Land Titles and 

Forgery

The Torrens System

The simplified system of titling lands was introduced by Sir Richard Robert Torrens in
South Australia in 1857, known as the Torrens system. The system, also known as “title by
registration” replaced the system of “title by deeds” (also known as “deeds system”), an old,
expensive and complicated system of tracing deeds.[1] Stated differently, the Torrens system
involves registration of title while the deeds system involves registration of instruments. Under
the Torrens system, the certificate is guaranteed by the law, and, with certain exceptions,
constitutes indefeasible title to the land mentioned therein[2]; unlike the deeds system which
proof of ownership to the land is traced through a series of instruments affecting the land (also
known as “chain of title”), hence, title to the land is often uncertain and unreliable.

The Torrens system therefore does away the need for a chain of title and instead puts a
stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted on the
certificate itself at the time of registration or those that arose subsequent thereto. Once the title
is registered, the owners can rest secure on their ownership and possession.[3] This principle of
the Torrens system is also known as the curtain principle – one does not need to look behind
the certificate of title and that ownership need not be proved by backtracking a series  of
documents.
Act No. 496, or the Land Registration Act of 1903 enacted by the Philippine Commission placed
all public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system.[4] The principles of the
Torrens system are recognized to the fullest extent in our registration law which is now the 1978
Property Registration Decree, which has codified all laws relative to land registration.[5]

However, the system does not furnish a shield for fraud, nor permit one to enrich himself
at the expense of others. The indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud
and misrepresentation. While registration operates as a notice of the deed, contract or
instrument to others, it does not add to its validity nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid
one. The registration under the Torrens system is not an impediment to a declaration by the
Courts of its invalidity.[6]

Forgery involving land titles and real properties

The following discussion will tackle on the legal principles governing falsification of land titles,
deeds and other instruments affecting transfers of real property and other interests thereto.

1. Forged deed

Generally, a forged or fraudulent deed or any instrument effecting transfer of ownership is a

nullity and conveys no title.[7] When the instrument presented to the Registry of Deeds for
registration is forged, even if accompanied by the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the
registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee or the
mortgagee, for that matter, acquire any right or title to the property.[8] Accordingly, an innocent
purchaser for value protected by law is one who purchases a titled land by virtue of a deed
executed by the registered owner himself, not by a forged deed.[9] This principle is expressed
under the third paragraph of Section 53 of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the “Property
Registration Decree” which reads:
 Section 53. x x x.
x x x. After the entry of the decree of registration on the original petition or application, any
subsequent registration procured by the presentation of a forged duplicate certificate of title, or a
forged deed or other instrument, shall be null and void.

Hence, a forged deed conveys no title and any transaction that has transpired by virtue of the
same document is an absolute nullity. Since no ownership was conveyed, the issued Transfer
Certificate of Title by reason of the forged instrument has no basis at all. Consequently, the
person who buys the real property in question cannot take refuge in the protection accorded by
the Torrens system on titled lands.[10]
Furthermore, while one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look behind the
certificate of title, one who buys from one who is not the registered owner is expected to
examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to
determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the
land. The Court has consistently applied the stricter rule when it comes to deciding the issue of
good faith of one who buys from one who is not the registered owner, but one who exhibits a
certificate of title.[11]

2. Innocent purchaser (buyer in good faith)

An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest therein and who then pays a full and fair price for it
at the time of the purchase or before receiving a notice of the claim or interest of some other
persons in the property. Buyers in good faith buy a property with the belief that the person from
whom they receive the thing is the owner who can convey title to the property. Such buyers do
not close their eyes to facts that should put a reasonable person on guard and still claim that
they are acting in good faith.[12]

In order that the holder of a certificate for value issued by virtue of the registration of a voluntary
instrument may be considered a holder in good faith and for value, the instrument registered
should not be forged.[13] As mentioned earlier, an innocent purchaser for value is one who buys
a titled land by virtue of a deed executed by the registered owner himself and not by a forged
deed. It is important to determine whether a purchaser of the land is an innocent purchaser for
value since the law protects them. The first sentence of the third paragraph of Section 53 of
P.D. 1529 provides:

Section 53. x x x.
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable
remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any
innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)

However, the second sentence of the above-cited provision (earlier quoted provision) operates
as a qualification of the first sentence or rather a limitation to the concept of innocent
purchaser[14] since it provides that if the subsequent registration was effected by means of
forgery, the same shall be null and void. This is the reason why there can be no “buyer in good
faith” when the instrument registered is forged. Thus, a purchaser who acquires a real property
by virtue of a falsified deed of sale has no right whatsoever as against the true owner of the
property even if he is a holder for value of a certificate of title. This usually happens when a
 person buys a property from a seller pretending to be the registered owner or an agent of the
owner acting on the latter’s behalf without corresponding authority.

3. Forged deed conveys no title, exception

In the case of Spouses Peralta v. Heirs of Abalon[15], departing from the rule that a forged or
fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title, the Court applied the exception. The case
involves a parcel of land registered under the name of Bernardina Abalon and fraudulently
transferred to Restituto Rellama and who, in turn, subdivided the subject property and sold it
separately to the Spouses Dominador and Ofelia Peralta; and Marissa, Leonil and Arnel, all
surnamed Andal. Thereafter, Spouses Peralta and the Andals individually registered the
respective portions of the land they had bought under their names. The heirs of Bernardina
were claiming back the land, alleging that since it was sold under fraudulent circumstances, no
valid title passed to the buyers. On the other hand, the buyers, who were now title holders of the
subject parcel of land, averred that they were buyers in good faith and sought the protection
accorded to them under the law. The Court in affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals,
held that despite the fraud that marred the sale between Bernardina Abalon and Rellama, a
fraudulent or forged document of sale may still give rise to a valid title if the certificate of title
has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name of the forger or to
the name indicated by the forger and remained as such, the land is considered to have been
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser, whose title is thus considered valid. The Court also
said:

“The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot convey title, the
exception thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, denotes the registration
of titles from the forger to the innocent purchaser for value. Thus, the qualifying point here is
that there must be a complete chain of registered titles. This means that all the transfers
starting from the original rightful owner to the innocent holder for value – and that includes the
transfer to the forger – must be duly registered, and the title must be properly issued to the
transferee. x x x.”
(Emphasis supplied)

Likewise in an earlier case, the Court ruled in Obsequio v. Court of Appeals[16] that

reconveyance of the property in question in favor of the previous owner by reason of an alleged
forged deed of sale is not proper. It held that the subsequent buyers of the property are
considered “purchasers in good faith” and there is no showing nor even an allegation that they
had any participation in the alleged forgery. Neither the buyers can be said negligent since at
the time of the sale, the land was already registered in the name of the seller including the tax
declaration. There is no annotation, defect or flaw in the title that would have aroused any
suspicion as to its authenticity and such being the case, the buyers have the right to rely on
what appears on the face of the certificate of title.

The old case of Fule v. De Legare[17] however, holds a similar ruling but with a slightly different
factual situation. While it appears that at the time the petitioners bought the property from John
Legare the property is not yet registered under the latter’s name, the Court held that this fact
alone does not strip the petitioners’ status as innocent purchasers for value. Although the title
was still under the name of respondent Emilia De Legare, the transfer certificate was already in
the possession of her adopted son, John Legare. The Court anchored its ruling from Section 55
of Act No. 496 (Section 53 of P.D. 1529) which provides that such possession and its
subsequent production to the petitioners operated as a “conclusive authority from the registered
 owner to the Register of Deeds to enter a new certificate.” Although the deed of sale in favor of
John Legare was fraudulent, the fact remains that he was able to secure a registered title to the
house and lot. It was this title which he subsequently conveyed to the petitioners.

Simply put, while the forger or the person who acquired the property through forgery acquires
no right or title over the same, if he has successfully registered the property under his name, his
subsequent transfer or encumbrance of the property in favor of an innocent third person who
had relied on the correctness of the issued certificate of title grants the latter the right over the
property and the court cannot disregard the same. This is a well recognized rule that a forged
deed or even a void title may still be a source of a valid title.

However, this doctrine has no application where the owner still holds a valid and existing
certificate of title covering the same interest in a realty; i.e., when the original owner retained
possession of the title, but through fraud, another person secured a court order for the issuance
of a copy thereof. The proper application of the exception is where the forger, thru insidious
means, obtains the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, converts it in his name, and
subsequently sells or otherwise encumbers it to an innocent holder for value, for in such a case
the new certificate is binding upon the owner (Sec.55, Act 496; Sec. 53, P.D. No. 1529). So if
the owner holds a valid and existing certificate of title, his would be indefeasible as against the
whole world, and not that of the innocent holder’s – prior tempore potior jure (earlier in time,
priority in right).[18]

4. Who is NOT an innocent purchaser; Exception to exception

A person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title itself
and to dispense with the need of inquiring further EXCEPT: (1) when the party has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such inquiry; or (2) when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his
vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the
title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion
should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the
vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither
be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith; and hence does
not merit the protection of the law.[19]

A certificate of title issued to an innocent purchaser for value cannot be revoked on the ground
that the deed of sale was falsified, if he had no knowledge of the fraud committed.
[20]Otherwise, the purchaser cannot be deemed as a purchaser in good faith.

In the Peralta case, while the Court upheld the Andals as buyers in good faith, the other buyers,
Spouses Peralta, were not. In upholding also the appellate court’s decision, the Court held that
there is a factual finding that in purchasing the subject property, the spouses merely relied on
the photocopy of the title provided by Rellama. A mere photocopy of the title should have made
Spouses Peralta suspicious that there was some flaw in the title of Rellama, because he was
not in possession of the original copy.

Thus, the exception to the general rule that a forged deed conveys no right or title as discussed
above have no application when there is a showing that the purchaser (or even a mortgagee) of
the property in question has actual knowledge of the fraud or forgery, or was placed under the
circumstances that would impel him to make further inquiries about the property and its vendor
 (or mortgagor) but otherwise failed to do so. A purchaser in bad faith or a negligent purchaser is
considered an exception to the exception.

5. Rule on Special Power of Attorney (SPA)

Section 64 of P.D. 1529 provides that any person may, by power of attorney, convey or
otherwise deal with registered land and the same shall be registered with the Register of Deeds
of the province or city where the land lies; and any instrument revoking the same shall be
registered in like manner. In relation to this, Article 1874 of the Civil Code provides that when a
sale of piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall
be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void.

A special power of attorney is a continuing one and absent a valid revocation duly furnished to a
third person, the same continues to have force and effect as against third persons who had no
knowledge of such lack of authority.[21]

While the general rule is that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title, a higher degree of prudence is required from one who buys
from a person who is not the registered owner, although the land object of the transaction is
registered. In such a case, the buyer is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but
all factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the
transferor. The buyer also has the duty to ascertain the identity of the person with whom he is
dealing with and the latter’s legal authority to convey the property.[22]

Settled is the rule that every person dealing with an agent or any person other than the
registered owner of the property is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril the
authority of the agent, and this is especially true where the act of the agent is of unusual nature.
If a person makes no inquiry, he is chargeable with knowledge of the agent’s authority, and his
ignorance of that authority will not be any excuse.[23]

In the issue of whether or not the buyer of the property under a deed of sale executed in the
name of the registered owner by a fake agent or attorney-in-fact is deemed a purchaser in good
faith, the Court in Solivel v. Francisco[24] laid down the ruling based on two different scenarios.
[25] In this case, the lower court upheld that the vendee is an innocent purchaser for value
despite the fact that the power-of-attorney is forged. It applied the case of Blondeau v.
Nano[26] which sustained foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under a deed which, though
allegedly forged, had nonetheless been duly registered because one of the two co-owners had
given the alleged forger not only his power-of-attorney but also possession of the title papers.
However, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision applying instead the case of De
Lara v. Ayroso[27]where it annulled a mortgage executed by an impostor who had, without
authority, gained possession of the certificate of title thru the owner’s daughter and simulated
the owner’s name to the deed of mortgage. The Court explained that in Blondeau, the owner’s
negligence or acquiescence, if not actual connivance, had made possible the commission of the
fraud, while in De Lara, the title was still in the name of the real owner when the land was
mortgaged by the impostor. The mortgagee was defrauded not because they relied upon what
appeared in a Torrens certificate of title — there was nothing wrong with the certificate — but
because they believed the words of the impostor when he told them that he was the person
 named as owner in the certificate. Simply stated, a person cannot be regarded as a
purchaser/mortgagee in good faith if he himself was negligent in the real estate transaction he
entered into and failed to exercise the degree of prudence required from one who buys from a
person who is not the registered owner.

6. The rule on mortgagees

Section 32 of P.D. 1529 extends the protection given to an innocent purchaser for value to an
innocent mortgagee. The term “innocent purchaser for value” also includes an innocent lessee.
[28] The said provision provides:

Section 32. x x x. Whenever the phrase “innocent purchaser for value” or an equivalent phrase
occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value.

The rule on good faith equally applies to mortgagees and even in lessees and other
encumbrancers for value of the real property. So while a purchaser need not look behind the
certificate of title and has the right to rely solely on what appears on its face, the same rule
applies to lessees and mortgagees.

Thus, despite the fact that the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, his title
being fraudulent, the mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given
effect by reason of public policy. This is the doctrine of “the mortgagee in good faith” based on
the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, as
buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. The
public interest in upholding the indefeasibility of a certificate of title, as evidence of the lawful
ownership of the land or of any encumbrance thereon, protects a buyer or mortgagee who, in
good faith, relied upon what appears on the face of the certificate of title.[29]

Where the certificate of title is in the name of the mortgagor when the land is mortgaged, the
innocent mortgagee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the certificate of title. In
the absence of anything to excite suspicion, said mortgagee is under no obligation to look
beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing on the face of said
certificate. Although Article 2085 of the Civil Code provides that absolute ownership of the
mortgaged property by the mortgagor is essential, the subsequent declaration of a title as null
and void is not a ground for nullifying the mortgage right of a mortgagee in good faith.[30]

Likewise, the fact that the foreclosure of the mortgage and the subsequent auction sale were
effected after the annotation of the adverse claim is of no moment. The foreclosure sale
retroacts to the date of registration of the mortgage. The lien of the innocent mortgagee for
value must be respected and protected.[31] As to third persons therefore, a prior registration of
a lien creates a preference and even a subsequent registration of a much earlier claim will not
diminish this preference.[32]

The mortgagees in the case of Llanto v. Alzona[33] entered into a contract of mortgage with the
mortgagors pretending to be the owners of the property. In this case, the mortgagees first
conducted a credit investigation, inspected the property and met the persons who represented
themselves to be the owners of the property before they entered into the transaction. The Court,
 in upholding the validity of the contract, said that the doctrine of “mortgagee in good faith” is an
exception to the rule enunciated under Article 2085 of the Civil Code which provides that one of
the essential requisites of the contract of mortgage is that the mortgagor should be the absolute
owner of the property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is considered null and void.

However, this doctrine presupposes that the mortgagor, who is not the rightful owner of the
property, has already succeeded in obtaining Torrens title over the property in his name and
that, after obtaining the said title, he succeeds in mortgaging the property to another who relies
on what appears on the title.[34] Hence, the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith does not apply
to a situation where the title is still in the name of the rightful owner and the mortgagor is a
different person pretending to be the owner. In such a case, the mortgagee is not an innocent
mortgagee for value and the registered owner will generally not lose his title.[35] In the same
vein, the doctrine has no application where the owner could not be charged with negligence in
the keeping of its duplicate certificates of title or with any act which could have brought about
the issuance of another title relied upon by the purchaser or mortgagee for value, as the
innocent registered owner has a better right over the mortgagee in good faith. For the law
protects and prefers the lawful holder of registered title over the transferee of a vendor bereft of
any transmissible rights.[36] These situations are also the known exceptions to innocent
purchasers in good faith as discussed above.

7. Banks as mortgagee

The rule is different however, with respect to banks and other financial institutions. The rule that
persons dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the certificate of title does not apply to
banks.[37] Banks are enjoined to exercise a higher degree of diligence, care, and prudence in
handling real estate transactions, especially those involving registered lands. Thus, a banking
institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract.[38]

Unlike private individuals, banks cannot rely merely on the certificate of title offered by the
mortgagor in ascertaining the status of mortgaged properties. Since its business is impressed
with public interest, the mortgagee-bank is duty-bound to be more cautious even in dealing with
registered lands. Thus, before approving a loan application, it is a standard operating practice
for these institutions to conduct an ocular inspection of the property offered for mortgage and to
verify the genuineness of the title to determine the real owners thereof. The apparent purpose of
an ocular inspection is to protect the true owner of the property as well as innocent third parties
with a right, interest or claim thereon from a usurper who may have acquired a fraudulent
certificate of title thereto.[39] If it did not conduct such examination and investigation, it must be
held guilty of gross negligence in granting the loans secured by the real property in question and
the bank cannot be considered as a mortgagee in good faith.[40]

The Court in Rural Bank of Compostela v. Court of Appeals[41]has once again stated the rule
on mortgagee in good faith with respect to banks, viz:

“Banks, indeed, should exercise more care and prudence in dealing even with registered lands,
than private individuals, for their business is one affected with public interest, keeping in trust
money belonging to their depositors, which they should guard against loss by not committing
any act of negligence which amounts to lack of good faith by which they would be denied the
protective mantle of the land registration statute, Act [No.] 496, extended only to purchasers for
value and in good faith, as well as to mortgagees of the same character and description.”
 Likewise, the due diligence required of banks extends even to persons regularly engaged in the
business of lending money secured by real estate mortgages.[42] Same degree of diligence is
also required with respect to investment, financing and realty corporations which because of the
nature of their business, are expected to exercise a higher standard of diligence in ascertaining
the status of the property, not merely relying on what appears on the face of the title.[43]

8. “Double sale” and forgery cannot co-exist

When a real property was sold to two different persons or more at the same time, the ownership
of such immovable property is governed by Article 1544 of the Civil Code, otherwise known as
the rule on “double sale” (or which is more appropriate as “multiple sale”). Said provision
provides:

Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, x x x.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.

One example of a situation where the provision of the law could be properly applied is where the
owner sold his property to a person while at the same time, his agent or any person acting on
the owner’s behalf sold the same to another, the two sellers as well as the two different buyers
being fully unaware of each other’s transaction, and all are acting in good faith. Simply
speaking, there are two valid sales and the question of who among the two buyers has the right
of ownership arises. In such a case, the law provides that the hierarchy of preference as to
whom ownership shall belong is as follows:

1. first registrant in good faith;

2. first possessor in good faith;
3. the person who in good faith presents the oldest title

It is worth noting that in every case, good faith is an indispensable requirement. The law does
not apply however, if the property is not registered under the Torrens system. The issue of
buyer’s good faith or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land,
and the purchaser is buying the same from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean.
[44] Moreover, the registration contemplated under Art. 1544 of the Code refers to registration
under P.D. 1529.[45]

Inasmuch as the rule on double sale is premised on the existence of two or more valid sales of
the same property, there is no “double sale” to speak of when there is fraud or forgery involved.
Hence, Art. 1544 does not apply. In Fudot v. Cattleya Land, Inc.[46], the Court ruled that Art.
1544 is not applicable in the instant case – the second sale in favor of petitioner is without the
consent of the other spouse and the latter’s signature in the deed being forged. The Court also
cited the case of Remalante v. Tibe[47] where it ruled that the Civil Law provision on double
 sale is not applicable where there is only one valid sale, the previous sale having been found to
be fraudulent. Likewise, in Espiritu and Apostol v. Valerio[48], where the same parcel of land
was purportedly sold to two different parties, the Court held that despite the fact that one deed
of sale was registered ahead of the other, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code will not apply where said
deed is found to be a forgery, the result of this being that the right of the other vendee should
prevail.

Remedy of the true owner or the aggrieved party

1. Direct attack on title

It is settled in this jurisdiction that the issue of the validity of title can only be assailed in an
action expressly instituted for such purpose. A certificate of title cannot be attacked collaterally.
This rule is provided under Section 48 of PD 1529 which states that:[49]
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. ― A certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
In Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals[50], it was stated that it is a well-known doctrine that the issue as
to whether title was procured by falsification or fraud as advanced by petitioner can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose. A Torrens title can be attacked only for
fraud, within one yearafter the date of the issuance of the decree of registration. Such attack
must be direct, and not by a collateral proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot
be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding. In Carvajal v.
Court of Appeals[51], it was ruled that an application for registration of an already titled land
constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title. The title may be challenged only in a
proceeding for that purpose, not in an application for registration of a land already registered in
the name of another person. After one year from its registration, the title is incontrovertible and
is no longer open to review.[52]
2. Action for reconveyance
After the lapse of one year, a decree of registration is no longer open to review or attack,
although its issuance is attended with fraud.[53] This does not mean, however, that the
aggrieved party is without remedy at law. If the property has not as yet passed to an innocent
purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance is still available. The sole remedy of the land
owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name is, after
one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of
justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser
for value, for damages.[54]
It has been held that an original owner of registered land may seek annulment of the transfer
thereof on the ground of fraud and the proper remedy is reconveyance.[55] An action for
reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy that seeks to transfer or reconvey property,
wrongfully registered in another person’s name, to its rightful owner. To warrant reconveyance
of the land, the plaintiff must allege and prove, among others, ownership of the land in dispute
and the defendant’s erroneous, fraudulent or wrongful registration of the property.[56] In the
action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is highly respected as incontrovertible; what
is sought instead is the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s
name to its rightful owner or to the one with a better right.[57]
In New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco[58], the Court enumerated the four requisites that
must concur for an action for reconveyance to prosper, to wit:
 “To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must concur: (1) the action
must be brought in the name of a person claiming ownership or dominical right over the land
registered in the name of the defendant; (2) the registration of the land in the name of the
defendant was procured through fraud or other illegal means; (3) the property has not yet
passed to an innocent purchaser for value; and (4) the action is filed after the certificate of title
had already become final and incontrovertible but within four years from the discovery of the
fraud or not later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust. x x x.”

Reconveyance is based on Section 53 of P.D. 1529 which provides that in all cases of
registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies
against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder
for value of a certificate of title. In civil law, the basis of an action for reconveyance is the trust
created by virtue of Art. 1456 of the Civil Code which provides that a person acquiring property
through fraud becomes by operation of law a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real
owner of the property. The presence of fraud creates an implied trust in favor of the plaintiffs,
giving them the right to seek reconveyance of the property from the private respondents. The
aggrieved party may file an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust,
which prescribes in ten years from the date of the issuance of the Certificate of Title over the
property provided that the property has not been acquired by an innocent purchaser for value.
[59]
While it is true that an action for reconveyance can prescribe or can be barred by statute of
limitations, an action for reconveyance based on a void contract is imprescriptible.[60]Thus, the
action based on a fictitious, fraudulent or forged deed may be brought by the aggrieved party at
any time.[61]
3. Action for damages
When the property has already passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, an
action for reconveyance is no longer appropriate. This is so because as a rule, a purchaser in
good faith is an exception to the general rule that a forged deed conveys no title. Nonetheless,
the true owner is not without recourse. He can still file an action for damages against the
person/s responsible for his loss of right or interest in his property.

A certificate of title issued to an innocent purchaser and for value cannot be revoked on the
ground that the deed of sale was falsified, if he had no knowledge of the fraud committed. The
recourse of the person prejudiced is to bring an action for damages against those who caused
or employed the fraud.[62]The Court cannot disregard the rights of an innocent purchaser for
value and order the total cancellation of the certificate for that would impair public confidence in
the certificate of title.[63]
An action for damages should be brought within ten years from the date of issuance of the
questioned certificate of title pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code.[64]
4. Cancellation of title
An action for cancellation of title is applicable where there are two titles issued to different
persons for the same lot. Where the same parcel of land is covered by two titles, necessarily
when one of the two titles is held to be superior over the other, the latter should be declared null
and void and should be cancelled.[65] In case of forgery, this rule contemplates a situation
where the true owner despite retaining possession of his duplicate certificate, through fraud,
another person succeeded in selling the property in his favor and another certificate of title was
issued as a result thereof.[66]
The general rule is that where two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the
same land in whole or in part, the earlier date must prevail as between the original parties, and
in case of successive registration where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the
 person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who relies
on the second certificate.[67] This principle is based on the maxim prior est in tempore, potior
est in jure (first in time, stronger in right) which is being followed in our jurisdiction in land
registration matters.[68]
It should be noted also that an action for cancellation of title is not an attack on the title. An
action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title,
thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct
when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the
other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.[69]
With respect to the aggrieved party however, the Court ruled in Gatioan v. Gaffud[70] that the
purchaser from the owner of the later certificate and his successors, should resort to his vendor
for redress, rather than molest the holder of the first certificate and his successors, who should
be permitted to rest secure their title.
5. Recovery from the Assurance Fund
The Assurance Fund is intended to relieve innocent persons from the harshness of the doctrine
that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to the land.[71]
If the property has already passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the
remedy is to file an action for damages from the person who allegedly registered the property
through fraud, or if he had become insolvent or if the action is barred by prescription, to file an
action for recovery against the Assurance Fund under Section 95 of P.D. 1529 within a period of
six years from the time the right to bring such action accrues.[72]
Section 95 of P.D. 1529 provides:

Section 95. Action for compensation from funds. A person who, without negligence on his part,
sustains loss or damage, or is deprived of land or any estate or interest therein in consequence
of the bringing of the land under the operation of the Torrens system of arising after original
registration of land, through fraud or in consequence of any error, omission, mistake or
misdescription in any certificate of title or in any entry or memorandum in the registration book,
and who by the provisions of this Decree is barred or otherwise precluded under the provision of
any law from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or the estate or interest therein,
may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction for the recovery of damages to be
paid out of the Assurance Fund.
The foregoing provision states all the requisites and conditions necessary before a person may
recover from the Assurance Fund. In one case[73], the Court denied the petitioner’s claim
against the Assurance Fund. The Court held in this wise:
“Petitioner’s claim against the Assurance Fund must necessarily fail. Its situation does not come
within the ambit of the cases protected by the Assurance Fund. It was not deprived of land in
consequence of bringing it under the operation of the Torrens system through fraud or in
consequence of any error, omission, mistake or misdescription in the certificate of title. It was
simply a victim of unscrupulous individuals. More importantly, it is a condition sine qua non that
the person who brings the action for damages against the Assurance Fund be the registered
owner and, as the holders of transfer certificates of title, that they be innocent purchasers in
good faith and for value. And we have already established that petitioner does not qualify as
such.”
An action for compensation from the Assurance Fund must be filed against the Register of
Deeds of the province or city where the land is situated and the National Treasurer as
defendants when “such action is brought to recover for loss or damage or for deprivation of land
or any estate or interest therein arising wholly through fraud, negligence, omission, mistake or
misfeasance of the court personnel, Register of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the
 registry in the performance of their respective duties.” (Section 96, Presidential Decree No.
1529). If “such action is brought to recover for loss or damage or for deprivation of land or any
interest therein arising through fraud, negligence, mistake or misfeasance of persons other than
court personnel, the Register of Deeds, his deputy or other employees of the registry,” the
action must be brought against the Register of Deeds, the National Treasurer, as well as other
persons as co-defendants.[74]
The claim against the Assurance Fund must be brought within a period of six (6) years from the
time the right to bring such action first occurred.[75]
6. Criminal case
6.1 Falsification
Forgery is a crime defined and penalized under Chapter I, Title IV, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code which is Crimes Against Public Interest. Crimes categorized under this title are those
involving fraud, deceit and falsity against the public at large. Falsification is the term applied by
the Code for forgery of documents, whether it is a public, private or commercial document,
although the Code did not specifically provide the definition of each.

A deed having been acknowledged before a Notary Public is considered a public document and
an unnotarized deed is considered a private document.

Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code punishes falsification of documents committed by a
public officer taking advantage of his official position while Article 172 of the same Code
punishes falsification committed by a private individual and the use of such falsified document to
the damage of a third party or with the intent to cause such damage.

Falsification of deeds, power of attorneys or other instruments affecting real properties is

punishable under Art. 171 or Art. 172 of the RPC if committed by a public officer or a private
individual, respectively. It should be noted however, that with respect to private individuals,
based from the reading of the said provisions, ‘damage to third party or intent to cause such
damage’ is not an element of the crime of falsification of public or commercial documents,
whereas the same is material when it comes to private documents.

Stated differently, falsification in Article 171 by public officers, whether the document is private,
public or commercial, and falsification in the first paragraph of Article 172 by private individuals
which pertains to public or commercial documents, are committed by the mere performance of
any of the acts specified therein (acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171); while
falsification in the second paragraph of Article 172 by private individuals which pertains to
private documents, is committed by the performance of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Article 171 coupled with the damage to the third party or with intent to cause such damage even
without actual damage. The element of damage therefore is not necessary when the document
involved is a public or commercial document.
The rationale for the distinction is provided by the Court in the case of People v. Pacana[76],
citing the December 23, 1885 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, to wit:
“x x x[I]n the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by private
persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third
person, for the reason that, in contradiction to private documents, the principal thing punished is
the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.”
 Aside from actions to redeem the property, the true owner of the property or any person
aggrieved by reason of the alleged forgery may pursue a criminal action against the wrongdoer
and may file an information for Falsification of Public Document under the RPC.

In Recebido v. People[77], while the petitioner admits that the deed of sale that was in his
possession is a forged document, he nonetheless, argues that the fact remains that there is no
proof that he authored such falsification or that the forgery was done under his direction. In
rejecting this claim and affirming his conviction for Falsification of Public Document, the Court
held that the petitioner was in possession of the forged deed of sale which purports to sell the
subject land from the private complainant to him and given this factual backdrop, the petitioner
is presumed to be the author of the forged deed of sale, despite the absence of any direct
evidence of his authorship of the forgery. Since the petitioner is the only person who stood to
benefit by the falsification of the document found in his possession, it is presumed that he is the
material author of the falsification.
6.2 Estafa through falsification
When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC as a necessary means to commit another
crime like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime. Under Article 48 of
the Code, there are two classes of a complex crime. A complex crime may refer to a single act
which constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or to an offense as a necessary
means for committing another.[78]
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing
estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words,
the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or
commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the
commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the
public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit estafa.[79]
In Milla v. People[80], the petitioner was held guilty of estafa through falsification of public
documents because he misrepresented himself to have the authority to sell the subject property,
and it was precisely this misrepresentation that prompted private respondent MPI to purchase it.
Because of its reliance on his authority and on the falsified Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No.
218777, MPI parted with its money.
To be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document, all the
elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document must exist. To secure a
conviction for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) (by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts)
of the Revised Penal Code, the following requisites must concur:

1. The accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations as to his power,

influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;
2. The false pretenses or fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneous
with the commission of the fraud;
3. The false pretenses or fraudulent representations constitute the very cause which
induced the offended party to part with his money or property;
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[81]
On the other hand, in order to sustain conviction for the crime of falsification of a public
document under Articles 171 and 172 of the RPC, the following requisites must concur:
1. That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who took
advantage of his official position;
2. That he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code;
3. That the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.[82]
Thus, in Ansaldo v. People[83] where the petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification
of public document, the Court held that not all the elements of the crime of falsification of a
public document are present and consequently, petitioner can only be found guilty of estafa.
While it is undisputed that petitioner committed estafa by falsely representing to the land owner
that he (petitioner) and his wife had the influence and capability to cause the subdivision of the
lot which induced the land owner to part with the owner’s copy of her title, there is no evidence
showing that petitioner had any participation in the execution of the mortgage involving the
subject title.
In another case, in Gonzaludo v. People[84], the petitioner was acquitted of the complex crime
of estafa through falsification of public document but held guilty of the crime of falsification of
public document. In this case, petitioner was convicted by the trial court of the said complex
crime for allegedly having conspired with Rosemarie Gelogo, who used the fictitious surname
“Villaflor” for the purpose of giving her a semblance of authority to sell the house purportedly
owned by her paramour, Ulysses Villaflor, who was legally married to private complainant, Anita
Villaflor. In exonerating the petitioner of the crime of estafa as one of the component of the
complex crime charged, the Court agreed with the contention of the petitioner that the third
element of the said offense is absent – that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations
constitute the very cause which induced the offended party to part with his money or property.
While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie in this case, when
she used the surname “Villaflor” to give her semblance of authority to sell the subject 2-storey
house, such fraud or deceit was employed upon the Canlas spouses who were the ones who
parted with their money when they bought the house. However, the Information charging
Rosemarie of estafa in the present case, alleged damage or injury not upon the Canlas
spouses, but upon private complainant, Anita Manlangit. Since the deceit or fraud was not the
efficient cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit to part with her property in this case,
Rosemarie cannot be held liable for estafa. With all the more reason must this be for the
petitioner. Nonetheless, he was convicted of falsification of public document because of his
conspiracy with Rosemarie in falsifying the deed of sale as sufficiently established by evidence
during the trial.
It bears stressing however, that there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of
private document because of their common element of deceit or damage. If the falsification of a
private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is
falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the
proper crime to be charged is estafa.[85]
6.3 Good faith defense in falsification
Settled is the rule that there is no crime absent criminal intent. In other words, the unlawful act
must be coupled with an evil desire for a crime to exist, save of course in cases of criminal
negligence where the negligence itself is the crime. Hence, it is settled in our jurisdiction that
since falsification of document is not in itself evil by its nature, absence of any malice or criminal
intent on the part of the accused might absolve him of criminal liability. Good faith therefore
might be a good defense.

In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan[86], the Court acquitted the accused father and son, a Mayor and
an outgoing chairman of Kabataang Barangay (KB), respectively, of the charge of estafa
through falsification. The Sandiganbayan convicted both the accused of the said charge when
the Mayor entered the name of his son in the payroll of the municipality during the period when
his son is on a hold-over capacity as a KB representative despite a new one has already been
elected, the private complainant. Likewise, the son signed the payroll and authorized another to
sign all the payrolls for the succeeding pay periods and claim the corresponding salaries in his
behalf. Persuaded that both accused acted in good faith and committed a mere error of
judgment without evil intent, the Court held:
“On the issue of criminal liability of petitioners, clearly the offenses of which petitioners were
convicted, i.e., estafa through falsification of public documents under Art. 171, par. 4, of The
Revised Penal Code, are intentional felonies for which liability attaches only when it is shown
that the malefactors acted with criminal intent or malice.  If what is proven is mere judgmental
error on the part of the person committing the act, no malice or criminal intent can be rightfully
imputed to him. x x x. Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to
exist. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will
exempt the doer from felonious responsibility. The exception of course is neglect in the
discharge of a duty or indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to a criminal intent, for
in this instance, the element of malicious intent is supplied by the element of negligence and
imprudence. In the instant case, there are clear manifestations of good faith and lack of criminal
intent on the part of petitioners.”
However, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Torres[87], where the respondents who were working
college students were charged, among others, by Falsification of Official Document by making
false entries in their Daily Time Records (DTR), the Court reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals exonerating the respondents based on good faith and affirmed the decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman finding the respondents administratively guilty of the said charge.
The Court of Appeals in its decision, held that the false entries the respondents made in their
DTRs have been made with no malice or intent as to constitute falsification, as entries in the
DTR is only a matter of administrative procedural convenience or as a matter of practice but not
for reason of strict legal obligation. Furthermore, they have not caused any damage to the
government or third person because under the facts obtaining, respondents may be said to
have rendered service in the interest of the public, with proper permission from their superior.
The integrity of the daily time record as an official document remains untarnished if the damage
sought to be prevented has not been produced.

The Supreme Court on the other hand is not persuaded. In striking the respondents’ claim of
good faith, the Court held that falsification of DTRs amounts to dishonesty. The evident purpose
of requiring government employees to keep a time record is to show their attendance in office to
work and to be paid accordingly. Closely adhering to the policy of no work-no pay, a DTR is
primarily, if not solely, intended to prevent damage or loss to the government as would result in
instances where it pays an employee for no work done. Explaining “good faith”, the Court
stated:

Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or
statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of
malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.
An individual’s personal good faith is a concept of his own mind and, therefore, may not
conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The
essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior
claim, and absence of intention to overreach another.
(Emphasis in the original)
The Court further said that the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it exonerated respondents
from administrative guilt. The Lecaroz case adopted by the appellate court in laying the legal
basis for its ruling does not apply to the instant case because said cases pertain to criminal
liability for Falsification of Public Document under the Revised Penal Code. The element of
damage need not be proved to hold respondents administratively liable.
With respect to disputes involving conveyance of real property, the case of Spouses Villamar v.
People[88] is one example where the defense of good faith was invoked by the spouses
accused, the alleged forgers of the Deed of Sale in question. In this case, a parcel of land was
sold by Elena Manantan to her nine children. Six of them later sold their respective shares to
one of their brother Simplicio who eventually sold his total share to his daughter, the one of the
spouses herein accused. The spouses registered with the Office of the Provincial Assessor of
Lingayen, Pangasinan a signed and notarized Deed of Sale. However, it was made to appear in
the said deed that all of Elenita’s children sold the property. While the spouses admit that not all
of Elenita’s children were vendors in the said document, they insist that they could not be held
guilty of falsification but rather the Office of the Provincial Assessor who prepared the document
without their knowledge. The trial courts and the Court of Appeals convicted the accused of
falsification of public document and disregarded the defense of good faith. It was held that while
the fact of forgery came to the knowledge of the accused and it was not disputed, their inaction
to inform the private complainant about the inclusion of her name in the said deed negates their
claim of innocence. It is well-settled that the person who stood to benefit by the forged
document or was in possession of it or makes use of the same is presumed to be the material
author of the falsification.[89] Since the Deed of Sale was executed in their favor, clearly, they
are the ones who benefited from the falsified document.
It should be noted however, that the Supreme Court affirmed their conviction merely because
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law.
Questions of fact are not reviewable and factual findings of the lower courts are binding on the
Court. According to the Court, “whether the spouses accused are innocent of the existence of
the falsified document” is a question of fact which is not reviewable. Furthermore, they failed to
show that their case falls within the recognized exceptions to the rule.

Similarly, the “good faith” defense was not appreciated in the case of Del Prado v.
People[90] which involves a Deed of Succession, the alleged falsified document. By virtue of the
said document, an Original Certificate of Title was cancelled and several titles were issued in
lieu thereof in favor of the several heirs. However, the heirs who executed and signed the
document inserted a clause which states: “…the parties hereto are the only heirs of the
decedent…” which in effect, excluded one co-heir, the private complainant. The accused heirs
insist that they were innocent of and did not really intend the exclusion of the complainant heir.
They also anchored their defense on the several documents they previously executed
recognizing the complainant’s heirship. However, the Court rejected the absence of malice on
the part of the several accused in this wise:
“There can be no good faith on the part of the petitioners since they knew of the untruthful
character of statements contained in their deed of succession.

xxx

The obligation of the petitioners to speak only the truth in their deed of succession is clear,
taking into account the very nature of the document falsified. The deed, which was transformed
into a public document upon acknowledgement before a notary public, required only truthful
statements from the petitioners. It was a legal requirement to effect the cancellation of the
original certificate of title and the issuance of new titles by the Register of Deeds. The false
statement made in the deed greatly affected the indefeasibility normally accorded to
titles over properties brought under the coverage of land registration, to the injury of
Corazon who was deprived of her right as a landowner, and the clear prejudice of third persons
who would rely on the land titles issued on the basis of the deed.
We cannot subscribe to the petitioners’ claim of good faith because several documents prove
that they knew of the untruthful character of their statement in the deed of succession. The
petitioners’ alleged good faith is disputed by their prior confirmation and recognition of
Corazon’s right as an heir, because despite knowledge of said fact, they included in the deed a
statement to the contrary. The wrongful intent to injure Corazon is clear from their execution of
the deed, showing a desire to appropriate only unto themselves the subject parcel of land.
Corazon was unduly deprived of what was due her not only under the provisions of the law on
succession, but also under contracts that she had previously executed with the petitioners.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, the Court rejected the claim of “good faith” by the petitioner in Lastrilla v. Granda[91].
Petitioner contends that assuming he knew or had a hand in the falsification of the three (3)
deeds of absolute sale and used the same to process the issuance of the new TCTs, said act is
not a punishable act of falsification as the same was authorized by the heirs of Aurora (the land
owner) including respondent. The Court held that such contention was belatedly raised on
appeal and as logically pointed out by respondent, he is an heir of Aurora and definitely, he did
not authorize petitioner to falsify the subject deeds and use the same to effect the transfer of the
TCTs. Furthermore, the finding that there is probable cause to believe that the signatures of
both Aurora and Rafael were falsified and the dates of the instruments were antedated lay
serious doubt on the claim that the conveyance was indeed authorized by Aurora herself. To
further sow doubt on the claim of authority, respondent’s claim that in 1999, his grandmother
Aurora was already “too sickly and frail to execute said documents,” finds support in the
evidence on record. A househelp in the residence of Aurora attested that in 1999, she was one
of those who took care of Aurora who was then very sickly, could hardly recognize faces,
remember names and events and very rarely talked and whose condition worsened starting
January 1999. Also bolstering respondent’s claim is the noticeable fact that Aurora signed the
GPOA dated February 14, 1999 in favor of Silvina by affixing her thumbmark instead of her
customary signature.
Proving forgery
Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is the duty of a party
to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence
required by law.[92] As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear,
positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The
best evidence of a forged signature in the instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the
alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by comparison between
the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose
signature is theorized upon to have been forged.[93]
In proving the genuineness of a handwriting, Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides:

Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting of a person may be

proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has
seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged, or has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness
or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission, United Presbyterian Church, USA, the Court
identified and explained the factors involved in the examination and comparison of handwritings:
x x x [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general
characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as
regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades,
etc., that may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive
on the question of the former’s authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned
handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best,
inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the
writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written
is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, play an
important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given
case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on
the character of a questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic
similarities, or dissimilarities, between that questioned handwriting and an authentic one.[94]
In Bucton v. Go[95], despite the testimony of an expert witness from the National Bureau of
Investigation who testified that there are significant differences between the signatures on the
standard documents from the one found in the SPA, this testimony, however, was disregarded
both by the RTC and the Court of Appeals which upheld the validity of the same on the ground
that it enjoys the presumption of regularity of a public document. The Court however, is not
convinced and held that while it is true that a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and has in its favor the presumption of
regularity, this presumption, however, is not absolute. It may be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. The testimony of the expert witness and the petitioner, had
it been properly appreciated, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity attached to
public documents and to meet the stringent requirements to prove forgery. In reversing the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court said:
“In upholding the validity of the SPA, the Court of Appeals brushed aside the foregoing
testimonial evidence of the expert witness and made an independent examination of the
questioned signatures, and based thereon, ruled that there is no forgery. The appellate court
attributed the variations to the passage of time and the person’s increase in age and dismissed
the findings of the expert witness because it failed to comply with the rules set forth in
jurisprudence that the standard should embrace the time of origin of the document, so that one
part comes from the time before the origin and one part from the time after the origin.  We are
not unmindful of the principle that in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis,
the standard of comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected
signature. However, when the dissimilarity between the genuine and false specimens of writing
is visible to the naked eye and would not ordinarily escape notice or detection from an
unpracticed observer, resort to technical rules is no longer necessary and the instrument may
be stricken off for being spurious. More so when, as in this case, the forgery was testified to and
thus established by evidence other than the writing itself. When so established and is
conspicuously evident from its appearance, the opinion of handwriting experts on the forged
document is no longer necessary.”

It is also worth stressing that a mere denial of a person whose signature was allegedly forged
that he signed the questioned deed of sale will not suffice to overcome the positive value of the
subject deed, a notarized document. Mere comparison of the alleged forged signature from the
presented samples of genuine signatures to show its variance therefrom cannot be considered
as sufficient evidence of forgery. A claim of forgery cannot also be accepted absent comparison
of signatures and witness (save for the claimant himself) to testify on the same. Otherwise, the
public document must be upheld.[96]
The issue of the genuineness of a signature in a deed is a question of fact
The issue of the genuineness of a deed of sale is essentially a question of fact. It is settled that
the Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in
the proceedings in the lower court. This is especially true where the trial court’s factual findings
are adopted and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by
the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. Conclusions and findings
of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal,
unless strong and cogent reasons dictate otherwise. This is because the trial court is in a better
position to examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying in the case. [97]
Thus, in Gepulle-Garbo v. Garabato[98], when the Court was presented with the question of
whether the signatures appearing on the deed of sale were forged, it held:
“The issue raised by petitioner is essentially factual in nature, the determination of which is best
left to the courts below. Well settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.  The
function of the Court in petitions for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing errors of law that
may have been committed by the lower courts. As a matter of sound practice and procedure,
the Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts, more so, when as
here, such findings are undisturbed by the appellate court. Stated otherwise, the Court refrains
from further scrutiny of factual findings of trial courts, more so when those findings are affirmed
by the CA. To do otherwise would defeat the very essence of Rule 45 and would convert the
Court into a trier of facts, which is not meant to be. Certainly the rule admits exceptions. None,
however, is applicable to the case at bar. Absent any application of any of the recognized
exceptions, this Court is bound by the findings of fact by the lower courts.”

Opinion of the handwriting experts, not binding upon the courts

In the Gepulle-Garbo case, the Court also ruled that courts are not bound by expert testimonies
especially that the examination was upon the initiative of the party who had complete control on
what documents and specimens to be examined by the National Bureau of Investigation. Such
person had the onus of showing that the signatures were forged. The Court said in this wise:
“The opinion of handwriting experts is not necessarily binding upon the court, the expert’s
function being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion. This
principle holds true especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or
dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned
signatures with those of the currently existing ones. A finding of forgery does not depend
entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an
independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable
conclusion as to its authenticity.”

Certificate of title vs. unregistered deed of sale

It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of
an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described
therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is
entitled to possession thereof.[99]Thus, even assuming that the deed of sale is genuine and
valid, as against the registered owners and the holder of such but unregistered deed of sale, it is
the former who has a better right to possess.[100]
 
Legal standing of informal settlers
It is settled that absence of title over the disputed property will not divest the courts of
jurisdiction to resolve the issue of possession and it is not a ground for the courts to withhold
relief from the parties in an ejectment case.[101]
Possession in ejectment cases means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal
possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. In a forcible entry case, prior physical
possession is the primary consideration. A party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him
to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. The party in
peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror.[102]
In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals[103] where the sole issue is possession, the Court brushed aside
the ruling of the Court of Appeals that both parties are in pari delicto or in equal fault being both
squatting on the property hence should be left where they are. The Court held that the principle
of pari delicto was erroneously applied. The application of this principle is not absolute, as there
are exceptions one of which is where its application would violate well-established public policy.
Courts must resolve the issue of possession even if the parties to the ejectment suit are
squatters. The determination of priority and superiority of possession is a serious and urgent
matter that cannot be left to the squatters to decide. To do so would make squatters receive
better treatment under the law. The law restrains property owners from taking the law into their
own hands. However, the principle of pari delicto as applied by the Court of Appeals would give
squatters free rein to dispossess fellow squatters or violently retake possession of properties
usurped from them. Courts should not leave squatters to their own devices in cases involving
recovery of possession.
In Pitargue v. Sorilla[104], both the plaintiff and the defendant were in effect squatting on
government property. Yet, the court upheld its jurisdiction to resolve the issue of possession
even if the plaintiff and the defendant in the ejectment case did not have any title over the
contested land.
Proposed amendment of Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code
As of this writing, pending in the Senate is the Senate Bill No. 2251 introduced on May 28, 2014
by Senator Joseph Ejercito which seeks to amend Arts. 171 and 172 of the RPC with respect to
falsification involving land titles entitled:

“AN ACT IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR FALSIFICATION OF CERTIFICATES OF

LAND TITLE OR ANY APPLICATION, DEED, INSTRUMENT OR SUPPORTING DOCUMENT,
REASONABLY CONNECTED WITH AND CALCULATED TO CAUSE THE ISSUANCE OF A
CERTIFICATE OF LAND TITLE, CLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A HEINOUS OFFENSE
INVOLVING ECONOMIC SABOTAGE IF THE VALUE OR AGGREGATE VALUE OF THE
LAND IS AT LEAST TEN MILLION PESOS (P10,000,000.00), AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ARTICLES 171 AND 172 OF ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.”
The proposed legislation was prompted by the increasing incidence of fake titles or issuance of
valid titles but as a result of fraudulent transactions which destroy the integrity of the Torrens
system. According to the Senator, our present law on land registration which is the Presidential
Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree lacks teeth to accomplish its goals and
objectives as it failed to provide penal sanctions in case of violation thereof. Currently, a person
responsible for the issuance of a fake or falsified title may only be held criminally liable for
perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and/or Falsification of Public Documents
under either Article 171 or Article 172 of the same Code. The penalty for perjury is a
mere arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. On the
other hand, the maximum penalty imposable for falsification is a mere prision mayor and a fine
not to exceed P 5,000.00.[105]