Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 94953 September 5, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
ARMANDO DE LARA Y GALARO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Tan, Manzano & Velez for accused-appellant.

QUIASON, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila in Criminal Case
No. 94953, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended by B.P. Blg. 179.

The Information charged appellant as follows:

That on or about January 9, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or
distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully and unlawfully sell or offer
for sale two (2) foils of flowering tops of marijuana and one (1) plastic bag of
flowering tops of marijuana, which are prohibited drugs (Rollo, p. 6).

Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the information
(Records p. 5).

II

On December 15, 1986, Capt. Restituto Cablayan of the National Criminal Investigation Service
(NCIS) of the Western Police District (WPD), instructed Sgt. Enrique David to conduct a surveillance
operation in the vicinity of Garrido and Zamora Streets at Sta. Ana, Manila, after receiving reports of
rampant drug-pushing in that area (TSN, December 14, 1987, p. 21).

In compliance thereof, a team led by Sgt. Enrique David, conducted a surveillance operation on
December 15 and 17, and confirmed the reported drug-pushing activities in that area by the group of
appellant and a certain Ricky alias "Pilay" (TSN, December 2, 1987, pp. 5-6). No arrest was made
because the team was instructed by their superior to conduct a surveillance operation only (TSN,
January 11, 1988, p. 28).

On January 8, 1987, Malaya (Exh. "F") and People's Tonight (Exh. "K"), reported that there were
rampant, drug-pushing activities in the vicinity of Garrido and Zamora Streets in Sta. Ana, Manila,
prompting Gen. Alfredo Lim, then WPD Superintendent, to reprimand the NCIS office (TSN,
December 2, 1987, p. 2).

On January 9, because of the reprimand given by Gen. Lim, Capt. Cablayan instructed Sgt. David to
plan a buy-bust operation and to form a
six-man team with Pfc. Martin Orolfo, Jr. as the poseur-buyer (TSN, December 2, 1987, p. 6,
January 11, 1988, p. 6).

At around 4:45 P.M. of the same day, the team, together with their confidential informant, went to
Garrido Street. Upon arriving threat, they strategically positioned themselves. Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. and the
confidential informant proceeded to the house of appellant located at No. 2267 Garrido Street, where
they saw him standing outside. The confidential informant introduced Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. to appellant as
an interested buyer of marijuana. Appellant asked Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. "Ilan ang bibilhin ninyo?" (How
much will you buy?). Pfc. Orolfo, Jr., replied: "Two foils" handing at the same time the marked
twenty-peso bill (Exh. "E") to appellant. The latter, after placing the money in the right pocket of his
pants, went inside his house (TSN, January 11, 1988, pp. 7-9). Minutes later, appellant came back
and handed two foils (Exhs. "D-1-a" and "D-1-b") wrapped in onion paper (TSN, January 11, 1988, p.
8). It was after he handed the two foils to Pfc. Orolfo Jr., that he sensed the presence of the police
operatives. He then tried to retrieve the two foils but Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. prevented him from doing so.
During the scuffle, one foil was torn. Appellant then ran inside his house with Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. in
pursuit. The latter was able to subdue appellant. Sgt. David confronted appellant, who admitted that
he kept prohibited drugs in his house. Appellant showed the arresting officers a blue plastic bag with
white lining containing prohibited drugs. A receipt of the articles seized (Exh. "F") was made by Pfc.
Orolfo, Jr. (TSN, January 11, 1988, pp. 12-15).

Thereafter, the team, together with appellant, proceeded to the WPD headquarters for investigation.
Thereat, Sgt. David ordered Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. to commence the investigation of appellant (TSN,
January 11, 1988, pp. 19-21).

During the investigation, appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
have the assistance of counsel. When appellant was asked to give a written statement, he refused to
do so pending arrival of his lawyer (TSN, January 11, 1988, p. 23).

The prohibited drugs seized from appellant were brought to the NBI for chemical analysis. A report
and certification of Ms. Aida Pascual, Forensic Chemist of the NBI (Exhs. "C" and "D"), show the
drugs to be positive for marijuana.

Appellant denied having sold marijuana to anyone and claimed that the arresting officers merely
planted the marijuana on his person. He testified that on January 9, 1987, he arrived home from
work as a security guard of the Vergara Brothers Agency at around 3:00 P.M. After changing his
clothes, he went out to fetch his son, who was left in the care of a neighbor. Upon returning to his
house with his son, he was arrested by the police. The police proceeded to search his house,
without any search warrant shown to him. After the search, he and his wife were brought to the WPD
headquarters. He claimed that inspite of his protestation that he would like to wait for his lawyer
before giving any statement, the police continued their interrogation.

Appellant denied that the twenty-peso bill was given to him by the poseur-buyer. He claimed that he
was merely forced to sign his name on the photocopy of the twenty-peso bill (Exh. "F") and that the
first time he saw the blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs was when he was at the police
station (TSN, June 14, 1988, pp. 1-11).

To corroborate his story, appellant presented his younger brother, Gerry de Lara.

On October 2, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of violation of Sec 4, Art II of R.A. 6425 as amended as charged in
the Information; and this Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer a penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 (Rollo,p. 24).

Hence, this appeal.

III

In his appeal, appellant questions the legality of his arrest and the seizure of prohibited drugs found
inside his house. Furthermore, he claims that he was not assisted by counsel during his custodial
interrogation (Rollo, pp. 55-57).

As to the legality of appellant's arrest, we find that the police operatives acted within the bounds of
law.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures dealing with warrantless arrests
provides:

Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person;

a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
 x x x           x x x          x x x

In the case at bench, appellant was caught red-handed in delivering two tin foils of marijuana to Pat.
Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer. Applying the aforementioned provision of law, appellant's arrest was
lawfully effected without need of a warrant of arrest. "Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a
result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were also under
obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest" (People v. Kalubiran, 196
SCRA 644 [1991]; People vs. De Los Santos, 200 SCRA 431 [1991]).

Appellant, however, asseverates that his arrest was precipitated only by newspaper publications
about the rampant sale of drugs along Garrido and Zamora Streets, Sta. Ana, Manila (Rollo, p. 53).
If appellant implies that the police merely stage-managed his arrest in order to show that they were
not remiss in their duties, then appellant is wrong. A surveillance on the illegal activities of the
appellant was already conducted by the police as early as December 15 and 17, 1986. The
newspaper reports concerning the illegal drug activities came out only on January 8 and 14, 1987,
long after the police knew of the said illegal activities. Appellant's eventual arrest on January 9, 1987
was the result of the surveillance conducted and the buy-bust operation.

The evidence shows that appellant ran inside his house upon sensing the presence of the police
operatives. The testimony of Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer, is as follows:

FISCAL:

Q: After placing the P20 bill in his right pocket, what did he do?

A: He went to his house and minutes later, he came back, sir.

Q: When he came back what happened?

A: He handed to me two tin foils containing suspected marijuana

leaves wrapped in onion paper.

Q: And what happened next when he returned with those items?

A: After he handed to me two foils, he sensed the presence of the

operatives and he tried to retrieve the two foils, sir, and I prevented
him and during the scuffle one piece of foil was broken, he tried to
run inside the house, so I subdued him immediately and
apprehended him while he was inside the house.

Q: After he was subdued by your group, what happened?

A: Sgt. David confronted him regarding this case and he voluntarily

admitted that he was still keeping prohibited drugs inside his house?

Q: What did the group do after he voluntarily admitted that he was

keeping prohibited drugs inside his house?

A: He pointed inside his house (sic) one plastic bag colored blue with
white lining containing prohibited drug" (TSN, January 11, 1988, pp.
12-14).

The policemen's entry into the house of appellant without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a
person caught committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid
(1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Section 5[a]).

We also find as valid the seizure of the plastic bag of prohibited drugs found inside appellant's
house.

The seizure of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs was the result of appellant's arrest inside
his house. A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the
immediate vicinity where the arrest was made (People v. Castiller, 188 SCRA 376 [1990]).

We find to be meritorious appellant's claim that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial
investigation, specifically when he was forced to sign the photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill
(Exh. "E"), Receipt of Property Seized (Exh. "F"), and the Booking and Information Sheet (Exh. "H").
The said documents are inadmissible in evidence for the reason that there was no showing that
appellant was then assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into writing (Constitution, Art. III,
Sec. 3[2]).

Be that as it may, the rejection of said evidence would not affect the conviction of appellant in view of
the abundance of other evidence establishing his guilt. The ruling in People v. Mauyao, 207 SCRA
732 (1992) is apropos:

It bears emphasis, however, that the accused appellant's conformity to the

questioned documents has not been a factor at all in his conviction. For even if these
documents were disregarded, still the accused-appellant's guilt has been adequately
established by other evidence of record. The trial court's verdict was based on the
evidence of the prosecution not on his signatures on the questioned documents.
Accused-appellant's denial simply can not prevail over the detailed and unshaken
testimonies of the apprehending officers who caught him red-handed selling
marijuana and who have not shown to have any ulterior motive to testify falsely
against accused-appellant.

IV

The trial court sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 pursuant to Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by
B.P. Blg. 179. However, said law was further amended by R.A. No. 7659.

Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty to be imposed for selling, administering, delivering or
distributing less than 750 grams of marijuana, shall range from "prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity."

Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for selling, dispensing, delivering, transporting or
distributing marijuana in excess of 750 grams or more shall be "reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos to Ten Million Pesos."

We noticed that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed by R.A. No. 7659 as the maximum
penalty when the quantity of the marijuana involved in the offense is less than 750 grams and at the
same time as the minimum penalty when the quantity of marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. It
is the duty of the Court to harmonize conflicting provisions to give effect to the whole law (Rufino
Lopez and Sons v. Court of Appeals, 100 Phil. 850 [1957]). Furthermore, one of this Court's
primordial responsibilities is to give a statute its sensible construction. This is to effectuate the
intention of the legislature so as to avoid an absurd conclusion with regard to its meaning (Lamb v.
Phipps, 22 Phil. 456 [1912]). Therefore, when the quantity involved is less than 750 grams, Section
17 of R.A. No. 7659 should be read correctly to provide a penalty ranging from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal only.

The provision of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that "penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony," finds meaning in this case.
Appellant is entitled to benefit from the reduction of the penalty introduced by R.A. No. 7659.

In order to determine the penalty to be imposed on appellant, we first divide the amount of 750
grams into three to correspond to the three applicable penalties, namely, prision
correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal.

If the marijuana involved is from 500 to 749 grams, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion temporal.
If the marijuana involved is from 250 to 499 grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision mayor and if
the weight of the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision
correccional.

Since there is no evidence as to the weight of the two foils and one plastic bag of flowering tops of
marijuana seized from appellant, we resolve the doubt in favor of appellant and conclude that the
quantity involved was: (i) below 750 grams; and (ii) not less than 250 but not more than 499 grams.

Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on appellant is prision mayor. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to appellant, who was convicted under a special law (People vs.
Macantando, 109 SCRA 35 [1981]), and as such law was interpreted in People v. Simon, G.R. No.
93028, July 29, 1994, the minimum penalty that can be imposed on appellant should be within the
range of prision correccional.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that appellant shall
suffer an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) years and TWO (2) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to EIGHT (8) years and ONE (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner, 
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.

From the records, we gathered the following facts.

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador
Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told
Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany
the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms,
arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya
pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned
out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one
was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.

Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men left the
premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you
were not injured". 2

After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him
liable only for an impossible crime, citingArticle 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means.

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with
bullets made the crime inherently impossible.

On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts were
sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its
Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that:

. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment
(Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and his accused's own
spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for
this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. 3

Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where:

. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person conceiving the idea
should have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a
reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible. So long as these
conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him criminally liable. 5

This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes
in the offender his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out
with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to
punish such criminal tendencies. 9

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: (1) the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b)
ineffectual. 10

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the
focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible
crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. 13 Thus:

Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to
perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance
of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a
crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent
the consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the
intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the
victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill, aimed
and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The
accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:

The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined where he was, and where the
bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this
country that where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply because of an obstruction in the
way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the criminal
attempt is committed.

In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim because the latter did not
pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court held him liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:

It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became impossible by reason of the
extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented from
committing the murder. This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently impossible to commit the
crime. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed, either by
outside interference or because of miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails
to materialize; in short it has no application to the case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not
within the control of the party.

In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob. In disposing
of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:

It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his criminal intent, no one can
seriously doubt that the protection of the public requires the punishment to be administered, equally whether in
the unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really present or not. The community
suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done
is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out, the
incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.

In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking that the latter was inside. However,
at that moment, the victim was in another part of the house. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder.

The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of
attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a
difference between the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.

In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the punishable.
Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were
attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is
merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into
two categories: legal versus factual impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:

. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been committed
had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was
impossible of commission.

Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S.
vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter
made the act criminal if done without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter
without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with
the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held
unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested
by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of
this contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, following the principle of legality, no
person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:

Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of
attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the law take place, this
court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.

To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment, the offender
cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt
are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the
other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for an
attempt not for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime.
Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge — that is, attempt.

This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the
criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in
Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible
crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a
supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally
liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident
independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding
Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and
penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree
of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the
accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

Lessons Applicable:

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
•    February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to
Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan.  Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he
wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya
should accompany them.  Otherwise, he would also be killed.
•    February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and fired at
Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the room.
•    RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the witness

ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under Art. 4 (2)

HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding
Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay
the costs

•    Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
•    The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability to punish criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)
•    Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime
•    Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where 
1.    the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
2.    there is intention to perform the physical act
3.    there is a performance of the intended physical act
4.    the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime
o    Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead 
•    Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime – this case
o    Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's
wallet and finds the pocket empty
•    United States: where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or
accomplishment - attempt to commit a crime; legally impossible of accomplishment - cannot be held
liable for any crime
INTOD vs CA
G.R. No. 103119
October 21, 1992 

FACTS: 

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio

and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house. At the
instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's
bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said
room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her
home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the
room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire. 

RTC: Convicted Intod of ATTEMPTED MURDER CA: Affirmed in toto 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime committed is impossible crime (YES)

HELD:

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would

not amount to a crime. Thus, legal impossibility would apply to those
circumstances where:

1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the

law; 
2) there is intention to perform the physical act; 
3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and 
4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a
crime. 

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category. 

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous

circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his
hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet
and finds the pocket empty. 

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he
thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in
said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

In Philippine jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of

accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized
by itself.
G.R. Nos. 134072-73            June 10, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
CONSTANCIO CANDIDO y COLLARGA, accused-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Accused-appellant Constancio Candido y Collarga was found guilty of murder aggravated by the use
of an unlicensed firearm and sentenced to death in Criminal Case No. Q-94-58986 1 in the Decision
dated June 22, 1998 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 220, Quezon City. He was
likewise found guilty of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, 2 as amended by Republic Act No.
8294,3 in Criminal Case No. Q-94-58985 and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of prision correccional in its maximum period. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Constancio Candido
y Collarga GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, as principal, of the crimes of Violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294; and Murder
qualified by treachery and aggravated by use of unlicensed firearm punishable under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659, in
relation with (sic) Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294, and accordingly sentences him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of PRISION CORRECCIONAL IN ITS MAXIMUM
PERIOD and a fine of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) for violation of P.D.
1866, as amended, in Criminal Case No. Q-94-58985; and to suffer the penalty of DEATH
with all its accessory penalties and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Nelson Daras y
Pueblo in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), for murder in Crim. Case
No. Q-94-58985 (sic); subject to the rule on successive service of sentence under Article 70
of the Revised Penal Code.

The Director of Metro Manila Rehabilitation Center, Camp Ricardo Papa, Lower Bicutan,
Taguig, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to transfer the custody of the accused to the
National Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, pending appeal.

The Branch Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to transmit the entire records of this case to
the Supreme Court for automatic review.

SO ORDERED.4

The relevant antecedents are as follows:

The information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-58986 for murder alleged:

That on or about the 9th day of October, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and employ personal violence upon
the person of one NELSON DARAS y PUEBLO, by then and there shooting the latter with a .
38 caliber revolver hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said
NELSON DARAS y PUEBLO mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said NELSON DARAS y PUEBLO.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

The information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-58985 for Violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended,
alleged:

That on or about the 9th day of October, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused
without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control one (1) .38 cal. revolver Smith &
Wesson "paltik" with Serial No. 453822 with three (3) live ammunitions and three (3) spent
shells without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper
authorities.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6
During his arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. 7 Thereafter, joint trial
of the cases ensued.

The prosecution’s evidence consist of the (a) testimonies of (1) Perlita Baldoza, a cousin of victim
Nelson Daras, and an eyewitness to the shooting incident; (2) SPO1 Wilfredo Red who apprehended
the accused-appellant and confiscated the subject firearm from the latter; (3) SPO1 Gil J. Gregorio
who investigated the case; (4) Ruben Aliaga, a "peryante," also an eyewitness to the shooting
incident; (5) Dr. Bienvenido O. Muñoz, Medico-Legal Officer III, Medico-Legal Division, National
Bureau of Investigation, who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim and (b) documents
consisting of (1) the Certification, dated March 22, 1995 of the Firearms and Explosive Office,
PNPHQ, Civil Security Force Command, Camp Crame, showing that accused-appellant does not
possess any authority or license from the government to possess the subject firearm; and (2) the
Autopsy Report No. N-94-2046.

The prosecution sought to prove that at around ten-thirty in the evening of October 9, 1994, witness
Perlita Baldoza who was at her stall in the peryahan (mini carnival) behind the Camelot Hotel at
Scout Tuazon, Barangay South Triangle, Quezon City saw accused-appellant alighting from a taxi
as if he was looking for somebody.8 She knew the accused-appellant because he was "an overseer"
in the peryahan.9 The accused-appellant walked towards the victim and positioned himself behind
him. Then, he immediately pulled out a gun and fired at the victim, hitting him in the lower portion of
the breast.10 The victim fell. Not satisfied, the accused-appellant came closer to the victim, then, fired
at him twice hitting him once on the right side of his chest.11 Wasting no time, accused-appellant
made his getaway and ran towards the direction of Scout Tuazon, Quezon City. 12 With the help of
one Dennis Guinto, witness Baldoza brought the victim to the Capitol Medical Hospital where he was
declared dead on arrival.13

Ruben Aliaga, a coin overseer in the "coin-throwing" game in the peryahan, was on duty the night
the unfortunate incident took place and corroborated the testimony of witness Baldoza. 14 He testified
that he saw accused-appellant holding a gun ("a short gun") when the latter arrived at
the peryahan and he saw him shoot the victim three (3) times. The victim had his back turned on the
accused-appellant when the latter shot him from behind. After the shooting incident, he also helped
in bringing the victim to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. 15

In the meantime, SPO1 Wilfredo Red and SPO1 Malang were on patrol duty in the area along Scout
Tuazon Street, Quezon City when they heard three (3) successive shots fired. 16 They went to the
direction where the shots were fired and came upon the accused-appellant running away from the
said direction. He was holding a gun. 17 SPO1 Red fired a warning shot and introduced himself as a
police officer and told the accused-appellant to surrender his gun 18 but the latter did not heed the
warning and instead, he poked the gun at SPO1 Red, then, he ran away. 19SPO1 Red chased
accused-appellant. He was able to subdue him. He confiscated accused-appellant’s gun 20 and
noticed that the subject firearm was a homemade revolver, with three (3) live ammunition and three
(3) spent shells.21 When shown the subject gun with Serial No. 453822 in court, SPO1 Red identified
the same as the one he confiscated from the accused-appellant. 22

Dr. Bienvenido O. Muñoz, Medico-Legal Officer III of the Medico-Legal Division of the National
Bureau of Investigation conducted an autopsy of the victim and made the following postmortem
findings, viz.:

Pallor, conjunctivae and integument.

Abrasions, reddish brown: nasal bridge, 0.5 x 1.0 cm.; chin, across midline, 3.0 x 7.0 cm.;
thigh, left, lower third, anterior, 0.7 x 5.0 cm.

Lacerated wound, forehead, across midline, 3.0 cm.

Gunshot wounds:

1. Entrance, ovaloid, 0.8 x 1.0 cm., with a contusion collar widest at its upper border. Located
at the anterior chest, level of second intercostal space, right, 11.0 cm. from anterior median
line, 134.0 cm. above right heel. Directed backward, downward and from right to left, into the
right thoracic cavity, perforating the lower lobe of right lung then fracturing the body of
7th thoracic vertebra, into the posterior thoracic wall, where a bullet was lodged and
recovered, 2.5 cm. to the left of posterior median line, 120.0 cm. above the left heel;

2. Entrance, ovaloid, 0.9 x 1.0 cm., with a contusion collar widest at its lower border. Located
at the back, level 10th intercostal space, left, 16.0 cm. from posterior median line, 109.5 cm.
above left heel. Directed forward, upward and medially, perforating the diaphragm and
spleen and making an wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.0 cm., chest, anterior, level of 7th intercostal
space, left, 7.0 cm. from anterior median line, 112.0 cm. above left heel.
 Hemothorax, right-950 c.c.; left-750 c.c.

Hemoperitoneum-600 c.c.

Brain and other visceral organs, pale.

Stomach-empty.23

In his testimony, Dr. Muñoz declared that he found two (2) gunshot wounds in the victim’s body. One
was located at the front portion of the chest and the other one was located at the back. He declared
the two (2) fatal gunshot wounds were the cause of death of the victim. 24 When asked about the
distance of the muzzle of the gun used by the accused-appellant to the body of the victim when he
fired it, Dr. Muñoz said that the distance was probably more than 24 inches because of the absence
of any of the characteristics of a close range fire like smudging or burning. 25As to the position of the
victim vis-a-vis the assailant when shot, particularly the first shot, which was gunshot wound No. 2,
Dr. Muñoz said that the assailant was at the back of the victim and more to the left. 26 With respect to
gunshot wound No. 1, he said that the assailant and the victim were probably both standing and that
the assailant was in front and to the right of the victim and the victim was standing on a lower level
than the assailant because the trajectory of the bullet was downward and from right to left. 27

It was also proven that the gun which took the life of the victim was not properly registered as
required by law. P/Senior Inspector Edwin Roque of the Records Branch of the Philippine National
Police issued a certification stating that the 0.38 caliber revolver recovered from the accused-
appellant was not a licensed firearm and that accused-appellant was not a licensed or registered
holder of any kind of firearm.28

The accused-appellant was presented as the sole witness for the defense. He admitted the killing
but claimed that he did so in self-defense. He testified that at about six o’clock in the evening of
October 9, 1994, he reported for work as an overseer in the peryahan of one Tony Baguio.29 At
around ten-thirty in the evening of that day, he closed one of the stalls in the peryahan because the
owner of that stall did not arrive.30 Immediately thereafter, the victim approached him and angrily
asked why he closed the stall. Without waiting for him to answer, the victim boxed him on his left
ear,31 then asked the accused-appellant if he was going to fight back.32 Suddenly, the victim drew his
gun. Accused-appellant grappled with the victim for the possession of the gun. In the course of the
struggle, the gun fired hitting the victim on the left side of his stomach. 33 After the first shot was fired,
the struggle for the possession of the gun continued. Accused-appellant then tried to raise the gun
but it fired again twice, hitting the victim at his right shoulder. 34 At this point, somebody struck his
neck causing him to move backward. A commotion ensued. 35Thereafter, a policeman (whom the
accused-appellant later identified as SPO1 Wilfredo Red) poked a gun at him and ordered him to
raise his hands, then frisked his body and was able to get P9,000.00 and $50.00 from him.36The
policeman then boarded him on a jitney and brought him to Camp Karingal. 37

In his brief, the accused-appellant ascribed the following errors to the court a quo, to wit:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

CRIME OF MURDER.

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF

TREACHERY DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE SAME.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE VERSION OF

THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THAT HE WAS MERELY ACTING IN SELF-DEFENSE.

IV

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE PROVISION OF RA 8294 AND IN

CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR TWO SEPARATE OFFENSES.38

The accused-appellant assails his conviction in this automatic review and contends that the trial
court has gravely erred in convicting him of murder aggravated by the use of an unlicensed firearm
and sentencing him to death on the basis of the prosecution’s evidence.
The Court affirms the judgment of conviction but reduces the sentence of death to reclusion
perpetua.

Having admitted killing the victim, the accused-appellant has the burden of proving that he acted in
self-defense by establishing (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed by him to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on his part in defending himself.39Accused-appellant has failed to discharge this burden.

The version of accused-appellant of what transpired that night is simply incredible. He asserted that
at around ten-thirty in the evening of October 9, 1994, he closed one of the stalls in
the peryahan when the victim approached him and angrily asked why he closed the stall. Then,
without waiting for his answer, the victim boxed him on his left ear. 40 Surprised and irritated, he
asked the victim why he boxed him.41 Instead of answering, the victim drew his gun and asked
accused-appellant if he was going to fight back.42 Accused-appellant then grappled for the
possession of the gun. In the course of the struggle for possession of the same, the gun fired hitting
the victim on the left side of his stomach.43 While the struggle for the possession of the gun
continued, accused-appellant then tried to raise the gun but the same fired again twice, hitting the
victim at his right shoulder.44

The presence of a number of gunshot wounds on the body of the victim negates self-defense and
indicates a determined effort on the part of the accused-appellant to kill the victim. The autopsy
made on the body of the victim as shown by the postmortem report indubitably shows that the nature
and location of the gunshot wounds inflicted on the victim belie accused-appellant’s claim of self-
defense. Dr. Muñoz found two (2) gunshot wounds and declared that the same caused the death of
the victim. One of the wounds was located at the front portion of the chest while the other one was
located at the back. As to the position of the victim vis-a-vis the assailant when shot, particularly the
first shot, which was gunshot wound No. 2, Dr. Muñoz stated that in gunshot wound No. 2, which
was located at the back, the assailant would have been at the back of the victim and more to his
left.45 With respect to gunshot wound No. 1, he said that if the victim and the assailant were both
standing, the assailant would have been in front and to the right of the victim and the victim would
have been standing on a lower level than the assailant. 46 Quite clearly, these findings confirm the
testimony of witness Baldoza that accused-appellant alighted from a taxicab, positioned himself
behind the victim and shot him at the back. When the victim fell to the ground, the accused-appellant
fired at him again.47 Dr. Muñoz further stated that the gun was not fired at close range because of the
absence of smudging or burning around the victim’s wound, thereby, negating accused-appellant’s
claim that the gun accidentally fired while he and the victim were grappling for the possession
thereof. Likewise, it is highly improbable for the victim to have been shot at the back if the gun
accidentally fired in the course of the struggle for its possession, as this would assume that the
victim’s hand holding the gun was twisted abnormally to reach his back with the gun muzzle pointed
at his back when the gun exploded. Accused-appellant did not testify that such an impossible
scenario took place. What is clear is that the nature and location of the gunshot wounds are physical
evidence that demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend oneself. 48

A plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated where it is not only uncorroborated by

independent and competent evidence, but also extremely doubtful by itself. 49 Here, accused-
appellant was presented as the sole witness for the defense. No other witness was presented to
testify how the fateful shooting happened. If it were true, as declared by the accused-appellant, that
a lot of people were present during the scuffle and wanted to pacify them, why had not there been
any attempt to present anyone of them to support his story. Notable among the persons he
mentioned were prosecution witnesses Baldoza and Aliaga who, far from helping him substantiate
his claim of self-defense, acknowledged their presence at the scene of the crime and testified
against him.

The eyewitness account of Perlita Baldoza was plain, clear, categorical and spontaneous. She
testified:

Q         On October 9, 1994 at around 10:30 p.m., do you recall where were you?

A         Yes, ma’am.

Q         Where were you then, Madam Witness?

A         In Scout Tuazon in my stall at the "peryahan", ma’am.

Q         While you were at your "peryahan" in Scout Tuazon, Quezon City, was there any
unusual incident that happened?

A         Yes, ma’am.
Q         What was that?

A         The accused, Constancio Candido, fired a gun at Nelson Daras.

Q         Now, prior to the time that accused Constancio Candido fired at Nelson Daras, have
you noticed Mr. Nelson Daras?

xxx

A         Yes, Your Honor.

FISCAL LACAP:

Where was Nelson Daras then prior to the shooting incident?

A         He was watching color games.

Q         Where was this color game that Nelson Daras was watching then?

A         There also at the "peryahan".

xxx

FISCAL LACAP:

How far was this color game from the place where you were?

A         Almost two meters.

Q         From where you were?

A         Yes, ma’am.

Q         While Nelson Daras was watching the color game, what happened after that?

A         While Nelson Daras was busy watching games, the accused Constancio Candido
suddenly appeared, alighting from a taxi as if he is looking for somebody.

Q         When you said "Tisoy", to whom are you referring to?

A         He is the one (Witness pointing to the accused Constancio Candido).

Q         Prior to October 9, 1994, do you know "Tisoy" already?

A         Yes, ma’am.

Q         Why do you know him?

A         He is also our companion. He is also in the "peryahan".

Q         As co-worker?

A         He is also working in the said "peryahan" where I have my stall.

Q         When you saw accused Constancio Candido as if he was looking for somebody else,
what happened next, if any?

A         When he saw Nelson Daras, he immediately pulled his gun and fired at Nelson.

Q         What was Nelson doing then?

A         He was watching color games.

xxx

FISCAL LACAP:
 You said that after alighting from a taxi and accused turned his head as if he is
looking for somebody else, how did he approach Nelson Daras?

A         I just saw him fire a gun at Nelson.

Q         Have you seen the gun that was used by the accused?

xxx

A         Yes, sir.

FISCAL LACAP:

What kind of gun did he use?

A         A short gun.

Q         Do you know what was the caliber of that gun?

A         No. I just noticed it is a short gun.

Q         After the accused fired his gun or shot Nelson Daras, what happened next, Madam
Witness?

A         Nelson Daras fell down.

Q         Do you know on what part of the body was Nelson Daras shot at by the accused
here?

A         Yes, ma’am.

Q         Where?

(Witness is pointing to her chest, the lower portion of the breast.) Madam Witness, when the
accused fired the first shot at Nelson Daras, where was he in relation to Nelson Daras?

A         At the back of Nelson Daras.

Q         After the accused fired a shot at Nelson Daras, what happened next?

A         Nelson Daras fell down.

Q         After Nelson Daras fell down, what transpired after that?

A         He came closer to Nelson Daras and fired at him twice.

Q         What happened next?

A         With the help of Dennis Guinto, we brought Nelson Daras to the Capitol Medical
Hospital.50

Witness Aliaga corroborated the foregoing testimony of witness Baldoza when he declared in a
simple and straightforward manner that the accused-appellant shot the victim three (3) times, hitting
him in the back. Both testimonies are consistent in all material points and no ill motive or reason was
shown to indicate that said witnesses falsely testified against accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant also contends that the court a quo erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of treachery despite the prosecution’s failure to establish the same.

Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code provides that treachery or alevosia exists when
the offender commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods, or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 51 The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of
any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. 52
The trial court correctly held that treachery had qualified the killing to murder. The suddenness of the
attack, apparently without any provocation on the part of the victim, should suffice to demonstrate
the treacherous nature of the aggression. The accused-appellant surreptitiously positioned himself at
the back of the victim, aimed his gun, and without warning, shot the latter. When the victim fell to the
ground, he again shot him twice. Clearly, the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim
to defend himself.

However, there is merit to accused-appellant’s contention that the trial court should have
appreciated illegal possession of firearms merely as an aggravating circumstance in the murder
case, instead of treating it as a separate crime. Although R.A. No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997,
or after the crimes involved in the case at bar were committed on October 9, 1994, it is
advantageous to the accused, hence, it should be given retrospective application 53 insofar as it
spares the accused-appellant from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of
firearm.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294 further amended Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, which in part, provides:

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Under the aforequoted section, where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, the separate penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall no longer be meted
out since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. The penalty for illegal possession
of firearms shall be imposed in all other cases where none of the crimes enumerated under R.A. No.
8294 is committed. The intent of Congress is to treat the offense of illegal possession of firearm and
the commission of homicide or murder with the use of unlicensed firearm as a single offense. 54

In view of this provision, the Court has held in a number of cases 55 that there can be no separate
conviction of the crime of illegal possession of firearm in a case where another crime, as indicated in
RA. No. 8294 (murder or homicide under Section 1, and rebellion, insurrection, sedition or
attempted coup d’etat under Section 3), is committed.

In the case at bar, although the prosecution was able to establish that the crime of illegal possession
of firearm under P.D. No. 1866 had been committed by the accused-appellant, R.A. No. 8294 merely
considers the use of an unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance in murder or
homicide, and not as a separate offense. Fortunately for the accused-appellant, the use of an
unlicensed firearm in the killing of the victim was not alleged in the information for murder. Such
being the case, the same could not be used as an aggravating circumstance to warrant the
imposition of the death penalty against the accused-appellant. 56

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated June 22, 1998 is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-
appellant Constancio Candido y Collarga is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of the
murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CONSTANCIO CANDIDO y COLLARGAG.R. Nos. 134072-73June 10,
2002Facts:

 At around 10:30 pm of October 9, 1994, the Constancio Candido walked towards the victim,Nelson
Daras and he immediately pulled out a gun and fired at the victim. The victim fell but Candido,
notsatisfied, came closer to him and fired him twice hitting him once on the right side of his chest. After
theincident, Candido ran while Daras was brought to the hospital but declared dead on arrival. Ruben
Aliaga, acoin overseer, testified for the incident.The gun used by Candido was not registered as required
by law. The accused admitted the killingbut claimed that he did so in defense. Accused-
appellant Constancio Candido y Collarga was found guilty of murder aggravated by theuse of an
unlicensed firearm and sentenced to death in the Decision dated June 22, 1998 rendered by theRegional
Trial Court, Branch 220, Quezon City. He was likewise found guilty of Violation of PresidentialDecree No.
1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty ofimprisonment
of 

prision

correccional

in its maximum period.

Issue:

Whether illegal possession of firearm is an aggravating circumstance in the murder case, insteadof
treating it as a separate crime in accordance to R.A. No. 8294.

Ruling:

Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997. Republic Act No. 8294 should be givenretrospective
application insofar as it spares the accused from a separate conviction for the crime of illegalpossession
of firearm.The Court held that there can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession of
firearm ina case where another crime, as indicated in RA. No. 8294 (murder or homicide under Section
1, andrebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup detat under Section 3), is committed.Section 1
of R.A. No. 8294 further amended Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, which in part, provides,

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such use of anunlicensed firearm
shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

 In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8294 merely considers the use of an unlicensed firearm as a
specialaggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a separate offense
People vs. Galacgac CA 54 O.G. 1027 Criminal Law, Generality principle in Criminal Law

JANUARY 11, 2018

FACTS:

On November 22, 1951, as a consequence of a shooting and beating spree which occurred in Sta. Cruz,
Manila, Enrique Galacgac, a naturalized American Citizen and Paulino Galacgac were accussed of attempted
parricide with physical serious injuries in Criminal Case NO. 19292 however, after trial Paulino  was
acquitted.  Enrique was also charged with frustrated homicide in Criminal Case 19293, with two separate
charges of attempted homicide, Criminal Case 19294 and 19295, and with illegal possession of firearms in
Criminal Case No.19296 however, likewise after trial was acquitted from the Criminal Case 19293 and 19294
but convicted for Criminal Case 19292, 19295 and 19296. And Pablo Soriano was accused of frustrated
homicide in Criminal case 19297.

For the Criminal Case 19292, serious physical injuries; Criminal Case 19295, attempted homicide and Criminal
Case 19296, illegal possession of firearms he was sentenced to suffer respectively, four months of arresto
mayor, an indeterminate penalty of from six months of arresto mayor to one year and eight months of
prision correctional and an imprisonment of one year and one day.

Pablo Soriano was found guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries, and was sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from six months of arresto mayor to one year and eight months of prision
correctional and to pay the cost except for criminal case 19292, Enrique was ordered to pay one-half of the
cost.  Not satisfied Enrique and Soriano appealed the judgments.

On appeal, Galacgac claimed that the firearm was a homecoming present for his wife and that he arrived at
3:00pm in Manila however the Phil Constabulary closes at 4:00pm and therefore he failed to secure a license
for the firearm.  Likewise, he claimed that being an American Citizen he couldn’t be prosecuted and likewise
convicted of illegal possession of firearm since in the United States it is a constitutional right “to keep and
bear arms.”

The indiscriminate shooting which resulted to the injury of Marina Ramos and Alfonso Ramos was brought
about by the hitting of Pablo Soriano with an iron bar on the forehead of Enrique twice causing blood to
profusely ooze from his head and thus making him dizzy and dimming his vision, when the latter interfered in
a marital argument.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Galacgac was liable for the crimes committed.

RULING:

The SC modified the judgment of the lower court, Enrique Galacgac was sentenced to suffer ten days of
arresto menor and pay one-half of the cost of Criminal Case 19292;  undergo same number of days of arresto
menor and to pay the cost in Criminal Case 19295; and an indeterminate imprisonment of from one year to
two years and six months, and to pay the cost for Criminal Case 19296.

Pablo Soriano was sentenced to suffer fifteen days of arresto menor and to pay the cost in Criminal Case
19297.

Enrique Galacgac  claimed that he is exempt from prosecution being and American Citizen and an employee
of the U.S. Navy.  The SC held that a mere civilian of the U.S. Navy is not entitled to any extra –territorial
privilege for, strictly speaking, he is not a member of the armed forces of the United States Army.

With regards to the illegal possession of firearms, based on sec.892 of the Revised Administrative Code,
ordains that any person, whether a national or foreigner, coming to the Philippines and bringing with him any
firearm, must deposit the same with the Collector of Customs who in turn must deliver it to the Phil
Constabulary, from which the firearm cannot be taken until the importer shall have secured a license to
possess it.

With regards to Pablo Soriano’s claim that he acted in defense of Concepcion, his testimony was belied by
Concepcion Ramos and Mauricio Ramos proving that Soriano did not act in defense of his person and his
family
FRANCISCO ESTOLAS vs. ADOLFO MABALOT

FACTS:

A Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision

of the CA.

On November 11, 1973, a Certificate of Land Transfer was issued in favor of respondent

over a 5,000 square meter lot located in Barangay Samon, Sta. Maria, Pangasinan.

In need of money for medical expenses, respondent passed on the subject land to the

petitioner for the amount of P5,800.00 and P200.00 worth of rice. According to respondent,

there was only a verbal mortgage; while according to petitioner, a sale had taken place.

Acting on the transfer, the DAR officials authorized the survey and issuance of an

Emancipation Patent, leading to the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3736 on

December 4, 1987, in favor of the petitioner.

Sometime in May, 1988, respondent filed a Complaint against the petitioner before the

Barangay Lupon for the purpose of redeeming the subject land. When no amicable settlement

was reached, the case was referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform’s regional office.

On July 8, 1988, Atty. Linda F. Peralta of the DAR’s District Office submitted her

investigation report finding that respondent merely gave the subject land to petitioner as

guarantee for the payment of a loan and recommending that the CLT remain in the name of

respondent.

Petitioner insisted that the subject land had been sold to him by respondent and requested

the DAR to cancel the CLT in respondent’s name. Another investigation was conducted on the

matter which led to the Order issued by DAR Regional Director Antonio M. Nuesa. DAR found

the act of respondent in surrendering the subject land in favor of petitioner as constituting

abandonment and denied respondent’s prayer for redemption of the subject land.

Respondent appealed the case to the DAR Central Office which issued an Order reversing

the assailed Order of DAR Regional Director Antonio M. Nuesa and ordering the petitioner to

return the subject land to respondent. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner theorizes that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) may award the land

to another qualified farmer-grantee.

Issue:

W/N respondent abandon the subject property, thereby making it available to other qualified

farmer-grantees?

Held:

Petition has no merit.

This Court has always ruled that agrarian laws must be interpreted liberally in favor of
the grantees in order to give full force and effect to the clear intent of such laws: "to achieve a

dignified existence for the small farmers"; and to make them "more independent, self-reliant and

responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society." Neither are we

convinced that an award under PD 27 may be transferred to another in case the grantee abandons

it. The law is explicit. Title acquired pursuant to PD 27 shall not be transferable except to the

grantee's heirs by hereditary succession, or back to the government by other legal means.

For abandonment to exist, the following requisites must be proven: (a) a clear and absolute

intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property and (b) an external act by

which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. There must be an actual, not merely a

projected, relinquishment; otherwise, the right or claim is not vacated or waived and, thus,

susceptible of being appropriated by another. Administrative Order No. 2, issued on March 7,

1994, defines abandonment or neglect as a “willful failure of the agrarian reform beneficiary,

together with his farm household, to cultivate, till or develop his land to produce any crop, or to

use the land for any specific economic purpose continuously for a period of two calendar

years.” In the present case , no such “willful failure ” has been demonstrated.

Furthermore, even if respondent did indeed abandon his right to possess and cultivate the

subject land, any transfer of the property may only be made in favor of the government.

In the present case, there was no valid transfer in favor of the government. It was petitioner

himself who requested the DAR to cancel respondent’s CLT and to issue another one in his

favor.

Petition denied
PEOPLE v. ROMANA SILVESTRE, GR No. 35748, 1931-12-14

Facts:

Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage, cohabited with her codefendant Martin
Atienza

On May 16,  1930,... Domingo Joaquin, filed with the justice of the peace for that municipality, a sworn
complaint for adultery... the two defendants begged... the municipal president  of Paombong... to speak to
the complainant... urging  him to withdraw the complaint

Domingo Joaquin acceded to it... and... the justice of the peace of  Paombong dismissed the adultery case
commenced against the accused

About November 20, 1930, the accused Romana Silvestre met her son by her former marriage,  Nicolas de la
Cruz, in the barrio of Santo Nino, and under pretext of asking him for some nipa  leaves

On the night of November 25,  1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz and his wife, Antonia de  la Cruz, were...
gathered together

Martin Atienza told said couple to take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to  it.

Upon being asked... why he  wanted to set fire to the house, he... answered that that was the  only way he
could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against
him and his codefendant

Alarmed at  what Martin Atienza had said, the couple left the  house at once to communicate with the barrio
lieutenant,  Buenaventura Ania,... as to what they had just heard Martin  Atienza  say; but they had hardly
gone a hundred arms' length when they heard cries of "Fire!  Fire!" Turning back they saw their home in
flames

The  fire destroyed ... about  forty-eight houses.

Tomas Santiago... and Tomas Gonzalez,... saw Martin Atienza... going away from the house where the fire
started, and Romana Silvestre leaving it.

With respect to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, the only evidence  of record against her  are:... that
Romana Silvestre listened to  her co-defendant's threat without raising a protest, and did not give the  alarm
when the latter... set  fire to the house.  Upon the strength of these  facts, the court below found her guilty of
arson as accomplice.

Issues:

which previous or simultaneous acts complicate Romana Silvestre in the crime of arson  committed by her co-
defendant Martin  Atienza?

Ruling:

Article 14 of  the Penal  Code,  considered  in connection with article 13,  defines an  accomplice to be one
who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit
it, nor cooperates in the... commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or  simultaneous actions

In the case of the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or... material
cooperation, and none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence
while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation,  for it does not appear that they 
encouraged or  nerved Martin Atienza to commit the... crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the
alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.

Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere  silence and  failure to give the alarm, without
evidence of agreement  or conspiracy, do... not constitute the cooperation required by  article 14 of the
Penal  Code for complicity  in  the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to which one
has kept silent;

Principles:

Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere  silence and  failure to give the alarm, without
evidence of agreement  or conspiracy, do... not constitute the cooperation required by  article 14 of the
Penal  Code for complicity  in  the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to which one
has kept silent

People vs. Silvestre and Atienza (Crim1)

People of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza, defendants-
appellants.

En Banc

Villareal, December 14, 1931

Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art 3.) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission

Facts:

 Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage

 Romana cohabited with codefendant Martin Atienza from March 1930 in Masocol, Paombong,
Bulacan

 On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the peace for Paombong, Bulacan a sworn
complaint for adultery

 After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged the municipal president of
Paombong to speak to the complainant and urge him to withdraw the complaint

 The two accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised not to live again
in Masocol (Atienza signed the promise)

 On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint and the
justice of the peace dismissed the adultery case

 The accused left Masocol and wen to live in Santo Niño, in Paombong

 About November 20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in
Santo Niño and followed him home to Masocol (under the pretext of asking him for some nipa
leaves)

 Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed her and lived in the home of
Nicolas

 On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the appellants were
gathered after supper, Martin told Nicolas and Antonia to take their furniture out of the house
because he was going to set fire to it

 He said that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol
who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and Romana

 Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him

 Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but were too late

 The fire destroyed about 48 houses

 Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire

 The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of arson 

 Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8 months, and 1 day
of cadena temporal)

 Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio mayor)

  The court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the affirmance of the CFI
decision with regard to Martin, but assigns errors with reference to Romana:

 The lower court erred in convicting Romana as acoomplice

 The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of insufficient evidence, or at
least, of reasonable doubt

Issue:

 Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice

Holding:

 No.

Ratio:

 Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one who does
not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to
commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would
not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or
simultaneous actions.

 In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of an
agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are
simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged
or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm,
that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.

 Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the
alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required
by Art. 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively,
or with regard to which one has kept silent

Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin Atienza, reversed with reference to Romana Silvestre, who
is acquitted.