1.

In a culture where the dominant conception of ethics is rule-based, virtue

ethics will be understood as the superior ability of an individual to follow
rules. This would be oppressive and/or otherwise limiting and would
actually not further the assumed "goods" of virtue ethics.
2. The idea that virtue ethics involves a cultivation of an individual's capacity
for ethical action sets the standard for self-produced wisdom and insight
(not to mention education) too high. As a theory of ethics (i.e. outside a
populist religious framework) it involves an implicit elitism. It would not
result in widespread social benefit (assuming that is one of the goals of
ethics) in the absence of a variety of means for moral influence and
leadership.
3. The concept of "virtue" is understood to be highly abstract and qualitative,
and so it presents challenges with respect to being operationalized and
made intersubjective. On the other hand if it is converted into concrete
observables, it becomes behaviorism and rule-following.

"here Aristotle is criticised for trying to :ustify slavery we again need to keep in mind
whathis role was in Athens as well as this model of governance which was arising in an
ancientw o r l d .   A r i s t o t l e h a d   t o f l e e a w a y f r o m A t h e n s w h e n A l e % a n d e r
the great died
a s   t h e  Athenians grew an anti95acedonian feeling. Aristotle was en:oying all the benef
its of citi'enship in Athens but he was not an Athenian born citi'en. ;ne can surely argue
that hewas writing to please them powerful citi'ens of the city. Be wouldn’t write anything that
woulddisplease them otherwise he would be e%tradited. /laves were needed to do all
the hardwork so that their masters had the free time to actively participate in the
city. /imilarly workers and servants today we utili'e them so we have more spare time to
dealwith our social activities and :obs. They are paid because there is regulation to pay
them.!othing has changed unless we change the way we perceive and think about it.
Any form of slavery today is unacceptable. And it should be. 2ut if Aristotle
was to write his &thics intoday’s societies  we would e%pect a more
thoughtful :ustification of our standards ande%pectations. Bence if you
are person who practices virtues by balancing vices then actions, decisions
andbehaviour will come more naturally and if the action you take satisfies you
morally as aperson you reached a goal, an end. &ach action and decision will depend
on the individualand the circumstances surround that. In a more virtuous world which
means more respect toindividuals and their rights because you set boundaries by
yourself you limit your actions sonot to interfere with others en:oyment et

It is always how a theory is applied or perceived that matters, and makes you
consider whether the theory behind everything makes something good or
bad. -or e%ample wasnuclear fusion a good thing# At the time it was
invented it was meant to be an endlesssource of energy and instead it was
used to kill millions in Fapan and is causing water  pollution etc.
In this case, Aristotle says that the virtuous “amount” of a characteristic is a “golden”
mean, found between two vices: one of deficiency and one of excess. For example,
according to Aristotle, the virtuous amount of courage is found between two vices:
recklessness (an excess of courage) and cowardice (a deficiency of courage).

However, this theory doesn’t actually help in finding virtue. Think about it: when you’re
trying to find out what the virtuous amount of a characteristic is, all the golden mean
offers is a tautological claim that the right amount is not too much and not too little
(tautological because the good amount of a characteristic is defined as being the good
amount of the characteristic).

And the virtue does not even have to truly be between two extremes. In the cases where
an extreme amount of a quality is desirable, Aristotle just pretends that this desirable
extreme is actually a mean.

But that’s the point: Aristotle’s golden mean relies on screwing with definitions. If you
are allowed to define qualities however you want you can explain away any good quality
as really being a “mean”, but that isn’t helpful in the slightest. That’s simply engaging in
the kind of behaviour philosophy is infamous for; wasting brainpower on something
that is useless.

So, if it’s so useless, why do people like it so much? After all, the idea of a “golden mean”
has been picked up and applied not only in ethics but pretty much everywhere else – “all
things in moderation” is a well known proverb, and hell, this “golden mean” business
has even managed to get itself classified as a fallacy.  The reason people use and like the
golden mean is the reason people like and use any other proverb; it’s a shorthand to
describe a fairly common situation, one where we realize that there can be both too
much and too little of something. When it applies people think of it and go “oh hey it’s
right again” and when it doesn’t apply it doesn’t really occur to them (and if it does, they
can explain it away by messing with definitions a bit).

Aristotle’s Golden Mean is a classic example of what’s wrong with the philosophy of the
Ancient Greeks, and in fact what is wrong with a lot of other philosophy too: when all is
said and done, it really tells you nothing at all. It might be useful as a proverb, but it
certainly has no normative qualities and never will no matter how much work is put into
it. Working on these useless Greek platitudes is just throwing good effort after bad; no
matter how much you think about a theory without content it will still have no content.