength of coupling also induces
a sudden chance in state. The change in the response of the systems between independence and low
interdependence is larger than the change between low strength of interdependence and complete
interdependence. This information is captured in the interdependent fragility curves, which are
introduced as a tool to enhance current loss estimation and risk assessment methods.
For systematic removals, two parameters, vertex degree, d(v), and vertex betweenness, Bv ,
could be utilized to determine the importance of network vertices, and to define the location for
potential initiation of network avalanches. When the removal of the elements of the power grid
focuses on its important elements, then the effect on the water network is smaller than in the case
where the removal of the power grid elements occurs at random. This contradicts the expected
result: if one systematically disrupts a network in the most damaging possible way, one expects
to see larger effects on other networks. The explanation of this contradiction is that the nodes that
are critical to maintaining the integrity of one network are not necessarily the nodes that maintain
the flow at the interface between networks.
The insights gained about response distributions, the importance of elements, and the interde-
pendent effects can be utilized to devise effective mitigation actions. These minimal interventions
have the potential to induce significant improvements in network response. This study explored
DOI: 10.1002/eqe
the ability of mitigation actions to decrease critical nodes’ congestion and seismic vulnerability.
Both are useful depending on the nature of the disruption. Small disruptions are controlled with
bypasses and large disruptions are contained if their elements are less fragile. The results indicate
that an effective mitigation policy should account for the simultaneous importance of every node
to maintain network connectivity, to facilitate network flow, to be instrumental in flow transfer
between networks at their coupling interfaces, and to reduce overall vulnerability. A simplified
method for interdependent rank ordering is proposed. By identifying critical interdependent net-
work elements, future corrective measures will ensure propagation of benefits during their life
cycle and throughout the same networked medium in which cascading failures propagate.
Finally, the search for mitigation actions also calls for more sophisticated representation of the
transient dynamics of networked systems. Physics-based models and time-dependent simulations
may provide the tools to identify the conditions that lead to cascading failures. Having identified
those conditions, one can take preventive actions which will ultimately ensure no widespread
failure within or across infrastructures.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The work reported here has been funded in part by the Mid-America Earthquake Center through National
Science Foundation grant EEC-9701785. However, all results, conclusions and findings are solely those
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsors.
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Seismic Response of Critical Interdependent Networks: Leonardo Due Nas-Osorio, James I. Craig and Barry J. Goodno

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EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING AND STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS

Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn. 2007; 36:285–306

Seismic response of critical interdependent networks

Leonardo Dueñas-Osorio1, ∗, † , James I. Craig2 and Barry J. Goodno1

Received 20 July 2005; Revised 29 March 2006; Accepted 5 July 2006

A collection of unforeseen modes of failure observed in large technological infrastructures have

Contract/grant sponsor: National Science Foundation; contract/grant number: EEC-9701785

Copyright q 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

2. DEFINITIONS AND CASCADING FAILURES

2.1. Vertex degree rank ordering

2.2. Vertex betweenness rank ordering

3. NETWORK PERFORMANCE MEASURES

Independent of the nature of the disruption, network functionality needs to be characterized by

3.1. Inverse characteristic path length, L

3.2. Connectivity loss, CL

Figure 1. Topological structure of selected networks: (a) electric power; and

4.1. Physical interdependence

4.2. Vulnerability of network elements

0.8 d(G) = 2, <L> = 5 km

5. SEISMIC HAZARD AND NETWORK VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

In order to develop fragility curves for interdependent networked systems, it is necessary to

5.1. Independent network response

Complement CDF of Connectivity Loss

0.6 Water at 0.3g

5.2. Interdependent network response

P(Water DS > 20% CL | PGA and Pw|p)

P(Wj | Pi) = P(Wj)

P(Wj | Pi) = P(Wj)

P(Wj | Pi) = P(Wj)

Connectivity Loss, CL- Water

(a) Fraction of Randomly Removed Power Grid Elements

Power Random Removal

Evaluation of the effectiveness of competing mitigation actions on infrastructure systems requires

Complement CDF of Connectivity Loss

6.1. Effective mitigation actions

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