In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 1, 2021

S21A0159. FITTS v. THE STATE.

S21A0160. FRANKLIN v. THE STATE.

BETHEL, Justice.

In these related appeals, Donovan Raishad Fitts and

Jermanique Vashon Franklin appeal their convictions for murder

and other crimes in connection with the shooting deaths of Tenecia

Posley and Barry Johnson.1 In Case No. S21A0159, Fitts asserts

1The crimes occurred on March 4, 2015. On January 26, 2017, a Warren

County grand jury indicted Fitts, Franklin, and Deaundre Ross for two counts
of malice murder, felony murder, burglary in the first degree, aggravated
assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and one
count each of armed robbery, false imprisonment, and home invasion.
Following a six-day joint trial ending on August 28, 2017, Ross was
acquitted after he presented evidence that while the murders were being
committed, he was in another county for a court calendar call related to
another crime. However, the jury found Fitts guilty of all counts, and he was
sentenced to serve consecutive life sentences without parole for each count of
malice murder, another consecutive life sentence for armed robbery, ten years
in prison to be served consecutively for false imprisonment, another
consecutive life sentence for home invasion, and five years in prison to be
served consecutively for each possession count. The other counts were either
merged or vacated by operation of law. Fitts moved for new trial on September
6, 2017, and amended his motion on August 7, 2019. The trial court held a
that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a subsequent

shooting incident as intrinsic evidence and as other-acts evidence

under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) and that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance for failing to object to certain hearsay

testimony and for not moving for a mistrial. In Case No. S21A0160,

Franklin claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict her

beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the crimes, that the Court

should reconsider the standard of review for sufficiency, and that

she received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

As to Fitts, we discern no reversible error, so we affirm in Case

No. S21A0159. As to Franklin, we reject each of her enumerations

of error, but we have found a merger error with regard to her

hearing on January 7, 2020, and denied his motion for new trial on February
6, 2020. Fitts timely filed a notice of appeal.
The jury found Franklin guilty of both counts of felony murder, one count
of burglary, and armed robbery, but acquitted her of the other charges.
Franklin was sentenced to two life sentences to be served concurrently for the
felony murders, 20 years in prison to be served consecutively for burglary, and
a third life sentence for armed robbery to be served concurrently. On
September 15, 2017, Franklin filed a motion for new trial, which was amended
twice. After a hearing, the trial court denied her motion for new trial on
February 7, 2020, and Franklin timely appealed to this Court. These cases
were docketed to the term of court beginning in December 2020, consolidated
for review, and submitted for decision on the briefs.
2
convictions for armed robbery and burglary. We therefore affirm her

convictions for felony murder but vacate her convictions for armed

robbery and burglary in Case No. S21A0160.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the

evidence presented at trial shows that Fitts and Franklin started

dating in late 2014 and began living together in early 2015. 2 The

couple resided at the home of Fitts’s godmother, Melba Ansley, who

testified that Franklin, who was a nurse’s assistant, moved in to care

for her after her recent heart surgery. Ansley also testified that she

considered Fitts to be her son, he had lived with her since he was 12

years old, and she allowed him to use her cell phone and her truck.

Fitts’s friend Deaundre Ross, who was dating Franklin’s sister, often

visited Fitts at Ansley’s home.

During this time, Franklin was having an affair with Damian

Calvin. Franklin had previously lived with Calvin at his house and

was familiar with some drug activity occurring there. Calvin was a

2 The couple were married in September of 2015, six months after the
crimes at issue.
3
drug dealer, and he kept illegal drugs in his house. The two had

plans to meet at a hotel about 45 minutes away on March 3, 2015,

but Franklin rescheduled for the morning of March 4. Midmorning

that day, right before she met Calvin at the hotel, phone records

showed that Franklin called Fitts once on Fitts’s own phone and

several times on Ansley’s phone, which was prepaid and therefore

had no subscriber information. 3 The cell-site location information for

Fitts’s phone placed him near Calvin’s house during this time.

Franklin testified that Fitts was using Ansley’s phone because his

own was broken. The two had no contact again until 11:22 a.m.,

when Fitts used Ansley’s phone to call Franklin. Franklin testified

that the phone calls were about repairs for Ansley’s truck.

While at the hotel with Franklin, sometime between 11:00 a.m.

and 11:20 a.m., Calvin received a call from Johnson, who said he was

on Calvin’s front porch. Johnson was a regular customer of Calvin.

Calvin told Johnson that he was not there and to come back another

3At the time of his arrest several months later, Fitts provided the
number for Ansley’s prepaid phone as his phone number.
4
time. Roughly ten minutes later, Calvin’s cousin, Keith Robertson,

called Calvin to tell him that, as he was driving past Calvin’s house,

he saw two men run from the house toward a truck parked across

from Calvin’s driveway in a sandpit. Robertson turned around so

that he could go back to check on Calvin’s house and then saw the

truck leave the sandpit.4 On the phone, Calvin asked Robertson to

check on both Calvin’s son and Posley, who was Calvin’s girlfriend

at the time, inside the house. After driving up Calvin’s driveway,

Robertson saw Johnson dead on the front porch, still holding his

cigarettes and keys. Robertson called for Posley, heard no reply, and

told Calvin to hurry home. Robertson then called 911 at

approximately 11:30 a.m. and waited at the end of Calvin’s driveway

for the police to arrive.

The police found the house thoroughly ransacked. The police

also discovered shoeprints leading from an abandoned house next

4Neighbors testified that they noticed a truck parked in the sandpit that
morning where they rarely, if ever, saw vehicles parked. One neighbor testified
that he saw the truck leave shortly after 11:00 a.m. Detectives later discovered
that the tires from Ansley’s truck matched the make and size of the tire prints
from the truck parked in the sandpit on the day of the murders.
5
door through the woods to Calvin’s backdoor, where someone had

used a brick to break in. The police discovered Posley, who had been

shot five times, on the floor in the corner of a bedroom, tightly bound

with zip ties. Calvin’s two-year-old son was found unharmed on the

bed. Johnson had been shot eight times through the glass front door.

Calvin testified that his drug merchandise and between $8,000 and

$9,000 in cash were missing after the incident. A GBI firearms

examiner testified that bullets and shell casings found at Calvin’s

house were all from the same gun; the police also later found shell

casings from this gun both at Ansley’s house5 and at the scene of a

subsequent shooting incident where both Fitts and Ross were

present.

After leaving the hotel, Franklin called Calvin a few times,

starting at 11:27 a.m. In the afternoon, Fitts and Franklin met at

the home they shared with Ansley and took Ansley’s truck for

repairs. Franklin testified that, on their way home, they picked up

5Ansley testified that Fitts and Ross would occasionally engage in target
practice in the yard.
6
Ross and that Fitts and Ross spent the rest of the day at Ansley’s

house. That evening, GBI agents interviewed Franklin to

corroborate Calvin’s alibi. Franklin was not considered a suspect at

that time. During that interview, she identified her boyfriend as

“Donovan Ansley,” but gave his correct address.

Franklin did not continue her physical relationship with

Calvin after the shootings. However, she asked him as often as every

other day about whether there were leads in the case.

In October 2015, the GBI executed a search warrant at Ansley’s

house. In November 2015, Franklin agreed to be interviewed by the

GBI. Franklin claimed that on the day of the crimes, she and Fitts

returned straight home after dropping off Ansley’s truck for repairs,

and that Fitts then stayed in his room. She made no mention of Ross

at that time. The police later arrested Fitts and Franklin.

While Fitts was in jail in March 2017, his sister asked him in

a recorded call, “So you did the shooting?” Fitts responded, “No, but

I was there, and I had a big part in it. Not with that one anyway.”

Fitts’s sister asked why Fitts would “do something like that,”

7
referring to the crimes. Fitts recounted how badly he needed money

but that the crime “wasn’t supposed to go like that.” Fitts said that

he knew what he did, that his situation pushed him to do certain

things that he would not normally do, and that remembering the

murders would eat him up when he was not busy or distracted.

At trial, following the close of the State’s case-in-chief,

Franklin moved for a directed verdict of acquittal under OCGA § 17-

9-1 (b). The trial court denied the motion at that point. Fitts declined

to testify, but Franklin testified in her defense and denied

participating in planning the crimes. 6 Franklin testified that,

unknown to Fitts, she and Calvin had secretly planned to meet for

sex, that she had no knowledge that the crimes were being

committed during her tryst with Calvin, and that she could not

account for why Fitts had decided to commit the crimes at Calvin’s

home during that same timeframe.

6 Fitts does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
convictions, and for non-death penalty cases that were docketed to the term of
court beginning in December 2020, we no longer routinely conduct a sua sponte
sufficiency review. See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 399 (4) (b) (846 SE2d
83) (2020).
8
 Case No. S21A0159

1. Fitts asserts that the trial court erred by admitting evidence

of a March 31, 2015 shooting incident, which the court admitted as

intrinsic evidence or, alternatively, as evidence of other acts under

OCGA § 24-4-404 (b), and in charging the jury on the limited purpose

of this evidence. We conclude that this claim does not require

reversal because any error was harmless to Fitts.

A few weeks after the murders, Deaundre Ross, who was Fitts’s

and Franklin’s co-defendant, was driving an SUV with his brother

as a passenger, while Fitts was driving a separate vehicle behind

them. Ross exchanged gunfire with a third party, leaving shell

casings on the street and inside the SUV. After the shooting, Ross’s

SUV broke down due to a bullet hole in its gas tank, so Fitts gave

Ross and Ross’s brother a ride back to Ross’s father’s house. Law

enforcement officers later determined that the shell casings from

this shooting incident matched the casings found at the scene of the

murders and at Ansley’s home where Fitts lived and Ross often

visited, meaning that the same gun had been used at all three

9
locations.

Before trial, the State filed a notice of intent to present

evidence of the shooting incident under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule

404 (b)”), and after a hearing, the trial court ruled that the evidence

was admissible as intrinsic evidence or, alternatively, under Rule

404 (b). Assuming without deciding that the evidence of the shooting

incident was admitted in error, this error was harmless to Fitts.

“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is

whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the

verdict.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Taylor v. State, 306 Ga.

277, 283 (2) (830 SE2d 90) (2019). When applying a harmless-error

analysis, we review the evidence de novo and weigh it as a

reasonable juror would rather than in a light most favorable to

upholding the jury’s guilty verdict. See id.

Here, the State relied heavily on the evidence of the

subsequent shooting to try to prove Ross’s participation in the

murders, and the evidence presented only indirectly implicated Fitts

in the shooting. At trial, the State presented evidence that Fitts was

10
driving behind Ross’s SUV when Ross used a gun in the shooting,

that the gun was the same one that was used in the murders three

weeks earlier and at Ansley’s house where Fitts lived and Ross often

visited, and that Fitts later drove Ross and Ross’s younger brother

home. However, there was no evidence presented at trial that Fitts

handled the gun during the shooting incident or was otherwise

involved in that shooting, or that Fitts was investigated for any

crime in relation to the shooting, unlike Ross.

In its closing argument, although the State argued that Fitts

was with Ross “doing another shooting together” when the murder

weapon was used in the shooting incident, the State emphasized the

shooting evidence with respect to Ross, saying multiple times that

the gun belonged to Ross and that it was Ross’s personal weapon

that he would not have shared. And the trial court gave a limiting

instruction in the final jury charge directing the jurors to consider

the State’s evidence of other crimes only insofar as it related to the

issues of knowledge, intent, and participation in a conspiracy.

In contrast to Fitts’s tenuous connection to that shooting

11
incident, the evidence presented at trial as to Fitts’s guilt for the

murders was strong. Most significantly, in the recorded jail phone

calls with his sister, Fitts admitted to playing a “big part” in the

crimes (although he denied shooting the victims), gave his motive

for the robbery, and said that he felt guilty about his participation.

Also, the tire tracks found at the scene were consistent with the tires

on Ansley’s truck that Fitts drove, and cell-site location data placed

Fitts in the vicinity of Calvin’s house during the crimes. Therefore,

we conclude that under the circumstances of this case, it is highly

probable that the admission of the evidence concerning the later

shooting incident did not contribute to the jury’s verdicts. See Lofton

v. State, 309 Ga. 349, 356-59 (3) (846 SE2d 57) (2020) (error was

harmless where prosecution presented strong independent evidence

of guilt, jury properly learned that appellant had access to murder

weapon, evidence was not significantly relied on in State’s closing

argument, and “any harm . . . was lessened because the State did

not try to use the [evidence] to establish that Appellant rather than

[his co-defendant] was the shooter”); Taylor, 306 Ga. at 283 (2) (error

12
was harmless because the evidence was strong and there was no

contention that prosecution heavily relied on erroneously admitted

evidence in closing argument).

2. Fitts asserts that he was denied constitutionally effective

assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to object to

hearsay testimony he claims was barred by the Confrontation

Clause of the United States Constitution and to move for a mistrial.

We disagree.

To prevail on this claim, Fitts must establish both that his

representation was professionally deficient and that he suffered

prejudice as a result, meaning that but for counsel’s deficient

performance, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome at

trial would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). If Fitts

cannot establish either deficient performance or prejudice, then we

need not address the other, and his claim will not succeed. See id.

During the direct examination of Ross’s father, Ross’s counsel

asked about his son’s involvement in the March 31, 2015, shooting

13
incident: “Did you know – did [Ross], your son, tell you anything

about the gun he had that day?” Ross’s father responded, “I know –

as far as the gun is concerned – he [Ross] supposedly gave it back to

Fitts.” The State then asked for a bench conference, during which a

discussion was held on the potential constitutional implications of

this response. The State and each defense counsel agreed to move

on after the trial court gave the jury the curative instruction: “the

previous answer that you just heard, you are instructed by the Court

to disregard that answer and not consider it as evidence in any

manner in this case. Do you understand?” Defense counsel then

resumed questioning Ross’s father.

Fitts argues that because the statement made by Ross’s father

violated Fitts’s constitutional right under the Confrontation Clause

and Ross’s defense counsel’s question itself was meant to elicit

inadmissible hearsay, his own trial counsel’s failure to object to this

testimony and timely move for a mistrial amounts to

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.7

7 Fitts argues in passing that Ross’s father’s statement violated Fitts’s

14
 “A defendant’s right under the Confrontation Clause is violated

under Bruton [v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (88 SCt 1620, 20 LE2d

476) (1968),] when there is a joint trial of co-defendants and the

testimonial statement of a co-defendant who does not testify at trial

is used to implicate the other co-defendant in the crime or crimes on

trial.” Battle v. State, 301 Ga. 694, 700 (4) (804 SE2d 46) (2017). In

this case, there was a joint trial of co-defendants where witness

testimony introduced a statement made by co-defendant Ross, who

had invoked his right against self-incrimination and did not testify,

that implicated his co-defendant Fitts.

However, “[t]he admission of an out-of-court statement into

evidence at a criminal trial comes within the scope of the

Confrontation Clause only if the statement was testimonial. A

statement is testimonial if its primary purpose was to establish

evidence for use in a future prosecution.” (Citations and punctuation

rights under Article I, Section I, Paragraph XIV of the Georgia Constitution,

but Fitts does not provide any citations of authority or arguments that would
suggest a more expansive right under the Georgia Constitution than under the
United States Constitution. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to his claims
under the United States Constitution.
15
omitted.) Reed v. State, 307 Ga. 527, 536 (2) (c) (837 SE2d 272)

(2019). Testimonial statements include statements made to a

government officer, during a police investigation or interrogation, or

intended to accuse someone of a crime and produce evidence for a

criminal prosecution. See Billings v. State, 293 Ga. 99, 104 (4) (745

SE2d 583) (2013); see also Allen v. State, 300 Ga. 500, 504 (3) (796

SE2d 708) (2017) (co-defendant’s statements made to a third party

after crimes and before arrests were not testimonial). Here, Ross

made the statement shortly after the shooting incident, before any

arrests, to his father rather than to police officers investigating a

crime, so it was not testimonial. Thus, any objection to this

testimony based on Bruton would have been meritless. See Reed, 307

Ga. at 536 (2) (c) (failure to make meritless objection does not

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).

We reach the same conclusion, but for different reasons, about

Fitts’s claim that his counsel should have objected to this testimony

as hearsay and moved for a mistrial. Pretermitting whether it would

have qualified under a hearsay exception, the statement was not

16
admitted into evidence. Instead, upon agreement of the parties, the

trial court instructed the jury that it was to disregard Ross’s father’s

answer to the question and to not consider it for any purpose.

Moreover, at the hearing on Fitts’s motion for new trial, trial counsel

testified that she feared that Ross’s father possessed more direct

knowledge implicating Fitts and decided to agree to the instruction

to disregard the testimony in order to move away from that line of

questioning. We cannot say that counsel’s strategic decision to

refrain from objecting to a statement that was excluded and moving

for a mistrial “fell outside the wide range of reasonably effective

assistance, or that [Fitts] would have been granted a mistrial but for

counsel’s decision not to move for one.” (Citation and punctuation

omitted.) Allen v. State, 277 Ga. 502, 503 (3) (a) (591 SE2d 784)

(2004). Thus, Fitts’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on this

ground also fails.

Case No. S21A0160

3. Franklin asserts that there was insufficient evidence both as

a matter of constitutional due process and under Georgia statutory

17
law to support her convictions for felony murder, burglary, and

armed robbery and that the trial court should have therefore

granted her motion for directed verdict of acquittal. Upon reviewing

the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that the evidence, while

far from overwhelming, was sufficient to sustain her convictions and

the trial court’s denial of her motion for directed verdict.

On appeal, a criminal defendant is no longer presumed

innocent, and we review whether the evidence presented at trial,

when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts,

enabled the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of the crimes of which she was convicted. See Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)

(1979); State v. Holmes, 304 Ga. 524, 526-27 (1) (820 SE2d 26)

(2018). “The standard of review for the denial of a motion for a

directed verdict of acquittal is the same as for determining the

sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 304 Ga. 752, 754 (822 SE2d

220) (2018). “Under this review, we must put aside any questions

18
about conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight

of the evidence, leaving the resolution of such things to the

discretion of the trier of fact.” (Citation and punctuation omitted).

Frazier v. State, 308 Ga. 450, 452-53 (2) (a) (841 SE2d 692) (2020).

In addition, as a matter of Georgia statutory law,

to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the

proved facts shall not only be consistent with the
hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other
reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the
accused.

OCGA § 24-14-6. “Whether alternative hypotheses are reasonable,

however, is usually a question for the jury, and this Court will not

disturb the jury’s finding unless it is insufficient as a matter of law.”

Frazier, 308 Ga. at 453 (2) (a). In reviewing whether the prosecution

ruled out every reasonable hypothesis, we ask whether the jury was

entitled to discredit alternative theories that could have explained

the circumstantial evidence and to believe the State’s theory of the

case instead. See Guzman-Perez v. State, 310 Ga. 573 (1) (853 SE2d

76, 80) (2020). When considering circumstantial evidence, jurors are

entitled to draw reasonable inferences “based on their own common-

19
sense understanding of the world” that “are ordinarily drawn by

ordinary [people] in the light of their experience in everyday life.”

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) McKie v. State, 306 Ga. 111,

115-16 (829 SE2d 376) (2019).

Criminal liability is imposed not only where a defendant has

directly committed crimes, but also where a defendant is a party to

the crimes, meaning where a defendant intentionally causes another

person to commit crimes, intentionally aids in the commission of

crimes, or intentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or

procures another to commit crimes. See OCGA § 16-2-20.

Conviction as a party to a crime requires proof that the

defendant shared a common criminal intent with the
direct perpetrators of the crimes. A jury may infer a
common criminal intent from the defendant's presence,
companionship, and conduct with other perpetrators
before, during, and after the crimes.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Coates v. State, 310 Ga. 94, 98

(849 SE2d 435) (2020).

Upon consideration of the standard of review requiring that we

construe the evidence in the light favoring the jury’s verdicts and

20
principles of accomplice liability, we conclude that the evidence was

sufficient to show that Franklin intentionally participated in the

criminal plan and was thus sufficient to sustain her convictions. 8

Moreover, even if we were to consider all of the evidence against

Franklin to be circumstantial, 9 the jury was authorized to find that

8 Franklin relies on several cases where this Court reversed convictions

due to the insufficiency of party-to-a-crime evidence, including Clyde v. State,
276 Ga. 839 (584 SE2d 253) (2003) (Clyde had motive and purchased the guns
used by his cousins to commit the murder, but there was no proof he
participated in the plan); Bacon v. State, 267 Ga. 325 (477 SE2d 122) (1996)
(direct evidence of association with the murderer plus circumstantial evidence
of presence during initial confrontation was insufficient without evidence of
intent); Moore v. State, 255 Ga. 519 (340 SE2d 888) (1986) (insufficient
evidence to support Steve’s murder conviction where brothers Delton and Steve
had motive and fled together afterwards, and witness testimony supported
Delton’s involvement, but circumstantial evidence implicated only Steve’s
presence and not his intent); and Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 862 (302 SE2d 347)
(1983) (evidence of presence at the crime scene, association with the murderer,
and even approval of act short of encouragement but not intent to participate
was insufficient). We need not decide if all of these cases were correctly decided,
because unlike here, there was no evidence in these cases presented that the
defendant agreed to or intended to participate in the crimes.
9 If disbelieved by the jury, Franklin’s testimony denying her

involvement in the crime could have served as direct evidence of the opposite
proposition. But we need not decide whether that is so here, nor if so, whether
and how much corroborative evidence would be required to support a
defendant’s disbelieved testimony because the circumstantial evidence here,
when construed in favor of the verdicts, is sufficient to support the verdicts the
jury returned. Cf. Daughtie v. State, 297 Ga. 261, 263-264 (2) (773 SE2d 263)
(2015) (where there is no other evidence of defendant’s guilt, then jury disbelief
of a defendant’s testimony, alone, is insufficient to sustain a conviction).

21
the evidence excluded “every other reasonable hypothesis save that

of the guilt of the accused.” OCGA § 24-14-6. The evidence presented

authorized the jury to find that Franklin had lived at the

burglarized home previously; knew of Calvin’s drug-dealing and of

his income tied to that business; served as a potential connection

between Fitts and Calvin; planned to meet and did meet Calvin at a

hotel while the crimes were being committed; communicated with

Fitts on the phone shortly before and after the crimes were

committed; followed Fitts to a repair shop away from Ansley’s home

so that they could drop off Ansley’s truck, which was seen by

witnesses in connection with the crimes; and gave investigators the

name Donovan Ansley, with the last name of Fitts’s godmother,

rather than Fitts’s real last name when she was first interviewed.

Further, the jury was entitled to believe the State’s theory and infer

that Franklin rescheduled her meeting with Calvin to ensure his

absence during the planned burglary; that the crimes would not

have been committed without Calvin being away; that in order to

mislead investigators, Franklin gave the GBI a false name for Fitts;

22
and that Franklin continued contact with Calvin, but not their

sexual relationship, after the crimes in order to keep tabs on the

investigation. The jury could have reasonably disbelieved Franklin’s

testimony that immediately before and after the crimes the jury

found Fitts to have directly committed, she and Fitts spoke on the

phone multiple times but only discussed how Ansley’s truck needed

repair; she and Fitts used Ansley’s prepaid phone because his other

phone, which he used throughout the same day, was broken; and her

rescheduled rendezvous with Calvin was unrelated to luring Calvin

away from his home during the burglary.

Regardless of whether Franklin intended that Fitts would

commit the murders, for the reasons outlined above the jury was

thus authorized to find that Franklin intended him to commit

burglary, which created a reasonably foreseeable risk that someone

would be killed. See OCGA § 16-2-6 (intent may be inferred upon

consideration of conduct and circumstances); see also Ellis v. State,

292 Ga. 276, 279 (1) (736 SE2d 412) (2013) (defendant guilty for

murder as a party to a crime because the crimes he did intend were

23
dangerous and created a foreseeable risk of death); Parks v. State,

272 Ga. 353, 354 (529 SE2d 127) (2000) (same). Accordingly,

Franklin’s argument fails.

4. Franklin also argues that as a matter of federal

constitutional due process, this Court should modify its approach to

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence under the Fourteenth

Amendment and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

Jackson v. Virginia. More specifically, Franklin argues that being

convicted based on only circumstantial evidence and as a party to a

crime creates too great a risk that an innocent person will be

convicted of crimes he or she did not commit, and that in these cases

specifically, to satisfy the demands of due process, the standard of

review should allow or include a consideration of evidentiary

conflicts in favor of the defendant’s innocence. However, Franklin

has not provided us with any legal authority to support her

argument that such a balancing test is required by the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as construed in Jackson.

Without more to show how this Court’s application of the Jackson

24
standard of review violates Franklin’s right to due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment, we will not deviate from that standard of

review.

5. Franklin also argues that her trial counsel rendered

constitutionally ineffective assistance. During his opening

statement, Franklin’s trial counsel said, “Now, . . . this case involved

apparently several individuals having duplicitous sexual

relationships with two different people at the same time. My client

was one of them.” Franklin argues that by calling her “duplicitous”

during his opening statement, her trial counsel destroyed her

credibility and set a negative tone for the evidence presented by

Franklin throughout trial. Considering that trial counsel testified

that his defense strategy was to show that Franklin was a credible,

good person from a well-liked family with a steady and respectable

job as a nurse, Franklin argues, her counsel’s discrediting comment

was a mistake that no reasonable attorney would make.

To prevail on this claim, Franklin must establish both deficient

performance and prejudice under Strickland. To establish that her

25
trial counsel performed deficiently, Franklin must prove that

counsel performed his duties “in an objectively unreasonable way

considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing

professional norms.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Watts v.

State, 308 Ga. 455, 458 (2) (841 SE2d 686) (2020). “Trial tactics or

strategy are almost never adequate grounds for finding trial counsel

ineffective unless they are so patently unreasonable that no

competent attorney would have chosen them.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Id. at 460 (2). And absent evidence to the

contrary, counsel’s actions are presumed strategic. See id. at 461 (2).

We see no objectively unreasonable performance in Franklin’s

trial counsel’s comment. Trial counsel testified that, in addition to

establishing that Franklin was more respectable than her co-

defendants, his strategy was to show that she was not a co-

conspirator but was merely caught in a love triangle that led to the

crimes. Even though describing one’s own client as “duplicitous”

might not have been the best choice of words for counsel to use before

the jury, under the circumstances, reasonable counsel could have

26
employed that description consistent with a reasonable trial

strategy of acknowledging to the jury the dishonesty involved in the

love triangle in which Franklin was participating. Accordingly,

because Franklin cannot establish that no reasonable attorney

would have made this choice under the circumstances, she has not

shown that her counsel performed deficiently, and her claim of

ineffective assistance fails.

6. Finally, we have identified a merger error in Franklin’s

sentencing. We have discretion upon our own initiative to correct

merger errors when they result in illegal and void judgments of

conviction and sentences. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 696-97 (4)

(808 SE2d 696) (2017).

Franklin was sentenced to serve three concurrent life

sentences for both felony murder counts and armed robbery and to

serve 20 years consecutively for burglary. The indictment in this

case did not predicate the charges of felony murder on a specific

felony; instead, each charge was predicated on “the commission of at

least one of the following felony offenses, to wit: burglary, armed

27
robbery, false imprisonment, aggravated assault, and home

invasion.” The jury did not specify which felony served as the basis

for either of Franklin’s convictions for felony murder. Where

ambiguity exists in the jury’s verdicts because the jury did not

specify which of two or more felonies served as the predicate felony

for a guilty verdict for felony murder, this ambiguity “must be

construed in the defendant’s favor.” Thompson v. State, 263 Ga. 23,

25 (2) (426 SE2d 895) (1993), overruled on other grounds, McClellan

v. State, 274 Ga. 819, 821 (1) (561 SE2d 82) (2002).

Due to the ambiguity in the jury’s verdicts, Franklin’s

conviction for armed robbery should have merged into one of her

convictions for felony murder. See Robertson v. State, 268 Ga. 772,

780 (22) (493 SE2d 697 (1997) (where unclear which of armed

robbery and burglary was the underlying felony for a single felony

murder conviction, trial court must merge armed robbery with

felony murder as the most severe in terms of potential punishment).

Likewise, her conviction for burglary should have merged into her

remaining conviction for felony murder.

28
 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm Franklin’s

convictions for felony murder, and we vacate her convictions for

burglary and armed robbery, which should have merged with her

felony murder convictions.

Judgment affirmed in Case No. S21A0159. Judgment affirmed

in part and vacated in part in Case No. S21A0160. All the Justices
concur, except Nahmias, P.J., who concurs in judgment only as to
Division 3 of Case No. S21A0160, and Melton, C.J., and McMillian,
J., who dissent in Case No. S21A0160.

29
 S21A0159. FITTS v. THE STATE.
S21A0160. FRANKLIN v. THE STATE.

MCMILLIAN, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

In these related appeals, Donovan Fitts and Jermanique

Franklin appeal their convictions for murder and other crimes in

connection with the shooting deaths of Tenecia Posley and Barry

Johnson. The evidence that Fitts, along with an unknown male

assailant, shot the victims during the course of a burglary was

substantial. Therefore, I concur fully in the Court’s decision in Case

No. S21A0159, in which we affirm Fitts’s convictions. However, it is

undisputed that Franklin was not present immediately before,

during, or after the shootings, and the circumstantial evidence upon

which this Court relies amounts to Franklin’s relationship as Fitts’s

girlfriend at the time the crimes were committed and conduct

common to such relationships like calling one another on the phone

and helping take a vehicle for repairs. Because I disagree that there

was sufficient evidence as a matter of Georgia statutory law and

constitutional due process for a rational jury to find Franklin guilty

30
of these crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, I respectfully dissent to

this Court’s judgment in Franklin’s case.

The standard of review for determining the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a conviction under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment is well-established: whether the evidence

presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

jury’s verdict, enabled a rational jury to find the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which she was convicted.

See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61

LE2d 560) (1979). This Jackson v. Virginia standard has been cited

over 13,000 times in Georgia appellate courts, but rarely has the

standard as described in Jackson been elucidated, so I revisit it here.

The Jackson Court explained the reason for this standard of review:

“a properly instructed jury may occasionally convict even when it

can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. at 317 (III) (B). So “the critical inquiry” must

be “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution,” whether any rational trier of fact could have found the

31
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at

318-19 (III) (B). In conducting this inquiry, the trier of fact is given

the responsibility of fairly resolving conflicts in the testimony,

weighing the evidence, and drawing “reasonable inferences from

basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. at 319 (III) (B).

The inquiry is somewhat more complicated in this case because

Franklin was not directly involved in the shootings and instead was

prosecuted as a party to Fitts’s crimes. Conviction as a party to a

crime requires proof that the defendant shared a common criminal

intent with the direct perpetrators of the crime, and a jury may infer

a common criminal intent from the defendant’s presence,

companionship, and conduct with other perpetrators before, during,

and after the crimes. Coates v. State, 310 Ga. 94, 98 (849 SE2d 435)

(2020).

In addition, as a matter of Georgia statutory law, “[t]o warrant

a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not

only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude

every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the

32
accused.” OCGA § 24-14-6. Because “not every hypothesis is

reasonable,” the evidence “need not exclude every conceivable

inference or hypothesis—only those that are reasonable.” Carter v.

State, 305 Ga. 863, 868 (2) (828 SE2d 317) (2019) (cleaned up).

“Whether alternative hypotheses are reasonable, however, is

usually a question for the jury, and this Court will not disturb the

jury’s finding unless it is insufficient as a matter of law.” Frazier v.

State, 308 Ga. 450, 453 (2) (a) (841 SE2d 692) (2020).

Here, “[w]hat the evidence produced by the State did not show

were the essential links between [the defendant’s] proven behavior

and the crimes charged.” Clyde v. State, 276 Ga. 839, 839 (584 SE2d

253) (2003) (emphasis in original). Evidence that a co-defendant

may have provided information or means to aid in the commission

of a crime is insufficient without further evidence of criminal intent

or knowledge of the criminal plan. See id. at 839-40 (defendant had

motive and purchased the guns used by his cousins to commit

murder but there was no proof he knowingly provided the guns to

his cousins or that he otherwise participated in planning the

33
crimes); Moore v. State, 255 Ga. 519, 520-21 (1) (340 SE2d 888)

(1986) (insufficient evidence to support one brother’s murder

conviction even though both brothers had motive and fled together

afterwards, and even where there was circumstantial evidence of

the brother’s presence at the scene of the crime); Brown v. State, 250

Ga. 862, 864-65 (1) (302 SE2d 347) (1983) (evidence of presence,

association, and even approval but not intent to participate in the

crimes was insufficient).

My review reveals no case where we have affirmed a conviction

as a party to a crime of a defendant who was not present during or

immediately before or after the crimes based on such limited

circumstantial evidence as there was here. 10 The State’s evidence

against Franklin amounted to a girlfriend calling a boyfriend in the

same time frame as he is committing crimes, Franklin and Fitts

taking the truck used by Fitts for repairs, and Franklin’s denials

that she was involved.11 Moreover, although the jury could have

10 I also note that the majority does not point to any case in which
the evidence has been found sufficient under similar circumstances.
11 The majority also notes that the jury could have disbelieved

34
inferred from the evidence presented that Fitts knew from Franklin

that Calvin would be out of the house on the morning of the murders

and that he kept drugs and money there, the State failed to produce

evidence that Franklin participated in planning the crimes or

benefitted from the proceeds. Thus, as a matter of Georgia statutory

law, this evidence in my opinion is not enough to exclude every

reasonable hypothesis other than guilt. Also, because these basic

facts proved by the State 12 would not allow a rational jury to

reasonably infer that Franklin had the criminal intent to support

her convictions beyond a reasonable doubt, I would conclude that the

evidence was insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process

Franklin’s denials of her involvement and that this could be considered

direct evidence against her. See Daughtie v. State, 297 Ga. 261, 263 (2)
(773 SE2d 263) (2015). But Daughtie made clear that such denials
constitute substantive evidence of guilt only if some corroborative
evidence exists to support the convictions, and I do not find sufficient
corroborative evidence here, particularly with respect to Franklin’s
criminal intent.
12 Suffice it to say, these kinds of basic facts such as knowing the

whereabouts of your significant other with a third party, phone calls, and
taking a vehicle for repairs would not be uncommon in many intimate
partner relationships, so I would conclude that a rational jury could not
have reasonably inferred Franklin’s criminal intent from this conduct
beyond a reasonable doubt.
35
and that as a result, Franklin’s convictions must be reversed, and

she cannot be retried. See Jefferson v. State, 310 Ga. 725, 726 (854

SE2d 528) (2021) (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16-17

(III) (98 SCt 2141, 57 LE2d 1) (1978)).

I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Melton joins this

dissent.

36
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 1, 2021

S21A0377. HOLMES v. THE STATE.

PETERSON, Justice.

Dequan Holmes appeals his convictions for felony murder,

aggravated assault, and two counts of possession of a firearm during

the commission of a crime for the shooting death of Javares Alston

and the non-fatal shooting of Danielle Willingham. 1 He argues that

1 The crimes occurred on June 28, 2012. On September 25, 2012, a

Richmond County grand jury indicted Holmes for malice murder, felony
murder, aggravated assault, and two counts of possession of a firearm during
the commission of a crime. At Holmes’s trial in August 2013, a jury found
Holmes not guilty of malice murder but guilty of felony murder, one count of
aggravated assault, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime. The court sentenced him to life without parole for felony
murder; twenty years of imprisonment for aggravated assault, to be served
consecutively; and ten years of imprisonment for two counts of possession of a
firearm during the commission of a crime, to be served consecutively. Holmes
filed a motion for new trial, and following a hearing, the trial court denied his
motion in an order entered on June 27, 2017. Holmes filed an untimely notice
of appeal, which we dismissed. The trial court granted Holmes’s motion for an
out-of-time appeal, and he then filed a timely notice of appeal. His case was
docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2020 and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
the evidence was insufficient to convict him and that the trial court

committed plain error when it charged the jury to “consider with

great care and caution” Holmes’s out-of-court statements. Holmes,

who was a juvenile at the time the crime was committed, also

challenges his sentence of life without parole, arguing that it

violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution

as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. We hold that

the evidence was sufficient to convict Holmes and that any error in

the trial court’s instruction to the jury did not amount to plain error

because the instruction did not affect the outcome of his trial. We

also conclude that Holmes’s sentence of life without parole was not

prohibited by United States Supreme Court precedent, especially in

the light of that Court’s recent decision in Jones v. Mississippi, ____

U.S. ___ (141 SCt 1307, 209 LE2d 390) (2021). We therefore affirm.

The evidence presented at trial showed the following.

According to Willingham, he and Alston shared a mobile home as

roommates. Sometime after 2:00 a.m. on June 28, 2012, Willingham

was awakened by loud knocking on the front door. Peeking out, he

2
saw by the light of a porch lamp a person whom he later identified

as Holmes, standing outside the door and saying, “I got your money.

I was just playing.” Willingham knew that Holmes and Alston

socialized, but he had never been introduced to Holmes. Willingham

went to Alston’s bedroom and relayed what Holmes said. Alston told

Willingham that he had been robbed recently. Alston went to the

door and opened it, with Willingham standing behind him. Holmes

again said, “I got your money. I was just playing.” But Holmes then

pulled a gun out of his pocket and began shooting. Willingham was

shot in his thigh while running for cover but managed to hide in the

bathroom; Alston tried to run but collapsed in the hallway after

Holmes shot him three times. Holmes continued to shoot until the

gun was empty and then left. Willingham testified that neither he

nor Alston had a knife or any other weapon when they opened the

door. He also said that he did not confront Holmes and did not

believe that Alston did either, nor did he hear any scuffle after

Holmes pulled out the gun.

Willingham called 911 after finding Alston face down on the

3
floor and unresponsive. Paramedics attempted to resuscitate Alston,

but he was pronounced dead on the scene. The police did not find

any weapons on Willingham or near Alston’s body at the time. An

autopsy confirmed that Alston died of his gunshot wounds.

After leaving the scene, Holmes called a close friend, Eugene

Butler, to pick him up at the mobile home park, telling Butler that

he had “messed up” and “got him one.” Butler’s girlfriend, Princess

Brown, drove Butler to meet Holmes at the mobile home park.

Holmes told Brown and Butler that some “work” was stolen from

him and two people owed him money, he was heated about it, he

went to their door to collect the money, and when they refused to

pay, he shot them. He told Butler that he shot one person in the head

or chest and killed him, but the second person did not die. Holmes

appeared nervous and scared, saying “I messed up,” “I don’t know

what I did,” “I lost my mind,” and “I got me one.” He also laughed

and said that he was “crazy” and “that’s what they get.”

Holmes testified at trial. He said that he regularly sold drugs

to people in the mobile home park, including Alston and Willingham,

4
that he had sold crack cocaine to other customers the day before the

shooting, and that he went to the mobile home on the night of the

shooting with crack cocaine in his pocket to sell “drugs” to Alston at

Alston’s request. Holmes claimed that Alston opened the door and

invited him in but then pulled a knife on him as he was entering,

saying, “give me that ‘S’ before I kill you.” Holmes told Alston “all

right,” but when Alston reached up, Holmes grabbed his pistol and

shot Alston while Holmes was running out of the mobile home.

Holmes admitted on cross-examination that he lied when giving

statements to the police after the shooting. The State later

introduced recordings of Holmes’s four police interviews. During the

first three interviews, Holmes denied shooting Alston, but he

admitted doing so, in self-defense, during the final interview. And

not once during his four interviews did he mention selling drugs to

Alston; instead, he told the police that Alston owed him money and

told him to come at 2:00 a.m. to collect it.

1. Holmes argues that the evidence was insufficient to

support his convictions because the State failed to disprove beyond

5
a reasonable doubt that he acted in self-defense. We disagree.

When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of

federal due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution, the proper standard of review is whether a

rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt

2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). This Court views the evidence in the

“light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the jury’s

assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.” Hayes v.

State, 292 Ga. 506, 506 (739 SE2d 313) (2013) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

In his trial testimony, Holmes admitted that he shot Alston

and Willingham but claimed that he shot them in self-defense. But

the jury could have rejected Holmes’s claim that he was acting in

self-defense. See Mims v. State, ___ Ga. ___, ____ (854 SE2d 742)

(2021) (“[T]he defendant’s testimony, in which he claimed he was

justified or provoked into acting, may itself be considered

substantive evidence of guilt when disbelieved by the jury, as long

6
as some corroborative evidence exists for the charged offense.”

(citation omitted)); see also Shaw v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 872 (1) (742

SE2d 707) (2013) (“[I]ssues of witness credibility and justification

are for the jury to decide, and the jury is free to reject a defendant’s

claim that he acted in self-defense.” (citation and punctuation

omitted)). Here, there was both corroborative and direct evidence

that Holmes shot Alston, and not in self-defense. Willingham

testified that he and Alston were unarmed when they opened the

door for Holmes; the police found no weapons on Alston or

Willingham or at their mobile home; Brown and Butler informed the

police that Holmes told them he shot the victims because they

refused to pay him; and Holmes’s credibility as a witness was

undermined by his in-court admission that he lied to the police and

his assertions of innocence in prior police interviews.

2. Holmes contends that the trial court committed plain error

in charging the jury to “consider with great care and caution” his

out-of-court statements. We disagree.

The relevant part of the challenged jury charge was as follows:

7
 You should consider with great care and caution the
evidence of any out-of-court statement allegedly made by
the Defendant offered by the State. The jury may believe
any such statement in whole or in part, believing that
which you find to be true and rejecting that which you find
to be untrue. You alone have the right to apply the general
rules of testing the believability of witnesses and to decide
what weight should be given to all or part of such
evidence.

Holmes argues that this pattern charge violated his right to due

process because the trial court did not clarify that the jury’s duty to

consider his statements with “great care and caution” applied only

to incriminatory statements. Without such a limitation, Holmes

argues, the jury was effectively told that it should apply a

heightened level of scrutiny to Holmes’s exculpatory statements and

his trial testimony. Holmes claims that the charge relieved the State

of its duty to prove all elements of the charged crimes beyond a

reasonable doubt because his trial testimony was the only evidence

of his sole defense (self-defense) and the trial court did not instruct

jurors to consider conflicting statements of other witnesses with the

same scrutiny.

8
 Holmes did not object to the charge at trial, so we review this

claim only for plain error. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) (failure to object

to a jury charge “shall preclude appellate review of such portion of

the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes

plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties”). To

establish plain error, Holmes “must point to an error that was not

affirmatively waived, the error must have been clear and not open

to reasonable dispute, the error must have affected his substantial

rights, and the error must have seriously affected the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Denson v.

State, 307 Ga. 545, 547-548 (2) (837 SE2d 261) (2019) (citation and

punctuation omitted). To show that an error affected his substantial

rights, Holmes must make an “affirmative showing that the error

probably did affect the outcome below.” McKinney v. State, 307 Ga.

129, 135 (2) (b) (834 SE2d 741) (2019) (citation and punctuation

omitted). If Holmes fails to meet any one of the elements of the plain

error test, his claim fails. See Denson, 307 Ga. at 548 (2).

Even assuming that Holmes could meet the other elements of

9
the plain error test, Holmes cannot show that the complained-of

charge constituted clear error. Considering the instructions in

context, see Campbell v. State, 292 Ga. 766, 769 (3) (740 SE2d 115)

(2013), a reasonable jury would not have understood the instruction

to mean that it should be more skeptical of Holmes’s testimony and

exculpatory statements than testimony of other witnesses. The

charge referred only to the State’s use of Holmes’s out-of-court

statements, which were mostly incriminatory, not to Holmes’s use

of those statements or his own testimony. In fact, the court

instructed the jury in a previous charge that it should evaluate

Holmes’s in-court testimony “as you would that of any other

witness.” And because the charge was given immediately after

instructions about evaluating whether the defendant’s custodial

statements were made voluntarily and with full knowledge of his

constitutional rights, a reasonable jury would likely have

understood the charge to encourage skepticism only of Holmes’s

custodial statements. See Williamson v. State, 305 Ga. 889, 896 (3)

(b) (827 SE2d 857) (2019).

10
 3. Holmes was four days shy of his eighteenth birthday when

he shot Alston and Willingham. He argues that his sentence of life

without parole (“LWOP”) for the murder of Alston violated the

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the

trial court failed to consider explicitly the characteristics of minors

and failed to make a distinct determination on the record that he

was irreparably corrupt. Holmes’s Eighth Amendment claim fails,

because the United States Supreme Court has recently made clear

that the Eighth Amendment does not require sentencing judges to

say anything on the record on these points, and there is nothing in

the record here showing that the trial court did not consider the

relevant factors.

At Holmes’s sentencing hearing, the State introduced evidence

of Holmes’s previous criminal activity as a juvenile, including

attempted strong-armed robbery and third-degree burglary in South

Carolina. Holmes’s grandmother testified that Holmes was “raised

in church” and “knew right from wrong” and that his family talked

to him often “about not being in trouble.” Holmes’s trial counsel

11
argued that an LWOP sentence was excessive given Holmes’s age,

and that Holmes had a possibility of redemption and rehabilitation

because he was only 15 during the South Carolina incident and 17

when he shot Alston and Willingham.

When announcing Holmes’s sentence, the trial judge stated:

Quite frankly, I’ve never given a life without parole and

I’ve had it requested many times. And I feel it is only
deserving in those cases that are so severe that the Court
doesn’t feel there’s any redeeming part to an individual.
This case was so calculated and so senseless and followed
so quickly after the attempted strong arm robbery and the
burglary in South Carolina, I feel that a sentence in this
case is appropriate for life without parole . . . . I regret it,
but I feel I have to do it.

The 2013 sentencing hearing was held after the United States

Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460

(132 SCt 2455, 183 LE2d 407) (2012). The trial judge did not

explicitly mention Holmes’s age or discuss the characteristics of

youth during sentencing. In his order denying Holmes’s motion for

new trial, however, the judge stated that Holmes’s sentence

complied with Miller because “the Defendant’s age and juvenile

status [were] considered during the sentencing hearing.”

12
 In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that a

sentencing scheme mandating LWOP for those under the age of 18

at the time of their crimes violated the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. See 567 U.S. at 465,

479. Four years later, the Supreme Court held in Montgomery v.

Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (136 SCt 718, 193 LE2d 599) (2016), that

Miller had announced a substantive rule of constitutional law that

must be given retroactive effect in state collateral review

proceedings. See id. at 212. In so doing, the Supreme Court said that

“the sentencing judge [must] take into account how children are

different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably

sentencing them to a lifetime in prison” before sentencing a juvenile

offender to LWOP; and that “[e]ven if a court considers a child’s age

before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence

still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects

unfortunate yet transient immaturity.” Id. at 208 (citation and

punctuation omitted). And Montgomery emphasized that an LWOP

sentence is permitted only in “exceptional circumstances”: for “the

13
rare juvenile offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity that

rehabilitation is impossible,” those “rarest of juvenile

offenders . . . whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility,” and

“those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption” —

and that a[n] LWOP sentence is not permitted for “the vast majority

of juvenile offenders.” Id. at 208-213.

Based on this language in Montgomery, we held in Veal v.

State, 298 Ga. 691 (784 SE2d 403) (2016), that it was not enough for

a sentencing court merely to consider generally a juvenile offender’s

age and associated characteristics. See id. at 703 (5) (d). Rather, we

said that to place a defendant “in the narrow class of juvenile

murderers for whom an LWOP sentence is proportional under the

Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Miller as refined by

Montgomery[,]” a sentencing court must make a “distinct

determination on the record” that the defendant “is irreparably

corrupt or permanently incorrigible[.]” Veal, 298 Ga. at 703 (5) (d).

Furthermore, we stated in a footnote that it is “important” that a

sentencing court “explicitly consider” the primary ways that

14
characteristics of children are relevant to sentencing. Id. at 702 (5)

(d) n.6. Our holding in Veal was explicitly a holding of federal

constitutional law based on our understanding of the decisions of the

United States Supreme Court in Miller and Montgomery. In

subsequent cases, we declined to extend Veal to hold that the

determination of irreparable corruption it required is a factual

finding — let alone a finding that must be made by a jury, or beyond

a reasonable doubt. See Raines v. State, 309 Ga. 258, 268 (2) (c) (845

SE2d 613) (2020); White v. State, 307 Ga. 601, 605-606 (3) (a) (837

SE2d 838) (2020).

Earlier this year, the United States Supreme Court decided

Jones, which confirmed that we were right not to extend Veal and,

indeed, held that in Veal we read Miller and — especially —

Montgomery too broadly. In Jones, the Court considered a

defendant’s claim that the sentencing court erred by imposing

LWOP sentences for crimes that the defendant had committed as a

minor, because the sentencing court failed to make a factual finding

of permanent incorrigibility or, at the very least, an on-the-record

15
explanation of the sentence containing an “implicit finding” of

permanent incorrigibility. 141 SCt at 1313. But the United States

Supreme Court upheld the sentence, holding that Miller does not

require a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility before

a sentencer imposes an LWOP sentence on a murderer under age

18. See Jones, 141 SCt at 1314-1319. And the Court rejected Jones’s

alternative argument that a sentencer must at least make an on-

the-record explanation for the sentence that carried an “implicit

finding” of permanent incorrigibility, saying that an on-the-record

finding is (1) not necessary to ensure that a sentencer considers a

defendant’s youth, (2) not required by or consistent with Miller or

the Court’s analogous death penalty precedents, and (3) not dictated

by any consistent historical or contemporary sentencing practice in

the States. See id. at 1319-1321. In particular, the Court explained,

“if the sentencer has discretion to consider the defendant’s youth [as

Miller requires] . . . it would be all but impossible for a sentencer to

avoid considering that mitigating factor,” especially where defense

counsel makes arguments focused on the offender’s youth. Id. at

16
1319.

In short, Jones clarified that although the Eighth Amendment

requires that, before sentencing a juvenile murderer to LWOP, a

trial court must hold a sentencing hearing where the defendant’s

age and characteristics of children are considered, neither Miller nor

Montgomery requires a sentencer to say anything on the record

about youth and its attendant characteristics before imposing an

LWOP sentence. Therefore, to the extent that Veal suggested a

requirement that sentencers provide explicit, on-the-record

explanations regarding determinations of permanent incorrigibility

and the characteristics of children, Jones has explained that we were

mistaken.

Holmes’s challenge to his sentence thus cannot succeed.

Holmes argues that his sentence is void because the trial court did

not make a “distinct determination on the record” that Holmes was

“irreparably corrupt or permanently incorrigible.” Veal, 298 Ga. at

703 (5) (d). But Jones makes it clear that no such determination need

be made on the record. See 141 SCt at 1312-1313, 1320.

17
 Holmes also argues that the trial court failed sufficiently to

consider “youth and its attendant characteristics” as factors at

Holmes’s sentencing hearing. But, under Jones, “unless the record

affirmatively reflects otherwise, the trial court will be deemed to

have considered the relevant criteria, such as mitigating

circumstances, enumerated in the sentencing rules.” Id. at 1321

(noting that appellate courts do not necessarily reverse a sentence

“merely because the sentencer could have said more about

mitigating circumstances” (citation and punctuation omitted)); see

also State v. Abbott, 309 Ga. 715, 719 (2) (848 SE2d 105) (2020)

(“Trial judges too are presumed to know the law and apply it in

making their decisions, absent some indication in the record

suggesting otherwise.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Here,

the trial judge, like the sentencer in Jones, had discretion to

sentence Holmes to a lesser sentence than LWOP. The record does

not show that the trial court failed to consider the required factors;

rather, the record shows that the trial court did consider them.

Holmes’s trial counsel made arguments focused on Holmes’s youth

18
and possibility for rehabilitation. The trial judge heard evidence

about Holmes’s childhood environment. All of this happened after

the Supreme Court decided Miller, so we presume the trial court

knew and applied its holding. And in denying Holmes’s motion for

new trial, the trial judge stated that he considered Holmes’s age and

juvenile status during the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, we

conclude that the trial judge sufficiently considered the required

factors in sentencing Holmes to LWOP.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

19
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 1, 2021

S21A0553. TYLER v. THE STATE.

BETHEL, Justice.

A Richmond County jury found Charles Tyler guilty of felony

murder, armed robbery, and other crimes in connection with the

shooting death of David Fulkrod and theft of copper from a recycling

facility. On appeal, Tyler challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

as to all of his convictions. Because the evidence was sufficient to

support each conviction, we affirm. 1

1The crimes occurred on June 4, 2008. In September 2008, a Richmond

County grand jury indicted Tyler for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder
predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), armed robbery (Count 3), burglary
(Count 4), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 5),
and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 6). At a jury trial held
from August 31 to September 3, 2009, Tyler was found not guilty on Count 1
and guilty on Counts 2 through 5. The State elected not to pursue Count 6, for
which the trial court entered an order of nolle prosequi. The trial court
sentenced Tyler to consecutive sentences of life in prison on Counts 2 and 3, a
consecutive term of 20 years in prison on Count 4, and a consecutive term of 5
years in prison on Count 5. On September 10, 2009, Tyler filed a motion for
 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the

evidence presented at trial showed the following. In the weeks

preceding the murder, CMC Recycling Augusta in Richmond County

terminated Tyler’s employment with the company. During the

afternoon of June 3, 2008, Tyler rented a U-Haul box truck and a

storage unit.

In the early morning hours of June 4, Fulkrod was working as

a security guard at CMC Recycling. He was stationed at a guard

shack at the facility’s entrance where he would maintain a log

recording the names of people arriving, their times of arrival, and

other activity. He spoke to his supervisor at 3:00 a.m. and

documented that he “made rounds” between 3:30 and 3:45 a.m.

new trial, which he subsequently amended. The trial court denied the motion
for new trial, as amended, on December 16, 2015, and Tyler filed a timely notice
of appeal on December 30, 2015. The case was docketed in this Court on April
27, 2017, as case number S17A1524, but was remanded to the trial court on
June 30, 2017, so that the complete record of the proceedings could be
transmitted to this Court. On January 28, 2019, the trial court entered an
order certifying that the record was complete and ordering the clerk of court to
transmit the complete record to this Court upon the filing of a new notice of
appeal by Tyler. On February 15, 2019, Tyler filed a notice of appeal. This case
was docketed in this Court to the April 2021 term and submitted for a decision
on the briefs.
2
Fulkrod left a voicemail with his supervisor that all was clear at

around 4:00 a.m. Fulkrod began an entry with a time notation of

4:40 a.m., but there was no description of what happened at that

time.

At around 5:30 a.m., another employee arriving for work found

the gate open but did not see anyone in the guard shack to grant him

entrance. The employee exited his vehicle, looked through the guard

shack window, and observed Fulkrod lying in a pool of blood.

Fulkrod had been shot in the head and died from his wounds. A 9mm

cartridge casing was found next to Fulkrod’s body.

Investigators discovered that a copper bale was missing from

the “lower” warehouse. A forklift, normally stored in the “upper”

warehouse, was also out of place, and a welding torch appeared to

have been used to cut the upper warehouse lock. Investigators also

located forklift tire tracks leading to the lower warehouse and tire

tracks from a vehicle with four rear tires leading from the company’s

front entrance to a lane between the upper and lower warehouses

and back out. They also located work boot impressions in the dirt at

3
the crime scene, a pair of bolt-cutters, and a destroyed lock by the

front entry gate.

The police provided information about the incident to the

public and requested reports of anyone seen in possession of large

amounts of copper. On June 5, the police received a call from a man

reporting that on the preceding day at approximately 5:45 a.m., he

was driving behind a U-Haul truck and observed “a big cube of

metal” that “looked like copper” in the back of the truck.

At around 7:00 a.m. on June 5, investigators discovered a large

copper cube in a delivery area of a grocery store. About seven miles

away from the grocery store, the police found Tyler lying beside a U-

Haul truck in the parking lot of a gas station. Tyler initially gave

the police a false name, and after being given Miranda warnings, 2

Tyler told investigators that he was using the U-Haul truck to move

himself and his wife from his mother’s house into a new apartment.

Tyler was then transferred to a hospital to be treated for

2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694)
(1966).
4
dehydration.

That same day, Tyler’s wife told investigators that she had

been living with her mother and was not moving into a new

apartment with Tyler. She also stated that she brought Tyler a

broom at his request to clean out the U-Haul. Tyler’s mother told

investigators that she had not seen her son in five years. When

investigators returned to the hospital later that day and told Tyler

what they had learned from his wife and mother, Tyler could not

provide an explanation, and “his eyes watered up with tears.”

Investigators also found copper scraps, a pallet, and some cardboard

boxes on the floor of the U-Haul. When told of this discovery by

investigators, Tyler denied that those items had been in the U-Haul

when he rented it, but stated that he was the only one who had

driven or had access to the truck. Investigators also found that the

tires on the U-Haul had the same characteristics as the impressions

left at the crime scene.

Investigators executed a search warrant at Tyler’s storage unit

and discovered approximately 2,700 pounds of copper in piles inside

5
and copper bits scattered around outside the unit. The amount of

copper discovered in the storage unit and behind the grocery store

was consistent with the amount of copper stolen from CMC

Recycling. Investigators then returned a third time to speak to Tyler

and again gave Miranda warnings to Tyler before questioning him.

Tyler initially denied renting a storage unit, but when investigators

revealed proof that he had done so, Tyler admitted that he rented

the unit. Tyler admitted that the storage unit’s key was on a lanyard

that officers had taken from him and stated that no one else had the

key. However, he denied that there was any copper in the unit and

disputed the account of a maintenance man who reported having

backed the U-Haul into the unit at Tyler’s request on the evening of

June 4.

The police searched Tyler’s apartment and found work boots

that matched the impressions documented at the crime scene.

Investigators also recovered documents in the apartment related to

renting a forklift, and notes detailing U-Haul truck rental costs and

weight limits, as well as documents listing various CMC Recycling

6
locations throughout the Southeast. Additionally, investigators

found Tyler’s resume, which listed that he was previously a

construction welder and that his skills included forklift operation.

2. In two separate enumerations of error, Tyler challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. Tyler first argues that

the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the

State did not establish each element of the offenses and because the

evidence was circumstantial, did not establish that he actively

engaged in any of the crimes, and did not preclude the possibility

that someone else committed the crimes. Tyler also argues that the

evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his convictions for armed

robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a

felony because it was equally possible that the copper was taken

before Fulkrod’s shooting, and thus a jury could not find that the

robbery was accomplished by use of force. For the reasons explained

below, each of these contentions fails.

When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of

federal due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United

7
States Constitution, the proper standard of review is whether a

rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III)

(B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). This Court views the evidence

in the “light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the

jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.”

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506

(739 SE2d 313) (2013). The jury’s resolution of these issues

“adversely to the defendant does not render the evidence

insufficient.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Graham v. State,

301 Ga. 675, 677 (1) (804 SE2d 113) (2017).

Further, as a matter of Georgia statutory law, “[t]o warrant a

conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only

be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every

other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”

See former OCGA § 24-4-6.3 Whether an alternative hypothesis is

3 This case was tried prior to the current Evidence Code becoming
effective in 2013. However, this provision “was carried forward into the new

8
reasonable or whether the circumstantial evidence excludes every

reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt is generally a question left

to the jury, and this Court “will not disturb that finding unless it is

insupportable as a matter of law.” Johnson v. State, 307 Ga. 44, 48

(2) (834 SE2d 83) (2019). “[I]t was for the jury to determine the

credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or

inconsistencies in the evidence. Likewise, it was for the jury to

decide whether the defense theory . . . was reasonable and not

excluded by other evidence.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)

Bamberg v. State, 308 Ga. 340, 343 (1) (a) (839 SE2d 640) (2020).

We first consider the sufficiency of the evidence presented as

to the offense of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault.

OCGA § 16-5-1 (c) provides that “[a] person commits the offense of

murder when, in the commission of a felony, he or she causes the

death of another human being irrespective of malice.” Tyler’s felony

murder conviction was predicated on his aggravated assault of

Evidence Code, and it now can be found at OCGA § 24-14-6.” Gibson v. State,
300 Ga. 494, 495 (1) n.4 (796 SE2d 712) (2017).
9
Fulkrod. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) provides, in relevant part, that “[a]

person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she

assaults . . . [w]ith a deadly weapon[.]” A person commits an assault

when he or she “[a]ttempts to commit a violent injury to the person

of another [or c]ommits an act which places another in reasonable

apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” OCGA § 16-

5-20 (a).

Here, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support

Tyler’s conviction for felony murder predicated on aggravated

assault. The jury could conclude from the evidence presented at trial

and summarized above that Tyler shot Fulkrod so that he could steal

copper from CMC Recycling.

Likewise, the evidence was sufficient to support Tyler’s

conviction for burglary. Under the statute in effect at the time of the

crimes, OCGA § 16-7-1 (a) provided that “[a] person commits the

offense of burglary when, without authority and with the intent to

commit a felony or theft therein, he . . . enters or remains within any

other building . . . or any room or any part thereof.” Here, the

10
evidence presented at trial authorized the jury to determine that

Tyler entered the CMC Recycling upper and lower warehouses

without authority and for the purpose of stealing copper. See

Blackshear v. State, 309 Ga. 479, 484 (1) (847 SE2d 317) (2020). The

evidence was therefore sufficient to support his conviction for

burglary.

Tyler was also convicted of armed robbery and possession of a

firearm during the commission of a felony predicated on armed

robbery or murder. OCGA § 16-8-41 (a) provides that “[a] person

commits the offense of armed robbery when, with intent to commit

theft, he or she takes property of another from the person or the

immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon, or any

replica, article, or device having the appearance of such weapon.” A

person commits the offense of possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony when he has within arm’s reach or on his

person a firearm during the commission of “[a]ny crime against or

involving the person of another . . . and which crime is a felony[.]”

OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) (1).

11
 The indictment alleged that Tyler committed armed robbery in

violation of OCGA § 16-8-41 “with the intent to commit theft, [by]

tak[ing] copper, the property of CMC [Recycling, Inc.], from the

immediate presence of David Fulkrod, by use of a certain firearm[.]” 4

“The State therefore was required to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that [Tyler]’s use of the [firearm] occurred ‘prior to or

contemporaneously with the taking’” of the copper in order to

sustain his conviction for armed robbery and unlawful possession of

a firearm during that offense. (Citation omitted.) Harrington v.

State, 300 Ga. 574, 577 (2) (a) (797 SE2d 107) (2017). A defendant

may be convicted of committing a robbery if he kills the victim first

and then takes property in his possession. See Hester v. State, 282

Ga. 239, 240 (2) (647 SE2d 60) (2007). The evidence was sufficient

for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the State

4 It is immaterial that the copper belonged to CMC Recycling, not

Fulkrod. See Holcomb v. State, 268 Ga. 100, 104 (5) (485 SE2d 192) (1997)
(“Robbery is a crime against possession, and is not affected by concepts of
ownership. . . . [T]he gravamen of the offense of armed robbery is the taking of
items from the possession of another by use of an offensive weapon, and not
the ownership status of the item taken.” (footnotes omitted)).
12
made such a showing here. The evidence showed that Fulkrod

regularly recorded the name and time of people arriving at the gate,

and there was an incomplete entry at 4:40 a.m. The jury could

conclude that Tyler arrived in the rented U-Haul at the main gate

and then shot Fulkrod before entering the property to complete the

theft. Investigators located tire marks matching the rented U-Haul

entering the main gate between the two warehouses, greatly

diminishing the theory that Tyler gained entry to the facility

through some other means. Further, from the evidence presented at

trial, the jury could infer that he needed time to cut the upper

warehouse lock with a welding torch and to drive the forklift from

that warehouse to the lower warehouse to load copper onto the

truck. And there was no evidence that Fulkrod was restrained in

any way to keep him from calling the police while the theft was

completed. Accordingly, as a whole, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the verdicts, this evidence was sufficient for the jury to

conclude that Tyler shot Fulkrod before stealing the copper. See

Lumpkin v. State, 310 Ga. 139, 146 (1) (a) (849 SE2d 175, 182) (2020)

13
(evidence sufficient to prove defendant’s use of an offensive weapon

occurred prior to or contemporaneously with the taking); Johnson v.

State, 307 Ga. 44, 49-50 (2) (b) (834 SE2d 83) (2019) (same). The

evidence was therefore sufficient to sustain his convictions for

armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of

a felony as a matter of due process.

Finally, we consider Tyler’s argument that the evidence was

insufficient under former OCGA § 24-4-6. Tyler denied any

involvement in the crimes and now argues that the State’s evidence

was circumstantial and did not exclude the possibility that someone

else committed the crimes. However, significant physical evidence

found by the police tied Tyler to the crimes, including a large volume

of copper and copper scraps found in and around the storage unit

and U-Haul that he had rented, work boots found in Tyler’s

possession the soles of which matched impressions found at the

crime scene, and documentation detailing information on forklift

and U-Haul rentals, U-Haul weight limits, and CMC Recycling

locations, as well as a resume detailing Tyler’s skills as a welder and

14
forklift operator. The jury was authorized to accept the State’s

theory of the crimes and was not required to conclude that the

hypothesis proposed by Tyler that someone else committed the

crimes was reasonable. See Blackshear, 309 Ga. at 483 (1).

Based on the foregoing, the jury was authorized to find that the

evidence, even if considered entirely circumstantial, was sufficient

to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of Tyler’s

guilt as to each offense for which he was convicted. See former

OCGA § 24-4-6; Blackshear, 309 Ga. at 484 (1). Moreover, viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdicts and deferring

to the jury’s assessment of the evidence’s weight and credibility, we

conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient as a

matter of constitutional due process to authorize a rational trier of

fact to find Tyler guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of

felony murder, armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm

during the commission of a felony. See Jackson, 442 U. S. at 319 (III)

(B); see also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“It

was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to

15
resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.” (citation

omitted)).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

16