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Game Theory: Dr. K. M. Salah Uddin Associate Professor Department of Management Information Systems
Game Theory: Dr. K. M. Salah Uddin Associate Professor Department of Management Information Systems
● Strategy Choices
Player B
b1 b2 Row
Player A Minimum
4 Maximin
a1 4 8
a2 11 5 5
Column 11 8
Maximum Minimax
Mixed Strategy Example
Player B
Player A b2 b3
a1 5 -2
a2 0 3
Other Game Theory Models
Player B
b1 b2 b3
Player A
a1 8 5 7
a2 2 4 10
Excercise
Problem No. 2: Assume that a two-person,
zero-sum game has a pure strategy solution. If
this game were solved using a linear
programming formulation, how would you
know from the linear programming the linear
programming solution that the game had a
pure strategy solution?
Problems
Problem No. 3: Consider the payoff table below
that shows the percentage increase in market
share for company A for each combination of
Company A and Company B strategies.
Assume that Company B implements mixed
strategy by using strategy b2 with probability
0.5 and strategy b3 with probability 0.5.
Company B decides never to use strategy b1 .
What is the expected payoff to company A
under each of its three strategies? If company B
were to always use the stated mixed strategy
probabilities, what is optimal strategy for
Problems
Company B
Increase Quantity Extend
advertising b1 Discount Warranty
b2 b3
Increase 4 3 2
advertising a1
Company A Quantity -1 4 1
Discount a2
Extend 5 -2 5
Warranty a3
Solution of Problem No. 3
The expected payoffs for Company A are as follows:
Strategy a1 : Expected Payoff = 0.5(3) +0.5(2) = 2.5
Strategy a2 : Expected Payoff = 0.5(4) +0.5(1) = 2.5
Strategy a3 : Expected Payoff = 0.5(-2)+0.5(5) = 1.5
If Company B were to implement strategy b2 with
probability 0.50 and strategy b3 with probability
0.50, Company A can select strategy a1 or a2 to obtain
an expected payoff providing a 2.5% increase in
market share.
Problems
Problem No. 4: Two television stations compete with each other for viewing
audience. The viewing audience gains in thousands of viewers for
station A are shown in the payoff table.
Station B
Sitcom rerun News Home
b1 program improvement
b2 b3
Station A Sitcom rerun a1 10 -5 3
News program a2 8 7 6
Home 4 8 7
improvement a3
Determine the optimal strategy for each station. What is the value of the
game?
Solution of Problem No. 4
The row minimums are -5, 6, and 4. Station A prefers the maximin strategy a2 to
obtain a gain of at least 6. The column maximums are 10, 8 and 7. Station B
prefers the minimax strategy b3 to limit its maximum loss to no more than
7. However, because the maximum of the row minimums is not equal to the
minimum of the row maximums, the game does not have a pure strategy. A
mixed-strategy solution with a value of the game between 6 and 7 exists.
The linear programming formulation and solution for Station A follows. Max
GAINA
s.t.
Station B Strategy
10PA1 + 8PA2 + 4PA3 - GAINA > 0 (Strategy b1 )
-5PA1 + 7PA2 + 8PA3 - GAINA > 0 (Strategy b2 )
3PA1 + 6PA2 + 7PA3 - GAINA > 0 (Strategy b3 )
PA1 + PA2 + PA3 = 1
PA1, PA2, PA3 > 0
Solution of Problem No. 4
The optimal strategy is for Station A to implement
strategy a2 with probability 0.6 and strategy a3
with probability 0.4. Using the absolute value
of the dual prices, we see that it is optimal for
Station B to implement strategy b1 with
probability 0.2 and strategy b3 with probability
0.8.
The expected value of the game is 6.4. This is an
expected increase of 6400 viewers for Station A.