Priscilla Alma Jose v.

Ramon Javellanas 
GR 158239 January 25, 2012

BERSAMIN, J.:
 
 
The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending partys
motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the particular
matter involved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the
trial court to do other than to execute the order. [1] Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh
period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which to appeal the denial.[2]
 
Antecedents
 
On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration
of P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land
with areas of 3,675 and 20,936 square meters located in Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan.
They agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the
balance of P80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System
(the registration being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and that
should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose
(Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the
balance and proceed with the application for registration.[3]
 
After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue, the
vendors undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being Margaritas sole surviving heir.
However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties
under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling
materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a residential or
industrial subdivision.[4] Faced with Priscillas refusal to comply, Javellana commenced on
February 10, 1997 an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her in
the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 79-M-97
entitled Ramon C. Javellana, represented by Atty. Guillermo G. Blanco v. Priscilla Alma Jose.
 
In Civil Case No. 79-M-97, Javellana averred that upon the execution of the deed of
conditional sale, he had paid the initial amount of P80,000.00 and had taken possession of the
parcels of land; that he had paid the balance of the purchase price to Juvenal on different dates
upon Juvenals representation that Margarita had needed funds for the expenses of registration
and payment of real estate tax; and that in 1996, Priscilla had called to inquire about the
mortgage constituted on the parcels of land; and that he had told her then that the parcels of
land had not been mortgaged but had been sold to him.[5]
 
Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the parcels of land; and that
Priscilla be ordered to institute registration proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale
in his favor.[6]
 
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by
prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.[7]
 
The RTC initially denied Priscillas motion to dismiss on February 4, 1998. [8] However,
upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself on June 24, 1999 and granted the
motion to dismiss, opining that Javellana had no cause of action against her due to her not
being bound to comply with the terms of the deed of conditional sale for not being a party
thereto; that there was no evidence showing the payment of the balance; that he had never
demanded the registration of the land from Margarita or Juvenal, or brought a suit for specific
performance against Margarita or Juvenal; and that his claim of paying the balance was not
credible.[9]
 
Javellana moved for reconsideration, contending that the presentation of evidence of full
payment was not necessary at that stage of the proceedings; and that in resolving a motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint
were hypothetically admitted and only the allegations in the complaint should be considered in
resolving the motion.[10] Nonetheless, he attached to the motion for reconsideration the receipts
showing the payments made to Juvenal. [11] Moreover, he maintained that Priscilla could no
longer succeed to any rights respecting the parcels of land because he had meanwhile acquired
absolute ownership of them; and that the only thing that she, as sole heir, had inherited from
Margarita was the obligation to register them under the Torrens System.[12]
 
On June 21, 2000, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any reason
to disturb the order of June 24, 1999.[13]
 
Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2000 order,[14] which the
RTC gave due course to, and the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA).
  
In his appeal (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259), Javellana submitted the following as errors of
the RTC,[15] to wit:
 
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT
THAT PLAINTIFF-APELLANT HAD LONG COMPLIED WITH THE FULL
PAYMENT OF THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AND HAD IMMEDIATELY TAKEN ACTUAL AND PHYSICAL
POSSESSION OF SAID PROPERTY UPON THE SIGNING OF THE
CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE;
 
II
THE TRIAL COURT OBVIOUSLY ERRED IN MAKING TWO CONFLICTING
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PROVISION OF THE CIVIL [CODE],
PARTICULARLY ARTICLE 1911, IN THE LIGHT OF THE TERMS OF THE
CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE;
 
 
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
BEING NOT A PARTY TO THE CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY
HER MOTHER IN FAVOR OF PLAINTFF-
APPELLANT IS NOT BOUND THEREBY AND CAN NOT BE COMPELLED TO
DO THE ACT REQUIRED IN THE SAID DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE;
 
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
WITHOUT HEARING THE CASE ON THE MERITS.
 
Priscilla countered that the June 21, 2000 order was not appealable; that the appeal was
not perfected on time; and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping.[16]
It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA
to assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his complaint (C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 60455). On August 6, 2001, however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari,[17] finding
that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders, and holding that it
only committed, at most, an error of judgment correctible by appeal in issuing the challenged
orders.
 
On November 20, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259,
[18]
 reversing and setting aside the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, and remanding the
records to the RTC for further proceedings in accordance with law. [19] The CA explained that the
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action; that Priscilla, as sole heir, succeeded to the
rights and obligations of Margarita with respect to the parcels of land; that Margaritas
undertaking under the contract was not a purely personal obligation but was transmissible to
Priscilla, who was consequently bound to comply with the obligation;  that the action had not yet
prescribed due to its being actually one for quieting of title that was imprescriptible brought by
Javellana who had actual possession of the properties; and that based on the
complaint, Javellana had been in actual possession since 1979, and the cloud on his title had
come about only when Priscilla had started dumping filling materials on the premises.[20]
 
On May 9, 2003, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration,  [21] stating that it decided
to give due course to the appeal even if filed out of time because Javellana had no intention to
delay the proceedings, as in fact he did not even seek an extension of time to file his appellants
brief; that current jurisprudence afforded litigants the amplest opportunity to present their cases
free from the constraints of technicalities, such that even if an appeal was filed out of time, the
appellate court was given the discretion to nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable reasons.
 
Issues
 
Priscilla then brought this appeal, averring that the CA thereby erred in not outrightly
dismissing Javellanas appeal because: (a) the June 21, 2000 RTC order was not appealable;
(b) the notice of appeal had been filed belatedly by three days; and (c) Javellana was guilty of
forum shopping for filing in the CA a petition for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC that
were the subject matter of his appeal pending in the CA. She posited that, even if the CAs
decision to entertain the appeal was affirmed, the RTCs dismissal of the complaint should
nonetheless be upheld because the complaint stated no cause of action, and the action had
already prescribed.
 
On his part, Javellana countered that the errors being assigned by Priscilla involved
questions of fact not proper for the Court to review through petition for review on certiorari; that
the June 21, 2000 RTC order, being a final order, was appealable; that his appeal was
perfected on time; and that he was not guilty of forum shopping because at the time he filed the
 
petition for certiorari the CA had not yet rendered a decision in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 68259, and because the issue of ownership raised in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 was
different from the issue of grave abuse of discretion raised in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.
 
Ruling
 
The petition for review has no merit.
 
I
Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal was a final order and appealable
 
 
Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000 was not the proper subject of an appeal
considering that Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that no appeal may be
taken from an order denying a motion for reconsideration.
 
Priscillas submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained.
 
First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by
the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final
order, not an interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory
orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,[22]thuswise:
 
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well
known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to
enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not
completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided
upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the
merits is yet to be held and the judgment
rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
 
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done
in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or
judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
 
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is
the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment
rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that appeal may be
taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable; [23] but the remedy from an
interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the
differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:
 
 xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to
avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the
hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the
appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits
of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to
incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many
appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order
may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered,
with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the
judgment itself.
 
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory
order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
 
Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of
a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has
expressly clarified that the prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for
 
reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order.
[24]

 
II
Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA
 
Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. She points out that he
received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on July 9, 1999, and filed his motion for
reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or after the lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied his motion
for reconsideration through the order of June 21, 2000, a copy of which he received on July 13,
2000; that he had only three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to
perfect an appeal; and that having filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, his appeal should
have been dismissed for being tardy by three days beyond the expiration of the reglementary
period.
 
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
 
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where
a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
 
 The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new
trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for
new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)
 
 
Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13, 2000, or until
July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal due to the timely filing of his motion for
reconsideration interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of the notice
of appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as Priscilla insists.
The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however, considering
that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] by
which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt
of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:
 
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has
the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more
simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the
rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42,
43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and
compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may
consist of 15 days or more.
 
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration.
 
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on
petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule
43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
partial) or any final order or resolution.[26]
 
 
The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has already retroactively
extended the fresh period rule to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage
and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure. [27] According to De los Santos v.
Vda. de Mangubat:[28]
  
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms
of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural
laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general
rule against the retroactive operation of statues ― they may be given retroactive
effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this
will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
 
The fresh period rule is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of
15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for
reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of
procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions,
such as the present case.
 
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the fresh period rule will
amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final
order were issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice
of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be
incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final
orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the fresh period rule while
those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.[29]
 
Consequently, we rule that Javellanas notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to
the fresh period rule.
 
III
No forum shopping was committed
 
 
Priscilla claims that Javellana engaged in forum shopping by filing a notice of appeal and
a petition for certiorari against the same orders. As earlier noted, he denies that his doing so
violated the policy against forum shopping.
 
The Court expounded on the nature and purpose of forum shopping in In Re:
Reconstitution of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and 303169 and Issuance of
Owners Duplicate Certificates of Title In Lieu of Those Lost, Rolando Edward G. Lim, Petitioner:
[30]

 
 
Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a
favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action
 of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on
the same cause or supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more
pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action,
and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia are present,
and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other,
there is forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an
action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent
the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
 
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical
causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where
different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were
raised, and two objectives were sought.
 
 
Should Javellanas present appeal now be held barred by his filing of the petition
for certiorari in the CA when his appeal in that court was yet pending?
 
We are aware that in Young v. Sy,[31] in which the petitioner filed a notice of appeal to
elevate the orders concerning the dismissal of her case due to non-suit to the CA and a petition
for certiorari in the CA assailing the same orders four months later, the Court ruled that the
successive filings of the notice of appeal and the petition for certiorari to attain the same
objective of nullifying the trial courts dismissal orders constituted forum shopping that warranted
the dismissal of both cases. The Court said:
 
Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a petition
for certiorari with the CA, engaged in forum shopping. When the petitioner
commenced the appeal, only four months had elapsed prior to her filing with the
CA the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and which eventually came up to this
Court by way of the instant Petition (re: Non-Suit). The elements of litis
pendentia are present between the two suits. As the CA, through its Thirteenth
Division, correctly noted, both suits are founded on exactly the same facts and
refer to the same subject matterthe RTC Orders which dismissed Civil Case No.
SP-5703 (2000) for
 
failure to prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is seeking the reversal of the
RTC orders. The parties, the rights asserted, the issues professed, and the
reliefs prayed for, are all the same. It is evident that the judgment of one forum
may amount to res judicata in the other.
xxxx
 The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive
and not alternative or cumulative. This is a firm judicial policy. The petitioner
cannot hedge her case by wagering two or more appeals, and, in the event that
the ordinary appeal lags significantly behind the others, she cannot post
facto validate this circumstance as a demonstration that the ordinary appeal had
not been speedy or adequate enough, in order to justify the recourse to Rule 65.
This practice, if adopted, would sanction the filing of multiple suits in
multiple fora, where each one, as the petitioner couches it, becomes a
precautionary measure for the rest, thereby increasing the chances of a
favorable decision. This is the very evil that the proscription on forum shopping
seeks to put right. In Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, the Court stated that the
grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the
rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory
decisions.Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a variety of
competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a
favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant confusion, the Court adheres
strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules
results in the dismissal of the case.[32]
 
 
The same result was reached in Zosa v. Estrella,[33] which likewise involved the
successive filing of a notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari to challenge the same orders,
with the Court upholding the CAs dismissals of the appeal and the petition for certiorari through
separate decisions.
 
Yet, the outcome in Young v. Sy and Zosa v. Estrella is unjust here even if the orders of
the RTC being challenged through appeal and the petition for certiorari were the same. The
unjustness exists because the appeal and the petition for certiorari actually sought different
objectives. In his appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to undo the RTCs
erroneous dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his judicial demand for
specific performance to be tried and determined in due course by the RTC; but his petition
for certiorari had the ostensible objective to prevent (Priscilla) from developing the subject
property and from proceeding with the ejectment case until his appeal is finally resolved, as the
CA explicitly determined in its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.[34]
 
Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against forum shopping
designed to prevent or to eliminate attendant. The first danger, i.e.,the multiplicity of suits upon
one and the same cause of action, would not materialize considering that the appeal was a
continuity of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455 dealt with an
independent ground of alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. The second danger, i.e., the unethical malpractice of
shopping for a friendly court or judge to ensure a favorable ruling or judgment after not getting it
in the appeal, would not arise because the CA had not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as
of the filing of the petition for certiorari.
 
Instead, we see the situation of resorting to two inconsistent remedial approaches to be
the result of the tactical misjudgment by Javellanas counsel on the efficacy of the appeal to
stave off his caretakers eviction from the parcels of land and to prevent the development of
them into a residential or commercial subdivision pending the appeal. In the petition
for certiorari, Javellana explicitly averred that his appeal was inadequate and not speedy to
prevent private respondent Alma Jose and her transferee/assignee xxx from developing and
disposing of the subject property to other parties to the total deprivation of petitioners rights of
possession and ownership over the subject property, and that the dismissal by the RTC had
emboldened private respondents to fully develop the property and for respondent Alma Jose to
file an ejectment case against petitioners overseer xxx.[35] Thereby, it became far-fetched that
Javellana brought the petition for certiorari in violation of the policy against forum shopping.
 
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on November 20, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
 
SO ORDERED.
 

Alvero vs. Dela Rosa

GR L-286 March 28, 1946
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, petitioner, 
vs.
ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondent.

E. M. Banzali for petitioner.

Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marcelo L. Mallari for
respondent.

TUASON, J.:

The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the
record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin,
in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in
connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the
accused. The motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.

According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of First
Instance in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary
investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and
asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then
his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses
could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal
and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was
sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right
to present evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first
instance.

Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to present evidence,
and by reason of that waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped,
we are of the opinion that the respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in
abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record for the purpose
set out therein. In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently
promulgated, in which case the respondent justice of the peace had allowed the accused, over
the complaint's objection, to recall the complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary
investigation so that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the justice of the peace's
order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of
the peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the
defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting
the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to
bring out the truth."

But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the complaint and
his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before
the issuance of the order of arrest." We called attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of
an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary
hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to
confront witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with
entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to
a fair trial.

The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the
majority and denied even any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding
the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the
petitioner.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.

 G.R. No. L-2068

TUASON, J.:
This cause is now before us on a motion for reconsideration. In the decision sought to be
reconsidered, we said, citing Dequito, et al. vs. Arellano, G. R. No. L-1336: "The constitutional
right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary
hearings; nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to
confront witnesses. As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely
without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair
trial." We took this ruling to be ample enough to dispose of the constitutional question pleaded
in the application for certiorari. Heeding  the wishes of the petitioner, we shall enlarge upon the 
subject.

It is contended that Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court [1] infringes Section 13, Article
VIII, of the Constitution.[2] It is said that the rule in question deals with substantive matters and
impairs substantive rights.

We can not agree with this view. We are of the opinion that Section 11 of Rule 108, like its
predecessors, is an adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law
creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous.
Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal
system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C. J. 980.) Substantive law is that part of
the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties
which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing
rights or obtains redress for their invasion. (36 C. J. 27; 52 C. J. S. 1026.)

As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and
prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which
provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. (22 C. J.
S. 49.) Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in
a criminal prosecution.

As a rule of evidence, Section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence - which is "the mode
and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to
establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" - is identified with and forms part of the
method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law,
a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice.
(State vs. Capaci, 154 So. 419, 179 La. 462.) The entire rules of evidence have been
incorporated into the Rules of Court. We can not tear down Section 11 of Rule 108 on
constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence embodied in these
Rules.

In Beazell vs.. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 70 L. ed. 216, the United States Supreme Court said:

"Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect that the constitutional
limitation may be transgressed by alterations in the rules of evidence or procedure. See Calder
v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L. ed. 648, 650; Cummings v. Missouri, Wall. 277, 326, 18 L. ed. 356,
364; Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 228, 232, 27 L. ed. 507, 508, 510, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443.
And there may be procedural changes which operate to deny to the accused a defense
available under the laws in force at the time of the commission of his offense, or which
otherwise affect him in such a harsh and arbitrary manner as to fall within the constitutional
prohibition. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 27 L. ed. 507, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443; Thompson v.
Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 42 L. ed. 1061, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 620. But it is now well settled that
statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused
of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage,
are not prohibited. A statute which, after indictment, enlarges the class of persons who may be
witnesses at the trial, by removing the disqualification of persons convicted of felony, is not an
ex post facto law. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 575, 28 L. ed. 263, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 202, 4 Am. Crim.
Rep. 417. Nor is a statute which changes the rules of evidence after the indictment so as to
render admissible against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible, Thompson v.
Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 43 L. ed. 204, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 922; or which changes the place of
trial, Gut v. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. ed. 573; or which abolishes a court for hearing criminal
appeals, creating a new one in its stead. See Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 382, 38 L. ed.
485, 487, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570."
Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the curtailment of the right of an accused in a
preliminary investigation to cross-examine the witnesses who had given evidence for his arrest
is of such importance as to offend against the constitutional inhibition. As we have said in the
beginning, preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due process of law. It may be
suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed
thereunder can not be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition.

While Section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a
preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his
constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him both at such investigation and at
the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty
of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be confronted by and
to cross-examine the witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a preliminary
investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that this formality is frequently waived.

The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is incapable of exact definition. The
difference is somewhat a question of degree. (Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F. 467; Beazell vs.
Ohio, supra.) It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative power
over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive rights of parties
affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P.
1102.) This being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on
substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such
incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a
defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the
Court's power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the
time of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a power to adopt a general, complete and
comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to their
source and discarding old ones.

The motion is denied.

Moran, Paras, Labrador, Bengzon, Briones, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
Perfecto, J., We dissent. Our opinion in the Dequito can still shows a motion for reconsideration
should be frauded.
Reyes, J., took no part.

[1] Rights of defendant after arrest. - After the arrest of the defendant and his delivery to the
court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He shall also be
informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he
desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so.
The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be
taken in writing and subscribed by him.

[2] The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The National Assembly shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
 FELIX MARTOS v. NEW SAN JOSE BUILDERS +

G.R. No. 192650

MENDOZA, J.:
Questioned in this Petition for Review is the July 31, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and its June 17, 2010 Resolution,[2]which  reversed and set aside the July 30,
2008 Decision[3] and October 28, 2008, Resolution[4] of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC); and reinstated the May 23, 2003 Decision[5] of the Labor Arbiter (LA). The
dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered, as follows:

1. Declaring the complainant Felix Martos was illegally dismissed and ordering respondent New
San Jose Builders, Inc. to pay him his separation pay, backwages, salary differentials, 13th
month pay, service incentive leave pay, and attorney's fees in the total amount of TWO
HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY ONE PESOS and 50/1000 (?260,
661.50).

The awards for separation pay, backwages and the corresponding attorney's fees are subject to
further computation until the decision in this case becomes final and executory; and

2. Dismissing the complaints/claim of the other complainants without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.[6]

The Facts

The factual and procedural antecedents were succinctly summarized by the CA as follows:
New San Jose Builders, Inc. (hereafter petitioner) is a domestic corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines and is engaged in the construction of road, bridges,
buildings, and low cost houses primarily for the government. One of the projects of petitioner is
the San Jose Plains Project (hereafter SJPP), located in Montalban, Rizal. SJPP, which is also
known as the "Erap City" calls for the construction of low cost housing, which are being turned
over to the National Housing Authority to be awarded to deserving poor families.

Private respondents alleged that, on various dates, petitioner hired them on different positions,
hereunder specified:

Names Date Employed Date Dismissed

1. Felix Martos October 5, 1998Feb July 2001ruary 25, 2002
2. Jimmy Eclana 1999
3. Rodel Pilones February 1999 July 2001
4. Ronaldo Noval
5. Jonathan Pailago
6. Ernesto Montaño 1998 2000
7. Doyong Jose 1996 July 2001
8. Deo Mamalateo 1999 July 2001
9. Roselo Magno 1994 November 2000
10. Bonnie Santillan 1998 July 2001
11. Arsenio Gonzales 1998 July 2001
12. Alex Edradan 1998 November 2001
13. Michael Erasca 1999 July 2001
14. Marlon Montaño 1998 July 2001
15. Vicente Oliveros April 5, 1998 July 2001
16. Reynaldo Lamboson 1999 July 2001
17. Domingo Rota 1998
18. Eddie Rota 1998
19. Zaldy Oliveros 1999 July 2001
20. Antonio Natel 1998 July 2001
21. Hermie Buison 1998 July 2001
22. Roger Buison 1998 2000
23. Mariano Lazate February 19, 1995
24. Juan Villaber January 10, 1997
25. Limuel Llaneta March 5, 1994
26. Lito Bantilo May 1987
27. Terso Garay October 3, 1986
28. Rowel Bestolo February 6, 1999
29. Jerry Yortas May 1994
30. Pastor Pantig April 11,1998
31. Gavino Nicolas June 20, 1997
32. Rafael Villa March 9, 1998
33. Felix Yortas 1992
34. Melvin Garay February 2, 1994
35. Neil Dominguez February 16, 1998
36. Reynaldo Evangelista, Jr. October 10, 1998
37. Jose Ramos October 10, 1998
38. Elvis Rosales June 14, 1998
39. Jun Graneho January 15, 1998
40. Danny Espares April 1999
41. Salvador Tonloc January 8, 1998
42. Rolando Evangelista March 15, 1998
43. Ricky M. Francisco September 28, 1991
44. Eduardo Alegria May 2001
45. Salvador Santos September 22, 2000
46. Greg Bisonia March 28, 1993
47. Rufo Carbillo March 28, 1993
48. Marvin Montero 1997 January 2001
49. Danilo Bessiri 1997 2002
50. Allan Caballero 1997 2002
51. Orlando Limos 1997 July 2001
52. Edgardo Biclar 1997 July 2001
53. Mandy Mamalatco 1989 2002
54. Alfred Gajo 1998 July 2001
55. Eric Castrence 1988 2002
56. Anthony Molina 1997 2002
57. Jaime Salin
58. Roy Silva 1997 2002
59. Danilo V. Begorie 1994 January 2001
60. Peping Celisana 1999 July 2001
61. Eric Ronda 1998 July 2001
62. Rufo Carbanillo 1998 July 2001
63. Rowel Batta 1999 July 2001
64. Ricardo Tolentino 1997 July 2001
65. Arnel Ardinez 1998 July 2001
66. Ferdinand P. Arandia 1998 1999
67. Romeo R. Garbo 1998 2000
68. Antonio Rota 1998 July 2001
69. Reynielande Quintanilla February 28, 1998 2002
70. Joselito Hilario 1998 2002
71. Jimmy Campana August 15, 1998 August 2001
72. Danilo Lido-An September 8, 1998
73. Emerson Peñaflor August 8,1998
74. Cesar Pabalinas
75. Jonathan Melchor November 1998
76. Alex David 1998
77. Eutiquio Alcala December 1999
78. Michael Carandang June 2000
79. Eduardo Nanuel October 1999
80. Ramon Evangelista February 15, 1998
81. Ruben Mendoza 1999 July 2001
82. Ernesto A. Mendoza 1998 July 2001
83. Ricky Ramos 1999 July 2001
84. Roberto Novella 1998 July 2001
85. Ruben Conde 1998 July 2001
86. Ramon Evangelista 1997 July 2001
87. Danilo Polistico 1999 July 2001
88. Domingo Mendoza 1999 July 2001
89. Fernando San Gabriel 1999 July 2001
90. Domingo Roto 1994 July 2001
Sometime in 2000, petitioner was constrained to slow down and suspend most of the works on
the SJPP project due to lack of funds of the National Housing Authority. Thus, the workers were
informed that many of them [would] be laid off and the rest would be reassigned to other
projects. Juan Villaber, Terso Garay, Rowell Batta, Pastor Pantig, Rafael Villa, and Melvin
Garay were laid off. While on the other hand, Felix Martos, Ariel Dominguez, Greg Bisonia,
Allan Caballera, Orlando Limos, Mandy Mamalateo, Eric Castrence, Anthony Molina, and Roy
Silva were among those who were retained and were issued new appointment papers to their
respective assignments, indicating therein that they are project employees. However, they
refused to sign the appointment papers as project employees and subsequently refused to
continue to work.

On different dates, three (3) Complaints for Illegal Dismissal and for money claims were filed
before the NLRC against petitioner and Jose Acuzar, by private respondents who claimed to be
the former employees of petitioner, to wit:

1. Complaint dated March 11, 2002, entitled "Felix  Martos, et al. vs. NSJBI", docketed as
NLRC-NCR Case No. 03-01639-2002;

2. Complaint dated July 9, 2002, entitled "Jimmy Campana, et al. vs. NSJBI," docketed as
NLRC-NCR Case No. 07-04969-2002;

3. Complaint dated July 4, 2002, entitled "Greg Bisonia, et al. vs. NSJBI", docketed as
NLRC-NCR Case No. 07-02888-2002.

Petitioner denies that private respondents were illegally dismissed, and alleged that they were
project employees, whose employments were automatically terminated upon completion of the
project for which they were hired. On the other hand, private respondents claim that petitioner
hired them as regular employees, continuously and without interruption, until their dismissal on
February 28, 2002.

Subsequently, the three Complaints were consolidated and assigned to Labor Arbiter Facundo
Leda.[7]

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

As earlier stated, on May 23, 2003, the LA handed down a decision declaring, among others,
that petitioner Felix Martos (Martos) was illegally dismissed and entitled to separation pay,
backwages and other monetary benefits; and dismissing, without prejudice, the
complaints/claims of the other complainants (petitioners).

Ruling of The NLRC

Both parties appealed the LA decision to the NLRC. Petitioners appealed that part which
dismissed all the complaints, without prejudice, except that of Martos. On the other hand, New
San Jose Builders, Inc. (respondent) appealed that part which held that Martos was its regular
employee and that he was illegally dismissed.

On July 30, 2008, the NLRC resolved the appeal by dismissing the one filed by respondent and
partially granting that of the other petitioners. The dispositive portion of the NLRC decision
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent's appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
appeal of the complainants is, however, PARTIALLY GRANTED by modifying the 23 May 2003
Decision of the Labor Arbiter Facundo L. Leda, in that, respondents are ordered to reinstate all
the complainants to their former positions, without loss of seniority rights and with full
backwages, counted from the time their compensation was withheld from them until actual
reinstatement.

Respondents are likewise ordered to pay complainants their salary differentials, service
incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay, using, as basis, the computation made on the claims
of complainant Felix Martos.

In all other aspects, the Decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Ruling Of The CA

After the denial of its motion for reconsideration, respondent filed before the CA a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, raising the
following issues:

The public respondent has committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the private
I)
respondents were regular employees and, thus, have been illegally dismissed.
The public respondent has committed grave abuse of discretion in reviving the complaints
II)
of the other private respondents despite their failure to verify the same.
The public respondent has committed grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the findings
III) of the Labor Arbiter granting relief in favor of those supposed complainants who did not
even render service to the petitioner and, hence, are not on its payroll.

On July 31, 2009, the CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the July 30, 2008
Decision and the October 28, 2008 Resolution of the NLRC and reinstating the May 23, 2003
Decision of the LA. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
assailed Resolution dated October 28, 2008 of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated May 23, 2003 of Labor
Arbiter Facundo L. Leda, is hereby ordered reinstated.

SO ORDERED.[9]
The CA explained that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reviving the complaints
of petitioners despite their failure to verify the same.  Out of the 102 complainants, only Martos
verified the position paper and his counsel never offered any explanation for his failure to secure
the verification of the others. The CA also held that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion
when it took cognizance of petitioners' appeal because Rule 41, Section 1(h) of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, which is suppletory, provides that no appeal may be taken from
an order dismissing an action without prejudice.

Nevertheless, the CA stated that the factual circumstances of Martos' employment and his
dismissal from work could not equally apply to petitioners because they were not similarly
situated. The NLRC did not even bother to look at the evidence on record and inappropriately
granted monetary awards to petitioners who had either denied having filed a case or withdrawn
the case against respondent. According to the CA, the position papers should have covered
only those claims and causes of action raised in the complaint excluding those that might have
been amicably settled.

With respect to Martos, the CA ruled that he was a regular employee of respondent and his
termination was illegal. It explained that Martos should have been considered a regular
employee because there was no indication that he was merely a project employee when he was
hired. To show otherwise, respondent should have presented his employment contract for the
alleged specific project and the successive employment contracts for the different projects or
phases for which he was hired. In the absence of such document, he could not be considered
such an employee because his work was necessary and desirable to the respondent's usual
business and that he was not required to sign any employment contract fixing a definite period
or duration of his engagement. Thus, Martos already attained the status of a regular employee.
Moreover, the CA noted that respondent did not report the termination of Martos' supposed
project employment to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), as required under
Department Order No. 19.

Being a regular employee, the CA concluded that he was constructively dismissed when he was
asked to sign a new appointment paper indicating therein that he was a project employee and
that his appointment would be co-terminus with the project.

Not in conformity with the CA decision, petitioners filed this petition anchored on the following

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LABOR
ARBITER BELOW GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINTS OF THE NINETY
NINE (99) PETITIONERS DUE TO FAILURE OF THE LATTER TO VERIFY THEIR POSITION
PAPER WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, SUCH TECHNICALITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
RESORTED TO BY THEM AS IT WILL DEPRIVE THESE PETITIONERS OF THEIR
PROPERTY RIGHT TO WORK.

B
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LABOR
ARBITER BELOW GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF
PETITIONER MARTOS AND THE OTHER 99 PETITIONERS WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, AND AS
FOUND BY THEM, THE DISMISSAL OF MARTOS IS ILLEGAL WHICH WOULD WARRANT
HIS REINSTATEMENT AND THE GRANT TO HIM OF FULL BACKWAGES AND OTHER
EMPLOYEES' BENEFITS.

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
ORDERING THE RESPONDENTS TO PAY THE PETITIONERS ACTUAL, MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

Position of Petitioners

Petitioners basically argue that the CA was wrong in affirming the dismissal of their complaints
due to their failure to verify their position paper. They insist that the lack of verification of a
position paper is only a formal and not a jurisdictional defect. Hence, it was not fatal to their
cause of action considering that the CA could have required them to submit the needed
verification.

The CA overlooked the fact that all of them verified their complaints by declaring under oath
relevant and material facts such as their names, addresses, employment status, salary rates,
facts, causes of action, and reliefs common to all of them. The information supplied in their
complaints is sufficient to prove their status of employment and entitlement of their monetary
claims. In the adjudication of labor cases, the adherence to stringent technical rules may be
relaxed in the interest of the working man. Moreover, respondent failed to adduce evidence of
payment of their money claims.

Finally, petitioners argue that they and Martos were similarly situated. The award of separation
pay instead of reinstatement to an illegally dismissed employee was improper because the
strained relations between the parties was not clearly established. Moreover, they are entitled to
actual, moral and exemplary damages for respondent's illegal act of violating labor standard
laws, the minimum wage law and the 13th month pay law.

Position of Respondents

On the other hand, respondent principally counters that the CA and the LA 1) did not err in
dismissing the complaints of the 88 petitioners who failed to verify their position paper, without
prejudice; 2) correctly ruled that Martos and the 88 petitioners concerned were not entitled to
reinstatement; and 3) correctly ruled that petitioners were not entitled to an award of actual,
moral and exemplary damages.

Petitioners have the propensity to disregard the mandatory provisions of the 2005 Revised
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (NLRC Rules)which require the parties to submit
simultaneously their verified position papers with supporting documents and affidavits. In the
proceedings before the LA, the complaints of the 99 workers were dismissed because they
failed to verify or affix their signatures to the position paper filed with the LA.
While it is true that the NLRC Rules must be liberally construed and that the NLRC is not bound
by the technicalities of law and procedure, it should not be the first to arbitrarily disregard
specific provisions of the rules which are precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining
just, expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes. It was only Felix Martos who
verified their position paper and their memorandum of appeal.  It was only he alone who was
vigilant in looking after his interest and enforcing his rights. Petitioners should be considered to
have waived their rights and interests in the case for their consistent neglect and passive
attitude.

Moreover, Martos was never authorized by any of his fellow complainants through a special
power of attorney or other document in the proceedings to represent them before the LA and
the NLRC. His acts and verifications were made only in his own personal capacity and did not
bind or benefit petitioners. There is only one logical reason why a majority of them failed to
verify their position paper, their appeal and now their petition: they were not in any way
employees of the respondent. They were total strangers to the respondent. They even refused
to identify themselves during the proceedings by their failure to appear thereat. Hence, it is too
late for the others to participate in the fruits, if any, of this litigation.

Finally, the reinstatement being sought by Martos and the others was no longer practicable
because of the strained relation between the parties. Petitioners can no longer question this
fact. This issue was never raised or taken up on appeal before the NLRC. It was only when the
petitioners lost in the appeal in the CA that they first raised the issue of strained relation.
Moreover, no proof of actual damages was presented by the petitioners. There is no clear and
convincing evidence on record showing that the termination of an employee's services had been
carried out in an arbitrary, capricious or malicious manner.

The Court's Ruling

The Court is basically asked to resolve two (2) issues: 1] whether or not the CA was correct in
dismissing the complaints filed by those petitioners who failed to verify their position papers; and
2] whether or not Martos should be reinstated.

Regarding the first issue, the Court agrees with the respondent.

Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide:

SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need
not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleadings and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information

and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief" or lacks a proper verification,
shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under
oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission
of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. x x x. [Emphases supplied]

The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an assurance that the

allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.[10] Verification is deemed
substantially complied with when, as in this case, one who has ample knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.[11]

The absence of a proper verification is cause to treat the pleading as unsigned and dismissible.
[12]

The lone signature of Martos would have been sufficient if he was authorized by his co-
petitioners to sign for them. Unfortunately, petitioners failed to adduce proof that he was so
authorized.  The complaints of the other parties in the case of Nellie Vda. De Formoso v. v.
PNB[13] suffered a similar fate. Thus:

Admittedly, among the seven (7) petitioners mentioned, only Malcaba signed the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping in the subject petition. There was no proof that Malcaba
was authorized by his co-petitioners to sign for them. There was no special power of attorney
shown by the Formosos authorizing Malcaba as their attorney-in-fact in filing a petition for
review on certiorari. Neither could the petitioners give at least a reasonable explanation as to
why only he signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping.

The liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some
excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the
essence of the proceeding and it at least connotes a reasonable attempt at compliance with the
rules. Besides, fundamental is the precept that rules of procedure are meant not to thwart but to
facilitate the attainment of justice; hence, their rigid application may, for deserving reasons, be
subordinated by the need for an apt dispensation of substantial justice in the normal course.
They ought to be relaxed when there is subsequent or even substantial compliance, consistent
with the policy of liberality espoused by Rule 1, Section 6.[14]  Not being inflexible, the rule on
verification allows for such liberality.[15]

Considering that the dismissal of the other complaints by the LA was without prejudice, the
other complainants should have taken the necessary steps to rectify their procedural mistake
after the decision of the LA was rendered.  They should have corrected this procedural flaw by
immediately filing another complaint with the correct verification this time. Surprisingly, they did
not even attempt to correct this technical blunder. Worse, they committed the same procedural
error when they filed their appeal[16] with the NLRC.

Under the circumstances, the Court agrees with the CA that the dismissal of the other
complaints were brought about by the own negligence and passive attitude of the complainants
themselves. In Formoso, the Court further wrote:

The petitioners were given a chance by the CA to comply with the Rules when they filed their
motion for reconsideration, but they refused to do so. Despite the opportunity given to them to
make all of them sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, they still failed to
comply. Thus, the CA was constrained to deny their motion and affirm the earlier resolution.

The Court can only do so much for them.

Most probably, as the list[17] submitted is not complete with the information as to when each
started and when each was dismissed there must be some truth in the claim of respondent that
those complainants who failed to affix their signatures in the verification were either not
employees of respondent at all or they simply refused to prosecute their complaints.  In its
position paper,[18] respondent alleged that, aside from the four (4) complainants who withdrew
their complaints, only 17 out of the more or less 104 complainants appeared on its records as its
former project employees or at least known by it to have worked in one of its construction
projects. From the sworn statements executed by Felix Yortas,[19] Marvin Batta,[20] Lito Bantillo,
[21]
 Gavino Felix Nicolas,[22] and Romeo Pangacian Martos,[23]they already withdrew their
complaints against respondent. Their status and cause of action not being clear and proven, it is
just not right that these complainants be considered as similarly situated as Martos and entitled
to the same benefits.

As to Martos, the Court agrees that the reinstatement being sought by him was no longer
practicable because of strained relation between the parties. Indeed, he can no longer question
this fact. This issue was never raised or taken up on appeal before the NLRC. It was only after
he lost the appeal in the CA that he raised it.

Thus, the Court deems it fair to award separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.  In addition to his
separation pay, Martos is also entitled to payment of full backwages, 13th month pay, service
incentive leave pay, and attorney's fees.

The accepted doctrine is that separation pay may avail in lieu of reinstatement if reinstatement
is no longer practical or in the best interest of the parties. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
may likewise be awarded if the employee decides not to be reinstated.

Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay is considered an
acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable.
On one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive
work environment. On the other hand, it releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable
obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust.[24]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

MARIA CONSOLACION RIVERA-PASCUAL, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES MARILYN LIM and

GEORGE LIM and the REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF VALENZUELA CITY, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated October 15, 20091 and
March 11, 20102 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 109265.ςηαñrοblεš
νιr†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

The facts leading to the filing of this petition are undisputed.

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Subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land with an approximate area of 4.4 hectares
and located at Bignay, Valenzuela City. The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. V-73892, registered in the names of George and Marilyn Lim (Spouses Lim).

On September 8, 2004, Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual (Consolacion) filed before the Office
of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region IV-A a petition to be
recognized as a tenant of a property located at Bignay, Valenzuela City against Danilo Deato
(Deato). At that time, the property, which has an approximate area of 4.4 hectares, was covered
by TCT No. 24759 under Deato s name. During the pendency of the petition, Deato sold the
property to Spouses Lim. The sale was registered on December 21, 2004 leading to the
issuance of TCT No. V-73892 in favor of Spouses Lim. Considering this development,
Consolacion filed a motion on March 3, 2005 to implead Spouses Lim as respondents.3ςrνll

The petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-0012-04, was granted
byRegional Adjudicator Conchita C. Miñas (RA Miñas) in a Decision4 dated December 2,
2005, the dispositive portion of which states:ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring that petitioner is the tenant of the subject landholding by succession from her
deceased father;

2) Declaring respondents spouses George and Marilyn Lim to have subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligation of spouses Danilo and Divina Deato;

3) Ordering the respondents and all persons claiming rights under them to maintain petitioner in
peaceful possession and cultivation of the agricultural land subject hereof;

4) Declaring petitioner to have the right to exercise the right of redemption of the subject parcel
of agricultural land pursuant to Section 12 of RA 3844 as amended; andcralawlibrary

5) Dismissing the petition against Louie Cruz, Fire Force Agency and Danny Boy Rivera for
having no proximate tenurial relationship with the petitioner hence beyond the jurisdictional
ambit of this Office.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

SO ORDERED.5ςrνll

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On July 7, 2006, the foregoing decision became final.6ςrνll

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Upon Consolacion s motion for execution filed on January 7, 2008, RA Miñas issued a writ of
execution on January 8, 2008.7ςrνll

On January 21, 2008, Consolacion filed a petition against Spouses Lim and the Registrar of
Deeds of Valenzuela City praying for the issuance of an order directing Spouses Lim to accept
the amount of P10,000,000.00 which she undertook to tender during the initial hearing,
declaring the property redeemed, and cancelling TCT No. V-73892.8 Consolacion consigned
with the RARAD the amount of P10,000,000.00 on March 3, 2008.9Ï‚rνll

Consolacion s petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-001-08, was given
due course by RA Miñas in a Decision10 dated June 2, 2008, the dispositive portion of which
states:ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:ςηαñrοblεš

νιr†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

1. As prayed for, declaring that the landholding subject of the petition as lawfully redeemed;

2. Ordering respondent spouses to accept and withdraw the amount of the redemption price
consigned with this Office which was deposited for safekeeping indicated in Manager s Check
No. 0000004518 issued by Allied Bank in the name of Spouses Marilyn and George Lim and/or
DAR Adjudication Board Region IV-A in the amount of ten (10) million pesos;
3. Upon acceptance and the withdrawal of the redemption price as ordered in paragraph 2
hereof, ordering respondent spouses to execute a Deed of Redemption in favor of petitioner;

4. In case of refusal and/or failure of respondent spouses to execute the Deed of Redemption
as ordered above, the Regional Clerk of the Board is hereby ordered to execute a Deed of
Redemption in the name of the petitioner; andcralawlibrary

5. Directing the Register of Deeds for Valenzuela City to cause the cancellation of TCT No. V-
73892 registered in the name of respondent spouses Marilyn and George Lim and a new one
issued in the name of petitioner upon presentment of the Deed of Redemption.

SO ORDERED.11ςrνll

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On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a

Decision12 on February 18, 2009 reversing RA Miñas Decision dated June 2, 2008.
Specifically:ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision dated 02 June 2008 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered:ςηαñrοblεš
νιr†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

1. DECLARING the landholding to be not lawfully redeemed;

2. DECLARING petitioner-appellee not a bona fide tenant of the subject landholding;

3. DECLARING that petitioner-appellee cannot redeem the subject parcel registered in the

names of the respondents-appellants;

4. ORDERING the respondents-appellants to be maintained in peaceful possession of the

subject landholding; andcralawlibrary

5. DIRECTING the Clerk of the Board of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Region
IV-A to return the Manager s Check No. 0000004518 issued by Allied Bank in the name of
Spouses Marilyn and George Lim and/or DAR Adjudication Board Region IV-A in the amount of
Ten Million pesos to herein petitioner-appellee.

SO ORDERED.13

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On April 13, 2009, Consolacion moved for reconsideration,14 which the DARAB denied in a
Resolution15dated June 8, 2009 for being filed out of time.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
lιbrαrÿ

SECTION 12 Rule X of the 2003 DARAB Rules provides that a Motion for Reconsideration shall
be filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the order, resolution, or decision of the
Board or Adjudicator. Records show that both the petitioner-appellee and her counsel received
a copy of the Decision dated 18 February 2009 on 27 February 2009 and that Legal Officer
Nancy Geocada, the alleged new counsel of the herein petitioner-appellee, filed the Motion for
Reconsideration only on 13 April 2009, clearly the Motion for Reconsideration was filed beyond
the fifteen (15) days (sic) reglementary period thus the herein Decision has already become
final and executory. x x x.16ςrνll

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On June 25, 2009, Consolacion filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
with the CA.17ςrνll

On July 1, 2009, the CA resolved to require Consolacion s counsel to submit within five (5) days
from notice his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance or
Exemption and an amended Verification and Certification Against Non-Forum-
Shopping.18 Apparently, Consolacion s counsel failed to indicate in the petition his MCLE
Certificate of Compliance or Exemption Number as required under Bar Matter No. 1922. Also,
the jurat of Consolacion s verification and certification against non-forum-shopping failed to
indicate any competent evidence of Consolacion s identity apart from her community tax
certificate.

Considering the failure of Consolacion and her counsel to comply, the CA issued a
Resolution19 on October 15, 2009 dismissing the petition.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
lιbrαrÿ

On July 7, 2009, the counsel for the petitioner received the above-mentioned Resolution.
However, the counsel for the petitioner failed to comply with the said Resolution which was due
on July 19, 2009.

For failure of the counsel for the petitioner to comply with the Resolution dated July 1, 2009,
despite receipt of the notice thereof, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.ςηαñrοblεš
νιr†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

SO ORDERED.20ςrνll

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Consolacion moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in a Resolution21 dated
March 11, 2010.

Consolacion is, before this Court, claiming that the CA s summary dismissal of her petition on
technical grounds is unwarranted. Consolacion invoked substantial justice against the CA s
strict application of the rule requiring her counsel to note his MCLE Compliance or Exemption
Certificate Number and the rule rendering the jurat of her verification and certification on non-
forum-shopping defective in the absence of the details of any one of her current identification
document issued by an official agency bearing her photograph and signature. That there was
merit in her petition and that she complied, albeit belatedly as her counsel s MCLE Compliance
Certificate Number was indicated and a verification and certificate on non-forum-shopping with a
proper jurat was attached to her motion for reconsideration, should have sufficed for the CA to
reverse the dismissal of her petition and decide the same on its merits. Consolacion alleged that
procedural rules or technicalities are designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and their
rigid application should be avoided if this would frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.

The Court finds no merit in the petition. The Court sees no reversible error committed by the CA
in dismissing Consolacion s petition before it on the ground of petitioner s unexplained failure to
comply with basic procedural requirements attendant to the filing of a Petition for Review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Notably, Consolacion and her counsel remained obstinate
despite the opportunity afforded to them by the CA to rectify their lapses. While there was
compliance, this took place, however, after the CA had ordered the dismissal of Consolacion s
petition and without reasonable cause proffered to justify its belatedness. Consolacion and her
counsel claimed inadvertence and negligence but they did not explain the circumstances
thereof. Absent valid and compelling reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in the
observance of procedural rules appears to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The
CA saw no compelling need meriting the relaxation of the rules. Neither does this Court see
any.

The Court is aware of the exceptional cases where technicalities were liberally construed.
However, in these cases, outright dismissal is rendered unjust by the presence of a satisfactory
and persuasive explanation. The parties therein who prayed for liberal interpretation were able
to hurdle that heavy burden of proving that they deserve an exceptional treatment. It was never
the Court s intent "to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity."22ςrνll

This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural rules. It is the duty of every
member of the bar to comply with these rules. They are not at liberty to seek exceptions should
they fail to observe these rules and rationalize their omission by harking on liberal construction.

While it IS the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that led to this unfortunate result, she is
bound by such.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated

October 15, 2009 and March 11, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109265
are AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.