IS THERE A THEORY OF FEDERALISM?

The Federal Principle: A Journey Through Time in Quest of a

Meaning. By S. Rufus Davis. (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1978). Pp. xi, 237. $14.50.

HE most comprehensive bibliography of federalism, in theory

T and practice, was published in 1967 and runs to 231 pages.' It is
not unreasonable to assume that, updated to the present, it would
cover in excess of 300 pages. But anyone undertaking that task
would at once be confronted by the problem of definition. K.C.
Wheare entitled his classic study of the subject Federal
Government, 2 avoiding the problem by the (relatively simple)
technique of deducing a definition from an examination of the best-
known examples of the species. Rufus Davis has chosen the term
"Federal Principle" for his scrutiny of the concept.
Davis' purpose is "to take stock of an idea that has lived a long
life,...was once an ornament of political science,...[but] has begun
to show distinct marks of wear and tear" (ix). The evidence of hard
times for the concept of federalism, says Davis, is everywhere: "in
the many and different approaches to the subject; in the varying at-
tempts to rectify its name; in the contradictory programs urged in its
name; in the alternating arrangements brought within its fold; in
the minimal returns of comparative studies; and in the growing
disinclination of many scholars to work with the concept" (ibid.).
Examples come, of course, readily to mind. When lawyers discuss
federalism in the United States it is inevitably in the context of the
provisions of the Constitution. Justice Black provided a rare excep-
tion when he undertook, in 1971, to define "Our Federalism" as "a
system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both
State and National Governments, and in which the National
Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect
federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in
ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of

1. Albert Liboiron, Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations in Australia,

Canada, the United States and Other Countries (Kingston, Ontario: Institute of In-
tergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 1967).
2. (4th edition; New York: New York University Press, 1964).
288 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

the State."3 The problem with that definition is, of course, in the
repeated use of the word "legitimate." What activities are
"legitimately" in the province of the member units rather than of the
nation? The Constitution of the United States offers few answers to
that question, leaving it even unsaid who, within the political
system, is to resolve the issue. More modern constitutions, often con-
ceived with a clear recognition of the tensions between states and
nation in the United States, have attempted to be more specific. In-
dia's elaborate schedules of powers that are exclusively the nation's,
exclusively the states', and not exclusive to either sphere go to the ex-
treme-but have not allowed that country to escape conflict be-
tween states and nation.
Political scientists are not as uniform in their approach as lawyers
are, and for good reasons. The diversity of perspectives in political
science is such that one can hardly expect anything else. Davis-who
has a fine way with words-entitles the chapter in which he
discusses modern political science approaches "The Twentieth Cen-
tury Doctors," with the subtitle "as many men, so many theories"
(155). The best he is able to do with the wide-ranging views is to
categorize them. Wheare and those who have followed his lead are
said to see federalism as a matter of degree; Carl Friedrich is iden-
tified as principal representative of the view that federalism should
be seen as a process; and Morton Grodzins and Daniel Elazar are
given prominence as exponents of "federalism as sharing" (158, 173,
182). But in summarizing his overview of the "twentieth century
doctors" Davis reaches the conclusion that the "deep ambivalence"
he perceives in their views is really unavoidable: given the nature
and experience of the American polity, how is one to reconcile the
reality of the national government's power with the persistent facts
of diversity?
It is worth recalling that Harold Laski predicted in 1939 that
federalism in the United States would become obsolete because it
would prove unable to "cope with...outstanding problems,...to
satisfy living demands,...to keep pace with the tempo of the life
giant capitalism has evolved." 4 But, as Davis observes (206), this

3. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).

4. Harold J. Laski, "The Obsolescence of Federalism," The New Republic, 98:367
(1939). This article was widely reprinted in standard collections of readings for begin-
ning American government courses in the 1940s and 1950s.
Laski restated his position nearly ten years later: "Federalism, which began by seek-
 IS THERE A THEORY OF FEDERALISM 289

deprecatory view of federalism in 1939 is not too different from that

of A.V. Dicey who, in 1885, asserted that "a federation...will
always be at a disadvantage in a contest with unitarian states of
equal resources."5

II

Federations have indeed failed in recent history but not for either
'
Dicey' s or Laski s reasons. The West Indies Federation, a product of
British initiative, reached an end in 1962, shortly after Jamaica and
Trinidad-Tobago, its most populous units, decided to withdraw.°
Malaysia and Singapore reached a parting of the ways in 1965, after
only two years of federation experience.' The Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland fell apart, after ten years existence; shortly
afterwards Nyasaland became the nation of Malawi and Northern
Rhodesia attained independence under the name of Zambia while
Southern Rhodesia declared itself independent of Great Britain and
would resist the end of white rule for another fifteen years.'
But Malaysia (less Singapore) continues as an effective federation,
India and Nigeria have joined the ranks of federally organized
polities, and Austria and Germany, (though only a part of the latter)
returned to the practice of federalism which had been obliterated by
Hitler's dictatorship. Debate over federalism has become increasing-
ly lively-and occasionally critical-in the established federations.
Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the United States are all, to
varying degrees, engaged in renewed search for the appropriate

ing to maintain variety in unity, has ended [sic] by succumbing to the influence of
giant capitalism." The American Democracy (New York: Viking Press, 1948), p. 50.
See also Karl Loewenstein, "The Value of Constitutions in Our Revolutionary Age,"
in: Arnold Zurcher, ed., Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II
(New York: New York University Press, 1951), pp. 211-212.
5. A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th ed.,
London: Macmillan, 1964), P. 172.
6. G.H. Flanz, "West Indian Federation," in: Thomas M. Franck, ed., Why
Federations Fail (New York: New York University, 1968), pp. 91-123; Ursula K.
Hicks, Federalism: Failure and Success (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978),
pp. 55-68.
7. Frank N. Trager, "The Federation of Malaysia," in: Franck, ed., op. cit., pp.
125-166; Hicks, op. cit., pp. 87-75.
8. Herbert J. Spiro, "The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland," in: Franck, ed.,
op. cit., pp. 37-89; Hicks, op. cit., pp. 76-84.
290. THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

balance between the powers of the nation and the powers of the
states.
Academic interest in federalism reflects this intensified public
concern. In the decade following the end of World War II signifi-
cant work was stimulated by the possibility of a federated Europe. 9
Canadian and Australian scholars, in more recent years, have
responded to sharply increased tensions in their respective federal
systems. 10 The International Political Science Association conducted
a roundtable on federalism at Oxford in 1963 and made "new trends
in the theory and practice of federalism" a major topic of its sixth
world congress in Geneva in 1964.
In the United States Morton Grodzins initiated a significant study
group on federalism at the University of Chicago. His student,
Daniel Elazar, continued and enlarged this effort, establishing the
Center for the Study of Federalism at Temple University, and a
quarterly journal, appropriately named Publius, dedicated solely to
the subject of federalism. A roster of American scholars alone who
have addressed themselves to various aspects of federalism would
easily fill several pages.
This cursory survey-which makes no claim to com-
pleteness-suggests that John Fischer may have been right when he
observed in 1954 that "the idea of federalism is more alive today
than at any time in the last 150 years."" But what do we mean when
we speak of federalism?
As Daniel Elazar observed in his article for the International En-
cyclopedia of the Social Sciences, "no single definition of federalism

9. E.g., R.R. Bowie and Carl J. Friedrich, eds., Studies in Federalism, (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1954); Karl W. Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the Atlantic
Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of
Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 1968); Arthur W. Macmahon, ed., Federalism, Mature and Emergent
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955), esp. Part Four.
10. E.g., R.B. Byers and Robert W. Reford, eds., Canada Challenged: The
Viability of Confederation (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs,
1979); P.A. Crepeau and C.B. McPherson, eds., The Future of Canadian Federalism
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965); R.L. Mathews, Intergovernmental Rela-
tions in Australia (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1974).
11. John Fischer, "Prerequisites of Balance," in: Macmahon, op. cit., n. 9, p. 58.
 IS THERE A THEORY OF FEDERALISM 291

has proved satisfactory to all students." 12 Davis wonders (204)

whether the subject has not been "slowly poisoned by increasing
doses of qualifications and rechristenings," and then presents no less
than 44 types of federalism which has has uncovered in the current
literature. (At that, he does not include the ultimate
19 oxymoron, the
German writer Hesse's "unitarian federalism.")
Davis presents his list of adjectives in random order without either
identifying the source or characterizing the qualification each adjec-
tive imposes upon the noun. But, roughly speaking, the array of con-
cepts can be divided into two groups: one which owes its origins to
academic• efforts to produce a taxonomic description, the other
which serves normative or programatic ends. Phrases like
"creative," "cooperative," "new" federalism are all images original-
ly conjured up by politicians. Academics then attempt to delineate
what these phrases mean.
But these efforts are rarely successful. Take the term "cooperative
federalism." Elazar defines it as patterned sharing or negotiated
coordination s ' but, following Grodzins, he also maintains that this
sharing (or coordination) had been a characteristic of the American.
system of government since its inception in 1789. But, one may ask,
is not joint effort a presupposition of any federal system? Unless
there is agreement on basic goals of the political system, can there be
a division of the system's powers? At best, the addition of the adjec-
tive connotes a special intensity of the pattern of sharing; at worst, it.
is no more than a pleonasm.
One could perform similar or comparable analyses with other ad-
jectival phrases intended to give the word "federalism" a special
meaning. Davis concludes that the plethora of modifiers merely
reflects the absence of an ascertainable (and reliable) content of the
noun itself (chapter 7). Those who have sought to construct a theory
of federalism have failed: "the informational, explanatory and
descriptive value of the federal symbol is very much less than it was

12. Daniel J. Elazar, "Federalism," in: Davis L. Sills, ed., International En-
cyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), vol. 5,
p. 335. Elazar is also the author of the entry "Federalism" in the fifteenth edition of the
Encyclopedia Britannica (Warren E. Preece, ed.: Chicago, Encyclopedia Britannica,.
1978), Macropaedia, vol. 7, p. 202.
13. Konrad Hesse, Der uniterasche Bunessstaat (1962), cited by Carl J. Friedrich,
Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 115.
14. Op. cit., n. 13.
292 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

once thought to be;...the language of traditional analysis offers us

little security;... the structure of a federal system is simply the
designation of the visible, never the invisible" (298).

III

Davis thus confirms what C.T. Hughes wrote in 1964:

The Received Theory seems...to assume that there is a discoverable thing called
"federalism." It [the theory] proceeds from a provisional definition, which
stands at the beginning of the book, through an examination and description of
the empirical data in the light of that definition, to a more refined definition at
the end of the book. This is justifiable on certain assumptions, though there is a
tendency for the assumptions to shift as the examination proceeds. The initial
assumption is of a sort of nominalism-"federalism is what I say it is"-but the
final assumption is a sort of realism-"there is a real thing called federalism,
and it looks like this."...I think there are such real things as "state" and
"justice"...but I think federalism itself is a term which does not have this thing-
status. le

This is not the place to discuss the problem of definition in the

social sciences. Federalism is not the only term that seems to defy
definition. It is not surprising that some writers have concluded that
federalism as a concept is absurd,'° that"
others have flatly ques-
tioned whther federalism even exists, and that one recent writer
proclaims that "the logic of federalism has ceased to inform
American political practice. " 18
Yet in the name of federalism elections are contested and lawsuits
are argued. Four days before Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as
President of the United States the National Conference of State
Legislatures and the National Governors' Association issued a state-
ment calling for reform (not resurrection or revival) of the American

15. Christopher J. Hughes, "The Theory of Confederacies," (working paper for the
Sixth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Geneva,
1964), p. 3.
16. Martin Shapiro, "Federalism," in Ronald K.L. Collins, ed., Constitutional
Government in America (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1980)., p. 359. It should
be noted that Shapiro's reference is to federalism as a legal concept.
17. William H. Riker, "Six Books in Search of a Subject-or Does Federalism Exist
and Does It Matter?" Comparative Politics, vol. 2, p. 135 (1965).
18. James O. Robertson, American Myth, American Reality, (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1980), p. 309.
 IS THERE A THEORY OF FEDERALISM 293

federal system. 10 In 1969 Professor Riker had conceded that some

lawyers, at least, acted as if federalism were real; he, however,
could only consider it a legal fiction of no significance to the realities
of governmental life. In 1981, federalism in America is, without
question, a live issue.
Why, then, this frustration of the academics? Is the search for one
unifying "federal principle" not to be fulfilled? Is it even worth pur-
suing?
It is well to bear in mind that thinking (and writing) about
federalism was for perhaps too long a time encumbered by two
significant limitations: the apparent success of the American model
and-possibly related-an almost total concentration on legal struc-
tures. Davis designates the product of the Philadelphia Convention
as "Federalism Mk. I" (Chapter 4); Friedrich does not include the
United States among the case studies that form the second half of his
Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice because "most readers
will be familiar with the ongoing discussion and development in our
country. "20
More important is the extent to which other nations have been in-
fluenced by the American model. 21 Toqueville had acclaimed the
creation of the federal state in North America as a novel contribu-
tion to statecraft and indeed there had never before been an ar-
rangement that so effectively blended national purposes with local
autonomy. Relatively little was known in the nineteenth century
about earlier historic precedents. There were two "confederations"
in existence, the Swiss-until 1848 little more than a loose pattern of
22
alliance and occasional collaboration -and the even looser Ger-
man Confederation that had emerged from the Congress of Vienna
in 1815. There were, also, the historic examples of the Hanseatic

19. State Legislatures, February 1981, is gven over to the topic of reform of the
federal system. The NCSL-NGA statement appears on page 7. See also the monograph
series being released by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
under the general title The Federal Role in the Federal System: The Dynamics of
Growth (1980-81).
20. Carl J. Friedrich, Op. cit., n. 13, p. 174.
21. The following discussion leans heavily on Chapter III, "Federalism," of Carl J.
Friedrich, The Impact of American Constitutionalism Abroad (Boston: Boston Univer-
sity Press, 1967).
22. The Swiss complicated the issue by retaining the term "confederation" for the
system they adopted in 1848.
294 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

League and the United Netherlands. Obviously these were not

desirable models for the nation-builders of the nineteenth century.
The United States, by contrast, was a success story. Here monarchic
government had been shaken off; since "the first new nation" had
based its government on federalism, other new nations undertook to
follow that example.
In Latin America, the reaction to the highly centralized ad-
ministration of the Spanish crown (through the four vice-royalties of
Mexico, Nueva Granada, Peru and La Plata) was heavily over-
shadowed by the example of the United States. But, as Harry Kantor
has pointed out, the presuppositions for successful federal ar-
rangements were wanting z3

In no Latin American country which adopted federalism were lines delimiting

the subdivisions drawn with any real understanding of the requisites for
creating viable units.... In the United Stated federalism worked because the
central government began with limited powers and grew through the years. In
Latin America it did not work because the central government in all the federal
states simply never relinquished enough power to the states or provinces to
allow them to become truly self-governing units....[In addition,] the tradition
of Spanish authoritarianism was strong, bred by centuries of colonial rule.
Uniformity was stimulated by the system of Roman law and by the unifying in-
fluence of the Roman Catholic Church, the dominant religious institution. 24

Few traces of federalism remain today in Latin America. Four

countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela) are, if one
reads their constitutions only, federal states. But the political
realities say otherwise. In the three countries first named the central
government has the constitutional power to intervene in the affairs
of the constituent states. "Intervencion" is commonly justified by
allegations of corruption or threats to the national interest. In fact,
the practice has been (and is) used to remove political opponents and
assure control by the dominant regime. In Venezuela, the central
government appoints the governors of the states and normally treats
them more as its agents than as officials of a distinct and separate
political entity. In all four countries there is great disparity, both in
population and wealth, among the constituent parts. In Argentina

23. Harry Kantor, "Latin American Federalism, Aspiration and Futility," in:
Valerie Earle, ed., Federalism: Infinite Variety in Theory and Practice (Itasca, Il-
linois: F.E. Peacock, 1968), pp. 186-187.
24. Ibid., pp. 205-208.
 IS THERE A THEORY OF FEDERALISM 295

the Federal Capital (Buenos Aires) and the province of Buenos Aires
together comprise virtually half of the nation's population. In Brazil
the two largest states, Sao Paolo and Minas Gerais (18 percent and
14 percent of the population) have traditionally predominated. One
of every five Mexicans lives in the Federal District (Mexico City) and
the same is true in Venezuela.
Kantor, writing in 1967, 25 was, pessimistic about the future of
federalism in Latin America and (except possibly for Venezuela
which has seen prosperity and increased political life in the interven-
ing years) there is little to make a different prognosis today. But
Kantor also noted "a great desire to continue federalism" in these
four nations as well as a trend toward closer ties among the five
republics of Central America. He foresaw, perhaps somewhat
wishfully, the possibility of "a type of federalism peculiar to Latin
America." It is, in any case, demonstrable that liberal elements in
Latin America have traditionally assumed that the desirable alter-
native to despotism and oligarchic regimes should be modeled after
the government of the United States, including its federal character.
Historically, the year 1848 marks the first major impact of
American federalism on European events. In that year Switzerland
adopted a federal constitution. In Germany the National Assembly
of Frankfurt produced a federal constitution but its labors proved in
vain. In both cases, the American model figured preeminently in the
discussions of the constitution-writers. Perhaps understandably, the
Swiss assembly heard repeated assertion that the American ex-
perience was not appropriate to Swiss conditions. In the end, the
new constitution incorporated the American solution of
bicameralism but even then it was insisted that the Swiss were not
imitating the United States. "Similar causes rather engendered "26
the
same effects in Philadelphia in 1787 and at Berne in 1848.
The same year 1848 also saw that first, albeit abortive, attempt to
write a constitution for a united Germany. The attempt failed but
two aspects of the effort are worthy of note: (1) the members of the
Frankfurt assembly were virtually of one mind in the determination
to seek a federal solution, and (2) they were equally certain 27
the
model for this solution was to be found in the United States.

25.William E. Rappard, La Constitution de la Confederation Suisse, 1848-1948

(1948), p. 269, quoted by Friedrich, op. cit., n. 13, p. 52.
26. Friedrich, op. cit., n. 21, p. 52.
27. Ibid., pp. 52-55.
296 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

When Germany attained unity for the first time in her history in
1871, it was in federal form but less for ideological or theoretical
reasons than in consideration of dynastic traditions. The new nation
included twenty-two monarchies (in addition to the three free cities
of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck, and Alsace-Lorraine, newly ac-
quired from France). But 65 percent of the land area and 62 percent
of the population were included in the state of Prussia. The popula-
tion ratio between Schaumburg-Lippe and Prussia was 1:770. In ad-
dition, some states, (e.g. Brunswick) consisted of scattered, non-
contiguous administrative units. 28
The Weimar Republic succeeded in eliminating a few of the
smallest member states by absorbing them into larger ones but re-
tained both the form and the pattern of the federal arrangement in
1871. The Nazi regime, while committed to centralization in prac-
tice, had no more impact on the territorial arrangement of the Reich
than did the Weimar Republic. Hitler was content to exert power
through the party organization, the district ( Gaue) of which were,
at least in some instances, more in accord with regional economic
and social patterns than was the formal structure of the state. The
party's predominance effectively nullified the constitutional division
of powers though in theory it remained in force. 29
The Federal Republic of Germany presents both a return to tradi-
tional patterns and a new departure. There is abundant evidence
that the people of West Germany desired a federal arrangement in
contrast to the party centralism of the Hitler area. Although the
Western allies were initially not agreed on the kind of a federal
structure they wanted for the new Germany,3
it was clear that they
did not desire to see a centralized state. °
The Basic Law now divides West Germany into ten units
(Lander), some of them clearly traditional (e.g. Bavaria and the
city-states of Bremen and Hamburg), others reflecting the
pragmatic necessities imposed by military occupation as well as the
urge to overcome the particularism of the past. But in the face of
much doubt that a federal structure could develop harmoniously

28. Peter Schaller, "The Federal System of the Federal Republic of Germany," in:
George W. Hoffman, ed., Federalism and Regional Development: Case Studies on the
Experience in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (Austin: Univer-
sity of Texas Press, 1981), p. 72.
29.Ibid., pp. 72-74.
30. Friedrich, op. cit., n. 21, pp. 66-68.
 IS THERE A THEORY OF FEDERALISM 297

unless it was grounded on perceived diversities, the Basic Law pro-

vided for a reorganization of the system so as take account of "inner-
ethnic ties, the historical and cultural context, economic feasibility,
31
practicability, and the social structure." But, although twice
special commisions made recommendations for change, none have
taken place that were not made necessary by external conditions
(specifically, the addition of the Saarland in 1959. 32 What this sug-
gests is (1) that, among peoples that have been long settled, localism
still is a powerful force, and (2) that, even where federal relations
are not sustained by long-standing traditions, there is a reluctance to
disturb them.
The pulling force of local traditions is abundantly evident among
the Swiss and the Austrians. Determined to eradicate memories of
the past, Hitler not only decreed the elimination of the word
"Austria" (thus the Land Upper Austria became Upper Danube and
the Land Lower Austria, Lower Danube) but also directed internal
shifts of territory. Yet as soon as Austria was free of German rule,
these realignments (which made good sense economically and
geographically) were countermanded. 33 If one recalls that, prior to
34
1918, there had been no political entity called "Austria," the sur-
vival of local traditions is, of course, not surprising. The Habsburg
emperor ruled in Tyrol not because he was emperor but because he
was Count of Tyrol-and proper Tyrolians were ever conscious of it.
Geographic considerations serve to reinforce tradition. The alpine
valleys of Switzerland and Austria were mostly separated from each
other by mountainous ranges that inhibited intercourse until the age
of the railroad and, more significantly, the automobile. There were
obvious limits to what a central government could expect to ac-

31. Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 29.

32. SchOller op. cit., n.28, pp. 80-93. Page 93 contains a map showing 1972 pro-
posals for a revised alignment of states. See also Karl H. Cerny, "Federalism in the
West Germany Republic," in: Valerie Earle, op. cit., n. 23, pp. 152-156.
33. Ludwig Jedlicka, "Verfassungs-und Verwaltungsprobleme 1938-1955," in: In-
stitut fair Oesterreichkunde, Die Entwicklung der Verfassung Oesterreichs coin Mit-
telalter bis zur Gegenwart (Graz: Stiasny Verlag, 1963), pp. 129-132.
34. While the country was known as "Austria" before 1867 and as "Austria-
Hungary" from 1867 to 1918, there was no Austrian nation. Thus, after 1867, the non-
Hungarian part of the dual monarchy was legally described as "the kingdoms and
lands represented in the Reichsrat." Hans Lentze, "Der Ausgleich mit Ungarn und die
Dezembergesetze von 1887," in: ibid., p. 105.
298 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

complish under such conditions-and there were compelling reasons

why local issues should be settled locally.
It is important to keep the distance factor in mind, not so much in
terms of miles (or kilometers) but in terms of the time it takes to
travel between points. This is as true of the United States as it is of
the countries of Europe. Thus, at the beginning of national govern-
ment in the United States a trip from New York to Boston took five
days, a journey from Boston to Savannah 22 1/2 days, and to reach
the distant points in the interior was a four to five weeks' trip from
almost any point on the east coast." s The dispersion of population in
Australia and Canada-even though federation in these two coun-
tries came much later than in the U.S.-is functionally the
equivalent of the separation of the centers of population in the for-
mative years of the American union."
But, if this proposition-that physical separation is important to a
federal system-is correct, why did the West Indian Federation fail
(or East Africa, or Central Africa, etc.)? Davis (216) concludes that
there has been too much of an "urge to tidy the matter," too much of
a desire to discover a "logic of federalism" (212, quoting Mac-
mahon"). too much of a flight toward theory.

IV

To say that a country has "a federal system of government" does,

in fact, tell us next to nothing about that system. It does not tell us
whether the country is as ethnically homogeneous as Australia or as
diverse as Switzerland. It does not reveal whether, within that coun-
try, there is one legal system or a plurality (if the latter were con-
sidered a criterion of a federal state, does the existence of a Scottish
legal system make the United Kingdom a federation?). Does the ex-
istence of a federal structure tell us anything about the nation's
economic system? Or its cultural policies? Or its strength or

35. Seymour Dunbar; A History of Travel in America (Indianapolis: Bobbs-

Merrill, 1925), vol. I, pp. 177 and 329; Charles O. Paullin and John K. Wright, Atlas
of the Historical Geography of the United States ( Washington: Carnegie Institution,
1932), Plate 138A, "Rates of Travel, 1800."
36. William S. Livingston, "Canada, Australia and the United States: Variations
on a Theme," in: Valerie Earle, ed., op. cit., n. 23, pp. 95-96.
37. Arthur W. Macmahon, "The Problem of Federalism: A Survey," in: Arthur W.
Macmahon, ed., op. cit., n. 9, p. 4.
 IS THERE A THEORY OF FEDERALISM 299

weakness in foreign affairs? To ask the questions is to answer them.

As the experience of Latin American federal states demonstrates,
even similarities in the formal statement of the federal relationship
do not assure that the practical results will bear much resemblance.
As Kantor has indicated, 38 although early constitution-makers south
of the Rio Grande deliberately followed the prototype of the United
States, even under the most favorable conditions federalism in Latin
America has not come close to its model.
Even as between societies of decidedly democratic cast
dissimilarities quickly appear. When the Australians wrote their
constitution (in 1897-98), they sought to avoid some of the problems
that Canada had experienced under the British North America Act.
Specifically, the Australians wanted to be able to amend their con-
stitution without the need to involve the Parliament at London (as
Canada had to do). Section 128 of the constitution therefore set up
an amending procedure. Amendments are proposed by the national
legislature and then submitted to popular referendum. To become a
part of the constitution, the proposal must be approved by a majori-
ty of those voting, and also by a majority of those voting in a majori-
ty of the states. This arrangement was modeled after the Swiss con-
stitution. But over a fifty-year period (1901-51), Australian voters
approved only four out of twenty-four submitted proposals, while
the Swiss record was twenty-six adopted out of thirty-one submit-
ted. 39 There is, of course, one major difference between Australia
and Switzerland: The Swiss constitution explicitly excludes the
Federal Court from judicial review of national legislation (but can-
tonal legislation can be and is reviewed) while Australia, no less
deliberately, not only followed 4othe practice of the United States but
embodies it in its constitution.

38. See supra, at notes 23 and 34.

39. Constitution of Australia (1901), chapter 8, § 128; Constitution of Switzerland
(1974 as amended in 1891), articles 118-123. See William S. Livingston, Federalism
and Constitutional Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 118 and
185-187. The figures in the text for Switzerland do not include proposals submitted by
popular initiative (an alternative not adopted by the Australians). If one includes these
proposals, the Swiss amended their constitution thirty-nine times in fifty years-or,
roughly ten times as often as the Australians.
40. Constitution of Switzerland, article 109; Constitution of Australia, Chapter 3,
§§ 75-76; Fred L. Morrison, "The Swiss Federal Court: Judicial Decision Making and
RecruitmFht," in: Joel B. Grossman and Joseph Tanenhaus, eds., Frontiers of Judicial
300 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

The example could be multiplied and the exercise would only

serve to confirm that federalism presents indeed, in Valerie Earle's
phrase, "infinite variety in theory and practice. " Federalism
works well in Switzerland in spite of four district linguistic and
cultural groups while in Canada Quebec threatens secession and
many observers see the fate of the entire federal union in danger.
Can one theory sustain both situations?

Davis further demonstrates the difficulty by a table (217,219)

which shows how much variety there is among the writers when it
comes to deciding how many (and which) states are to be classified
as "federal." The range runs from four (Albert Bushnell Hart in 1891
and K.C. Wheare in 1951) to Duchacek 's twenty-one. To this might
be added Elazar whose count comes to seventeen "federal systems,"
plus eighteen "political systems utilizing federal principles." 42 The
evident discrepancies are, of course, functions of the definition
employed by each of the several writers.
Livingston, in his influential article A Note on the Nature of
43
Federalism, argued against preoccupation with legal (or legally-
based) taxonomies. "The essence of federalism," he wrote in another
place, "lies not in the institutional or constitutional structure but in
the society itself. Federal government is a device by which the
federal qualities of the society are articulated and protected."44 He
gives due credit to political, economic, social, and cultural
forces-these determine the particular solution a society seeks (and
sometimes finds) for the problem of political organization. What

Research (New York: Wiley, 1988), pp. 133-138; J.D. Miller, Australian Government
and Politics: An Introductory Survey, second edition (London: Duckworth, 1959), pp.
141-147.
41. Subtitle of the book of essays edited by Professor Earle, cited supra, n. 23.
42. Daniel J. Elazar, "The Principles and Practices of Federalism: A Comparative
Historical Approach" (Philadelphia: Center for the Study of Federalism, Working
Paper No. 8, [n.d.]), Tables I and II.
43. In: Aaron Wildavsky, ed., American Federalism in Perspective (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1967). This article originally appeared in the Political Science Quarterly, vol.
57 (1952), pp. 81-95.
44. Ibid., p. 37.
 IS THERE A THEORY OF FEDERALISM 301

solution a particular polity produces is a "response to a definite set of

stimuli."
But Livingston does not tell us what kinds of stimuli will produce
what kind of federalism; all he says is that the social diversities that
produce federalism may be of many kinds.
Davis (168-172) acknowledges that "to those wearied of the
elaborate classificatory sophistries of the `constitutionalists,' Liv-
ingston's essay first came as a breath of fresh air." Livingston, he
concedes, is "most certainly not a dogmatist nor an arithmetician."
But what he has produced is "a theory without a tool-kit." By plac-
ing the major emphasis on non-constitutional, non-structural
criteria what has emerged is a definition that fits any political entity
that contains-and somehow accommodates-diversity. To be sure,
Livingston stipulates that the diversity must be "significant" before
the " society is likely to provide " accommodation. But may one not
also reverse that statement: if the society provides accommodation,
then the difference is to be called significant? What, then, is the
cause and what the effect?
Occasionally in the literature of federalism one may find an il-
lustration that hypothesizes that the minimal form of federalism is
one in which the member states have only the power "to change the
shape of postmen's helmets," that this is the low point of the a con-
tinuum which, at the other end, extends to the powers of war and
peace. The source of this image is a 1951 article by the British
political scientists W.J.M. McKenzie and Brian Chapman 45 which,
while focusing on the Italian constitution of 1948, raises the question
of when arrangements that recognize regional differences rise to the
level of "federalism."
Regionalism, the two authors point out, is a fact of life in all but
the tiniest political units. Italy, they maintain, is but a case in point.
Even before the peace treaties of 1919 placed ethnic and linguistic
minorities within the boundaries of the Italian state there were glar-
ing contrasts, often open conflicts, between North and South, "be-
tween the Italy as advanced as any state in Western Europe and one
as backward as some countries of the Middle East. "40 The unique
circumstances under which Italy achieved its unification between

45. "Federalism and Regionalism," Modern Law Review, vol. 14 (1951), pp.
182-194.
46. Ibid., p. 184.
302 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

1860 and 1870-the predominance in the effort of the Piedmontese,

the perceived need to follow the example of France, the bloody crisis
which at the time threatened the survival of the prime example of a
working federalism-all combined to produce the constitutional
framework of a unitary state. What resulted was "centralism in
theory and diversity in practice."
The post-World War II constitution, sought to recognize the
dilemma implicit in this formulation. 47 Drawing on theoretical
discussions by Gaspare Ambrosini, Title V, "Regions, Provinces
and Communes," 48 established regional government as a constitu-
tional principle. The nation was divided into twenty regions which
were to exercise considerable powers over their internal affairs. Five
regions-Sicily, Sardinia, Alto Adige (the South Tyrol), Friulia-
Venezia Giulia, and Val d'Aosta-each an area of unique problems
of economic and ethnic nature, were designated "special regions."
As such they were granted "particular forms and conditions of
autonomy, in accordance with special statutes. " In response to
strong pressures from these regions they were granted "limited ex-
clusive legislative power,"; i.e., the right to legislate, within
specified areas, to the exclusion of national law.
The other fifteen regions had to wait until 1970 before Parliament
implemented the constitutional provisions. The machinery of
regional autonomy is thus in place but its scope is rather narrowly
circumscribed. Regions may adopt laws to implement national
legislation when it is cast as a national "framework law" (leggi cor-
nici) and they may adapt national legislation to specific needs and
conditions of the region. But all of this is limited to a list of subject-
matter fields enumerated by Parliament (and, of course, subject to
change by that body). More significantly, a government commis-
sioner and a control commission, both appointed by the central
government, must approve all acts of the regional government. 4B
McKenzie and Chapman, writing in 1951, could not foresee how
slowly regionalization would reach reality in Italy. They recognized
that, both politically and financially, the central government might

47. Autonomia Regionale e Federalismo (Rome, 1944), cited ibid., p. 185.

48. Constitution of the Republic of Italy (1948), Title V. articles 114-133. Original-
ly there were only nineteen regions but Molise was later separated from Abruzzi.
49. P.A. Allum, Italy-Republic Without Government? (New York: Norton,
1973), pp. 225-238.
 IS THERE A THEORY OF FEDERALISM 303

be able to frustrate the projected development of a regional struc-

ture. But they did not (and perhaps could not) anticipate that a
dominant Christian Democratic party would adamantly defer a
decentralization that might-as indeed it now has-placed the
government of some regions in the hands of the Communists.
What McKenzie and Chapman did see was that the Italian ap-
proach (at least as it stood on paper) could have wider application,
especially in the United Kingdom. There, they maintained,
regionalism already existed. It had been incorporated into the Act of
Union with Scotland of 1707, was to be found in a variety of special
arrangements for Wales and had been reiterated in the Ireland Act
of 1949. 50 Even beyond these statutory bases, there were, they
asserted, "things which Parliament could legally do, but which it
does not do because a majority of its members think them wrong." 51
In other words, the regional character of the government of the
United Kingdom is founded on the political morality that is the
essence of British constitutionalism.

VI

It is at this point that the issues of the shape of the postmen's

helmets enters into the discussion. McKenzie and Chapman use this
(slightly bizarre) example to point out that what may suit a political
scientist may not be nearly so welcome to the lawyer. Ambrosini
had, in effect, proposed a way-station between federalism and
unitary government, and the Italian constitution appeared to give
reality to this theoretical construct. This, say McKenzie and Chap-
man, is the kind of gradualism that political scientists can live with.
For "when [political scientists] want to know whether a state is cen-

50. Textbook treatments of the government of the United Kingdom usually give on-
ly cursory mention of the differences that characterize governmental arrangements in
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (to say nothing of the Channel Islands and the
Isle of Man). Recent events have produced greater attention to the matters though
usually still from a centrist or English perspective. See, e.g., the chapter subtitled "The
Diversity of the United Kingdom, "in Max Beloff and Gillian Peele, The Government
of the United Kingdom: Political Authority in a Changing Society (New York: Norton,
1980). There is apparently only one book dealing with government in Scotland, J.G.
Kellar, The Scottish Political System (second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1975).
51. Op. cit., n. 45, p. 183.
 304 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

tralized or decentralized [they] ask in real life not about the federal
principle but about the point where the division of central and local
powers fall on [the] scale. It is an empty form to say that a state is a
federation if the units (or, on the other hand, the central govern-
52
ment) have no power except to regulate postmen's helmets."
But suppose the design of postmen's helmets became a matter of
real (or imagined) significance? What, for instance, ask the two
authors, if one of the German Lander decided to dress its mailmen
in the uniform of the S.S.? Only six years after World War II, one
can imagine that this would be widely interpreted as evidence of (or
at least advocacy of) a revival of Nazism. At once the lawyers would
be faced with the need to draw a line-or at least to know how to
balance the conflicting interests. The convenient continuum cannot
possibly be designed with the kind of specificity that answers all
questions, especially questions not likely to have been anticipated. 53
In the United States, for instance, we do not doubt that the
Founding Fathers aimed for a system in which "every farmer and
every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty
that he will have free access to every market in the Nation" 54 but
that vision did not embrace rapid mass transportation, electronic
data transmission, and industrial pollution.

VII

In this country we often talk as if the merging of the legal and

political were unique to the United States. We often quote
Toqueville's observation that "scarcely any political question arises
in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a
judicial question"55 -with the implication that the opposite is true
elsewhere. But Toqueville did not say that and authors like Cap-
pelletti and McWhinney have reminded us that the United States
does not have a monopoly on the practice of judicial review. 56 Con-
52. Ibid., p. 185.
53. Ibid., pp. 185-186.
54. Justice Jackson in Hood v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
55. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Reeve translation, edited by
Phillips Bradley; New York: Knopf, 1945), vol. 1, p. 280.
56. Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1971); Edward McWhinney, Judicial Review in the English-Speaking
World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956); Friedrich, op. cit., n. 21, chap.
IV.
 IS THERE A THEORY OF FEDERALISM 305

flicts that arise from political issues will in many countries emerge as
law suits and their resolution sought by the techniques of the law.
The contrast between legal analysis and political analysis, between
lawyers' thinking and political scientists' thinking is not confined to
the American scene.
The literature on federalism does not make too much of a point of
the extent to which law thinking tends to influence lay thinking.
Paul A. Freund alludes to it briefly at the end of his essay "Umpiring
the Federal System." 57 McKenzie and Chapman sharply criticize
Dicey's view of federalism as being based on Austinian
jurisprudence and note, passingly, that Austin 's (and Dicey' s) ap-
proach had broadly colored British perceptions of that country's
political institutions. 58 Michael D. Reagan urges that, because
federalism as a term is so overladen with legal thinking, the relation-
ship of different levels of government, the "New Federalism,"
"should be labeled "Intergovernmental Relations"-as indeed has
come to happen, both on the official level and among scholars. 5B
Certainly the older literature on federalism, whether written by
lawyers or by political scientists, reflects a primarily legal view of
the subject. More recent criticism often takes this legalistic approach
for its target, as Davis shows by grouping these writers together in
one chapter (chap. 5, 121-154). Conversely, legal writers can be
found who consider federalism in primarily political terms. B ° One
can sympathize with those who would prefer to keep the two groups
separate, at least when they are talking about federalism.

57. In: Macmahon, op. cit., n. 9, p. 173, with a pertinent quotation from Arthur
T. Goodhart, fn. 50, p. 178.
58. Op. cit., n. 45, p. 184.
59. Michael D. Reagan and John G. Sanzone, The New Federalism (second edi-
tion,New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 4-6. President Eisenhower ap-
pointed a Commission on Intergovernmental Relations; out of one of its recommenda-
tions came the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. For examples of
the use of the term in the scholarly literature, see: William Anderson, Intergovernmen-
tal Relations in Review (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960); W. Brooke
Graves, American Intergovernmental Relations (New York: Scribner, 1964); Dell
Wright, Understanding Intergovernmental Relations (North Sciutate, Mass.: Duxbury
Press, 1978).
60. E.g., Herbert Wechsler, "The Political Safeguards of Federalism," in: Prin-
ciples, Politics and Fundamental Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961),
also in a slightly different form in Macmahon, op. cit., n. 9, pp. 97-114.
 306 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

The confusion is likely to be confounded if one takes cognizance of

how federalism as a term is used by practicing politicians. Thus
President Reagan's assistant for intergovernmental relations advises
that the President is committed to a "revitalized federalism" which
is defined as "a return of authority and revenue to state and local
government. " The same article reports that, in his speech at Notre
Dame University in May 1981, the President " noted that
Washington has...usurped powers that belong to state and local
governments." The article is preceded by this quotation from the
President's inaugural address: "It is my intention to curb the size and
influence of the federal establishment and to demand recognition of
the distinction between the powers granted to the federal govern-
ment and those reserved to the states or to the people. All of us need
to be reminded that the federal government did not create the states;
the states created the federal government." B1
The question may be asked whether this is "Our Federalism" as
Justice Black had defined it in Younger v. Harris. 82 Black, it will be
recalled, defined federalism as sensitive balancing of the legitimate
interests of nation and states; President Reagan speaks of two (ap-
parently easily identifiable) groups of powers. Black would
recognize that there is a need to weigh interests; Reagan appears to
believe that there is a clear line that only needs to be enforced. Can
the two views be reconciled? Are they even on the same level?
Harry N. Scheiber, in several articles but most extensively in an
essay in the spring 1980 Law and Society Review, 83 has
demonstrated how the appeal to federalism has historically been
used in this country. To this end he compares and contrasts the use
of federalist rhetoric and the actual exercise of governmental
powers. He concludes that "the performance record of governmen-
tal quality within the [American] federal system is at best mixed."
Especially, he notes, if performance is evaluated in terms of in-
dividual liberty-"which, after all, is at the core of the values
claimed for s4
American federalism"-the record is, at best, in-
conclusive.

61. Richard S. Williamson, "The Shape of 'Reagan Federalism'," State

Legislatures, vol. 7, no. 7 (July/August 1981), pp. 37-39.
62. Supra, at n. 3.
63. "Federalism and Legal Process: Historical and Contemporary Analysis of the
American System," Law and Society Review, vol. 14 (1980), pp. 663-722.
64. Ibid., p. 705-707.
 IS THERE A THEORY OF FEDERALISM 307

Nor does history demonstrate that the cause of federalism has

been the consistent monopoly of any one group or party. "Political
actors," Scheiber observes, "[often] found themselves with strange
bedfellows or in unfamiliar clothing. "85 Federalism, it appears, has
more often been the means rather than the end. Black, I believe,
recognized this when he spoke of federalism in terms of "sensitivity"
and "endeavors." These are terms that describe a state of mind, not
a taxonomy.
But, as Scheiber also notes, it is in the nature of society that struc-
tures once established take on an existence and a dynamic of their
own. 88 The dynamics of the American federal system are most
significantly determined by our decentralized, state-based political
parties. Riker contends that the party system is what really main-
tains federalism in this country. 87 Yet it is well to bear in mind that
the decentralization of the American party system is the product of a
structural mandate of the Constitution, i.e. the residence require-
ment for members of Congress. 88 It is this structural element that
supplies the underpinning for the rhetoric of American federalism.
Is the Tenth Amendment" a similar structural support? The
language of the amendment suggests that, under the Constitution,
powers are either delegated to the national government or they are
not; and if they are not, then they belong to the states (unless the
Constitution contains a special prohibition). Presumably when it is
asserted-as President Reagan's statement appears to do-that the
division of powers is unambiguous, it is this kind of reading of the
text that serves as the basis.
James Madison certainly did not anticipate this interpretation. In
his speech of June 8, 1789, in which he introduced the several
amendments that would become the Bill of Rights he commented,
almost casually:

65. Ibid., p. 710.

86. Ibid., p. 708, where Livingston, (op. cit., n. 43) is quoted to the same effect.
87. William H. Riker, op. cit., n. 17, pp. 135-136 and 145-156.
68. Constitution of the United States, Art. I, sec. 2, ch. 2 and sec. 3, cl. 3: "No per-
son shall be a Representative...[and] no Person shall be a Senator...who shall not,
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that state in which...[or] for which he shall be
chosen."
89. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, no pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
308 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

I find, from looking into the amendments proposed by the State conventions,
that several are particularly anxious that it should be declared in the constitu-
tion, that the powers not therein delegated should be reserved to the several
States. Perhaps words which may define this more precisely than the whole of
the instrument now does, may be considered as superfluous. I admit they may
be deemed unnecessary: but there can be no harm in making such a declaration,
if gentlemen will allow that the fact is as stated. I am sure I understand it so,
70
and do therefore propose it.

Again, during the debate over Hamilton's proposal to establish a na-

tional bank, less than two years later, Madison said: "Interference
with the powers of the States was no constitutional criterion of the
powers of Congress. If the power was not given, Congress would not
exercise it; if given, they might exercise it, although it should in-
terfere with the laws, or even the Constitution of the States. "71 The
evidence supports Justice Roberts ' summation in 1931: "The Tenth
Amendment was intended to confirm the understanding of the peo-
ple at the time the Constitution was adopted, that powers not
granted to the United States were reserved to the States or to the
people. It added nothing to the instrument as originally
ratified.... "72 Or, as Justice Stone put it ten years later in United
States v. Darby, "the Tenth Amendment...states73but a truism that
all is retained which has not been surrendered."
But the record of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment is not without ambiguity. For much of the nineteenth
and in the first four decades of the twentieth century the Court,
sometimes explicitly, sometimes by inference only, treated the Tenth
Amendment as an identifiable limit to Congressional Action. Thus
in 1871 Justice Nelson wrote that "the States, within the limits of
their powers not granted, or, in the language of the Tenth Amend-
ment, `reserved,' are as independent of the general government as
that government within its sphere is independent of the States," and
thus a national tax on personal income could not apply to the
salaries of state officials. 74 And in 1918, the Court's nullification of

70. Annals of Congress, vol. 1, cols. 458-459.

71. Ibid., vol. II, col. 1897 (1791).
72. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733 (1931).
73. 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
74. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 124 (1871), overruled in Graves v. O'Keefe,
306 U.S. 468 (1939).
 IS THERE A THEORY OF FEDERALISM 309

the national child labor law was similarly grounded on the Tenth
Amendment. 75 Black's apostrophe of "Our Federalism," while it cer-
tainly shares none of the absolution of Justice Nelson's language in
Collector v. Day, was thus not so much an innovation as a refine-
ment of a position that has considerable grounding in the past.

VIII

Empirical evidence thus supports that conclusion which Davis

reaches on the basis of his examination of the many varieties of
federalism in the writings of the theorists. The term, standing alone,
does not adequately inform; modified-by any of the 44 adjectives
listed by Davis or others that might yet be added to the list-it loses
the unifying character that would serve definitional value.
But the phenomenon of federalism persists. Its manifestations are
so numerous and so varied that the sheer effort to identify a common
minimum content is a challenge of unique dimension. In this essay a
limited number of examples and illustrations from countries other
than the United States has been brought into the discussion in order
to provide a broader perspective of the subject. Yet, whatever
76
one
may consider to be the number of federal states today, there are
other examples that could-and perhaps should-have been in-
troduced. Each would have been distinguishable from the others,
for reasons that might be historical, cultural, economic or
geographic. To cover all of them by one definition would require a
phrase so broad and so imprecise that it would do little to infuse
"
meaning. This is, of course, the main point of Davis ' argument: No
single perception of the subject will provide us with an accurate
means of decoding and translating the transactions of any single
federal culture; nor will any combination of the known ways of
looking at the matter enable us to decode and translate the transac-
tions of all the heterogeneous phenomena that move about in the
77
`federal' galaxy. (216). But "federalism does matter." It matters,
however, not because it provides a finite prescription of structural
relationships but because its connotations are deeply imbedded in
realities of political behavior.

75. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).

76. See text, supra, at fn. 42.
77. Scheiber, op. cit., n. 63, p. 713.
310 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

This becomes evident if one correlates concern with (or invocation

of) federalism as a concept with the rise of critical political tensions
in federally organized states. The issue of the role and size of the na-
tional government in the United States precipitates discussion over
the scope of federalism when the political forces in the nation divide
most sharply over the policies pursued by the national government.
In part, this is so because those who use the federalism argument are
well aware of the fact that it continues to have strong political ap-
peal. 78
Similar observations have been made about federalism as a tool of
political rhetoric in other countries. Perhaps the most telling exam-
ple is the case of Austria where the federal relationship underwent
considerable change in the years before 1966 but, because the two
major political parties shared the government and thus the respon-
sibility for the changes, federalism (and its manifestations) never
became an issue for public debate. It became a matter for both the
public and academic discussion almost as soon as the coalition was
replaced by a single-party government in 1966. 79 To put it different-
ly, federalism regained vitality as an issue when the political consen-
sus on national policy ceased to incorporate the overwhelming ma-
jority of the electorate.
"Federalism," Livingston observed, "...is a response to the values
of society. "80 Like Livingston, Riker and others, Davis confirms that
federalism is not an ideology nor is it a concept that, of its own force,
triggers policy outcomes or influences political action. Its impor-
tance rests in, its adaptability as a verbal symbol, its capacity to
reflect, in terms that do not compel orthodoxy, the never-ceasing
tensions between broadly national needs and the desire of local (or
regional) interest to make their own decisions in their own interests.
Like many key words in the world of politics, federalism partakes
more of the pragmatic than the absolute, more of empiricism than of
theory.

University of Kansas FRANCIS H. HELLER

78. Livingston, op. cit., n. 38, p. 119.

79. Manfried Welan, "Die Geschichte der osterreichischen Bundesverfassung als
Spiegelbild der osterreichischen Demokratie," in: Anton Pelinka and Manfried Welan,
Demokratie and Verfassung in Oesterreich (Vienna: Europa Verlag,1971), pp. 50-52.
80. Loc. cit., n. 78.