SECTION 11
confession was validly taken and in accordance with his
1. Spouses Algura vs. Local Government Unit of the
City of Naga, G.R. No. 150135, October 30,
2006.
2. Re: Letter dated April 18, 2011 of Chief Public
Attorney Persida Rueda-Acosta Requesting
Exemption from the Payment of Sheriff’s Expenses,
A.M. No. 11-10-03-O, July 30, 2013
SECTION 12
1. R.A. No. 7438
2. Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 US 478 (1964)
3. Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966)
4. People of the Philippines vs. Mahinay, G.R. No.
122485, February 1, 1999.
FACTS: Larry Mahinay works as a houseboy for Maria
Isip. His task was to take care of Isip’s house which was
under construction adjacent to her old residence. The
victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip’s
neighbor in Dian Street. Elvira Chan. The victim’s
mother, noticed that her daughter was missing. Isip
testified that the appellant failed to show up for supper
that night and that on the following day, boarded a
passenger jeepney and disappeared. On that same
morning, the victim’s dead body was fpund in a septic
tank. With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless
body of the victim was retrieved from the septic tank.
She was searing a printed blouse without underwaer
and her face bore bruises. After a series of follow-up
operations appellant was finally arrested. He was
brought to the Valenzuela Police Station. With the
assistance of an attorney he executed an extra-judicial
confession when he narrated in detail how he raped
and killed the victim. Appellant was charged with rape
with homicide to which he pleaded not guilty. After
trial, the lower court rendered a decision convicting
appellant of the crime charged, sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of death.
Appellant now claims that the extra-judicial confession
that he executed was executed in violation of his
constitutional right to counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant’s extra-judicial
rights under Sec. 12 of the Bill of Rights.
HELD: No, his contention is belied by the records as well
as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned
and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed
pre-interrogatory and custodial rights.
The penalty imposed by the trial court us correct. Under
Article 335 of the Revised penal Code, as amended by
R.A 7654 “when by reason or on occasion of the rape, a
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.”
5. People of the Philippines vs. dela Cruz, G.R. No.
137405, September 27, 2002
6. People of the Philippines vs. Loveria, G.R. No.
79138, July 2, 1990.
7. People of the Philippines vs. Obrero, G.R. No.
122142, May 17, 2000.
DOCTRINE: Under the Constitution, an uncounseled
statement, such as it is called in the United States from
which Article III, Section 12 (2) was derived, is presumed
to be psychologically coerced.
FACTS: Jimmy Obrero was arrested in Pangasinan for
the crime of robbery with homicide. While he was in
custodial investigation, Atty. Bienvenido Reyes, a police
captain of the WPD Headquarters, introduced himself
as a legal counsel, and assisted Jimmy in giving an
extrajudicial confession, which was the basis of his
prosecution in the lower court.
ISSUE: Is Jimmy Obrero’s extrajudicial confession
admissible in Court?
RULING: NO, Obrero’s confession is inadmissible in
court because he was not given the Miranda warning
effectively. Atty Reyes, despite being a lawyer, was not
the accused’s counsel of choice. There was thus only a
perfunctory reading of the Miranda Rights to accused-
appelant without any effort to find out from him
whether he wanted to have a counself, and, if so,
whether he had his own counsel, or wanted the police
to appoint one for him. Here, Atty. Reyes, who though
presumably competent, cannot be considered an
independent counsel.
8. Gamboa vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-56291, June 27, 1988.
9. People of the Philippines vs. Zuela, G.R. No.
112177, January 28, 2000.
10. Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 97214, July
18, 1994.
FACTS: Petitioner Novallo is the collecting and
disbursing officer of Numencia National Vocational
School. The amount of ₱16, 483.62 was failed to
account during the audit and failed as well to restitute
despite demands by the Provincial Auditor, thus he was
accused violating par. 4 of Art. 217 of RPC. A warrant of
arrest was issued, followed by two alias warrants of
arrest, still then could not be found. In 1984, Novallo
was finally arrested, but later released an provisional
Liberty upon the approval of his property bail band. RTC
arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. RTC transferred
the case to Sandiganbayan thus a new order for
Novallo’s arrest was issued. Said Warrant was returned
with a certification by the RTC that the accused had
posted a bail band. But later found defective. Petitioner
moved to quash, that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction, that the attempt to prosecute him before
sandigan bayan constitute double Jeopardy.
Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was under custodial
investigation when he signed the certification prepared
by State Auditing Examiner Leopoldo Dulguime.
HELD: No. Accused-petitioner claims to have been
deprived of his constitutional rights under Section 12,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution. 3 Well-settled is the
rule that such rights are invocable only when the
accused is under "custodial investigation," or is "in
custody investigation," 4 which we have since defined as
any "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." 5 A person under a normal audit examination is
not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner
himself can hardly be deemed to be the law
enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In
any case, the allegation of his having been "pressured"
to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime
appears to be belied by his own testimony.
11. People vs. Macam, G.R. Nos. 91011-12, November
24, 1994.
12. Ho Wai Pang vs. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 176229, October 19, 2011.
13. Ladiana vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
144293, December 4, 2002.
SECTION 13
1. Rule 114, Rules of Court
2. Lavides vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129670,
February 1, 2000.
3. Yap vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6,
2001.
FACTS: Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of
estafa for misappropriating amounts equivalent to PHP
5.5 million. After the records of the case were
transmitted to the CA, he filed a motion to fix bail
pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and
allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of PHP 5.5
million, as recommended by the Office of the Solicitor
General on condition that he will secure “a
certification/guaranty from the mayor of the place of
his residence that he is a resident of the area and that
he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered
or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior
notice to the court and private complainant”.
Yap sought the reduction of the bail but was denied.
Hence, he appealed to the SC, he contended that the
CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively
denied him his right to bail. He also contested the
condition imposed by the CA that he secures a
certificate or guaranty, claiming that the same violates
his liberty of abode and travel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proposed bail was violative
of petitioner’s right against excessive bail
RULING: Yes. The SC said that the bail amounting to PHP
5.5 million is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes
an effective denial of petitioner’s right to bail. The
purpose of the bail is to guarantee the appearance of
the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the
court. The amount should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused but not higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfill the purpose. To fix bail at
an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which
petitioner is charged is to permit the impression that
the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability
that accused is charged of. The SC further said that this
cannot be allowed because bail is not intended as
punishment nor a satisfaction of civil liability which
should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate
court. Also, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedures advises courts to consider the
following factors in setting the amount of bail:
 Financial ability of the accused to give
bail;
 Nature and circumstances of the
offense;
 Penalty for the offense charged;
 Character and reputation of the
accused;
 Age and health of the accused;
 Weight and evidence against the
accused;
 Probability of the accused appearing at
the trial;
 Forfeiture of other bail;
 The fact that the accused was a fugitive
from justice when arrested; and
 Pendency of other cases where the
accused is on bail.
4. Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August
18, 2015.
FACTS: Former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, charged by
the Ombudsman with plunder in the Sandiganbayan,
filed a motion praying that he be allowed to post bail.
He based his motions on the grounds that: (a) the
prosecution had not yet established that the evidence
of his guilt is strong; (b) although he was charged by
plunder, if proven guilty, his penalty would only be
reclusion temporal as he was entitled to two mitigating
circumstances – his voluntary surrender and his old age;
and (c) he was not a flight risk and his age and physical
condition must further be seriously considered.
Sandiganbayan denied the said motion stating that it is
only after the prosecution shall have presented its
evidence and the court shall have made a
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong,
can he demand bail.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused – petitioner be entitled
to post bail?
RULING: YES. The SC grants the provisional liberty to
Enrile in consideration of his poor health.
The right to bail, as a general rule, is that any person,
before being convicted of any criminal offense shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
In this case, the SC mainly considered Enrile’s poor
health condition to justify his admission to bail,
believing that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will
enable him to have his medical condition be properly
addressed and attended to by competent physicians of
his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate
preparation of his defense but will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial – which is the objective
of bail.
Further, Sandiganbayan’s contention is not correct on
the proper time to file a motion for bail. Waiting for the
trial to finish before application of bail defeats the
objective of bail to entitle the accused with provisional
liberty pending trial.
5. Government of Hong Kong vs. Olalia, G.R. No.
153675, April 19, 2007.
6. Camara vs. Enage, G.R. Nos. 32951-2, September
17, 1971.
Facts: Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental,
Ricardo De La Camara, petitioner, was arrested on
November 7, 1968 for alleged participation of the killing
of fourteen and wounding eleven other laborers in
Tirador Logging Co.
The provincial fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance
a case of multiple frustrated murder and multiple
murder in the other against the petitioner.
The petitioner filed bail, although he maintained his
innocence. The respondent Judge granted him the bail
but, requiring him to post P1,195,200.00 for his
temporary release. This incident went to the attention
of the then DOJ Secretary Vicente Abad Santos. By then,
the Secretary told through a telegram that the bail was
so excessive and he even suggested that a reasonable
bail shall be P40,000.00 only. The respondent became
adamant, so this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the bail is excessive
Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed the case for moot
and academic since the petitioner escaped from the
penal detention facility. Nevertheless, according to the
Court, the bail was too excessive. By being excessive
means it is as though the accused is never given the
chance to post bail. If the only purpose of the bail is to
let the accused be present during the hearing, it is a
violation of his right if the same is excessive.
7. Comendador vs. de Villa, G.R. No. 93177, August 2,
1991.
SECTION 14
1. Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143618-41,
July 30, 2002.
2. Buscayno vs. Military Commissions Nos. 1, 2, 6 and
25, G.R. No. L-58284, November 19, 1981.
3. Dumlao vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 52245, January 22,
1980.
4. Malana vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
173612, March 26, 2008.
5. Marquez vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 187912-14,
January 31, 2011.
6. People of the Philippines vs. Holgado, G.R. No. L-
2809, March 22, 1950.
7. US vs. Karelsen, G.R. No. 1376, January 21, 1904.
8. People of the Philippines vs. Quitlong, G.R. No.
121562, July 10, 1998.
9. Conde vs. Rivera, G.R. No. 21741, January 25, 1924.
FACTS: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in
Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less
the five information for various crimes and
misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses
and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different
occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice
been required to come to the Supreme Court for
protection, and now, after the passage of more than
one year from the time when the first information was
filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of
her troubles as she was when originally charged.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her
right to a speedy and impartial trial.
Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly
guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial.
Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right
to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go
free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance
of law.
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a
prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his
protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this
instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to
relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a
dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his
liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
10. Mateo vs. Villaluz, G.R. No. 34756-59, March 31,
1973.
11. Garcia vs. Domingo, G.R. No. L-30104, July 25,
1973.
12. People of the Philippines vs. Ramos, G.R. No.
59318, May 16, 1983.
FACTS: Malcon Olevera was arrested for possession of
dried marijuana leaves. Upon investigation, Olevere
declared that he bought the recovered marijuana leaves
from one Rogelio Ramos. A police team with suspect
Olevere proceeded to the residence of Ramos and
arrested him. During the custodial investigation,
Olevere executed a written sworn statement implicating
the accused-appellant Ramos as the source of the
marijuana leaves. He accused after having been duly
apprised of his constitutional rights, verbally admitted
the commission of the offense charged. Upon
arraignment, the accused-appellant entered a plea of
not guilty to the information filed against him. At the
trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses. After
the trial the Court of First Instance of Manilla found
Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in view of the verbal admission given by the
appellant himself and the evidence offered and
admitted to Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the
accused, more particularly the right to meet the witness
against him face to face and to cross-examination him
has been violated.
HELD: The lower court erred in admitting as evidence
the written sworn affidavit of Malcon Olevere. This
piece of evidence is a mere scrap of paper because
Malcon Olevere was not produced in court for cross-
examination. The constitutional right to meet witnesses
face to face 15 in order not to deprive persons of their
lives and properties without due process of law is well-
protected in our jurisprudence.
A witness, therefore, may not testify as to what
he merely learned from others, either because he was
told or having read or heard the same. Such testimony
is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof
of the truth of what he has learned. Since Malcon
Olevere was not presented as a witness, the testimonies
offered by the witnesses for the prosecution are
regarded as hearsay, insofar as they impute to the
appellant the commission of the offense charged.
13. Soriano vs. Angeles, G.R. No. 109920, August 31,
2000.
DOCTRINE: Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed,
especially weighed against a judge’s sacred allegation
under oath of office to administer justice without
respect to any person and do equal right to the poor
and the rich.
FACTS: Private respondent Garcia and his uncle went
into a barangay hall and looked for petitioner Soriano,
and then allegedly gave the petitioner blows to the
face. There was an altercation that resulted in the
hospitalization of the petitioner. Judge Angeles
acquitted the private respondent because she found it
hard to believe that the petitioner did not resist or say
anything when he was assaulted by the private
respondent.
Soriano filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that the
decision is invalid because it was not rendered by an
impartial tribunal, citing the reason that the judge called
the parties to her private chamber and asked for the
parties to settle the case instead, and when the
petitioner refused, she did not set the case for hearing
until after three weeks allegedly to provide a cooling off
period.
ISSUE: Was the petitioner’s right to an impartial trial
violated?
RULING: NO, the petitioner’s right to an impartial trial
was not violated, because a perusal of the judgment of
the trial showed that the parties were heard
conformably to the norms of due process, evidence was
presented by both parties and duly considered, their
arguments were studied, analyzed, and assessed, and
judgment was rendered in which findings of facts and
conclusions were set forth. A postponement was not an
unreasonable request, because the regular counsel of
the private defendant was absent, and a new one was
to take over.
14. People of the Philippines vs. Yambot, G.R. No.
120350, October 13, 2000.
Facts: On February 7, 1994, the group of the accused,
kidnapped Francisco Bernabe in Dalandan, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. They asked Arceli Bernabe, the wife of
Francisco, to give them 20 Million Pesos in exchange of
the liberty of her husband. However, it was reduced to
2,370,000.00 Pesos and became the final pay-off of the
ransom. The operatives safely rescued Francisco
Bernabe, killed some of the perpetrators, abduct others
including Yambot and Valenzuela while others were
remain at large.
After the hearing, the lower court, RTC, decided against
all the kidnappers and sentenced them to death by
electrocution. Through automatic appeal due to the
nature of their sentence, they assailed that they were
denied due process on the ground that they failed to
submit their own evidence. However, in the record it
was shown that their absence of presenting their own
witness was due to their waver of presenting the same.
Issue: Whether or not they were denied due process for
not presenting their own witness as part of their
evidence.
Ruling: The Supreme Court decided in favor of Yambot
and Valenzuela. The failure of presenting the same to
the lower court was the fault of their counsel. Their
counsel asked the court for the resetting of the hearing
on the ground that their witnesses were not available.
This happened four times and each time the court
granted the motion to reset the hearing, although the
court warned the counsel that if the witnesses would
not show up again in the next hearing, Yambot and
Valenzuela’s right to present their witness will
tantamount to a waiver. However, in each resetting, the
counsel failed to present even himself in the hearing,
this happened three times. So, the lower court decided
against the accused based on the waiver to present
their witness.
According to the Supreme Court, since it was the
counsel’s fault, the decision against Yambot and
Valenzuela is a violation of due process on the ground
of their failure to present their witness, although not
their fault. So, the judgment of the lower court was set
aside and the Supreme Court ordered the lower court
to receive the evidence of the accused.
15. People of the Philippines vs. Jarra, G.R. No. L-
61356-57, September 30, 1986.
SECTION 15
1. Go vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 167569, September 4, 2009.
SECTION 16
1. Caballero vs. Alfonso, Jr., G.R. No. L-45647, August
21, 1987.
2. Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 120681, October
1, 1999.
FACTS:Several cases were filed by the ombudsman in
the Sandiganbayan against Mayor Jejomar Binay
for illegal use of public funds and violation of Anti-graft
and corrupt practices act. The crimes were committed
by the petitioner in his incumbency in the year 1987.
Petitioner moved to quash the informations, alleging
that the delay of more than 6 years constituted a
violation of his right due process. His arraignment was
held in abeyance pending the resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to quash and the latter’s MR. In the
meantime, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend
the accused “pendente lite” which was eventually
granted and ordered the 90-day suspension.
Petitioner filed petition for certiorari in the SC, praying
that the resolution denying MR be set aside and claimed
that he was denied of his rights when the suspension
was ordered even before he could file his reply. SC, then
directed Sandiganbayan to permit petitioner to file said
reply. After the submissions of reply, Sandiganbayan
reiterated its previous resolutions and order.
Meanwhile,
RA 7975 redifining the jurisdiction of sandiganbayan,
thus petitioner filed before Sandiganbayan a motion to
refer his cases to the RTC, alleging that Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction on the instant case. SB denied,
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to speedy
disposition was violated.
HELD: No. The SC held that there was no undue delay.
The right to speedy disposition of a case, like the right
to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements
of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.
3. Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995,
October 6, 1998.
SECTION 17
1. U.S. vs. Navarro, G.R. No. 1272, January 11, 1904.
2. Isabela Sugar Co. vs. Macadaeg, G.R. No. L-5924,
October 28, 1953.
3. U.S. vs. Tan Teng, G.R. No.7081, September 7, 1912.
4. Villaflor vs. Summers, G.R. No. 16444, September 8,
1920.
5. People of the Philippines vs. Gallarde, G.R. No.
133025, February 17, 2000.
6. Beltran vs. Samson, G.R. No. 32025, September 23,
1923.
FACTS: Petitioner herein complains the respondent
judge for ordering him to appear before the provincial
fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting for the
purpose of comparing petitioner’s handwriting to a
falsified document in question on a separate case.
Petitioner refuses to do such act and seeks refuge in the
constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law,
“nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the writing constitutes evidence
against himself within the scope and meaning of the
constitutional provision.
RULING: YES. The act of writing or taking dictation is
included in the privilege not to give self-incriminating
evidence.
SC stated that writing is something more than moving
the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a
purely mechanical act, because it requires the
application of intelligence and attention; and in the case
at bar, writing means that the petitioner herein is to
furnish a means to determine whether or not he is a
falsifier.
7. Mapa Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April
26, 1994.
SECTION 19
1. R.A. No. 9346
2. People of the Philippines vs. Estoista, G.R. No. L-
5793, August 27, 1953.
3. People of the Philippines vs. Puda, G.R. No. L-
33841, October 31, 1984.
FACTS : Accused appellant Flavio Puda was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death after finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder after
killing one Ching Tian Un. Unfortunately, because of the
negligence of some court personnel, the records of the
case were not forwarded by the court to the SC for
automatic review. Eleven years after his conviction, the
accused wrote a letter to the SC inquiring about the
status of his case. The SC then inquired through a letter
and found that due to the inadvertence of the then
clerk in charge of criminal cases, the records of his case
were placed in the archives sometimes in 1960 instead
of being forwarded to the SC. Hence, it was only then
that the entire records were elevated. The accused
raised alleged errors saying that the Trial Court erred in
imposing death penalty for being violative of the
constitutional provision (1935 Constitution) against the
imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, and he
should not be meted with the supreme penalty of death
by the SC as he has fully paid his due to society for
having suffered enough in staying in death row for more
than 20 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death penalty is violative of
the constitutional right against imposition of cruel and
unusual punishment
RULING: No. the Supreme Court held that death penalty
is not cruel, unjust, or excessive. In the case of Kemmler
(136 U.S. 436), the United States Supreme Court said
that “punishments are cruel when they involve torture
or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not
cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the
Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life”. The court, however, agrees with
the accused’s contention that the penalty should not be
imposed on him since he has been detained and
continues to be in the death row for about 24 years and
it took 11 years after his trial and conviction before the
records of his case were discovered and transmitted to
the SC for automatic review. The penalty of death is
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
4. People of the Philippines vs. Mercado, G.R. No.
116239, November 29, 2000.
5. People of the Philippines vs. Echegaray, G.R. No.
117472, February 7, 1997.
SECTION 20
1. Lozano vs. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December
18, 1986.
SECTION 21
1. People of the Philippines vs. Ylagan, G.R. No.
38443, November 25, 1933.
2. Lamera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93475, June
5, 1991.
FACTS:
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985,
along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-
type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and
bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto Reyes
resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries to
Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal.
As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed
against petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with
multiple physical injuries under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code and (b) an Information for violation
of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code
on Abandonment of one's victim.
In June 1987 the MTC of Pasig rendered its decision in
finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of
Abandonment of one's victim as defined and penalized
under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal
Code. Petitioner appealed from said Decision to the RTC
of Pasig. In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner
was arraigned for violation of Article 365. He entered a
plea of not guilty.
He filed a petition for review in the CA but which was
denied. He raised before the SC that that he cannot be
penalized twice for an “accident” and another for
“recklessness.” He maintained that since he is facing a
criminal charge for reckless imprudence, which offense
carries heavier penalties under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, he could no longer be charged
under Article 275, par. 2, for abandonment for failing to
render to the persons whom he has accidentally
injured.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecution for negligence under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is a bar to
prosecution for abandonment under Article 275 of the
same Code because it constitutes double jeopardy.
RULING:
No, the SC affirmed that the Articles penalize different
and distinct offenses. The rule on double jeopardy,
which petitioner has, in effect, invoked, does not,
therefore, apply pursuant to existing jurisprudence.
Hence, the petition should be dismissed for lack of
merit.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.
He is charged for two separate offenses under the
Revised Penal Code. In People vs. Doriquez, the SC held
that it is a cardinal rule that the protection against
double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same
offense or identical offenses. Where two different laws
(or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise
from the same facts, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the
other.
The two information filed against petitioner are clearly
for separate offenses. The first, for reckless imprudence
(Article 365), falls under the sole chapter (Criminal
Negligence) of Title Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book
Two of the Revised Penal Code. The second, for
Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls
under Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of Title
Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of
Book Two of the same Code.
Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by
means of culpa. Crimes against Security are committed
by means of dolo.
3. People of the Philippines vs. Relova, G.R. No. L-
45129, March 6, 1987.
4. People of the Philippines vs. Balisican, G.R. No. L-
26376, August 31. 1966.
5. Braza vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 195032,
February 20, 2013.
6. Ivler vs. Modesto-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716,
November 17, 2010.
7. Melo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-3850,
March 22, 1950
8. People of the Philippines vs. Buling, G.R. No. L-
13315, April 27, 1960.
9. People of the Philippines vs. Tria-Tirona, G.R. No.
130106, July 15, 2005.
10. Lejano vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
176389, January 18, 2011.
SECTION 22
1. In Re Kay Villagas Kami Inc., G.R. No. 32485,
Octobber 22, 1970.
2. People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 101724, July 3, 1992.
Facts: Two letter-complaints were filed on October 28,
1986 and December 9, 1986 with the Tanodbayan by
Teofilo Gelacio to Ceferino Paredes. The petitioner was
a public officer being then the Provincial Attorney of
Agusan del Sur.
The complaint was based on taking advantage of his
public position by influencing and inducing the Land
Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the land subject
to this litigation filed by the accused with the Bureau of
Lands is a disposable land with free patent where in
fact, the accused knew that the same had been
reserved for school site.
He was arrested upon a warrant issued by the
Sandiganbayan. On April 5, 1991, he filed an urgent
Motion with the prayer that the charged against him be
quashed since he is charged for an offense which has
prescribed. He further reiterated that since it was
already prescribed, his constitutional rights has been
violated.
Issue: Whether or not the offense is already prescribed.
Ruling: The Supreme Court decided in favor of the
respondent. According to the Court, if the respondent is
charged with that offense under R.A. No. 3019 which
was amended by BP 195 which increases the period for
prescription from ten to fifteen years he will no longer
be liable. However, if BP 195 will apply which amended
the R.A. No. 3019, would make it an ex post facto law
since it would change his situation to his disadvantage
by making him criminally liable for a crime that had
already been extinguished under the law existing when
it was committed.
3. Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096,
January 20, 1999.
FACTS: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of
Sections 4 and 7 of RA 8249, an act which defines and
expands the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; and
further alleges that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over their case.
Petitioner was charged for murder before the
Sandiganbayan, on November 1995. On March 5-6,
1996, petitioner, along with other co-accused, filed
separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that RA 7975 (repealed
by the assailed law) limits the jurisdiction of the said
court and does not have the authority to try their
murder case. These motions were granted and
transferred to the Quezon City RTC.
However, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved
for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should
remain with the Sandiganbayan.
Pending resolution, RA 8249 was approved into law.
The Sandiganbayan retained jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners now argues that sections 4 and 7 of RA 8249
for being an ex post facto law. Section 4 defines the
expanded jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and section
7 states that the assailed law shall apply to all cases
pending in any court.
ISSUE: Whether or not sections 4 and 7 of RA 8249 is
unconstitutional for having a retroactive application.
RULING: It is constitutional. The SC said that there is
nothing ex post facto in RA 8249.
An ex post facto law, generally prohibits retrospectivity
of penal laws. RA 8249 is not a penal law. It is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Therefore, the retroactive application of RA
8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
4. People of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-
32613-14, December 27, 1972.
Facts: On March 10, 1970, a prima facie case was filed
against Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance in
Tarlac concerning the Anti-Subversion Act. He was
accused of being an officer or a ranked leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and
illegal organization aimed to overthrow the government
of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit,
subversion or any other illegal means. Co claimed that
the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. On May 25,
1970, Nilo Tayag and five others were also charged in
the same court with subversion. Tayag copied Co’s
attack on the law. The court ruled the statute void on
the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is
vague overbroad. Government appealed to the SC as a
special civil action for certiorari.
Issues:
Relevant: WoN the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of
attainder
Irrelevant: WoN it is vague and overbroad
Irrelevant: WoN it denies the defendants the due
process of the law
Held and Ratio:
Relevant: No. Only when a statute applies either to
named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of
a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them
without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder.
(US v. Lovett 328 US 303 1946)
Irrelevant: No. The contention about the word
“overthrow” regarding the government (peaceful
overthrowing) is clarified by the provision of the clause:
by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion or any
other illegal means.
Irrelevant: No. The freedom of expression and freedom
of association is superseded by the right of the state to
self-preservation.