European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp.
348–367, 2006
doi:10.1016/j.emj.2006.05.009
Actionable Strategy
Knowledge:
q
A Practice Perspective
PAULA JARZABKOWSKI, Aston Business School
DAVID C. WILSON, Warwick Business School
Increasingly the body of knowledge derived from
strategy theory has been criticized because it is
not actionable in practice, particularly under the
conditions of a knowledge economy. Since strategic
management is an applied discipline this is a seri-
ous criticism. However, we argue that the theory-
practice question is too simple. Accordingly, this
paper expands this question by outlining first the
theoretical criteria under which strategy theory is
not actionable, and then outlines an alternative per-
spective on strategy knowledge in action, based
upon a practice epistemology. The paper is in three
sections. The first section explains two contextual
conditions which impact upon strategy theory
within a knowledge economy, environmental
velocity and knowledge intensity. The impact of
these contextual conditions upon the application
of four different streams of strategy theory is exam-
ined. The second section suggests that the theoreti-
cal validity of these contextual conditions breaks
down when we consider the knowledge artifacts,
such as strategy tools and frameworks, which arise
from strategy research. The third section proposes
a practice epistemology for analyzing strategy
knowledge in action that stands in contrast to more
traditional arguments about actionable knowledge.
From a practice perspective, strategy knowledge is
argues to be actionable as part of the everyday
activities of strategizing.
Ó 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Strategy as practice, Strategy know-
ledge, Relevance, Strategy tools, Strategy theory
q
The authors wish to thank Don Maclean, Patrick Regner,
Richard Whittington and Nicolay Worren for their comments
on earlier drafts of this paper, as well as participants at the
Academy of Management Conference, 2004, where an abridged
version of this paper appeared in the Conference Proceedings.
348
Ó 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
0263-2373 $32.00
Strategy is a key concept of organization theory.
Broadly, it is the theoretical concepts and frame-
works which guide the strategic decisions that influ-
ence both the long and short-term objectives of an
organization (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Hickson
et al., 1986; Rumelt, Schendel and Teece, 1991). Much
of today’s strategy knowledge is the culmination of
organizational research and theory that has devel-
oped over the past forty-five years (see, for example,
Bowman, Singh and Thomas, 2002; Tsoukas and
Knudsen, 2002; Whittington, 2004). It comprises a
pervasive set of concepts and constructs that are
implicitly involved in the work of strategizing (Whit-
tington et al., 2003). In addition to economic models
of firm positioning and competition (Porter, 1980),
strategy knowledge comprises theories of organiza-
tion as diverse as the resource-based view (Barney,
1991) and complex adaptive systems (Levy, 1994; Sta-
cey, 1995). As Hafsi and Thomas note (2005) note,
these key concepts of strategy knowledge have been
the subject of intense debate in recent years. Despite
these paradigmatic disputes, one of the ultimate
goals of strategy knowledge is to act as a framework
which can help inform and guide those managers
who steer the strategic course of an organization.
Strategy knowledge is thus intended to be actionable
knowledge.
The paradox of this emerging field is that, despite its
plural and diverse approaches, the relevance of strat-
egy knowledge to practice is increasingly questioned
(Baldridge, Floyd and Markoczy, 2004; Bettis, 1991;
Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Hafsi and Thomas, 2005;
Løwendahl and Revang, 1998). For example, practi-
tioners ‘‘are abandoning traditional approaches to strat-
egy’’ and academics ‘‘are re-examining the relevance of
the concepts and tools of the strategy field’’ (Prahalad
and Hamel, 1994: 5). This concern about strategy
knowledge is part of wider concern on whether orga-
nization theory is actionable in practice (see, for
example, Academy of Management Conference,
European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
 ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE
2004; Academy of Management Journal, 2001, 44.2;
Administrative Science Quarterly, 1982, 27.4; British
Journal of Management, 2001; Maclean and Macin-
tosh, 2002; Pettigrew, 1996; Tranfield and Starkey,
1998). As a key part of organization theory, strategy
has been the target of further criticisms which argue
that theory fails to keep pace with the changing com-
petitive conditions of a ‘knowledge economy’ – glob-
alization, deregulation, technology and increased
rates of innovation (Chakravarthy, 1997; Courtney,
Kirkland and Viguerie, 1997; Eisenhardt, 2002; Prah-
alad and Hamel, 1994; Venkatraman and Subraman-
iam, 2001).
This paper argues that the simple dichotomy
between theory and practice is insufficient to capture
the richness of interplay (or lack of interplay)
between the two. Adopting a practice perspective,
we propose that the relationship between theory
and practice involves a process of dissociation in
which current questions about actionable strategy
knowledge may be misleading. For example, theo-
rists argue that changing competitive conditions
have rendered traditional strategy knowledge largely
irrelevant. Such theoretical arguments claim that
practitioners need new and emerging theories of
strategy that are better adapted to competitive condi-
tions to guide strategy practice. This paper examines
these arguments, proposing that even where they
hold true, practitioners do not apply theory directly.
Instead, they use tools and frameworks developed
from a wide range of organizational research. Fur-
thermore, in practice such frameworks may be
adapted and modified by practitioners/strategists
to suit their own, rather than intended theoretical,
ends. We therefore develop the concept of dissocia-
tions between strategy theory and its use in practice,
building upon Weick’s (1995) proposition that theory
interacts better with its prescription by receiving
feedback. We argue that the use of theories in prac-
tice is more complex than an examination of the
extent of their direct application. An examination of
practice, therefore, rather than theorizing about prac-
tice may yield insight into how theory and practice
are inter-related.
Asking the Wrong Question: Is Theory
Actionable in Practice?
As Weick (1995) argues, theories themselves are no
more than approximations. They represent the
interim struggles of social scientists as they strive for
a bigger theory with a wider scope. Theory is thus
not a static concept in a dichotomous relation with
practice, but is a continuum ranging from guesses
to frameworks and general principles. This paper
aims to contribute to our understanding of the
relationship between theory and practice by suggest-
ing that there is a dissociation between theoretical
knowledge and its direct application in practice which
European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
may be better explained if we take a practice
perspective.
The paper is in three sections. First, many of the con-
cerns about the practical application of strategy the-
ory are based upon the evolving nature of theory
as competitive conditions change due to globaliza-
tion, deregulation, technology and increased innova-
tion (Prahalad and Hamel, 1994; Løwendahl and
Revang, 1998; Venkatraman and Subramaniam,
2001). These changed competitive conditions are var-
iously termed ‘post-industrial society’ (Løwendahl
and Revang, 1998), the ‘new economy’ (Coyle and
Quah, 2002; Eisenhardt, 2002), or the ‘knowledge
economy’ (Kim and Mauborgne, 1999). As the latter
term ‘knowledge economy’ is a persistent descrip-
tor 1, it will be used in this paper. The first part of this
paper outlines the major changing competitive con-
ditions that are argued to influence whether knowl-
edge is actionable in a knowledge economy,
environmental velocity and knowledge intensity,
and assesses how strategy theory has adapted (or
failed to adapt). Taking four key schools of thought
in strategy (positioning; resource based; hypercom-
petitive and complexity theory) we mirror each
against the changing competitive conditions. There
is evidence of theoretical development as some
approaches become increasingly relevant and vice
versa. Therefore, there is some support for the argu-
ment that some schools of strategy theory may be
less actionable than others. However, the second part
of the paper raises questions over the direct applica-
tion of these theories by practitioners.
In the second part of this paper we argue that theo-
retical knowledge goes through a process of dissoci-
ation, which means it is rarely disseminated directly
into practice as ‘theory’. Rather, theoretical knowl-
edge is simplified into ‘knowledge artifacts’, such
as tools, techniques, and frameworks (Furrer and
Thomas, 2000). The dissociation from theoretical
knowledge to knowledge artifacts is important in
understanding how strategy knowledge can be trans-
lated into practice. Knowledge artifacts include posi-
tioning frameworks, matrices such as the Boston Box
or environmental scanning tools such as the PESTL
analysis. These artifacts are disseminated into prac-
tice through MBA courses, strategy texts, strategy
consultants and the popular business media (Abra-
hamson, 1996; Barry and Elmes, 1997; Beyer and
Trice, 1982; Mazza and Alvarez, 2000; Tsoukas and
Knudsen, 2002). This paper therefore proposes that
strategy knowledge, as derived from organization
and economic theory, is used in practice as knowl-
edge artifacts (Linstead and Grafton-Small, 1992;
Tsoukas, 1998; Worren et al., 2002), which are implic-
itly involved in the work of strategizing (Jarzabkow-
ski, 2004; Whittington, 2003; Whittington et al., 2003).
While research provides some evidence that practi-
tioners use these knowledge artifacts (e.g. Grant,
2003; Haspeslagh, 1982; McCabe and Narayanan,
349
ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE
1991; Rigby, 2001), to assume that they are used with
reference to the theories from which they sprung is
erroneous. We argue that, frequently, practitioners
use knowledge artifacts (tools and frameworks)
without reference to the theories from which they
originated. While the use of strategy tools is evidence
that practitioners find them actionable, there is a dis-
crepancy between how theorists and practitioners
define and assess the relevance of theory (Baldridge
et al., 2004; Hafsi and Thomas, 2005; Maclean and
Macintosh, 2002). This discrepancy is located within
the dissociation between theory and practice, which
undergoes a further phase when theoretical knowl-
edge artifacts, such as tools and frameworks are
applied in practice.
The third section of this paper addresses the relation-
ship between theory and practice by proposing a
practice epistemology for understanding strategy
knowledge in action (Cook and Brown, 1999;
de Certeau, 1984). It looks at what practitioners do
when they apply strategy frameworks. From this
practice perspective, the use of strategy knowledge
and knowledge artifacts is grounded in the bricolage
involved in everyday strategizing practice (Chia,
2004; Jarzabkowski, 2004; Tsoukas and Knudsen,
2002; Whittington, 2002; 2003; Wilson and Jarzabkow-
ski, 2004). Bricolage is the practical use of theoretical
artifacts in creative and adaptive ways that have little
to do with their theoretical origins (see Baker, Miner
and Eesley 2003, de Certeau, 1984; Levi-Strauss,
1966). In the bricolage of practical application, strat-
egy knowledge goes through another dissociation
from theory. We therefore argue that current con-
cerns about the actionable nature of strategy knowl-
edge are grounded in representationalist, rational
choice perspectives (Rorty, 1991; Tsoukas, 1998; Tso-
ukas and Knudsen, 2002), which marginalize both
the knowledge artifacts arising from theory and the
uses of these artifacts in practice. A practice perspec-
tive moves us beyond linear, representationalist con-
cepts of actionable knowledge to considering both the
practical uses of knowledge and how these uses
might inform our design of theory. The paper con-
cludes by suggesting that while the context of a
knowledge economy is relevant for assessing the
potential relevance of strategy knowledge, we need
also to study systematically how knowledge artifacts
are used in the everyday practice of strategy.
Contextual Conditions for Actionable
Strategy Theory
Contextual conditions establish the parameters
under which a theory may be considered valid or
false (Bacharach, 1989; King et al., 1994; Popper,
1968; Whetten, 1989). They identify the contingencies
under which bodies of strategy knowledge may be
more or less actionable (Priem and Butler, 2001). In
a knowledge economy, existing theory is posited to
350
be irrelevant due to increasingly high velocity busi-
ness environments (D’Aveni, 1994; Eisenhardt and
Sull, 2001; Prahalad and Hamel, 1994) and the rise
of knowledge as a key source of competitive advan-
tage (Courtney et al., 1997; Nahapiet and Ghoshal,
1998). This paper therefore draws together the vari-
ous challenges for the application of strategy theory
in a knowledge economy into two key contextual
conditions, environmental velocity and knowledge inten-
sity. The first condition, environmental velocity, is
essentially a characteristic of industry structure,
while the second, knowledge intensity, is more a
characteristic of firm behavior. While they are not
mutually exclusive conditions, each has specific
implications for the practical relevance of some
schools of strategy theory over others. As such they
constitute important contextual conditions with
which to formulate falsifiable propositions about
the practical validity of strategy theory in a knowl-
edge economy (Bacharach, 1989; Priem and Butler,
2001; Whetten, 1989). This section of the paper exam-
ines these contextual conditions as a theoretical basis
for analyzing the extent to which different schools of
strategy knowledge remain actionable.
In a knowledge economy, globalization, deregulation
and technological diffusion are posited to increase the
speed, complexity, dynamism and turbulence of the
environment, with consequences for the tasks and
tools of strategy (Eisenhardt, 2002; Prahalad and
Hamel, 1994). These environmental changes may be
subsumed under an overarching contextual condi-
tion, environmental velocity, which captures their
essential elements. High velocity environments are
characterized by ambiguous industry structure,
blurred boundaries, fluid business models, ambigu-
ous and shifting market players and non-linear and
unpredictable change (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).
Ambiguity of industry structure and shifting industry
players arise from declining barriers to entry, more
frequent entry and exit, and high variance in firm per-
formance within a single industry; that is bombs and
stars (D’Aveni, 1994; Thomas, 1996). Commensurate
with these changes in industry structure, boundaries
between industries and, therefore, between firms are
blurred, as evidenced in the convergence between
telecommunications, media and technology, leading
to fluid business models and changing industry con-
stellations and clusters within the value chain (Cha-
kravarthy, 1997; Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001). In such
environments change in competition, demand and
technology is rapid and information is often inaccu-
rate, unavailable or obsolete (D’Aveni, 1994; Eisen-
hardt and Bourgeois, 1988). Environmental velocity
implications for the relevance of strategy theory are
thus primarily structural considerations but they also
indicate changing approaches to the nature of knowl-
edge and information.
In a knowledge economy, knowledge is an important
source of competitive advantage. While the nature of
knowledge has multiple definitions that are beyond
European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
 ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE
the scope of this paper (see Eisenhardt and Santos,
2001), an overarching explanation is provided as a
basis for discussing the implications of knowledge
intensity to strategy theory in practice. Knowledge
intensity may be identified by input measures, such
as R&D investment and output measures, such as
product innovation and patent registration. Addi-
tionally, within-firm measures may be used, such
as the appropriation of new technologies for process
efficiency, process innovation and knowledge trans-
fer and the percentage of skilled or ‘white-collar’
labor (Coyle and Quah, 2002). However such mea-
sures tend to overlook the social complexity of
knowledge intensive environments, such as the
importance of external and internal knowledge net-
works. For example, firms increasingly need to incor-
porate the consumer into their value chain as a
source of knowledge (Løwendahl and Revang,
1998), to develop a portfolio of intra-organizational
relationships to build social and intellectual capital
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), and to include middle
and lower-level employees in their strategy making
as valuable knowledge workers (Nonaka and Takeu-
chi, 1995). Knowledge-intensity is thus the degree to
which a firm is dependent upon the knowledge gen-
eration inherent in its activities and outputs, which
may include both subjective and social knowledge
bases as well as objective, codified and explicit
knowledge bases. The key implication is that knowl-
edge intensity constitutes both a source of uncer-
tainty and also of competitive advantage for firms.
It is thus related to, but distinct from, environmental
velocity, being more a characteristic of firm behavior
than of industry structure.
A key question then becomes how do existing theo-
ries of organizational strategy match up against these
contextual conditions of environmental velocity and
knowledge intensity? We now explore this question.
Theories of Organizational Strategy
in Context
Four different schools of strategy theory are chosen for
this analysis; the positioning school, capability-build-
ing theory, high velocity strategy and complex eco-
system theories. These four theoretical approaches
have been chosen because they are prominent bodies
of strategy research tracing developments within the
field over the past 30–40 years. The positioning school
is an ‘outside-in’ approach, derived largely from
industrial economics and focusing on firm positioning
within the environment, and the capability school is
an ‘inside-out’ approach which examines competitive
advantage as a function of internal resources and
capability building (Conner, 1991; Lengnick-Hall
and Wolff, 1999; Mintzberg et al., 1998; de Wit and
Meyer, 1998). In recent years both these schools have
been found inadequate to explain strategy in high
velocity environments or in complex interconnected
European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
systems. Hence, new streams of research have arisen,
such as high velocity, hypercompetitive theories and
complex ecosystem theories (Brown and Eisenhardt,
1997; D’Aveni, 1994; Levy, 1994; Pascale, 1999; Stacey,
1995).
The selection of these four approaches as important
but distinct bodies of strategy theory is strengthened
by their inclusion in many existing taxonomies of
strategy research. For example, Lengnick-Hall and
Wolff (1999) compare the similarities and contradic-
tions of the latter three; capability building, high
velocity, and ecosystem theories, finding them to be
three distinct bodies of knowledge with different
core logics of competitive advantage. Their taxon-
omy, however, is limited in failing to address the
industrial economics legacy, which is considered an
earlier body of strategy theory with a distinct logic
from, for example, resource-based views of competi-
tive advantage (Conner, 1991; Venkatraman and
Subramaniam, 2001). Therefore, this paper draws
upon Mintzberg et al.’s (1998) positioning school as
a synthesis of the most common industrial economics
artifacts that provide concepts, tools and techniques
to strategy theory. The purpose of this section of
the paper is to flesh out criticisms of strategy theory
by examining the extent to which each school of
research may be considered actionable under the
contextual conditions of a knowledge economy.
Positioning School Theory
The positioning school is founded on the industrial
economics structure-conduct-performance para-
digm. From this perspective, an attractive and profit-
able industry is one where a firm can find a stable
and defensible position in order to avoid competition
and so earn superior rents (Porter, 1979). Competi-
tion is undesirable because it destroys profitability
for all players. Hence, firms erect barriers to entry
to attain defensible positions and tacitly collude to
avoid competition by finding different positions
within an industry. This perspective has an underly-
ing principle of stability, since sustainable advantage
may be derived from positioning on given assets
(Conner, 1991; Thomas, 1996; Tsoukas and Knudsen,
2002).
The relevance of the positioning school has come
under fierce criticisms, based primarily upon the con-
textual condition of environmental velocity. These
criticisms take three main stances; that assumptions
of stasis have lost relevance, that industry structure
is ambiguous, and finally that competition drives
rather than destroys value. First the assumptions of
stasis in the positioning school are seen as irrelevant
under high velocity because, as environments move
faster, the stable assets that created barriers to entry
and defensible positions are eroded. In such environ-
ments there is rapid entry and exit of players as
351
ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE
opposed to an oligopoly of largely stable players, so
that the incentives for ‘gentlemanly agreements’ to
collude are swept aside (Chakravarthy, 1997;
D’Aveni, 1994). Secondly, industry structure is ambig-
uous under high velocity conditions, such that buyers,
suppliers, potential entrants and substitutes and even
rivals cannot be easily determined. For example, if
competition is based on the creation of new, as yet
unanticipated customer need, neither buyers nor sub-
stitutes can be clearly identified (Bogner and Barr,
2000; D’Aveni, 1994). Hence industry analyses and
the development of differentiated positions become
obsolete. Finally, the value of competition itself is
under question in a high velocity environment. While
the positioning school is based on Bain-type industrial
economics that suggests competition destroys value,
from a Schumpeterian perspective the increased com-
petition in high velocity environments drives value
creation (Conner, 1991; Thomas, 1996). For example,
the challenge of rivalry drives innovation, such as
speed in developing new products, services or pro-
cesses, and so generates value, while, conversely, tacit
collusion to avoid competition destroys value (Bogner
and Barr, 2000; Thomas, 1996).
These three criticisms suggest that positioning school
theory is not actionable in high velocity environ-
ments and may even, in the final criticism, be detri-
mental to value creation. This final point leads to
another, less articulated criticism of the positioning
school in terms of its relevance in knowledge inten-
sive conditions. While knowledge-intensive environ-
ments could potentially be characterized by relative
stability and definable industry structure, the propo-
sition that high velocity environments drive speed of
innovation suggests that positioning school logic will
also be practically limiting in knowledge intensive
environments. Positioning school logic will encour-
age practitioners to hoard and build upon existing
knowledge assets for defensible positions, rather
than encouraging them to embrace knowledge gener-
ation in order to destroy existing positions and gen-
erate new ones (Thomas, 1996). The positioning
school is thus one body of strategy knowledge that
is less actionable under contextual conditions of envi-
ronmental velocity and knowledge intensity.
Capability-building Theory
Capability building theory covers three main sub-
themes of strategy research; the resource based view
(RBV) (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984), core compe-
tences (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) and dynamic
capabilities (Teece et al., 1997), each of which draw
upon similar conceptual fundamentals (Lengnick-
Hall and Wolff, 1999). Essentially, this body of strat-
egy research views competitive advantage from the
perspective of a firm’s superior resources, compe-
tences and capabilities, which lead to sustainable
competitive advantage. Successful firms develop
352
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable
resources and competences that may be leveraged
to generate superior and sustainable rents (Barney,
1991). To this extent, there are some similarities to
the positioning school since superior rents are
derived from barriers to entry (Conner, 1991). How-
ever, in capability-building theory these barriers are
erected by firm-specific choices about internal orga-
nization that, being socially complex and path-
dependent, are non-imitable. This body of theory
has an inherent assumption of relatively stable and
long-lasting competitive advantage, in which the
resource or competence base may be gradually
evolved and leveraged over time (Lengnick-Hall
and Wolff, 1999; Venkatraman and Subramaniam,
2001). Furthermore, it involves an essentially stable
view of competition, since other firms are assumed
to be pursuing relatively consistent courses, such that
the firm with a superior resource or competence base
can benchmark against the competitor and so gain
advantage (Chakravarthy, 1997).
Capability-building theory has come under criticism
within high velocity environments, primarily because
of its path-dependent and evolutionary character.
These characteristics predispose inherent rigidities
and competency traps that prevent a firm from
embracing swift, radical and repeated change (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990; Lengnick-Hall and Wolff, 1999;
Leonard-Barton, 1992). Hence the core basis of com-
petitive advantage under capability-building theory
is best suited to lower environmental velocity (Cha-
kravarthy, 1997). Early forms of RBV have also been
criticized for their static, codified and non-generative
views of knowledge, which are not applicable in
a knowledge-intensive environment (Scarbrough,
1998; Spender, 1996). However, other forms such as
core competences, with its emphasis on tacit and
intangible knowledge and innovation resources, are
highly applicable to knowledge-intensive environ-
ments (cf. Prahalad and Hamel, 1990).
In an attempt to counteract the limitations of earlier
RBV, capability-building theory has been extended
to incorporate dynamic capabilities, which, while
still predicated on path, focus strongly on the learn-
ing processes by which firms reconfigure their
resources to adapt to changing environments (Helfat,
2000; Teece et al., 1997). The dynamic capability per-
spective permits some concepts from capability-
building theory to be relevant and applicable in
higher-velocity markets. Thus, firms in high velocity
markets may have capabilities in rapidly reconfigur-
ing their resources through, for example, time pacing
(Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). Similarly, a firm
might have capabilities applicable to a knowledge-
intensive environment, such as knowledge genera-
tion and transfer (Grant, 1996; Nonaka and Takeuchi
1995). Furthermore, development of dynamic capa-
bilities might reflect the interplay between high
velocity and knowledge-intensive contexts, in which
speed of change drives capabilities in the rapid
European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
 ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE
creation of situation-specific knowledge (Eisenhardt
and Martin, 2000).
This flexibility that has been introduced to capability-
building theory is further evidence of the contingent
relationships between contextual conditions and the
application of strategy knowledge, such as resource-
based theory (cf. Miller and Shamsie, 1996). Thus,
dynamic capabilities are seen as processes to manipu-
late resource configurations according to the environ-
mental conditions in which they are used (Eisenhardt
and Martin, 2000:1118). In moderate velocity environ-
ments, dynamic capabilities retain the evolutionary
and long lasting sustainability premises of the
resource-based view. For example, a firm is able to
evolve capabilities over time and use these to develop
a path dependent and inimitable base of long-term
competitive advantage. In higher velocity environ-
ments, dynamic capabilities will be used to build
rapid new resource configurations and in knowledge
intensive environments a firm will develop strong
knowledge-based resources and competences (Eisen-
hardt and Martin, 2000; Miller and Shamsie, 1996).
The two conditions thus contextualize the application
of particular types of capability building theory.
Hypercompetitive or High Velocity Theory
As existing strategy theory was found inadequate to
explain strategy in high velocity environments, a
new body of theory arose around hypercompetitive
or high velocity strategy. High velocity strategy is
characterized by rapid innovations, short product
lifecycles, new technologies, unexpected new
entrants, and continuous repositioning of players
within the industry (D’Aveni, 1994; Eisenhardt and
Martin, 2000). Since any advantage is temporary,
the generation of defensible positions or sustainable
resources is not possible. In this school of strategy
research, competitive advantage is based upon a
guerrilla logic of continuously disrupting current
positions and strategies in order to generate new
areas of advantage (Lengnick-Hall and Wolff, 1999).
A firm must compete by resorting to tools and tactics
associated with speed, surprise, innovation and
flexibility.
While high velocity research has been conducted to
generate knowledge about strategy in high velocity
environments, it also indicates links between velocity
and knowledge-intensity. The techniques that create
advantage under velocity are frequently associated
with the generation and exploitation of knowledge
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Miller and Shamsie,
1996). For example, a firm with a strong knowledge
base may be able to mobilize that knowledge in the
pursuit of new strategies, particularly where knowl-
edge is explicit technical knowledge that is inherently
mobile across a range of activities (Liebeskind, 1996).
European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
Additionally, a knowledge-intensive firm may have
greater learning capacity and so be more able to adapt
to a rapidly changing environment (Autio et al., 2000).
While knowledge may be an important source of
advantage under high velocity environments, this
does not infer conflation of velocity and knowledge
intensity. Rather, knowledge becomes a source of
value in high velocity environments because of the
speed with which it may be mobilized or its innova-
tive outputs realized. Therefore, inimitability, which
is a key source of knowledge-based advantages in
more stable environments, becomes obsolete (Autio
et al., 2000; D’Aveni, 1994; Lengnick-Hall and Wolff,
1999). The primary source of advantage is not build
up of inimitable long-term knowledge but using
knowledge for rapid reconfiguration in order to gen-
erate new advantages. High velocity theory is thus
primarily actionable in high velocity environments
but may also have application under conditions of
rapidly changing knowledge demands.
Ecosystem, Complexity Theory
A recent stream of strategy research, drawing upon
business ecosystems, complexity theory and chaos
theory, develops a perspective on competitive
advantage arising from a firm’s position within a
complex ecosystem (Lengnick-Hall and Wolff,
1999). This perspective deals with the uncertain,
non-linear and emergent nature of strategy within
an interconnected but widely dispersed system of
positive and negative feedback loops (Stacey, 1995).
Drawing on the biological evolution of ecosystems,
such research emphasizes the interdependence, sym-
biosis, and co-evolution of different actors within a
system (Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000; Levinthal
and Warglien, 1999; Moore, 1993). Since firms exist
within an ecosystem comprising other firms, institu-
tions and actors, even minor actions in one part of
the system have consequences for other parts of the
system. The system evolves in a continual process
of self-organization of contradictory forces of posi-
tive and negative feedback and stability and instabil-
ity. Such self-organization predisposes continuously
adaptive and emergent patterns of activity.
The complexity and non-linear adaptation of such
systems inhibits long-term forecasting. However, as
adaptation is generally evolutionary, comprehension
of systemic patterns and short-term forecasting is
possible (Levy, 1994). This aspect of ecosystem the-
ory has implications for its application under high
velocity contextual conditions. Since the system is
continuously evolving, it is not low velocity but nei-
ther can it be considered high velocity. Indeed, the
contradictory self-organizing feedback loops in com-
plexity theory are resistant to the continuously dis-
ruptive instability that is inherent in high velocity
theory. From a complex adaptive system perspective,
353
ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE
hypercompetition and high velocity logic is innately
destructive to a system because it focuses excessively
on positive feedback loops (Zohar and Morgan,
1996). An industry may show hypercompetitive
shifts, similar to the punctuated equilibrium associ-
ated with radical change in biological systems (Bein-
hocker, 1999; Levy, 1994), but generally change is
adaptive and evolutionary. Hence, some stability of
competitive advantage may be forecast and attained
for short periods, particularly where the firm exists
within a healthy ecosystem (Arthur, 1996; Moore,
1993). Healthy ecosystems are those with more
connections, in which actors are more sensitized to
each other and so able to adapt continuously (Leng-
nick-Hall and Wolff, 1999). However, these wide-
spread connections also increase complexity and
lessen agility in high velocity markets (Eisenhardt
and Galunic, 2000: 97), thus moderate velocity is an
applicable contextual condition for complex ecosys-
tem theory.
Knowledge intensity, on the other hand, is an impor-
tant contextual condition increasing the relevance of
complex ecosystem theory. While the other three the-
oretical approaches are, fundamentally, based on an
assumption of competitive advantage as ‘winner-
takes-all’, in an ecosystem, integrity of the whole
system is vital to successful strategic activity (Leng-
nick-Hall and Wolff, 1999; Moore, 1993). Winner-
takes-all is comparable to a dominant and predatory
species in a biological ecosystem that eliminates
other viable forms. This is destructive to the requisite
diversity of the system and so, ultimately, to the
dominant species (Pascale, 1999). In a business eco-
system, maintaining widespread and collaborative
connections across traditional industry boundaries
and competitors constitutes systemic attractors that
create favorable conditions for the system as a whole.
Hence, the relationship with knowledge is different
to the other theoretical approaches. Knowledge is
no longer either an inimitable source of competitive
advantage or the basis for disrupting the competitive
advantage of competitors. Rather, knowledge is an
important systemic property that should be shared
in order to enhance the interconnectedness and
health of the system. This suggests a collaborative
and co-evolutionary approach to competition, in which
it is important to incorporate the customer, the sup-
plier, the employee and even the competitor, into
the knowledge chain (Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000).
The greater the knowledge demands on the system,
the more that shared knowledge will constitute an
attractor to the system (Levy, 1994; Stacey, 1995).
Complex ecosystem theory is thus highly applicable
under knowledge-intensive contextual conditions.
Table 1 summarizes the core logic of each school of
strategy knowledge and its relevance under contex-
tual conditions of environmental velocity or knowl-
edge intensity. Each school is then positioned
relative to the others on a matrix in Figure 1, in which
the vertical axis represents environmental velocity,
354
while the horizontal axis deals with knowledge
intensity 2. The positioning school has low relevance
under each condition and so is placed in quadrant A,
as are early forms of capability-building theory.
However, capability-building theory has been
extended recently to incorporate more knowledge-
intensive and dynamic forms of resource and compe-
tence configuration. Hence, it appears in quadrants
B and C as well, in accordance with the specific
capabilities applicable under each contextual condi-
tion. Complex ecosystem theory is firmly within
quadrant B but encroaching into quadrant D as it is
primarily implicated in knowledge-intensive condi-
tions but operates under moderate velocity. As high
velocity theory is primarily related to speed of
response in high velocity environments, it is posi-
tioned in quadrant C. However, high velocity theory
indicates some interdependence between environ-
mental velocity and the knowledge capacity of the
firm. Therefore, it is partially within quadrant D.
While no body of theory applies specifically to both
contextual conditions, increasingly high velocity the-
ory and some forms of capability-building theory
indicate a relationship between the two, hence
arrows suggest movement within a knowledge econ-
omy towards theory that can meet both contextual
conditions.
Figure 1 is a helpful schema for furthering a research
agenda into actionable strategy knowledge. Extant
criticisms of strategy theory as not actionable in prac-
tice are based on the need for theory to evolve in line
with the changing competitive conditions of a knowl-
edge economy. The above discussion, which is sche-
matically drawn together in Figure 1, indicates that
these criticisms have some foundation and, therefore,
have serious implications for some schools of theory.
It is increasingly difficult to find low velocity and
low knowledge intensity sectors that fit within quad-
rant A (cf. Løwendahl and Revang, 1998). Even mass
production industries or those based on raw materi-
als face increasing demands for speed and reduced
cycle time due to the pull from more complex indus-
tries with greater consumer interface further up their
supply chain. For example, automobile components
manufacturers face increasing knowledge demands
in product and process innovations facilitated by
supply chain integration and knowledge transfers
from more knowledge intensive industries further
up their value chain. Thus, for the majority of indus-
tries in the current competitive climate, some schools
of strategy theory, particularly the positioning school
and early RBV, are losing relevance. These theories
are, therefore, less actionable under changing com-
petitive conditions, as some critics suggest (Chakra-
varthy, 1997; Courtney et al., 1997; Prahalad and
Hamel, 1994). Environmental velocity and knowl-
edge intensity, thus provide empirical parameters
to contextualize the actionability of strategy knowl-
edge, which, despite widespread criticisms, remains
to be systematically subject to empirical scrutiny
(Baldridge et al., 2004).
European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
 ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE

Table 1 Core Logics and Contextual Conditions of Streams of Strategy Theory

Core logica Contextual conditions

Positioning logic
 Find a stable and defensible position where it is  Low environmental velocity (EV)
possible to earn superior rents  Low knowledge intensity (KI)
 Erect barriers to entry
 Tacitly collude to avoid direct competition

Capability-building logic
 Unique resources can be leveraged for sustainable advantage  Low EV for early RBV and competences
 Competition is relatively stable, permitting superior resource  Low KI for early RBV
combinations to be exploited long-term  High KI for core competences, knowledge-based
 Path-dependence is an inimitable source of competitive advantage view and learning aspect of dynamic capabilities
 High EV for capabilities in speedy resource
reconfiguration

High-velocity/hypercompetition logic
 Any advantage is temporary  Primarily high EV conditions
 Continuous disruption is the key to competitive advantage  Associated with KI due to knowledge involved in
 Speed in reconfiguring resources and products is vital developing new products and the technologies
involved in speed of resource reconfiguration.

Complexity logic
 Strategy in a complex ecosystem of positive and negative  Moderate EV due to continuously changing
feedback loops is uncertain, non-linear and emergent environment
 Interdependence, symbiosis, co-evolution and requisite  High KI due to interdependence within ecosystem
diversity increase the health of a business ecosystem
 Healthy ecosystems are key to competitive advantage
in an uncertain and unstable world
a
These are summaries of more extensive treatments on the core logics of each stream of strategy theory. For more extensive
explanations, contrasts and comparisons between each stream see Chakravarthy (1997), Conner (1991), Lengnick-Hall and Wolff
(1999), Mintzberg et al (1998) and Venkatraman and Subramaniam (2001).

Strategy Knowledge and Knowledge able strategy knowledge, it does not get to grips with
Artifacts knowledge artifacts; those tools, techniques and
frameworks arising from bodies of theory. Yet this
paper argues that these are the knowledge artifacts
While the discussion in the first section is helpful in that strategy research provides to managers in prac-
providing a theoretical basis for examining action- tice (Bowman et al., 2002; Furrer and Thomas, 2000;
Rumelt et al., 1991; Thomas, 1984; Thomas and
Pollock, 1999). For example, many empirical studies
HIGH of the application of strategy knowledge have exam-
C High Velocity theory D ined strategy tools and frameworks as the typical
unit of analysis (e.g. Armstrong and Brodie, 1994;
Capability-building: Hambrick et al., 1982; Haspeslagh, 1982; McCabe
Speed in resource
reconfiguration and Narayanan, 1991; Miller and Friesen, 1986a;
1986b; Shrivastava, 1987; Wensley, 1982). These tools
Environmental Velocity

and frameworks may, therefore, be considered the

LOW Knowledge Intensity HIGH
Complex ecosystem theory knowledge artifacts arising from strategy research
(Jarzabkowski, 2004; Linstead and Grafton-Small,
Capability-building:
Early RBV &
1992; Tsoukas, 1998; Tsoukas and Knudsen, 2002;
Capability-building:
competences knowledge based resources
Whittington, 2003; Worren et al., 2002). Such
Positioning School & competences knowledge artifacts find their way into practice
B through the teaching of business schools, their incor-
A
LOW
poration in strategy texts, their use by consultants,
and their dissemination in the business media
Figure 1 Contextual Conditions for Four Streams of (Abrahamson, 1996; Astley and Zammuto, 1992;
Strategy Theory Barry and Elmes, 1997; Mazza and Alvarez, 2000;

European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006 355
ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE
Tsoukas and Knudsen, 2002; Whittington et al., 2003).
These artifacts are thus the actionable forms of
knowledge that strategy research provides to prac-
tice. If we wish to understand actionable strategy
knowledge we must look not only to the theories
available for use but also, and more pertinently, to
whether the artifacts arising from these theories are
actionable. This section builds upon existing taxono-
mies of the above four streams of strategy knowledge
by identifying their associated artifacts; that is, their
tools and frameworks. This categorization is by no
means exhaustive but serves to illustrate some of
the more common forms of knowledge artifact that
theory has provided to practice. The paper then
briefly examines empirical evidence on the uses of
these artifacts in light of the above contextual condi-
tions for actionable strategy knowledge, proposing
that the development of knowledge artifacts is the
first phase in a process of dissociation between the-
ory and its application in practice.
The positioning school is notable for its knowledge
artifacts, having evolved numerous matrices and dia-
grams that indicate the relationships between key
variables, and which are evergreen in our strategy
textbooks and courses (Mintzberg et al., 1998). This
proliferation may be partially accounted for by the
microeconomic traditions underpinning the position-
ing school, which are characterized by deductive,
analytic and predictive modes and methods of
research that have a tendency towards ‘‘clean’’ and
parsimonious models for expressing theory (Hirsch
et al., 1987). Michael Porter (1980; 1985) is the pri-
mary exponent of the positioning school. The main
artifacts arising from this body of theorizing are Por-
ter’s 5 forces and the generic strategy model (GSM).
However, there are a number of complementary
models that also belong within the general family
of the positioning school, since they are based on bar-
riers to entry, market share, and the attainment of
defensible and differentiated positions. For example,
the experience curve, the PIMS database, the BCG
portfolio matrix and strategic groups (Bowman
et al., 2002; Furrer and Thomas, 2000; Mintzberg
et al., 1998; Rumelt et al., 1991; Venkatraman and
Subramaniam, 2001). Table 2 categorizes the main
tools and frameworks that are broadly attributable
to the positioning school.
Capability-building theory has spawned fewer tools
and frameworks than the positioning school, particu-
larly in terms of parsimoniously expressed models
for capturing its approach to competitive advantage.
This may be because it is conceptually, ambiguously
and subjectively expressed in terms of what consti-
tutes a resource or competence (Priem and Butler,
2001). Hence, such knowledge lends itself less to con-
crete knowledge artifacts such as matrices and more
to knowledge as a framework of concepts (Astley
and Zammuto, 1992). Nonetheless, most strategy
textbooks contain various diagrammatic schemata
illustrating the relationships between resources, com-
356
petences and competitive advantage (for example,
Grant, 2002). Table 2 provides a categorization of
the key concepts and frameworks arising from capa-
bility-building theory and a sample of their sche-
matic depiction in key strategy texts.
The set of artifacts arising from high velocity research
are also more conceptually and ambiguously
expressed than in the positioning school. For example,
D’Aveni (1995:48) proposes a 7S framework for hyper-
competitive conditions that he emphasizes are not
‘‘generic strategies or a recipe for success’’ but, rather,
‘‘key approaches . . . to carry the firm in many different
directions’’. Similarly, Eisenhardt and Sull (2001) advo-
cate strategizing by simple rules in high velocity envi-
ronments, in order to retain sufficient flexibility to
make rapid decisions. However, such frameworks
are not prescriptive since the actual content of the
rules varies greatly according to the particular firm.
The frameworks that have arisen are primarily ori-
ented towards increasing speed in decision-making,
facilitating experimentation, and designing flexible
organizations to aid in rapid reconfiguration of
resources (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999; Volberda,
1996). Additionally, some frameworks have been pro-
posed as aids to assist practitioners with decision-
making under conditions where industry structure is
ambiguous and the potential value and uptake of
new products and technologies is unknown. For
example, real options (Bowman and Hurry, 1993) is
a decision-making tool that permits managers to
experiment with a range of possible strategic options
whilst retaining the ability to exit at relatively low cost
from markets that fail, or to push market evolution in
favor of their existing options (McGrath, 1997; Miller
and Waller, 2003). Market disruption analysis encour-
ages practitioners to anticipate potential disruptive
technologies and unexpected entrants (Bower and
Christiansen, 1995), while the delta model is designed
to help managers capitalize on the potential network
effects of a disruptive technology (Hax and Wilde,
1999). Table 2 outlines some key tools associated with
high velocity strategy research.
Complex ecosystem theory has generated few con-
crete strategy tools and frameworks for managers
to use, perhaps because strategy is emergent and
non-linear in such systems. However, guidelines for
managerial influence involve facilitating a within-
firm and extra-firm context in which the system
may achieve its own self-organizing interconnec-
tions. Strategizing tools and frameworks are thus
centered on shaping the system architecture to
acknowledge co-existent tensions and so trigger rela-
tionships between parts of the system. For example,
managers may use organizational design tools to
encourage knowledge-sharing processes (Levinthal
and Warglien, 1999). Performance and accounting
metrics and reward systems can encourage the
trade-offs and tensions of both within firm collabora-
tion and competition in order to capture co-existent
competing markets (Beinhocker, 1999; Eisenhardt
European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
 ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE

Table 2 Tools, Techniques and Artifacts Associated with Streams of Theory

Theory Tools, techniques and artifacts

Positioning school  BCG portfolio matrix (Henderson, 1979)

 Experience curve (Henderson, 1979)
 Game theory toolsa (Von neumannn and Morgenstern, 1944)
 PIMS (Buzzell et al., 1975)
 Porter’s 5 forces (Porter, 1980)
 Porter’s generic strategy model (GSM) (Porter, 1985)
 Strategic groups (McGee and Thomas, 1986)
 Value chainb (Porter, 1985)

Capability-building  Core competences (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990)

schoolc  Dynamic capabilities (Teece et al, 1997)
 Knowledge management (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995)
 RBV: Valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991)
 Value chain (Porter, 1985)
 Sample of textbook schemata:
 Resources, capabilities and rents (Grant, 2002:153)
 Resources, competence & strategic capability (Johnson and Scholes, 2002: 146)

High velocity school  Cycle-time reduction (Stalk, 1988)

 7S Disruption: speed, surprise, shifting the rules, simultaneous and sequential thrust,
signaling, strategic soothsaying, and stakeholder satisfaction (D’Aveni, 1994)
 Market disruption analysis (Bower and Christensen, 1995; Rigby, 2003)
 Patching – flexible & modular organizational design for rapid entry and exit of markets
(Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999)
 Real options to negotiate favourable environments (McGrath, 1997)d
 Simple rules to facilitate speed and flexibility (Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001)e
 Time-pacing (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998; Stalk, 1988)
 Delta model (Hax and Wilde, 1999)

Complex ecosystem  Co-evolution (Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000)

school  Knowledge management tools
 Managing the system architecture (modular design, reward systems, team processes,
strategic language) to ensure diversity and increase within-firm and extra-firm
interactions (Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000; Moore, 1993; Nahapiet, 2001;
Pascale, 1999; Stacey, 1995)
 Porter’s diamond (1990) explains ecosystem competitive advantage as complex interactions
between co-evolutionary pockets (McKelvey, 1999; Thomas, 1996)
 Real options and multiple scenarios to capture emergent learning in complex conditions
(Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Copeland and Keenan, 1998; Luehrmann, 1998; Miller and
Waller, 2003)
 Simple rules to condition system interactions (Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001; Macintosh and
Maclean, 1999; Sanchez 1997)
 Supply chain integration and simplification (Levy, 1994; Harvard Management Update, 1999;
Whiting, 2001)

a
Tsoukas and Knudsen (2001) discuss modern game theory as sequential static games, while Lampel (in Mintzberg et al., 1998:110-
111) and Furrer and Thomas (2000) note that game theory is only useful for simple, low complexity questions.
b
Mintzberg, et al (1998) place the value chain within the positioning school because of its focus on generating distinctive positions.
However, as many textbooks place it within the capability-building school, it is placed in both in this paper.
c
While the capability-building school has provided few ‘models’, the conceptual frameworks of this sample of key theorists have been
translated in practitioner-oriented journals, such as Harvard Business Review, Long Range Planning and McKinsey Quarterly. A
sample of pictorial schemata from strategy texts is provided.
d
While real options theory is not specific to either high velocity or complex ecosystem theory, it is posited as a tool for strategic
decision-making under uncertainty, taking two relevant forms here: First, for negotiating favourable environments under volatility
and uncertainty, which corresponds with high velocity logic; and second for capturing emergent learning in complex environments,
particularly in conjunction with multiple scenarios, which corresponds with complex ecosystem logic. Hence, real options is placed
in both tool sets.
e
While simple rules are primarily a technique for complex adaptive systems, these authors recommend it as a technique for speed
and flexibility in fast-moving markets.

European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006 357
ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE
and Galunic, 2000; Levinthal and Warglien, 1999).
Some managerial discretion over the system exists
in terms of predisposing the architecture towards
stability or instability. Stability is engendered by sim-
plification of the procedures of interaction (Levy,
1994; Stacey, 1995), which is the basis of complex-
ity-based computer simulations to improve logistics
or increase supply chain integration (Harvard Man-
agement Update, 1999; McKelvey, 1999; Whiting,
2001). These system design tools are intended to help
managers to stabilize and simplify complexity. On
the other hand, instability may be desirable to
stimulate emergent strategy and learning. Instability
arises from shifting the rules and webs of interac-
tion through simple rules, modular organizational
design, and fostering roles that span internal and
external contexts (Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000;
Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001; MacIntosh and MacLean,
1999; Nahapiet, 2001; Pascale, 1999; Sanchez, 1997;
Stacey, 1995). While such tools are neither prescrip-
tive nor content specific, they provide rich concep-
tual frameworks to assist management under
complexity. Table 2 provides a categorization of
some typical tools associated with complexity strat-
egy research.
Drawing upon the categorizations in Table 2, a sec-
ond matrix, Figure 2, can be developed to indicate
the strategy knowledge artifacts which managers
‘should’ find relevant under different contextual con-
ditions. Figure 2 is empirically operationalizable in
terms of actionable knowledge artifacts, since empir-
ical work could compile industry and firm level data
on contextual conditions and correlate it with practi-
tioner responses to the use or non-use of specific
tools and frameworks. It would also be possible to
analyze the coherence between the core logic of a
firm’s strategy and the firm’s environment. For
example, Lengnick-Hall and Wolff (1999: 1128) note
C Time - pacing
Cycle time reduction
Real options D’Aveni 7 S
Patching:Fast enter & exit
Market disruption analysis
Dynamic capabilities: speed
Value chain:
speed of transfers
LOW Knowledge Intensity
Value chain Early RBV
BCG portfolio matrix
Experience curve
Game theory
Strategic groups
5 forces
Porter’s GSM
PIMS
A B
Figure 2 Contextual Conditions and Strategy Tools, Techniques and Artifacts 3
358
that ‘‘tools, techniques and methods suggested by
approaches within the same core logic could be effectively
blended to develop a customized strategy that is not only
robust but also quite unique’’. Hypothetically, action-
able strategy knowledge would involve the use of
theoretically coherent knowledge artifacts that are
applicable to the contextual conditions of the firm
(Furrer and Thomas, 2000). However, the contextual
conditions that indicate the application of theory in
Figures 1 and 2 also indicate overlaps in theoretical
streams. For example, if a firm is in Quadrant A,
practitioners might apply knowledge artifacts from
both the positioning school and the static forms of
RBV, based upon leveraging resources to attain a
sustainable and defensible position. Therefore, prac-
titioners might also develop a coherent strategy
using artifacts arising from different theories, provid-
ing that they were all consistent with the contextual
conditions of the firm. Thus, as we examine action-
able strategy knowledge from the perspective of
knowledge artifacts in Figure 2, there is a blurring
of the theoretical distinctions found in Figure 1. As
the footnotes to Table 2 indicate, the classification
of artifacts into specific theoretical groups is, itself,
fraught with difficulty, being much more complex
than the grouping of the theories themselves. The
knowledge artifacts that are disseminated into prac-
tice do not map well to their theoretical origins.
We maintain that the blurring of theoretical distinc-
tion found in Table 2 and Figure 2 is based in a pro-
gressive dissociation of strategy knowledge artifacts
from their theoretical origins, as they get closer to
practice. Theoretical tools are, by their nature, simpli-
fied heuristic devices to aid thinking (Newell, Shaw
and Simon, 1962; Pidd, 1996). For example, in a
recent interview, Porter (Argyres and McGahan,
2000:45–46) refers to his five forces and generic strat-
egy models as ‘‘framework[s] . . . to capture the full rich-
HIGH
D
Simple rules:
fast decisions
Simple rules:
Environmental Velocity
trigger system
Patching: shift interaction HIGH
Co- evolution Manage
Real options & architecture
multiple scenarios
Dynamic capabilities: learning
Value/supply chain
knowledge integration
Knowledge management
Core competences
LOW
European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
 ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE
ness of a phenomenon with the most limited number of
dimensions’’ in order ‘‘that managers can apply these
principles prospectively’’. This accords with the infor-
mation processing capacity of individuals, assisting
with the practical uptake of theory by simplifying it
into tools and frameworks (Miller, 1956). Indeed,
the diagrammatic representation of many theories,
particularly from the positioning school with its sim-
ple and elegant frameworks, may increase the likeli-
hood of utility (Furrer and Thomas, 2000; Worren
et al., 2002). However modeling also represents a step
in the process of dissociating knowledge artifacts
from their theoretical bases.
Let us extend this notion of dissociation by briefly
examining research into the uses of strategy artifacts.
If the criticisms of the application of strategy theory
in a knowledge economy hold true, we should expect
to see less use of theory and, therefore, also the arti-
facts from quadrant A and more from the other three
quadrants. The limited evidence on knowledge econ-
omy use of strategy artifacts, however, does not indi-
cate that artifacts in quadrant A are dying off. For
example, Grant (2003) undertook a study of the
impact of turbulence on strategic planning in the
major oil companies. His turbulence construct
equates primarily with the environmental velocity
contextual condition but also, due to complex inter-
nal linkages, the knowledge intensity condition, plac-
ing oil companies high on the vertical axis and
moderately to the right on the horizontal axis; that
is, positioned between quadrants C and D of the
matrix, displaying many of the contextual conditions
of a knowledge economy. While Grant did not study
artifacts per se, they are mentioned in his discussion
of the strategic planning process. He did indeed find
evidence of new artifacts being used analytically,
such as real options analysis (quadrants B and C).
Capability-building artifacts such as core compe-
tences and organizational capabilities (quadrants B
and C) were verbalized although not used for sys-
tematic analyses. However, positioning school tools
from quadrant A, such as Porter-style industry anal-
yses, game theory and PIMS analysis were also in
evidence. Concurrent with these artifacts, he found
a shift away from the sustainability arguments of
RBV towards a combination of long-term visioning
and short-term financial performance management,
where trade-offs were manifest in the use of two
types of tools, economic value added (EVA) focusing
on short-term targets and modified forms of multiple
scenario planning (quadrant B) to envision longer-
term horizons. This coincided with more decentral-
ized forms of organizing (quadrants C and D) to
facilitate speedier decision-making. Under the con-
textual conditions of the knowledge economy, oil
companies have adopted knowledge artifacts in all
four quadrants.
Other empirical studies also find that strategy knowl-
edge artifacts are used but that this involves a varied
uptake of newer knowledge economy tools and the
European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
continued use of traditional strategy tools (e.g. Rigby,
2001a; 2001b). Strategy knowledge artifacts are,
therefore, actionable in practice, but not in accor-
dance with the contextual conditions under which
scholars have criticized and hypothesized their
potential application (e.g. Courtney et al., 1997; Cha-
kravarthy, 1997; Furrer and Thomas, 2000; Prahalad
and Hamel, 1994). Does this mean that knowledge
economy effects are less pervasive than expected,
as some literatures suggest (McNamara et al., 2003;
Porter, 2001)? Alternately is it a reflection of the com-
plexity of diversified firms, which may have busi-
nesses in more than one quadrant of the matrix,
such that a range of artifacts might apply? These
explanations may well contribute to our understand-
ing of the application of strategy theory in practice.
However, this paper argues that the primary reason
for the persistence of such knowledge artifacts is
that, in practice, they become dissociated from their
theoretical bases. Therefore, if we wish to understand
actionable strategy knowledge, we need to examine
the uses of its artifacts in practice.
A Practice Perspective on Knowledge
Artifacts in Action
In this section, the criticisms of actionable strategy
knowledge discussed in section one are attributed
to a representationalist epistemology on the uses of
theoretical knowledge, while the dissociation of
knowledge artifacts from their theoretical bases in
practice is located in a practice epistemology. The
paper first critiques the representational epistemol-
ogy for its rational perspective upon the use of
knowledge. An argument is then built for a practice
perspective on the use of knowledge in action. Rather
than invalidating the contextual conditions under
which knowledge may be actionable, a practice per-
spective provides greater insight into the role of
knowledge artifacts in negotiating those contextual
conditions. The practical use of knowledge artifacts,
while under researched, may thus provide valuable
feedback into the design of actionable strategy
knowledge.
Tsoukas and Knudsen (2002) problematize perspec-
tives on the use of strategy knowledge as one of
the epistemological relationship between strategic
thinking and acting. From a representational episte-
mology, there is a Cartesian relationship between
thought and action, in which thought precedes action
(Clegg et al., 2004; Rorty, 1991; Tsoukas, 1998;
Tsoukas and Knudsen, 2002; Varela et al., 1991).
Knowledge is designed to objectively assist this lin-
ear process in a prescriptive fashion. A representa-
tional epistemology sums up the proposed
relationship between knowledge and action as;
‘‘Action is driven by reliable prior knowledge’’ (Tsoukas
and Knudsen, 2002: 425).
359
ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE
From a representational epistemology, the business
environment contains a set of given principles. Strat-
egy knowledge is a set of reliable and robust con-
cepts that may be used to think about these
principles in order to undertake well-considered
strategic action. Therefore, a purpose of strategy
knowledge is to provide a set of knowledge artifacts
that inform managerial thinking in an accurate way
that will assist rational, instrumental action. This per-
spective contains an implicit ‘rational economic man’
assumption about the use of knowledge as optimiz-
ing, rational choice. The criticisms of strategy theory
that are examined in section one of this paper are
grounded within a representational perspective,
since they assume that knowledge will be relevant
in accordance with contextual conditions. The more
theoretically robust knowledge is, the more that it
will have specific application to particular conditions
(see Baldridge et al., 2004; Schendel, 1991). Actionable
strategy knowledge thus describes contextual condi-
tions as an objective reality and provides a prescrip-
tion for acting within that reality. Should those
conditions change, the knowledge artifacts will cease
to have application and the rational strategist will
discard them. From this perspective, any practical
use of strategy knowledge other than direct instru-
mental application in accordance with contextual
conditions is regarded as a matter of deviance (Beyer
and Trice, 1978; Merton, 1938), deliberate distortion
(Weiss, 1979), or corruption (Louzeau et al., 2002).
Strategy knowledge that fails to deliver on its pre-
scriptions is a consequence of either the failure of
practitioners, who are unable or unwilling to use
the knowledge adequately, or a failure of the knowl-
edge since it is not able to have the desired effect on
practice (Louzeau et al., 2002). In this paper, how-
ever, we maintain that practical uses of strategy
knowledge involve a further dissociation from the-
ory that is consistent with a practice epistemology
on the use of knowledge.
A practice perspective is informed by philosophical
traditions, such as American pragmatism (Dewey,
1988; James, 1907) and Aristotelian perspectives on
action through practical reason and practical coping
(Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Tsoukas and Cum-
mings, 1997). It has recently gained prevalence as a
‘practice turn’ in the social sciences (see Ortner,
1984; Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki et al., 2001), which
informs empirical explanations in management disci-
plines as diverse as technology (Ciborra and Lan-
zarra, 1991; Orlikowski, 1992; 2000; Suchman, 1987),
organizational learning and knowing (Blackler,
1995; Boland and Tenkasi, 1995; Brown and Duguid,
1991; 2001; Carlile, 2002; Cook and Brown, 1999),
innovation (Dougherty, 1992; 2004), and strategy
(Blackler et al., 2000; Hendry, 2000; Hendry and Seidl,
2003; Jarzabkowski, 2004; 2005; Jarzabkowski et al.,
2006; Whittington, 1996; 2002; 2003; 2004). While
the assumptions underpinning representational uses
of knowledge are based on rational choice, a practice
perspective has an assumption of knowledge use as
360
practical-evaluative wisdom (Chia, 2004; Emirbayer
and Mische, 1998; Jarzabkowski, 2005; Tsoukas,
1998; Whittington, 2003; Wilson and Jarzabkowski,
2004). Practical evaluative use of knowledge deals
with the ability to ‘get things done’ within the partic-
ular contingencies and demands of the here and
now. In the exercise of real-time judgments, practitio-
ners draw upon existing knowledge artifacts, fash-
ioning them according to situational demands. A
practice perspective thus involves the use of knowl-
edge as it is adapted to the needs of any given
situation.
A practice perspective is particularly pertinent to
understanding actionable strategy knowledge. It
moves away from the linear and uni-directional con-
cept of strategy knowledge inherent in the represen-
tational argument. Rather, ‘‘we must see knowledge as a
tool at the service of knowing not as something that, once
possessed, is all that is needed to enable action or practice’’
(Cook and Brown, 1999: 388). Strategy knowledge is
not a reified construct that may be possessed but part
of the social practices in which strategic actors partic-
ipate in order to communicate and construct mean-
ings about strategy, furthering their ends in ways
that are intelligible to others (cf. Astley and Zamm-
uto, 1992; Barry and Elmes, 1997; Chia, 2004; Garfin-
kel, 1967; Tsoukas and Knudsen, 2002; Wenger,
1998). Hence, the practice of strategy may not
depend upon the acquisition of more knowledge
but on the innovative use of existing knowledge
(Cook and Brown, 1999). Rather than requiring evo-
lution in strategy theory in order to cope with chang-
ing competitive conditions, a practice perspective
suggests that practitioners might simply adopt exist-
ing theories and artifacts, adapting them to their own
purposes with little concern for their theoretical origins
or purposes.
A basic premise of the practice perspective on knowl-
edge use is that the knowledge artifacts being used
will be altered (Jarzabkowski, 2004; Whittington,
2003; Worren et al., 2002). Strategy theory generates
a variety of artifacts, such as Boston Boxes, SWOT,
Five forces, and various other frameworks that are
used in action. However, their use is more complex
than direct application, suggesting that while these
artifacts might have a theoretical purpose or intent
for which they were developed, they may be appro-
priated and adapted by actors for particular and the-
oretically unanticipated purposes and outcomes.
This practical adaptation of artifacts to a purpose is
defined as bricolage, the making do and ‘‘artisan-like
inventiveness’’ (de Certeau, 1984: xviii), by which
actors produce their own intentful activities from
the artifacts that structure everyday activity. Brico-
lage involves taking existing tools and fashioning
them to an individual’s own ends, without particular
regard for either the most appropriate tool for a task
or for the original purpose of the tool to be used
(Baker et al., 2003; Levi-Strauss, 1966).
European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
 ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE
Bricolage is inherent in the practical use of knowl-
edge, utilizing those knowledge artifacts that are at
hand to exercise real-time judgments and actions in
the face of uncertainty or ambiguity about future
strategy. Practitioners act upon future strategy with-
out accurate foresight. Strategy artifacts assist in this
process not as rational tools for diagnosing future
action, but as tools that may be fashioned to effect
current actions in ways that may bring about future
actions. Rather than seeking new knowledge, in bri-
colage the use of an existing, well-known tool that
is readily to hand is likely because such tools may
be more easily fashioned to the practitioner’s intent.
Strategists continue to draw upon established arti-
facts, such as Porter’s five forces, because these have
technical, cultural and linguistic legitimacy that
makes them easily appropriable (Campbell, 1997).
That is, technically, the tool is familiar and easy to
adapt, whereas a new tool might require significant
learning to get to a stage of action. Theoretically,
the tool is considered to be robust, hence its technical
legitimacy need not be questioned prior to use, even
where the theoretical underpinnings may no longer apply
to the use. Culturally the tool is widely accepted, hav-
ing been broadly disseminated in strategy texts and
other media. Linguistically, it is recognizable, mak-
ing it easy to use the tool for purposes of mutual
intelligibility (Garfinkel, 1967; Suchman, 1987). These
legitimacies of strategy tools, particularly well-estab-
lished familiar tools, make them highly appropriable
for bricolage (see Campbell, 1997; de Certeau, 1984;
Levi-Strauss, 1966). We may thus understand Grant
(2003) and Rigby’s (2001a; b) findings that ‘old’ strat-
egy tools, which might theoretically be presumed
less useful in some contextual conditions, continue
to be used in practice.
However, such use is not direct application. Rather
through bricolage tools may be significantly altered,
generating hybrid forms that offer new modes of act-
ing whilst retaining some traces of the past. Such bri-
colage is not insignificant. Indeed, bricolage is
associated with the adaptation of organizations, insti-
tutions, and their practices (Campbell, 1997, see also
Zbaracki, 1998). Neither does bricolage constitute
deviance nor ignorance about using a tool ‘properly’,
as it may involve high levels of practitioner skill and
experience to deploy tools in practically situated
ways that may not accord with their initial purpose
(Giard, 1998). Most importantly, bricolage is not rare
or unusual behavior. Rather, it is part of the everyday
creativity and reflexivity of practice (de Certeau,
1984; Schon, 1983). Bricolage dissociates knowledge
artifacts from their theoretical bases in the service
of practitioners engaged in the everyday practice of
strategy. A brief example of bricolage in the use of
a particular knowledge artifact, the balanced score-
card, can be found in Chesley and Wenger (1999).
These authors show that the use of strategy artifacts
involves some form of co-evolution between the orga-
nization and the framework in question. In this pro-
European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
cess, both the framework and the organization are
changed. Implementing the balanced scorecard (a
generic strategy framework) in the National Recon-
naisance Office (NRO) seemed at first to be a typical
direct application of a framework in order to assess
organizational performance. In the process of imple-
mentation, however, Chesley and Wenger (1999)
noted some key changes. First, the balance scorecard
model was adapted to fit the organizational context
and, secondly, its contextual use was the spur to stra-
tegic conversations about organizational change.
The model was adapted because the NRO is a public
agency. Terms such as ‘innovation and learning’
(part of the original scorecard) were changed to ‘cus-
tomer satisfaction’ since informants indicated that
customers were the most important thing to NRO.
In addition, ‘financial management’ (again part of
the original scorecard) was expanded to include bud-
geting since the NRO has to meet a budget rather
than make a profit. These changes simply repre-
sented fitting the framework to the organizational
context. However, its application initiated a series
of recursive processes in the organization. First, the
model provided a language (for the first time) in
the organization to discuss strategy. Secondly, it
developed a perspective on sharing a strategy across
what were effectively three separate divisions. Previ-
ously, each division had acted in isolation. Thirdly,
the application of the framework heightened anxi-
eties amongst managers since it explicitly assessed
performance and, fourthly, the net result was a sig-
nificant (and successful) organizational change.
From the perspective of this paper, the recursive pro-
cesses are important aspects of this strategic change.
When strategic conversations began in the NRO,
managers would typically revisit the scorecard
framework to criticize and modify it. Quite literally,
the framework gave them something to talk about
in a common language and in an organization where
it had long been felt that textbook organizational
solutions did not work in practice. Modifying the
framework provided a legitimacy previously absent
and this legitimacy then facilitated discussions about
performance and change. Yet, each discussion began
afresh by re-visiting the framework. In the final anal-
ysis, the balanced scorecard resembled little of its ori-
ginal format and content. Yet, it had facilitated
strategic conversations which were multi-level and
across divisions. It had also created strong commit-
ment to change since the constant re-visiting and
modifications made to the framework encouraged
strong levels of buy-in from staff. In this case we
can see evidence of bricolage and its effects in the
practical application of a framework that was
designed to assess performance but which was
adapted to secure strategic conversation, integration
and change.
The use and adaptation of a knowledge artifact in
order to foster strategic conversation and change
361
ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE

Dissociation 1:
Dissociation 2:
Simplification of theory to
Adaptation of artifacts
artifacts with few variables
through use in practice
& clear relationships

Theorizing Knowledge in action:

Knowledge artifacts:
actionable knowledge: Use by practitioners;
Tools, techniques
Contextual conditions Bricolage: Adaptive,
and frameworks
to strategy theory creative, everyday
arising from theory
practice of strategy

A: Representational epistemology:
Prescriptive assumptions about relationship of theory to practice

B: Practice epistemology:
Weak feedback on practical application of knowledge to theory

Figure 3 Dissociation of Strategy Theory in Practice

rather than to serve a technical diagnostic purpose
does not make it less actionable. Rather, increasingly
the construction of strategic activity is conceptual-
ized in terms of narrative, language and discourse
(Barry and Elmes 1997; Hardy et al., 2001; Jarzabkow-
ski and sillince, 2006; Knights and Morgan, 1991;
Shaw et al., 1998). Indeed, Astley and Zammuto
(1992) contend that the primary role of theoretical
knowledge is to provide a conceptual language for
managers (see also Beyer and Trice, 1982; Pelz,
1978). However, with a few exceptions, such as Ches-
ley and Wenger’s (1999) study, there has been little
systematic empirical research into the role that strat-
egy knowledge and its artifacts play in the strategic
language and associated practice of organizations.
Instead, many academics seem wedded to a repre-
sentational epistemology, conceptualizing use as pri-
marily prescriptive application and expressing
concern about modified uses of knowledge artifacts.
For example, McCabe and Narayanan (1991) classi-
fied responses from managers who indicated that
they did not directly apply the PIMS and BCG tools
but used their underlying principles to inform their
strategy practice as ‘non-use’. Similarly, Grant
(2003:513–14) expresses concern over the uptake of
capability-building theory because ‘‘interviewees fre-
quently referred to ‘building competitive advantage’,
‘exploiting key strengths’ and ‘leveraging core compe-
tences’’’ but most had not developed these into sys-
tematic processes or tools. Thus, misleadingly,
these practical uses of knowledge artifacts are repre-
sented as less actionable than their prescriptive theo-
retical uses.
This is not to imply that direct and prescriptive uses
of knowledge artifacts should not or do not occur in
practice. Rather this paper proposes that actionable
strategy knowledge may involve a range of practical
uses of knowledge artifacts. More importantly, given
that the limited empirical evidence suggests that
strategy practitioners do indeed use the knowledge
artifacts of strategy, we need to understand the dis-
sociation process, modeled in Figure 3, which occurs
in putting theory into practice. The first step in the
dissociation process involves simplifying theoretical
knowledge into artifacts that may be used in practice.
As seen in Figure 2, this may result in the blurring of
theoretical boundaries between artifacts. The second
phase of the dissociation process occurs when these
artifacts meet the bricolage inherent in the everyday
situated practice of strategy. The bold arrow, A, indi-
cates a representational epistemology with its pre-
scriptive assumptions about the role theory should
play in practice, which fuels many existing criticisms
that strategy knowledge is not actionable. The dotted
arrow, B, illustrates a less researched area grounded
in a practice epistemology; how practitioners use
knowledge artifacts in action, which may not be
directly associated with their theoretical provenance.
Conclusions
Asking the wrong questions results in the wrong, or at
least only partial, answers. In this paper we argue that
asking if practitioners use theory is an over-simplified
and potentially misleading question. Our agenda set-
ting argues for a more comprehensive understanding
of actionable organizational knowledge from a prac-
tice perspective. Knowing how practitioners use
knowledge artifacts is important since practice may,
or may not be, consistent with theory. Practice also
provides a feedback loop into the world of theory
since it provides practical organizational problems
that are addressed by using and modifying theoretical
knowledge artifacts. The examples given in this paper
are from theories of strategy, although we would

362 European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
 ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE
argue that the relevance of the argument holds true for
other areas of organization theory. Practice provides
the links between strategy knowledge, the design of
a knowledge artifact, and its end use (see Weick,
1995). This may be likened to the architectural design
process, which goes from abstract concepts to
sketches, blueprints, builders’ specifications and,
eventually, the physical manifestation of the building
(Liedtka, 2000; see also Hatcheul, 2001; Tranfield and
Starkey, 1998). Academics are concerned with the ear-
lier phases of this process, whilst practitioners are
more concerned with the translation of concepts into
the practical world of action (Hafsi and Thomas,
2005; Maclean and Macintosh, 2002). But the building
as a physical structure may differ in aspects of design,
use and situation from its blueprint intentions. Situ-
ated conditions, such as prevailing winds, geology
and social community issues may prompt modifica-
tions to the building by practitioners. Practitioners
use strategy knowledge, developing it into situated
artifacts of action. As indicated by arrow B in Figure
3, the dissociation process is not a failing of practice
but a practical instantiation of theory that may well
contribute to our theoretical understandings. Before
we probe the problem of actionable theoretical knowl-
edge, we should first examine seriously the actual use
of knowledge artifacts in practice. That is, if the artifact
arising from theoretical knowledge remains action-
able, then its underpinning theoretical provenance
may surely have something to learn from the theory
in action.
While this paper has shown that the application of
strategy knowledge is not necessarily consistent with
the contextual conditions under which it ‘should’ be
actionable, this does not imply abandonment of these
conditions as purely hypothetical. The contextual con-
ditions of environmental velocity and knowledge
intensity certainly pose strategic problems and issues
within a knowledge economy and so are pertinent to
both practice and theory. It is, therefore, still impor-
tant to examine comparatively both which strategy
knowledge and artifacts are used and particularly
how they are used under the different conditions of
the matrix provided in Figures 1 and 2. Future empir-
ical research may trace different patterns of use of
similar artifacts in accordance with the different con-
textual conditions and consequent nature of strategy
tasks. In particular, whilst practitioners may use and
adapt the artifacts at hand for want of more specific
ones, this does not mean that more contextually appli-
cable ones should not be sought. For example, socio-
technical research offers a precedent, illustrating
how technology breaks down as a tool in the social
context of use (Orlikowski, 1992; 2000; Ball and Wil-
son, 2000; Suchman, 1987). Such findings aid in the
design, user-interface and implementation of techno-
logical tools to make them more accessible to practice.
Similarly, with an enhanced practical understanding
of what is used and how, it may be possible to design
more appropriate strategy tools for particular contex-
tual conditions (Worren et al., 2002).
European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
These arguments take us back to Weick (1995). Theo-
ries are little more than temporary approximations,
yet they become embedded in both the languages
of theory and practice (Barry and Elmes, 1997). What
is notable, however, is the apparent importance of
bricolage in this process. As practitioners experiment
with, modify and apply theoretical knowledge arti-
facts they combine elements of theory in ways that
strategy theorists might regard as separate and sacro-
sanct. We argue that this bricolage produces modi-
fied forms of theory in practice that, however
imperfect, are communicable both to improve and
develop practice and also to refine and modify the-
ory. Bricolage involves the combination of theory
and practice which both develops out of and because
of the particular contextual setting in which applica-
tion takes place. We suggest that this is probably true
of the bulk of organizational theorizing (as Weick
argues). However, we have particularly examined
the strategy part of organization theory because, in
practice, strategy is a central and expensive part of
organizational work (Whittington, 2003; Whittington
et al., 2003), where there is some empirical evidence
to show that the artifacts of strategy have been assim-
ilated into practice (Chesley and Wenger 1999; Grant,
2003; Haspeslagh, 1982; Rigby, 2001a; b).
We are not, however, suggesting that this use of arti-
facts indicates that strategy theorizing is made more
relevant. Quite the reverse; we are arguing that the
dissociations we have revealed between theory and
practice are helpful to organization theorists as they
seek to increase the scale and scope of their theoriz-
ing (Weick, 1995). If theories of organization really
are approximations and temporary constructs, then
their practical application in the form of bricolage
we have described should serve to re-inform and to
modify the theories which underpin the various
frameworks they produce. Indeed, understanding
practice may lead to greater sophistication as well
as greater applicability of theory. However, the key
to this lies in theorists understanding accurately the
world of the practitioner (Hafsi and Thomas, 2005;
Maclean and Macintosh, 2002). Practitioners are lia-
ble to combine and re-use what theory provides in
ways which do not always match the intentions of
the theorists. This bricolage has to be understood
by organization theorists before they can claim to
be making theories more relevant. This paper has
attempted to uncover some of the details of this bri-
colage and to show how theorists might make use of
and interpret such practitioner actions.
Last, but by no means least, academics are an impor-
tant part of the production and distribution of strat-
egy knowledge, through research and teaching.
Theorists expose thousands of undergraduates,
MBAs and executive audiences to the academic
product. Yet little is known of how managers use
the theoretical artifacts typically gained from an
MBA or other business qualification (Keep and
Westwood, 2003; Priem and Rosenstein, 2000). As
363
ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE
purveyors of a product we have a market-based
incentive to understand how that product is adopted
and adapted in practice (Starkey and Madan, 2001),
to say nothing of a moral obligation (Whittington,
2003). This is increasingly important when we under-
stand strategy as a pervasive and consequential prac-
tice, the failure of which has serious implications
(Whittington et al., 2003). Tsoukas and Knudsen
(2002:428) propose that an important question for
strategy scholars; ‘‘How should knowledge about strat-
egy be used?’’ We agree but suggest that it is a mis-
leading first question. First, we should ask and
ascertain how is knowledge about strategy used?
Then, and only then, can we begin to establish the
links between theory and practice which can help
inform and develop organization theory.
Notes
1. The term ‘knowledge economy’ is consistently used in policy
documents such as that of the OECD and also in academia, for
example Democracy in a Knowledge Economy was the key
theme at the 2003 Academy of Management conference.
2. The authors wish to thank John McGee, Janine Nahapiet and
Keith Ruddle for their contributions to the origins of this
diagram.
3. Tools are arranged according to the degree of application to
contextual conditions, within the limits of space and the static
model.
References
Abrahamson, E. (1996) Management fashion. Academy of
Management Review 21, 254–285.
Academy of Management Annual Conference (2004) Con-
ference topic: Creating actionable knowledge. New
Orleans, August.
Academy of Management Journal (2001) Special research
forum: Knowledge transfer between academics and
practitioners. 44(2): 340–440.
Administrative Science Quarterly (1982) Special Issue,
Part I: The utilization of organizational research.
27(4): 587–685.
Argyres, N. and McGahan, A. (2000) An interview with
Michael Porter. Academy of Management Executive 16(2),
43–52.
Armstrong, J.S. and Brodie, R.J. (1994) Effects of portfolio
planning methods on decision making: Experimental
results. International Journal of Research in Marketing 11,
73–84.
Arthur, W.B. (1996) Increasing returns and the new world
of business. Harvard Business Review 74(4).
Astley, W.G. and Zammuto, R.F. (1992) Organization
science, managers, and language games. Organization
Science 3, 443–460.
Autio, E., Sapienza, H.J. and Almeida, J.G. (2000) Effects of
age at entry, knowledge intensity, and imitability on
international growth. Organization Science 43(5),
909–924.
Bacharach, S.B. (1989) Organizational theories: Some crite-
ria for evaluation. Academy of Management Review 14,
496–515.
Baker, T., Miner, A. and Eesley, D. (2003) Improvising
firms: Bricolage, account giving and improvisational
competencies in the founding process. Research Policy
32, 255–276.
364
Baldridge, D., Floyd, S. and Markoczy, L. (2004) Are
managers from mars and academicians from venus?
Toward an understanding of the relationship between
academic quality and practical relevance. Strategic
Management Journal 25, 1063–1074.
Ball, K. and Wilson, C. (2000) Power, control and com-
puter-based performance monitoring: Repertoires,
resistance and subjectivities. Organization Studies
21(3), 539–565.
Barney, J. (1991) Firm resources and sustained competitive
advantage. Journal of Management 17, 99–120.
Barry, D. and Elmes, M. (1997) Strategy retold: Toward a
narrative view of strategic discourse. Academy of
Management Review (22/2), 429–452.
Bettis, R.A. (1991) Strategic management and the straight-
jacket: An editorial essay. Organization Science 2(3),
315–320.
Beyer, J.M. and Trice, H.M. (1982) The utilization process:
A conceptual framework and synthesis of empirical
findings. Administrative Science Quarterly 27, 591–622.
Blackler, F., Crump, N. and McDonald, S. (2000) Organiz-
ing processes in complex activity networks. Organiza-
tion 7, 277–300.
Bogner, W.C. and Barr, P.S. (2000) Making sense in hyper
competitive environments: A cognitive explanation for
the persistence of high velocity competition. Organi-
zation Science 11(2), 212–226.
Boland, R.J. and Tenkasi, R.V. (1995) Perspective making
and perspective taking in communities of knowing.
Organization Science 6(4), 350–372.
Bower, J.L. and Christensen, C.M. (1995) Disruptive tech-
nologies: Catching the wave. Harvard Business Review
73(1).
Bowman, E.H. and Hurry, D. (1993) Strategy through the
open lens: An integrated view of resources invest-
ments and the incremental-choice process. Academy of
Management Review 18(4), 760–782.
Bowman, E. H., Singh, H. and Thomas. H. (2002) The
domain of strategic management: History and evolu-
tion. in A. Pettigrew, Thomas H., & Whittington R.
(Eds.), The Handbook of Strategy and Management,
Chapter 1.
British Journal of Management (2001) Special issue on
Bridging the Relevance Gap. Volume 12. Special issue
1.
Brown, J.S. and Duguid, P. (2001) Knowledge and organi-
zation: A social practice perspective. Organization
Science 12(2), 198–213.
Brown, J.S. and Duguid, P. (1991) Organizational learning
and communities-of practice: Toward a unified view
of working, learning and innovation. Organization
Science 2, 40–57.
Brown, S. and Eisenhardt, K.M. (1997) The art of contin-
uous change: Linking complexity theory and time-
paced evolution in relentlessly shifting environments.
Administrative Science Quarterly 42, 1–34.
Buzzell, R.D., Gale, B.T. and Sultan, R. (1975) Market share
– a key to profitability. Harvard Business Review (Jan–
Feb), 97–107.
Campbell, J. (1997). ‘Mechanisms of evolutionary change in
economic governance: Interaction, interpretation and
bricolage.’ In Evolutionary Economics and Path Depen-
dence. (eds.) L. Magnusson and J. Ottosson, 10-32.
Carlile, P.R. (2002) A pragmatic view of knowledge and
boundaries: Boundary objects in new product devel-
opment. Organization Science 13(4), 442–455.
Chakravarthy, B. (1997) A new strategy framework for
coping with turbulence. Sloan Management Review
(Winter), 69–82.
Chesley, J. and Wenger, M. (1999) Transforming an
Organization: Using Models to Foster a Strategic
Conversation. California Management Review (41/3),
54–73.
European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
 ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE
Chia, R. (2004) Strategy-as-practice: reflections on the
research agenda. European Management Review 1,
29–34.
Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal, D.A. (1990) Absorptive
capacity: A new perspective on learning and innova-
tion. Administrative Science Quarterly 35, 128–152.
Conner, K.R. (1991) A historical comparison of resource-
based theory and five schools of thought within
industrial organization economics: Do we have a
new theory of the firm? Journal of Management 17,
121–154.
Cook, S. and Brown, J. (1999) Bridging epistemologies: The
generative dance between organizational knowledge
and organizational knowing. Organization Science 10,
381–400.
Copeland, T.E. and Keenan, P.T. (1998) Making real
options real. McKinsey Quarterly 3, 128–140.
Courtney, H., Kirkland, J. and Viguerie, P. (1997) Strategy
under uncertainty. Harvard Business Review 75(6),
67–80.
Coyle, D. and Quah, D. 2002. ’Getting the measure of the
new economy.’ iSociety Report of The Work Foundation.
D’Aveni, R. (1995) Coping with hypercompetition: Utiliz-
ing the new 7S’s framework. Academy of Management
Executive 9(3), 45–59.
D’Aveni, R.A. (1994) Hyper-Competition. The Free Press,
New York.
de Certeau, M. (1984) The Practice of Everyday Life.
University of California Press, Berkeley.
de Wit, B. and Meyer, R. (1998) Strategy: Process, Content,
Context. International Thomson Publishing, London,
UK.
Dougherty, D. (2004) Organizing practices in services:
Capturing practice-based knowledge for innovation.
Strategic Organization 2, 35–64.
Dougherty, D. (1992) A practice-centered model of organi-
zational renewal through product innovation. Strategic
Management Journal 13(5), 77–92.
Eisenhardt, K.M. and Bourgeois, L.J., III (1988) ‘Politics of
strategic decision making in high-velocity environ-
ments: Toward a midrange theory. Academy of Man-
agement Journal 31(4), 737–770.
Eisenhardt, K.M. (2002) Has strategy changed? MIT Sloan
Management Review 43(2), 88–91.
Eisenhardt, K.M. and Sull, D. (2001) Strategy as simple
rules. Harvard Business Review 79, 106–119.
Eisenhardt, K.M. and Martin, J.A. (2000) Dynamic capabil-
ities: What are they? Strategic Management Journal 21,
1105–1121.
Eisenhardt, K.M. and Brown, S.L. (1999) Patching: Restitch-
ing business portfolios in dynamic markets. Harvard
Business Review (77/3), 72–82.
Emirbayer, M. and Mische, A. (1998) What is agency?
American Journal of Sociology 103(4), 962–1023.
Furrer, O. and Thomas, H. (2000) The rivalry matrix:
Understanding rivalry and competitive dynamics.
European Management Journal 18(6), 619–638.
Garfinkel, H. (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology. Prentice
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
Giard, L. (1998) Doing-Cooking. In The Practice of Everyday
Life, (eds) L. Giard, P. Mayol and M. de Certeau. Living
and Cooking vol. 2. University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis.
Ghoshal, S. and Moran, P. (1996) Bad for practice: A
critique of the transaction cost theory. Academy of
Management Review 21(1), 13–47.
Grant, R.M. (1996) Toward a knowledge-based theory of
the firm. Strategic Management Journal 17, 109–122.
Grant, R.M. (2003) Strategic Planning in a turbulent
environment: Evidence from the oil majors. Strategic
Management Journal 24(6), 491–518.
Hafsi, T. and Thomas, H. (2005) The field of strategy: In
Search of a Walking Stick. European Management
Journal 23(5), 507–519.
European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
Hambrick, D.C., Macmillan, I.C. and Day, D.L. (1982)
Strategic attributes and performance in the BCG
matrix: A PIMS-based analysis of industrial product
businesses. Academy of Management Journal 25(3),
510–531.
Harvard Management Update (1999) And now: Complex-
ity theory. Harvard Management Update, 4(3), 8–9.
Hatcheul, A. (2001) The two pillars of new management
research. British Journal of Management 12, S33–S39.
Hendry, J. (2000) Strategic decision-making, discourse, and
strategy as social practice. Journal of Management
Studies 37, 955–977.
Hendry, J. and Seidl, D. (2003) The structure and signifi-
cance of strategic episodes: Social systems theory and
the routine practices of strategic change. Journal of
Management Studies 40(1), 175–196.
Hickson, D.J., Butler, R., Gray, C., Mallory, G.R. and
Wilson, D.C. (1986) Top Decisions. Strategic Decision-
Making in Organisations. Jossey-Bass, California.
Hirsch, P.M., Michaels, S. and Friedman, R. (1987) Dirty
hands versus clean models: Is sociology in danger of
being seduced by economics? Theory and Society 16(3),
317–336.
James, W. (1907) Pragmatism. The American Library, New
York.
Jarzabkowski, P. (2004) Strategy as practice: Recursive,
adaptive and practices-in-use. Organization Studies
25(4), 529–560.
Jarzabkowski, P. (2005) Strategy as Practice: An Activity-
Based Approach. Sage, London.
Jarzabkowski, P., Balogun, J. and Seidl, D. (2006). Strate-
gizing: The challenges of a practice perspective.
Human Relations Special Issue, forthcoming.
Jarzabkowski, P. and J.A.A. Sillince, (2006). A rhetoric-in-
context approach to building commitment to multiple
strategic goals. Advanced Institute of Management
(AIM), UK, Working Paper No. 034-February-2006.
Keep, E. and Westwood, A. (2003). Can the UK learn to
manage? The Work Foundation Report, UK.
Kim, W.C. and Mauborgne, R. (1999) Creating new market
space. Harvard Business Review 77(1), 83–93.
King, G., Keohane, R.O. and Verba, S. (1994) Designing
Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Knights, D. and Morgan, G. (1991) Corporate strategy,
organizations and the subject: A critique. Organization
Studies 12(2), 251–273.
Lengnick-Hall, C. and Wolff, J.A. (1999) Similarities and
contradictions in the core logic of three strategy
research streams. Strategic Management Journal 20,
1109–1132.
Leonard-Barton, D. (1992) Core capabilities and core
rigidities: A paradox in managing new product
development. Strategic Management Journal 13,
111–125.
Levinthal, D.A. and Warglien, M. (1999) Landscape design:
Designing for local action in complex worlds. Organi-
zation Science 10(3), 342–357.
Levi-Strauss, C. (1966) The Savage Mind. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago.
Levy, D. (1994) Chaos theory and strategy: Theory, appli-
cation and managerial implications. Strategic Manage-
ment Journal 15, 167–178.
Liebeskind, J.P. (1996) Knowledge, strategy and the theory
of the firm. Strategic Management Journal 17, 93–107.
Linstead, S. and Grafton-Small (1992) When theory
becomes artifact. In Symbols and Artifacts: Views of the
Corporate Landscape ed. Gagliardi. de Gruyter, Berlin.
Louzeau, D., Langley, A. and Denis, J.-L. (2002) The
corruption of management techniques by organiza-
tions. Human Relations 55(5), 537–564.
Løwendahl, B. and Revang, Ø. (1998) Challenges to
existing strategy theory in a post-industrial society.
Strategic Management Journal 19(8), 755–774.
365
ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE
Luehrman, T. (1998) A strategy as a portfolio of real
options. Harvard Business Review 76(4), 51–67.
Maclean, D. and Macintosh, R. (2002) One process, two
audiences: On the challenges of management research.
European Management Journal 20(4), 383–392.
Macintosh, R. and Maclean, D. (1999) Conditioned emer-
gence: A dissipative structures approach to transfor-
mation. Strategic Management Journal 20, 297–316.
Mazza, C. and Alvarez, J.L. (2000) Haute couture and pret-
a-porter: The popular press and the diffusion of
management practices. Organization Studies 21,
567–588.
McCabe, D.L. and Narayanan, V.K. (1991) The life cycle of
the PIMS and BCG models. Industrial Marketing Man-
agement 20, 347–352.
McGrath, R. Gunter (1997) A real options logic for initiating
technology positioning investments. Academy of Man-
agement Review 22(4), 974–996.
McKelvey, B. (1999) Avoiding complexity catastrophe in
coevolutionary pockets: Strategies for rugged land-
scapes. Organization Science 10(3), 294–321.
McNamara, G., Vaaler, P.M. and Devers, C. (2003) Same as
it ever was: The search for evidence of increasing
hypercompetititon. Strategic Management Journal 24(3),
261–278.
Miller, D. and Shamsie, J. (1996) The resource-based view
of the firm in two environments: The Hollywood film
studios from 1936 to 1965. Academy of Management
Journal 39(3), 519–543.
Miller, D. and Friesen, P.H. (1986a) Porter’s (1980) generic
strategies and performance: An empirical examination
with American data. Part 1: Testing Porter. Organiza-
tion Studies 7(1), 37–55.
Miller, D. and Friesen, P.H. (1986b) Porter’s (1980) generic
strategies and performance: An empirical examination
with American data. Part 2: Performance implications.
Organization Studies 7(3), 255–261.
Miller, G.A. (1956) The magic number seven plus or minus
two: Some limits on our capacity for processing
information. Psychology Review (March), 81–97.
Miller, K.D. and Waller, H.G. (2003) Scenarios, real options
and integrated risk management. Long Range Planning
36, 93–107.
Mintzberg, H. and Waters, J. (1985) Of Strategies, Deliber-
ate and Emergent. Strategic Management Journal 6(3),
257–272.
Mintzberg, H., Ahlstrand, B. and Lampel, J. (1998) Strategy
Safari. The Free Press, New York NY.
Moore, J.F. (1993) Predators and prey: A new ecology of
competition. Harvard Business Review(May–June),
75–86.
Nahapiet, J. and Ghoshal, S. (1998) Social capital, intellec-
tual capital and the organizational advantage. Acad-
emy of Management Review 23(2), 242–266.
Newell, A.J., Shaw, J.C., and Simon, H.A. (1962) ‘The
processes of creative thinking.’ In, Contemporary
Approaches to Creative Thinking. H.E. Gruber, G. Terrell,
and M. Wertheimer (Eds.).
Orlikowski, W. (2000) Using technology and constituting
structure: A practice lens for studying technology in
organizations. Organization Science 12, 404–428.
Ortner, S. (1984) Theory in anthropology since the sixties.
Comparative Studies in Society and History 26(1),
126–166.
Pascale, R.T. (1999) Surfing the edge of chaos. Sloan
Management Review (Spring), 83–94.
Pettigrew, A. 1996. ’The double hurdles for management
research.’ In Advancement in Organizational Behaviour.
T. Clarke and G. Mallory (Eds.).
Pidd, M. (1996) Tools for thinking: Modeling in management
science. Wiley, Chichester.
Popper, K.R. (1968) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Harper
& Row, New York.
366
Porter, M. (1980) Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Ana-
lyzing Industries and Competitors. Free Press, New York.
Porter, M. (2001) Strategy and the Internet. Harvard Business
Review 79(March), 62–78.
Porter, M.E. (1979) The Structure within industries and
companies’ performance. The Review of Economics and
Statistics 61(2), 214–227.
Porter, Michael E. (1985) Competitive Advantage: Creating
and Sustaining Superior Performance. The Free Press,
New York.
Prahalad, C.K. and Hamel, G. (1994) Strategy as a field of
study: Why search for a new paradigm? Strategic
Management Journal 15, 5–16.
Prahalad, C.K. and Hamel, G. (1990) The core competence
of the organization. Harvard Business Review 68, 79–91.
Priem, R.L. and Butler, J.E. (2001) Is the resource-based
‘view’ a useful perspective for strategic management
research? Academy of Management Review 26(1), 22–40.
Priem, R.L. and Rosenstein, J. (2000) Is organization theory
obvious to practitioners? A test of one established
theory. Organization Science 11(5), 509–524.
Rigby, D. (2001a) Management tools and techniques: A
survey. California Management Review 43, 139–160.
Rigby, D. (2001b) Putting Tools to the Test. Strategic
Leadership, 4–12.
Rorty, R. (1991) Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Rumelt, R.P., Schendel, D. and Teece, D.J. (1991) Strategic
management and economics. Strategic Management
Journal 12, 5–29.
Sanchez, R. (1997) Strategic management at the point of
inflection: Systems, complexity and competence
theory. Long Range Planning 30(6), 939–946.
Schatzki, T. R., Cetina K. K. & v. Savigny, E. 2001. The
Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory. London,
Routledge.
Schendel D. 1991. ‘Fundamental research issues in strategy
and economics. Strategic Management Journal, Winter
Special Issue 12: 1–5.
Shaw, G., Brown, R. and Bromiley, P. (1998) Strategic
stories: How 3m is rewriting business planning.
Harvard Business Review 76, 41–50.
Shrivastava, P. (1987) Rigor and practical usefulness of
research in strategic management. Strategic Manage-
ment Journal 8(1), 77–92.
Spender, J.-C. (1996) Making knowledge the basis of a
dynamic theory of the firm. Strategic Management
Journal 17, 45–62.
Stacey, R. (1995) The science of complexity: An alternative
perspective for strategic change processes. Strategic
Management Journal 16(6), 477–495.
Starkey, K. and Madan, P. (2001) Bridging the relevance
gap: Aligning stakeholders in the future of manage-
ment research. British Journal of Management 12, 3–27.
Suchman, L. (1987) Plans and situated actions. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Teece, D.J., Pisano, G. and Shuen, A. (1997) Dynamic
capabilities and strategic management. Strategic Man-
agement Journal 18, 509–533.
Thomas, H. (1984) Strategic decision analysis: Applied
decision analysis and its role in the strategic manage-
ment process. Strategic Management Journal 5(2),
139–156.
Thomas, H. and Pollock, T. (1999) From I-O economics S-C-
P paradigm through strategic groups to competence-
based competition: Reflections on the puzzle of
competitive strategy. British Journal of Management
10(2), 127–140.
Thomas, L.G. (1996) The Two Faces of Competition:
Dynamic Resourcefulness and Hypercompetitive
Shift. Organization Science 7(3), 221–242.
Tranfield, D. and Starkey, K. (1998) The nature, social
organization and promotion of management research:
European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
 ACTIONABLE STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE: A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE
Towards policy. British Journal of Management 9,
341–353.
Tsoukas, H. (1998) The word and the world: A critique of
representationalism in management research. Interna-
tional Journal of Public Administration 21(5), 781–817.
Tsoukas, H. and Knudsen, C. (2002) ‘The Conduct of
Strategy Research.’ In The Handbook of Strategy and
Management, (eds) A. Pettigrew, H. Thomas, & R.
Whittington, Chapter 18: 411–435.
Tsoukas, H. and Cummings, S. (1997) Marginalization and
recovery: The emergence of Aristotelian themes in
organization studies. Organization Studies 18, 655–674.
Varela, F.J., Thompson, E. and Rosch, E. (1991) The
Embodied Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Venkatraman, N. and Subramaniam, M. (2001) ‘Theorizing
the future of strategy: Questions for shaping strategy
research in the knowledge economy.’ In The Handbook
of Strategy and Management, (eds) A. Pettigrew, H.
Thomas, & R. Whittington, Chapter 20: 461–474.
Volberda, H. (1996) Towards the flexible form: How to
remain vital in hypercompetitive environments. Orga-
nization Science 7(4), 359–374.
von Neumannn, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1944) The Theory of
Games and Economic Behavior. Wiley, New York.
Weick, K. (1995) What theory is not, theorizing is. Admin-
istrative Science Quarterly 40, 385–390.
Wenger, E. (1998) Communities of practice: Learning, meaning
and identity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Wensley, R. (1982) PIMS and BCG: New horizons or false
dawn?. Strategic Management Journal 3(2), 147–158.
PAULA JARZABKOW-
SKI, is a Reader in Stra-
tegic Management at
Aston Business School and
an Advanced Institute of
Management (AIM) Gho-
shal Fellow.
Her research focuses on the
dynamics of strategy for-
mation as a social practice,
particularly in pluralistic
contexts such as public
sector organizations and regulated firms. She has
published refereed articles on this topic in Organization
Studies, Journal of Management Studies and Journal of
Management Inquiry, co-edited a special issue of
Human Relations on the topic and, in 2005 published
the first research monograph in this area ‘Strategy as
Practice: An Activity-Based Approach’ with Sage.
European Management Journal Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 348–367, October 2006
Whetten, D.A. (1989) What constitutes a theoretical contri-
bution? Academy of Management Review 14, 490–495.
Whiting, R. (2001) Behavior change for supply chains.
Information Week, 831, 04/02/2001: 56–59.
Whittington, R. (2002) ‘Practice perspectives on strategy:
unifying and developing a field.’ Academy of Man-
agement Conference Best Paper Proceedings, Denver,
August.
Whittington, R. (2003) The work of strategizing and
organizing: For a practice perspective. Strategic Orga-
nization 1(1), 119–127.
Whittington, R. (2004) Strategy after modernism: Recover-
ing practice. European Management Review 1(1).
Whittington, R., Jarzabkowski, P., Mayer, M., Mounoud, E.,
Nahapiet, J. and Rouleau, L. (2003) Taking strategy
seriously: Responsibility and reform for an important
social practice. Journal of Management Inquiry 12(4),
396–409.
Wilson, D.C. and Jarzabkowski, P. (2004) Thinking and
acting strategically: New challenges for interrogating
strategy. European Management Review 1(1).
Worren, N., Moore, K. and Elliot, R. (2002) When theories
become tools: Toward a framework for pragmatic
validity. Human Relations 55(10), 1227–1250.
Zbaracki, M.J. (1998) The rhetoric and reality of total
quality management. Administrative Science Quarterly
43(3), 602–636.
Zohar, A. and Morgan, G. (1996) Refining our understand-
ing of hypercompetition and hyperturbulence. Orga-
nization Science 7(4), 460–464.
DAVID C. WILSON, is
Professor of Strategic
Management at Warwick
Business School. He is the
author of eight books and
many articles on strategy,
decision making and
organisational change.
He was Chairman of the
British Academy of Man-
agement (1994–1997) and
was elected a Fellow of the
Academy in 1995. He is Chairman of the European
Group for Organisation Studies. He is currently
researching governance, uncertainty and strategy
implementation.
367