AN ASSESSMENT OF THE INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

COMMAND: HOW IT ADDRESSES THE BASE SYSTEM AND

SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS OF THE PHILIPPINE
ARMY

LTC GLOVEN B LEY (CE) PA

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

OF THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COURSE CLASS 68

May 2021
 ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City

DISCLAIMER

This is an official document of the Command and General Staff

College, AFPETDC.

Quotations from, contractions, and reproduction of all or any part of this

document are not authorized without the specific permission from the

Commandant of CGS College.

The opinions, ideas, and proposals expressed herein are those of the

student-author and do not necessarily express the official views of the CGS

College, AFPETDC or any other government agencies.

Reference to this work includes the foregoing statement.

Command and General Staff College

Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo
Quezon City

i
 HEADQUARTERS
TH
79 INFANTRY (MASALIGAN) BATTALION
3RD INFANTRY (SPEARHEAD) DIVISION, PHILIPPINE ARMY
Brgy Bato, Sagay City, Negros Occidental

ENDORSEMENT

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation in the Command

and General Staff Course Class 68, this study entitled, “AN ASSESSMENT

OF THE INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT COMMAND: HOW IT

ADDRESSES THE BASE SYSTEM AND SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT

PROBLEMS OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY”, prepared and submitted by LTC

GLOVEN B LEY (CE) PA, the acceptance of which is hereby endorsed.

ii
 ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City

APPROVAL SHEET

This Commandant‟s Paper hereto attached, entitled “AN

ASSESSMENT OF THE INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT COMMAND:

HOW IT ADDRESSES THE BASE SYSTEM AND SUPPORT

DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY”, prepared and

submitted by LTC GLOVEN B LEY (CE) PA, in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the Command and General Staff Course Class 68, is hereby

accepted.

COL EDWIN C SADANG (MNSA) PA DR. THERESITA V ATIENZA

Panel Co-Chairperson Panel Co-Chairperson
Date Signed: 05 April 2021 Date Signed: _05 April 2021_

Accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation in the

Command and General Staff Course Class 68.

COL JOSE DEMAR A PAULY COP (GSC) PA

Commandant
Date Signed: 07 May 2021

iii
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Writing this Commandant‟s Paper was indeed a great and satisfying

experience and would not have been completed without acknowledging the

persons and groups who in one way or another helped me to achieve this. It

has been a long journey but the support they have provided lessened the

difficulties and hardship of having limited time, considering the current

pandemic situation in the country.

First of all, I would like to thank the Great Architect of the Universe for

providing me the strength and wisdom as I journeyed towards the completion

of this research paper and for protecting my family and the whole CGSC

Class 68 against COVID-19.

Special mention is due to the following persons who contributed to the

successful accomplishment of this paper;

To our panel members, Dr. Theresita V Atienza as our Civilian Panel

and COL EDWIN C SADANG MNSA (SC) PA as our Military Panel, not only

for being panel members but also for mentoring and guiding us all to finish the

paper and to COL JOSE DEMAR A PAULY COP (GSC) PA, Commandant,

Command and General Staff College, Armed Forces of the Philippines

Education, Training and Doctrine Command and to the whole Panel 3

members.

To MGEN TYNE T BAÑAS, AFP (Retired), the Former Commander of

Installation Management Command (IMCOM), PA for sharing his knowledge

of the unit, being the First Commander despite residing in Mindanao as of the

writing of this paper. The ideas and guidance he had provided and shared

with me greatly contributed to this research paper.

iv
 To BGEN RAMIL G BITONG, PA, the incumbent Commander of

IMCOM (P), for his insights on the current status of the unit and the

suggestions and recommendations he imparted to me on how to further

improve the said Command.

To COL NOEL D BELERAN PN (M) (GSC), the incumbent Commander

of Naval Installation Command (NIC), Philippine Navy (PN), for sharing his

ideas about his unit and how it conducts and performs its functions as the

base support unit of the PN. His ideas were listed and taken down which

become part of the references, helping me to come up with good

recommendations to further capacitate the unit.

To the other key informant officers, COL ARBOLEDA, the Chief of Staff

of IMCOM (P), LTC TISON, the Commanding Officer of 1st Installation

Management Battalion (IMB), stationed in NOLCOM, Camp Aquino, Tarlac,

MAJ GARGAR of OG5, PA, MAJ BANOEY of Doctrine Center, TRADOC and

MAJ LAPADA of OG3, IMCOM (P) who provided me the information I needed.

I also would like to thank the staff officers from Headquarters PA and

IMCOM (P) for lending me their time and sharing their ideas during Focused

Group Discussions (FGDs) which greatly contributed to the successful

completion of this Commandant‟s Paper. From HPA, MAJ MAGAMAY (OG1,

PA), MAJ BAUTISTA (OG3, PA), MAJ AQUINO and MAJ VIERNES (OG4,

PA), MAJ SUELTO (OG7, PA), CPT CABALLERO (OG8, PA) and MAJ

CADIZ (TRADOC, PA) with LTC GANITNIT (OG1), CPT PEREZ (OG3), COL

ROBLEs (OG4), COL AYCARDO (OG8), MAJ AÑANA (REO) and MAJ

OTGALON (5IMB), all from IMCOM (P).

v
 To all my classmates, LTC DEBORAH G CASTILLO (FA) GSC PA, for

providing me information about doctrine and doctrine development, LTC

JOSEPH C FLORES (INF) GSC PA and LTC JF SPERRI G GOTICO FA

(GSC) PA, for their inspirational advice and sharing with me their

Commandant‟s Paper which served as my guide and reference, and LTC

CARL SHAHJAHAN D DELOS SANTOS (MI) GSC who acted as moderator

during one of the FGDs and to all my classmates at AFPETDC, CDR MARZ T

TADULAN (GSC) PN, CDR ARNOLD C BARCELON (GSC) PN, LTC

MICHAEL F LUGTU (MI) GSC PA and COL JOSEPH B MADARANG (GSC)

PA.

Special mention is also accorded to LTC GERARD T ALVARAN INF

(GSC) for being my official adviser for this paper even though he is in Negros

Island, commanding the 79th Infantry Battalion of the 3rd Infantry Division.

This paper will not be possible without the advice and help coming from

one of my senior advisers, COL RANDY F FAJILAGUTAN CE (MNSA) PA

who from the very beginning of the research had provided me brotherly

advices.

To my two former commanders MGEN EDMUNDO R PANGILINAN

AFP (Ret) and BGEN VIRGILIO B BARTOLOME AFP (Ret) who both

provided me their moral advices and support from the beginning until I

completed this paper.

And to the faculty and staff of AFPETDC, for this once in a lifetime

opportunity for being a part of CGSC Class 68 and molding us to be the future

commanders of the AFP who are fit to command, capable to plan and

qualified to advise.

vi
 Likewise, my gratitude to the officers and men and women of the 9th

Post Engineer Detachment (9PED), IMCOM (P), PA for providing me a little

space which served as my classroom and for providing me manpower for my

technical requirements.

To COL JOSE RITCHE M PABILONIA PAF (GSC), Course Director of

CGSC Class 68, for guiding the whole class from the very start of the course

until graduation, and to the members of CGSC Class 68, for the experiences

despite being far from each other, we were able to unite and establish a

special bond common only to our class.

I would like also to extend my gratitude to my sister, Atty. Gina B Ley

and to my two nephews, Carlo Enrique Lanuzo-Manalastas and Nicko

Enrique Lanuzo-Manalastas for painstakingly proofreading this paper.

Lastly, this Commandant‟s Paper would not have been possible without

the support of my family with my wife, Mae, and my four lovely daughters,

Cleo, Clarisse, Claire, and Claudette who served as my strength and

inspiration as I journeyed towards this course. Thank you for the love and

understanding.

As I end this, my deepest appreciation and gratitude to those who were

not mentioned but contributed a large portion towards the completion of this

paper as I finish the CGSC. Again, thank you very much.

vii
 ABSTRACT

LTC GLOVEN B LEY (CE) PA. May 2021. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE

INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT COMMAND: HOW IT ADDRESSES THE
BASE SYSTEM AND SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS OF THE
PHILIPPINE ARMY. Command and General Staff College, AFP Education
Training and Doctrine Command, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon
City.

Adviser: LTC GERARD T ALVARAN (INF) GSC PA

This Commandants Paper aims to determine the current status of the

Installation Management Command (IMCOM), Philippine Army (PA) based on

the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facility

and Policy (DOTMLPFP) domain of capability assessment and how it

currently addresses the Base System and Support Development (BSSD)

problems of the Philippine Army. Along the way, problems were identified and

solutions were provided in order to fully capacitate the Command in

performing its unique functions. Several other recommendations and solutions

were provided in order for the Command to become more responsive to the

needs of the Philippine Army.

The research used a qualitative approach to gather data and

information. Document Analysis (DA), Key Informant Interviews (KII) and

Focused Group Discussions (FGD) were considered to gather data and a

triangulation method was applied to analyse and study the research. With

this, the researcher was able to come-up with recommendations on how to

further capacitate the Command in order to be more responsive to the needs

of the PA.

There were a total of nine (9) respondents for KII coming from IMCOM

(P) PA and from Naval Installation Command (NIC), Philippine Navy (PN) and

from Headquarters, Philippine Army. A total of eighteen (18) respondents

viii
participated in three FGDs conducted in Headquarters IMCOM and

Headquarters Philippine Army (HPA). All respondents are all experts in the

subjects provided for them to be able to help realize the research.

The research paper concluded that the current status of IMCOM (P)

based on the DOTMLPFP capability assessment is not fully responsive to the

needs of the PA to address the BSSD problems. However, several solutions

and recommendations were provided to raise the Commands capabilities into

a responsive BSSD unit of the PA. At the end of the research, a

recommendation was provided in order for Higher Headquarters to consider

and come up with a solution to implement the said recommendation. To

further improve the Command, a recommendation for future studies were

provided that will greatly support this research.

ix
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Disclaimer …………………………………………………..……………..……. i

Endorsement ………………………………………………..……………..…… ii

Approval Sheet ……………….…………………………….…………..…....… iii

Acknowledgment .………….…………………………………..……..………... iv

Abstract ………………………………………………………….………………. viii

Table of Contents ……………………………………………….………..…….. x

List of Tables…………………………………………………………………….. xii

List of Figures …………………………………………………….…………….. xiii

List of Appendices …………………………..…………………..…….……….. xiv

List of Acronyms ………………………………………………….……..……… xv

CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

1.1. Background of the Study ………………..………………….…….……. 1

1.2. Problem Statement ………………………..……..…….…………….… 4
1.3. Objectives and Goals ….……..……….………..……..……….…….… 5
1.4. Significance of the Study ……………………...……………….……… 5
1.5. Scope and Limitations ………………………..………...…….……….. 7
1.6. Definition of Terms ……………………………………………...….….. 8

CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1. Review of Related Literature ………...….…………...………………. 12

2.2. Synthesis and Gaps …………...…………….………………..………. 27
2.3. Conceptual Framework …….……………….………………………… 28

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

3.1. Research Design…………………………...…………………….…….. 31

3.2. Locale of the Study…………….………..………….……………….…. 33
3.3. Units of the Study……………………………..………………………… 33
3.4. Sampling Design…..………………………………….………………… 34
3.5. Data Collection Procedures………………………..…..…………...…. 34
3.6. Research Instruments …...……………………………..……………… 35
3.7. Data Analysis…………..…………………………….……………….…. 36
3.8. Research Framework ……………..….…………….………………….. 36

x
CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

4.1. Current status of IMCOM (P) in relation to the DOTMLPFP

Domain of the capability assessment……………………………...… 38
4.2. Challenges IMCOM (P) as BSSD unit of the PA ……...…………… 68
4.3. Recommandations that can be drawn in order to address
BSSD problems………………………………………………………… 85

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDTIONS

5.1. Summary of Findings ………………...……….……………..………… 96

5.2. Conclusion ………………………..….……………………...………….. 97
5.3. Recommendations …………...…………….………………..…………. 99
5.4. Action Plans and Project..……...………………….……………..……. 107
Proposal for Sustainability ……...…...…………..…………..….…….. 114
Strategic Implications to Defense and Security …..…………..…….. 114
Suggestions for Further Studies ……………….……….……….……. 117
5.5. My Leadership Journey …………………………...…………………… 118

REFERENCES

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: List of Participants for FGD ………….………….… 126

APPENDIX B: List of participants for Key Informant Interview …. 127

APPENDIX C: Letter to Col Beleran, Commander, NIC, PN……. 128

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH …………………………………………….……… 130

xi
 LIST OF TABLES
Table
Number Page

1 Findings on IMCOM (P) Assessment on Training ………...……….. 51

2 Equipment Readiness of IMCOM (P) 2020 ………………………….75

3 Summary of Challenges and Recommended Solutions ……...… . 106

4 Summary of Fund Requirements for APP ……………………….. . 109

5 Action Plan and Program Matrix ………...…………………..……. . 111

xii
 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure
Number Page

1 Conceptual Framework ............................................................... 30

2 Triangulation of Data .................................................................. 36

3 Research Framework ................................................................. 37

4 IMCOM (P) Table of Organization and Equipment ...................... 46

5 HHSG TOE ................................................................................ 47

6 Force Structure Review Flow Chart ............................................ 72

7 Philippine Army Force Structure 2028 ...................................... 115

8 DAP Framework of Development and Security ......................... 116

xiii
 LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: List of Participants for Focused Group Discussion

APPENDIX B: List of Participants for Key Informant Interview

APPENDIX C: Letter to Col Beleran, Commander, NIC, PN

xiv
 LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADP - Army Doctrinal Publication

ADRP - Army Doctrinal Reference Publication

AFP - Armed Forces of the Philippines

AFPETDC - Armed Forces of the Philippines Education, Training and

Doctrines Command

APB - Annual Plans and Budget

APP - Action Plan and Project

AOR - Area of Responsibility

BGEN - Brigadier General

BSSD - Base System and Support Development

CBA - Capability Based Assessment

CGSC - Command and General Staff Course

CJCS - Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff

CMO - Civil Military Operations

CMTD - Capability, Materiel and Technology Development

COP - Corps of Professor

CPP-NPA - Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army

CREO - Command Real Estate Officer

CSAFP - Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines

DA - Document Analysis

DD - Doctrine Development

DOTMLPF - Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership,

Personnel, and Facility

DOTMLPFP - Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership,

Personnel, Facility and Policy

DND - Department of National Defense (Philippines)

xv
DoD - Department of Defense (USA)

DPG - Defense Planning Guidance

EP - Enlisted Personnel

FA - Field Artillery

FNA - Functional Need Analysis

FGD - Focused Groups Discussion

FM - Field Manual

FROD - Force Restructuring and Organizational Development

FSA - Functional Solution Analysis

GHQ - General Headquarters

HHSBn - Headquarters and Headquarters Service Battalion

HHSG - Headquarters and Headquarters Support Group

HPA - Headquarters Philippine Army

HRD - Human Resource Development

IGRR - Implementing Guidelines, Rules and Regulation

IMB - Installation Management Battalion

IMCOM - Installation Management Command

INF - Infantry

JCIDS - Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System

JRRS - Joint Readiness Reporting System

KII - Key Informant Interview

LOI - Letter of Instructions

MGEN - Major General

MI - Military Intelligence

MP - Military Police

xvi
NOLCOM - Northern Luzon Command

NIC - Naval Installation Command

OG1 - Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel

OG3 - Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations

OG4 - Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics

OG5 - Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans

OG7 - Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Military

Operations

OG8 - Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Education and

Training

PA - Philippine Army

PAMU - Philippine Army Major Unit

PAM - Philippine Army Manual

PAF - Philippine Air Force

PED - Post Engineer Detachment

PPE - Personnel Protective Equipment

PN - Philippine Navy

RA - Republic Act

REO - Real Estates Officer

SEB - Security and Escort Battalion

SRP - Strategy Research Project

SOLCOM - Southern Luzon Command

SC - Signal Corps

SSC - Special Service Center

SWOT - Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats

TE - Table of Equipment

xvii
TOE - Table of Organization and Equipment

TRADOC - Training and Doctrine Command

US - United States

VTC - Video Tele-conferencing

VUCA - Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity

xviii
 CHAPTER 1

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

Chapter 1 detailed and provided information on the research paper,

“An Assessment on the Installation Management Command: How it addresses

the Base System and Support Development Problem of the Philippine Army”.

Highlighted in this chapter is the background of the study stating why there is

a need to conduct the study, the problem statement, and the research

questions. The author came up with the objectives of the study and these

objectives were used as the basis of formulating the conceptual framework on

how the study was conducted.

1.1. Background of the Study

Base System and Support Development (BSSD) is one among the

primary concerns of the Philippine Army (PA) as stated in the Armed Forces

of the Philippines (AFP) Modernization Program. The Republic Act (RA) 7898,

also known as the “AFP Modernization Act”, was activated on 23 February

1995; it aims to modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) into a

military organization where it can fully exercise and implement its

constitutional mandate of upholding the sovereignty and preserve the estate

of the Republic of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 7898, 1995). RA 7898

has a fifteen (15) year program with a core purpose of modernizing the AFP

into a capable, responsive, and reliable Armed Forces ready to defend the

country and its sovereignty. The program also directed the AFP leadership to

develop permanent bases within the Philippine territory in compliance with the

government‟s national defense strategies and socio-economic thrusts. These

bases will be used to provide an adequate support system to the units and
 2

housing facilities to its personnel including the civilian human resource. In

addition, these bases are going to be used as training grounds for maneuver

and territorial forces together with the reserve components of the AFP. In line

with this, the AFP was also tasked to provide a systematic relocation of its unit

to strengthen its capability within the performance of their mission (Republic

Act No.7898, 1995). When President Benigno S. Aquino III was elected as

President of the Philippines in 2010, the program was extended for an

additional fifteen (15) years when he signed on December 11, 2012, the

Republic Act (RA) 10349 which amended and revised the components of the

AFP Modernization Program (Republic Act No. 10349, 2012).

The Department of National Defense (DND) issued the Department

Circular Number 3 which contains the “Implementing Guidelines, Rules, and

Regulations of the Revised AFP Modernization Act (IGRR).” In this Circular,

the AFP was tasked to develop its land, air, and water capabilities to uphold

the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic, and to secure the

national territory from future internal and external threats. Force Restructuring

and Organization Development alongside with the BSSD are important

components of the DND Circular No. 3. With this directive, the Headquarters

Philippine Army (HPA) issued Letter Directive No. 4 dated 4 March 2019,

which directs the Philippine Army (PA) “to pursue Base System and Support

Development by developing strategic bases and optimize the employment of

military reservations, establish an Army Installation Management System to

systematized the establishments, maintenance, and management of Army

installations and develop a Real Estate Assets Management System to

 3

effectively and efficiently manage the PA properties” (HPA Letter Directive No.

4, 2019).

In compliance with HPA Letter Directive No. 4, the AC of S for Plans,

G5 of the Philippine Army made a Concept Paper for the activation of the

Installation Management Command, IMCOM (P); it was immediately

submitted to the Commanding General, PA for approval. The paper stated

that the Strategic Basing Plan will include a proposal for the location of camps

to be developed into strategic bases. The camps and installations for the PA

are a projection of the state of readiness of the PA. These will serve as the

staging point for strategic military power projection, military training and

readiness, and well-being of the soldiers and their families, and the PA civilian

employees. Furthermore, these will sustain the operational needs of the PA

units (Concept Paper, 2019).

BSSD has become a perennial problem within the PA. Currently, the

PA maintains 135 military reservations at different locations throughout the

Philippine archipelago. With the high number of military reservations,

problems like the perfection of ownership; the security of bases; the repair and

maintenance of camps; and the well-being of soldiers, their families, and PA

civilian employees are difficult to manage.

In the current set up of the PA, the Philippine Army Major Units (PAMU)

perform support services to the organization. These support service functions

distract the PAMU Commanders in performing their primary mission to their

Area of Responsibility (AOR) (Concept Paper, 2018).

The Philippine Army fast tracked the activation of the IMCOM to

address its BSSD problems. This follows the Higher Headquarters‟ guidance
 4

to have a unit dedicated to providing base support functions and services,

facilities and base personnel; and to managing PA Real Estate assets. This

will relieve the PAMU Commanders from managing BBSD problems and will

allow them to focus their efforts and resources towards their respective

primary mission (Concept Paper, 2018).

Existing gaps and problems in the organization were determined upon

examining the approved Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) of

IMCOM (P). There is no office that caters to the CMO concerns of the unit;

such office is responsible for coordinating with stakeholders and concerned

agencies for perfection of ownership, and for managing problems with regards

to military reservations. There is also no Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

Center, an office that will cater to problems and concerns on morale, welfare,

and recreation of the PA personnel, their dependents, and PA civilian

employees.

Thus, there is a need for the PA to assess and evaluate the capabilities

of IMCOM (P) as a unit that will address its BSSD issues.

1.2. Problem Statement

This research paper will evaluate the effectiveness of the current

structure of IMCOM (P) as the primary BSSD unit of the PA. Specifically, this

paper will answer the following research questions:

a. What was the current status of IMCOM (P) as BSSD Unit of the

PA with regard to the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership,

Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPFP) Framework?

 5

b. What were the challenges of IMCOM (P) as a BSSD unit in

terms of DOTMLPFP Framework?

c. What recommendations can be drawn to address the

challenges?

1.3. Objectives and Goals

The main objective of the study is to explore the responsiveness of

IMCOM (P) in addressing the BSSD problems within the Philippine Army. It

aims for the following purpose:

a. To determine the current status of IMCOM as a BSSD Unit of

the PA using the DOTMLPFP Framework.

b. To determine the challenges of IMCOM (P) as a BSSD unit in

terms of DOTMLPFP Framework.

c. To provide recommendations that will address the challenges of

IMCOM (P).

1.4. Significance of the Study

A well-organized, well-equipped, and well-trained unit, which is based

on a highly recognized doctrine, can perform its mandated tasks, and

accomplish its mission effectively and efficiently. The capability-based

assessment of IMCOM (P) guided by a holistic approach in a continuously

volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment will

significantly affect the way the PA addresses its BSSD situation. This study

will significantly benefit the PA in the future, as it gears toward shielding its
 6

future force structure. This will also arm the current IMCOM unit on how to

respond and address the prevalent BSSD problems of the PA.

The IMCOM (P) was created and immediately activated to relieve the

PAMU Commanders in the management of the BSSD issues in the camps

occupied by their units; the PAMU‟s core functions, especially the Infantry

units, are to fight and combat internal problems, such as the CPP-NPAs and

the other identified Muslim rebel groups. The responsibility on BSSD is

transferred to the IMB assigned at the occupied camp. This will give the

PAMU Commanders time and space to focus directly on fighting the war and

maintaining peace and security in their respective AORs. Furthermore, the

funds allocated by PAMUs in their Annual Plans and Budget (APB) for the

repair and maintenance of facilities and equipment will be directed to support

additional requirements that will benefit their functions. The security and

cleanliness of the camp, repair and maintenance of facilities, & parades and

ceremonies will no longer be the responsibility of PAMU Commanders.

The PAMU‟s many functions also restrict it from effectively managing

its BSSD issues. Majority of the camps do not provide decent

accommodations to the troops due to lack of available space or to dilapidated

structures; PA personnel coming to the camp from an operation for an

administrative purpose lack proper accommodations and comfortable billeting

areas.

The establishment of a dedicated unit to BSSD can now concentrate on

perfection of ownership of all camps owned by the PA, including the camps

currently being occupied by the two Area Commands in Luzon. This will also
 7

prevent further claims of illegal settlers on areas occupied by PA throughout

the country.

When the IMCOM (P) was activated, it was directed to execute the

program and management concepts of the PA, and to ensure that installations

can support the strategic mobility power projection, military training and

readiness, and well-being of soldiers. The well-being of soldier‟s families

inside the camp is also ensured, thus every soldier is confident that their

family is well taken care off. As the Command settles and confronts its

burdens during the transition and its early years, the Higher Headquarters

should provide all its support until the regularization of the Command‟s

operations.

This paper is the first assessment on the IMCOM (P) since its

activation, thus can be used as a baseline for future assessments of the

Command. It will also outline the benefits that the AFP and the whole

organization of the PA will obtain from the IMCOM (P) as a distinct and

separate unit catering the BSSD problems of the whole APF.

1.5. Scope and Limitations

This Commandants Paper covers the assessment on the status of the

newly activated IMCOM (P), PA from 2019 after its activation until 1st quarter

of 2021. It also focused on the mechanisms that the IMCOM (P) will use to

address the BSSD problems of the PA with regard to the DOTMLPFP

framework.

The study used the Capability Based Assessment (CBA) of the US

Army as a guide to determine the current or existing capability of IMCOM (P)

 8

and as a comparison to the identified capabilities of IMCOM (P) based on the

future Force Structure of the PA.

Since the IMCOM (P) is a newly activated unit, there are no prior

studies on its capabilities. Studies that focus on the assessments and

upgrades of a military unit‟s capability were used as main references. This

research was also limited to the direct assessment of the IMCOM‟s current

capabilities using the methods and processes reported in prior foreign studies

for comparison.

The researcher focused primarily on the Luzon based units as a source

of participants for the focused group discussion. Some Commanders from

Luzon based units are considered as Key Informants for the conduct of Key

Informant Interviews due to their proximity to the researcher‟s location. The

current pandemic situation also limited the researcher‟s capability to conduct

on-field research, surveys, face-to-face interviews, and focused group

discussions; these were instead conducted online with the aid of modern

technology.

The latter part of this study focused on the Strategic Implication on

Defense and Security and its impact on the defense and national security of

the country.

1.6. Definition of Terms

Assessment – it refers to the difference of methods or tools that is

being used to evaluate, measure, and document the academic readiness,

learning progress, skill acquisition, or educational needs of students

(Partnership, 2015).
 9

Base – a place where soldiers, their families and people working in a

military organization live and work (Longman).

Base Development – operationally defined in this paper as the

improvement or providing quality development in all bases and camps in

support to all military operations in the area.

Base Management – operationally defined as how a certain unit

manages military installations and bases in support to military operations.

Base management includes providing safe quartering for military personnel

and their dependents and managing their morale, welfare and recreation

requirements.

Chain of Command – as operationally defined in this research as the

IMCOM‟s level of command or line of authority wherein orders are being

passed from the Commanders going down to its lowest members.

Doctrine – a set of principles that guides how an organization fights or

conducts its operation in accomplishing the mission (Doctrine Center, 2014).

Facility – a real property entity consisting of one or more of the

following: a building, a structure, a utility system, pavement, and underlying

land (DOD Dictionary of, 2020).

Force Restructuring – operationally defined as the reorganization of

current and future forces adjusting in the future military environment and how

the military will address the future threats.

Leadership – it describes the leader attributes and core leader

competencies that make possible focused feedback, education, training,

experiences, and development across all leadership levels (Waters C. G.,

2013).
 10

Materiel – in a military context, materiel relates to the specific needs of

a force to complete a specific mission. The term is also often used in a

general sense to describe the needs of a functioning army (Freebase).

Military Base – operationally defined as an area that provides billeting

or accommodation into a certain unit utilizing as military command posts,

training venue for military exercises and other military and non-military

activities.

Military Installation – in this research, it is operationally referred to as

the camp, base, post or any facility where the military houses its personnel

and their dependents and civilian human resources. This is also a place

where the military conducts training exercises in preparation for any mission

provided.

Organization – defines as a unit with varied functions through which a

group individual cooperates systematically to accomplish a specific mission

and directly provide or support war-fighting capabilities of the unit (DOD

Dictionary of, 2020).

Personnel – are the fundamental element of any organization and they

are the most potent force behind the performance of the organization

(Alvaran, 2018).

Policy – a policy is a statement of intent that is implemented as a

procedure or a system, which, in my use of the DOTMLPF-P construct, is

carried out via Doctrine (Rhyne D. W., 2014)

Real Estates – this term refers to all real properties owned by the

Philippine Army including the old and newly built structures, piece of land and
 11

military reservations that was either acquired or by Presidential Declaration

(Vicente, 2020).

Responsiveness – operationally defined as to how a certain military

unit reacts quickly in a certain situation utilizing all available resources at

hand.

System – a set of principles or procedures according to which

something is done; an organized framework or method (Oxford Languages).

Training – is the instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to

perform specific military functions and tasks. It is also the exercise of one or

more military units conducted to enhance their combat readiness (DOD

Dictionary of, 2020).

 CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURES

This chapter provided a survey of local and foreign research, scholarly

studies, journals, publications, and other documents related to functions and

capabilities of the Installation Management Command (IMCOM) or any other

related organization. It also highlighted several related reviews of insights and

concepts for the proper assessment of the IMCOM, such as the Capability

Based Assessment (CBA) being used by the US Army. At the end of this

chapter, syntheses, gaps, and challenges are determined and presented.

2.1. Review of Related Literature

To conceptualize the review, the author used the Doctrine,

Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facility, and Policy

(DOTMLPFP) framework to analyze and study all available literature relevant

and fit for the assessment of IMCOM. According to Rhyne (2014), the

DOTMLPFP framework is usually associated with non-material solution

requirements analysis aiming to come up with recommendations and to

provide solutions on the identified gaps and challenges (Rhyne D. W., 2014).

An online article explains that each component of the DOTMLPFP framework

is a hierarchical means to obtain a systematic solution (System, 2012).

The Installation Management Command (IMCOM) of the Philippine

Army, which was approved and activated on 04 March 2019, is currently in its

infancy stage. At this early stage, the unit is not yet fully operational and is

currently experiencing several “birth pains” within the organization. The

approval and implementation of the Future Force Structure of the Philippine

Army (PA) officially includes the IMCOM in its organizational structure; thus,
 13

there is a need to forward, examine, and develop the capability and structure

of the unit.

The Capability Based Assessment (CBA) is used as a process of

determining doctrinal, training, organization, and material requirements and

translates organizational requirements into organizational models (AcqNotes).

Policy (P) is included in the framework to further expand the assessment

summed up as Doctrine, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,

Leadership, Personnel, Facility, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P).

The DOTMLPFP framework is one of the methods used by various

military organizations to assess the capability and effectiveness of its unit.

Alvaran (2018) stated that the pillars of the capability development objectives

include Capability and Materiel Technology Development (CMTD), Force

Restructuring and Organizational Development (FROD), Doctrine

Development (DD), Base Support Systems and Development (BSSD), and

Human Resource Development (HRD) (Alvaran, 2018).

Orpiano (2018), in his article “Knowing the DOTMLPF in connection to

the AFP Modernization Program”, expressed that the military considers the

DOTMLPFP framework when it wants to improve and upgrade its capabilities.

He also stressed the importance of the Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities,

and Threats (SWOT) analysis; however, it is only applicable to the

organization and does not tackle the technicalities related to capabilities of an

organization. Thus, Orpiano gave more importance to the DOTMLPFP

framework because it defines the procedures that each element in the military

is perceived - from an organizational Chain of Commands to proper

operations and maintenance of essential military assets (Orpiano, 2018).

 14

A Strategy Research Project (SRP) titled “A Capability Based

Assessment of the Future Installation Enterprise” was conducted by Stephen

P. Bickel in 2018. He recommended the use of a Capabilities Based

Assessment (CBA) process to identify areas that require better alignment

between the Army‟s current capabilities and future IMCOM management

needs. This assessment, which can be applied to assess the installation

management, is a four-phased process which consists of:

a. defining the future operating environment,

b. conducting a functional area analysis (FAA),

c. completing a functional needs assessment (FNA), and

d. performing a functional solutions analysis (FSA).

Bickel (2018) also pointed out that a non-material approach or a

material approach is required to fill a capability gap identified in the FNA. He

also expressed that DOTMLPFP analysis is the first step in the FSA; the FSA

provides an assessment of the prioritized list of installation management gaps

and develops probable solutions. Applying the CBA framework to IMCOM

helps identify gaps between current and future requirements and allows for a

better position of current resources to achieve success in future Army

missions (Bickel, 2018).

In the 3rd version of the Capability Based Assessment (CBA), published

by the US Joint Chief of Staff, J-8 (2009), it identified the following:

(1) capabilities and standard operational performance required to successfully

carry out missions, (2) failures in existing weapon systems to deliver those

capabilities, (3) associated operational risks, (4) possible non-material

approaches for lessen or eliminating the failures, and (5) recommendations

 15

when to appropriately pursue a materiel solution (J-8, CBA User‟s Guide

Version 3, 2009).

Colonel John Boggs (2015), a retired US Marine Corps, mentioned that

DOTMLPF-P is a senior leader‟s tool and model for the strategic outlook of

their organization. This model supports the senior leaders‟ ability to see their

organizations from a strategic point-of-view and will also support the effective

operationalization of the strategy. Accordingly, it was also noted that both

materiel solutions (i.e., equipment, property, utilities, etc.) and non-material

solutions (i.e., doctrine, people, leadership, etc.) are exceptional responses to

strategic needs (Boggs, 2015).

Pint, et.al (2017), in their article, “Review of the Army Total Force

Policy Implementation”, published by Rand Corporation, assessed the US

Army policy across the domains of doctrine, organization, collective training,

mobilization, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities

(DOTMLPFP). They made an assessment on how the Army fully implements

its policy and accomplishes its mandated task in consonance with the trend of

modern technology. They were also able to determine gaps and provided

recommendations to modify the Army‟s objectives of achieving a more

effective and integrated operational force (Ellen M. Pint, 2017).

Haig and Addison (2013), in an interview with Jim Hill, CEO of

Proofpoint Systems Inc., stated that the military uses the DOTMLPFP process

when it faces a capability issue. They emphasized that it is a tool that can

identify the solutions needed in the successful implementation of its main

policy. Furthermore, the DOTMLPFP helps an organization determine other

 16

alternatives and expand their understanding of addressing issues (Haig and

Addison, 2013).

Doctrine

The first domain of the DOTMLPFP process is Doctrine. In the

Philippine Army Manual (PAM) 8-01, doctrine is defined in military usage as

the “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in

support of objectives” (Doctrine Center, 2014). This will be used as a basis on

how IMCOM of the PA will function and direct their efforts towards

accomplishing their desired mission.

In the Philippine Army Manual (PAM) 0-1, Philippine Basic Doctrine, it

is stated that doctrine is the major factor that contributed to the successful

accomplishment of the mission of any unit. Doctrine provides a solution to

address all challenges in any military operations (Army P., 1996).

RAND defined military doctrine as the fundamental set of principles that

guide military forces as they pursue national security objectives. These set of

principles range from the policies and procedures put in place by a selected

military branch to the tactics and techniques taught to new members during

training (RAND Corporation).

The US Department of Defense (DoD) Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms defined doctrine as the fundamental principles by which the

military forces or units guide their actions in support of national goals (Terms,

2010).

In the research conducted by Tangen (2009), “A Methodology for the

Quantification of Doctrine and Materiel Approaches in a Capability-Based

Assessment”, he pointed out that doctrine is the answer to the question of

 17

how well the military unit fights. He further defined it as a set of guiding

principles and beliefs, which can come from sources other than published

manuals (Tangen, 2009).

Spencer (2016) in his own study defined the Army doctrine as the basic

principles by which the military forces or elements duplicate their actions in

support of national objectives. It is more than just concepts and ideas; it is a

body of beliefs on how military forces plan to operate as part of a joint force

and a statement of how the military intends to fight. It establishes a common

figure of reference, including rational tools that military leaders use to resolve

military problems (Spencer, 2016).

The Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instructions (CJCS) 3010.02E

defined the Joint doctrine as the fundamental principles that guide the

utilization of U.S. military forces in coordinated action toward an objective. It is

established on current capabilities (i.e., existing force structures and fielded

equipment) and incorporated with time-tested principles of joint operations,

operational art, and elements of operational design. It is an authoritative

source for current military operations (Mayville, 2016).

According to the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms, doctrine comprises

the “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof

guide their actions in support of national objectives.” It is authoritative source

but requires judgment in application (Rhyne, 2014).

Bickel (2018) stated that doctrine are fundamental principles to guide

actions in support of national security objectives by providing organizations a

common language to understand missions and functions while also serving as

the basis for unit organization and equipment as well as leader and workforce
 18

training. He further emphasized that the biggest risk from the lack of doctrine

is inefficiency. He also stated that the US Army does not have a

comprehensive and coherent set of doctrine for installation management

(Bickel, 2018).

Organization

U.S. Army Regulation 5-22 defines an organization as a unit with varied

functions through which a group individual cooperates systematically to

accomplish a specific mission and directly provide or support war-fighting

capabilities of the unit. Subordinate units coordinate with other units and

enable the higher-level unit to accomplish its specific mission. This includes

the military, civilian, and contractor support required to control, sustain, and

reconstitute war-fighting capabilities (Army D. o., AR 5-22, 2015).

Military organization is the structuring of the military of a certain state to

offer a military capability as their national defense policy may require. In some

countries, paramilitary forces are included in a nation's armed forces, even

though they are not considered as part of its regular military forces. Soldiers

that are not a component of military or paramilitary organizations, such as

insurgent forces, often imitate military organizations, or use unexpected

structures, while formal military organization tends to use hierarchical forms

(DOTMLPF, 2010).

Bickel (2018) mentioned in his study that the present Installation

Management workforce of the US Army consists primarily of a mixture of

civilian functional experts, senior enlisted men, and field grade officers. The

civilian workforce is composed of a wide variety of functional experts

representing several Army Civilian career programs (e.g., engineers,

 19

comptrollers, scientists, housing managers, and installation managers)

(Bickel, 2018).

In line with the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System

(JCIDS) Manual of the US, an organization is defined as “[a] joint unit or

element with varied functions enabled by a structure through which individuals

cooperate systematically to accomplish a standard mission and directly

provide or support joint war-fighting capabilities” (Rhyne, 2014).

In support of the previous studies, Sumpter (2007) explained that the

perceived Installation Management Agency was not given the qualified staff.

There were virtually no increases in personnel under the realignment of

Installation Management Agency functions. She argued that staffing came

from existing organizations based on authorization and function redistribution.

She also stated that staffing at the regional level was underqualified and thus

personnel need to educate their regional counterparts on the history of issues

and problems of policies regarding installation management (Sumpter, 2007).

Training

The development of competent leaders is one of the Army's important

and fundamental imperatives; leaders must be appropriately prepared for

increasingly responsible positions (G9).

The U.S. Installation Management Command Regulation 350-1 states

that an Installation Management Community should be committed to develop

a healthy, well-balanced, multi-skilled workforce of both military and civilian

leaders and personnel with the knowledge, skills, opportunities, and outside-

the-box thinking to successfully accomplish a specific mission. It also

recognized that a multi-skilled workforce, composed of military and civilian

 20

leaders and personnel, is the key to the successful execution and

accomplishment of its objectives. The IMCOM must build and sustain a

competent team of active and adaptive leaders, as well as a trained,

experienced, and educated civilian workforce to provide excellent services for

soldiers and their families and to meet the daily sustenance and maintenance

of an installation (IMCOM, 2010).

Waters (2013) reported that the current and future challenges of an

Army require the need for effective training, education, and development of

civilian personnel within the IMCOM. As such, these will also prepare

members of the Army for potential warfare. Furthermore, Waters stated that

the Army must focus primarily on the development of its military and civilian

personnel; this will prepare members of the Army during times of warfare or

when national policy dictates so. A report of US General Raymond T. Odierno

was cited by Waters; it called on the US Army to adapt and implement

changes in its organization structure. General Odierno‟s report stated that

such adaptation will ensure the continued dominance of the US‟s land forces

while continuing to preserve the professionalism of its military and civilian

personnel (Waters, G. A., 2013).

The U.S. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) -1 fully detailed the

qualifications, duties, and responsibilities of a person in the Army Profession,

as well as the process for the reinforcement of IMCOM leaders and officer

leadership development. It also clearly stated the critical role of education,

training, and development for Army soldiers and civilian human resources

(Waters G. A., 2013).

 21

Bickel (2018) concluded in his study that the current U.S. IMCOM

organization does not provide career progression for officers delegated to

installation management leadership positions. Leadership command in the

garrison is a centralized & selected command billet, which considers a

generalist assignment availability. Similarly, Bickel stated that Sergeants

Major with no prior background in installation management are typically

selected for the leadership role. Furthermore, ninety-eight percent (98%) of

the current US IMCOM organization have no prior experience in installation

management. Military members assigned to installation management

positions, compared to their civilian counterparts, are experts in only one of

the Army‟s branches or functional areas. They receive little preparation for

integrating and synchronizing the full range of installation support for Senior

Commanders (Bickel, 2018).

Training and education provide a concrete foundation for the current

capabilities of the Army and enables the transformation and institutionalization

of new capabilities throughout the force. All the training and education

requirements for the future force must be conceptualized and developed with

continuous force development (Corps, 2017).

Materiel

Materiel is a term used for equipment and supplies in the military and

supply chain management. In a military context, it pertains to the specific

needs of a force to complete a specific mission. It is also often used, in a

general sense, to describe the needs of a functioning army. (Freebase, n.d.).

Patrick (2020) states that materiel includes specific equipment, weapon

systems, stores, and technology. In the past, however, it was only restricted to
 22

the capabilities of an organization. Nowadays, it includes improved and

upgraded war materials and equipment due to developments in modern

technology (Patrick, 2020). However, materiel is usually given least priority,

compared to doctrine, due to its expensive and time-consuming elements

(System, 2012).

According to Santos (2017), materiel is the equipment available, or the

lack of it, that is needed to perform a particular capability-based mission. In

addition, he also considered firepower, mobility, communications and

electronics systems, survivability, and other quartermaster items listed in the

Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE). The materiel portion is usually

given importance since it refers to the actual equipment used in the

performance of a mission (Santos, 2017).

Alvaran (2018) cited a study by Nabulneg which stresses that materiel

is the most important physical resource and is composed of materials and

equipment that are needed to accomplish a unit‟s mission. The cited study

expounds that materiel is a critical requirement for the effective and efficient

function of an organization or unit (Alvaran, 2018).

Leadership

According to Ellert (2008), there is a struggle in defining leadership and

identifying leadership competencies due to the different standpoints of a

multitude of organizational disciplines (Bennis, 1998; Burns, 1978; Fiedler,

1997; Northouse, 2004; as cited by Ellert, 2008). It was also clearly stated in

the study that leadership and leadership competencies are required to sustain

the force transformation in the Army training environment and are

 23

acknowledged as important aspects in the professional development of

military and civilian leaders.

Dargle (2016) supports Ellert‟s study and further states that the Army

Installations demand adaptable and competent leaders. Leaders should

always be ready and capable of anticipating, identifying, and remaining

cognizant of current and future mission requirements of IMCOM. This is to

ensure that all installations of the Army meets regular modernization and new

construction, maintains efficient and sustainable operations, and enables the

provision of effective services to soldiers, their families, and civilian

employees (Dargle, 2016).

In addition, the US Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22,

states that Army Leadership is a key document for members of the Army

Profession. It describes the attributes and core competencies of a leader, and

includes possible focused feedback, education, training, experience, and

development across all leadership levels. The document also describes the

three pillars and three domains of the Leader Development Model (Waters,

2013).

In a research conducted by Ali, et al. (2013), leadership is mentioned

as a concrete solution to the development of any organization. It is a great

imperative in educational administration because of its far getti effects on the

accomplishment of school objectives and attainment of educational goals (Ali

et al., 2013). The study further cited Ukeje (1999) and Ezeuwa (2005), which

sees leadership as the act of influencing people to work together towards the

achievement of a common goal (Ali et al., 2013).

 24

Leadership was initially associated with a specific training. This training

is directed to the development of leaders, primarily through further education.

This, however, makes an artificial distinction between the component training

and leadership training. It also does not explain the purposes of such training.

It enforces the creep towards „leadership development‟, omitting the core of

„leadership‟ (Patrick, n.d.)

Personnel

Alvaran (2018) stated in his paper that personnel are a fundamental

element of any organization; it is the most potent force behind the

performance of an organization (Alvaran, 2018).

To complement this, the US IMCOM Regulations 350-1, “Training and

Leader Development”, stated that IMCOM should be dedicated to developing

a healthy, well-balanced, and multi-skilled workforce, comprising military and

civilian leaders and civilian resource; the workforce should be knowledgeable,

skillful, and capable of grasping opportunities for successful and innovative

accomplishment of its mission. This regulation further stressed that a multi-

talented composite workforce is key to the successful execution of an

organization‟s mission (IMCOM U. A., 2010).

A study conducted by Santos (2017) explains that personnel refer to

the qualified officers, military personnel, and civilian human resource assigned

to any military organization. He also emphasized the importance of

assessments to ensure deserving people are placed in positions

commensurate to their merits. The study also stated the necessity of filling the

personnel rolls to ensure that a unit or military organization has sufficient

workforce (Santos, 2017).

 25

Facility

The Chairman of the US Joint Chief of Staff published Instructions

3010.02E. These instructions stated that the key facilities may include

command installations and industrial facilities of primary importance in support

of military operations or military production programs. Joint concepts may

impact several joint functions and operations that rely on facilities, in and

outside the continental United States, for deployment, reception, staging,

movement, integration and sustainment (J-7, 2016).

Santos (2017) also stated in his paper that facilities pertain to base

support systems that would allow units to train and to house military

personnel, their families, as well as civilian human resources. He added that

large scale training facilities are needed to enhance maneuvering operations,

and to combine arms operations, armor operations, and military operations.

He also linked facilities to materiel (e.g., storage houses or repair areas can

be obtained for vehicles and aircrafts) (Santos, 2017).

Vicente (2020) mentioned that the PA Logistics Manual –

PAM 4-00 (2007) defines facility as “real property, including all buildings, land

to include their permanent improvements like access roads, railroads, fencing

and piers”. He also stated that the Joint Readiness Reporting System (JRRS)

of AFP indicates a facility as consisting of buildings, spaces, or rooms

(Vicente, 2020).

Moore (2008) stated that changes related to fundings should be

required and implemented. He emphasized that inadequate funding for

installation limits services and prevents timely investments in infrastructure;

 26

ultimately, all quality-of-life programs since the late 1990‟s across the Army

suffer (Moore, 2008).

Policy

Rhyne (2014) discussed that although Policy, “P”, is the last

component in the DOTMLPFP framework, it should be given a higher priority.

He strongly suggested that policy be covered first. He defined policy as “a

principle or rule to guide decisions and achieve rational outcomes”; it is a

statement of intent that is implemented as a procedure or a system and

carried out through Doctrine, following the DOTMLPF-P construct (Rhyne,

2014).

In the Joint Doctrine Development System of the US, it stated that

policy is used to directly assign tasks, to prescribe needed capabilities, and to

provide sets of specific guidance that will ensure the preparedness of the

Armed Forces of the United States in performing their tasks and mission (Joint

Doctrine Development System, 2015).

An online resource describes policy as the deliberate system of

principles to implement objectives as procedures or protocols, to guide in

decision making, and to achieve desirable results or outcomes. Policies are

usually adopted by a body that governs an organization; it is used to assist

leaders in both subjective and objective decision making. In subjective

decision making, policy is used to assist the senior management arrive to

decisions based on the relative merits of several factors. Objective decision

making, on the other hand, is operational in nature (DOTMLPF, 2010).

The Guidance for Developing and Implementing Joint Concepts,

published by the US J7 Directorate for Joint Force Development, indicated

 27

that joint concepts and policy are closely related. In their view, policy can

direct and assign tasks, prescribe desired capabilities, and provide guidance

for the Armed Forces of the United States. They concluded that policy can

therefore establish requirements for joint concepts and capabilities (J-7,

2016).

2.2. Synthesis and Gaps

The survey of available local and foreign literature and studies provided

several variables that will contribute to the realization of this research‟s

objectives and will also provide answers to the research questions discussed

in Chapter 1.

The author found that several studies used the Capability Based

Assessment (CBA) of the US Military for capability assessment. These studies

focus on using the DOTMLPFP domain, since it can determine the status of

the unit being assessed and it can also identify the existing challenges and

gaps in an organization. Solutions or interventions can be recommended upon

the identification of the organization‟s gaps and challenges; these will address

the improval of a unit‟s capability and will, also, aid in future force restructuring

of the organization.

IMCOM (P), which has been recently activated as the sole PA unit

catering to BSSD problems, will play a significant role in the management and

organization of the PA. Capability Based Assessment (CBA) and the

DOTMLPFP domain, as it was used in the cited studies, will be the pattern in

assessing the effectiveness of IMCOM (P), PA as it slowly transitions into a

regular PA Major Unit (PAMU). Furthermore, it is important to determine the

 28

status of the unit, to determine the challenges and in the unit, and to provide

solutions and recommendations that will improve the unit.

The author identified gaps and limitations related to those in the cited

literature. There is no available local study in the capability assessment of

IMCOM (P) since it is a recently activated PAMU. Studies on other units‟

capabilities, however, can be consulted and used as a guide to adopt a similar

approach in the research process of this paper. Despite conducting a deep

research on available doctrine related to IMCOM (P) operations, there is a

lack thereof that can be used as a guide on its functions and operations as a

distinct regular unit of the PA.

2.3. Conceptual Framework

A conceptual framework, which is illustrated in Figure 1, was

formulated to help the researcher and readers have a better understanding of

the research process. This will also be used as a guide in answering the

research questions provided and in realizing the specific objectives of the

paper.

The variables in the framework are arranged to attain the goal of the

newly activated unit as a „well organized and responsive IMCOM (P) that will

address the BSSD problems of the PA‟. The lower portion (base) of the

framework is the current and existing status of IMCOM (P), PA based on the

concept or ideas it was activated. It is the very foundation of the unit and will

serve as the building ground of the framework. In this part, analysis of the

status of the unit is important to have a clearer understanding of the unit itself;

it will also serve as a basis for the assessment of the units‟ capability. The
 29

status of the unit provides its mission, and this may vary depending on the

tasks to be accomplished. The IMCOM‟s mission, upon its activation, is to

manage, develop, and administer military installations and reservations; it is to

perform BSSD functions for the PA as directed by the AFP. Three variables

[i.e., management (manage), development (develop), and administration

(administer)] encompass all the functions of the unit as stated in its activation

papers.

The overall assessment of the status of IMCOM (P), PA will be based

on the interdependency of the variables presented, on its mission, and on the

assessment of the DOTMLPFP domains of the unit.

The right side of the framework represents the DOTMLPFP domain,

which will be used as the tool in assessing the present status and capabilities

of the IMCOM (P). It balances the framework by highlighting its importance in

the IMCOM‟s capability-based assessment (CBA).

Analyzing the IMCOM‟s mission using the CBA and the comparison of

its current status and future force structure will eventually result in the

identification of gaps and challenges that the need to be improved.

Recommendations and interventions obtained from thorough analysis of the

unit‟s gaps and challenges will improve the capability of the IMCOM (P) in

addressing the BSSD problems of the PA. The PA would then be able to

come up with the following: (1) a policy that will address the functions of the

unit; and (2) a doctrine intended for the operations of unit. The availability of a

particular doctrine and policy for the IMCOM (P) would help it to address the

BSSD problems of the PA.

 30

Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

 CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the following: research design,

locale and unit of the study, sampling and data collection procedures,

research instruments, data analysis and research framework. This chapter

also explains the methods used throughout the study and how the researcher

came up with a conclusion, identifying gaps and providing solutions to the

problem identified.

3.1. Research Design

In this research, the author has used the qualitative approach to gather

data and information in order to conduct capability-based assessments and to

determine the status of the capability of IMCOM (P) using the DOTMLPFP

framework. To be specific, the author has utilized the descriptive and

evaluative approach. The research design employed made sure that the data

collected had a contributory factor in order to address the research problem

stated in Chapter 1. With this, the research process was done through the

following: document analysis, key informant interviews and focused group

discussion.

Document Analysis

Document Analysis is a form of qualitative research method in which

documents are analyzed and interpreted by the researcher to give meaning

related to the topic being studied (Bowen, 2009). In this research, the author

focused on the analysis of past studies through review of related literature

from foreign and local references. The data collected is supported by

assessing and analyzing other documents available like publications, field

 32

manuals, case study reports, and other foreign journals. Local references like

the PA Doctrine Manuals and publications were also used to further

strengthen and support the data previously collected.

Key Informant Interviews

Key Informant refers to the person or persons who have thorough

knowledge or ideas related to the dissertation chosen as medium for interview

(Lavrakas, 2008). On the other hand, a key informant interview is the conduct

of in-depth interviews to a person or persons or organization that has/have

first-hand knowledge of the topic being researched (Lavrakas, 2008). In this

study, key informants have been carefully selected. They are evaluated and

assumed to have thorough knowledge relative to their expertise to provide

answers to the problems of this research. The result from conducted

interviews were used as supporting documents to further justify the data

collected during the document analysis conducted beforehand.

Focus Group Discussion

Focus Group Discussion is the gathering of pre-selected people who

are willing to participate in a discussion related to the topic being researched.

The purpose of this is to collect individual information related to the topic. The

participants themselves conduct the process through brainstorming by

producing ideas through intensive group discussion (Market Base News).

To further support the data collected in the Document Analysis and Key

Informant Interviews, the author set up focused-group discussions to select

officers and personnel who also have knowledge on the research topic. Their

knowledge about the topic is significant and crucial to fully support the

information and data collected from the two previous methods.

 33

3.2. Locale of the Study

The current study was conducted in the Philippine Army, specifically

within the Installation Management Command in Fort Bonifacio, the home of

the Philippine Army. However, the scope was extended within other units and

offices with related functions as IMCOM (P). The elements of time and the

proximity to the location of the author were the basis to consider the extension

of the research location. In addition, the author eventually considered the

collection of information and data from the Naval Installation Command of the

PN at Naval Base Heracleo Alano, Sangley Point, Cavite.

3.3. Units of the Study

Key informants came from a pool of selected officers and personnel

from the Installation Command of the Philippine Airforce, the Philippine Navy,

and the IMCOM (P) of the Philippine Army. To further strengthen the data

gathering, several Senior Officers were also considered as key informants like

the former Commander of IMCOM (P), its incumbent Commander, several

officers assigned in Doctrine Center, TRADOC, PA, officer from OG5, PA and

officers from OG3, IMCOM (P), PA.

To be specific, the author also considered the Commander of the Naval

Installation Command of the PN, since the Philippine Airforce (PAF) has not

activated its Installation Command as of this writing. On the other hand, the

author has likewise considered officers from IMCOM (P), chief of offices of the

PA Staffs, and officers from NIC, PN as media during the Focus Group

Discussions. The conduct of FGDs through Video Tele-Conferencing (VTC) or

Zoom replaced face-to-face FGDs, given the current state of the pandemic.
 34

3.4. Sampling Design

For the conduct of the present research, the author used the purposive

method of sampling procedure by selecting officers, enlisted personnel (EP)

and civilian human resources that are knowledgeable and willing to share their

ideas about the research topic. The generated information from the selected

media were collected and analyzed in relation to the relevance of each data,

thus helping the author to arrive at a conclusive decision. Personnel from the

existing Installation Commands of the PA and PN were likewise used as

media.

3.5. Data Collection Procedures

Document Analysis

Document Analysis was done through the evaluation and review of

related literature of past studies and research papers from local and foreign

sources. To further support the analysis, the researcher included the analyses

of existing laws, policies, manuals, directives, and publications from both local

and foreign references. However, with the current situation of the COVID-19

pandemic where access to libraries is impossible, most of the readings of

related literature came from the Internet.

Key Informant Interview

In this method, the researcher conducted interviews to select key

informants with related functions to the topic in order to acquire data and

information to further support the study. The interviews were a semi-structured

type of interview, using prepared questions supported by on-site questions

that might come up during the conduct of the interviews. However, reiterating
 35

again the current condition of the pandemic, telephone conversations with key

informants were substituted as an alternative way in conducting said

interviews.

Focused Group Discussion

Focused Group Discussion (FGD) was conducted using the semi-

structured method by inviting officers with related knowledge relative to the

functions and mission of IMCOM (P). FGDs were conducted to validate

information and data gathered through Document Analysis and KII. However,

with the current situation of the pandemic, FGD was conducted through the

Internet where the same person was invited during the conduct of the

discussion. This was done to further determine the existing gaps and

limitations needed to be addressed in the future.

3.6. Research Instruments

The author decided to collect, measure, and analyze data related to the

research using the semi-structures type focused interview and focused group

interview. A semi-structured-focused interview is a semi-formal interview

where the author prepares guide questions related to the topic. However, as

the process continues, changes were immediately applied based on the flow

of the interview. For the FGDs, participants, who were selected, were asked to

join and give their opinion or perception regarding the subject presented.

For the data analysis, the author studied and analyzed the result of the

review of related literatures in Chapter 2 and assessed its relevance to the

two previous tools used.

 36

3.7. Data Analysis

All the data collected from the DA, KII, and FGDs were compared,

analysed, and studied, allowing the author to arrive with a conclusion. In this

study, the author adapted the Triangulation Method of analyzing data. The

triangulation of documents confirms or invalidates, clarifies, or expands the

findings across other data sources which prevent the occurrence of bias

(Frey, 2018). This tool facilitated the connectivity of the data through

verification of information collected from DA, KII, and FGD, arriving with a

justified conclusion and recommendation.

Figure 2. Triangulation of Data

3.8. Research Framework

In order to come up with a good research output, the author adapted

the Input-Process-Output-Outcome (IPOO) model in order to give a simple

understanding of the research. See Figure 3 for the process.

 37

Figure 3. Research Framework

The input data that were used in this analysis came from the result of

data collection through the review and analysis of documents gathered from

the Internet. In this process the author used manuals, publications, policies,

and other related journals from foreign and local sources to collect data. In

addition, data collected from DA, KII, and FGDs will also be used to further

support the study. The process involved collaboration and cross examination

of data collected from the three aforementioned methods. The process

identified gaps and solutions based on the DOTMLPFP framework being

used. This method will also identify if the current capability of IMCOM (P) is

responsive to the needs of the PA. The last process is the output stating the

identified gaps and recommending solutions that can address the said

problems. Through these three processes, the desired outcome was

formulated and subsequently addressed the research objectives.

 CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

This chapter provides several findings followed by the analysis of the

researcher based on the data gathered as a result of Document Analysis (DA)

of manuals, directives, official documents and online research of writings and

other related literature. Supporting these findings are the results of Key

Informant Interviews (KII) conducted to several active and retired officers with

related works to BBSD and to the unit. The result of the Focused Group

Discussions (FGD) provides additional concrete information that will form part

of the triangulation process, providing an appropriate conclusion at the end.

These methods will provide answers to the following research

questions in order to assess the IMCOM (P) in addressing BSSD-related

problems of the PA:

a. What was the current status of IMCOM (P) in relation to the

DOTMLPFP domain of capability assessment?

b. What were the challenges of IMCOM (P) as a BSSD unit of the

PA considering the above mentioned domain?

c. What recommendations can be drawn in order to address the

above mentioned problems?

4.1. Status of IMCOM (P) in relation to the DOTMLPFP domain of

capability assessment

The current status of IMCOM (P) is provided in this chapter using the

DOTMLPFP domain previously discussed individually. The findings were

specified according to the specific domain: Doctrine, Organization, Training,

 39

Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facility and Policy with corresponding

analysis.

Doctrine

On doctrine that is defined in this study as being a set of principles that

guides IMCOM (P) in the conduct of its operations. The PA activated IMCOM

(P) as a dedicated unit to provide base functions, base personnel, facilities,

and services and to manage PA Real Estate (Army P., 2019). Based on DA,

there were no established written doctrines for BSSD in the PA. The

activation is based only on Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 2 and Higher

Headquarters guidance in consonance with the PA Future Force Structure

and Strategic Basing Plan.

Section viii of the 2018-2023 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) of the

Department of National Defense (DND) states that: “Program 1 shalI pursue

its Base Systems and Support Development by developing identified strategic

bases and optimize utilization of military reservations; establishing an Army

Installation Management System to systematize the establishment,

maintenance and management of PA installations; and developing a Real

Estate Assets Management System to effectively and efficiently manage the

assets and/or properties of the Army.” This guidance was reiterated again in

the 2019-2024 DPG of the DND stating that there is a need to reassess and

re-evaluate the master list of specified camps and military installations to be

developed” (Defense, 2019). Having this as reference, AFP provided

guidance to all its service command to propose and activate a dedicated unit

to implement the directive and address existing BSSD-related problems in

their own area of operations.

 40

In addition, DA conducted at Naval Installation Command Operations

(NIC3), Naval Installation Command (NIC), Philippine Navy (PN) also

revealed that the said unit has no written doctrine relative to BSSD functions

of the NIC. This is further supported by an interview conducted with the

Commander of NIC, PN stating that the NIC, PN, since its activation, has no

doctrine whatsoever regarding BSSD. The NIC, PN based their mission on

the existing LOI, Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), and regulations

formulated by the PN. In fact, they based their functions on the latest SOP

approved by the Higher Headquarters of the PN, the SOP Number 8, Naval

Installation Command Integrated Base Support Operations and Administration

Protocol (3rd Revision).

Moreover, LOI Number 2 of the Philippine Army provides further

guidance on the transfer of Base Support Functions from Philippine Army

Major Units (PAMUs) to IMCOM (P), PA. It is stated in this LOI that the

doctrine on the employment and utilization of IMCOM (P) shall be anchored

basically on its mission and capabilities. As stated in the LOI, the mission of

IMCOM (P) is to “manage, develop and administer military installations and

reservations in order to perform BSSD functions as directed by the GHQ,

AFP.” Also mentioned are thirteen (13) initial capabilities of IMCOM (P):

a. Provides plans, policies, programs and procedures on matters

relating to installation management and resourcing.

b. Directs execution of Army programs and management concepts

to ensure installation are capable of supporting strategic mobility power

projection, military training and readiness, and well-being of soldiers and their

families.
 41

c. Recommends and executes approved policy, planning,

budgeting and programming for installation resource requirement,

d. Serves as the proponent for installation management doctrine,

professional development of installation and garrison commanders and staff.

e. Provides the infrastructure (facilities, real estate management,

support services) to maintain installation readiness to train, project,

reconstitute and protect forces.

f. Develops camp/installation development plan of all the PA major

installations.

g. Preserve and secure the military reservations and real estate

under PA supervision.

h. Conducts and facilitates the repair and maintenance and

management of base facilities.

i. Develop and improve training facilities and provide recreational,

housing facilities.

i. Provide security services to PA major camps/installations.

k. Manage civilian contractors who work for the installations.

l. Conduct limited procurement of goods and services for the

installations and PA major units.

m. Performs other tasks as the Commanding General, PA may

direct.

The interviews with the former Commander of IMCOM (P), MGEN

BAÑAS and the incumbent Commander of IMCOM (P), BGEN BITONG,

confirms that there were, and still are, no existing written doctrines relative to

BBSD functions in the PA. This is also the case when the Chief of Staff of
 42

IMCOM (P), COL ARBOLEDA, and LTC TISON, the Commanding Officer

(CO) of 1st Installation Management Battalion (IMB), IMCOM (P) stated that

there were no existing written doctrines to be found related to BBSD functions

of IMCOM (P).

To further add to the findings, an interview with LTC CASTILLO, who

was formerly assigned at the PA Doctrine Center, said that “[…] from 2006-

2009, I can‟t recall of a doctrine specifically about BSSD. Doctrine

development at that time was classified according to functional area such as

PAM 1-00 for Personnel, PAM 2-00 for Intelligence, PAM 3-00 for Operations,

PAM 4-00 for Logistics, and so on [sic].” She later added that there was no

existing written doctrine related to BSSD in the PA Doctrine Center, TRADOC

and a Doctrine Roadmap was developed and served as reference for the

development of succeeding doctrines falling under respective functional

areas. The said roadmap is updated periodically to serve as a guide and to

ensure accommodation and coverage of the needed doctrine for

development.

The two (2) FGDs conducted support the assertion that there were no

existing written doctrines relative to BSSD functions of IMCOM (P). All nine

(9) participants from the first group and the nine (9) participants in the second

group all agree that the activation of IMCOM (P) was based on the existing

policies and regulations from Higher Headquarters.

During the FGD at Headquarters, IMCOM (P), CPT PEREZ, as

representative from OG3, IMCOM (P), mentioned that there were no available

written doctrines that indeed support the BSSD-related functions of IMCOM

(P). Since IMCOM (P) is a newly activated unit, it only based the performance
 43

of its function on the mission stated in the LOI No. 2 published by HPA. At

present, the said unit, in coordination with Headquarters Philippine Army

(HPA) staff, is currently developing its doctrine with TRADOC, PA. MAJ

OTGALON also supports this statement, asserting that the unit can use the

doctrine being used by the PN and PAF in their Installation Commands.

However, study of the NIC, PN revealed that it does not have any set of

doctrines, while the PAF is currently drafting a concept paper on the activation

of its own Installation Command. As stated by the participants in the FGD,

doctrines should be formulated before a unit is activated. Doctrines, in this

way, are very important in all newly-activated units because it serves as a

guide on how the unit and its personnel will perform their mandate and how

they will accomplish their mission.

The Old United States (US) Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations,

provides fundamental principles, tactics, techniques, procedures, and terms

and symbols. The manual provides a doctrinal approach to address the

challenges in the operational environment of today. It is a guide on how the

forces will prevent adversaries and fight the enemy of today with their new

modern forces and capabilities (Army, 2017). Even the US Army updates its

US FM 3.0 in order to cope up with modern warfare. After a decade of fighting

in wars around the world, the US army has now its new doctrine on field

operations which serves as the new guide of every US Army in the most

technological and sophisticated warfare of the new generation (South, 2017).

This is the very reason why every newly activated unit should have a doctrine;

that is, to be able to have fundamental principles, tactics, techniques, and

 44

procedures like the US FM 3.0 that serves as a guide in the performance of

their mandated tasks.

The activation of IMCOM (P) has been long overdue in compliance with

the DND and Higher Headquarters‟ guidance to have a dedicated unit that will

address BSSD-related problems of the PA. With this, HPA was quick to

respond by activating the IMCOM (P) in March 2019 even with minimal

resources in terms of personnel, fund support and equipment. Based on the

DA, KIIs, and FGDs, it reveals that there was no doctrine available in the PA

relative to BSSD functions. As revealed, IMCOM (P) was conceptualized

“hastily” which, as a result, made Higher Headquarters activate IMCOM (P)

even in the absence of any written doctrine. The immediate need of the

Organization to solve BSSD-related problems of the PA resulted with the

immediate approval of Higher Headquarters and by the DND. In addition,

there was already a written guidance coming from the previous commander

that serves only as the basis for the activation of IMCOM (P). Additionally,

there were already approved several local policies, directives and guidance on

how IMCOM (P) will function and perform its mandated task in lieu of any

doctrine published beforehand. These de facto sets of guidance are based

solely on practices from other support units that were deemed best by the

aforementioned commanders; and as such, these ordinances were modified

to fit the needs of IMCOM (P). That being said, these provisional directives will

be adopted and incorporated during the formulation of the official IMCOM (P)

doctrine.

As a newly activated unit, it is expected that doctrine has not been

provided or formulated since BSSD is an added function to the whole PA.

 45

The current scenario provides that all PAMUs focus on their individual core

functions with base support and function added as one of their concerns.

Even other newly-activated units had experienced the same problems on how

they will function and perform their duties with the absence of written doctrine

that will serve as their guide.

Organization

The organization that is being defined here is composed of different

IMCOM (P) units with varied functions that work together in order to

accomplish a specific mission. The current organizational set up of IMCOM

(P) as approved is in compliance with Higher Headquarters guidance; that is,

to create an Installation Command for the Philippine Army that addresses

BSSD-related problems that have been in the organization. Using LOI No. 2

as reference, IMCOM (P) will be composed initially of a Headquarters and

Headquarters Service Battalion (HHSBn), three (3) unfilled-Installation

Management Groups (IMGs), Security and Escort Battalion (SEB), Military

Police Battalion (MPB) and fifteen (15) IMBs including the two (2) IMBs

located in Southern Luzon Command (SOLCOM) and Northern Luzon

Command (NOLCOM), respectively. See Figure 4.

 46

Figure 4. IMCOM (P) Table of Organization and Equipment

Based on the analysis, it is revealed that there are problems with the

approved TOE, specifically on the organization itself. This was further

supported by the results of KII and FGD that there are two significant findings

to which all participants agree. The first finding on the organization is the

misalignment of sub-units like SSC and 9PED. As such, these units were

transferred from Headquarters and Headquarters support Group (HHSG), PA

to IMCOM (P) upon its activation. SSC in the HHSG organization is in the first-

line unit, while 9PED was recognized already as the same level as SSC. The

aforementioned units are all considered HHSG sub-units together with MPB,

SEBn, and HSBn of HHSG. However, in the submitted TOE of IMCOM, SSC

and 9PED were, and still are, sub-units of HSBn of IMCOM (P). Shown below

is the approved Table of Organization of IMCOM during its activation.

DA reveals that there was a misalignment of units after the approved

Table of Organization (TOE) was published. This was confirmed by MAJ

LAPADA during the first FGD. He mentioned that units like SSC and 9PED

are supposed to be in the first level units of IMCOM (P). However, as

 47

reflected, they are now under the Headquarters and Headquarters Service

Battalion (HHSB). This was also seconded by MAJ OTGALON with the same

observation as MAJ LAPADA.

(Source: HHSG TOE 2020)

Figure 5. HHSG Table of Organization and Equipment

Reflected in the table above is the approved organization of HHSG

reflecting the location of SSC and 9PED as the first line of unit of HHSG. Both

units require O6 (Colonel) officers as their commanders and it is the same

with HHSB. As such, the two officers are considered as commanders of their

respective units.

The second issue with the organization of IMCOM (P) is the missing of

important units or offices in the approved TOE. As stated by the participants in

the KII and FGD, some units need to be included or activated in order to

enhance further the performance of IMCOM (P) and the accomplishment of its

mandated tasks and missions. As indicated in the two (2) FGDs, there is a

need to include important primary staff offices to further improve the

responsiveness of the unit. For instance, it was noted that IMCOM (P) has no

AC of S for CMO, G7 and AC of S for Education and Training, G8 as well as

 48

REO in its approved TOE. All of these offices are very important; significantly

it will cover the Civil Military Operations, the training and real estate

requirements of the unit. In addition to the needed offices, one significant

point noticed by the participants is the absence of a Command Training

School unit. This unit is very important because there is a need to improve the

skill competency of each and every soldier knowing that IMCOM (P) is a

highly technical unit compared to other PAMUs. All participants in the KII

highly recommended that the Command should have its own dedicated

Training School while having its reorganization. During the interview with

Commander, NIC, PN he also mentioned that NIC has no training school as of

this time and all personnel were sent to different training schools of the PN

purposely to enhance their skill competencies; thus complying with the

training requirements for their personal advancement in the service. It was

mentioned that these problems are being considered as part of the TOE

revision in the years to come.

In the next FGD conducted through Video Tele-Conferencing (Zoom),

MAJ BAUTISTA from G3PA, mentioned that the one of the issues in the

approved TOE of IMCOM (P) is the misalignment of units like SSC and 9PED.

He also emphasized that SSC should be at the first level unit of IMCOM (P).

This was also supported by the result of Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with

the former and incumbent Commanders of IMCOM (P). They both

acknowledged the problem that there is indeed a misalignment of units,

specifically the SSC and 9PED. The finding of misalignment of units was even

confirmed by MGEN BAÑAS during his interview. He mentioned that SSC

should not be under HHSB being the same level of command for both units.
 49

Another finding that came out during the research in terms of the

organization of IMCOM (P) is the not inclusion of some units like Command

Real Estate Office (CREO), Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Military

Operations,G7, Assistant Chief of Staff for Education and Training, G8, and

the Command Training School to name the few. All of these offices and units

were not included in the Table of Organization and Equipment as approved by

the Higher Headquarters. This particular finding was also raised by MAJ

BAUTISTA during the second FGD and was even supported by MAJ SUELLO

of G7PA representative, stating that IMCOM (P) should have a Civil Military

Operations (CMO) office on its TOE. CPT CABALLERO of G8PA

representative also mentioned that since IMCOM (P) is a Command, it should

have a G8 and Command Training School that will cater its training

requirements. During the conduct of KI with the Commander of NIC, PN, he

was asked if the unit has a training school which caters the training

requirements of the unit and its personnel. He responded that it was also one

of the many problems of the unit, that is, how the unit will train their personnel

on the skill competency requirements. The current setup does not reflect the

Training School. The same is true with the statement of MGEN BAÑAS that

the TOE of IMCOM (P) needs to be revised to include a G8 and Command

Training School during the formulation and review of TOE.

IMCOM (P) organization was crafted in compliance with the HPA

directive to immediately create a unit dedicated and capable of addressing the

BSSD problems of the PA and the AFP in general. The need to have a Table

of Organization as a requirement and attachment on the concept paper of

activation was immediate and important and Higher Headquarters provided a

 50

minimal organizational set-up in order to facilitate the immediate approval of

the activation. However, doing this created a problem on the current approved

TOE of the Command for having a misaligned unit and missing or lacking

several important offices and units. As stated by Higher Headquarters, TOE

review in order to have a responsive organization to address the BSSD

problem should be done after the approval. This will also provide the IMCOM

(P) Command staff and Higher Headquarters staff enough time to study and

assess the current approved TOE and be able to identify what is needed and

be able to come up with a good and responsive IMCOM (P) organization

ready to address the problems. With this, a good organization will be

approved by the leadership.

Training

On training as operationally defined here where the personnel of the

Command enhance their capacity and capability. The training requirement of

IMCOM (P) is very important as a newly activated PAMU. As stated in the

approved LOI Number 2, upon its activation, IMCOM (P) should immediately

undergo organizational training assisted by Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC) of the PA. During the FGD with HPA Staff Branch Chiefs, it was

mentioned that TRADOC had already completed the organizational training of

IMCOM (P) and had come up with assessment and recommendations.

Based on the data collected, IMCOM (P) completed the organizational

training the TRADOC, PA had conducted. This kind of training is very

important in certain units that have just been activated in order to align its

personnel to their mandated tasks and missions they have to accomplish. The

aforementioned training was conducted last 26 to 30 October 2020 by

 51

TRADOC, PA through its Training Analysis Center. Copies of the After

Evaluation report of IMCOM (P) Organizational Training were provided to the

researcher for reference. Accordingly, the result of the TRADOC assessment

to IMCOM (P) evaluation yielded a satisfactory remark with an 83.76% rating,

equivalent to a Training Readiness of R2. This assessment is timely and

relevant to the present research because it will help in the formulation of

recommendations. However, there are some areas in the training portion that

need to be improved as recommended by both participants and the

researcher. To be specific, the following are the findings of TRADOC, PA

during their assessment in the organizational training conducted by IMCOM

(P) as shown in the Table 1;

Table 1. Findings on IMCOM Assessment on Training (TRADOC, 2020)

Crafted Organizational Training Concept Plan and
POI is based on HPA Training Directive number 32
but not in accordance with existing HPA policies.
Curriculum or POI is not certified and not in standard
form.
POI crafted is a syllabus (no learning objectives,
competency lists and evaluation and assessment)
Findings
Alignment of Unit METL or capabilities to training
METL or objectives.
Not all members of the Training Directorate are not
IDT trained of have not undergone similar courses
Some members of the Training Directorate do not
have the relevant degrees or experience on the
training offered or conducted.

CPT CABALLERO presented during the FGD the results of the

assessment and provided the researcher the copy of the result. In another

FGD conducted, G8, IMCOM (P) mentioned that the unit is currently

conducting in-service training to all personnel. This is in support of the

organizational training they had conducted in order to fully capacitate all

 52

personnel on IMCOM (P) based on its capability requirements. He

emphasized the lack of a Training School for the command; a unit that will

implement and oversee the training programmed for the command.

During the KI with MGEN BAÑAS, he mentioned that with regards to

training, during his time, IMCOM (P) is currently in its infancy stage; that is,

there is a low training status for the unit not to disregard the effected of the

pandemic, COVID19, last year. Adding to this, he also mentioned that the unit

should continue to conduct its organizational training and further explore the

possibilities on how to improve the competency of all officers and personnel in

relations to BSSD functions.

On the other hand, BGEN BITONG during his interview mentioned that

the command had just completed the organizational training with a sole

purpose of empowering the personnel with necessary skills related to BSSD

functions.

The training is programmed to improve the skill of all personnel

assigned in IMCOM (P) to further increase the level of their competencies. As

a newly activated unit of the PA, it is expected that some personnel have low

capability levels in terms of BSSD functions. The goal of training aside from

basic soldiery is to introduce some personnel who are new to the units in the

mission and functions of IMCOM (P). As for the year 2021, the training plan

of IMCOM (P) personnel is directed specifically on the skill requirements of

every sub-unit. For MPBn, they are programmed to undergo in-service

training related to all police related subjects while 9PED personnel are

programmed to undergo in-service training related to engineering. On the

 53

other hand, SEB personnel are to be trained on skills related to security,

parades and ceremonies.

Skill competency is very important for a unit like IMCOM (P). As

mentioned by COL BELERAN, every individual assigned in the installation

command should possess the necessary skills that can easily adopt and

contribute to the accomplishment of the unit‟s unique mission. They should

have the necessary skills specific to the nature of their work. Accordingly, he

also mentioned that every member of the unit should be ready to perform any

assigned task other than basic soldiery. In the absence of training school,

every individual soldier is being sent to another training institution and

maximized the availability of training and materiel provided for them. In

addition, in service training is programmed to complement the knowledge and

skills acquired outside the unit.

There are 31 in-service training intended for different units of IMCOM

(P) to be implemented as reflected in the in-service training plan for 2021.

These are all trainings that will enhance and improve the unit and individual

skills of every soldier anchored in the training directive of HPA.

The need to have a training school was also mentioned by BGEN

BITONG during his interview. As he mentioned, IMCOM (P) is a unique and

peculiar unit that requires a unique and peculiar talent and skills in order to

accomplish its desired mission. This can only be achieved if there is a training

school that will cater the skills requirement of the command. As of the

moment, with the absence of the training school, he mentioned tapping the

services of schools that are available outside the military that offer skill

competencies at least related to the skill requirements of the command.

 54

TESDA as mentioned, can be one of the few schools that offer competency

courses that can be tapped for special skills like engineering related

competencies.

After its organization and activation, several personnel were assigned

to IMCOM (P). These personnel came from different PAMUs with different

skills and competency with mostly coming from infantry units with war fighting

as the only competency. As expected, the level of competency on BSSD

functions is low and with this, there is a need to enhance the competency

level of the Command especially its personnel. This is the very reason why

Higher Headquarters immediately conducted an organizational training to

IMCOM (P) as part being a newly unit with new core functions.

The just completed organizational training conducted by TRADOC, PA

provided the unit the opportunity to improve its personnel on their skills and

competency. The result of the training shows that there was a big

improvement on the Command in relation to its training readiness that reflects

a highly rating of Readiness Condition of R2 that is mission capable.

However, based on the result, there are some factors that need to improve in

order to further increase the training readiness level of the Command in order

to adopt the trending problems and requirements of the Higher Headquarters.

The number of trainings as reflected in the training program for 2021 will

eventually improve and enhance the training readiness for the next

succeeding year.

On the contrary, KII and FGD revealed that there is a need to have a

Training School in the organization of the Command. Training School will

provide the venue for the personnel to further enhance their level of
 55

competency. The Command can send personnel to undergo training on other

PAMUs and even in civilian schools. However, some training from other

Training Schools and institutions cannot provide the skill requirements of the

whole Command. In addition to the activation of the Training School, the unit

should be provided with competent instructors that are capable to educate all

personnel on BSSD related functions and duties of the unit.

Materiel

On materiel that is being operationally defined here as being the

equipment and supplies available that is needed by IMCOM (P) to perform its

specific mission. As stated in the previous chapter is the equipment and

supplies available that is needed by IMCOM (P) to perform its mandated tasks

and accomplish its mission. The result of FGD‟s states that, currently, IMCOM

(P) is conducting a Table of Equipment (TE) review in order to come up with a

comprehensive and detailed list of equipment and facilities that is needed by

the unit. The unit equipment fill up needs to be revised in order to compliment

what is needed by the unit. Based on the document presented by MAJ

AQUINO of G4, PA representative, equipment readiness of IMOCM (P) is the

weakest link of the unit with R4 rating. This was also supported by the

statement of MGEN BAÑAS that during his time, equipment fill up of IMCOM

was very low. The result of the interview with LTC TISON, proves that the

equipment fill-up of IMCOM (P) and even its IMB is low. Having a low

equipment fill up, the unit cannot fully implement and perform its mandated

task because of this reason. However, Higher Headquarters is already

providing the unit additional equipment to be able to increase its equipment

capabilities. COL ARBOLEDA, supported both the 2 previous statements of

 56

the KI‟s stating during his interview that the equipment and supplies of

IMCOM is limited.

Stated in the LOI Number 2, all equipment by transferred unit; 1st IMB

and 2nd IMB, ASCOM, MPBn, SEBn, SSC and 9PED, all of HHSG will be

transferred to IMCOM (P) upon its assumption of the units mentioned.

Additional Mission Essential Equipment (MEE) will be provided by Higher

Headquarters to augment the existing equipment that was transferred in order

to increase the equipment readiness. The same is with the Installation

Management Battalions (IMBs) that were already activated in the different

PAMUs in Luzon. Findings revealed that there is some equipment that was

retained by some PAMUs stating the reason that this equipment is very

essential and necessary in support to the performance of their mandated task

and in the accomplishments of their missions. Also stated in the LOI, all MEE

from units that were transferred to IMCOM (P) will carry with them the entire

primary and secondary MEE found in their inventory. This will be done

through transfer of property from one losing unit to the other. However, upon

completion of transfer, the units‟ equipment readiness remains low because

some of the PAMUs did not release some of their equipment, specifically the

mobility assets. Accordingly, this equipment is necessary and important in the

performance of their mandated task as the infantry unity of the PA. This issue

is one of the contributory factors that affect the low equipment readiness fill up

of IMCOM (P).

As a newly activated PAMU, it is expected that IMCOM (P) will be

experiencing the dilemma on equipment readiness as mentioned in the FDGs.

Document reveals that from a low 29% or R4 on equipment readiness during

 57

the time after its activation, it increases to 32% or still R4 (Not Mission

Capable) as reflected in the 4th Quarter 2020 Consolidated Equipment

Readiness Report 2020 submitted by the Command to CGPA. Although there

is a slight increase in the equipment readiness, its contribution to the overall

readiness of the unit is not enough to push the rating up. The low increase in

the readiness condition is due mainly because of the effect of TOE revision

currently being implemented. As always mentioned in all conferences, related

to this issue, Higher Headquarters (G4PA) made an assurance that it will

provide all needed equipment to further increase the overall equipment

readiness of the unit.

The study revealed the low equipment readiness of the Command

specifically focused on the equipment fill-up. It was expected that all the

losing PAMUs like the 2nd ID, 5th ID, 7th ID and 9th ID will comply with the

instructions that all the equipment of HHSBn of their unit will be turned over to

IMBs. However, some PAMUs consider retaining their equipment to them

because of the necessity and also importance of the said equipment in the

accomplishment of their missions. Considering also their low equipment

readiness fill-up contributed to their decision to retain the said equipment.

Higher Headquarters is require to provide additional capabilities in

terms of equipment to IMCOM (P) even after its activation aside from

considering the transfer from PAMUs. However, this idea did not materialize

because of the existing policy of “scrap and build” of DND. Added to this, is

the non-approval of capital outlay that limits Higher Headquarters to procure

large major items and equipments.

 58

Another reason for the low equipment readiness condition is the

transfer of these equipments from PAMUs to IMCOM (P). As of this research,

the conduct of inventory of equipments has not been completed that affected

the transfers of the above mentioned to IMCOM (P). The long and tedeous

process largely contributed to the transfer.

Leadership

Leadership describes the leader‟s attributes and core competencies

that focus on education, training, experiences, and development (Waters G.

A., 2013). Leadership is also one of the critical factors to be considered on

the DOTMLPFP domain in assessment of IMCOM (P) capabilities. LOI

Number 2, it states that,

“Key positions shall be filled up based on the proposed IMCOM's (P)

Table of Organization (TO), Current Officers and Key Non-Commissioned

Officers (NCOs) of the absorbed units shall form the core of the IMCOM (P).

Additional Officers and Key NCOs shall be reassigned to IMCOM (P) to

capacitate the unit in performing its mission.”

In the statement of BGEN BITONG in his interview, he clearly stated

that leadership in terms of AFPOS should be much less of concern

considering the fact that what is important is the skill of officers assigned to

the unit.

During the interview with COL BELERAN, he made that at present the

unit is manned by a 07 rank or Brigadier General based on the approved TOE

for NIC, PN. He made a comment that the position of the Commander should

have an at least 08 rank or Major General rank in order to have a level of

power and authority with the other Commander counterparts.

 59

On the other hand, one (1) respondent during the KII reveals that

IMCOM (P) has competent Officers and senior NCOs in response to the

Leadership portion of the DOTMLPFP domain. Accordingly, LTC TISON

states that with relation to leadership, IMCOM (P) have some well-trained and

qualified officers that presently handled the command. Its commander and

Staffs, the same as its sub-units officers are well qualified, trained and

possess commendable leadership even though they come from units with

different competency requirements as IMCOM (P). The other informant states

that, currently, leadership in all levels for IMCOM (P) as of this time is

sufficient enough to perform the unit‟s mandate and to accomplish its mission

of solving the BBSD problem of the PA.

With this, HPA Staffs were tasked to provide and fill-up the leadership

requirement of IMCOM (P) based on the rank requirements for the officers

and the same is through with the personnel having related skills to the

required position. However, Higher Headquarters assigned officers and

Enlisted Personnel (EP) coming from different PAMUs not considering the

AFP Occupational Specialization (AFPOS) of the officers and the Military

Occupational Specialization (MOS) of the EP. Looking at the approved

manning of IMCOM (P), the majority of AFPOS requirements for officers are

either Engineer Officer or Logistician Officers with some positions and

designations requiring APFOS and MOS immateriel. Despite this, HPA did not

give much attention to the AFPOS of officers being assigned to IMCOM (P)

but rather focused on the filling-up of the position. This is the same through

with the EP of the unit.

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Another concern being raised is that, as stated in the approved TO, the

rank requirement for Deputy IMCOM (P) is 06 or with a rank of Colonel. This

has been noted that the Deputy Commander of IMCOM (P) should be at least

07 for he is the officer next in line in the Command that represents the

Commander in his absence. The leadership concerns raised by one of the

respondents regarding the TO requirement for Deputy Commander is based

on the fact that being the second in Command, Deputy Commander of

IMCOM (P) should be at least having an 07 rank or Brigadier General as its

equivalent. As one of the inherent duties of the Deputy Commander is to

perform the duty as a commander in the absence of the Commander, his rank

should be at par with the current situation in the HPA. He will be representing

the Commander in all activities and engagements having the Commanding

General PA (CGPA), the Vice Commander (VCOM) PA and the Chief of Staff

(CS,) PA as its stakeholders. In addition, his command is extended up to the

different PAMUs location with 08 ranks or Major General being the

Commander of PAMUs.

The assignments of officers and EP to IMCOM (P) having an AFPOS

and MOS other than infantry is another issue taking into consideration the

skills and competency requirements of the unit. As mentioned, IMCOM (P)

should be with officers that are heavy on engineering and logistics when the

BSSD competency will be the basis of assignment. However, he clarifies that

IMCOM (P) also needs infantry officers and other AFPOS other than the two

mentioned competencies mainly because there are also other functions that

need to be addressed. The unit cannot do away with infantry or any other

AFPOS because MPBn, SEBn and SSC are all part of the BSSD functions of
 61

IMCOM (P) that needs different skills and competencies other than

engineering and logistics. As of this time, the primary concern of the unit is to

fill up the gaps on its personnel fill-up and later provide training that will

develop and capacitate all personnel with the assurance that they are ready

and capable to perform the BSSD functions as mandated by the higher

headquarters.

Personnel

Personnel being the fundamental and most important element of

IMCOM and considered as the most potent force behind the performance of

the unit (Alvaran, 2018). Personnel are one of the very important aspects to

be considered in a newly activated unit. In fact, this is usually the weakest link

in relations to the operational readiness of the unit with equipment readiness

as its competition. In LOI Number 1, it was stated that personnel of the units

transferred to IMCOM (P), SEBn, MPBn, SSC and 9PED, shall form the core

organization of the command. As also stated in the directive, all personnel,

resources and equipment of the transferred unit will be carried over to

compose the personnel requirement of IMCOM (P). However, based on the

just completed activation of IMB‟s in the Luzon, some personnel were not

released by different PAMU‟s leaving the newly activated IMB‟s a low

personnel fill-up in their roster of troops. Justification from the PAMU‟s states

that, as much as they wanted to release the personnel to IMCOM (P), the

units itself also in dire need of personnel in order to accomplish their mission

in their respective Area of Responsibility (AOR).

 62

On the report submitted by IMCOM (P) on the personnel readiness

condition of the Command, it was revealed that the current Readiness

Condition of IMCOM

Based on COL ARBOLEDA, IMCOM (P) is lacking personnel into a

higher degree basing his statement in the low personnel readiness fill-up in

the JRRS report submitted in the 4th quarter of 2020. Accordingly, the

proposed revision of the unit‟s TOE is also one of the contributory factors on

the low personnel readiness as reported.

In the interview with LTC TISON, he stated that at present, the

command is lacking competent personnel especially its sub-units that will

perform the mandated tasks as required by the units in the installation or in

camp. He added that despite this, the unit can still perform its mandated tasks

as expected of its supported units using whatever available resources

(personnel) the unit has.

The same problem exists in the INC, PN as mentioned by COL

BELERAN that the unit‟s personnel fill-up is low. He mentioned that other

units did not allow transferring their personnel to INC. Even if personnel are

allowed to transfer, the level of skill competency is low making the unit

unresponsive to the task required of them to perform.

The current personnel fill up of IMCOM, (P) is 61% or R3 (Partially

Capable) as expected from a newly activated unit of the PA. On the other

hand, it was mentioned by the other 2 respondents that as of this time,

IMCOM (P) had already several competent and skilled personnel, officers and

EP, ready and willing to support the unit in addressing the BSSD problem that

has been existing in the organization. The organizational training conducted

 63

provided all the personnel with a view and ideas on BSSD functions of the

unit. On the other hand, the unit will continue to provide all its officers and

personnel all the necessary and required skills as expected members of

IMCOM (P).

The current personnel readiness of IMCOM (P) is relatively low due to

low personnel fill-up. This is the result of the DND‟s guidance of “Scrap and

Build Policy” wherein the PA can activate a new unit based on the Future

Force Structure requirements having a condition of scraping another unit and

putting all resources including personnel to the newly activated unit. As a

specific guidance, the policy greatly affects the future plans of the PA resulting

to the reassignment of other personnel from different PAMUs just to comply

with the requirements of activation. The assignment of personnel to IMCOM

(P) with competency not related to the unit‟s mission that contributed much as

part in the low personnel readiness in the JRRS report, has long been noted.

However, Higher Headquarters need to satisfy the first very important

requirement of filing up the unit with personnel in order to slowly improve its

personnel readiness status. As mentioned during the two FGD, this situation

is just but normal considering that personnel are all coming from a unit with

different duties and functions than IMCOM (P). With the directive coming from

DND emphasizing the scrap and build policy became a very big contributory

factor in the filling of officer and EP of the unit. In view of the skill competency

of the troops assigned to IMCOM (P), the JRRS report reflects that the unit is

way beyond as expected.

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Facility

Facility being considered as a real property entity or key facility

consisting of command installations, building, a structure, a utility system,

pavement, and underlying land (Vicente, 2020). In relation to facility, during

the interview with COL ARBOLEDA, it was mentioned that some of the

facilities are currently being improved as it was in low condition when

transferred to IMCOM (P). LTC TISON, also mentioned in his separate

interview that the facilities being occupied by the command and its IMB‟s are

all old buildings which need to be repaired in order to be conducive to living.

As a newly organized unit in the area, it is expected that facilities are one of

the problems. MGEN BAÑAS reveals that the current facilities provided to

IMCOM (P) are poor.

According to BGEN BITONG, IMCOM‟s units in the field have better

facilities compared to IMCOM (P) Headquarters. He mentioned that IMCOM

(P) has no permanent Headquarters when it was activated and has been

transferring ever since when the area that is being temporarily occupied will

be used. The working condition of the officers and EP and all personnel is not

better considering that it is important to work in an office that is fixed and

permanent. The same problem is being experienced by INC, PN that some of

the facilities that were transferred to the unit are dilapidated as revealed by

COL BELERAN. When he assumed command, he immediately directed to his

staff to look into this problem and find ways to have it all improve in order to

provide a good working and living environment to their personnel.

During FGD using Zoom with the HPA Staff Chief of offices, it was

discovered that there is an existing issue between IMCOM (P) and HHSG in
 65

relation to who will be the Camp administrator of Fort Bonifacio. The confusion

created by this issue hampered the continued camp development and camp

management. Critical to this issue is the large number of “Tikas Projects” that

are to be implemented by the Department of Public Works and Highways

(DPWH) in the camp. This was confirmed by LTC LAROA, G3, PA

representative during the discussion.

And lastly, all FGD‟s and the three (3) KI all mentioned that the main

problem related to facilities is the delayed transfer of all booked facilities from

losing units to IMCOM(P). This will also create confusion and problems

related to repair and maintenance and most importantly with the release and

obligation of the Repair and Utilities fund.

One of the findings in DA, FGD‟s and KI‟s is the low quality and

dilapidated facilities provided to IMCOM (P) after its activation. Actually, the

HPA is not yet fully prepared with regards to providing the unit with a decent

Headquarters and facilities. As previously mentioned in the previous findings

that IMCOM (P) was “hastily” activated based on the immediate needs of the

PA and as reference with the guidance from DND. With the guidance of DND

to immediately create a unit that is dedicated to solve and address the BSSD

problems of the PA, Higher Headquarters immediately acted on the guidance

that also allowed General Headquarters (GHQ) to recommend the activation

of the unit to DND. DND in his part approves the activation of IMCOM (P) in a

provisional status. For this reason, HPA only provide IMCOM (P) with facilities

that are available as recommended by HHSG.

Accordingly, sub-units in the field like the 1IMB and 2IMB both have

better facilities. This is due to the fact that this unit has been in existence
 66

since 2016 under the Command of Army Support Command (ASCOM), PA as

their mother unit. With the long period of their existence, they each had

already established their Command Headquarters and were able to fixe and

repair existing facilities in the camps they were managing. However, the other

three (3) IMB‟s are currently in the process of improving their own facilities in

their own camps being managed. Accordingly, IMCOM (P) had a better

Headquarters as of this writing considering the repair and innovations that

was already implemented with the support coming from Higher Headquarters.

The issue of confusion as to who will have the authority to administer

Fort Bonifacio between IMCOM (P) and HHSG has long been considered until

this time. The problem of camp administration has been clearly solved. G3PA

representative provided Resolution Number 10-20 approved by the PA

Capability Development Board as approved on 30 July 2020 stating thereat

that HHSG will remain a Camp Administration of Fort Bonifacio.

And lastly, considering the issue, it was not clear when the turn-over of

facilities and equipment from the losing unit to IMCOM (P) will be completed.

As mentioned, there are already efforts that are being done to immediately

resolve the issue. Until such time that this issue is not being resolved,

PAMUs who had already being catered by the newly activated IMB‟s will still

have a problem in the repair and maintenance of the facilities located in their

camps.

Policy

Policy is being defined in this research, directs assigned tasks,

prescribed desired capabilities, and provides guidance for ensuring that

IMCOM is prepared to perform its assigned roles and responsibilities. Policy is

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being used in the absence of doctrine in the performance of the mandated

tasks and mission. There are some policies given to IMCOM (P) that became

the basis in the performance of their functions. For instance, as BGEN

BITONG mentioned during his interview, CGPA had already given his

guidance on how to manage and implement the functions of the unit and how

IMCOM (P) functions will work. This guidance is the very reference for

IMCOM (P) to proceed on the activation of additional IMBs in the remaining

two (2) geographical areas in the Philippines. On the other hand, the LOI

Number 2 also serves as the basis on how the unit will perform and how to

accomplish its mission in line with the CGAP‟s guidance and directives.

COL BELERAN, mentioned that there are policies and other related

directives that NIC, PN had been using as a guide and reference how the unit

will function and how it will accomplish its mission. This was also revealed by

one of the staff officer of NIC, PN when he provided the researcher

documents stating that the function, duties, responsibilities and mission of the

unit. Letter of lnstruction (LOI) Number 017-14 which is known as the

Establishment of Naval lnstallation Command is the updated documents that

are also being used by their unit.

COL ABOLEDA and LTC TISON both mentioned during their

interviews that there are policies and directive that direct or guide IMCOM (P)

on how it performs its functions. These are being reviewed to further improve

that could fully assist the unit in the accomplishments of its core mission.

MGEN BAÑAS made a very good critical comment with regards to

policy. He mentioned that although there is already an existing policy that

guides how IMCOM (P) will perform, in the part of lower units and PAMUs,
 68

there is some confusion as to who will perform the said functions. Policies

are currently being reviewed, to determine how IMCOM (P) could fully assist

operational PAMUs to focus on their core mission. As stated by one of the KI,

particularly, policy that defines the tasks of sub-units in rendering BSSD

functions is still to be clarified and needs to be ironed out in order to get rid of

confusion in doing specific tasks in the camp they are currently managing.

Additionally, the command relationship of IMCOM (P) sub units to its

supported units should be clear and possible supported by documents like

orders coming from Higher Headquarters. MGEN BAÑAS in his own view

states that policies are sufficient for the current tasks but it may still be

developed as the need arises.

Policies are being used to guide IMCOM (P) on how it performs its

BSSD role and how it functions as BSSD units of the PA. Policies provide the

Command a clearer view on how it will perform and conduct its functions in

attainment of its mission. The confusions that exist with regards to the

implementations of policies and guidelines between IMB and PAMUs are the

result of not having a clearer understanding of the current policies and

instructions. Higher Headquarters made sure that policies, directives and

instructions is readily available to support the Command and PAMUs on how

changes be made and how changes in functions be implemented.

4.2. Challenges of IMCOM as BSSD unit of the PA considering the

DOTMLPFP domain
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Doctrine

As previously mentioned in the findings in the current status of IMCOM

(PA), there has been no doctrine related to BSSD or Base Support Functions

(BSF) that will guide the unit in the performance of its mandated tasks and

accomplish its mission. According to MGEN BAÑAS and BGEN BITONG said

during their KI that having no doctrine is the very big challenge not only to the

unit had but also the whole PA as well.

Doctrine formulations is one of the very reason why there has been no

doctrine available related to BSSD functions that will be use by IMCOM (P) in

the performance of its functions. Considering the time requirements and the

funds needed to come up with a good doctrine is also considered as one of

the big challenge that Higher Headquarters needs to address. The support

coming from Higher Headquarters is crucial that will dictate the go signal

when to start the formulation of doctrine.

LTC CASTILLO when asked about what are the most common

challenges in developing doctrine, she provided the following issues;

a. Absence of full-time doctrine writers

b. Lack of “skilled” doctrine writers

c. As part of modernization program, doctrine development is

allocated a small amount of fund support.

MAJ BANOEY from Doctrine, Center, TRADOC, PA also affirms that

the current biggest challenge in their office is doctrine writing and the

availability of docrine writers. As of this time, there has been no available

personnel to focus their work on writing doctrines related to BSSSD functions.

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Added to this is the non availability of fund support that will support its

formulations.

The absence of full time doctrine writers contributed as one of the

challenges in the doctrine domain of the DOTMLPFP as mentioned in the

findings. This has been true ever since that the unit responsible in the

development of doctrine (Doctrine Center, TRADOC, PA) had their own

internal problem of lack of dedicated personnel to do the work. The absence

of skilled doctrine writers will result to the delay of formulation of doctrine. The

issue of lack of doctrine writers has been confirmed also by Maj Banoey,

Chief, Doctrine Development Center of the PA. According to him, all writers

are being hired based on the project requirement and civilian writers are not

included in the Plantilla of the Civilian Human Resource of the office. On the

other hand, Officers assigned there are exercise purely managerial functions

and their lack of experiences and lacked of training for the doctrine

development affects the doctrine formulation.

As mentioned, the limited fund allocated to develop doctrine is minimal.

This is another challenge to be considered in the doctrine development of

BSSD functions of IMCOM (P). This should have fuelled out the progress of

the work. However, if there were no funds to support the projects, tendency of

which is the relaxation of what is being done or it remains unaccomplished.

Organization

Based on the findings on the status of IMCOM (P) relative to its

organization as previously mentioned in the first research question, several

challenges come along the way most especially on the current condition of

unit being in an infancy stage so to speak. As mentioned, there is a need to

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improve the Table of Organization of IMCOM (P) based on the needed

requirements to function as BBSD unit of the PA. Improvement should be

integrated in terms of adding important units or offices that will cater a specific

function relative to BBSD. Finding out and identification of what units and

officers are important that possess a great challenge to the command and to

HPA as well.

As mentioned by LTC TISON, one of the challenges he mentioned that

there are some existing policies in the Higher Headquarters that prevented

HPA from pursuing a more improved and responsive BSSD unit. This limits

the HPA staffs from having a well organize and responsive unit.

In addition to the findings relative to the challenges that exist in the

organization of IMCOM (P) was revealed during FGD that the process of TOE

revision is a very tedious process. It was also mentioned that in order to revise

the Table of Organization, it needs to pass a very long process before it will

be approved.

In order to further support the study related to the organization, MAJ

BAUTISTA, the Chief Organization Branch of G3, PA during FGD mentioned

that one of the challenges is the delineation of BSSD functions between the

newly created IMB‟s and the PAMUs. There has been no clear definition that

will perform the said functions in the camp.

One of the challenges that were noticed by the researcher is the very

immediate need to revise the Table of Organization of IMCOM (P) as

revealed. The need to include some offices and unit that will functions to

support the BBSD requirements of IMCOM (P) is very important. Currently,

the command is on the process of having a TOE review based on what sub-
 72

unit is needed to further made IMCOM (P) responsive to the BSSD

requirements of the PA. With the guidance of the CGPA to immediately

implement the activations of the remaining IMB‟s in Visayas and Mindanao,

there is really a need to improve the organization based on the needed skills

and competency of the sub-units.

The approval on the revision of the TOE of IMCOM (P) is very tedious

and a very long process. This is due to the fact that TOE revision needs to be

studied based on the needs of the unit and able to be supported by

justifications from HPA different staffs and offices. Shown in Figure 6 is the

flow of process how to revise the TOE of an organization;

(Source: OG5, PA)

Figure 6. Force Structure Review Flow Chart

Accordingly, the approval of revision of TOE will entail an approximate

minimum of six (6) months passing different process through HPA TOE

Revision Board before the approval of CGPA. It will then be forwarded at

GHQ for study by the GHQ Organizational Planning Board before the

approval of CSFP. It will be endorsed by CSAFP to DND for SND‟s approval.

The process will end upon the approval of SND. In a normal process, it will
 73

takes about one and a half (1 ½) to two (2) years of process before it will be

approved.

Training

There are also some challenges that IMCOM (P) is currently

experiencing related to its training being a newly activated unit. Like the

doctrine and organization, lack of training relative to BBSD functions is the

main consideration and became a big challenge to IMCOM‟s leadership and

to the HPA leadership not to mention. IMCOM (P) as a newly activated unit

with special units that requires high skills competency to its personnel, it is but

important that to increase the competency level requirement and this can be

solve by training that will be conducted.

Skills development will be the primary considerations knowing the fact

that some of the personnel assigned to IMCOM especially in the command

headquarters that lacks training and skills in order to function as BSSD unit of

the PA. Skills development can be done in a training school, however the

command as discovered, do not have its own training school attached to its

organization based on the approved TOE which was also mentioned by

BGEN BITONG. This problem again contributed to become one of the many

challenges other than that listed and mentioned above. In addition to this,

MGEN BAÑAS mentioned and emphasized that in one of the challenges that

IMCOM (P) is currently facing after its activation is the lack of competent

trainers to further enhance the skill competencies. This should have been

included if the Training School existed in the organization.

As mentioned by COL BELERAN, the INC, PN had almost the same

functions with IMCOM (P) that requires skills and competency that challenges
 74

one of the current challenges it had. Accordingly, every soldier in INC, PN

should have a skill related to BSSD functions however majority of them had

no related background in their previous assignment. The same with IMCOM

(P), he states that how to train the personnel is the biggest challenge.

The problem of lack of skill competencies and how to train the existing

personnel of the organization is very challenging that requires thorough

considerations. As previously mentioned, the unit needs to enhance the skills

of each and every individual soldier and provide them knowledge on BSSD

functions to be able to perform according to its mission. However, the lack of

training school contributes to the challenges to the unit itself having the same

problem with INC, PN. To add more to the challenges, as a PA Major Unit, it

should have a staff that will supervise and plan the requirements of the unit.

The absences of AC of S for Education and Training (AC of S, G8) became a

big factor in this challenge.

In addition, using the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Number 20

also known as the Joint Readiness Reporting System (JRRS) as reference,

“states that the commander has the responsibility for developing a training

strategy that will maintain unit proficiency for all tasks that have been

designated as mission essential (Joint Readiness Reporting System, 2014).”

In the absence of the training school and Assistant Chief of Staff for Education

and Training, G8, commanders are still oblige to develop training plans under

specialized office or unit that will also implement the said plan. This training

plan should be composed of training requirements to include all sub-units plan

for training. The lack of training school and other staffs related to training does

not mean that the command will not provide the personnel the required skills
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and competency. It was clearly stated that the commanders should be

responsible in crafting and at the end implementing the training program of the

unit. The unit sends it personnel to other training schools outside the unit so

as to find ways to enhance the capabilities.

Materiel

Based on the research conducted, the biggest challenge the command

is now facing with regards to its materiel component in the DOTMLPFP

domain of capability assessment is how to increase the equipment and facility

readiness of the unit. Based on the 4th Quarter 2020 Consolidated Equipment

Readiness Report submitted by IMCOM (P) to HPA, as reiterated from the

previous findings, the current Equipment Overall Readiness of the unit is R4

or Not Mission Capable. See table 2.

Table 2. Equipment Readiness of IMCOM (P) 2020

It was clearly stated in one of the guidance in the LOI Number 2 that all

available resources, personnel and equipment of units transferred to IMCOM

(P) will be carry over to their new unit. Unit such as MPBn, SEBn, SSC and
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9PED complied with this directive however minimal amount of increase in the

overall Equipment Readiness Condition can be drew from this.

The scrap and build policy also affects the problem with regards to

equipment and considered as one of the few challenges IMCOM (P) is

currently experiencing. Higher Headquarters are constrain from procuring

additional equipment for IMCOM (P) preferably because the unit is not yet in

one of the consideration of concerned staff and was not included in the

budget planning in 2019. As a newly activated unit, it is expected that minimal

equipment and personnel fill-up will be the factors to be considered. Added to

the problem are the no capital outlay directive being implemented and the

long procurement process being undertaken by Higher Headquarters.

The low equipment readiness condition of the unit as reflected in the

4th quarter report of IMCOM (P) is a manifestation that Higher Headquarters

in not prepare for its activation. As previously mentioned in the earlier part of

this paper, HPA was obliged to activate IMCOM (P) as compliance to DND‟s

directive that is to have a dedicated unit to perform base support functions.

The Future Force structure already depicts the existence of IMCOM (P) as

one of the PA‟s unit to perform BSSD functions. However, based on the

current situation, priority of resources is currently being directed to field units

in order to support their operational requirements to end the internal problem

of the country. Since the command is not yet included in the bulk of the

logistical funds of the PA, minimal support is allocated coming from the

contingency fund of the logistic support. For the 2nd year after its activation, it

is expected that there will be some changes in the areas being considered

(equipment) as the unit had already crafted and submitted to Higher

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Headquarters the Mission Essential Equipment (MEE) requirement in order to

further improve the unit‟s capability. The budget section also included in their

Annual Plans and Budget (APB) for the next succeeding year the budgetary

estimates to repair the existing equipment to further increase the capability in

terms of equipment. Other facilities and building were also included and was

given due considerations.

The scrap and build policy that is also one of the major challenge to the

unit. As previously mentioned, although there was already a directive to all

PAMUs that all equipment of the absorbed unit will be carry over, some did

not fully transfer those equipment to IMCOM (P) justifying that these

equipment is also very important in the accomplishment of their mission in

their Area of Responsibility (AOR).

Leadership

Leadership has also been one the factor that faces a challenge in a

newly activated IMCOM (P). When the unit was activated, the pool of officers

who composes the unit came from the different PAMUs but majority from

officers in the HHSG rooster of troops. Analysis of LOI Number 2 states that

“key positions shall be filled up based on the proposed IMCOM's (P) Table of

Organization. Current Officers and Key Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs)

of the absorbed units shall form the core of the IMCOM (P). Additional Officers

and Key NCOs shall be reassigned to IMCOM (P) to capacitate the unit in

performing its mission (Sarsagat, 2019).” This was the guidance as stated in

the LOI, however the availability of additional Officers with competency related

to the function of IMCOM (P) became a big challenge.

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As stated by BGEN BITONG, he is expecting that the core of officers‟

competency that was assigned to IMCOM (P) are all engineers thinking that

the corps of engineers has the functional skills related to BBSD functions. To

add more, he also mentioned that the unit should have additional pool of

officers to be assigned to IMCOM (P) regardless of AFPOS. This is also one

of the challenge Higher Headquarters should look upon.

During a series of FGD‟s the same observations has been raised by by

LTC GANITNIT, G1, IMCOM (P) stating that some officers assigned in

IMCOM (P) are not engineers or logistician but rather coming from different

AFPOS. Adding to this challenge is the nature of the previous assignments

and the training of these officers did not have a direct connection with the

BBSD functions of IMCOM (P).

According to COL BELERAN, the big challenge NIC, PN is currently

facing is the previous assignments and the training backgrounds of availability

of pool of officers that being assigned to his unit did not aligned with the

required competency of the unit.

It was clearly stated that the officer requirements of IMCOM (P) should

be filled-up as necessary with competent and skillful officers who has a

background or at least related background to BSSD functions. Education is

important because this will capacitate the officers how they will function and

how will they perform on the position provided for them. However, Higher

Headquarters had difficulty in providing IMCOM (P) with BSSD trained officers

or any related courses at the least. PAMU‟s also had a problem with its

personnel fill-up most especially with officers wherein they are also in

shortage that also reflects low fill up in its JRRS report. To add, PAMU‟s are
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also hesitant to release it officers because they are also currently occupying

critical positions in their units. Complied to do so, they have to resort of

releasing an officer that are not fully utilized and not occupying critical and

sensitive position in their unit.

Personnel

The problem of personnel as previously mentioned is the personnel fill

up of the unit. As noted in the JRRS report for the 4th quarter 2020, it was

revealed that as of this writing, IMCOM (P) is only 61% fill-up (R3) or Partially

Capable unit. Because of the current problem that exists in the unit, the

challenge to the IMCOM (P) leadership and his staff is how to fill up the

personnel requirement of the unit. In addition, filling up is not as simple as it

is. Higher Headquarters cannot provide with additional personnel because of

the current personnel fill-up in the field is also low. Personnel requirement by

different PAMU‟s is also at high level considering the task and mission

provided to them.

MGEN BAÑAS made emphasis and give importance on the IMCOM

(P) personnel fill-up. He categorically made mentioned that filling up of

IMCOM (P) personnel is a very big problem. This was also made mentioned

by BGEN BITONG and COL BELERAN during their own separate KIs.

During the conduct of two (2) FGDs, LTC GANITNIT and G1PA

representative provided the same answers when asked about what are the

biggest challenge that have been foreseen in relations to the personnel fill-up

of IMCOM (P) that currently, the personnel readiness is R3 is partially

Capable. Solving the problem on low personnel readiness is one of the

challenges in the personnel section.

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In addition to this, according to the DND‟s directive dated 2019,

IMCOM (P) is provisionally approved pending its regularization. It was implied

that IMCOM (P) will remain in a provisional status pending reaching the R2

(Mission Capable) status of its readiness condition with personnel readiness

as its part. This issue had been one of the challenges to the Higher

Headquarters and to the IMCOM (P) leadership and staffs how to raise the

status as require being able to comply with DND‟s requirement prior to its

regularization as one of the PAMU.

Lastly, BGEN BITONG specifically mentioned that it is a challenge for

IMCOM (P) to convince Higher Headquarters personnel to at least allocate

more civilian employees with core competency in order to support the existing

personnel of the unit.

The challenge that has been raised in relation to the unit‟s personnel

became of the priority of IMCOM (P) leadership and staffs and even raised to

HPA level. The filling up of its personnel requirement is paramount and

immediate that will help in the unit‟s regularization as a PAMU. The scrap and

build policy of DND provided a big problem and poses a big challenge to the

PA as the PA leadership and the DND look at the activation of IMCOM (P) as

a solution to the current BSSD problem of the whole PA, the personnel

requirement was not thoroughly considered. With the current thrust of the PA

to increase the personnel fill up of the PAMU‟s in order to fast track the

internal problem of the country became one of the contributory factor on the

minimal number of personnel being release in order to comply to Higher

Headquarters directive. This became a hindrance in releasing personnel by

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PAMU Commanders considering the immediate needs of personnel in the

field.

The increase of the personnel fill-up of the unit by hiring competent

civilians with core competency related to BSSD is timely and significant. He

knows for the fact that the reassignment of military from other units to IMCOM

(P) is almost difficult considering the fact that PAMUs also are in dire needs of

personnel in the accomplishments of their missions. This is the reason why he

mentioned that IMCOM (P) leadership should challenge the HPA staffs and

should consistently follow for the approval of the proposal that will eventually

lead to its realization. Accordingly, it is easier to recruit civilian employees

than recruiting a soldier. It was even mentioned that hiring civilian employees

will benefits the command and will be less costly if financial requirement is the

concern.

Facility

Considering the facility, one of the challenges that were discovered

during the conduct of the research is the transfer of Personnel Protective

Equipment (PPE‟s) from PAMUs to IMCOM (P). As stated in LOI Number 2,

all equipment should be immediately transferred to IMCOM (P) upon its

activation. However, as of this writing, it was revealed that the facility and

other equipment have not yet been transferred to IMCOM (P). This was

revealed by BGEN BITONG. He states that as newly activated unit, it is

expected that the facility problem will also be one of the challenge that

IMCOM (P) is currently facing. He even mentioned that since its activation,

IMCOM (P) had already completed three (3) transfers for its Headquarters.

He even made mentioned that the command is having difficulty in the

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improvement of the facility because of the ownership issue. The issue has

been highlighted in the previous remarks by G4PA rep during one of the FGD

where camp administration became an issue between HHSG and IMCOM (P).

During KI with LTC TISON, he mentioned that being the camp

administrator of the Headquarters Northern Luzon Command (NOLCOM),

AFP, and the transfer of facility from NOLCOM to 1IMB has not been

completed. It has been a big challenge for IMB because there was confusion

especially on the financial requirements and funds allocation primarily on the

conduct of repair of facilities.

To add more to the challenges being mentioned, fund allocations is

also considered as one problem that IMCOM (P) is currently facing.

Difficulties in the transfer of funds intended for the repair and maintenance is

being experience because it has already been programmed in the Annual

Plans and Budget (APB) of NOLCOM in that case and the accountabilities

and responsibilities of the fund lies within them. This was also confirmed by

Col Beleran that the same issue also exists in the INC, PN.

As mentioned in the findings that one of the challenges of IMCOM (P)

relative to its facilities is the transfer of ownership from losing unit. There has

been a series of conferences and discussion conducted by OG4, PA focusing

on the transfer of of facilities to be specific however there are processes that

concerned unit is currently conducting. In addition, transferring of properties

from one property accountable officer to the other will take a series of

procedures that needs to be followed. The process requires long period of

time to accomplish. Knowing the time frame after the activation of IMCOM (P),
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the possibility of not accomplishing the tasks of transferring the property

accountability to IMCOM (P) is expected.

On funds, as revealed during the research, IMCOM (P) had a problem

on its fund support especially on the transfer from PAMUs to the Command

that is needed in the implementation of project as continuity to finish it. Being

a new unit, it is expected that budgets are not yet included on its Annual Plans

and Programs for the existing year. However, it was revealed that for the next

succeeding year it was already considered and the Command were already

provided with guidance in order to solve the mentioned concern.

Policy

In the absence of doctrine, policy became the guiding principles on how

IMCOM (P) will perform its tasks and accomplish its mission. As stated by

LTC TISON in his KI, there are series of policies and directives that was

provided by Higher Headquarters to PAMUs and IMCOM (P) before, during

and after activations but as of the moment, it seems that it was not fully

understand by concerned unit most especially the PAMUs. There was an

unclear interpretation of these policies that made it a challenge to IMCOM (P)

and to the other unit concerned.

Based in the document presented by NIC, PN, as of this time, policies

and directives are being used by the Command. Accordingly, the same

problem with IMCOM (P) is present especially in the interpretation of all the

policies. According to MAJ LAPADA, one of the challenges is the unclear

interpretation of policy of both units. Delineation of functions of HHSG and

IMCOM (P) is also one of the challenges that became a product of the issue

being contested. Last January a committee meeting was conducted by

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FRODC, G5,PA chaired by G5 himself. The decision was to put the existing

policy in abeyance because HHSG is not ready to fully turn over the camp to

IMCOM (P). The challenge now is to when HHSG will transfer the BSSD

functions to IMCOM (P) as required from them by the LOI.

The policy is being used as the guiding principle of IMCOM (P) on how

they will perform their tasks and functions. For instance, the issue being

raised in the previous concerns, HHSG and IMCOM (P) had a problem with

the policy that was published as guide how the transfer BSSD functions in

Fort Bonifacio. There was no clear functions as to and when the transition will

be conducted. The issue has been also experienced in the IMBs as the

PAMUs are also in confusion on who will perform such other functions. As

mentioned, this had been noticed by Higher Headquarters and as of this

report, some series of inter-unit coordination is being conducted to clearly

explain and clearly defines each and every function of the two units.

The confusion on the policy of immediately transfers the facilities and

equipment had also been one of the causes of having delineation in the

functions and mission of the Command and the PAMU‟s. The issue of the

repair and maintenance of facilities in the camp was not clear as to who will

implement the said activities. In the early activation and transfer of unit to

create IMB‟s the current repair and maintenance fund is still part of the

PAMU‟s budget allocation for the current year. The fiscal capacity and fiscal

requirements in order to obligate and liquidate the support is still in the

purview of the PAMUs that leads for them to hold the funds. The solution of

transferring the funds is one of the solution however, the time requirements to

do the process is long and tedious.

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4.3. Recommendations that can be drawn in order to address the

BSSD problems

Doctrine

Based on the research conducted, the result of the FGD reveals that

the recommendations had been provided to further improve the capability and

responsiveness of IMCOM (P) on how it will address the BSSD problems that

currently exists in the Command. From the KIIs, it is obvious that they

recommended that a doctrine manual should be formulated in order to have a

single reference on how IMCOM (P) and its sub-units to further support the

recommendations. The three FGDs conducted came up with a suggestion that

as a new functional unit of the PA, the organization should come up with a

doctrine focusing on the BSSD functions of the unit. In some documents

studied, emphasis were given on the importance of doctrine so as for those

who already had, it is also highly recommended to conduct assessment and

revision if necessary.

In order to come-up with a good output on doctrine development, result

of the three methods; DA, KII and FGD, highly recommends the hiring of

qualified and credible doctrine writers coming from civilian source.

Although it requires long period of time and a critical mind in order to

come up with a specific doctrine related to BSSD, the result of the research

highly recommended the formulation of a doctrine manual specifically on

BSSD functions. IMCOM (P) being the only unit that is performing BSSD

functions should be the aggressive in pushing this plan that will beneficial to

the command in the future. The frequent conduct of FGDs and coordination
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with Doctrine Center, TRADOC and other concerned staff offices of the PA is

also equally important so as to maintain the continuity of the project.

As mentioned, hiring of very credible and professional doctrine writer is

paramount. The PA should look into considerations that doctrine writing is a

skill and doctrine should be written by people who are capable and proficient

in this field. Not to underestimates the capabilities of the officers and NCOs

assigned of doing the task, however the civilian effort is necessary to augment

the existing resources the Center have. And most importantly, the stint or

duty of officers in the Center is short sometimes leaving the project hanging

passing it to the new officers that resulted to the restart of the project from the

very beginning.

Fund requirements should also be one of the considerations. Aside

from requiring long period of time, doctrine development requires fund support

in order to move forward and conduct the process otherwise; again, this

project will be put on hold while waiting for the fund support. How IMCOM (P)

coordinates with concern offices and units is the deciding factor to consider in

this recommendation.

Organization

LOI Number 2 provides temporary organization for IMCOM (P) in order

to initially perform its tasks and mandate upon its activation. During FGD at

Headquarters IMCOM (P), CPT PEREZ recommends the conduct of TOE

review and subsequently come-up with a good proposal of the revised TOE

which was also seconded by MAJ LAPADA. The same recommendations had

been proposed during the second FDG that was conducted online through

zoom meetings. This idea also come up in the result of the KIIs conducted to
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several active and retires officers. Both the current Commanders of IMCOM

(P) and NIC, PN highly recommends the need to revise the TOE based on the

actual needs of both units.

TOE revision is necessary for IMCOM (P) as a newly activated unit

addressing the BSSD problems of the PA. Its organization is unique and

special compared to the organization of other units. Emphasis on the revision

of the TOE should be a priority stating the fact that accordingly, the unit is a

special unit with peculiarity that needs peculiar skills to address the BSSD

problems of the whole PA. It was obviously noted that the formation and

conceptualization of the units‟ organization was done hastily as he mentioned

to come up with a proposed TOE in order to comply with the intent of the

leadership of having a unit capable to address the existing BSSD problems of

the PA. Emphasis on the importance of review as a basis on the revision so

as to have IMCOM (P) officers a full understanding of what is really required

from the Command to function in accordance what is desired. Proper

coordination with TRADOC and OG3, PA in order to come-up with a good

proposal was highly recommended to his staffs and sub-ordinate units.

Realignment of some sub-units was also recommended and as part of the

TOE reviews consideration in order to level and correct the positioning of sub-

units so as not to create confusion in the future.

Training

In order to further improve the skills and competency of the unit and its

officers and personnel, the training requirements should be satisfied. Majority

of the KIs during their interview reveals the importance of skill competency

and can be done through trainings. As examined, IMCOM (P) being

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considered as one of the PAMU of the PA should have a primary staff that will

plan and recommends best practices and solution in the enhancement of skills

of every member of the command. With this, it was highly recommend that

command should have its own staff that will cater the training problem of the

individual soldiers based on their MOS. To implement the plans, it was highly

recommended also that a Training School should be included and be one of

the priorities to be activated in the ongoing TOE revision proposal. With this,

in the absence of both, it was highly recommended that the command should

come-up with a good training plan for the next succeeding years to capacitate

the personnel on the skill requirement as they function as BSSD unit of the

PA. Inter-agency coordination is also highly recommendation so as to further

enhance the skills and competency of the whole unit.

Basing on the result of the research, it was evident that the command

does not have a dedicated office and unit that will cater the training and

education of the officers and personnel even including the civilian human

resource. The challenge is how to enhance the skill competency of the

command and its personnel, knowing the fact that there was no one to do the

job. Although included in one of the functions of OG3, it is hard for the office

to focus on the training functions and how to conduct the said trainings. With

this it was highly recommended to create the Office of the Assistant Chief of

Staff for Education and Training, OG8 to rely focus on addressing the training

problem of the command. It is also highly recommended that a Training

Scholl will be activated to cater the actual training needs of the command. As

one of the PAMU, the command should have a training school of its own

specializing on the skill requirement as important on the accomplishments of

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the mission. Training school should recruit capable and highly competent

instructors in every MOS requirements of the personnel.

Materiel

The materiel requirement of IMCOM (P) is high, knowing the fact that

its equipment readiness status is low. BGEN BITONG and MGEN BAÑAS

stated the importance of equipment to the whole unit considering the high

requirements of the PA. They both recommend that IMCOM (P) should be

provided with equipment necessary for the performance of its mission.

Accordingly, both stated that this problem be included in the ongoing TOE

review and should provide a better revised TE for future use.

The immediate transfer of the equipment from PAMU to IMCOM (P)

should be immediately facilitated and completed so as not to create confusion

on both units on the functions needs to be performed. All members of the

FGDs suggested that the concerned staff in the PA and in IMCOM (P) should

be facilitate the transfer of the equipment to IMCOM (P) in order for the later

can immediately execute the necessary functional requirements in compliance

to HPA‟s guidance.

The increase in equipment readiness lies on the support Higher

Headquarters will provide to IMCOM (P). As such, the fund requirements are

important as initial steps to further increase the materiel requirements. Both

KII and FGD suggest that IMCOM (P) should come up budgetary

requirements that will be submitted to OG4, PA for their perusal that will

provide them the list of important equipment that the office can easily support.
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The transfer of equipment as part of the instruction as stated in the LOI

Number 2 is very necessary so that IMCOM (P) can fully exercise its freedom

of actions in dealing and performing its assigned tasks and mission. With this,

the issue of confusion will be avoided and clear ideas on the functions of

IMCOM (P) will now be defined. The transfer of this equipment will provide

huge connection in the ongoing TOE revision being able to identify what is

needed to enhance further. Having this done, the command will be able to

formulate a plan how to improve its capability in relations to its equipment and

other materiel things so as to come along with the revision of the organization.

It was also being recommended that IMCOM (P) should have a clear

list of materiel requirements forwarded to concern office in the HPA. This will

eventually help the above mentioned office on their future planning and be

able to identify what is needed by IMCOM (P) based on its importance and

urgency.

Leadership

Assignment of competent and skillful officers to IMCOM (P) is equally

important with others domain. As such, during the FGD, it was recommended

that the OG1, PA should assign officers with skills related to BSSD function to

further capacitate the command in performing its functions. In addition, if

necessary, as recommended by MGEN BAÑAS and BGEN BITONG, in the

absence of availability of officers having an AFPOS relevant to the BSDD

functions, reassignment of officers having different AFPOS can be consider

for not sub-units position to include the staffs, requires engineer and

logistician officers. In order to address the problem of having no related

background or training related to BSSD, the both recommend that training is

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necessary to capacitate the said officers in their related functions. As such,

officer fill up is temporarily the primary concerns of the unit to further increase

it personnel readiness status.

Reassignment of officers with corresponding AFPOS as required in the

TOE is difficult especially other units are currently having the same problem

and sentiments having a low personnel fill-up. As such, there is a need to

carefully study who will be reassign to IMCOM (P) based on the assessment

of the unit on their officer fill-up and based on the position the officers concern

are currently occupying. The dilemma of this is one unit will be filled-up but

another will lower its personnel readiness condition. This has been the

problem especially with the Higher Headquarters guidance of scrap and builds

policy.

Personnel

Based on the KIIs and FGDs, it was highly recommended that the

Higher Headquarters should prioritize the reassignment of personnel to

IMCOM (P) to fully capacity the unit as one the PAMU. In not fully increase

the fill-up BGEN BITONG recommended that the command is considering

hiring of civilian personnel to augment the current state of personnel fill-up.

As such, this will temporarily solve the personnel requirements in terms of

manpower. This idea has been supported by MGEN BAÑAS as he highly

recommend the same strategy two problems with just one solution, maintain

the personnel readiness condition of PAMUs and at the same time increase

the man power requirements of IMCOM (P). The same idea had been

mentioned by COL BELERAN, considering hiring civilian for NIC, PN to

augment the man power requirement of their unit.

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Another recommendation common is the idea of outsourcing some

administrative functions of the command. However, limited portion of the

camps should be the consideration knowing the fact that some parts of the

camp are off-limits to civilians because of security considerations. However,

COL BELERAN disagree with the idea unless otherwise we had already solve

the insurgency problem of the country then maybe it is important to do the

proposal.

The recommendation of recruiting highly skilled personnel by Special

Enlistment to perform the highly technical functions of the command is being

proposed.

Personnel requirement of IMCOM (P) is critical to its functions because

man power is important. The current policy of scrap and build hampers the

Higher Headquarters plan to fully fill up IMCOM (P) in full swing knowing the

fact that other units losing the reassigned personnel will be affected if ever.

Like the officers, personnel became also one of the problems. With this, the

first option is to reassign personnel however it did not fully materiels as

explained earlier. The next recommendation mentioned is the hiring of

additional civilian human resource to augment the current and existing fill-up.

In this way, the source of man power to increase the fill up is not only limited

to Enlisted personnel but to the proposed augmentation. This will also one

way of helping the AFP in ballooning problem in the pension requirements of

the retirees.

The proposal might also be one of the solution in the low personnel fill-

up in the field. The intention of hiring civilian manpower is to eliminate the

traditional practice of using military personnel performing administrative

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functions such as maintaining camp cleanliness, drivers and errand

personnel. This can be perform by civilian man power with less financial

requirements and no pension require after their services. Personnel will be

sent back to the filed units and perform functions and duties based on the

MOS they had.

The last recommendation provided by the KIIs and FGD members is

the outsourcing of other non-critical base support functions. This concept had

been a practice in one camp in Quezon City where the management of gates

in the camp is been provided by civilian contractors. This augments the

civilian human resource requirement of the camp. However, they are being

close supervised by the Military Police for smooth implementation of camp

rules and regulations. In the PA, the maintenance of Army General Hospital

(AGH) is being performed by civilian contractor with military personnel

focusing on the management and supervision of the whole Hospital. In

another instance, the maintenance and cleanliness of the PA Grandstand is

now being done by a civilian contractor who undergone the process as

required by the law.

Facility

For the facilities, the same findings had been found to currently exist in

the current status of IMCOM (P), the pending turn-over from PAMUs to

IMCOM (P). This has also been acknowledged by all KKI‟s and member of

the FGDs conducted. As revealed by MAJ AQUINO of OG4, PA is currently

on the process on how to implement the turn overs as required in the LOI

Number 2. With this problem, it was recommended that the office concerns of
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the PAMU should focus and facilitate the immediate turn over or transfer of

facilities to IMCOM (P).

It was also recommended by MGEN BAÑAS and BGEN BITONG that

HPA should provide fund support to further improve the facilities in the camps.

This is to further come up with a living quarters and officers that are conducive

to work and live. To add, there should also be a standard design so as to

have uniformity in all camps on the facility existing thereat.

Lastly, the big challenge now is how to improve the facility readiness of

IMCOM (P). As previously mentioned, the facility readiness of the Command

is relatively low.

With the current problem, the recommendation of having an immediate

transfer of facilities to IMCOM (P) from PAMU is very important. As previously

mentioned, there had been already confusion on the performance of a base

function on who will do and when we will do it. Take for instance the, problem

in Fort Bonifacio. One year after IMCOM (P) was activated, there was no turn-

over of facilities had happened despite the reminders that turn over should

immediately be done after activation. With this, there has been a confusion

that is currently in-charge on camp security and camp maintenance and

cleanliness. However, it has been already resolve based on the resolution

provided to both units. Even up to this time, IMCOM (P) has no permanent

Headquarters yet.

The immediate transfer of facilities will also provide ideas to IMCOM

(P) on planning its repair and maintenance plan identifying priorities to be

repaired. The command can include the facilities in their Annual Plans and

Budget Program providing and allocation fund support to the identified

 95

facilities. The documentary requirements in obligating and liquidating fund

support will no longer be a problem and without confusion. The transfer will

also increase the Facility readiness of the Command considering that all the

facilities will contribute to the improvement of the said readiness status.

 CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents the summary of findings and analyses; the

conclusion and recommendations which are related to the study derived from

the data presented in the previous chapter is likewise presented. At the end of

this chapter, an Action Plan and Project is also presented to illustrate the

implementation of strategies and interventions being identified.

5.1. Summary of Findings

Based on all the data gathered from DA, KII, and FGD, the following

findings can be best summarized as follows;

There was no written doctrine that would guide IMCOM (P) how it

performs and functions as a BSSD unit of the PA. However, in the absence

of written doctrines, policies, directives, and written instructions coming from

Higher Headquarters is being used as reference to guide the Command into

performing its functions. In lieu of the absence of any written doctrine,

however, is the general acceptance of practices conducted by both officers

and personnel of the unit which were deemed beneficial and effective to the

betterment of the said unit; these practices, detailed and analyzed in the

previous chapters, were subsequently adopted by the unit to address BSSD-

related problems concerning the PA and itself.

In the current organization, there has been a misalignment of sub-units

like the SSC and 9PED which lack important offices and units. This is due to

the reason that the approved TOE was formulated just to comply with the

requirements as prescribed in the request for the approval of activation. As

recommended by all the KIIs and members of all FGDs that IMCOM (P) in
 97

coordination with concerned offices and units should start the TOE review in

order to determine what units and offices need to be realigned, created, and

activated. TOE revision should come up with good recommendations for the

approval of Commander, IMCOM (P) prior endorsement to Higher

Headquarters for approval.

On the training, the completed organizational training conducted by

TRADOC, PA increases the training readiness of the Command from R4 that

is Not Mission Capable to R3 as Partially Mission Capable as shown in the

result as presented to the Commander of IMCOM (P). The training enables

the Command to provide training to all personnel prior to the full functions as a

BSSD unit of the PA. The list of programmed training activities of the

Command for the succeeding year will further increase the training readiness.

The activation of the Training School will also help in the improvement of the

competencies of the troops.

With regard to the materiel domain, the equipment readiness of the

Command is low and is considered as one of the weakest links in the JRRS

submitted for the period of 2020. The guidance of “Scrap and Build” policy of

DND and the No Capital Outlay being implemented largely contributed to the

low equipment readiness of the Command. The slow transfer of equipment

from PAMUs to IMCOM (P) also affects the rating.

On the leadership portion, some of the officers assigned to IMCOM (P)

were not AFPOS-qualified in contrast to expectations that all assigned officers

should either be an engineer or a logistician coming from different units.

However, the problem is being addressed by assigning the above mentioned

officers to some units that require AFPOS immateriel. In addition, officers are
 98

also included in the organization training for them to have appropriate

knowledge and understanding on the BSSD functions which they are going to

perform for the accomplishment of the unit‟s mission.

Personnel readiness is low due to the fact that personnel came from

PAMUs where personnel requirement is also high. The “Scrap and Build”

policy of DND also affected the personnel-readiness rating of the Command.

Added to this are the low personnel fill-up of PAMUs preventing them from

releasing a bigger number of personnel allowed for transfer. Recruitment of

additional personnel through regular and special enlistment, hiring of civilian

resources that are BSSD qualified and outsourcing several no-critical works

and locations are being recommended.

Accordingly, the conditions of the facilities transferred to IMCOM (P)

are low. The improvement of the said facilities is paramount in order to have

decent and improved spaces for officers and enlisted personnel to include

their dependents. Critical for this problem is the approval of the request for

funding intended for the improvement and repairs of the dilapidated facilities.

And lastly on Policy, Higher Headquarters provided the Command

policies that will help it perform its function while doctrine formulation is being

conducted. There had been little confusion with regards to the interpretation

of some policies and directives; however, these had been addressed by

proper coordination and explanation of concerns units.

5.2. Conclusion

Based on the data gathered through DA, KII, and FGD, the study came

with the conclusion that IMCOM (P) is not fully responsive to address the
 99

BSSD problems of the PA. The identified problems in the DOTMLPFP

framework affected significantly the capability of the unit. The immediate

compliance to the directive of creating the Command constituted also in the

current status in terms of capabilities.

The current leadership of IMCOM (P) recognizes the gaps and

limitations of the unit; however, accordingly, the approval of the activation

triggers the need of not only complying with the directive but should be viewed

on the perspective of the need of the PA and the AFP on the purpose of

having the unit. The BSSD problems in the PA, most especially on the

military reservations, are likewise being managed by the Army. The

increased number of illegal settlers who are occupying not only military

reservations but portions of camps are indeed alarming. Adding to the

problem is the perfection of ownership of all military reservations. Having

IMCOM (P) as the unit of the PA that is capable to address the mentioned

problems, will surely solve the long existing problems on all aspects of base

support functions.

5.3. Recommendations

In order for IMCOM (P) to accomplish its mandated tasks and become

more responsive to the needs of the PA in addressing BBSD problems, the

following are being recommended to answer the problem and challenges

discovered as provided in research question number 2.

Based on the findings and analyses of the study, the following

recommendation has been developed to further improve the current status of

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IMCOM (P) in order for the unit to become more responsive in addressing all

the BSSD problems of the PA.

The unit should implement the BSSD Capability Enhancement Program

in order to strengthen the capability of IMCOM (P) by doing the following;

a. Creation of Technical Working Group (TWG) in order to

develop a doctrine. This TWG will be composed of officers from IMCOM (P)

and from Doctrine Center, TRADOC, PA with a sole purpose of coming up

with a doctrine or manual specific to the functions of IMCOM (P). Being the

guide of the unit on how to perform its functions, doctrine should be written so

as to have a written document that will eventually be used as reference in the

near future. Lessons learned and good practices should also be included,

hence they are already tested and proven. Developed doctrine should also

be assessed in order to determine its applicability and should be restudied in

order to come up with a better and feasible reference. In the absence of

doctrine, policies should be first developed that will provide a clear and

understandable concept on how to function as a BSSD unit of the PA. This

will also provide uniformity in all units of IMCOM (P) so as not to be confused

with other functions provided for them.

b. Formulation of policy manual. In the absence of a clear

doctrine, formulation of policy manuals is important. This will replace doctrine

in its absence that will guide and assess IMCOM (P) in performing its BSSD

functions. Policy manuals should be clear to be easily understood and

implemented.

c. TOE revision and restructuring of IMCOM (P) organization

and its sub-ordinate units. The current structure of IMCOM (P) as analyzed
 101

is not fully responsive to the needs of HPA stating the fact that it is lacking

units that are very important. The inclusion of the AC of S for Education and

Training, G8 that will oversee and plan all the training requirements of IMCOM

(P) to further capacitate all personnel in the function of BSSD is very

necessary. This should also be followed by the activation of Command

Training School as the functional unit of G8. The creation of the AC of S for

CMO is also important so as to have a dedicated office that will come up with

plans and recommendations related to CMO operations. The creation of the

Command Real Estate Office that will cater the real estate problem of the

whole PA must not be forgotten. Other units and offices can also be

recommended depending upon the result of the TOE review being conducted

so as to determine their necessity. Part of TOE revision is also the activation

of Command training school and recruitment of qualified trainers. As one of

the PAMU, IMCOM (P) should have its own Command Training School loaded

with highly skilled and highly qualified trainers with competency on BSSD

functions. The establishment of the training school will increase skill

competencies of the personnel as they engage in a special assignment of

helping the PA solve the existing BSSD problems.

d. Finalize the Table of Equipment and work towards its

revision. In line with the revision and restructuring of the TO of IMCOM (P), it

is important that the Table of Equipment (TE) should be also revised and

should come up with a final list of equipment that is very necessary to the unit.

This should be in accordance to the new structure that has been approved

and should undergo a series of discussions and brainstorming in order to

come up with a holistic list necessary to the performance of the functions and
 102

most importantly to the accomplishment of the mission. While conducting the

TO review, Higher Headquarters should continue to fill-up the materiel

requirements in order to slowly capacitate IMCOM (P) in terms of its materiel

requirements.

e. Recruit more Officers, Senior NCOs and additional

personnel. IMCOM (P) was activated to address the current BSSD problems

of the PA. Other functions of IMCOM (P) require special skills and unique

capabilities in order to accomplish it. In order to do this, the Command should

be well equipped and heavy on its officers and senior NCO‟s. Higher

Headquarters should provide the Command with enough leadership that will

guide its personnel how they will perform their functions in consonance to their

competency. It is expected that Higher Headquarters will act on this however

it is also expected that competency will be a big problem. In order to solve

this, seminars and schooling should be conducted in order to enhance

leadership as part of its competency training.

For personnel, additional fill up should come from other skilled

units like the Corps of Engineer and ASCOM. Priority of assignment from

other units should be implemented by Higher Headquarters. In regular

enlistment, recruitment should focus on the capability and skills in addition to

the standard criteria for recruitment.

f. Continue the Recruitment Plan of personnel through

Special Enlistment. As previously mentioned, IMCOM (P) is a highly skilled

unit that requires special skills and a high level of competency. As such,

recruitment should not only settle on the standard mode of process but rather

should focus on recruitment of highly skilled applicants. As mentioned,

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IMCOM (P) is a peculiar unit that requires no ordinary skills and capabilities.

As such, available applicants with such aligned peculiarity in terms of skill

should be the priority and having no such skills available in the regular

recruitment, special enlistment with special mode of recruitment should be

implemented.

g. Outsourcing of human resources to augment the military

personnel conducting BSSD functions. One of the problems that were

also mentioned previously is the low personnel fill up of the command. As

such, this problem largely affects the performance of the functions of the

Command that surely delays the accomplishments of the mission.

Outsourcing human resource is highly recommended to augment the available

personnel resources to fully capacitate the command in performing such

functions. This will fill the gaps in personnel and human resource

requirements of the command. As such, this will also help in the ballooning

pension problem of the retired sector as the benefits of the outsourced civilian

human resource will be the burden of the company where they were hired.

h. Facilitate the immediate transfer of PPEs from PAMUS to

IMCOM (P). This should be done immediately after activations of sub-units.

As stated previously in LOI No.2 that all resources should be carried over by

the activated unit as the initial equipment of the newly activated IMBs. This

will also prevent confusion on who will do the needs to be done on repair and

maintenance of the facilities.

i. Standardize and continue the construction of additional as

well as improving the existing facilities. One of the BSSD functions of

IMCOM (P) is the maintenance and repair of building facilities. As such, the
 104

Command should continue the construction of additional facilities in all camps

so as to further improve the quality of working environment and the living

conditions of all the personnel. Furthermore, the Command should come up

with a standard modular design in all facilities to be constructed in order to

have uniform completed projects in the future. This should be done through

coordination with concerned offices in HPA and to the civilian sector such as

the DPWH. Likewise, HPA should already have a final decision on the

permanent locations of bases and camp based on the approved strategic

basing concept of the PA where improvement will be implemented.

j. Conduct of an Advocacy Campaign by going around the

different PAMUs. Advocacy campaigns are very important in order to

understand why IMCOM (P) was activated and how it functions as a BSSD

unit of the PA. This will further educate PAMU‟s on the purpose and mission

of IMCON (P) and how it is related to them. In addition, this will draw the line

and provide delineation between PAMU‟s functions and IMCOM (P) mission

so as not to create confusion between and among the two (2) units.

k. Request additional funds from higher Headquarters. Funds

have always been one of the factors that created problems and challenges. In

a newly activated unit like IMCOM (P), fund support is very important as part

of the factors that have a bigger contribution to the accomplishment of the

mission. Being in its infancy stage, HPA should allocate additional funds for

IMCOM (P) as it capacitates the unit. Although the fund requirement of the

Command was already included in the year‟s Annual Plans and Budget

(APP), the need for additional funds is necessary. Higher Headquarters must
 105

look into the possibility of considering IMCOM (P) as one of its priority unit in

terms of fund allocation.

In a lower level, transfer of funds from PAMUs that provided

allocations for repair and maintenance to IMCOM (P) should be immediately

processed in order to implement what is planned and be able to provide the

end user the required documentary papers for liquidation. After this, HPA

should allocate funds for repair and maintenance directly to sub-units of

IMCOM (P).

l. And lastly, sustain the momentum of activation of IMCOM (P)

in order to fully address the base service and support of all major army

camps. The efforts that were already provided in support of IMCOM (P) after

its activation should be provided with follow up. The gains that had already

been done should continue in order to force Higher Headquarters not to stop

providing support to IMCOM (P). As such, IMCOM (P) leadership should

continue its effort and have Higher Headquarters realize that IMCOM (P) is a

unit that needs to be provided with full support.

Shown in Table 3 is the summary of problems and challenges identified

from the analysis and the corresponding recommended solutions.

 106

Table 3. Summary of Challenges and Recommended Solutions

Challenges Recommendations
Doctrine
There has been no written doctrine 1. Develop and formulate a doctrine
available to guide IMCOM (P) in and policy manual
performing its tasks, formulation is 2. Study the doctrine of other
the biggest challenge countries related to BSSD functions
Organization
Lack of important units and offices TOE revision and restructuring of
IMCOM (P) organization and its
sub-ordinate units
Training
1. Lack of competency of personnel 1. Plan and intensify the conduct of
related to BSSD functions trainings
2. No Command Training School 2. Activation of Command training
3. Lack of competent trainers school and recruitment of qualified
trainers
Materiel
Low equipment readiness (R4) Prioritize and increase fill up of
MEEs to increase equipment
readiness
Leadership
Low officers fill up with BSSD Increase officers fill up and conduct
related trainings training on BBSD related courses
Personnel
Low personnel readiness (R3) Increase personnel fill up by;
1. Reassignment
2. Regular enlistment
3. Special enlistment
4. Hiring of civilian human resource
5. Outsourcing
Facility
Incomplete transfer of PPE‟s from 1. Facilitate the immediate transfer
PAMUs to IMCOM (P) of PPEs to IMCOM (P)
2. Standardize and continue the
construction of additional facilities as
well as improving the existing ones
Policy
Confusing policies related to BSSD Cascading of policies down to
PAMU level
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5.4. Action Plan and Project

Based on the recommendations provided, the Action Plan and

Programs (APP) is formulated purposely to strengthen the IMCOM (P) in

order to improve its current status into a fully mission capable unit of the

Philippine Army, to become more responsive in addressing the BBSD problem

of the PA and in support to the government efforts. Specifically, this APP aims

to improve the capability of IMCOM (P) to fully address the existing base

service and support development requirements of all major PA camps.

The realization of the APP could be accomplished through the

implementation of recommended projects that is very essential in achieving

the purpose. With this, the following recommended activities should be

recommended and implemented in order to improve the status of IMCOM into

a fully mission capable unit and responsive to the needs of the PA.

a. Creation of Technical Working Group (TWG). This is to review,

formulate and recommend responsive IMCOM (P) organization that is capable

to perform BSSD functions of the PA.

b. Conduct of seminars and workshops. This is to identify

problems and be able to come-up with good solutions applicable to the needs

of IMCOM (P).

c. Conduct of TOE review and revision. The purpose of this is to

come-up with a good restructured and formulated TOE for IMCOM (P)

responsive to the needs of the PA.

d. Implement the Special Enlistment Program of the PA specific to

the needs of IMCOM (P). This is to provide the Command the necessary

skills which are very important and significant in the performance of the BSSD
 108

functions. Selection should be carried out religiously in order to select

competent applicants.

e. Conduct of immediate transfer of PPE‟s. The immediate transfer

of all PPEs will improve the equipment and facility readiness of the Command

in order to become more responsive toe the BSSD requirements of the PA.

f. Policy review and formulations. This will provide the Command

an opportunity to review existing policies and be able to formulate new ones in

order to fully capacitate IMCOM (P) on addressing the BSSD problems.

g. Conduct of advocacy campaigns in order to remove confusions

between IMCOM (P) and PAMUs on the transfer of BSSD functions. This will

explain further to all units involved the real intentions of the creation of

IMCOM (P).

h. And lastly, conduct of sustainment program in order to protect

and preserve the gains of the activation of the Command. This will maintain

continuity on the efforts and gain of the activation.

The realization of the APP will be done with duration of approximately

two (2) years and require fund allocation amounting to P 475,000.00. To have

a better understanding of the fund requirements for the duration of the APP,

shown in Table 4 is the summary of fund requirements with corresponding

justifications;
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Table 4. Summary of Fund Requirements for APP

Activities Cost
Presentation of APP P 10,000.00
 Snacks 5,000.00
 Office supplies 500.00
 Communication Expenses 2,000.00
 Incidental/Miscellaneous 2,500.00
Expenses
Creation of TWG P 5,000.00
 Administrative Support 3,000.00
 Snacks 1,000.00
 Miscellaneous/Incidental 1,000.00
Expenses
Conduct of Seminars and workshops P 100,000.00
 Administrative Support 30,000.00
 Foods 50,000.00
 Communication Support 5,000.00
 Miscellaneous/Incidental 15,000.00
Expenses
TOE Review, restructuring and P 100,000.00
formulation 30,000.00
Adminsitrative Support 20,000.00
 Foods/Snacks 10,000.00
 Communication Support 20,000.00
 Office Supplies 20,000.00
 Miscellaneous/Incidental
Expences
Formulation and publication of policy P 100,000.00
manual
 Administration Expenses 10,000.00
 Office Supplies 10,000.00
 Snacks/Foods 20,000.00
 Printing and Publication 60,000.00
Conduct of immediate transfer of PPE P 50,000.00
 Travel Expenses 20,000.00
 Administrative Expenses 10,000.00
 Office supplies 10,000.00
 Miscellaneous/Incidental 10,000.00
Expenses
Conduct of advocacy campaign P 10,000.00
 Adminstrative Expenses 5,000.00
 Communication Expenses 5,000.00
Sustainment P 100,000.00
TOTAL P 475,000.00
 110

Presented in Table 5 in the next pages are the matrixes of major

activities, probable and identified potential obstacles and constraints with

the corresponding preventive or contingency actions with needed fund

requirements;
Table 5. Action Plan and Program Matrix
Expected
Person/ Potential Preventive/
Results/ Time Budget
Objective Major Activities Group Frame Obstacles/ Contingency
Success Requirement
Responsible Constraints Action
Indicators
Presentation of Com, IMCOM Author 7 Rejection of Review,
APP for (P) and CGPA days the APP restudy and
approval accepted and reassess the P 10,000.00
approved the APP
APP.
Creation of Orders were Adjutant, PA 7 Non- Designation
TWG issued days availabilty of of alternates P 5,000.00
officers
Conducts of  Identified and  IMCOM 30  Lack of  Close
seminars and reviewed the (P) Staffs days SMEs coordination
workshops requirements  HPA  Availability with SMEs
. Staffs of  Webinars
To strengthen  Solutions to participants P 100,000.00
IMCOM (P)
the problems  Covid
through
BSSD
identified pandemic
Enhancement
Program  Unit aligned
TOE review,
restructuring
and formulation
 Activation of
additional staff Completed
Unavailability
offices and IMCOM 90 Proper
of members P 100,000.00
 Strengthening responsive Staffs days coordination
of staffs
legal TOE
 Activation of
Training
School and

111
othe sub-units
111

114
Table 5. Action Plan and Program Matrix
Expected
Person/ Potential Preventive/
Results/ Time Budget
Objective Major Activities Group Frame
Obstacles/ Contingency
Success Requirement
Responsible Constraints Action
Indicators
Formulation Policy manual Approval and Proper P 100,000.00
and publication printed and IMCOM (P), Delayed coordination
of policy published OG3, printing with
manuals PA/OG5,/O 60 concerned
G7,PA/OG8 days offices
,PA/PA/TRA
DOC
Recruitment Recruited G1, IMCOM 180 Availability of Proper TBD
through quality and (P)/G1, PA days quota for coordination
To strengthen Special competent enlistment with
IMCOM (P) Enlistment soldiers concerned
through Plan offices
BSSD
Enhancement
Conduct PPEs properly Log Officers 60 Unreconciled Proper P 50,000.00
Program
immediate transferd to of IMCOM days data coordination
transfers of IMCOM (P) and with concern
PPE PAMUs/Res offices
Increased in ponsible
Equipment and Supply
Facility Officers
readiness

112
114
112
Table 5. Action Plan and Program Matrix
Expected
Person/ Potential Preventive/
Results/ Time Budget
Objective Major Activities Group Frame
Obstacles/ Contingency
Success Requirement
Responsible Constraints Action
Indicators
Conduct of Eliminated IMCOM (P) 30 Covid Conduct P 10,000.00
advocacy confusions on Staffs days pandemic online
campaigns BSSD situation advocacy
functions campaigns
through VTC

Request for Improved the G4, IMCOM 1 Availablity of Follow up TBD

To strengthen additional fund conditions of (P)/G4, PA year funds coordinations
IMCOM (P) supports for facilities and with concern
through repair and equipments office
BSSD maintainance
Enhancement
Program
Sustainment of Continued IMCOM (P) 1 Lost of with other P 100,000.00
activation gains of year priority concern
activation offices

113
114
113
 114

Proposal for Sustainability

In order for the proposed APP to be sustainable, there is a need to

have a full commitment coming from the Higher Headquarters‟ leadership

such as the DND, AFP and PA. There should be a collective and joint effort of

all stakeholders; HPA staff, TRADOC, PA and IMCOM (P) staff, and others

provided above in the table. The commitment also of concerned officers from

IMCOM (P) itself is very important for the continuous progress of the plan. In

addition, it is very important to engage all stakeholders in order to maintain the

momentum from the very start.

With regards to TOE review, the complete participation of all staff

members of IMCOM (P) is very crucial and important as they conduct their

constant TOE reviews and conferences. In order to sustain the gains for this

purpose, the OG3, IMCOM (P) should be very aggressive and very

enthusiastic in conducting the TOE review as frequently as necessary.

Most importantly, PA should support all the necessary fund

requirements so that the APP will have a full implementation. The full

commitment of HPA in terms of financial factors will support the APP in its

sustainability. The delayed or non-financial support of Higher Headquarters

will surely delay the implementation as it is very important to align with the

timeline provided based on the necessity of the APP.

Strategic Implication to Defense and Security

The activation of IMCOM (P) being the only unit that addresses the

BSSD problem of the whole PA including the two camps being occupied by

the two Area Commands; Northern Luzon Command (NOLCOM) in Tarlac

 115

City and Southern Luzon Command (SOLCOM) in Lucena, Quezon, is very

timely and crucial for the whole PA. As stated in the DPG‟s; 2018-2023,

2019-2024, and 2020-2026, the relocation of units is immediate in order to

prepare the whole Philippines in the imminent threats and danger being posed

by the current situation in the WPS. By this, it is the intention of the

leadership that as we shift from internal threat to external defense it is

necessary to align forces and their locations. However, leaving the current

camps and installations currently being occupied is not favorable for the

following reasons: firstly, it is owned by the AFP; second, others have

strategic values; and lastly, can be used as source of financial benefits that

will eventually add to the financial capabilities and requirements of the AFP in

the future.

The PA Future Force Structure requires creating additional forces in

consonance to the relocation of forces in order to adjust to the needs of the

external defense proposal. Shown in Figure 7 is the proposed PA Future

Force Structure for 2028;

Figure 7. Philippine Army Force Structure 2028 (Flores, 2020)

 116

With this, the APP will further improve the capability of IMCOM (P) as it

becomes one of the functional commands of the PA as it performs the BSSD

functions. This will surely contribute as the PA slowly implements its future

plans of shifting from internal to external defense providing the much needed

support of its territory if imminent danger will arise in the future. As the

territorial defense forces are on its capability build up, the Base support

functions can longer be their issues and concerns and their focus will be

directed already in the core functions of protecting the country and its

sovereignty.

Adopting the Development Academy of the Philippines‟ (DAP)

Framework of Development and Security as shown in the figure below, this

proposed APP will further support the governments‟ thrust combining good

governance, national development and security having the nation well-being

as its core principle. By doing so, this paper will help the national interest of

having good governance, productive, and prosperous nation in the future.

Figure 8. DAP’s Framework of Development and Security

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Suggestions for Further Studies

The result of the study provided the researcher a clearer view on the

current capability of IMCOM (P) and was able to identify the challenges it is

currently experiencing as of this time right after its activation. In line with the

findings or challenges, there are some recommendations and suggestions

coming from KIIs and FGD‟s that were listed and taken into consideration.

However, some of these recommendations require longer period of time and it

is necessary for the researcher to recommend such recommendations for

future studies. Listed below are some recommendations that need further

studies in the future;

a. Development of doctrine manual specifically directed on the

BSSD functions of IMCOM (P). This will provide guidance on how the

Command functions in the future.

b. Consider the increase in hiring of additional civilian workers to

further improve the personnel fill-up of the Command and its sub-units. Some

regular Enlisted Personnel especially with higher ranks should be re-assigned

back to the units in the field based on their MOS providing additional troops

thereat. This proposal will be beneficial to the organization and be one of the

solutions in the ballooning pension problem of the retired personnel.

c. Outsourcing the base support function requirements of the

camp. This has been one of the practices of other military organizations of

other countries. Manning of gates, cleanliness of unrestricted areas, janitorial

services and other services like office couriers, office drivers and errand

personnel can be considered in this proposal.

 118

d. Improve the TO requirement of Deputy Commander, IMCOM (P)

from O6 (Colonel) to O7 (Brigadier General). Being the second in command,

the rank of the Deputy IMCOM (P) should be in a level with other PAMUs

where the Deputies are O7 (Brigadier General).

5.5. My Leadership Journey

My journey started in a small barrio in a small town in the province of

Iloilo in Panay Island. Born from a simple family, with a father working as one

of the government employees in the municipal town that later resigned from

government service because of his ambition to become a Municipal councilor,

an ambition to serve his fellowmen in his town that had never been

accomplished. Born from a mother, who aside from being a housewife was

also a dress maker to augment the small income of my father just to raise the

family of four and be able to send them to college. Lucky for us, all four

siblings graduated from college as a fulfillment of our parents‟ dream of

providing us a good education while they both worked to support their

ambitions.

My military career started when I passed the Philippine Military

Academy (PMA) entrance examination in 1993. Having a little interest in the

military, I was already a senior student in Mapua Institute of Technology (MIT)

taking up a Civil Engineering course to fulfill my father‟s dream of having an

engineer in the family. Being the eldest and the only son, I had no option but

to follow and try to fulfill my father‟s ambition. However, everything changed

after passing the PMA examination. Although it is against my father‟s dream,

I had his full supporter as I tried my luck in the military. In 1994, I formally
 119

entered the academy and was able to hurdle the rugged training of

regimented life inside the portals of the institution. Being one of the eldest who

entered the academy at the age of 21, coupled with the desire to belong to the

Long Gray Line so to speak, I continue my aspirations and chose to become

one of the cadets of PMA. After four years of having a regimented life, I finally

graduated and belong to one of the prestigious classes of PMA, the “Masinag”

Class of 1998 having produced one of the living heroes the Academy has ever

produced as of this time, the most prestigious Medal of Valor Award.

As a young Lieutenant, I was assigned in the Bicol area being

designated as Platoon Leader and as Company Executive Officer. It was this

time that I had a full experience exercising my leadership skills and

competency. For several periods, I was tasked to command a platoon in a

very far-flung area having with me less than thirty personnel to man a

detachment. It was the first taste of being in the actual field environment

remembering and applying what I have learned in the Academy.

My first assignment in Bicol as platoon leader provided me the glimpse

of a true military officer‟s life in the combat field. How the Academy had

molded me became my basis and inspiration on how to deal with every critical

circumstance of being a junior officer. My training in the Academy became my

armor as I battled my ascent to the ladder of officership.

Being assigned in a distant location and having different positions with

different types of leaders molded me to become what I am today. My

previous assignments all over the archipelago from Luzon, Visayas and

Mindanao and my deployment in United Nations Disengagement Observatory

Forces (UNDOF) helped me become a better person, a better officer and a

 120

good leader. How I survived the rugged terrain as I traversed the path

towards my senior years tested my leadership capabilities and skills. As part

of my military life, I endured difficulties and trials addressing former

commanders‟ desire to serve them in the best of my abilities. Unknowingly,

this occasion had provided me with an aspiration considering them as my

mentors and leaders. What I have learned from them became my reference

to mirror them how I will lead my troops in my field of specialization.

Capturing their good leadership style and how they lead the troops in their

own unique way provides me insights and ideas how I will perform my

leadership ability that will lead to the accomplishments of every mission not

sacrificing the morale and welfare of my personnel. The good practices that I

captured from them became one of my listed priorities on how I will conduct

myself as a Commander and how I deal with the challenges I am facing and

the unit as well.

The training I had undergone locally and abroad further improved my

competency and skills as I perform my responsibilities as a Commander and

as a member of the AFP. Reechoing what I have learned provided my sub-

ordinates personnel including officers, the chance of having an additional

knowledge other than what they had learned in school. As a Commander, it is

my duty to capacitate them in any means so that they will be able to address

all difficulties in their future tasks.

To end, having joined the AFP Command and General Staff Course

Class 68 and Master‟s in Public Management Major in Development and

Security (MPMDEVSEC) Batch16 became an added opportunity in my

leadership journey for this provides me the chance to learn and at the same
 121

time to mingle and work with my classmates from other branch of service.

The bonding and camaraderie we developed even miles apart seeing each

other only in the wide screen of our laptop computers provided us the idea on

each other‟s journey. Even with the emergence and arrival of the pandemic

Covid19 that almost halted our desire of taking up the course added more

challenges in this journey. The desire to learn and gain friends never blocked

our way towards our very own individual endeavor. As we survive and

graduate in the both learning institutions, the very opportunity of having with

each other‟s group cannot deny us the fact that indeed both schools had

prepared us to be fit to command, capable to plan, and qualified to advise. As

our graduation is fast approaching, as we almost complete our journey in this

CGSC, I can now proudly say that I am now ready and prepared to start

another journey in my military career and hopefully to be able to command a

battalion in the near future.

Lastly, I would like to end this by a quote, “Every successful leader had

his own journey, trailing the rugged path to reach the top of success.

Reaching the top is not easy, it‟s either you travel alone or you travel with

someone that will push you up not with someone who will drag you down.”

Anonymous

This is my journey.
 122

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Ali, A. Y. (2013). Leadership Style and Teacher Job Satisfaction: Empirical

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(2014). Joint Readiness Reporting System. Quezon City: GHQ, AFP.

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doctrine.html.

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Contingency Procurement Part I. V.A.: Defense Acquisition University.

Spencer, J. (2016). WHAT IS ARMY DOCTRINE? Modern War Institute.

System, S. (2012). DOTMLPF-What is it? Soldiers System; An Industry Daily.

Terms, D. o. (2010). Joint Publication 1-02.

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Army, P. (2019, 07 31). Transfer of Base Support Functions from Philipiine

Army Major Units to Installation Management Command of the
Philippine Army. Letter of Instruction Number 02. Taguig City, Metro
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Concept Paper. (2018, December 7). Activation of IMCOM.

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Dargle, P. E. (2016). Garrison Leadership; Creating a New Paradigm. US

Army Wag College.

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the Philippine Army. Quezon City, Metro Manila, Ohilippines:
AFPETDC, AFP.

Santos, A. A. (2017). Strengthening the Army Artillery Regiments (AAR)

CAPABILITY FOR PHILIPPINE ARMY TERRITORIAL DEFENSE
DIVISION. Quezon City: AFP EDUCATION, TRAINING AND
DOCTRINE COMMAND.

Vicente, I. D. (2020). Strengthening the Capability of Army Leadership

Development and Education Center.

Alvaran, G. T. (2018). Responsiveness of the Army Management Center in

Sustaining the Ground Troops in Joint Operations. Quezon City: AFP
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Tangen, S. A. (2009). A Methology for the Quantification of Doctrine and

Materiel Approaches in the Capability-Based Assessment. School of
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Sumpter, B. J. (2007). The Evolution of the Installation Management

Command. Pennsylvania: U.S. War College
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APPENDIX A: List of Participants for Focus Group Discussion

Headquarters, Philippine Army via Zoom

MAJOR MAGAMAY – OG1, PA

MAJOR BAUTISTA – OG3, PA

MAJOR LAROA - OG3, PA

MAJOR AQUINO – OG4, PA

MAJOR VIERNES – OG4, PA

MAJOR SUELTO – OG&, PA

CAPTAIN CABALLERO – OG8, PA

MAJOR CADIZ – TRADOC, PA

LTC DELOS SANTOS - Moderator

Headquarters, IMCOM (P), Philippine Army Conference Room

LTC GANITNIT – OG1, IMCOM (P), PA

LTC DELOS SANTOS – OG2, IMCOM (P), PA

CAPTAIN PEREZ – OG3, IMCOM (P), PA

MAJOR LAPADA – OG3, IMCOM (P), PA

COL ROBLES - OG4, IMCOM (P), PA

COL AYCARDO – OG8, IMCOM (P), PA

MAJOR ANANA – REO, IMCOM (P), PA

MAJOR OTGALON – 5IMC, IMCOM (P), PA

COL FAJILAGUTAN – Moderator

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APPENDIX B: List of Participants for Key Informant Interview

MGEN BANAS – Former IMCOM (P) Commander

BGEN BITONG – Incumbent IMCOM (P) Commander

COL BELERAN – Commander, Naval Installation Command (NIC), PN

COL ARBOLEDA – Chief of Staff IMCOM (P), PA

LTC TISON - Commander 1st IMB, IMCOM (P), PA

LTC CASTILLO – formerly assigned Doctrine Center, TRADOC, PA

MAJOR GARGAR – OG5, PA

MAJOR LAPADA – OG3, IMCOM (P) PA

MAJOR BANOEY – Doctrine Center, TRADOC, PA

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APPENDIX C: Letter to Col Beleran, Commander, NIC, PN

15 December 2020

COLONEL NOEL D BELERAN PN(GSC)

Commander, Naval Installation Command
Naval Base Heracleo Alano
Sangley Point, Cavite City

Dear Sir,

Currently, I am a student at the Command and General Staff College, Armed

Forces of the Philippines Education, Training and Doctrine Command taking
the Command and General Staff Course Class-68. At present, I am
conducting a study on the Assessment on the Installation Management
Command and how will it address the Base System and Support
Development problem in the Philippine Army.

In line with this, may I humbly request for your support through an interview
with you as my key informant (KI) in my study being the current Commander
of the Naval Installation Command, Philippine Navy.

This interview aims to explore your experience as the Commander of the said
unit. Rest assured that whatever findings the research study will be treated
with the utmost confidentiality and will be utilized solely for this academic
paper.

If you wish to contact me, I can be reached through my mobile number,

09178696810.

Thank you very much sir and God Bless.

Very truly yours,

LTC GLOVEN B LEY (CE) PA

Student, CGSC Class-68
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RESTRICTED
Honor. Patriotism. Duty.
 130

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

LTC GLOVEN B LEY (CE) PA hails from a small town of Pototan in

the province of Iloilo. A pure-blooded Ilonggo, he was born on 24 May 1973.

He is a proud member of the Philippine Military Academy “Masinag” Class of

1998 with a degree of Bachelor of Science Major in Civil Engineering. Upon

his graduation from PMA, he was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant in the

Philippine Army on 9 March 1998. Immediately after graduation, he took up

the Engineer Officer Basic Course in Camp Tinio, Nueva Ecija. After finishing

the Engineer Officer Basic Course, he was assigned at the 2nd Infantry

(Jungle Fighter) Division, PA stationed at Camp Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal and

was deployed in the mountainous areas of Camarines Norte in Bicol Region.

His first eight years as young lieutenant was spent mostly in the Infantry,

having been assigned in the 16th Infantry (Maglilingkod) Battalion as Platoon

Leader and in the 80th Infantry (Steadfast) Battalion as Company Commander

both from 2ID. He spent most of his time leading the troops scouring the

mountains of Sierra Madre in Rizal and Bulacan and the mountains of

Occidental Mindoro. In 2005, he took up the Engineer Officer Advance

Course and immediately upon his graduation he was deployed in Central

Visayas in the 53rd Engineer Brigade. He was then assigned in the 552 nd
 131

Engineer (Eager Beaver) Battalion stationed in Camp Hernandez, Dingle,

Iloilo.

In 2009, he was sent to China to take up specialization course for ten

(10) months and after his return, he was assigned in the 9th Post Engineer

Detachment, HHSG, PA in Fort Bonifacio as Executive Officer. In 2012, he

was lucky enough to be one of the members of the 500 strong contingents of

Filipino Peacekeepers that was sent to Golan Heights and became part of the

United Nation Disengagement Observatory Forces (UNDOF) thereat. After

his return from UN deployment, he was assigned in 6th Infantry (Kampilan)

Division, PA stationed in Mindanao where he spent almost two years as

Special Staff to the Commander of 6ID. After his tour of duty in Mindanao, he

was reassigned again in 9PED as Commanding Officer for almost four (4)

years. During that time, he was also designated as Operations Officer, G3 of

the newly activated IMCOM (P) in concurrent capacity before taking up the

CGSC Class 68.

His assignment in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao earned him several

medals and commendations. He was awarded the prestigious UN Medal for

his great contribution as part of the Philippine Contingent to Golan Heights

and a Plaque of Appreciation by the Commanding General of the Philippine

Army for being an outstanding foreign student in the Logistical Engineering

University, Peoples Liberation Army in Chonqing, China.

LTC LEY is a member of the Kalantiao Masonic Lodge Number 187 of

the Free and Accepted Masons of the Philippines. Being a member of his

lodge, he never forgets to perform his civic obligations by helping other people

and by joining the Lodge civic projects.

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He is happily married to former MS MAE BARBARA V LANUZO and

they are blessed with four lovely daughters, Cleo Mae Anne, 25 years old

working as Branch Manager of a well-know international Coffee shop, Clarisse

Anne, 24 years old working in the Asia Pacific College, Claire Andrea 21

years old, a 4th year college student taking up Digital Filming at St. Benilde

and Claudette Andrea, 8 years old.