Twenty-First Century Philippine-American Security Relations Managing An Alliance in The War of The Third Kind

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Twenty-First Century
Philippine–American Security Relations:
Managing an Alliance in the War of the
Third Kind
Renato Cruz De Castro
Published online: 22 Sep 2006.
To cite this article: Renato Cruz De Castro (2006) Twenty-First Century Philippine–American Security
Relations: Managing an Alliance in the War of the Third Kind, Asian Security, 2:2, 102-121, DOI:
10.1080/14799850600710655
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Asian Security, vol. 2, no. 2, 2006, pp. 102–121
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN 1479-9855 print/1555-2764 online
DOI:10.1080/14799850600710655
Twenty-First Century Philippine–American Security

1555-2764
1479-9855
FASI
Asian Security,
Security Vol. 2, No. 2, April 2006: pp. 0–0
Relations: Managing an Alliance in the War of the

Third Kind
RENATO CRUZ DE CASTRO
Philippine–American
Asian Security Security Relations
Abstract: This paper examines the changing nature of twenty-first century Philippine–US
security relations. It notes that the alliance is against a non-state actor, and raises the possibility
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that this security arrangement might be difficult to maintain given its prohibitive governance
cost and the systemic nature of the threat. It also observes that the alliance has been plagued by
dissension between the two countries. In conclusion, the article maintains that these two allies
have compelling reasons to revitalize and maintain their security ties. They have also devel-
oped forms of cooperation to reduce the alliance’s governance costs, iron out their differences,
limitations and conflicting interests, and ensure that the partnership will remain functional in
the face of new and long-term security challenges posed by international terrorism.
Two months after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, US
President George W. Bush approved the participation of 200 American troops in a
two-and-a half-week joint exercise with Filipino forces. He also ordered the deploy-
ment of 190 Special Forces officers that would train the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) in counter-terrorism tactics. In January 2002, US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld announced the deployment of about 600 American troops in the Philippine
island of Basilan. These 600 troops would act as military advisers to the AFP’s South-
ern Command and would be based in the country for at least six months.1 Immedi-
ately, anti-American critics and left-wing groups in the Philippines vigorously
protested this planned deployment of American troops to Basilan and accused the
Philippine government of colluding with Washington in using the post-9/11 hysteria
to justify a heightened and more permanent US military presence in the country. They
warned the Arroyo Administration that the military exercise could become a bigger
and messier operation and could last longer than its six-month schedule.2 They also
viewed the deployment of American troops as part of Washington’s grand design to
strengthen its military presence in the Philippines and across Southeast Asia, which
diminished with the end of the Cold War and after the US military withdrawal of its
air and naval bases from the Philippines in the early 1990s.3
However, the protesters, critics, and analysts of the military exercise dubbed “Balikatan
02-1” missed a very significant point in the post-9/11 Republic of the Philippines (RP)–
United States security relationship – that it is different in many aspects from the old, pre-
1991 RP–US alliance. The US troop deployment in the Philippines was part of the second
phase of America’s war on terrorism, directed at denying al-Qaeda a new home base and
Address correspondence to: Renato Cruz De Castro, International Studies Department, De La Salle University,
2401 Taft Avenue, 1004 Manila, Philippines. E-mail: decastror@dlsu.edu.ph
Philippine–American Security Relations 103
access to human and material resources in Southeast Asia. Unlike the US forward deploy-
ment during the Cold War, the stationing of American troops in the Philippines was not to
secure major sea and air lanes in East Asia for the Western alliance’s trade and commerce.
Rather, the US forces were deployed to encourage and assist governments in neutralizing ter-
rorist groups that threaten their own countries and international security as well.
Most significantly, faced with a new form of global security challenge, the RP–US secu-
rity alliance subsequently shifted its focus away from state actors and toward terrorism
and the socio-economic conditions that engender it. This terrorist threat has basically
transformed the nature of the RP–US alliance. Terrorism is a form of a systemic threat or a
security challenge resulting from the cumulative effects of various international develop-
ments, and not from a state action that is purposive and hostile. This situation raises the
problem of the dynamics involved in an alliance between two states against a non-state
actor. Thus, this article examines how these two states are managing their security relations
against an amorphous and systemic security challenge like terrorism. It asserts that to
maintain an alliance against such a threat, both allies must expediently lower the cost of
governance by formulating the necessary policies to enhance their mutual benefits and to
prudently manage their political differences. Further, it explores the changing nature of the
RP–US alliance in the twenty-first century by addressing the following questions: 1) What
is the raison d’être of the current alliance? 2) How did this alliance evolve? 3) How are the
two countries conducting their alliance against a non-state security challenge? And, finally,
4) what is the future of this alliance against a non-state security challenge?
Managing Alliances in the War of the Third Kind

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pen-
tagon in Washington brought into the United States a form of warfare that has been
fought in the developing world since the end of the Second World War – the war of
the third kind. The war of the third kind is a form of political violence waged by orga-
nizations other than the state against state actors.4 It is a type of warfare waged either
between a state and some other organization or between two such organizations.5 This
strife involves adversaries that are asymmetric in capabilities, and the weaker side, the
sub-state actor, attempts to bring about political change by organizing and fighting
more effectively than its stronger adversary – the state.6
Terrorism is a form of war of the third kind. As a form of asymmetric conflict, ter-
rorism refers to the use of force for political purposes such as to create fear, draw
widespread attention to a political grievance, and/or provoke draconian or sustainable
response from the targeted state.7 Typical terrorist activities include indiscriminate
violence, armed assaults on civilians, political assassinations, kidnappings, hostage-
taking, and hijacking. As a form of violence, terrorism is differentiated from criminal
or random violence by the fact that the former is driven by political motives. Terrorist
groups generally challenge the state’s monopoly of violence and its ability to protect
its citizens. Terrorist acts gain political significance even if the motive for them is not
political but religious, criminal, or psychopathological.8 Terrorism is also distin-
guished from irregular or guerrilla warfare by the kind of violence terrorists conduct.
It seeks to bring awareness to a political grievance but rarely, if ever, results in its own
political change.9
104 Asian Security
Terrorism should be understood primarily in terms of its objective – propaganda. By

applying violence against their victims, the terrorists seek not only to coerce and kill but
more importantly to persuade others about the validity or rightness of their cause. The
immediate victim of terrorist violence is mere instrumental; the skin on a drum is beaten
to achieve a calculated impact on a wider audience.10 Thus, terrorism has often been
compared to a theater because it is a form of political violence staged to get the attention
of a wider audience. From the terrorists’ point of view, massive acts of terrorism (like the
9/11 attacks) are primarily directed at helping them achieve their media-centered public-
ity goals, and advance, in the process, some if not all of their political objectives. These
goals included catching the attention of their target audience, generating a wide discus-
sion of their motives, and achieving a global status of prominence for their leaders.11
Causing massive destructions in lives and properties, the terrorist attacks in the United
States were forms of propaganda since they were a “perfectly choreographed production
aimed at American and international audience.”12 The very act of causing massive car-
nage and killing innocent bystanders is calculated to generate a social shock wave and
send a political message that the state is unable to protect its citizens and vital infrastruc-
ture. Terrorism’s long-term goals are to weaken the socio-political fabric of a society, to
undermine a liberal-democratic regime, to provide a rationale for a government to clamp
down on civil liberties, and to exacerbate tensions among states. Terrorism presents the
international community with the following security challenges:13
1. Terrorism represents a form of a threat without threateners or systemic threat – This means
that as an international phenomenon, terrorism is the cumulative effects of actions taken
for other reasons, not from an intent that is emanating from a purposive and hostile state.
2. Terrorism is a chronic and long-term security challenge – States are generally used to
address acute and short-term security threats, such as war, not chronic security
issues like terrorism whose causes are prevalent today but whose consequences
could be felt tomorrow or years after.
3. Addressing terrorism may be neither cheap nor as unifying as dealing with tradi-
tional security threats like war – As history has shown, societies generally coalesce if
they are faced by wars. The threat of a war or a military invasion is both stunning
and unifying for a society. War would have united all the people against a clear and
present danger. This is not the case in confronting new security challenges like ter-
rorism. The people might be more concerned with other social problems, and
addressing terrorism would entail something very difficult to do in a society –
changing the behavior of people in numerous and trivial manners.
Terrorist groups operate through a series of networks and relationships that link
one terror group to another globally. Contemporary terrorist organizations are not
simply single and coherent political entities like nation-states. Rather, they are systems
with various elements, many of which are transnational in nature. An international
terrorist group is an amalgam of merchants, suppliers, heads-of-state, population frag-
ments, militants, and religious leaders sympathetic to the terrorist cause. It epitomizes
a security challenge whose root causes are traceable to the turmoil of a modern and
globalizing international society. Because of globalization, national borders have
become permeable while states have become more interdependent than ever. One
response to globalization has been to revert inward, to save traditional industries, cul-
ture and religion, and to expel foreigners and other cultural artifacts of globalization.14
Religion often becomes a powerful rallying point, providing some people a way to
define, restore, and reinforce their personal and communal identity that has been dam-
aged by globalization and modernization.15
Contemporary Islamic terrorist groups symbolize this discontent against global-
ization and its adverse societal consequences. Along with other generally peaceful and
reformist Muslims, Islamic terrorist groups refuse to accept and vehemently challenge
the current trends and distribution of power in the international system.16 They advo-
cate a return to the pristine purity of the early years of Islam. They also cling to a
romanticized notion of an Islamic golden age which they believe they could return to
if they were able – through terrorism – to transform their relationship with the West
into one of equality instead of subordination. Modern communications and technol-
ogy have increased the ability of these local terrorist groups and religious movements
to organize, coordinate, share ideas, and mobilize on a global scale. Communication
through the Internet, increased tourism, the emergence of an informal, international
financial network, refugee flows, and labor migration all make the organization of reli-
gious diasporas much easier and faster. Thus, modernization and globalization facili-
tate the construction and consolidation of religiously motivated terrorist groups
worldwide.17
Various radical Islamic groups are now linked by a complex web that enables them
to cooperate with each other, making it extremely difficult for states to target each of
these groups individually, one at a time.18 Terrorism might not be home-grown but
imported into a state by a non-state actor to sow violence in the targeted state. In some
cases, local terrorist groups are utilized as a war-by-proxy device by states unwilling
or unable to engage directly in armed conflict with the target state.19 Some local terror-
ist groups have even expanded their networks and operations to other states or regions
of the world. Terrorism becomes transnational as Islamic extremists look for interna-
tional symbols as targets, and when the desired politico-psychological impact of their
violent acts goes beyond the confines of their national sanctuary. Many diverse terror-
ist groups and extremist movements regularly act “in solidarity” as a global jihad or
under the banner of anti-Americanism to pursue common objectives or interests. Usu-
ally, members of these terrorist groups travel abroad to train recruits, to secure logis-
tics, or attack targets symbolizing their domestic cause or some broader global issue.
Al-Qaeda is a case in point. This terrorist group operates globally like a venture
capital firm – providing funding, contacts, and expert advice to militant groups and
individuals throughout the Islamic world.20 Consequently, the links between radical
Islamic groups in the twenty-first century are qualitatively different from the informal
relations that existed among European terrorist groups in the 1970s and 1980s.21 This
matrix of relationships among terrorists belonging to different groups makes the
threat of contemporary international terrorism more dangerous than ever.22 Like other
security issues in the twenty-first century, terrorism has evolved into a transnational
form of violence. In addition, its development as a cross-border, non-state, and net-
work-based phenomenon has simply undermined the general precept in the “realist”
106 Asian Security
international relations view that the most significant threats to global security emanate
from states rather than non-state actors.23
Waging a global anti-terrorist campaign demands a sense of common purpose
among like-minded states to strengthen their ties against any form of extremism and to
identify countries and societies that are havens for terrorist groups. The most immedi-
ate task for these states is to develop policy coordination, including military or com-
bined counter-terrorist cooperation on a particular regional security issue or on a
series of security-related or counter-terrorist measures. Such a campaign requires that
states work together through security alliances. As a form of interstate cooperation, an
alliance demands the states’ explicit declaration of intent to assist each other by coop-
erating militarily against other states.24 States form alliances – which are a form of
inter-state cooperation – primarily for the purpose of aggregating power, enhancing
the individual capacities of each member, either through a deterrent guarantee pro-
vided by a more powerful state, or increasing the allies’ own defense capabilities by
pooling their collective resources, abilities, and efforts in the process of creating secu-
rity relations.25 Allies usually combine their resources against a specific and common
enemy, usually another state, which may be more powerful than any of the allies indi-
vidually. A common alliance scenario brings together two weaker states expecting
mutual support against a stronger state that threatens them both. Alliances are against,
and only derivatively for, someone, or something – usually another state.26 Adversarial
relations against this state provide the raison d’être for alliances and alignments
between the opposing states. The greater the threat posed by the adversarial state, the
greater is the cohesion of the alliance.
However, an alliance against non-traditional security hazards, like terrorism, pre-
sents a major challenge for states. In addressing terrorism, for instance, states do not
face a common enemy in the form of a national, tangible, and more powerful conven-
tional military threat. Thus, states engaged in a counter-terrorism campaign do not
usually sign any formal alliance treaty. There is also no need for power aggregation,
deterrent guarantee, or massive pooling of collective resources as in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) or other formal alliances. Rather, states simply have to
demonstrate the willingness to work together, and develop the habits of cooperation.27
What is crucial is for the allies to develop policy coordination, including combined
military cooperation, on a particular transnational security related issue – terrorism.28
The willingness to work together and develop habits of cooperation against a non-
state security challenge is a function of two very important variables: the governance
costs of the alliance; and the management of the two countries’ political differences
resulting from their security interactions or alliance politics.
Any alliance entails governance costs such as the imposition of constraints on state
autonomy, the fostering of suspicion and mistrust even among the closest allies, the
formation of patterns of dependency, the creation of possibilities for defection, and
the development of opportunities for allies to push the burden of the alliance onto
their partners, to free-ride as much as possible, which is not a good basis for a harmo-
nious and lasting security cooperation. A close alliance can also involve substantial
domestic political cost to a regime in power, particularly if it entails the basing of
foreign troops that is perceived as an infringement on the sovereignty of a state.29 The
alliance’s governance cost is usually offset by the mutual benefits the allies can derive
from this joint security venture. Another thing that could undermine any security
cooperation is alliance politics. This pertains to major political differences or dissen-
sion usually afflicting any alliance. These disagreements may be caused by any of four
factors: muddled perceptions, stifled communications, disappointed expectations, and
paranoid reactions between the two allies.30 Alliance politics could be mitigated
through the proper management of this security partnership. Effective management
involves a delicate balancing act that develops the alliance’s capacity for mutual secu-
rity, and accommodation of the members’ different and converging interests in an
effort to minimize disputes and confrontation among or between them.
Revitalizing an Old Alliance

In the mid-1940s, the Philippines entered into a de facto bilateral defense arrangement
with the United States to address its immediate postwar defense concerns. It later con-
cluded a number of bilateral security treaties with its former colonial master that were
tight and comprehensive. The Philippines agreed to host major American naval and air
facilities with the signing of the RP–US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. Both coun-
tries became formal allies with the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951. They also
became members of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954. Gradu-
ally, however, the Philippines and the United States encountered conflicts of interest in
their security relationship. The most damaging of these problems was the slow dissipa-
tion of a common threat. This consequently led to a gap in the two countries’ security
perspective. On the one hand, Washington was focused on the evolving capabilities of
the Soviet Union in East Asia. On the other hand, many Filipinos thought that no major
foreign threat confronted their country and that domestic insurgency was the only dan-
ger to Philippine national security. This consequently led to a popular argument in the
Philippines that there was no national security need for the US facilities in the country
since they were of no use in dealing with the insurgency.
This cleavage widened as the Cold War ended in 1989. After nearly 11 months of
hard and tedious negotiation and bargaining, Washington and Manila forged a new
accord to replace the 1947 Military Base Agreement, the Treaty of Friendship, Coop-
eration, and Security or PACT of 1991. However, the Philippine Senate by a vote of
12 (against) to 11 (in favor) rejected the PACT on September 16, 1991. A year later,
Washington withdrew its forces from Subic Naval Base. In the aftermath of the with-
drawal, Washington significantly downgraded its political and military relations with
Manila by declaring that the United States could no longer guarantee the external defense
of the Philippines as American forces had lost a facility from which they could operate.31
The shocking events of September 11, 2001 gave a new impetus to the revitalization
of the RP–US alliance. Soon after 9/11, President Arroyo became one of the first Asian
leaders to declare support for Washington’s campaign against global terrorism. She
offered Washington access to former American military facilities in the Philippines,
and later issued a 14-stage counter-terrorism program to provide intelligence
exchanges with the United States. Manila used its offer of diplomatic and political sup-
port to Washington as a means to bolster the alliance which had been badly strained
by the withdrawal of American forces in 1992, and to put the Philippines back on the
108 Asian Security
radar screen of the Beltway’s policymakers. Washington, for its part, took immediate
steps to provide financial, military, and diplomatic assistance to countries supporting
the United States in the campaign against global terrorism.
The revitalization of the alliance was largely a result of dramatic changes in US for-
eign policy after 9/11. US policy toward East Asia was realigned as earlier priorities
became secondary to the overriding emphasis that redefines America’s foes and allies
on the basis of whether or not they support Washington in its campaign against global
terrorism.32 President Arroyo’s early and strong declaration of support for America’s
war on terror pleased the Bush Administration, which was seriously considering the
southern island of Mindanao as the likely second front for the US campaign against
terrorism in East Asia. Assisting the Philippines in its counter-insurgency operation
against the Abu-Sayyaf presented Washington a proving ground for an emerging facet of
the Bush Administration’s counter-terrorism strategy – supplying military hardware and

training to countries trying to bring domestic insurgents to heel.33 The Philippine
example could influence other governments to cooperate with the United States and
would prevent any future attempts by al-Qaeda to establish terror cells in Manila or
elsewhere in the country or in Southeast Asia.34 Some of the key strategic factors
behind the US decision to engage Manila in a revitalized alliance against international
terrorism are to ensure that the Philippines and Southeast Asia would not become a
sanctuary of terrorist networks, and to engage the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) in a cooperative security arrangement to address transnational
security challenges like terrorism, piracy, and human trafficking.35
During the Washington summit in November 2001, President George W. Bush and
President Arroyo reaffirmed the relevance of the 50-year-old RP–US Mutual Defense
Treaty in maintaining order and stability in East Asia. Both leaders also underscored
the importance of the alliance as a pillar of US forward presence in the East Asia,
which helps preserve strategic balance, and promotes prosperity in the region.36 Presi-
dent Bush also raised the prospect of sending American ground troops to Mindanao to
assist the AFP in its campaign against the Abu Sayyaf. President Arroyo, however,
declined the offer and instead told her American counterpart that the AFP would be
perfectly capable if it were provided the necessary equipment and counter-terrorism
training. President Bush then agreed to work for a ten-fold increase in US military
assistance to improve the Philippine military’s counter-terrorism capability, and to
advance the AFP’s modernization program.37
Wars of the Third Kind: The Philippine Case

In the 1970s, the Philippines experienced two separate, long-term insurgencies that
have cyclically flared and abated, resulting in more than 50,000 deaths. On the main-
land of Luzon and on several islands, the leftist National Democratic Front (NDF)
and its armed group the New People’s Army (NPA) mounted a major insurgency that
involved hit-and-run tactics, bombings, and assassinations aimed against the Philippine
state.38 In the southern island of Mindanao, the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) waged an ethno/religious insurgency intended to gain autonomy or indepen-
dence for the island. This insurgency, which began with sporadic clashes between
Muslim forces and the government, developed into full-blown pitched battles
involving nearly 15,000 to 30,000 MNLF fighters against the AFP in the mid-1970s. In
the early 1990s, both conflicts had largely petered out. During this period, the number
of communist guerrillas dramatically decreased from a peak strength of 25,800 in 1988
to about 14,470 in 1992, then further down to 6,800 in 1997.39 However, in the mid-
1990s, the moribund NPA membership swelled from 6,800 in 1997 to 11,930 in 2001.40
The number of communist insurgents’ firearms also increased by four percent annu-
ally since 1995 and the guerrilla fronts expanded from 58 in 1995 to 70 by the turn of
the century.41
At the same time, a more militant and religious-oriented secessionist group, the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) began mobilizing its forces for the creation of
Muslim Mindanao as an entity separate from the predominantly Christian Philippine
state. The MILF originated as a breakaway faction of the MNLF with a more pro-
nounced Islamic orientation. In 1996, the government signed a peace agreement with
the MNLF, which formally ended its 25-year armed struggle and paved the way to the
creation of the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development to oversee
development efforts in Mindanao. The MILF, however, believed that the only viable
solution to the Mindanao conflict was complete independence and the establishment
of an Islamic state.42 On the heels of the 1996 Mindanao peace agreement forged
between the Philippine government and the MNLF, heavy fighting broke out between
the AFP and the MILF. Excluded from the peace talks, certain MILF elements openly
promoted the waging of an armed struggle against the Philippine government and the
creation of a separate Islamic state as soon as feasible. In early 1999, the MILF and the
AFP began engaging in a number of full-scale combat encounters.43
In the aftermath of 9/11 and the consequent US-led war on terror, the Philippine
government has accused the MILF of collaborating with Southeast Asian transnational
terrorist groups, particularly Jemaah Islamiyah and the Abu Sayyaf. The MILF leader-
ship denied the charge, and it has continuously announced since 2002 that the organi-
zation was cutting off ties with all terrorist groups, paving the way for formal peace
talks with the Philippine government.44 The MILF set three conditions before it would
negotiate with the Philippine government: a) the talks should be mediated by the
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) or by an OIC member country; b) both par-
ties should comply with the terms of past agreements; and c) that the talks should be
held outside the Philippines.45 All three conditions were accepted by the Arroyo
Administration.
In 2001, the MILF signed the Tripoli Agreement on Peace with the Philippine gov-
ernment. The agreement provides for an incremental and piecemeal approach in the
peace negotiation as it emphasizes the crafting of confidence-building measures before
contentious issues of a political nature can be gradually resolved by both sides. The
agreement also lays down the modalities for the cessation of hostilities and the cre-
ation of restraining arrangements for the MILF and the AFP. To ensure that these
rules are observed, an International Monitoring Team (IMT), headed by Malaysia, has
been convened for deployment in the conflict-affected areas. Currently, both parties
have constituted various technical committees to resolve numerous pressing issues in
the peace talks. The two sides declared a major breakthrough in September 2005, after
reaching a consensus on the issues of ancestral domain or areas recognized as parts of a
110 Asian Security
Moro homeland. However, the on-going negotiation has been slowed as the two sides
got bogged down on the issues of the form of autonomous government for the Moro
homeland and the post-conflict status or settlement of the MILF guerrillas.46
Then in the late 1990s, a new Muslim insurgent group, Abu Sayyaf, staged several
spectacular high-profile hostage seizures in the southern Philippine island of Mind-
anao. The Philippine armed forces pursued the group members and engaged them in
fierce firefights.47 Abu Sayyaf advocated an Islamist agenda far more radical than the
one espoused by the MILF as it called for the establishment of an Islamic state gov-
erned by the Sharia.48 The group conducted a campaign of bombings, murders, kid-
nappings-for-ransom, massacres and extortions. Thus, its members were branded as
successful “entrepreneurs of violence.”49 This terrorist/bandit group was also able to
make connections with international terrorist networks, which drove the Philippine
state to commit enormous resources to ensure its eradication. Indeed, the Philippine
government’s involvement in this war of the third kind has become a classic case of a
continuing low-intensity conflict.
Alliance in the War of the Third Kind

The present security ties between the Philippines and the United States have assumed a
form totally different to their defense relationship during the Cold War era, which pri-
marily involved the stationing of forward-deployed American forces on Philippine
territory. Manila and Washington have taken advantage of the current convergence of
their interests (on counter-terrorism) to revive their longstanding alliance without
reestablishing permanent US bases in the Philippines. This revitalized alliance is pri-
marily aimed to improve the two countries’ capabilities in waging wars of the third
kind, and develop interoperability between the two armed services. Although the US
military has an honored legacy of special operations and low-intensity conflicts, its
experience in the war of the third kind is usually placed at the periphery of classic mil-
itary education, professionalism, and strategy, and is regarded as tangential to the real
issues of war and peace.50 Thus, the US military is at a distinct disadvantage in the spec-
trum of unconventional conflicts or wars of the third kind. However, the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, and the consequent US military action against Afghanistan, prompted the
Pentagon to give its unconventional troops or Special Forces the lead role in the war
on terrorism by using them for covert operations worldwide.51 Specifically, American
Special Forces will serve as the Pentagon’s “hunter-killer teams” that will pursue
“high-value” targets (terrorist) around the world.52
However, to effectively respond to unconventional conflicts, the United States
needs to develop an effective force structure; that requires planning, organization, and opera-
tion to address the socio-political milieu of the revolutionary/counter-revolutionary
system. This environment, however, could only be found in less developed parts of the
world.53 The Pentagon must produce the essential components for participating in a
war of the third kind – self-reliant individuals who are patient, persistent, sophisti-
cated, able to blend with local conditions, and capable of operating for long periods in
small groups isolated from American society.54 Success in waging a war of the third
kind is not contingent upon the possession and deployment of large armies, massive
firepower, and sophisticated weapons systems. Rather, staging a war of the third kind
relies on small, efficient bands of soldiers who can blend in and function as skilled
political mobilizers and teachers in a society rocked by low-intensity conflicts. As in
the Vietnam War, the US military discovered that strategy, as taught at staff and war
colleges, was inadequate for understanding “a war without fronts,” let alone for suc-
cessfully waging it.55 The best school for this new type of war is the Philippines, which
has been fraught with numerous types of insurgencies since the 1960s.56
Washington also has other political objectives in revitalizing its security ties with
its former colony. The first is to prevent the country from becoming an entry point or
a haven for various international terrorist networks operating in Southeast Asia, while
simultaneously using it as a possible base to monitor or neutralize radical Islamic net-
works, particularly since it is politically impossible for the United States to get directly
involved in either Malaysia or Indonesia.57 The second is to influence the Philippine
government’s counter-terrorism campaign. From Washington’s point of view, the

AFP’s inability to stem the tide of insurgency and terrorism is also due to the rampant
corruption within the Philippine police and military forces. Washington has realized
that equipping the AFP with better counter-insurgency materiel is irrelevant when its
top officers pocket scarce defense resources and receive large bribes from the rebels or
terrorists.58 By revitalizing its defense relations with the Philippines, the US military
can now be more specific and on-target in its assistance package to the AFP; be able to
establish a more effective mechanism for monitoring changes and developments
happening in an allied organization; and be in the best position to help mold the
Philippine military in accordance to its regional security concerns.
The Philippines, on the other hand, has a special interest in reviving its security
ties with the United States. Its foremost interest is in much-needed American mili-
tary assistance, which could shore up the AFP’s counter-insurgency capabilities and
bolster the military’s political support for the Arroyo Administration.59 In the mid-
1990s, the Philippine government tried to modernize its military. However, the pro-
gram failed to take off because of the Asian financial crisis and the consequent bud-
get short-falls of the government. The reduction in US military assistance after 1992
and the reluctance of the Philippine Congress to increase the defense budget also
caused a rapid deterioration of the AFP’s aging and nearly obsolete military equip-
ment such as military trucks, armor personnel carriers, helicopters, transport and
ground-attack aircrafts, patrol vessels, and transport ships.60 The US–Philippine
Joint Defense Assessment (JDA) observed that the AFP’s counter-insurgency and
counter-terrorism operations were hampered by the lack in firepower, ground and
air mobility, communications, intelligence, air-support and overall capacity to sup-
port economic and social development in insurgent regions.61 Manila was faced with
no choice but to look to Washington for some level of US military assistance until it
could finance its own military modernization program. Consequently, despite
opposition from the leftist and nationalist groups, the Arroyo Administration took
the calculated risk of increasing American military involvement in its campaign
against radical Islamic movements in the country.62 The revitalized alliance is put in
force by the two allies through joint training, the provision of US military assistance
to strengthen the Philippines’ counter-terrorism capability, and military/political
consultation and support.
112 Asian Security
Joint Military Exercise

A clear indication of the improved RP–US security ties is the increasing number of
bilateral and multilateral joint military exercises between the AFP and the US armed
forces. From Washington’s perspective, these exercises reinvigorate US bilateral secu-
rity alliances in the region and clarify broader strategic purposes and direction in a
post-Cold War period.63 Strategically, they help Washington enhance and foster con-
sultation and policy coordination with Asian allies regarding the full range of US poli-
cies affecting their mutual interests. Moreover, they promote tactical proficiency and
interoperability of US forces and its allies. From the Philippine side, the joint military
activities give the AFP the opportunity to be acquainted with and trained on the latest
techniques and technologies in modern warfare, so essential in its counter-insurgency
campaign, and in modernizing obsolete military hardware. They also provide the AFP
the chance to learn and execute a variety of non-combat military operations such as
maritime patrol and surveillance, search and rescue operations, disaster-and-relief
operations, and humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.
After the US military forces were withdrawn from the Philippines in 1992, Manila
and Washington had conducted an average of six to eight military exercises a year.64
Since 2002, however, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of military exer-
cises between the two allies. In that year, the AFP and the US military conducted 15
bilateral and multilateral training activities. These ranged from the large-scale and
highly-publicized, six-month-long counter-terrorism exercise dubbed Balikatan-02-1
involving 4,385 Philippine and US combat troops to the short-term, low-key and highly
specialized exercise labeled Runway Construction Exercise 2002, which saw AFP and
US Army engineers jointly constructing a range control tower, a 20-by-40-foot attached
three-room barracks, and a runway. The two allies also conducted various exercises to
improve RP–US armed forces’ combat readiness in joint/combined operations and to
enhance inter-operability through training exchanges of skills, knowledge, and tech-
niques in conventional warfare. More significantly, the US military undertook civic and
humanitarian projects for local communities as a building block for enhancing American
capability in an area where it is least effective – nation-building.65 In 2003, the Pentagon
committed the following to reinforce the AFP’s counter-terrorism training program: the
training of two additional Light Reaction Companies (LRC) and eight light infantry bat-
talions for counter-terrorism; the strengthening of the operational and intelligence capa-
bilities of the Southern Command; and the enhancement of the AFP’s staff skills in
intelligence, civil affairs, medical, and information operations, and the training of PAF
helicopter crew in night flying.66
In 2004, there were 18 joint exercises between the US armed forces and the AFP
largely involving civic action and humanitarian missions. The exercises created valu-
able opportunities for various formations of elite American units to interact with their
Philippine counterparts and develop interoperability. For example, “Balance Piston”
intensified small unit tactics training between the Philippine Army’s Special Opera-
tions Command and the US Army 1st Special Forces Group. “Palah” gave a US Navy
SEALS (Sea Air Land) team and the Philippine Navy’s Special Warfare Group (SWAG)
a chance to practice in small units tactics, marksmanship, and over-the-beach training.
“Teak Piston” allowed the US Air Force’s Special Operations Group and the Philippine
Air Force to engage in various types of air operation. These exercises provided the US
Coalition Support Team (CST) or Special Forces working closely with the host state
to understand situations in an ongoing war of the third kind. Spending much time in
the communities affected by local conflicts, the American Special Forces were able to
modify training and assistance to their local counterparts and help broaden the US
Combined Joint Force Commanders’ military doctrine and practices regarding uncon-
ventional warfare.67
As far as community development is concerned, these joint exercises also enable the
US military to redesign and implement humanitarian or civic action programs, such as
the construction of schoolhouses, roads and bridges, and the provision of free medical
and dental services. Thus, the US military reinforces military stabilization capabilities
required in traditional peacekeeping operation and in the war on terrorism.68 As a case
in point, the US forces’ humanitarian and development programs, combined with the
AFP’s military operations, eventually deprived Abu Sayyaf of its jungle base in Basi-
lan. This happened because these programs fostered a secure environment for sus-
tained economic development in the island.69 The US military still maintains small
units on the island mainly for regular medical and civic action programs, with the US
Agency for International Development (USAID) financing development projects in
Basilan.70 These military exercises also reflect a shift in US strategic interest from its
initial focus on external threats to capacity-building with oversight and endorsement
of the AFP operations against threats to internal stability.71 The current focus is to
address local conditions that engender terrorism by providing economic aid, strength-
ening democratic institutions, and encouraging decentralization and autonomy in con-
flict areas to weaken support for insurgent groups.72 This type of operation gives the
US more valuable lessons in the use of the military after a conflict to underpin an
enduring transition to stability and democracy.73
Providing Assistance for War of the Third Kind

The United States currently assists the Philippine military in developing a defense pro-
gram that will improve its capability to address threats to the country’s security, spe-
cifically insurgency and terrorism.74 After 9/11, Manila received the promised ten-fold
increase in military assistance from the United States rising from US$1.9 million in FY
2001 to US$19 million for FY 2002 under the Foreign Military Assistance Program
(FMP), as Washington found it in its interest to strengthen the AFP’s counter-terrorism
capability. The Philippines was also the recipient of US$29.50 million in Excess of
Defense Articles (EDA) in the form of 15,000 M-16A1 rifles, 35 M35 trucks, three
night-capable UH-1 helicopters, and a Cyclone Class Patrol boat, and an additional
US$10 million in Anti-Terrorist Assistance. More significantly, the AFP obtained
US$20 million-worth of mobility spare parts for its C-130s, UH-1 helicopters, M-35
trucks, and patrol boats for FY 2003. All this has enabled the AFP to rehabilitate mili-
tary hardware that had been retired from service because of the lack of spare parts. The
United States also provides counter-terrorism modules to the AFP amounting to
US$55 million plus US$25 million in new grant assistance to train and equip an entire
engineering battalion. This new unit will conduct civic action and humanitarian
projects in conflict zones in the Philippines.
114 Asian Security
Politico-Military Consultation
Another sign of the revitalized RP–US alliance against terrorism is the intense politico-
military consultation between the two countries’ armed services and defense depart-
ments. Even before 9/11, the two allies had already been conducting defense policy
dialogue and joint evaluation of Philippine defense requirements in the light of emerg-
ing non-traditional security challenges like transnational crime, international terrorism,
human trafficking and illicit trade in narcotics.75 Called the Joint Defense Assessment
(JDA), it was revised in 2000 to improve the AFP’s capability in counter-terrorism.
The JDA commits the United States to assist the Philippine military establishment in
developing a defense program that will improve the AFP’s ability to respond to
national security threats. The JDA focuses on long-term institutional reforms in the
AFP and provides for significant American involvement in monitoring their imple-
mentation.76 It emphasizes joint doctrine and interoperability between the armed ser-
vices in the government’s counter-insurgency efforts and calls on the Philippine Army
to concentrate on its counter-terrorism capability.77 The JDA also commits the United
States to provide sustained assistance, training and equipment in developing the AFP’s
counter-terrorism capabilities.78
After the six-month-long Balikatan 02-1 exercise in Mindanao, the RP–US Mutual
Defense Board formulated in July 2002 a highly confidential Five-Year Work Plan that
calls for increased and sustained security cooperation. The plan provides for the for-
mation of a trained and well-equipped Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in the AFP,
the construction of bases and staging areas for the RDF, and the development of the
Philippine military’s capability and competence for joint/combined force operations
with the US armed forces. Both sides also recognized the need to strengthen the
51-year-old MDT by making it adapt to a changing security environment characterized
by transnational threats such as global terrorism.79 In August 2002, US Defense Secre-
tary Donald Rumsfeld and then Philippine National Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes
signed an agreement creating a bilateral Defense Policy Board. The board will enable
civilian officials from both countries to deal with issues of politically managing the
alliance and addressing common security concerns.80 The board is also tasked to help
Manila develop its defense industries, and the AFP in the maintenance of its military
equipment.81 More importantly, the board is given the responsibility to create the pol-
icy situation ideal for a robust defense relationship, and to explore avenues of defense
cooperation for a more stable regional security environment.
Twenty-First Century Alliance Politics

To emphasize the importance of the revitalized RP–US alliance against international
terrorism, President George W. Bush visited Manila in October 2003. During his brief
eight-hour visit, President Bush reaffirmed America’s commitment to enhance the
capabilities of the AFP to counter-terrorism, and designated the Philippines as a major
non-NATO ally, giving it greater access to US defense equipment and supplies.82
Behind the handshakes and photo sessions of dignitaries from both sides during President
Bush’s state visit, the cracks were already apparent in the two allies’ campaign against
international terrorism. On July 27, 2003, a total of 323 officers and men, coming
from the elite formations of the AFP – the Philippine Army’s Scout Rangers and the
Philippine Navy’s Special Warfare Group83 (SWAG) – occupied the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Ayala Center in Makati City, the heart of the Philippines’ financial/
commercial district. The mutineers declared that their occupation of the Oakwood
premises was staged to enable them to air their grievances about graft and corruption
in the AFP, the sale of arms and ammunition to the insurgents, the involvement of key
AFP and defense officials in the Davao City bombings, and the micro-management of
the AFP by then Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes. After the mutineers had aired their
grievances and negotiated with government representatives, they abandoned their
position, unwired the explosives they had installed around the area, and immediately
returned to their barracks where they awaited their fate. The mutiny alarmed Wash-
ington. Manila had received millions of dollars-worth of US military assistance and
training to help the AFP deal with the transnational threat of terrorism. However, the
mutiny revealed that the problems in the Philippine military are more than just techni-
cal or logistical and that further US military assistance to the AFP might just be a
waste of American taxpayers’ money given the alleged level of corruption within the
Philippine defense establishment. Then, three months before President Bush’s visit,
Indonesian terrorist Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi escaped from his cell in Camp Crame,
the headquarters of the Philippine National Police (PNP). This prompted Washington
to shorten President Bush's visit to Manila from two days to eight hours.
Later, in March 2004, the two allies found themselves at odds over the Pentagon’s
plan to send 3,000 Special Forces and Marines to Sulu to assist the AFP in tracking
down Abu Sayyaf insurgents. The planned operation, which would have surpassed
significantly the previous Balikatan exercises, would open a possible new front, repre-
senting a major escalation in America’s war against international terrorism.84 The
Pentagon’s announcement of joint combat operations in the Southern Philippines trig-
gered a political controversy as the US Defense Department’s use of the term “joint
operation” implied that American troops would be allowed to play a combat role, vio-
lating a Philippine Constitution provision that prohibits foreign troops from conduct-
ing combat operations in the country. To soothe the political uproar, President
Arroyo explained that American troops to be deployed in Sulu would only engage in
training their Filipino counterparts, and in conducting humanitarian and civic action
operations. This embarrassed the Pentagon, which assumed the operation to be a com-
bat mission, since American military exercises are not usually held in hostile, guerrilla-
infested areas like the Sulu Archipelago.85 Manila’s action was considered a setback for
the Bush Administration’s efforts to widen its global campaign against terrorist net-
works.86 President Arroyo’s flip-flop was viewed as Manila’s inability to practice what
it preaches – national commitment to the international counter-terrorism campaign of
the United States.87
But the worst was yet to come. In support of its ally’s expansion of the war on ter-
ror in the Middle East, Manila decided to send the Philippine Humanitarian Assistance
Mission to Iraq in June 2003. The mission was composed of 60 medical personnel,
25 police, 50 soldiers, and 39 social workers. Its primary objective was to provide humani-
tarian assistance to the Iraqis affected by the Second Gulf War. The contingent worked
closely with the Polish group and was deployed in the sector between Baghdad and
Basra where it joined other units from Ukraine, Bulgaria, Latvia and other states that
116 Asian Security
are part of the US-led “Coalition of the Willing.” On July 1, 2004, an Iraqi insurgent
group calling itself the Khaled bin Al-Waleed Brigade captured a Filipino truck driver
named Angelo de la Cruz. A week later, the Iraqi insurgents demanded the immediate
withdrawal of the Philippine Humanitarian Mission before July 20 or de la Cruz
would be executed. The airing of the insurgents’ demand via Al-Jazeera immediately
fueled a public clamor for the government to withdraw the Filipino contingent from
Iraq to save Mr. de la Cruz. The United States, however, immediately warned its ally
that making any concession to the kidnappers of de la Cruz would only encourage
more kidnappings in Iraq.
De la Cruz’s captivity, as well as his possible execution at the hands of the Iraqi
insurgents, was used by anti-war groups in Manila to drum up their demand for the
withdrawal of the Filipino contingent from Iraq. Thousands attended church services
to pray for and demand De La Cruz’s release. Fearing that the execution of the Fili-
pino hostage would trigger a major political backlash that could undermine her fledg-
ling administration, President Arroyo gave in to the demand of the insurgents.
Immediately, a ranking US State Department official criticized the Philippine govern-
ment’s decision as sending a wrong message.88 The State Department warned that ties
with Manila could be jeopardized by President Arroyo’s move. It cautioned the decision
could set a dangerous precedent for other hostages, and contrasted the Philippines’
action with the strong resolve of South Korea, Japan and other US allies to stand fast
against terrorist threats to their nationals.89 Despite US warnings, the Philippines with-
drew its small contingent and faced the prospect of placing bilateral security relations
in a precarious position, especially when the American ambassador suddenly left
Manila for urgent consultations with officials in Washington.
The alliance underwent a crisis as Washington reviewed its financial and military
assistance to Manila. American officials also assessed the possible long-term conse-
quences of the Philippine action on the global war on terror. Immediately, Manila
tried to repair the damage by emphasizing that the two countries are strategic treaty
allies particularly in the global counter-terrorism campaign.90 Manila announced that it
would maintain its strategic ties with Washington despite this isolated case (the with-
drawal of the Filipino troops from Iraq).91 It also declared that it considers the United
States as its “big brother in the security arena” and expressed hope that its relations
with Washington would survive the hostage crisis.92 Philippine officials added that
although the country withdrew its troops from Iraq, “it will still be assisting the coalition
of the willing by providing moral and political support.”93 President Arroyo, in a
speech before the Manila Overseas Press Club, stressed the importance of the two allies’
partnership in sharing fighting skills and intelligence as well as conducting humanitar-
ian missions since 2001.94 To accentuate its support to its ally, the Philippines backed
Washington’s diplomatic positions regarding international terrorism and Iraq in sev-
eral international fora, i.e., the UN Security Council, Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).95 Manila was banking that its
general support of the global war on terror through diplomatic measures and collabora-
tion with the US military in containing terrorism elsewhere could deflect American
criticism and assuage Washington's ire over the withdrawal of the Philippine humani-
tarian contingent from Iraq.
To further appease its ally, Manila eventually allowed the US military to deploy
American troops for a joint military exercise with the Philippine Army in Central
Mindanao, which is a stronghold of the MILF. Despite concerns aired by the MILF
against the training exercise, 25 US Special Forces and 156 Philippine Army troops
held “Balance Piston” in a 200-hectare military camp, which is the headquarters of the
Philippine Army’s 602nd Brigade from July 26 to August 13, 2004 in North Cotabato.96
The exercise consisted of special operations, medical operations, communication train-
ings, and a humanitarian mission held in a Muslim community near the camp.97 The
following year, Philippine and US military officials formulated a comprehensive plan
for joint security exercises in the Philippines until 2009 and for the policy direction in
the two countries’ bilateral security relations.98 The plan provides a number of com-
bined US–RP military exercises in Central Mindanao, which is deemed by the Pacific
Command as “a window of terrorism not only in the Philippines but also in the entire
Southeast Asia region.”99 The two countries also began negotiations for a new agreement
that will expand the existing MDT and Status of Forces Agreement (the US–Philippine
Visiting Forces Agreement or VFA) to include provisions on counter-terrorism and
transnational crimes.100 More significantly, the AFP now allows US troops to assist
Philippine troops in field intelligence-gathering and small-unit infantry training in
Mindanao.101 These concessions have given US forces greater access to the second
front beyond Afghanistan in the war against terrorism, which Pentagon strategists
appear intent on doing, perhaps to secure early and demonstrable victories against an
amorphous and elusive enemy.102 They also give Washington a political leverage in the
current peace negotiations between Manila and the MILF since it now has “boots on
the ground” in Central Mindanao.103
The concessions extended by the Arroyo Administration to its ally – and Manila’s
calculation that given the US military's concern over the local militants linked to the
al-Qaeda network in Mindanao, Washington would not severely punish Manila –
prevented a major rift in the alliance. The Bush Administration probably thought that
without US military and economic support, the Philippines might become a central
haven for transnational terrorist groups in Southeast Asia with the reported training
camps run by the extremely radical, Jemaah Islamiyah, in Mindanao. This scenario
could create greater instability in the Southeast Asian region. In time, the Angelo de la
Cruz episode dimmed as the two allies crossed the threshold of the alliance into a
more mature security partnership by confronting twenty-first century terrorism head-
on through economic development, politico-diplomatic consultation, and security/
defense cooperation.
Into the Twenty-First Century

As early as 2000, the two allies had already recognized the need to revitalize and reori-
ent their five-decades-old alliance to face the major security challenge of the twenty-
first century – international terrorism. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the
United States and emergence of a violent group of Islamic militants in Basilan with
links to al-Qaeda provided a compelling stimulus for Manila and Washington to revive
their security relations in the new millennium. On the one hand, the cash-strapped
Philippine government found it convenient to tap the United States for the equipment
118 Asian Security
and weapon systems needed to effectively wage a war of the third kind against local
insurgents and terrorist groups. Washington, on the other hand, was motivated by the
need to acquire experience and skills in the conduct of the war of the third kind, which
can be provided only by a society rocked by this type of violence and strife. Washing-
ton also found it prudent to assist the Philippines and prevent it from becoming a
haven for international terrorist groups. The two allies put their security relations into
action through joint military exercises, provisions of inexpensive and low-tech military
equipment and training/skills in the conduct of low-intensity conflicts, and constant
politico-security consultations. These low-key forms of security cooperation have
ensured that the governance costs of the alliance would be reasonable and long-lasting,
considering the uncertain and indefinite time needed to contain the terrorist challenge.
The twenty-first century RP–US alliance has been beset by difficulties and numer-
ous disagreements. The Philippines’ reluctance to allow the United States to conduct a
joint mission with the AFP in Sulu, the Oakwood mutiny, and the escape of captured
terrorists from Philippine prisons have tested the limits and strength of this alliance.
The crisis that seriously challenged the security partnership occurred during the
Angelo de la Cruz hostage incident in 2004. Fortunately, both sides were circumspect
enough to develop policies and means that effectively mitigated this crisis and ensured
the stability of their security cooperation. Despite numerous discords, both countries
are determined to keep the alliance functional given the long-term nature of interna-
tional terrorism. As a form of systemic threat, terrorism remains a constant security
challenge among states in a world that is becoming more interdependent and global-
ized. Surely, both countries will continue to maintain and prudently manage their
twenty-first century alliance in this war of the third kind.
NOTES
1. Jay Solomon, “Plan to Deploy U.S. Troops Spurs Debate in Philippines,” The Asian Wall Street Journal,
January 17, 2002, p. 1.
2. Michael Richardson, “Joint Operation Easier to Begin Than to End,” International Herald Tribune, January
28, 2002, p. 2.
3. Raymond Booner, “Terror in Philippines: What is the U.S. Doing There?” International Herald Tribune,
June 11, 2002, p. 5.
4. Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 198.
5. See Martin Van Creveld, “What is Wrong with Clausewitz,” in Gert de Nooy, ed., The Clausewitzian Dic-
tum and the Future of Western Military Strategy (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 7–23.
6. James D. Kiras, “Terrorism and Irregular Warfare,” in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen, and Colin S.
Gray, eds., Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), p. 211.
7. Kiras, “Terrorism and Irregular Warfare,” p. 221. The author is very aware of the difficulty of defining the
term terrorism. In his latest book, Walter Lacquer noted that the term had more than 100 definitions in the
1980s, and more have been added since then. The author decided to use the definition that terrorism is a polit-
ically motivated violence aimed at influencing a wider audience – the notion that it is actually “propaganda by
deed” or primarily a psychological weapon of the weaker side. See “Toward a Definition or Humpty Dumpy
and the Problem of Terrorism,” in Walter Laqueur, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twentty-First Century
(New York: The Continuum Press, 2003), pp. 232–238.
8. Alex P. Schmid, “Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 16, No. 2
(Summer 2004), p. 200.
9. Kiras, “Terrorism and Irregular Warfare,” p. 211.
10. Schmid, “Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism,” p. 207.
11. See Brigitte L. Nacos, “The Terrorist Calculus behind 9/11: A Model for Future Terrorism?” Studies in Con-
flict and Terrorism Vol. 26, No. 1 (2003), p. 5.
12. Nacos, “The Terrorist Calculus behind 9/11,” p. 3.
13. Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 43–45.
14. Paul Marber, “Globalization and its Contents,” World Policy Journal Vol. 21, No. 4 (Winter 2004/05), p. 34.
15. See Tanja Ellingsen, “Toward a Revival of Religion and Religious Clashes,” Terrorism and Political Violence,
Vol. 17 (2005), p. 307.
16. Mohammed Ayoob, “Political Islam: Image and Reality,” World Policy Journal Vol. 21, No. 3 (Fall 2004), p. 11.
17. Ellingsen, “Toward a Revival of Religion and Religious Clashes,” p. 308.
18. Matthew Levitt, “Untangling the Terror Web: Identifying and Counteracting the Phenomenon of Crossover
between Terrorist Groups,” SAIS Review Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter 2004), p. 34.
19. Schmid, “Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism,” pp. 200–201.
20. Jason Burke, “Al Qaeda,” Foreign Policy Vol. 142 (May/June 2004), p. 18.
21. Burke, “Al Qaeda,” p. 34.
22. Burke, “Al Qaeda,” p. 34.
23. Philip G. Cerny, “Terrorism and the New Security Dilemma,” Naval War College Review Vol. 45
(September 2005), p. 12.
24. Glenn H. Synder, “Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” International Organization Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter
1991), p. 123.
25. Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in Theory and Practice: What Lies Ahead?” Journal of International Affairs Vol.
43, No. 1 (Summer/Fall 1989), p. 1; and David A. Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and The Variety of Interna-
tional Relations,” International Organization Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), p. 6.
26. Alliances are usually equated with the states’ preoccupation with power and autonomy in an anarchic interna-
tional system. Alliances are considered one of the means by which states improve their security against each
other. From the Treaty of Westphalia to the Cold War, alliances were usually in the form of formal military
agreements and arrangements between two or more states through which they seek either to protect them-
selves or to collude in expanding their power at the expense of another state. Thus, it has always been assumed
that alliances are usually against other states. See James D. Morrow, “Arms versus Allies: Trade-Offs in
Search for Security,” International Organization Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 207–233; and Terry Terriff,
Stuart Croft, Lucy James, and Patrick M. Morgan, Security Studies Today (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press,
1999), pp. 56–58.
27. See Denis Blair and John T. Hanley, “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Arrangements,”
The Washington Quarterly Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter 2001), p. 9.
28. Blair and Hanley, “From Wheels to Webs,” p. 9.
29. Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, “The Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of
Egypt, 1962–73,” International Organization Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer 1991), p. 375.
30. See Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 56.
31. US Congress, House, the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hear-
ings, Implications of the U.S. Withdrawal from Clark and Subic Bases, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1992, p. 35.
32. Murray Hiebert, “A Flawed Policy,” Far Eastern Economic Review Vol. 164, No. 4 (October 25, 2001), p. 30.
33. Dan Murphy, “Long-Term Strategy Emerges Out of the Philippines,” The Christian Science Monitor July 3,
2002, p. 2. Accessible via www.csmonitor-com.
34. Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine–U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation (Washington: Congres-
sional Research Service of Congress, 2002), p. 8.
35. US Congress, House, The Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International
Relations, Hearings, Southeast Asia after 9/11: Regional Trends and U.S. Interests, 107th Congress, 1st Session,
20001, p. 2.
36. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement between George W. Bush and Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo on the 50th Anniversary of the Philippine-U.S. Alliance,” November 20, 2001.
37. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement between the United States of America and the
Republic of the Philippines,” November 20, 2001, p. 2.
38. Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, Warfare and the Third World (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 225.
39. Renato S. Villa, “National Defense and Security,” The Aquino Administration: Record and Legacy (1986–
1992) (Diliman, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1992), p. 93.
40. Sandre Aguinaldo, Ariel Diarma, and Dona Policar, “AFP Retakes Lead Role vs. Insurgency,” The Manila
Times, February 26, 1998, pp. 1 and 5.
41. Aguinaldo et al., “AFP Retakes Lead Role vs. Insurgency.”
42. Syed Serajul Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the
Philippines,” Asian Survey Vol. XXXVII, No. 5 (May 1998), p. 451.
43. Raffy S. Jimenez, “AFP: It’s War Against MILF,” The Manila Times, January 5, 1999, p. 4.
44. Karl Lester M. Yap, “MILF Ceasefire Stalls Hunt of JI, Sayyaf Suspects,” Business World, February 3, 2005,
p. 1. Also see James Hookway, “Local War No More,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 166, No. 23 (June
12, 2003), p. 14.
45. See Maulana M. Alonto, “Quo Vadis, GRP?” (Unpublished monograph: n.d.), available at www.
luwaran.com/docs/pr/alonto.pdf. Also see “Al-Qaeda and the Separatists,” The Economist, February 28,
2004, pp. 41–42; and “War without End,” The Economist, May 3, 2003, p. 46.
46. Reuters, “Government Looks to MILF Talks with Guarded Optimism,” Philippine Star, February 4, 2006, p. 4.
120 Asian Security
47. Jeffrey M. Bale, “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts: A Profile and WMD
Threat Assessment,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies
(Unpublished Manuscript, Date unknown), pp. 41–42.
48. Bale, “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts,” p. 34.
49. See Mark Turner, “The Management of Violence in a Conflict Organization: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf,”
Public Organization Review Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 2003), p. 399.
50. Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala, U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Pro-
cesses, and Politics (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002), p. 46.
51. Jennifer D. Kibbe, “The Rise of the Shadow Warriors,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 83, No. 2 (March/April 2004), p. 102.
52. Kibbe, “The Rise of the Shadow Warriors,” p. 110.
53. Sarkesian et al., U.S. National Security, p. 57.
54. Sarkesian et al., U.S. National Security, p. 57.
55. Creveld, “What is Wrong with Clausewitz,” p. 207.
56. See Victor N. Corpuz, Silent War (Quezon City: VNC Enterprise, 1989).
57. James Putzel, “Political Islam in Southeast Asia and the U.S.–Philippine Alliance,” in Mary Buckley and Rick
Fawn, eds., Global Response to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond (London and New York: Rout-
ledge, 2003), p. 184.
58. Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, Inc., 2003), p 207.
59. Putzel, “Political Islam in Southeast Asia and the U.S.–Philippine Alliance,” p. 184.
60. The AFP Modernization Board, The AFP Modernization Program: 2002 Accomplishment Report (Quezon
City: Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, 2003), p. 6.
61. The Secretary of Defense, “The U.S.–Philippines Joint Defense Assessment” (Washington DC: Department
of Defense, April 23, 2001), pp. 25–43.
63. Blair and Hanley, “From Wheels to Webs,” pp. 10–11.
64. Raul Leyritana, Art Ang, Vic Castro, and Rafael Mariano, “Briefing Paper on R.P.–U.S. Security Relations”
(Pasay City: Foreign Service Institute, April 30, 2003), p. 4.
65. See Scott Carlson, Dustin W. Perry, and Marlon J. Martin, “Balikatan 2002–03: Enhancing Philippine–U.S.
Security Relations,” Asia-Pacific Forum (Winter 2002–03), pp. 32–42.
66. Carlson et al., “Balikatan 2002–03,” annex e, p. 1.
67. See Cynthia F. Teramae, “Working Toward Combating Terrorism,” Asia-Pacific Defense Forum (Fall 2003), p. 27.
68. Michael O’Hanlon and P. W. Singer, “The Humanitarian Transformation: Expanding Global Intervention
Capacity,” Survival Vol. 46, No. 1 (Spring 2004), p. 1.
69. Roel Pareno and Pia Lee-Brago, “Government Hopes Basilan Model will Work for Sulu,” The Philippine
Star, January 7, 2006, pp. 1, 5 and 10.
70. Pareno and Lee-Brago, “Government Hopes Basilan Model will Work for Sulu,” p. 5.
71. Carl Baker, “Philippines and the United States 2004–2005: Defining Maturity,” The Asia-Pacific and the
United States 2004–2005, Special Assessment (February 2005), p. 8.
72. See John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?” Foreign Affairs Vol. 81, No. 4 (July/August 2002),
pp. 60–74.
73. James Dobbins, “Nation-Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World’s Only Superpower,” Rand
Review Vol. 27, No. 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 17–27.
74. Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines (Manila: United
States Embassy, October 18, 2003), p. 1.
75. Domingo L. Siazon “Challenges and Opportunities for RP–US Relations in the 21st Century,” Philippines
Today (July–September 2000), p. 2.
76. Baker, “Philippines and the United States 2004–2005,”p. 3.
77. See Secretary of Defense, “The U.S.–Philippines Joint Defense Assessment,” p. 53.
78. Secretary of Defense, The U.S.–Philippine Joint Defense Assessment, p. 54.
79. News Release No. 0202-02, “Joint Statement by the Philippine–U.S. Mutual Defense Board,” June 27, 2002,
p. 30. Available at www.pacom.mil/news.
80. Jim Garmone, “U.S., Philippine Contacts to Expand,” American Forces Information Service, August 13, 2002,
p. 1. Available at www.defenselink.mil/news.
81. Office of Public Affairs, “Statement from Philippine Secretary of National Defense Angelo Reyes,”
Department of National Defense Press Release (Quezon City: Department of National Defense, August
2002), p. 1.
82. Sol Jose Vanzi, “Terror Fight Pushes RP-US Ties to New High,” Philippine Star, October 11, 2003, p. 1.
Available at www.newsflash.org.
83. James Hookway, “Genuine Grievances,” Far Eastern Economic Review Vol. 166, No. 31 (August 7, 2003), p.
16.
84. James Hookway, “A New Front,” Far Eastern Economic Review Vol. 166, No. 9 (March 6, 2003), p. 19.
85. Bradley Graham, “Military Mission to Philippines on Hold: Way to Reconcile U.S. Role with Host’s Consti-
tution Sought,” Washington Post, March 1, 2003, p. A01.
86. Graham, “Military Mission to Philippines on Hold,” p. A01.
87. See “Philippine Flip-Flop,” Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2003, p. A14.
88. Aljazeera, “Philippine Withdrawal Angers U.S.,” Aljazeera Net, July 18, 2004, p. 1. Available at http://
english.aljazeera.net.
89. Mark Baker, “Philippine Withdrawal ‘could hurt U.S. Links,’” The Age, July 16, 2004, p. 1. Available at
www.theage.com.au/articles.
90. Xinhua New Agency, “Philippine–U.S. Relations to Remain Robust: Foreign Secretary,” CEIS (August 9,
2004), p. 1. Available at http://proquest.umi.com.
91. Sol Jose Vanzi, “Palace: U.S. Remains Big Brother to RP,” Philippine Headline New Online, July 22, 2004,
p. 1. Available at www.newsflash.org.
92. Vanzi, “Palace: U.S. Remains Big Brother to RP,” p. 1.
93. Sol Jose Vanzi, “RP–US Relations remain Good – Foreign Affairs Undersec,” Philippine Headline New
Online, August 6, 2004, p. 1. Available at www.newsflash.org.
94. Xinhua News Agency, “Philippine–US Relations to Remain Robust: Foreign Secretary,” August 9, 2004,
p. 2. http://proquest.umi.com.
95. Baker, “Philippine Withdrawal ‘could hurt U.S. Links,’” p. 5.
96. Alexander Yano, “Philippine Government Says Military Exercise with U.S. No Threat to MILF,” BBC
Monitoring Asia-Pacific, London, July 26, 2004, p. 1. Available at http://proquest.umi.com.
97. Dateline Philippines, “Philippine Military Says Joint Exercise with U.S. Confined to Cotabato,” BBC Mon-
itoring Asia Pacific, London, July 25, 2004, p. 1. Available at http://proquest.umi.com.
98. Jose T. Barbieto, “R.P.–U.S. Military Exercise,” Business World, February 4, 2005, p. 1. Available at http://
proquest.umi.com.
99. Jaime Laude, “R.P.–U.S. “War Games Set in Cotabato,” The Philippine Star, January 14, 2006, pp. 1 and 8.
100. Karl Lester Yap, “R.P., US Officials in Talks for New Defense Treaty,” Business World, February 22, 2005,
p. 1. Available at http://proquest.umi.com.
101. Yap, “R.P., US Officials in Talks for New Defense Treaty,” p. 1.
103. For a comprehensive discussion on US interest in the Mindanao Peace Process see Abuza, Militant Islam in
Southeast Asia, pp. 202–212.
Renato Cruz De Castro is Chair of the International Studies Department, De La Salle University and
holds the Dr. Aurelio Calderon Professorial Chair of Philippine–American Relations. He earned his
Ph.D. from the University of South Carolina as a Fulbright Scholar in 2001. Since 1994, he has written
several articles on international relations and security that have been published in a number of scholarly
journals and edited works in the Philippines, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.

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