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POLITICAL LAW
Handout No. 40

MEMORANDUM CIRCULARS MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE LAW THEY SEEK TO IMPLEMENT.
IT SHOULD NOT MODIFY THE SAME.

The Supreme Court has very well settled that memorandum circulars must not override,
supplant, or modify the law, but must remain consistent and in harmony with the law they seek
to apply and implement. Under the Local Tax Code, the sole jurisdiction for collection of
amusement tax on admission receipts in places of amusement rests exclusively on the local
government, to the exclusion of the national government.

In the instant case, a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 was filed seeking to set aside
a decision of the CTA invalidating a memorandum circular which imposes value added tax (VAT)
on gross receipts from admission to cinema houses.

Petitioners argue that the exhibition of movies by cinema operators or proprietors to the paying
public, being a sale of service, is subject to VAT. Respondents on the other hand allege that gross
receipts from cinema admission tickets were never intended to be subject to any tax imposed by
the National Government.

Ruling on the case, the Supreme Court stated that the memorandum circular imposing VAT on
the gross receipts for admission to cinema houses is invalid. The legislature never intended
operators of cinemas to be covered by VAT under the NIRC. Since the BIR is an agency of the
national government, then it follows that it has no legal mandate to levy an amusement tax on
admission receipts in the said places of amusement. There is no provision of law imposing VAT
on gross receipts of cinemas which are derived from admission tickets. Commissioner on Internal
Revenue vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc. GR. No. 183505, February 26, 2010.

PROFESSIONALISM, RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS, GOOD MANNERS AND RIGHT
CONDUCT ARE EXPECTED OF ALL JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.

While the allegations of complainant were not fully substantiated, the Court disagrees with the
respondents that disrespectful remarks made by court personnel should be tolerated and even
considered “justified remarks.” The respondents, and all court personnel for that matter, should
be reminded that the image of the Judiciary is mirrored in the kind of conduct, official or
otherwise, which the personnel within its employ display, from the judge to the lowliest clerk.
Impolite language and improper tone should be avoided. Professionalism, respect for the rights
of others, good manners and right conduct are expected of all judicial officers and employees.

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Thus, all employees are required to preserve the Judiciary’s good name and standing as a true
temple of justice. For such improper remarks, the respondents and their court personnel are
admonished. Magleo vs. De Juan-Quinagoran, 739 SCRA 628, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2336 November
12, 2014

MISCONDUCT IS DEFINED AS “A TRANSGRESSION OF SOME ESTABLISHED AND DEFINITE RULE

OF ACTION, MORE PARTICULARLY, UNLAWFUL BEHAVIOR OR GROSS NEGLIGENCE BY A PUBLIC
OFFICER.”

Misconduct becomes grave if it “involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence.” Section 52(A)(3), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service provides that the penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the
service, which was correctly imposed by the Ombudsman on petitioners, along with OIC District
Engineer Tingson, Jr. and the other BAC Member Elizabeth H. Gardose. Lagoc vs. Malaga, 729
SCRA 421, G.R. No. 184890 July 9, 2014

THE PRESIDENT EXERCISES ‘GENERAL SUPERVISION’ OVER LGUs ONLY TO ‘ENSURE THAT LOCAL
AFFAIRS ARE ADMINISTERED ACCORDING TO LAW.’ HE HAS NO CONTROL OVER THEIR ACTS IN
THE SENSE THAT HE CAN SUBSTITUTE THEIR JUDGMENTS WITH HIS OWN.”

There is likewise no merit in the respondent’s claim that the petitioners’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies warrants the dismissal of the petition. It bears emphasizing that the
assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the rule-making or quasi-legislative power of the DILG.
This pertains to “the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation
that is within the confines of the granting statute.” Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative
or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law. In challenging the validity of an administrative
issuance carried out pursuant to the agency’s rule-making power, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not stand as a bar in promptly resorting to the filing of a case in
court.

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The Constitution has expressly adopted the policy of ensuring the autonomy of LGUs. To highlight
its significance, the entire Article X of the Constitution was devoted to laying down the bedrock
upon which this policy is anchored. It is also pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution of
enhancing local autonomy that the LGC was enacted.

Verily, local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization. In Limbona v. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786 (1989),
the Court elaborated on the concept of decentralization, thus: [A]utonomy is either
decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local
governments “more responsive and accountable,” and “ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress.” At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. x x x.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the
favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities.

To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy, the Constitution confines the power of the
President over LGUs to mere supervision. “The President exercises ‘general supervision’ over
them, but only to ‘ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.’ He has no control
over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.” Thus, Section
4, Article X of the Constitution, states: Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure
that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions. Villafuerte, Jr. vs. Robredo, 744 SCRA 534, G.R. No. 195390 December 10, 2014

A JUDGE CANNOT CHOOSE HIS DEADLINE FOR DECIDING CASES PENDING BEFORE HIM.

Without an extension granted by the Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the
required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. If a judge is
unable to comply with the period for deciding cases or matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for
an extension. An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period
constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions such as

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suspension from office without pay or fine on the defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in
each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period
and other factors, such as the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the damage
suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age of the judge, and other
analogous circumstances. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Fuentes III, 692 SCRA 429, March
06, 2013

THE COURT HAS REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT IT IS NOT A COLLECTION AGENCY FOR THE
UNPAID DEBTS OF ITS OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, BUT HAS NEVERTHELESS PROVIDED FOR
SECTION 8, RULE 140 OF THE RULES OF COURT THAT HOLDS ITS OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE IN UNPAID DEBT SITUATIONS.

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that willful failure to pay a just debt is a ground
for disciplinary action against judges and justices and should find full application in the present
case. Just debts, as defined in Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
E.O. No. 292, refer to (1) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (2) claims, the existence and
justness of which are admitted by the debtor. Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies
willful failure to pay a just debt as a serious charge, penalized as follows: SEC. 11. Sanctions.

If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: 1.
Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2. Suspension from the office without
salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3. A fine of
more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

While reference to a debt necessarily implies a transaction that is private and outside of official
transactions, the rules do not thereby intrude into public officials’ private lives; they simply look
at their actions from the prism of public service and consider these acts unbecoming of a public
official. These rules take into account that these are actions of officials who are entrusted with
public duties and who, even in their private capacities, should continually act to reflect their
status as public servants. Employees of the judiciary should be living examples of uprightness not
only in the performance of official duties but also in their personal and private dealings with other
people so as to preserve at all times the good name and standing of the courts in the community.
Manlapaz vs. Sabillo, 690 SCRA 478, February 13, 2013

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Handout No. 40

THE COURTS MAY NOT BE BOUND BY THE FINDING OF FACTS OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
WHEN THE FINDING ABSOLUTELY LACKS CLEAR, MANIFEST AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND
THERE IS CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ACTED ARBITRARILY OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR IN A CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL MANNER.

While it is an established rule in administrative law that the courts of justice should respect the
findings of fact of said administrative agencies, the courts may not be bound by such findings of
fact when there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly,
manifestly and patently insubstantial; and when there is a clear showing that the administrative
agency acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or in a capricious and whimsical
manner, such that its action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. These exceptions
exist in this case and compel the appellate court to review the findings of fact of the Ombudsman.
In the instant case, the subsequent lifting of the preventive suspension order against Capulong
does not render the petition moot and academic. It does not preclude the courts from passing
upon the validity of a preventive suspension order, it being a manifestation of its constitutionally
mandated power and authority to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Capulong, 719 SCRA 209, March 12, 2014

THE CLERK OF A SUPERIOR COURT SHALL ISSUE UNDER THE SEAL OF THE COURT ALL ORDINARY
WRITS AND PROCESS INCIDENT TO PENDING CASES, THE ISSUANCE OF WHICH DOES NOT
INVOLVE THE EXERCISE OF FUNCTIONS APPERTAINING TO THE COURT OR JUDGE ONLY.

It is clear from the foregoing that Clerk of Court Maog overstepped the bounds of his authority.
Instead of just quoting the dispositive portion of the order, he included the phrase “and turn over
the possession and operation of the subject terminal to plaintiff” to allegedly give more meaning
to an otherwise vague order. Despite his noble intention, by doing so, COC Maog arrogated unto
of court are governed by Section 4 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, which provides: SEC.

The clerk of a superior court shall issue under the seal of the court all ordinary writs and process
incident to pending cases, the issuance of which does not involve the exercise of functions
appertaining to the court or judge only; and may, under the direction of the court or judge, make
out and sign letters of administration, appointments of guardians, trustees, and receivers, and all
writs and process issuing from the court. Robles vs. Maog, 761 SCRA 30, July 01, 2015

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The rules on the retirement benefits under Executive Order No. 172, in relation to Republic Act
No. 3595, are:

1. The employee must have completed his term of office, or become incapacitated to discharge
the duties of his office, or dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the age
of sixty years but before the expiration of his term of office;

2. The lump sum is to be paid out according to the employee’s number of years of service with
the ERB;

3. The lump sum gratuity to be paid is the employee’s salary for one year, not to exceed five
years;

4. The lump sum is based on the employee’s last annual salary that he was receiving at the time
of retirement, incapacity, death or resignation, as the case may be;

5. In case of resignation, the employee should have rendered not less than twenty years of service
in the government; and,

6. The employee shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life
equivalent to the amount of monthly salary he was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity
or resignation. Ocampo vs. Commission on Audit, 698 SCRA 136, June 10, 2013

VIEW THAT THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE APPLIES WHEN IT CAN BE SHOWN THAT THERE IS
PLAUSIBLE RISK, AND ITS CAUSES CANNOT BE DETERMINED WITH SCIENTIFIC CERTAINTY.

The precautionary principle applies when it can be shown that there is plausible risk, and its
causes cannot be determined with scientific certainty. It is not available simply on the basis of
imagined fears or imagined causes. Otherwise, it will be absurd. Rather than a reactive approach
to fear, the precautionary principle is evolving as a proactive approach in protecting the
environment. Furthermore, being only a principle, it does not trump the requirements for proper
invocation of remedies or act to repeal existing laws Social Justice Society (SJS). Social Justice
Society (SJS) Officers vs. Lim, 742 SCRA 1, November 25, 2014

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS ARE CLEARLY PART OF THE PRESIDENT’S DUTY TO EXECUTE THE
LAWS FAITHFULLY. THESE AGREEMENTS TRACE THEIR VALIDITY FROM EXISTING LAWS OR

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TREATIES DULY AUTHORIZED BY THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT. THEY

IMPLEMENT LAWS AND TREATIES.

In contrast, treaties, as international agreements that need concurrence from the Senate, do not
originate solely from the President’s duty as the executor of the country’s laws, but from the
shared function between the President and the Senate that the Constitution mandated under
Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution. Between the two, a treaty exists on a higher plane
as it carries the authority of the President and the Senate. Treaties, which have the impact of
statutory law in the Philippines, can amend or prevail over prior statutory enactments. Executive
agreements — which exist at the level of implementing rules and regulations or administrative
orders in the domestic sphere — have no such effect. They cannot contravene or amend
statutory enactments and treaties. This difference in impact is based on their origins: since a
treaty has the approval of both the President and the Senate, it has the same impact as a statute.
In contrast, since an executive agreement springs from the President’s power to execute laws, it
cannot amend or violate existing treaties, and must be in accord with and made pursuant to laws
and treaties.

For context, the Agreement between the RP and the US (Parties) concerning Military Bases
contained in this constitutional provision pertains to the Military Bases Agreement of 1947
(MBA), whereby the US was accorded the following rights: (a) power, authority, and control over
military establishments; (b) use, operation, and defense of its bases, as well as the areas adjacent
thereto in order to access the same; (c) use of certain land, coastal areas, and the air for military
maneuvers, staging areas, and other military exercises, free of charge; and (d) entry of US base
personnel, their families, and other technical personnel of other nationalities into the Philippines.
The Parties agreed that the MBA would be effective for a period of ninety-nine (99) years, or until
the year 2046. Throughout the years, a number of piecemeal amendments were made thereto,
particularly: (a) the shortening of its term to a total of forty-one (41) years, or until 1991, pursuant
to the Ramos-Rusk Agreement; (b) the return of 17 US military bases to the Philippines, in
accordance with the Bohlen-Serrano Memorandum of Agreement; (c) the recognition of
Philippine sovereignty over the Clark and Subic Bases through the Romulo-Murphy Exchange of
Notes of 1979; and (d) the placing of the concept of operational use of military bases by the US
Government within the context of Philippine sovereignty, including the need for prior
consultation with the Philippine Government on the former’s use of the bases, pursuant to the
Romualdez-Armacost Agreement of 1983. Apparently, these amendments were reflective of the
Philippines’ intention to gradually restrict US control over the bases. The growing recalcitrance
on US control was the catalyst for the adoption of Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which, as above cited, stringently demands, as a first requisite, a treaty duly

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concurred in by Senate, if we were to allow once more the presence of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities in the country. Saguisag vs. Ochoa, Jr., 798 SCRA 292, July 26, 2016

THE CONSTITUTION HAS ENTRUSTED TO THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT THE CONDUCT OF

FOREIGN RELATIONS FOR THE PHILIPPINES.

Whether or not to espouse petitioners’ claim against the Government of Japan is left to the
exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere
with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department.
Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction,
to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner. Vinuya vs. Romulo, 732 SCRA
595, August 12, 2014

VALIDITY OF ACTS OF “DE FACTO” GOVERNMENT— IT IS A LEGAL TRUISM IN POLITICAL AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT ALL ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE,
AND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENTS OF A DE FACTO GOVERNMENT ARE GOOD AND VALID.

Kinds of “De Facto” Government— There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or
government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and control
of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains
itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth,
first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established
and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course
of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine in
Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and of Tampico, Mexico,
occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States. And the third is that
established as an independent government by inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection
against the parent state, such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt against
the Union during the war of secession. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Key, G.R. No. L-5, September 17,
1945

THE GOVERNMENT RESULTING FROM THE EDSA REVOLUTION WAS A DE JURE GOVERNMENT
ASSUMED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

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The resulting government following the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 was indisputably a
revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations
that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003

FROM THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE, INVOLUNTARY OR ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE

IS CONSIDERED A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance is considered a

flagrant violation of human rights. It does not only violate the right to life, liberty and security of
the desaparecido; it affects their families as well through the denial of their right to information
regarding the circumstances of the disappeared family member. Thus, enforced disappearances
have been said to be “a double form of torture,” with “doubly paralyzing impact for the victims,”
as they “are kept ignorant of their own fates, while family members are deprived of knowing the
whereabouts of their detained loved ones” and suffer as well the serious economic hardship and
poverty that in most cases follow the disappearance of the household breadwinner. The UN
General Assembly first considered the issue of “Disappeared Persons” in December 1978 under
Resolution 33/173. The Resolution expressed the General Assembly’s deep concern arising from
“reports from various parts of the world relating to enforced or involuntary disappearances,” and
requested the “UN Commission on Human Rights to consider the issue of enforced
disappearances with a view to making appropriate recommendations.” Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, 606
SCRA 598, G.R. No. 182498 December 3, 2009

TO DATE, THE PHILIPPINES HAS NEITHER SIGNED NOR RATIFIED THE CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF ALL PERSONS FROM ENFORCED, SO THAT THE COUNTRY IS NOT YET
COMMITTED TO ENACT ANY LAW PENALIZING ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE AS A CRIME.

To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country is not
yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence of a
specific penal law, however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as heretofore
mentioned; underlying every enforced disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to
life, liberty and security that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect
through its rule-making powers. Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598, G.R. No. 182498 December
3, 2009

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ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE AS A STATE PRACTICE HAS BEEN REPUDIATED BY THE

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SO THAT THE BAN ON IT IS NOW A GENERALLY ACCEPTED
PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, WHICH WE SHOULD CONSIDER A PART OF THE LAW OF
THE LAND, AND WHICH WE SHOULD ACT UPON TO THE EXTENT ALREADY ALLOWED UNDER
OUR LAWS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS THAT BIND US.

While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced
disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared
enforced disappearance as a specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance
as a State practice has been repudiated by the international community, so that the ban on it is
now a generally accepted principle of international law, which we should consider a part of the
law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws and
the international conventions that bind us. Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598, G.R. No. 182498
December 3, 2009

THE MOST WIDELY ACCEPTED STATEMENT OF SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TODAY IS

ARTICLE 38(1) OF THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, WHICH PROVIDES
THAT THE COURT SHALL APPLY “INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM, AS EVIDENCE OF A GENERAL
PRACTICE ACCEPTED AS LAW.”

The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” The material sources
of custom include State practice, State legislation, international and national judicial decisions,
recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form,
the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the UN General
Assembly. Sometimes referred to as “evidence” of international law, these sources identify the
substance and content of the obligations of States and are indicative of the “State practice” and
“opinio juris” requirements of international law. Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598, G.R. No.
182498 December 3, 2009

THE PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE II AND SOME SECTIONS OF
ARTICLE XII ARE NOT SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS, THE DISREGARD OF WHICH CAN GIVE
RISE TO A CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE COURTS.

By it very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.” The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “basic political creed of the

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nation” by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids of as
guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of
laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, the principles and state
principles enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not “self -executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.” Tanada vs.
Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997.

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA IS GENERALLY DEFINED AS “A BODY OF TREATY RULES
AND CUSTOMARY NORMS GOVERNING THE USES OF THE SEA, THE EXPLOITATION OF ITS
RESOURCES, AND THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION OVER MARITIME REGIMES.

It is a branch of public international law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the
uses of the oceans.” The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on
December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came
into force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification.

The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty
(mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). The freedom to
use the world’s marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of international law. The
UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of
the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic
zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels
depending on where the vessel is located.

The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel
visiting the Philippines to promote “common security interests” between the US and the
Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel,
and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter
of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.

The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it
is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine
waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement. As it is, the waiver of State immunity
under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the
present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17,
Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an

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environmental law is to be filed separately: SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.—The filing of
a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil,
criminal or administrative actions.

In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the
grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a
writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of
State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have
resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages,
including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or
that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental
law.

A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the violator is also a

major relief that may be obtained under a judgment rendered in a citizens’ suit under the Rules,
viz.: RULE 5 SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.—If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff
proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the
environment and the payment of attorney’s fees, costs of suit and other litigation expenses. It
may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the
environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust
fund for that purpose subject to the control of the court. In the light of the foregoing, the Court
defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation measures
through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another
State in the context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that “[t]he conduct
of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative — ‘the political’ — departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be
done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” Arigo vs.
Swift, 735 SCRA 102, September 16, 2014

Election Protest, defined.

An Election Protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest
between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds or
irregularities. It aims to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the
legal votes cast and, therefore, entitled to hold the office. Abayon vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET), 791 SCRA 242, G.R. No. 222236, G.R. No. 223032 May 3, 2016
A PREPROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY IS SUMMARY IN CHARACTER.

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A preproclamation controversy is summary in character. It is the policy of the law to said

controversies are promptly decided, so as not do delay canvass and proclamation. This is
consistent with Section 20 of RA No. 7166 of COMELEC resolution no. 2962 which provide that
any candidate may contest the inclusion of an ER by making an oral objection at the time the
questioned return is submitted for canvas which must also inlclude his objections in writing.

In the case at bar, the Supreme Court ruled that the Petitioner therein failed to object and file
for exclusion of the contested ERs in a timely manner as required by the said RA. The minutes of
the proceedings before the MBOC reveal that the contested ERs were presented for inclusion in
the canvas, and then orally objected by the petitioner. However, only one written petition for
exclusion was filed for the five contested ERs. While the law does not specifically mandate that
written objections are submitted exactly the same time as the oral manifestations, a lapse of 12
hours after the ERs have been presented for canvass is simply inexplicable and unacceptable.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE POWER OF HRET TO ANNUL ELECTIONS AND THE
COMELEC’S AUTHORITY IN DECLARING FAILURE OF ELECTIONS?

The Court agrees that the power of the HRET to annul elections differ from the power granted to
the COMELEC to declare failure of elections. The Constitution no less, grants the HRET with
exclusive jurisdiction to decide all election contests involving the members of the House of
Representatives, which necessarily includes those which raise the issue of fraud, terrorism or
other irregularities committed before, during or after the elections. To deprive the HRET the
prerogative to annul elections would undermine its constitutional fiat to decide election contests.
The phrase “election, returns and qualifications” should be interpreted in its totality as referring
to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. Consequently, the annulment of
election results is but a power concomitant to the HRET’s constitutional mandate to determine
the validity of the contestee’s title. Abayon vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET), 791 SCRA 242, G.R. No. 222236, G.R. No. 223032 May 3, 2016

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE POWER OF HRET?

The power granted to the HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired
as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Thus, the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives,
may annul election results if in its determination, fraud, terrorism or other electoral irregularities
existed to warrant the annulment. Because in doing so, it is merely exercising its constitutional
duty to ascertain who among the candidates received the majority of the valid votes cast. Abayon
vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), 791 SCRA 242, G.R. No. 222236, G.R. No.
223032 May 3, 2016

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE PASSAGE OF R.A. 7166 TO THE POWER OF HRET?

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The passage of R.A. No. 7166 cannot deprive the HRET of its incidental power to annul elections
in the exercise of its sole and exclusive authority conferred by no less than the Constitution. It
must be remembered that the COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative and
administrative functions. In Bedol v. COMELEC, 606 SCRA 554 (2009), the Court expounded, to wit:
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the
Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The
quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the
enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of
all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to
the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative
functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the
enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution
(Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52[c]) authorize the COMELEC to
issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus
Election Code. The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance
with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. Abayon
vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), 791 SCRA 242, G.R. No. 222236, G.R. No.
223032 May 3, 2016

ENUMERATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF MARGINALIZED AND UNDER-REPRESENTED

SECTORS FOR PARTY LIST ELECTION IS NOT EXCLUSIVE.

In the instant case, the COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s accreditation on moral grounds, ruling that
said group advocates sexual immorality and is not one of those sectors enumerated in the
constitution and RA No. 7941. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of its accreditation violated the
constitutional guarantee against establishment of religion.

The Supreme Court ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Comelec (Gr. No. 147589,
June 26, 2001) that the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities m elderly handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers and professionals, are not exclusive. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC, GR.
No. 190582, April 8, 2010.

RELIGION IS NOT A VALID BASIS FOR THE DENIAL OF AN APPLICATION FOR ACCREDITATION
IN THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM.

In the instant case, the COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s accreditation on moral grounds, ruling
that said group advocates sexual immorality and is not one of those sectors enumerated in the

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constitution and RA No. 7941. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of its accreditation violated
the constitutional guarantee against establishment of religion.

The Supreme Court ruled that religion is not a valid basis for the denial of application for
accreditation in the Party-List System.

The Non-Establishment Clause calls for the neutrality of the government on religious matters.
The government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects.
This can be found in Section 5 of Article III of the Constitution which provides that no law shall
be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC, GR. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE POWER EXERCISED BY COMELEC IN DECIDING ELECTION

CONTESTS AND IN DECLARING FAILURE OF ELECTIONS?

The COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial function when it decides election contests not otherwise
reserved to other electoral tribunals by the Constitution. The COMELEC, however, does not
exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it declares a failure of elections pursuant to R.A. No.
7166. Rather, the COMELEC performs its administrative function when it exercises such power.
R.A. No. 7166 was enacted to empower the COMELEC to be most effective in the performance
of its sacred duty of ensuring the conduct of honest and free elections. Further, a closer perusal
of Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code readily reveals that it is more in line with the
COMELEC’s administrative function of ensuring that elections are free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible, and not its quasi-judicial function to adjudicate election contests. The said provision
reads: Sec. 6. Failure of elections.—If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or
had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting
and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis
of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a
date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. Abayon vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), 791 SCRA 242, G.R. No. 222236, G.R. No. 223032 May
3, 2016

IS THERE AN OVERLAPPING OF POWERS BETWEEN HRET AND COMELEC?

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The difference between the annulment of elections by electoral tribunals and the declaration of
failure of elections by the COMELEC cannot be gainsaid. First, the former is an incident of the
judicial function of electoral tribunals while the latter is in the exercise of the COMELEC’s
administrative function. Second, electoral tribunals only annul the election results connected
with the election contest before it whereas the declaration of failure of elections by the COMELEC
relates to the entire election in the concerned precinct or political unit. As such, in annulling
elections, the HRET does so only to determine who among the candidates garnered a majority of
the legal votes cast. The COMELEC, on the other hand, declares a failure of elections with the
objective of holding or continuing the elections, which were not held or were suspended, or if
there was one, resulted in a failure to elect. When COMELEC declares a failure of elections,
special elections will have to be conducted. Hence, there is no overlap of jurisdiction because
when the COMELEC declares a failure of elections on the ground of violence, intimidation,
terrorism or other irregularities, it does so in its administrative capacity. In contrast, when
electoral tribunals annul elections under the same grounds, they do so in the performance of
their quasi -judicial functions. Abayon vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), 791
SCRA 242, G.R. No. 222236, G.R. No. 223032 May 3, 2016

HOW IS THE POWER TO DECLARE FAILURE OF ELECTIONS EXERCISED?

It must be remembered that “[t]he power to declare a failure of elections should be exercised
with utmost care and only under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt that the
disregard of the law had been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is
impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain
result whatsoever, or that the great body of the voters have been prevented by violence,
intimidation and threats from exercising their franchise.” Consequently, a protestant alleging
terrorism in an election protest must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the will of
the majority has been muted by violence, intimidation or threats. Abayon vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), 791 SCRA 242, G.R. No. 222236, G.R. No. 223032 May
3, 2016

PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY, DEFINED.

The petition filed by Ludovico against Labao, Jr. before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA Case No. 13-
294 (DC), is not a pre-proclamation controversy. The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) clearly defines the
term “pre-proclamation controversy.” Pertinently, Section 241 thereof provides as follows: Sec. 241.
Definition.—A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered
political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any
matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns. Labao, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 797
SCRA 219, G.R. No. 212615, G.R. No. 212989 July 19, 2016

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