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The three (3) powers of government — executive, legislative, and judicial — have been generally
viewed as non-delegable. However, in recognition of the exigencies that contemporary
governance must address, our legal system has recognized the validity of “subordinate
legislation,” or the rule-making power of agencies tasked with the administration of
government.

In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, 166 SCRA 533
(1988): The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of
the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the
many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial
powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally pertain. In the case of the
legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not
necessary. This has led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become
the rule and its non-delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task
of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems
attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. (Quezon City PTCA
Federation, Inc. vs. Department of Education, 784 SCRA 505, G.R. No. 188720 February 23, 2016)

The separation of powers doctrine is the backbone of our tripartite system of government.

It is implicit in the manner that our Constitution lays out in separate and distinct Articles the
powers and prerogatives of each coequal branches of government. In Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 710
SCRA 1 (2013), this Court had the opportunity to restate: The principle of separation of powers
refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. In the
celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, it means that the
“Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government.” To the legislative
branch of government, through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive
branch of government, through the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the
judicial branch of government, through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws. Because
the three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, “[e]ach
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere.” Thus, “the legislature has no authority to execute or construe

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the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no
power to make or execute the law.” The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of
autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must be
divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would
avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. To achieve
this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by coequal branches of government that are
equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of
independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or
self-interest assertions of another or others. (Padilla vs. Congress of the Philippines, 832 SCRA 282,
G.R. No. 231671 July 25, 2017)

It is the general policy of the Supreme Court (SC) to sustain the decision of administrative
authorities, especially one that was constitutionally created like herein respondent Commission
on Audit (COA).

It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decision of administrative authorities, especially
one that was constitutionally created like herein respondent COA, not only on the basis of the
doctrine of separation of powers, but also of their presumed expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. It is, in fact, an oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are
accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. (Buisan vs.
Commission on Audit, 816 SCRA 346, G.R. No. 212376 January 31, 2017)

Under Section 17 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives (HoR)
is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

Concerning now the quo warranto petition, G.R. No. 213069, of CIBAC Foundation, the Court
reminds the petitioners that under Section 17 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members, x x x. Because the nominees of CIBAC National Council, Tugna and
Gonzales, assumed their seats in Congress on June 26, 2013 and July 22, 2013, respectively, G.R.
No. 213069 should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It should be noted that since they had
been already proclaimed, the jurisdiction to resolve all election contests lies with the HRET as it is
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its Members.

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(Rivera vs. Commission on Elections, 790 SCRA 377, G.R. No. 210273, G.R. No. 213069 April 19,
2016)

Before HRET jurisdiction is triggered over winning candidates, the following must concur: a.)
proclamation; 2.) oath; and 3.) and assumption to office.

All 3 events duly took place in the case of respondent Reyes, such that the HRET at this point
should have jurisdiction over questions relating to respondent Reyes’ election. If only for
emphasis, I call attention again to the fact that as of June 30, 2013, Reyes had been proclaimed,
had taken her oath, and assumed office as the elected and proclaimed Representative of
Marinduque. Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the Electoral Tribunal of the
HOR shall be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
[its] Members.” I highlight, too, that in Reyes v. COMELEC, 699 SCRA 522 (2013), the majority
declared that a winning candidate becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the HRET only after he
or she becomes a member of the HOR. The majority stressed that a candidate becomes a member
of the HOR only after he or she has been proclaimed, taken his or her oath, and assumed the
office. In other words, the majority in Reyes v. COMELEC, required the concurrence of all three
events — proclamation, oath, and assumption to office — to trigger the jurisdiction of the HRET
over election contests relating to the winning candidate’s election, returns, and qualifications. All
three events duly took place in the case of respondent Reyes, such that the HRET at this point
should have jurisdiction over questions relating to respondent Reyes’ election, even on the basis
of the majority’s own standards. (Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr., 780 SCRA 81, G.R. No. 211140 January
12, 2016.)

The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of its entire
membership. However, the House of Representatives may decide to have officers other than the
Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are chosen is something
within its sole control.

The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of its entire
membership. Said provision also states that the House of Representatives may decide to have
officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are
chosen is something within its sole control. In the case of Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., 298
SCRA 756 (1998), which involved a dispute on the rightful Senate Minority Leader during the 11th
Congress (1998-2001), this Court observed that “[w]hile the Constitution is explicit on the manner
of electing x x x [a Speaker of the House of Representative,] it is, however, dead silent on the
manner of selecting the other officers [of the Lower House]. All that the Charter says is that ‘[e]ach
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.’ [As such], the method of

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choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be
prescribed by the [House of Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court.” (Baguilat, Jr. vs. Alvarez,
832 SCRA 111, G.R. No. 227757 July 25, 2017)

Section 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the sole
authority to, inter alia, “determine the rules of its proceedings.” These “legislative rules, unlike
statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their
effectivity. In fact, they ‘are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them.

Section 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the sole
authority to, inter alia, “determine the rules of its proceedings.” These “legislative rules, unlike
statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity.
In fact, they ‘are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.’ Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the
courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the
concurrence of a majority [of the House of Representatives].” Hence, as a general rule, “[t]his
Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without
running afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold x x x.
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents
the Court from prying into the internal workings of the [House of Representatives].” (Baguilat, Jr.
vs. Alvarez, 832 SCRA 111, G.R. No. 227757 July 25, 2017)

Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, expressly “includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”

While the Court in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning an act of the political departments
of government, will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, it will, however,
strike it down on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. This stems from the expanded concept
of judicial power, which, under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, expressly “includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality

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of the Government.” Case law decrees that “[t]he foregoing text emphasizes the judicial
department’s duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law.
(Baguilat, Jr. vs. Alvarez, 832 SCRA 111, G.R. No. 227757 July 25, 2017)

The Constitution mandates that judicial power include the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Consequently, the Court dismisses the notion that the recertification of contraceptive drugs and
devices by the FDA in exercise of its regulatory function is beyond judicial review. After all, the
Constitution mandates that judicial power include the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Alliance for the
Family Foundation, Philippines, Inc. (ALFI) vs. Garin, 801 SCRA 453, G.R. No. 217872, G.R. No.
221866 August 24, 2016)

The Supreme Court (SC) has held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives (HoR), the Commission on
Elections’ (COMELEC’s) jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET’s) own
jurisdiction begins.

In a long line of cases and more recently in Reyes v. COMELEC, et al., 708 SCRA 197 (2013), the
Court has held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins. Since the nominees of CIBAC National Council have already assumed their seats in
Congress, the quo warranto petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (Rivera vs.
Commission on Elections, 790 SCRA 377, G.R. No. 210273, G.R. No. 213069 April 19, 2016)

Political question; definition

This refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to

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the legislature or executive branch of the government.” (Rama vs. Moises, 812 SCRA 347, G.R. No.
197146 December 6, 2016)

Political Questions and Justiciable Questions, distinguished.

The difference between the political and the justiciable questions has been noted in Sanidad v.
Commission on Elections, 73 SCRA 333 (1976), as follows: x x x The implementing Presidential
Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of
legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable
one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2(2), Article X of the new
Constitution provides: “All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement,
or law, which shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court En Banc and no treaty, executive
agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten
Members. . . .” The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and
statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the
Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is
vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
(Rama vs. Moises, 812 SCRA 347, G.R. No. 197146 December 6, 2016)

The determination of probable cause, one made for the purpose of filing an information in court,
is essentially an executive function and not a judicial one.

The State’s self-preserving power to prosecute violators of its penal laws is a necessary
component of the Executive’s power and responsibility to faithfully execute the laws of the land.
(Philippines vs. Commission on Elections, 826 SCRA 112, G.R. No. 159139, G.R. No. 174777 June 6,
2017)

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may
revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."
On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but
likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court I which does not look into the

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absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper
and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an
appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is
automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension was made.

Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally
different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same
trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power
of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
(G.R. No. 231658, G.R. No. 231771, G.R. No. 231774, 4 July 2017.)

The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections I and 5
of Article VIII.

The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article
VIII. For instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President can be found in the last paragraph
of Section 4, Article VII.102 The power of the Court to review on certiorari the decision, order, or
ruling of the Commission on Elections and Commission on Audit can be found in Section 7, Article
IX(A). (G.R. No. 231658, G.R. No. 231771, G.R. No. 231774, 4 July 2017).

The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is independent of the actions taken by Congress.

During the oral argument, the Office Solicitor General urged the Court to give deference to the
actions of the two co-equal branches of the Government: on the part of the President as
Commander-in-Chief, in resorting to his extraordinary powers to declare martial law and suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and on the part of Congress, in giving its imprimatur to
Proclamation No. 216 and not revoking the same.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the extraordinary powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said presidential action. In particular, the
President's extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and

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imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress. (G.R. No. 231658,
G.R. No. 231771, G.R. No. 231774, 4 July 2017).

Judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the
President's decision of which among his graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation.

The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the extraordinary powers of: a) calling out the
armed forces; b) suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and c) declaring martial
law. These powers may be resorted to only under specified conditions.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the powers of the Commander-in-Chief by
revising the "grounds for the activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating them, the
scope of the powers, and review of presidential action." (G.R. No. 231658, G.R. No. 231771, G.R.
No. 231774, 4 July 2017).

The parameters for determining the sufficiency of the/actual basis/or the declaration of martial
law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are:

a) Actual invasion or rebellion; and public safety requirement; and

b) Probable cause is the allowable standard of proof for the President. (G.R. No. 231658,
G.R. No. 231771, G.R. No. 231774, 4 July 2017).

The Supreme Court ruled that Proclamation No. 216 which extended the suspension of martial
law was valid.

Facts, events and information upon which the President anchored his decision to declare martial
law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A review of the facts under the case
similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had
sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion,
that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the
allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation of the
President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical
consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. (G.R.
No. 231658, G.R. No. 231771, G.R. No. 231774, 4 July 2017).

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The 1987 Constitution grants to the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the discretion to

determine the territorial coverage or application of martial law or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus
or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to
the President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only
a part thereof under martial law.

This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive Department,

particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief, who is the repository of vital, classified, and
live information necessary for and relevant in calibrating the territorial application of martial law
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It, too, is a concession that the
President has the tactical and military support, and thus has a more informed understanding of
what is happening on the ground. Thus, the Constitution imposed a limitation on the period of
application, which is 60 days, unless sooner nullified, revoked or extended, but not on the
territorial scope or area of coverage; it merely stated "the Philippines or any part thereof,"
depending on the assessment of the President. (G.R. No. 231658, G.R. No. 231771, G.R. No.
231774, 4 July 2017).

Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the
President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers of the
Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII.99 This
is clear from the records of the Constitutional Commission when its members were deliberating
on whether the President could proclaim martial law even without the concurrence of Congress.
(G.R. No. 231658, G.R. No. 231771, G.R. No. 231774, 4 July 2017).

The Constitution vests the Supreme Court (SC) with judicial power, defined under Section 1,
Article VIII as “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government.”

The Constitution vests the Supreme Court with judicial power, defined under Section 1, Article
VIII as “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are

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legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discre- Information Technology Foundation of the tion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.” Conspicuously
absent in the provision is the power of the judiciary to prosecute crimes — much less the broader
power to execute laws from which it can be inferred. As early as 1932, we held that: “It is judicial
power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme
Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other
department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the
powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.” Information Technology
Foundation of the (Philippines vs. Commission on Elections, 826 SCRA 112, G.R. No. 159139, G.R.
No. 174777 June 6, 2017)

Police power is vested primarily with the national legislature, which may delegate the same to
local governments through the enactment of ordinances through their legislative bodies (the
sanggunians). The so-called general welfare clause, provided for in Section 16 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), provides for such delegation of police power.

The general welfare clause provides for the exercise of police power for the attainment or
maintenance of the general welfare of the community. The power, however, is exercised by the
government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other
constitutional and civil rights. Jurisprudence defines police power as the plenary power vested in
the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people. The Latin maxim is salus populi est
suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). Police power is vested primarily with
the national legislature, which may delegate the same to local governments through the
enactment of ordinances through their legislative bodies (the sanggunians). The so-called general
welfare clause, provided for in Section 16 of the Local Government Code, provides for such
delegation of police power. (Cruz vs. Pandacan Hiker's Club, Inc., 778 SCRA 385, G.R. No. 188213
January 11, 2016)

The power of judicial review specially refers to both the authority and the duty of the Supreme
Court (SC) to determine whether a branch or an instrumentality of government has acted
beyond the scope of the latter’s constitutional powers.

Distinguished from the general notion of judicial power, the power of judicial review specially
refers to both the authority and the duty of this Court to determine whether a branch or an
instrumentality of government has acted beyond the scope of the latter’s constitutional powers.
As articulated in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, the power of judicial review involves

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the power to resolve cases in which the questions concern the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), this
Court exhaustively discussed this “moderating power” as part of the system of checks and
balances under the Constitution. In our fundamental law, the role of the Court is to determine
whether a branch of government has adhered to the specific restrictions and limitations of the
latter’s power. (Saguisag vs. Ochoa, Jr., 779 SCRA 241, G.R. No. 212426, G.R. No. 212444 January
12, 2016)

In Judicial Review, there has to exist an Actual Case or Controversy.

The performance of an official act by the Executive Department that led to the entry into force of
an executive agreement was sufficient to satisfy the actual case or controversy requirement.

The Supreme court found that the matter before it involved an actual case or controversy that is
already ripe for adjudication. The Executive Department has already sent an official confirmation
to the U.S. Embassy that “all internal requirements of the Philippines x x x have already been
complied with.” By this exchange of diplomatic notes, the Executive Department effectively
performed the last act required under Article XII(1) of EDCA before the agreement entered into
force. Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, is clear that the presence of foreign military
forces in the country shall only be allowed by virtue of a treaty concurred in by the Senate. Hence,
the performance of an official act by the Executive Department that led to the entry into force of
an executive agreement was sufficient to satisfy the actual case or controversy requirement.
(Saguisag vs. Ochoa, Jr., 779 SCRA 241, G.R. No. 212426, G.R. No. 212444 January 12, 2016)

The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether those
assailing the governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for
adjudication.

They must show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they
have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of
the enforcement of the challenged governmental act.

Here, “interest” in the question involved must be material — an interest that is in issue and will
be affected by the official act — as distinguished from being merely incidental or general. Clearly,
it would be insufficient to show that the law or any governmental act is invalid, and that
petitioners stand to suffer in some indefinite way. They must show that they have a particular
interest in bringing the suit, and that they have been or are about to be denied some right or

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privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some
burden or penalty by reason of the act complained of. The reason why those who challenge the
validity of a law or an international agreement are required to allege the existence of a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy is “to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.” (Saguisag vs. Ochoa, Jr., 779 SCRA 241, G.R. No. 212426, G.R. No.
212444 January 12, 2016)

Supreme Court (SC) emphasizes that a taxpayers’ suit contemplates a situation in which there
is already an appropriation or a disbursement of public funds. A reading of Article X(1) of
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) would show that there has been neither an
appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement of funds.

A taxpayer’s suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Here, those challenging the act must
specifically show that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public
money, and that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed act.
Applying that principle to this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending powers. We agree with the OSG that the petitions cannot qualify
as taxpayers’ suits. We emphasize that a taxpayers’ suit contemplates a situation in which there
is already an appropriation or a disbursement of public funds. A reading of Article X(1) of EDCA
would show that there has been neither an appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement
of funds. (Saguisag vs. Ochoa, Jr., 779 SCRA 241, G.R. No. 212426, G.R. No. 212444 January 12,
2016)

Those Members of Congress who are challenging the official act have standing only to the extent
that the alleged violation impinges on their right to participate in the exercise of the powers of
the institution of which they are members.

The Supreme Court emphasizes that in a legislators’ suit, those Members of Congress who are
challenging the official act have standing only to the extent that the alleged violation impinges on
their right to participate in the exercise of the powers of the institution of which they are
members. Legislators have the standing “to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers, and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity
of any official action, which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.” As legislators,
they must clearly show that there was a direct injury to their persons or the institution to which
they belong. (Saguisag vs. Ochoa, Jr., 779 SCRA 241, G.R. No. 212426, G.R. No. 212444 January
12, 2016)

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Due Process in criminal cases guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the
contrary is proved.

Observance of the proper procedure before courts, especially before the Sandiganbayan, cannot
be stressed enough. Due process is enshrined in the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights.
“Due process [in criminal cases] guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the
contrary is proved[.]” “Mere suspicion of guilt should not sway judgment.” (Actions Republic vs.
Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016)

While law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this
presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent
and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution’s sweeping guarantees as to the identity and integrity of seized drugs and drug
paraphernalia will not secure a conviction. While law enforcers enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself constitute
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity is merely just that — a
mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by evidence cannot
be regarded as binding truth. (People vs. Hementiza, 821 SCRA 470, G.R. No. 227398 March 22,
2017)

The Constitutions of 1935, 1973 and 1987 have uniformly differentiated the President’s power
of supervision over local governments and his power of control of the executive departments,
bureaus and offices.

Local autonomy and decentralization of State powers to the local political subdivisions are the
results of putting restraints upon the exercise by the Presidents of executive powers over local
governments. Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution reads in part: “The President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.” As with the counterpart
provisions of our earlier Constitutions, the aforesaid provision has been interpreted to exclude
the President’s power of control over local governments. The Constitutions of 1935, 1973 and
1987 have uniformly differentiated the President’s power of supervision over local governments
and his power of control of the executive departments, bureaus and offices. (Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Bataan vs. Garcia, Jr., 804 SCRA 629, G.R. No. 174964 October 5, 2016)

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The President is granted the privilege of immunity from suit “to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being
the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s
time, also demands undivided attention.”

The Court finds it proper to drop President Aquino as respondent taking into account that when
this Petition was filed on May 17, 2016, he was still then the incumbent President who enjoyed
immunity from suit. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved in the system of
government of this country, even though not expressly reserved in the 1987 Constitution. The
President is granted the privilege of immunity from suit “to assure the exercise of Presidential
duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also
demands undivided attention.” (Aguinaldo vs. Aquino III, 811 SCRA 304, G.R. No. 224302
November 29, 2016)

Executive Immunity

Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of
their incumbency and tenure but not beyond (IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ, G.R. No. 76180
October 24, 1986)

The unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is
not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity
of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President
to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be
anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions.
(Estrada Vs. Desierto, GR. No. 146710-15, 2 March 2001)

Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President pursuant
to the well-settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to
discipline is lodged in the same authority in whom the power to appoint is vested.

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Section 38(a) of Presidential Decree No. 807 has drawn a definite distinction between subordinate
officers or employees who were presidential appointees, on the one hand, and subordinate
officers or employees who were non-presidential appointees, on the other. Without a doubt,
substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees from non-presidential appointees
truly existed. For one, presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the
President pursuant to the well-settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power
to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same authority in whom the power to appoint is vested.
Having the power to remove or to discipline presidential appointees, therefore, the President has
the corollary authority to investigate them and look into their conduct in office. Thus, Baculi, as a
presidential appointee, came under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President in line with the
principle that the “power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint.” As such, the DAR
Secretary held no disciplinary jurisdiction over him. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 807 has
expressly specified the procedure for disciplinary actions involving presidential appointees.
(Baculi vs. Office of the President, 820 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 188681, G.R. No. 201130 March 8, 2017)

Although the powers and functions of the Chief Executive have been expressly reposed by the
Constitution in one person, the President of the Philippines, it would be unnatural to expect the
President to personally exercise and discharge all such powers and functions.

Somehow, the exercise and discharge of most of these powers and functions have been delegated
to others, particularly to the members of the Cabinet, conformably to the doctrine of qualified
political agency.

It was of no moment to the validity and efficacy of the dismissal that only Acting Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs Gaite had signed and issued the order of dismissal. In so doing, Acting
Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite neither exceeded his authority, nor usurped the power of the
President. Although the powers and functions of the Chief Executive have been expressly reposed
by the Constitution in one person, the President of the Philippines, it would be unnatural to expect
the President to personally exercise and discharge all such powers and functions. Somehow, the
exercise and discharge of most of these powers and functions have been delegated to others,
particularly to the members of the Cabinet, conformably to the doctrine of qualified political
agency. Accordingly, we have expressly recognized the extensive range of authority vested in the
Executive Secretary or the Deputy Executive Secretary as an official who ordinarily acts for and in
behalf of the President. As such, the decisions or orders emanating from the Office of the
Executive Secretary are attributable to the Executive Secretary even if they have been signed only
by any of the Deputy Executive Secretaries. (Baculi vs. Office of the President, 820 SCRA 1, G.R.
No. 188681, G.R. No. 201130 March 8, 2017)

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An exchange of notes is considered as an executive agreement, which is binding on the State

even without Senate concurrence.

In this case, it is fairly apparent that the subject taxes in the amount of P52,612,812.00 was
erroneously collected from petitioner, considering that the obligation to pay the same had already
been assumed by the Philippine Government by virtue of its Exchange of Notes with the Japanese
Government. Case law explains that an exchange of notes is considered as an executive
agreement, which is binding on the State even without Senate concurrence. In Abaya v. Ebdane,
515 SCRA 720 (2007): An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement that has many
similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two
documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of
the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State
to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or
departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because
of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval. It is stated
that “treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations, memoranda of
understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of notes” all refer to “international instruments
binding at international law.” x x x x Significantly, an exchange of notes is considered a form of an
executive agreement, which becomes binding through executive action without the need of a
vote by the Senate or Congress. (Mitsubishi Corporation-Manila Branch vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 825 SCRA 332, G.R. No. 175772 June 5, 2017)

In conformity with the constitutional guarantee of due process of law, no one shall be affected
by any proceeding to which one is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any
judgment rendered by the court.

It is undisputed that petitioners were not parties to the DARAB case; it was between Rillon and
Sps. Tan. In Green Acres Holdings, Inc. v. Cabral, 697 SCRA 266 (2013), the petitioner therein was
also not made party to the DARAB case. The Court ruled that in conformity with the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law, no one shall be affected by any proceeding to which one is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. For the
same reason, DARAB Case No. 9631 should not bind petitioners in this case. (Heirs of Catalino
Dacanay vs. Siapno, Jr., 793 SCRA 318, G.R. No. 185169 June 15, 2016)

The illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.

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It is settled that any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a
court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters
his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. As we held in People v. Samson, 244 SCRA
146 (1995): Appellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest as
he failed to move for the quashing of the information before the trial court. Consequently, any
irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of “not guilty” and by participating in the trial. At
any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Simply put, the illegality of the
warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts
on record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless
arrest after a valid information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had
commenced and had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against
her. (People vs. Pepino, 779 SCRA 170, G.R. No. 174471 January 12, 2016)

Under Rule 116 of the same Rules, it is mandatory for the trial court to designate a counsel de
oficio for the accused in the absence of private representation.

Guided by the constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused to counsel and pursuant to its rule-
making authority, the Court, in promulgating the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, adopted
the following provisions: Rule 115, SEC. 1. Rights of accused at the trial.—In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights: x x x x (c) To be present and
defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of the judgment. x x x x x x x Rule 116 of the same Rules makes it mandatory for the
trial court to designate a counsel de oficio for the accused in the absence of private
representation. (Ibañez vs. People, 782 SCRA 291, G.R. No. 190798 January 27, 2016)

Passionate and emphatic grievance, channelled through proper public authorities, partakes of
a degree of protected freedom of expression.

Who appear to be officials of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority where Subic Bay Marine
Exploratorium is found — is sufficiently “public,” as required by Articles 353 and 355 of the
Revised Penal Code and by the Anti-Cybercrime Law, is a matter of defense that should be
properly raised during trial. Passionate and emphatic grievance, channelled through proper public
authorities, partakes of a degree of protected freedom of expression. Certainly, if we remain
faithful to the dictum that public office is a public trust, some leeway should be given to the public
to express disgust. The scope and extent of that protection cannot be grounded in abstractions.

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The facts of this case need to be proven by evidence; otherwise, this Court exercises barren
abstractions that may wander into situations only imagined, not real. (Dio vs. People, 792 SCRA
646, G.R. No. 208146 June 8, 2016)

The State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to have some form of belief system,
whether such may be belief in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life, or even an outright
rejection of religion.

Our very own Constitution recognizes the heterogeneity and religiosity of our people as reflected
in Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146 (2014), as follows: At the outset, it cannot be denied that
we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and
religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in
practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single
society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all — the religious
people of different sects and the nonbelievers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally
believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to Who they called for guidance and
enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. (Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of
Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, 819 SCRA 313, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC
March 7, 2017)

The right to religious profession and worship has a two (2)-fold aspect — freedom to believe
and freedom to act on one’s beliefs.

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And
this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is “designed to protect
the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs,
to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good.” “The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold
aspect — freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s beliefs. The first is absolute as long as
the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the
belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. (Re: Letter of Tony Q.
Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, 819 SCRA
313, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC March 7, 2017)

Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and State.

Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and State. In
fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony with each other. The State is aware of the

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existence of religious movements whose members believe in the divinity of Jose Rizal. Yet, it does
not implement measures to suppress the said religious sects. Such inaction or indifference on the
part of the State gives meaning to the separation of Church and State, and at the same time,
recognizes the religious freedom of the members of these sects to worship their own Supreme
Being. As pointed out by Judge Lutero, “the Roman Catholics express their worship through the
holy mass and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing the right to the free exercise of
their religion. Our Muslim brethren, who are government employees, are allowed to worship their
Allah even during office hours inside their own offices. The Seventh Day Adventists are exempted
from rendering Saturday duty because their religion prohibits them from working on a Saturday.
Even Christians have been allowed to conduct their own bible studies in their own offices. All
these have been allowed in respect of the workers’ right to the free exercise of their religion.”
(Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in
Quezon City, 819 SCRA 313, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC March 7, 2017)

The freedom of religion enjoys a preferred status among the rights conferred to each citizen by
our fundamental charter.

The freedom of religion enjoys a preferred status among the rights conferred to each citizen by
our fundamental charter. In this case, no less than petitioner Valmores’ right to religious freedom
is being threatened by respondents’ failure to accommodate his case. In this regard, when
confronted with a potential infringement of fundamental rights, the Court will not hesitate, as it
now does, to overlook procedural lapses in order to fulfill its foremost duty of satisfying the higher
demands of substantial justice. The Court is also aware of petitioner Valmores’ plea for the
expedient resolution of his case, as he has yet to enroll in the MSU-College of Medicine and
continue with his studies. Plainly enough, to require petitioner Valmores to hold his education in
abeyance in the meantime that he is made to comply with the rule on hierarchy of courts would
be unduly burdensome. It is a known fact that education is a time-sensitive endeavor, where
premium is placed not only on its completion, but also on the timeliness of its achievement.
Inevitably, justice in this case must take the form of a prompt and immediate disposition if
complete relief is to be accorded. (Valmores vs. Achacoso, 831 SCRA 442, G.R. No. 217453 July 19,
2017)

Religion as a social institution is deeply rooted in every culture; it predates laws and survives
civilizations.

Religion as a social institution is deeply rooted in every culture; it predates laws and survives
civilizations. In the Philippines, the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions were crafted in full
acknowledgment of the contributions of religion to the country through the enactment of various

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benevolent provisions. In its present incarnation, our fundamental law, by “imploring the aid of
Almighty God,” makes manifest the State’s respect and recognition of the collective spirituality of
the Filipino. Such recognition is embodied in Section 5, Article III of the Constitution: SEC. 5. No
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights. (Valmores vs. Achacoso, 831 SCRA 442, G.R. No. 217453 July 19, 2017)

The Constitution guarantees the freedom to believe absolutely, while the freedom to act based
on belief is subject to regulation by the State when necessary to protect the rights of others and
in the interest of public welfare.

In a nutshell, the Constitution guarantees the freedom to believe absolutely, while the freedom
to act based on belief is subject to regulation by the State when necessary to protect the rights of
others and in the interest of public welfare. Today, religion has transcended mere rubric and has
permeated into every sphere of human undertaking. As a result, religious freedom, to a limited
extent, has come under the regulatory power of the State. In 2010, the CHED institutionalized the
framework for operationalizing Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution vis-à-vis the academic
freedom of higher education institutions (HEIs), pursuant to its statutory power to formulate
policies, priorities, and programs on higher education in both public and private HEIs.

Religious freedom is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling state interest.

Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling state
interest. To successfully invoke compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that the
masses in the QC Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the judges
and employees in the performance of their official functions. (Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano,
Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, 819 SCRA 313, A.M. No.
10-4-19-SC March 7, 2017)

The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and State.

On the opposite side of the spectrum is the constitutional mandate that “no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion,” otherwise known as the non-establishment clause.
Indeed, there is a thin line between accommodation and establishment, which makes it even
more imperative to understand each of these concepts by placing them in the Filipino society’s
perspective. The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and
State. It simply means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion,

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aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or
remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion;
that the state cannot punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or nonattendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activity or institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they
may adopt or teach or practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the
affairs of any religious organization or group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the state
cannot establish or sponsor an official religion. (Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of
Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, 819 SCRA 313, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC
March 7, 2017)

The holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the Quezon City (QC) Hall of Justice is not a
case of establishment, but merely accommodation.

It is our considered view that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of
Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation. First, there is no law, ordinance
or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities expressly mandating that judiciary
employees attend the Catholic masses at the basement. Second, when judiciary employees attend
the masses to profess their faith, it is at their own initiative as they are there on their own free
will and volition, without any coercion from the judges or administrative officers. Third, no
government funds are being spent because the lightings and air-conditioning continue to be
operational even if there are no religious rituals there. Fourth, the basement has neither been
converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor has it been permanently appropriated for the
exclusive use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has not prejudiced other religions.
(Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in
Quezon City, 819 SCRA 313, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC March 7, 2017)

Consistent with the nonestablishment clause, the Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction under
the law to decide private respondents’ complaint because not all of the parties involved in the
action are Muslims.

As a government instrumentality, the Municipality of Tangkal can only act for secular purposes
and in ways that have primarily secular effects — consistent with the nonestablishment clause.
Hence, even if it is assumed that juridical persons are capable of practicing religion, the
Municipality of Tangkal is constitutionally proscribed from adopting, much less exercising, any
religion, including Islam. The Shari’a District Court appears to have under- Municipality of Tangkal,
stood the foregoing principles, as it conceded that the Municipality of Tangkal “is neither a Muslim
nor a Christian.” Yet it still proceeded to attribute the religious affiliation of the mayor to the

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municipality. This is manifest error on the part of the Shari’a District Court. It is an elementary
principle that a municipality has a personality that is separate and distinct from its mayor, vice
mayor, sanggunian, and other officers composing it. And under no circumstances can this
corporate veil be pierced on purely religious considerations — as the Shari’a District Court has
done — without running afoul the inviolability of the separation of Church and State enshrined in
the Constitution. In view of the foregoing, the Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction under the
law to decide private respondents’ complaint because not all of the parties involved in the action
are Muslims. Since it was clear from the complaint that the real party-defendant was the
Municipality of Tangkal, the Shari’a District Court should have simply applied the basic doctrine
of separate juridical personality and motu proprio dismissed the case. (Municipality of Tangkal,
Province of Lanao del Norte vs. Balindong, 814 SCRA 237, G.R. No. 193340 January 11, 2017)

The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right
to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he
has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present
when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any
questioning if he so desires.

The said rights are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the State as would lead
the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth. (People vs. Cabanada, 831 SCRA 485, G.R. No. 221424 July 19, 2017)

By express constitutional mandate, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives (HOR) (or of the Senate).

Under Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC has the “exclusive jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials x x x.” In other words, the Constitution vests the COMELEC this
exclusive jurisdiction only with respect to elective regional, provincial, and city officials. The
COMELEC, by express constitutional mandate, has no jurisdiction over the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the HOR (or of the Senate) as Article VI vests this jurisdiction with
the HRET (or the SET). The validity of the proclamation of respondent Reyes who became a
member of the HOR on June 30, 2013, and the right of either respondent Reyes or Velasco to hold
the contested congressional seat are election contests relating to a Member’s election, returns,
and qualifications. By Reyes v. COMELEC’s own defined standard, the jurisdiction over these
election contests affecting respondent Reyes already rested with the HRET beginning June 30,
2013. (Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr., 780 SCRA 81, G.R. No. 211140 January 12, 2016)

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The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack
thereof of the candidate.

The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the CoC of petitioner should be denied due
course or cancelled “on the exclusive ground” that she made in the certificate a false material
representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and
restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in
this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC
cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate. (Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections, 786 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 221697, G.R. Nos.
221698-700 March 8, 2016)

As presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment

of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified “is guilty of or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.”

Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently
required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent
court that the candidate sought to be disqualified “is guilty of or found by the Commission to be
suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.” (Poe-Llamanzares vs.
Commission on Elections, 786 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 221697, G.R. Nos. 221698-700 March 8, 2016)

Misrepresentation; Before a certificate of candidacy (CoC) can be cancelled or denied, there has
to be a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified. Such prior authority is the
necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found.

Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one
to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the
COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must
beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with
jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by
a judgment of a competent court or tribunal. If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior
finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification “provided by law or the Constitution,”
neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false
representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he
or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of

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POLITICAL LAW
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the representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts
of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases
equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be determined. (Poe-
Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections, 786 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 221697, G.R. Nos. 221698-700
March 8, 2016)

A person intending to run for public office must not only possess the required qualifications for
the position for which he or she intends to run, but must also possess none of the grounds for
disqualification under the law.

A CoC is a formal requirement for eligibility to public office. Section 74 of the OEC provides that
the CoC of the person filing it shall state, among others, that he is eligible for the office he seeks
to run, and that the facts stated therein are true to the best of his knowledge. To be “eligible”
relates to the capacity of holding, as well as that of being elected to an office. Conversely,
“ineligibility” has been defined as a “disqualification or legal incapacity to be elected to an office
or appointed to a particular position.” In this relation, a person intending to run for public office
must not only possess the required qualifications for the position for which he or she intends to
run, but must also possess none of the grounds for disqualification under the law. (Dimapilis vs.
Commission on Elections, 823 SCRA 451, G.R. No. 227158 April 18, 2017)

Only Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations whose capital is sixty percent (60%) owned
by Filipinos citizens, are constitutionally qualified to own private lands.

Preserving the ownership of land, whether public or private, in Filipino hands is the policy
consistently adopted in all three of our constitutions. Under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions, no private land shall be transferred, assigned, or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Consequently, only Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations whose capital is 60% owned
by Filipinos citizens, are constitutionally qualified to own private lands. Upholding this
nationalization policy, the Court has voided not only outright conveyances of land to foreigners,
but also arrangements where the rights of ownership were gradually transferred to foreigners. In
Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52 (1967), we considered a 99-year lease
agreement, which gave the foreigner-lessee the option to buy the land and prohibited the Filipino
owner-lessor from selling or otherwise disposing the land, amounted to — a virtual transfer of
ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus
possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi, and jus abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it (jus
disponendi) — rights the sum total of which make up ownership. (Philippine National Oil Company
vs. Keppel<br/>Philippines Holdings, Inc., 798 SCRA 65, G.R. No. 202050 July 25, 2016)

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The Constitution requires that all public officers and employees be, at all times, accountable to
the people; serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency; act with patriotism
and justice; and lead modest lives.

Public service demands the highest level of honesty and transparency from its officers and
employees. The Constitution requires that all public officers and employees be, at all times,
accountable to the people; serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency; act
with patriotism and justice; and lead modest lives. Public office is a public trust; it must be treated
as a privilege rather than a right, and rest firmly upon one’s sense of service rather than
entitlement. (De Castro vs. Field Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman, 825 SCRA 351,
G.R. No. 192723 June 5, 2017)

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