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 1

Animal Interests and Animalism: A Reply to Bailey

Isaac Collins1

Abstract Andrew Bailey has recently argued that the apparent overlap between the interests
of the human organism, and the interests of the human person support the thesis of animalism.
According to Bailey, the consistent harmony of interests between human persons and human
animals is best supported by the idea that we are identical to human animals. Contra Bailey, I
will argue that this argument in favour of animalism does not succeed for two primary
reasons. Firstly, I will argue that there are no good grounds to argue that human animals, and
organisms in general, have interests. Secondly, I will contend that even if human organisms do
have interests, there are situations where the interests of human persons and human organisms
diverge. I will then address possible justifications that the defender of this argument may use
to deny such divergence, and show that they are either implausible, or eventually come at the
cost of the argument as a whole.

Keywords Animalism ∙ Personal Ontology ∙ Personal Identity ∙ Biological Interests ∙

Metaphysics

1 Introduction

Animalism says that human persons are identical to human organisms; our existence and
persistence is dependent upon the human organism. In support of this account of personal
identity, Andrew Bailey (2016) has recently provided a unique and fascinating argument that
has been dubbed the Animal Interests Argument. According to Bailey, there is an apparent
interlocking harmony between the interests of human animals and the interests of human
persons. Bailey calls this long list of correlations between the interests of human persons and
the interests of their animals ‘‘the interest datum’’. If the interest datum is true, then according
to Bailey, it is best explained by the thesis that we are identical to animals. I am not convinced
by this argument however.
After presenting animalism and the Animal Interests Argument, I will attempt to cut the
argument off at its source by illustrating that there is no reason to believe that the human
organism has interests. Despite the prima facie intuition that organisms have interests, the

1
The University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW, Australia.
isaac2001collins@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0001-6280-2111
 2

existence of such needs to be justified before the argument can get off the ground.
Unfortunately, each attempt in establishing biological interests fails to be persuasive, or so I
will argue. In later sections, I will assume that the human organism has interests, however, I
will maintain the apparent interlocking interests of the human person and the human animal
should be rejected. Despite the common overlap, there are striking examples of divergent
interests between the animal and the person, and thus, we should reject the interest datum. I
will then respond to attempts at denying this divergence of interests. I will contend that these
attempts are either unpersuasive, or eventually come at the cost of the Animal Interests
Argument as a whole. As such, despite its unique and original argumentation, the Animal
Interests Argument should be rejected.

2 Animalism and the Animal Interests Argument

Animalism, put simply, says that we are identical to animals. In other words, the human
person is identical to a particular human organism.2 This ontology posits that when our human
organism exists, we exist. Wherever the human organism is located, we are located.
Everything that is true of you, is also true of the human organism. The human organism is
both a necessary, and sufficient condition for our existence, because we are the human
organism.
This theory of personal identity seems plausible at first glance. We often consider
ourselves to be human animals. When we look in the mirror and see the face of a human
animal staring back, we believe that we are looking at ourselves.
Despite this plausible intuition, many philosophers have pushed back against animalism,
arguing that it does not stand up to ontological scrutiny, and faces an array of plausible
objections (see Campbell & McMahan 2010; Campbell 2015; Johnston 2016; Watson 2016;
Boyle 2019; Duncan 2021) In response to this pushback, animalism has seen a rising wave of
new arguments in its favour (e.g. Blatti 2012; Licon 2012; Bailey & Pruss 2021). Avoiding
the classical argument for animalism known as the Thinking Animal Argument (see Blatti
2016), these recent vindications of animalist ontology appeal to an admittedly unique pathway
of argumentation. Such an example of a recent argument in support of animalism is Andrew
Bailey’s aforementioned Animal Interests Argument.
The Animal Interests Argument highlights the supposed intimate and obvious associations
between human animals and human persons, and uses such associations to lead to the
conclusion that we are identical to human animals. According to animalism, whatever is true
of the human animal is also true of you; you are the animal. If animalism is true, we would be
able to recognise these apparent associations between the human animal and the human
person. According to Bailey, it is uncontroversially obvious that such associations already
exist. Bailey writes that ‘’Our animals are ever with us. We see them in mirrors. When our
animals go unfed, we feel the pangs of hunger. When they lie down and fall into deep sleep,
we go unconscious. When we hope for rain, the eyes of our animals brighten and their heads
turn towards the clouds above’’ (2016, p. 2317). Despite the exhaustive list of possible

2
For a classical defence and overview of the animalist ontology, see Olson (1997).
 3

overlapping between human persons and human animals, Bailey’s argument narrowly focuses
on one specifically, interests.
According to Bailey, human persons and human organisms have ‘’interlocking interests’’.
When you harm the human animal, you harm the human person. If someone were to beat up
your human animal, they would harm the animal; but moreover, they would harm you too. As
such, you and your human animal have a great many interests in common. Bailey calls this
correlation between the interests of the human animal and the human person ‘’the interest
datum’’. According to the Animal Interests Argument, if the interest datum holds true, it is
best explained by animalism. Furthermore, if the interest datum is best explained by
animalism, then animalism is true.
Thus, the Animal Interests Argument can be formulated as the following:

P1: Human organisms and human persons both have correlated interests
(the interest datum holds true).
P2: If the interest datum holds true, then it is best explained by animalism.
P3: If the best explanation of the interest datum is animalism, then
animalism is true.
C: Animalism is true.

I will now respond to the Animal Interests Argument.

3 Does the Human Organism Have Interests?

The basis of Bailey’s Animal Interests Argument is that the human organism and the human
person have a consistent overlapping of interests. Whilst this claim of a consistent
overlapping will be shown to be problematic, I want to focus on the assertion that human
organisms have interests to begin with. Unless the existence of such interests can be
grounded, there is no reason to believe that the rest of the Animal Interest Argument succeeds.
Before I proceed, it must be clarified to what exactly counts as an organism's interest. I
will follow in the language of environmental ethicist Katie McShane (2019), who defines an
organism's interests, or biological interests, as interests that living things have merely in virtue
of being alive, independently of other capacities such as sentience or consciousness. They
have these interests in virtue of being an organism. I will further agree with Bailey’s definition
that interests are the things that benefit you when fulfilled, and harm you when frustrated.3
Furthermore, we cannot assume that the conscious interests of the human persons belong to
the organism. This would jump to the conclusion that the human organism is the subject of
these conscious interests, and therefore already affirm the truth of animalism. Therefore an
account of the organisms interests, or biological interests must be developed externally to the
conscious interests of the human person. So on what non-conscious basis should we believe
that the human organism has interests, and can thereby be benefited and harmed?

3
Bailey (2016) clarifies his definition of an interest in a footnote: ‘’I shall use ‘‘interest’’ and its cognates in this way:
the things that are good for or benefit you are in your interest, and those that are bad for or harm you are not in your
interest.’’
 4

The idea that nonsentient, nonconscious organisms can be harmed or benefited has
seemed intuitively plausible to many people, philosophers and nonphilosophers alike (see
Johnson 1991; Goodpaster 1978; Attfield 1981; Rolston 1988; Taylor 1986; Varner 1998).
Claims such as “Injecting poison into the root system is bad for the oak tree” or “It would be
good for my houseplant to get a bit more sunlight” are fairly common in ordinary discourse,
and they don’t seem to involve merely metaphorical uses of “good for” and “bad for.” One of
the early accounts of biological interests consists in the parts or traits of an organism
continuing to perform the functions that they were selected for performing.4 The organism has
an interest in its parts/traits performing their adaptive functions. This account of biological
interests at first seems plausible. The problem with this account however, is that what worked
well for an organism’s ancestors might not work well for the organism itself, especially if the
environment has changed. Consider for example a species of plant that has adapted to express
stomata that are structured in a way that produces a high rate of transpiration. This particular
species has developed in warm, moist climates, and thus requires structures that ensure a high
transpiration rate to control its temperature. Now consider the climate that the species resides
in quickly changes from warm and moist, to cool and dry. The adaptive functions account of
biological interests would still conclude that this species has an interest in performing its
adaptive function of facilitating a high transpiration rate, and thereby suffering a loss of
moisture. Despite this species of plant still performing their adaptive functions, most would
find it absurd that facilitating a high transpiration is beneficial, or in the interests of this
species of plant. Unless we put our foot down and posit that exercising all evolved adaptive
functions just is what’s good for an organism, which would entirely beg the question, there
seems to be no reason for grounding the interests of an organism in its adaptive functions.
Perhaps this conclusion has been reached too quickly however. It could be that what is in
the interest of an organism is not the exercising of evolutionary traits specifically, but the ends
to which these evolutionary functions serve, such as survival and reproduction. On these
alternative descriptions, something is in the interest of an organism if it contributes to the
fulfillment of greater teleological ends (see Goodpaster 1978; Taylor 1986; Sandler 2007).
If we revisit the previous example through this new lens of biological interests, achieving
a high rate of transpiration does not benefit the plant as it does not contribute to its
teleological ends of survival and reproduction. In response to this account, I will grant that
organisms are teleological systems. However, for this account of biological interests to
succeed, it must be consistent in the sense that if organisms have interests in virtue of their
teleological nature, then all entities which are teleological in the same sense, must have
interests. A prominent objection to teleological accounts of biological interests is that they
have trouble with either including too many entities within the scope of biological interests, or
they conversely exclude too many entities from the scope. As a result, there must be a
carefully chosen account of teleology that includes and excludes the right kinds of entities. A
highly recognised account of teleology is established by Gary Varner (1988), who grounds the
teleological nature of an entity, and therefore its interests, in natural selection. This
teleological account still faces the problem of the scope however. Firstly, many authors have
pointed out that natural selection does not only affect populations of organisms. Mark Bedau
(1991) has argued that the fundamental principles of evolution by natural selection also apply

4
A part’s/trait’s behavior is selected for when it is adaptive; it has a positive impact on fitness within an environment.
 5

to populations of crystals.5 If Bedau’s argument works, then this would lead to the conclusion
that crystals also have interests and thereby, can be benefited and harmed. Thus, the
teleological account of biological interests may include the wrong types of entities into the
scope. Furthermore, if having a history of natural selection is necessary for biological
interests, this would exclude certain living beings from having a good of their own. For
example, “artifactual” or ‘’instant’’ organisms as envisioned by synthetic biologists (e.g.
Endy 2005; Andrianantoandro et al. 2006) come to exist as the result of a coincidental
conglomeration of molecules to form a perfect physical copy of a naturally evolved organism,
but will not have interests according to this theory. Therefore, if a conscious human organism
was created in this envisioned ‘’instant’’ process, they would not have any biological
interests. This means the Animal Interests Argument would not apply to this particular
individual, and therefore the human person would not be identical to their organism, despite
having the same relations as any other human.6 I take this to be counterintuitive to the Animal
Interests Argument theorist.
The teleological account of biological interests must therefore appeal to an alternative
source of teleology which does not utilise evolution by natural selection . In recent years, an
account of teleology based on the notion of biological organisation has come about (see
Mossio & Bich 2014). This account argues that the teleology of organisms is not grounded in
evolution, but in its maintenance of internal organisation. Echoing a Kantian analysis of the
human, this account points out that organisms, via their metabolism, characteristically
construct and maintain their own parts; they are self-producing and self-maintaining systems.
They are end-directed by themselves. This account certainly avoids the problems of the one
previously mentioned, nonetheless it still faces its own scope problem. Just like organisms,
there are some non-living systems such as the water cycle, hurricanes, or the flames of a fire
which are self-maintaining (see Toepfer 2012; Bickhard 2000) Thus, if these non-living
systems are truly self-maintaining, then the Animal Interests Argument theorist will be
committed to the absurd idea that hurricanes have interests and a wellbeing.
The previous reasoning does not rule out the idea that a sound account of teleology for
organisms may one day be put forth. Until then, it is unconvincing that a case can be made for
organisms having interests based on teleology, without either including or excluding the
wrong kinds of entities from the scope. As such, teleology can not be used as a ground to base
the interests of the human organism, or any organism for that matter on. In order to establish
that the human organism has interests, it must be done so in a way that avoids appeals to
proper functioning, evolutionary history, or teleology. These cases for organism interests
either include entities that clearly do not have a wellbeing, or exclude entities that we would
typically believe have interests. As of the moment, the case for the existence of organism
interests has not been a success. Unless the Animal Interests Argument theorist can firmly
establish that the human organism has interests, we have nothing to compare our interests
with to establish an interlocking correlation. Thus, until this challenge has been met, the
interest datum cannot succeed, and the Animal Interests Argument cannot get its foot in the
door.

5
Also see Rosenberg (2012).
6
This is assuming that the animalist cannot provide an alternative argument in favour of their ontology.
 6

4 Conflicting Interests

In case my previous reasoning is mistaken, and human organisms do in fact have interests,
there is a further potential problem that faces the Animal Interests Argument. The core of
Bailey’s argument is the interest datum, which states that there is a consistent overlap between
our interests, and the interests of human animals. Thus, the most fruitful way of raising a
problem for the Animal Interests Argument is to show a mismatch between our interests and
the apparent interests of the human organism. This strategy is highlighted by philosopher
Kristin Seemuth Whaley (2017), who states that if a mismatch can be shown, it will
undermine Bailey’s argument by either weakening the interest datum, or providing reason to
reject that the interest datum is best explained by animalism. In the following section, I will
provide two cases where our interests and the interests of the human organism diverge
drastically. And while I still remain unconvinced that human organisms have interests, I will
concede that such interests exist, and that such interests involve some form of proper
functioning, health, and the quality of life of the organism.7 Thus, we can observe cases where
our interests, and the interests of the human organism do not match.
Consider the following case:

Daniel: Daniel is a young man who was recently diagnosed with a fatal disease that
he has a very low chance of recovering from. Daniel’s illness is predicted to kill him
within the next five years. Fearing this, and desperately wanting to live a long happy
life, Daniel undergoes a procedure in which his brain is implanted into a synthetic
humanoid body, granting his consciousness the ability to live a long happy life.
While the procedure is successful, Daniel’s old body is now without a brain, and is
left to die over the next few hours.

In the case of Daniel it is clear that the interests of the organism are frustrated. On any
given account of biological interests, the interest in survival is undoubtedly the most
noteworthy. Whether an account of biological interests is grounded in evolution,
teleology or internal organisation, the interest in living would be of the highest priority to
any organism. In contrast, Daniel clearly has an interest in the brain transplant procedure.
Daniel holds prudential concern for his conscious experiences, and wants such
consciousness to continue through life. If so, then in the case of Daniel, the interests of
the human organism are strikingly juxtaposed to that of the human person. Animalism
does not offer a good explanation of this difference, for Daniel’s interests should match
those of his organism, as according to Bailey ‘’everything true of you is true of your
animal, and vice versa.’’ (2016, p. 2316).
This case demonstrates a general issue for the interest datum, and thereby the Animal
Interests Argument; a human person can often have interests that run opposite to those of
the organism. In order to save the consistent overlapping of interests that is the interest
datum, a defender of the Animal Interests Argument must provide a reason as to why the
organism has an interest in the brain transplant procedure. I will now respond to such
attempts.

7
I have chosen to characterise the interests of the human organism this way as it seems to echo the previously
explored accounts of biological interests (Goodpaster 1978; Taylor 1986; Sandler 2007; Mossio & Bich 2014)
 7

4.1 Persistence Conditions

In the case of Daniel, it appears that Daniel’s organism is left for dead, while his brain
and consciousness are transplanted into a healthy humanoid vessel. I take this case to be
one of conflicting interests between Daniel and his organism. However, I may be
mistaken. It could very well be true that Daniel’s organism is interested in the brain
transplant, and thus, is not affected in whether the body of the organism dies following
the procedure. But why should we believe this? As has been explored, biological
accounts of interests generally place great emphasis on teleological ends such as survival
and reproduction. Why would a human animal be interested in a procedure that ultimately
frustrates its most fundamental interest? Perhaps the answer to this question is that the
human organism survives the brain transplant, and therefore its interests are not
frustrated.
But how could this possibly be true? We often think that the death of the organism's
body means the end of the organism. Having an organ survive, such as the brain, usually
would not suffice for the organism surviving. Consider a man who undergoes a kidney
transplant operation, only for the man to die during the surgery once his kidney is
removed. We do not think that the man has survived merely because one of his kidneys is
still alive and functioning. So why should we believe that the organism survives the
events of the brain transplant procedure?
The defender of the Animal Interests Argument can maintain that Daniel’s organism
survives the procedure if one accepts that human organisms have psychological
persistence conditions, as well as biological ones. This strategy echoes the ontology of
Rory Madden (2016), who argues that a human animal would survive as a cerebrum if
detached from the body. In defence of this claim, Madden argues that the persistence of a
human animal depends on the continuous preservation of a sufficient number of
capacities that are characteristic of human animals. Furthermore, there is a whole host of
characteristic activities of human animals that are disregarded when focusing merely on
biological continuity. Besides biological capacities such as breathing and digestion, there
is a vast catalogue of psychological capacities that are present in a human organism. For
example, Madden considers capacities such as planning, remembering, mourning,
relaxing, and problem-solving to be of the psychological kind, but nonetheless a part of
the human organism. Madden insists that a functioning brain that is removed from a
human animal will exhibit a high enough number of human-animal-characteristic
activities such that the animal persists at the removed brain. If this is applied to the case
of Daniel, then there are no diverging interests, as the organism survives the procedure
and goes on to live a long and happy life.
Although this solution of endorsing psychological persistence conditions seems
plausible, it is faced with problems. Firstly, in the case of Daniel, the surviving brain is
not the only candidate for the organism to persist as. Both the removed brain, and the
body of the organism survive (at least for a period of time). As such, there must be a
given reason why we should favour the organism persisting as the brain, and not the
body. Madden’s reasoning for this claim is that the removed brain retains more capacities
than the body. But why should we believe this? Madden notes that among our
psychological capacities are things like colour discrimination, face recognition, and
practical know-how, which are covered by the term ‘thinking’. Things like breathing, he
 8

argues, do not include such a range of capacities. As such, Madden subdivides the general
characteristic of ‘’thinking’’ into many sub-capacities, as such, the capacities of the
removed brain outnumbers those of the body. But if we can subdivide capacities like
thinking into many more distinct capacities, why can we not do the same for things such
as digestion or breathing?8 These biological capacities, like thinking, are extremely
complex. Capacities such as digestion, blood circulation, kidney filtration, and hormone
secretion are quite complicated, and involve an array of processes on the macroscopic
and molecular level. We should therefore be skeptical of Madden’s claim that the
capacities of the removed brain outnumber those of the body. Thus, we already have good
reason to reject the solution from psychological persistence conditions.
Nonetheless, there is a further problem that faces this proposed answer to cases like
Daniel. If Madden is correct in saying that in the case of Daniel, the organism survives
the procedure as the removed brain, we must wonder what is left of the brainless body. In
Madden's solution, the brainless body is not Daniel. If it were, this would defeat the entire
purpose of his solution. Therefore, there are two remaining possibilities for what this
brainless body is: it is either some other organism, or not an organism at all.
Let’s examine the first possibility that the brainless organism is a new and distinct
organism from the one that is now persisting as the brain. The question that must be
asked is: where did this organism come from? Did it come into existence at the moment
the brain was removed? Or did this organism already exist prior to the procedure? If the
latter is true, then this means that before the procedure, there were two coinciding
organisms present within the skin of Daniel. This conclusion leads to a potential case of
the too-many-subjects-problem. This means that before the procedure, the atoms that
composed Daniel’s body, also composed another organism that is spatially overlapping
with Daniel (except for the brain). This leads to the absurd conclusion that when Daniel
was walking, eating, breathing and digesting, as was a distinct second organism
composed of the same matter. A similar issue arises when the animalist must consider
where a corpse of a deceased animal comes from, if it is a distinct entity from the
organism. Either the corpse came into existence at the moment of death, or it existed
alongside the organism. The animalist theorist Eric Olson (2013) suggests that both of
these answers should be avoided. Instead, Olson solves this problem by eliminating
corpses from his ontology, and committing to the idea that only organisms exist. This will
not work for the defender of the Animal Interests Argument who claims that the brainless
body in Daniel is a new, distinct organism. Since the brainless body is still taken to be an
organism, it cannot be eliminated from the defenders ontology.
Perhaps then the defender of the Animal Interests Argument can get around the issue
of too-many-subjects when it comes to walking, digesting, and breathing by claiming that
Daniel’s organism has always been just the brain. This solution would depict the brain
transplant procedure in Daniel as a separation event between two organisms. Daniel’s
organism only ever occupied the brain, while the second organism occupied all parts of
the body except the brain. Thus, there isn’t a problem of overlapping walkers, digesters,
breathers etc. The issue with this solution is that it firstly abandons animalism in favour
of a proper parts view of personal identity.9 Instead of saying that human persons are

8
This issue with Madden’s account has already been pointed out by different authors. For example, see Whaley
(2017, p. 60-61)
9
For examples of such an account, see Licon (2013); Campbell (2015); Download (2019)
 9

identical to the animal, this solution identifies human persons with the brain. The second
problem with this solution is that if it is adopted, it comes at the cost of the Animal
Interests Argument. If the defender of the Animal Interests Argument identifies the human
person with the brain, this means the human person can have interests relating to other
entities, without being identical to them. If we are identical to brains, we nonetheless
have an interest in the wellbeing of the organism which houses us. Furthermore, the
organism that houses us also has an interest in its wellbeing. Despite this overlapping of
interests, we are still distinct from the organism which houses us. This conclusion goes
against the second premise of the Animal Interests Argument which states that if the
interest datum holds, then it is best explained by animalism. Clearly, if the defender of the
Animal Interests Argument commits to the claim that the brain and the brainless body are
two distinct organisms, and that human persons are identical with the former, then the
argument loses its strength. This solution shows us that a human person can have
overlapping interests with a distinct organism, without being identical to it. The other
possible answer is that the brainless body is an organism that only came into existence
once the brain was removed. Madden suggests that this case can be likened to the
common horticultural practice of plant cutting, in which a small branch of a larger plant
is removed and planted in a suitable medium, and with proper care grows into a full,
mature plant. In the case of Daniel the small branch is the brainless organism. Instead of
cutting the brain away from the body, we have to view the case of Daniel as cutting the
body away from the brain, where the body then develops into its own distinct organism
whilst the brain continues to persist as the original organism. I am not sure what to say
about this line of reasoning. There is a continuous debate to whether merely removing
some tissue can create a new distinct entity (see Johnston 2007; Olson 2015; Johnston
2016; Yang 2019). It could very well be the case that a new human organism is created
merely by removing some tissue, but this is controversial and would require separate
argumentation. While claiming that a new organism begins to exist with the removal of
the brain may eventually come to be regarded as true, this answer is not yet well
accepted. Whether this answer is a suitable explanation for the existence of the brainless
organism in the case of Daniel is yet to be determined.
The last possible solution for the defender of organisms having psychological
persistent conditions is to deny that the brainless body is an organism at all. Instead, the
brainless body is akin to a corpse, or an arrangement of particles arranged body-wise.
This solution however must also be met with an answer to the aforementioned corpse
problem that animalists face; where did the corpse come from? A plausible, although
demanding answer, is to follow Olson (2004) in denying the existence of corpses from
one’s ontology. Even if this answer is sound, there is one final problem: why should we
deny that the brainless body is a human organism? If we deny that the brainless body in
Daniel is a human organism, this will commit one to the conclusion that pre-sentient
foetuses and human animals that suffer significant brain damage are not organisms.
Furthermore, this position runs contrary to standard biological definitions. Whilst the
conditions and processes that constitute an organism are always being debated, there are
usually some standard characteristics of an organism. In a recent survey of the literature
surrounding the conditions of an organism, philosopher Ellen Clarke (2010) distinguishes
at least thirteen conditions. For example, organisms are said to involve the existence and
continuity of policing internal mechanisms, histocompatibility, a single life cycle, and
 10

spatial boundaries or contiguity. Brainless organisms such as the one in Daniel certainly
fit this bill. So denying that the brainless body is an organism does not look feasible for
the defender of the psychological persistence condition solution.
Nonetheless, suppose that the defender of the Animal Interests Argument
successfully avoids the implications of Daniel by appealing to psychological persistence
conditions. Is the interest datum out of the woods? Not quite. Whilst one could argue that
in the case of a brain transplant, the organism persists as the brain, there are other cases
which could be constructed that does not allow for this. Such cases would not allow for
the organism to persist at all, but are nonetheless in the interest of the human person.
These cases, similar to Daniel show a distinct divergence in interests between the person
and the organism. Consider the following case:

Bernard: Bernard is a young man who was recently diagnosed with a fatal disease
that he has a very low chance of recovering from. Bernard’s illness is predicted to
kill him within the next five years. Fearing this, and desperately wanting to live a
long happy life, Bernard undergoes a procedure in which his brain is implanted into a
synthetic humanoid body, granting his consciousness the ability to live a long happy
life. Since organisms have psychological persistence conditions, Bernard’s organism
is now reduced down to the brain, and exists within a synthetic humanoid vessel. The
procedure is successful, and for many years, Bernard lives a healthy life. However,
Bernard is now diagnosed with another disease that will cause him to become
severely depressed and prohibit him from enjoying the rest of his life. The only cure
for this disease is to undergo a commissurotomy. This procedure will split Bernard’s
brain into two separate functioning cerebral hemispheres, with each hemisphere
placed into a separate synthetic humanoid body. Furthermore, the original synthetic
humanoid body will be destroyed. Bernard’s psychological features are still
preserved in each cerebral hemisphere, and each hemisphere believes themselves to
be the continuation of Bernard. Bernard thus has a desire to undergo this procedure
to avoid his otherwise depressing life.

Let us assume that in the case of Bernard, each individual cerebral hemisphere contains
the same amount of human-animal-characteristic capacities. What is the defender of the
Animal Interests Argument to say about this case in regards to the survival of Bernard’s
organism? I believe there are three options available: (1) Bernard’s organism survives as
one of the functioning cerebral hemispheres (2) Bernard’s organism survives as both
functioning cerebral hemispheres (3) Bernard’s organism does survive the
commissurotomy.
Which of these options makes the most sense? The first option does not seem
plausible. Since both cerebral hemispheres have the same number of
human-animal-characteristic capacities, it would be arbitrary to conclude that Bernard’s
organism has persisted as one hemisphere but not the other. The second option does not
look favourable either. If Bernard’s organism persists as both hemispheres, the law of
transitivity demands that each hemisphere is numerically identical. In many ways, they
are qualitatively identical, but they surely cannot be numerically identical. If one
hemisphere is destroyed, the other will persist, thus, the detached cerebral hemispheres
cannot be identical, and therefore, Bernard’s organism cannot survive as both of them.
 11

This leaves only the third option which says Bernard’s organism does survive the
procedure. If this is true, then we have found an inconsistency in the interest datum. If
Bernard’s organism does not survive the procedure, this frustrates the organism's most
fundamental interest of survival. In comparison, Bernard is looking forward to the
procedure, as even though his organism will not survive, he nonetheless holds prudential
value for his psychological continuation. This appears to be a divergence of interests
between the human animal and the human person, and thus, strong evidence against the
interest datum, and thereby, the Animal Interests Argument. Unless some response can be
given to the case of Bernard, we have good reason to deny the interest datum, even if
psychological persistence conditions are true.

4.2 Reply to Bernard: Four-Dimensionalism

In order to save the interest datum from counterexamples such as Daniel or Bernard, the
defender of the Animal Interests Argument has to illustrate that the organism’s interests
are not frustrated in such cases. Since both of the aforementioned examples try to
highlight the mismatch between the organism’s interest for survival with the interests of
the human person, the defender of the Animal Interests Argument will have to provide
reasons to believe that the organism actually survives these examples. In the case of
Daniel, one may appeal to psychological persistence conditions to ensure the survival of
the human organism. While I find this move unconvincing, the case of Bernard provides
good reason to further doubt the interest datum, even if psychological persistence
conditions are true. In the case of Bernard, the organism has persisted as the removed
brain, however, where does the organism go when the brain is then divided into two
functioning cerebral hemispheres? The organism surely cannot persist as both
hemispheres, nor is it attractive to identify its persistence with one cerebrum, and not the
other. Thus, the organism does not survive the procedure. What can the defender of the
Animal Interests Argument say in response to this? What strategy can be taken to argue
that the organism does in fact survive the procedure?
One possible way is to appeal to the metaphysics of four-dimensionalism. On this
metaphysics, objects and persons are not wholly present at one point in time. They are
composed of temporal parts that span from the beginning of their existence, to the end of
their existence.10 In making sense of this, we have to view time as a dimensional like
space, and we have to see objects and persons as events. Take for example, a game of
football that spans a one hour time period. If you paused the game at the tenth, fifteenth,
or twentieth minute, you would not be observing the entirety of the game. You would
only be seeing a temporal part of it. In order to view the game as a whole entity, you
would have to observe all of its temporal parts added together. Therefore, when we view
an object or a person at a specific point in time, we are really only seeing a small part of
them. The reason why this is a possible solution for the case of Bernard is that it avoids
the implication that something goes out of existence when it is split into two. On a
four-dimensionalist metaphysics, the two cerebral hemispheres are not distinct substances

10
For a detailed explanation of four-dimensionalism and temporal parts, see Hawley (2020)
 12

that come into existence at the moment of division, they are merely temporal parts of
already existing substances. In this view, nothing new came into existence at the moment
of division. It is similar to how two distinct roads may have a point of intersection. At the
intersection, the two roads are overlapping in their spacial parts, however there are still
two distinct roads that are present in the intersection. Only once the roads diverge from
the intersection do we realise that there were two distinct roads the entire time. Each road
is composed of their own spatial parts, which at times, overlap with those of the other
road. Thus, in the case of Bernard, the separated cerebral hemispheres are not new
substances that suddenly emerge, they are simply temporal parts in a larger collection of
temporal parts which make up the organism.
I am not convinced by this move. If the two cerebral hemispheres are simply
temporal parts of larger temporally extended substances, then which cerebral hemisphere
do we identify as a temporal part of Bernard’s organism? On a four-dimensionalist
metaphysics, a substance is the summation of all its temporal parts. This means that the
defender of the Animal Interests Argument is going to have to identify Bernard’s
temporally extended organism with a collection of certain temporal parts. For example,
before the brain transplant, Bernard’s organism was identified as a whole unified
structure of organ systems, we could call this temporal part ‘Body’. Furthermore, when
Bernard underwent a brain transplant and his organism was reduced down to a brain, we
could call this temporal part ‘Brainy’. Since the defender of the Animal Interests
Argument wants to say that Bernard’s organism survives past Brainy and persists through
the commissurotomy, the defender will have to claim that one of the separated cerebral
hemispheres is a temporal part of Bernard’s organism. Consider a similar case of
monozygotic twinning, where two organisms emerge from a single zygotic organism. In
this case, many philosophers do not want to say that the zygotic organism passes out of
existence when it divides in two (Curtis 2012; Efird & Holland 2019). Such philosophers
therefore adopt a four-dimensionalist metaphysics, where the original zygote is described
as a temporal part that is shared between two temporally extended organisms, like an
intersection that is shared between two spatially extended roads. Therefore, before the
zygote had even divided, there were already two temporally extended organisms present.
If this same line of reasoning is applied to the dividing of the brain, then the temporal
parts of Body and Brain are shared between two temporally extended organisms. These
organisms are the summations of temporal parts, most of which they share. Whilst the
two organisms share the parts of Body and Brain, they each have their own distinct
temporal parts when the brain divides into two cerebral hemispheres. Call the temporal
part of the left hemisphere ‘Leftie’ and the temporal part of the right hemisphere
‘Righty’. Thus, one of the temporally extended organisms is the summation of Body,
Brain, and Lefty. Whilst the other temporally extended organism is the summation of
Body, Brain, and Righty. The question that remains is, which of these organisms is
Bernard’s organism? Is Lefty or Righty a temporal part of Bernard’s temporally extended
organism? It seems arbitrary to identify Bernard’s organism with one of these
summations of parts, but not the other.11 Therefore, the defender of the Animal Interests

11
One may question why both Lefty and Righty cannot be temporal parts of Bernad’s organism. The problem with
this solution can be illuminated if we consider it in the case of monozygotic twinning. If both Lefty and Righty are
temporal parts of one organism, then this implies that the two human animals which emerge from a single zygote are
also parts of a singular organism. This however seems absurd.
 13

Argument is back to the original problem of locating Bernard’s organism when the brain
is divided into two cerebral hemispheres?
There is a second problem that the defender of the Animal Interests Argument faces
when adopting a four-dimensionalist metaphysics. As just discussed, on this metaphysics,
organisms are temporally extended substances that are composed of temporal parts. This
leads to the following problem. According to four-dimensionalism, a temporally extended
entity has a property at time t1 only insofar as one of its temporal parts has it at t1. For
example, if the organism is thinking at time t1, this is because one of its temporal parts is
thinking at t1. This means, according to four-dimensionalism, there is a temporal part that
thinks just as you do. But, four-dimensionalism says that you are not the temporal
part—you are an aggregate of all your temporal parts. It follows that there are at least two
things that think your thought at t1. This leads to the epistemic problem of
too-many-thinkers, where we cannot know which thinker we are identical to, as Trenton
Merricks writes, ‘‘you are unable to know whether you have existed for more than a
moment, since you cannot tell whether you are a lifelong person or, instead, its
now-located temporal part’’ (2001, p. 99). This isn’t necessarily a problem of the Animal
Interests Argument, it is moreover a problem that emerges if one adopts a
four-dimensionalist metaphysics to answer the case of Bernard.12
This problem is exaggerated when we consider that in the case of Bernard there are
two temporally extended organisms which share the temporal parts of Body and Brain.
As such, when the temporal part of Brain is thinking, as are the two temporally extended
organisms. Therefore, if one adopts a four-dimensionalist metaphysics to save the Animal
Interests Argument, it comes at the cost of another demanding problem. Therefore, I am
not convinced that four-dimensionalism is a sound solution to the case of Bernard and
therefore the Animal Interests Argument is threatened by a case of mismatched interests.
While four-dimensionalism posits that in the case of Bernard nothing new emerges
from the commissurotomy, it does so by arguing that two temporally extended organisms
have existed prior to the procedure. This leads to the problem of having to identify which
of these is Bernard’s organism, considering they share all the same temporal parts, except
for the divided cerebral hemispheres, which nonetheless have qualitatively identical
neurological and psychological properties. Furthermore, this solution leads into a
problem of too-many-thinkers, a problem animalism is so often characterised as avoiding
(See Olson 1997). Unless an alternative solution to the case of Bernard can be given, we
should reject the interest datum, as there are cases where the interests of human persons
and human animals do not match. We should therefore reject the Animal Interests
Argument.

5 Conclusion

Andrew Bailey has argued that the consistent overlap of interests between the human
animal and the human person support the thesis of animalism. Despite the ingenuitive and
creative line of reasoning, I remain unconvinced by this argument for two primary

12
For a more in depth discussion on the too-many-thinkers problem and four-dimensionalism, see Rimell (2017).
 14

reasons. The first is that the premise of human organisms having interests seems
philosophically dubious. Despite the common sense intuition that organisms have
interests, the justification for this belief is not persuasive. Arguments for biological
interests that rely upon evolutionary or teleological accounts do not appear to be
convincing, as both face a problem of either including, or excluding the wrong types of
entities. Unless a sound justification for biological interests is established, Bailey’s
argument cannot get off the ground.
Secondly, even if organisms do have interests, there are cases where the interests of
the human organism are juxtaposed to those of the human person. Solutions to these
cases, such as appealing to psychological persistence conditions do not appear to work. In
cases of brain transplants, it seems implausible that the human brain retains more
capacities than the brainless human body. Nonetheless, even if the organism persists as a
removed brain, this leads into difficult questions surrounding the ontology of the
brainless body left behind. Furthermore, even if appealing to psychological persistence
conditions works in cases such as brain transplants, there are other examples that cannot
be answered with such solutions. Cases of dividing the brain into two functioning
cerebral hemispheres pose a threat to the survival of the organism. One may adopt a
four-dimensionalist metaphysics to ensure the organism’s survival, however such a
solution comes at the epistemic cost of being unable to identify which cerebral
hemisphere is a temporal part of the organism, in addition to a problem of
too-many-thinkers. Unless alternative solutions can be given to cases involving the
mismatching interests of human persons and human animals, the Animal Interests
Argument should be rejected.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Matthew Joseph for his feedback on an early version of this paper. I
would also like to extend my thanks to Nicholas Rimell and Clint Dowland for their guiding wisdom and
feedback on later versions of this paper.

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