1. AMERICAN PRINT WORKS VS
REPUBLIC OF THE PH VS LA
LAWRENCE
FACTS: Defendant Mayor Lawrence blew up by
gunpowder, burned and destroyed the goods
and merchandizes of Plaintiff American Print
Works.
The mayor was sued for damages by the owner
of the building.
Mayor’s contention was that it was lawful for
him to do as Mayor of the city of New York
“That when any building in the city of New York
shall be on fire, it shall be lawful for the Mayor,
to direct and order the same, or any other
building which they may deem hazardous and
likely to take fire, or to convey the fire to other
buildings, to be pulled down or destroyed.” by
virtue of a law that remained in full force and
effect, and unrepealed.
“An Act to reduce several Laws relating
particularly to the city of New York, into one
Act,”
However, the plaintiff American Print Works
contend that there was an expropriation and he
was entitled to payment for just compensation.
ISSUE: W/N the action of the mayor is
considered as expropriation.
SC RULING: No. In the case at bar, there was
no expropriation, the property in question does
not come under the right of eminent domain. It
is under the right of necessity or self-
preservation. The plaintiff American Print
Works can recover indemnification for
damages, but cannot claim just compensation
because the destruction is not a form of taking
contemplated in the exercise of eminent
domain.
2.
ORDEN DE PP. BENEDICTINOS
DE FILIPINAS
FACTS: The Government drew plans to extend
Azcarraga street from its junction with Mendiola
street, up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc,
Manila to ease and solve the daily traffic
congestion on Legarda Street. The government
offered to buy a portion of a parcel of land
belonging to La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de
Filipinas, however the two parties have not
reached an agreement. The Government then
instituted the expropriation proceedings.
Trial Court ordered the Government to take
possession of the land upon depositing the
amount. Upon deposit, trial court issued an
order to place the Government in possession of
the aforesaid property.
La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas
moved to dismiss, stating that the property
sought to be expropriated was already
dedicated to public use and therefore, cannot be
subject to expropriation. Furthermore, there is
no necessity for the expropriation because the
proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass
through a different site which would entail less
expenses on the part of the Government.
Trial Court granted the motion, holding that the
“expropriation was not of extreme necessity”.
Hence, this appeal by the Government.
ISSUE: W/N the expropriation of the property
in question is necessary.
SC RULING: No. it does not need extended
argument to show that whether or not the proposed
opening of the Azcarraga extension is a necessity in
order to relieve the daily congestion of traffic on
Legarda St., is a question of fact dependent not only
upon the facts of which the trial court very liberally
took judicial notice but also up on other factors that
do not appear of record and must, therefore, be
established by means of evidence. We are,
therefore, of the opinion that the parties should have
been given an opportunity to present their respective
evidence upon these factors and others that might
be of direct or indirect help in determining the vital
question of fact involved, namely, the need to open
the extension of Azcarraga street to ease and solve
the traffic congestion on Legarda street.
3. CITY OF MANILA V. CHINESE
COMMUNITY
FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein,
prayed for the expropriation of a portion private
cemetery for the conversion into an extension of
Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary
that such public improvement be made in the
said portion of the private cemetery and that the
said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Chinese Community answered that the said
expropriation was not necessary because other
routes were available. They further claimed that
the expropriation of the cemetery would create
irreparable loss and injury to them and to all
those persons owing and interested in the
graves and monuments that would have to be
destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public
improvement was not necessary on the
particular-strip of land in question.
Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right
to exercise the power of eminent domain and
that the courts have no right to inquire and
determine the necessity of the expropriation.
Thus, the same filed an appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire
into, and hear proof of the necessity of the
expropriation.
Held: The courts have the power of restricting
the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the
purposes designated by the law. The moment
the municipal corporation or entity attempts to
exercise the authority conferred, it must comply
with the conditions accompanying the authority.
The necessity for conferring the authority upon
a municipal corporation to exercise the right of
eminent domain is admittedly within the power
of the legislature.
But whether or not the municipal corporation or
entity is exercising the right in a particular case
under the conditions imposed by the general
authority, is a question that the courts have the
right to inquire to.
4. REPUBLIC VS PLDT
FACTS: The defendant PLDT entered into an
agreement with RCA Communications Inc., an
American corporation, whereby telephone
messages coming from the US and received by
RCA’s domestic station, could automatically be
transferred to the lines of PLDT, and vice versa.
The plaintiff through the Bureau of
Telecommunications, after having set up its own
Government Telephone System, by utilizing its
own appropriation and equipment and by
renting trunk lines of the PLDT, entered into an
agreement with RCA for a joint overseas
telephone service.
Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with them,
PLDT notified the former and receiving no reply,
disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the
same; thus, prompting the plaintiff to file a case
before the CFI praying for judgment
commanding PLDT to execute a contract with
the Bureau for the use of the facilities of PLDT’s
telephone system, and for a writ of preliminary
injunction against the defendant to restrain the
severance of the existing trunk lines and restore
those severed.
ISSUE: W/N the trunk lines of PLDT can be
validly expropriated.
SC RULING: YES. While the Republic may not
compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it,
the Republic may, in the exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain, require the
telephone company to permit interconnection of
the government telephone system and that of
the PLDT, as the needs of the government
service may require, subject to the payment of
just compensation to be determined by the
court.
5. PLDT VS NTC
FACTS: Private respondent Express
Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI) obtained
from Congress Republic Act No. 2090 a
franchise to establish radio stations for domestic
and transoceanic telecommunications.
Petitioner PLDT invoked the “prior operator” or
“protection of investment” doctrine in its
opposition to ETCI’s subsequent application for
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
(CPCN).
The National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) granted provisional
authority to ETCI subject to the condition that it
shall enter into “interconnection agreement” with
PLDT.
PLDT assailed the orders of National
Telecommunications Commission granting
Express Telecommunications provisional
authority to install, operate and maintain a
Cellular Mobile Telephone System in Metro
Manila now ETC. PLDT also alleged essentially
that the interconnection ordered was in violation
of due process and that the grant of provisional
authority was jurisdictionally and procedurally
infirm. However, NTC denied the
reconsideration. Hence, the petition at bar.
ISSUE: W/N PLDT may refuse NTC order to
enter into “interconnection agreement” with
ETCI.
SC RULING: NO. The PLDT cannot justifiably
refuse to interconnect.
Rep. Act No. 6849, or the Municipal Telephone
Act of 1989, mandates interconnection
providing as it does that "all domestic
telecommunications carriers or utilities ... shall
be interconnected to the public switch telephone
network." The interconnection which has been
required of PLDT is a form of “intervention” with
property rights dictated by the encompassing
objective for the common good. The NTC, as the
regulatory agency of the State, merely
exercised its delegated authority to regulate the
use of telecommunications networks when it
decreed interconnection.
6. US VS CAUSBY
FACTS: Causby (plaintiff) owned a dwelling and
a chicken farm near a municipal airport. In 1942,
the United States (defendant) began using this
airport for frequent and regular military flights,
which passed directly over Causby’s property at
83 feet, which was 67 feet above the house, 63
feet above the barn and 18 feet above the
highest tree. They frequently came so close to
respondents' property that they barely missed
the tops of trees, the noise was startling, and the
glare from their landing lights lighted the place
up brightly at night. This led to the death of 150
chickens which destroyed the use of the
property as a chicken farm and caused loss of
sleep, nervousness, and fright on the part of
respondents.
Causby sued in the Court of Claims to recover
for an alleged taking of their property and for
damages to their poultry business.
The court of claims held that the United States
had taken an easement over the property, and
granted an award of $2,000 for the easement
and resulting property damage. However it
made no finding as to the precise nature or
duration of the easement.
Issue: Whether or not Causby was owed
compensation under the Takings Clause (U.S.
Constitutional Amendment V)
SC RULING: YES. The majority opinion cited
the law (49 U.S.C. § 180) where Congress
defined the "navigable airspace" in the public
domain, as that above the "minimum safe
altitude" which varies from 500 to 1000 feet
depending on time of day, aircraft, and type of
terrain. Since the aircraft passing over Causby's
property were at 83 feet, the court determined
the flight path was an easement, a form of
property right. Because the government had
taken the easement through private property,
Causby was owed compensation under the
Takings Clause.
7. AYALA DE ROXAS VS CITY OF
MANILA
FACTS: Ayala de Roxas applied to the
defendant city engineer for a license to
construct a terrace over “the strip of land 3
meters in width between the main wall of her
house and the edge of the said canal of Sibacon
or San Jacinto, which strip of land belongs
exclusively to her”; but the defendant refused to
grant the license or authorize the plaintiff to build
the terrace.
Plaintiff has been informed, that sole reason
wherefore the license was denied is because
“the said defendants pretend to compel the
plaintiff to leave vacant and without any
construction whatever thereon the said strip of 3
meters in width which is a portion of the ground
belonging to her, in order to use the same as the
wharf or public way so that the plaintiff will only
be able to use the said strip in the same manner
and for the same purposes as the public in
general, thus losing the enjoyment, use, and
exclusive possession of the said strip of the
property which the plaintiff and the former
owners thereof have enjoyed quietly and
peacefully during more than seventy years.
Additionally, it was agreed between both parties
that the strip above referred to had not been
expropriated in whole or in part by the
municipality of Manila, and that neither had the
latter offered any compensation for the same to
the owner thereof.
Issue: W/N the non-issuance of a license to
Ayala de Roxas is tantamount to a taking that
requires just compensation.
Held: Yes. What the City of Manila have
therefore done is to prevent the Ayala de Roxas
from continuing to enjoy, use, and freely dispose
of such strip of their ground, as they had been
doing up to the time when they applied for a
license to construct a terrace over said strip, and
the City prevented it with the intention of
establishing a public easement provided for in
an ordinance of their own which they consider is
pursuant to the provisions of the Law of Waters
and of the Civil Code in force.
8. PEOPLE V. FAJARDO
FACTS: Fajardo and Babilonia (son-in law) are
charged with violation of Ordinance 7 Series of
1950 of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur
which penalizes a person who constructs a
building without permit from the mayor.
After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a
permit to build a building beside the gasoline
station near the town plaza. His request was
repeatedly denied due to the reason that
it “hinders the view of travelers from the
National Highway to the public plaza”.
Fajardo and Babilonia proceeded with the
construction of the building without a permit,
because they needed a place of residence very
badly, their former house having been
destroyed by a typhoon and they had been living
on leased property.
Appellants were charged and convicted by
peace court of Baoo for violating such
ordinance.
ISSUE: W/N the ordinance is constitutional.
SC RULING: NO. The ordinance is
unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates
to permanently deprive appellants of the right to
use their own property; hence, it oversteps the
bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking
of appellants property without just
compensation.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts
the use of property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking
of the property.
While property may be regulated to the interest
of the general welfare, and the state may
eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the
state may not permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property and practically
confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the
aesthetic appearance of the community.
9. NPC VS. AGUIRRE-
PADERANGA
FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC)
filed a case for expropriation against Petrona O.
Dilao, et al. before Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
involving parcels of land located in Cebu.
Expropriation was instituted to implement Leyte-
Cebu Interconnection Project. NPC moved for
the issuance of writ of possession of the
lands. The RTC issued an order granting NPC‘s
motion. It appointed 3 Board of Commissioners
to determine just compensation.
However, NPC filed an opposition assailing the
correctness of the appraisal for failing to take
into account Republic Act No. 6395 which
provides that the just compensation for right-of-
way easement shall be equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the market value of the property. NPC
asserted that Dilao, et al. could still use the
traversed land for agricultural purposes, subject
only to its easement. It added that the lots were
of no use to its operations except for its
transmission lines.
The RTC rendered its decision ordering NPC to
pay fair market value at P516.66 per square
meter. NPC appealed but the same was denied.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court‘s
decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/N the just compensation for right-of-
way easement being expropriated is proper.
SC RULING: YES. The just compensation
recommended, which was approved by the trial
court, is just and reasonable compensation for
the expropriated property of Dilao and her
siblings. In the case at bar, the easement of
right-of-way is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain. The limitation
imposed by NPC against the use of the land for
an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use. Aside from the
actual damage done to the property transversed
by the transmission lines, the agricultural and
economic activity normally undertaken on the
entire property is unquestionably restricted and
perpetually hampered as the environment is
made dangerous to the occupant’s life and limb.
10. RICHARDS V. WASHINGTON
TERMINAL
FACTS: Richards commenced an action in the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to
recover for the damage to his property resulting
from the maintenance of an alleged nuisance by
Washington Terminal by means of the operation
of a railroad and tunnel upon its own lands. The
tunnel and the tracks were used for the passage
of trains, all of them being passenger trains with
the exception of an occasional shifting engine.
Richard’s property has been damaged by the
volumes of dense black or gray smoke, and also
by dust and dirt, cinders and gases, emitted
from the exhaust fan and trains. His house was
pleasant and comfortable for purposes of
occupation before the construction of the tunnel
and tracks, but since then it has not only
depreciated in value.
Washington Terminal pleaded not guilty, the
issue then came on for trial by jury, and, at the
conclusion of Richard’s evidence, a verdict was
directed in favor of Washington Terminal. The
court of appeals affirmed the judgment. Hence,
the petition at bar.
ISSUE: W/N Richards is entitled to recover for
the damage to his property.
SC RULING: YES. Richard is entitled to a just
compensation under the power of eminent
domain. He is entitled to compensation for such
special damages as devolve exclusively upon
his property.
11. REPUBLIC VS. CASTELLVI eminent domain, the just compensation should
be determined as of the date of the filing of the
FACTS: In 1947, the republic, through the complaint.
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered
into a lease agreement over a land in Pampanga Based on the requisites for the power of
with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When expropriation, only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are
Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in present in this case.
1956, the AFP refused because of the
permanent installations and other facilities worth
almost P500,000.00 that were erected and
already established on the property.

Despite repeated demands, the Republic had

been illegally occupying her property since July
1, 1956, thereby preventing Castellvi from using
and disposing of it, thus causing her damages
by way of unrealized profit. Castellvi then
instituted an ejectment proceeding against the
AFP. However, in 1959, the Republic
commenced the expropriation proceedings for
the said land.

RTC approved that the lowest price that should

be paid was P10.00/sqm for the land of Castellvi
and ordered that Republic will pay 6% interest
per annum from July 1, 1956 when Republic
commenced its illegal possession of the
Castellvi land until July 10, 1959 when the
provisional value thereof was actually deposited
in court.

ISSUE: W/N the compensation should be

determined as of 1947 or 1959.

SC RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the

taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and
that just compensation should not be
determined on the basis of the value of the
property that year. The lower court was correct
when it held that the “taking” of the property
under expropriation commenced with the filing
of the complaint in this case.

Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,

“just compensation” is to be determined as of
the date of the filing of the complaint. The
Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking
of the property sought to be expropriated
coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for
12. AMIGABLE VS CUENCA
FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the registered
owner of Lot No. 639, which is an Estate in Cebu
City. She had a transfer certificate title issued by
the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1,
1924. No annotation in favor of the government
of any right or interest in the property appears at
the back of the certificate. Without prior
expropriation or negotiated sale, 6,167 square
meters of land was used for the construction the
Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
In 1958, Amigable’s counsel wrote the President
of the Philippines, requesting the payment for
her lot. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor
General and was disallowed it in his 9th
Indorsement dated December 9, 1958.
Amigable then filed a complaint against the
Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca
in his capacity as Commissioner of Public
Highways for the recovery of the portion of the
lot used. Cuenca’s defense was that the case
was premature, barred by prescription, and the
government did not give its consent to be sued.
ISSUE: W/N Amigable may properly sue the
government.
HELD: YES. Where the government takes away
property from a private landowner for public use
without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved
party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit.
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve
as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to
a citizen. The only relief available is for the
government to make due compensation which it
could and should have done years ago. To
determine just compensation of the land, the
basis should be the price or value at the time of
the taking.
13. CITY GOVERNMENT OF
QUEZON CITY VS ERICTA
FACTS: City Gov’t of Quezon enacted
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 which provides that
at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park
cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial
of deceased persons who are paupers and have
been residents of Quezon City for at least 5
years prior to their death. The Quezon City
engineer then required the respondent,
Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further
selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots
in Quezon City where the owners thereof have
failed to donate the required 6% space intended
for paupers burial.
Himalayang Pilipino reacted by filed with the CFI
of Riza, seeking to annul Sec. 9 of the
Ordinance in question, to which the CFI, though
Hon. Ericta, responded favorably.
City Government of Quezon City now argues
that the taking of the property of Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc., is a valid and reasonable exercise
of police power and that the land is taken for a
public use as it is intended for the burial grounds
of paupers. Furthermore, Quezon City Council is
authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local
police power
ISSUE: WON Sec. 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-
64 a valid exercise of police power.
RULING: NO. There is no reasonable relation
between the setting aside of at least six (6)
percent of the total area of private cemeteries
for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
and the promotion of health, morals, good order,
safety, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of
the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose,
the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
14. PHILIPPINE PRESS
INSTITUTE VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution 2772
directing newspapers to provide provide free
print space of not less than one half (1/2) page
for use as “Comelec Space” which shall be
allocated by the Commission, free of charge,
among all candidates within the area in which
the newspaper, magazine or periodical is
circulated to enable the candidates to make
known their qualifications, their stand on public
issues and their platforms and programs of
government.
To compel print media companies to donate
“Comelec-space” amounts to “taking” of private
personal property for public use or purposes
without the requisite just compensation. The
extent of the taking or deprivation is not
insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis
temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of
private property. The monetary value of the
compulsory “donation,” measured by the
advertising rates ordinarily charged by
newspaper publishers whether in cities or in
non-urban areas, may be very substantial
indeed.

Philippine Press Institute, a non-stock, non-

profit organization of newspaper and magazine
publishers asks the Court to declare said
resolution unconstitutional and void on the
ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by
the Constitution upon the government, and any
of its agencies, against the taking of private
property for public use without just
compensation.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of

Comelec alleged that the resolution does not
impose upon the publishers any obligation to
provide free print space in the newspapers. It
merely established guidelines to be followed in
connection with the procurement of “Comelec
space”. And if it is viewed as mandatory, the
same would nevertheless be valid as an
exercise of the police power of the State- a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision
or regulation of the Comelec over the
communication and information operations of
print media enterprises during the election
period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial
and credible election.

ISSUE: Whether the resolution was a valid

exercise of the power of eminent domain?

SC RULING: No. The court held that the

resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of
the power of eminent domain.
15. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur.
Once operational, the center would make
SUR V. COURT OF APPEALS available to the community invaluable
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the information and technology on agriculture,
Province of CamSur passed a Resolution fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the
livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and
authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase
or expropriate property contiguous to the craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing
project also satisfies the public purpose
provincial capitol site. The San Joaquins failed
to appear at the hearing of the motion, moved to requirement of the Constitution.
dismiss the complaints on the ground of
inadequacy of the price offered for their
property. The trial court denied the motion and
authorized the Province of CamSur to take
possession of the property upon the deposit with
the Clerk of Court. The trial court then issued a
writ of possession.
On appeal, The CA set aside the order of the
trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines
Sur to take possession of private respondents'
lands and the order denying the admission of
the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered
the trial court to suspend the expropriation
proceedings until after the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have submitted the
requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform to convert the classification of the
property of the private respondents from
agricultural to non-agricultural land.

ISSUE: WON, the expropriation was for a

public purpose.

SC RULING: YES. There has been a shift from

the literal to a broader interpretation of “public
purpose” or “public use” for which the power of
eminent domain may be exercised. Under the
new concept, “public use” means public
advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends
to contribute to the general welfare and the
prosperity of the whole community, like a resort
complex for tourists or housing project. The
expropriation of the property authorized by the
questioned resolution is for a public purpose.
The establishment of a pilot development center
would inure to the direct benefit and advantage