8 - BCRSP Risk Management Study Guide - 2014 Edition

Canadian
Registered
Safety
Professional
Risk Management
Study Guide
Board of Canadian Registered Safety Professionals
6700 Century Avenue Suite 100, Mississauga, ON L5N 6A4
Tel: (905) 567-7198

Toll free: 1-888-279-2777
E-Mail: info@bcrsp.ca
Web: www.bcrsp.ca
Last Revision: 2015

BCRSP Guide to Registration © Page 2
Risk Management
RISK MANAGEMENT (RM)

This domain was developed by Stephen McColl, Ph.D. and John Hicks, Ph.D, QEP, C.Chem., University
of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON.
Originally Developed: 2003 Last Revision Completed: 2015
Table of Contents
Preface .......................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.0 Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 5
1.1 Scope ............................................................................................................................................ 5
1.2 Course Reading Materials ............................................................................................................. 6
2.0 RISK MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES ................................................................................................ 8
2.1 Why Manage Health and Safety ................................................................................................... 8
2.2 What is Risk Management? .......................................................................................................... 9
2.3 Hazard and Risk .......................................................................................................................... 10
2.4 Core Activities in the Risk Management Process ....................................................................... 11
2.5 Why Does Risk Management Need to be a Process .................................................................. 12
2.6 Risk Management Frameworks .................................................................................................. 13
2.7 Likelihood, Consequence, and Risk ............................................................................................ 16
2.7.1 Likelihood ................................................................................................................................ 16
2.7.2 Consequence .......................................................................................................................... 17
2.8 Decision-Making in Risk Management ........................................................................................ 17
2.8.1 The Risk Measurement Matrix ................................................................................................ 18
2.8.2 Event Tree Analysis ................................................................................................................ 19
2.9 Some Guiding Principles for Decision-Making ................................................................................. 19
2.9.1 Weight-Of-Evidence ................................................................................................................ 20
2.9.2 Precautionary Principle ........................................................................................................... 20
2.9.3 Sound Science ........................................................................................................................ 20
2.9.4 The ALARA Principle .............................................................................................................. 20
2.9.5 Reasonable Relationship ........................................................................................................ 20
3.0 Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems ................................................................ 22
3.1 What is an OHS Management System? ..................................................................................... 22
3.2 A Brief Overview of Canadian Standards Development ............................................................. 24
3.3 Main Components of OHS Management Systems ..................................................................... 25
3.4 Key Features of an Effective OSHMS ......................................................................................... 26
3.4.1 Continual Improvement ........................................................................................................... 26
3.4.2 System Activities ..................................................................................................................... 27
3.4.3 Stakeholder Involvement (Internal and External) .................................................................... 27
3.4.4 Auditing/Verification ................................................................................................................ 28
4.0 Measuring Health and Safety Performance ........................................................................................ 28
4.1 Traditional Approaches to Measuring Health and Safety Performance ...................................... 28
4.2 Why Measure Performance? ...................................................................................................... 29
4.3 What to Measure? ....................................................................................................................... 30
4.4 How to Measure Performance .................................................................................................... 31
5.0 Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning ....................................................................... 32
5.1 Basic Guidelines to Preparing an Emergency Response Plan ................................................... 32
5.2 Planning For Emergencies .......................................................................................................... 33
5.3 Site Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place ......................................................................................... 34
5.4 Education and Training ............................................................................................................... 36
5.5 Equipment Requirements ............................................................................................................ 37
5.6 First Aid ....................................................................................................................................... 37
Risk Management
5.7 Finance ........................................................................................................................................ 38

5.8 Public Communication ................................................................................................................ 38
6.0 Incident Command Systems ........................................................................................................... 39
6.1 Conceptual Basis of an ICS .............................................................................................................. 39
6.2 Events that Require an ICS ............................................................................................................... 39
6.3 Command Structures and Flexibility.................................................................................................. 39
6.4 Action Plans ....................................................................................................................................... 40
6.5 Coordination ...................................................................................................................................... 40
6.6 Team Composition ............................................................................................................................ 41
6.7 Facilities and Equipment ................................................................................................................... 42
6.8 Command Transfer............................................................................................................................ 42
7.0 Business Continuity Planning.......................................................................................................... 43
7.1 The Role of Prevention ............................................................................................................... 43
7.2 Business Impact Analysis ........................................................................................................... 43
7.3 Developing Recovery Strategies ................................................................................................. 43
7.4 Business Continuity Plan Development ...................................................................................... 43
7.5 Follow-up Testing and Review .................................................................................................... 44
8.0 Prevention of Workplace Violence .................................................................................................. 45
9.0 The Hierarchy of Controls ............................................................................................................... 49
9.1 Conceptual Basis ............................................................................................................................... 49
9.2 Types of Controls .............................................................................................................................. 49
9.3 Implementation .................................................................................................................................. 50
10.0 Hazard Communication ............................................................................................................... 51
10.1 The Function of Hazard Communication .................................................................................... 51
10.2 Hazard Communication Standards ............................................................................................. 52
10.3 Hazard Symbols .......................................................................................................................... 52
10.4 Safety Data Sheets ..................................................................................................................... 53
10.5 Labeling ....................................................................................................................................... 53
10.6 Hazard Awareness Training ........................................................................................................ 56
11.0 Example of a Workplace Health and Safety Risk Management System ........................................ 57
11.1 Workplace Health and Safety Risk Management-Queensland Advisory Standard 2000 ........... 57
12.0 Case Studies ................................................................................................................................... 59
12.1 Classification of OHSMS Case Studies According to System Types ......................................... 59
12.2 Case Study #1 Powell River Kraft Pulp Mill, British Columbia ................................................... 61
12.2.1 Background ......................................................................................................................... 61
12.2.2 Facts .................................................................................................................................... 61
12.2.3 Assessment ......................................................................................................................... 61
12.3 Case Study #2 Agfa-Gevaert N.V. , Mortsel (Belgium) ............................................................... 62
12.3.1 Background ......................................................................................................................... 62
12.3.2 Facts .................................................................................................................................... 63
12.3.3 Assessment ......................................................................................................................... 64
12.4 Case study #3 The Homecare Unit in the Municipality of Herlev, Herlev (Denmark) ................... 64
12.4.1 Background .............................................................................................................................. 64
12.4.2 Facts .................................................................................................................................... 64
12.4.3 Assessment ......................................................................................................................... 65
12.5 Case Study #4 Berglandmilch Company, Graz (Austria) ........................................................... 66
12.5.1 Background ......................................................................................................................... 66
12.5.2 Facts .................................................................................................................................... 66
12.5.3 Assessment ......................................................................................................................... 67
Risk Management
Preface
This study guide provides an appropriate set of information sources and references to allow a candidate
to develop an understanding of the field of risk management and its importance to the set of
competencies of the OHS professional.
The following materials are provided:
1) A study guide that identifies appropriate information sources for the candidate, and
2) A set of learning objectives that allow the candidate to identify the primary task towards
developing this expertise.
The study guide is appropriate for the practicing or aspiring OHS professionals in any professional
environment. However, it is particularly directed through the use of methods and case studies, towards
the workplace OHS professional acting within a medium or large organization.
Typically the primary aim of the organization is to produce some product, goods, or services—whereas
workplace safety and health is often considered as of secondary importance to the organization goals and
objectives. A conceptual approach that places greater emphasis on the integration of risk management
methods and health and safety management systems within the mainstream of the organization will be
discussed in the materials presented in this domain.
Risk Management
1.0 Introduction
Today’s OHS management professional has a wide array of responsibilities and needs to be competent in
a number of specialized fields. Some of these include health, technology, legal responsibilities, and good
safety practices. An additional responsibility is a requirement to understand risk management principles
and how they can be applied to improving safety in the workplace.
Let us begin with the question “What is the role of Risk Management in the practice of safety?”.
In reviews of industrial accidents and disasters, we can see that many of these events could have been
prevented, or that the outcomes of the events could have been much less severe. It leads us to consider
that with a little more forethought, or effective decision-making the workplace can be made safer. Is there
a methodology or process that will allow poor safety practices to be highlighted and removed, or made
less consequential?
This is where Risk Management (RM) is most important. The role of RM is to provide a framework for
decision-making. This includes a method for prioritizing safety and health issues. By prioritizing the safety
issues they can be dealt with using appropriate resources and concern. Low risk events will not overtake
the resources needed for higher risk events that may need urgent attention.
It is also designed to provide a framework for resolving health and safety issues where active decision-
making is needed, but where uncertain or incomplete information may inhibit a clear and agreeable
resolution to the concern. Think about this. How often have you as an OHS professional been concerned
about some activity or technology, but did not have adequate information to gauge the hazard or potential
consequences of a safety failure. Was it a reason not to act, or did you have to respond in a limited
means to the safety threat? A Risk Management framework may not solve this lack of information or
resources problem for you, but it may provide a suitable decision-making method that the best forward
actions will be identified to solve the issue.
Finally, an understanding of risk management concepts and methods is designed to complement and
enhance your other skill sets. Your understanding of health, technology, law, and good safety practices
should be made more effective with the addition of risk management processes.
1.1 Scope
This study guide describes the learning objectives, context, and references for the student to understand
the risk management knowledge domain. The following section headings summarize the contents of the
Risk Management Domain Study Guide:
Part A. Risk Management Principles

1) Why manage health and safety?
2) What is risk management?
3) Hazard and risk
4) Core activities in the risk management process
5) Why does risk need to be formalized into a process
6) Risk management frameworks
7) Likelihood, consequence, and risk
8) Decision-making in risk management
9) Some guiding principles for decision-making
Part B. Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems (OHSMS)

1) What is an OHS Management System?
2) A brief overview of Canadian Standards development
3) Main Components of OHS management systems
4) Key Features of an Effective OHSMS
Risk Management
5) Advantages and disadvantages of OHSMS approaches
Part C. Measuring Health and Safety Performance

1) Traditional approaches to measuring health and safety performance
2) Why measure performance?
3) What to measure
4) How to Measure Performance
Part D. Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning

1) Preparing an Emergency Response Plan
2) Incident Command Systems
3) Business Continuity Planning
4) Workplace Violence and Harassment
5) The Hierarchy of Controls
6) Hazard Communication
Part D. Example of a Workplace Health and Safety Risk Management System

1) Workplace Health and Safety Risk Management: Advisory Standard 2000
Part E. Case Studies

1) Classification of OHSMS case studies according to system types
2) Case Study 1
3) Case Study 2
4) Case Study 3
This list of topics provides an outline of the primary features of risk management in occupational health
and safety. For those that practice risk management on a regular professional basis, there will be
selected sub-topics that will need further study. This study guide is intended to produce “enlightened” and
knowledgeable OHS professionals that have an adequate understanding and intellectual comfort with the
broad concepts and practice of risk management, as well as specific applications in the field of
occupational health and safety.
1.2 Course Reading Materials

The second edition of this guide is designed to be the primary reference for the Risk Management (RM)
domain. Several information sources have been used to support the document and the most important of
these are listed below. For each section of this study guide the original reference is provided next to the
section heading and in brackets. It is not necessary to review all of these references to be successful in
the BCRSP’s examination. However, the practicing OHS professional is encouraged to gain a deeper
understanding of the subject matter through these information sources.
A. RECOMMENDED READINGS: (abbreviations for study guide citation are shown in bold italic)
Primer Environmental health risk management: A primer for Canadians by Stephen McColl, John Hicks,
Lorraine Craig, and John Shortreed, Network For Environmental Risk Assessment and Management
(NERAM). Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, Oct 2002. PART 1: Fundamental Concepts in Risk Management.
IRGC Global Risk Governance: Concept and Practice Using the IRGC Framework O. Renn and K.
Walker (Ed.) Springer, ISBN 978-1-4020-6798-3. 2008.
IOSH Systems in focus: guidance on occupational safety and health management systems. Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH Guidance TA/R/250203/W), United Kingdom, Feb 2003.
NIOSH System Safety and Risk Management by Pat L. Clemens and Rodney J. Simmons for U.S
Department of Health and Human Services, (www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/96-37768/pdfs/96-37768.pdf),
1998.
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QL Workplace health and safety risk management: Advisory Standard 2000. Workplace Health & Safety,
Dept of Energy, Training, and Industrial Relations. Queensland Government, Australia. version
1/12/1999.
HSE A guide to measuring health & safety performance. Health and Safety Executive (HSE), United
Kingdom, Dec 2001.
B. OTHER READINGS:
HSE 2001. Reducing risks, protecting people: HSE's decision-making process. 2001. Health and Safety
Executive (U.K.).
IOHA 1999. IOHA Report to ILO on international occupational health and safety management systems.
International Occupational Hygiene Association (IOHA). International Occupational Safety and Health
Information Centre, International Labour Organization (ILO). Geneva, June 1999.
NOHSC 1999. Occupational health and safety management systems - Information Paper. National
Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC). Australia, Nov 1999.
NOHSC 2001. Occupational health and safety management systems: A review of their effectiveness in
securing healthy and safe workplaces. National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC).
Australia, April 2001.
Sahdra et al. 1999. Occupational health: risk assessment and management. edited by Steven S. Sadhra,
Krishna G. Rampal ; foreword by J. Malcolm Harrington. Oxford ; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Science, 1999
C. REFERENCE SOURCES:
AS/NZS 4360 Australian/New Zealand Standard for Risk Management. Standards Australia. 1999
AS/NZS 4801 Occupational health and safety management systems - Specification with Guidance for
Use. Standards Australia. 1997.
BS 8800. Occupational health and safety management systems. British Standards Institution (BSI). 1996.
CAN-CSA Q850. Risk management framework. Canadian Standards Association. 1997
ILO/OSH 2001. Guidelines on occupational safety and health systems. Programme on Safety and Health
at Work and the Environment (SafeWork). International Labour Organization (ILO), Geneva. Dec 2001.
ISO 9000. Quality Management (series). International Standards Organization. 1986 (rev. 2000).
ISO 14000. Environmental Management Systems (series). International Standards Organization 1996.
D. CASE STUDY SOURCES:
The use of occupational safety and health management systems in the member states of the European
Union: experiences at company level. European Agency for Safety and Health at Work. Luxembourg,
2002.
Risk Management
2.0 RISK MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
This section presents the fundamental concepts and terminology of the Risk Management (RM) domain.
An understanding of these concepts will allow the practitioner to analyze and assess a potentially
hazardous workplace situation. Practical application of the concepts helps the practitioner to develop an
understanding of risk management processes. The qualitative and quantitative outcomes of the risk
management process allow the practitioner to apply good judgment to each new case.
2.1 Why Manage Health and Safety

For all OHS professionals, there is an inherent requirement to help maintain a safe and healthy work
environment within the organization. This requirement applies to those that are employed directly or
retained on a contractual basis.
Incidence Rate: There are several measures that can be used to estimate the effectiveness of health
and safety standards. One of these measures is the annual incidence rate of workplace injuries
expressed as the frequency of reported injuries (or illnesses) within a specified number of workers. The
measure may be applied for a relatively small group such as in a workplace, or be applied for a larger
occupational category, a regulatory jurisdiction, or an entire country.
Cumulative Burden: The annual 'cumulative burden' of workplace injuries and illnesses can be
expressed as the number of days lost due to accidents and sick days due to work-related illnesses. The
cumulative burden is a measure of the frequency rate, and the duration or intensity of the events. There
may be a high frequency of incidents within an employee group, but if they are of minor intensity or
duration the cumulative burden may not be large or visible to the organization. Conversely, there may be
only a few events but they may be of long duration. A feature of risk management practice is to
determine the frequency and the severity of the possible events so that they can be better managed.
These are two of the most common measures used within an organization or jurisdiction.
According to the AWCBC (Association of Worker’s Compensation Boards of Canada), in Canada it is

estimated that 1 out of 16 workers suffers an injury while at the workplace every year—one injury every
nine seconds. Almost 1,000,000 injuries were reported in Canada in 2006, the most recent year that full
information is available. Of these events almost 1000 were fatal.
Over half of the injuries result in lost work time—more than 16 million days of work lost each year—the
equivalent of the average annual work of 67,000 people. Particularly at risk are young, inexperienced
workers. About 30% of all accident victims compensated for time lost are young Canadians aged 15 to
29.
In 2011, workers’ compensation boards across Canada awarded about $5.5 billion in health and safety
benefits— an average of $7,000 per compensated case. Upon inclusion of the indirect costs—such as
lost company productivity, reduced worker income, and residual health problems in returning workers—
the annual cost of occupational injuries to the Canadian economy is thought to be over $10 billion. While
human suffering cannot be accounted in dollars and cents, these figures show the adverse impact on
human resources and the enormous financial losses caused by occupational injuries. They provide a
convincing demonstration of the need to prevent workplace injuries and illnesses.
Most workplace accident and illness insurance programs (e.g. Workers’ Compensation) cover only a
limited range of costs related to workplace accidents and illnesses, which would include:
• direct costs associated with injuries and ill health of their employees (through workers'
compensation insurance coverage)
• insurance for vehicles
Risk Management
• third-party insurance (in some cases)

• insurance of building structures in most cases
Workplace compensation and insurance programs typically do not cover indirect costs, including many of
the following:
• sick-pay (for illnesses not directly attributable to workplace hazards),

• damage or loss of product and raw materials,
• repairs to plant and equipment,
• overtime working and temporary labour,
• production delays,
• investigation time, and
• fines.
These unaccounted health and safety costs will vary in range for each industry or workplace, so it is the
responsibility of health and safety professionals to identify the specific costs and benefits within their own
organization. The cumulative impact of these costs on an organization creates a compelling argument for
the development of a comprehensive workplace risk management system by an organization. In most
production-oriented organizations, a sound cost-benefit argument for the introduction of health and safety
programs is often persuasive to higher-level management.
Learning Objectives:
The candidate should be able to:
• define several standard measures commonly used quantify the impact of workplace accidents
and illnesses in Canada.
• cite the approximate annual rates and cumulative annual burden of occupational injuries and
illnesses in Canada.
• provide reasonably accurate figures on the annual direct costs and estimated indirect cost of
occupational accidents and illnesses in Canada.
• identify what the workers' compensation and/or workplace liability insurance typically does and
does not cover in most organizations.
• identify the possible scope of uninsured costs in comparison to actual insured costs. The
applicant should be able to identify why this could encourage the development of an
organizational risk management system.
2.2 What is Risk Management?

(Primer 1-1 to 1-3)
All organizations and individuals face risks on a regular basis. Some risks are considered significant and
warrant concern and action to minimize their likelihood and impact, while other lesser risks are generally
tolerated and accepted if their probability of occurrence is very low or their likely health and safety
consequences are thought to be small.
Risk management attempts to define the concept of 'safety' in terms of risks to human health that are
sufficiently small to be deemed 'acceptable' to the exposed individuals. Since perfect safety can never be
absolutely assured in the presence of potentially hazardous materials and processes, risk managers must
be able to identify those risks that have the highest priority for abatement or control, and then must
identify and select control measures that are both effective and cost-efficient.
Sometimes parts of the risk management process are combined within other activities that concern
occupational health and safety matters—such as quality management, environmental systems
management, process safety, or disaster planning. More recently, the term and the practice of risk
management has been used as a broader framework for information gathering, and as a decision-making
Risk Management
process for safety and health issues.
Uncertainty and Decision-Making: Since many risks are, by their nature, uncertain or incompletely
characterized, it is also important to address the issue of timely decision-making under conditions of
considerable uncertainty and time-urgency. Other key activities of paramount importance include
adequate provision for worker participation in the risk decision-making process, and ensuring effective
means of risk communication among all potentially affected groups during and after these deliberations.
Perceptions of Risk Management: Unfortunately, the term risk management is sometimes misperceived
as a strategy that encourages managerial practices that permit substantial levels of environmental hazards
or unsafe working conditions to persist to the detriment of employees or the general public. This is a false
perception. In the recent past, the frequent use of so-called 'behaviour-based safety programs' often lead to
an excessive emphasis on 'behavioural management' to discourage unsafe employee practices in the
workplace. This has produced accusations by some critics that such programs simply seek to identify
unsafe behaviour among workers and punish those who practice it, while ignoring the unsafe workplace
itself. The contemporary practice of risk management in occupational health and safety has no meaningful
relationship to such a traditional 'behavioural management' approach, and it is important to distinguish
clearly between these similar-sounding terms. Risk management emphasizes the essential role of
managers, workers, and regulators acting in concert to ensure a safe and healthful workplace for all
workers, with emphasis on system-wide approaches to risk control, while rejecting simplistic programs
directed solely at influencing worker behaviour or blaming victims of accidents and illness.
• relate the concept of 'safety' to the concept of 'acceptable risk' and the process of 'risk
management'.
• understand how risk management might be combined with other related workplace management
systems that are potentially relevant to occupational health and safety.
• identify some of the key issues and activities of risk management in dealing with decision-making
in the workplace.
• distinguish between the current meaning of 'risk management' approaches in the workplace and
the older concept of 'behavioural management' approaches.
2.3 Hazard and Risk

(Primer 1-3 to 1-4)
Although hazard and risk are used indiscriminately in everyday situations, there is a fundamental
distinction to be made between a hazard and a risk. A hazard is defined as the inherent property of a
substance, process, or activity that predisposes it to the potential for causing harm to health, safety or
human welfare. Risk is defined as the chance that someone or something will be adversely affected in a
particular way by unintended exposure to the hazard. Risk therefore refers to the possibility of danger,
rather than actual danger. The probability of an event occurring is inherent in the concept of risk, but not
in the concept of hazard.
Since any given workplace may contain a very large number of identifiable hazards, it is important for risk
managers to concentrate on those hazards whose risks that are 'reasonably foreseeable' as having a
significant potential for harm. Future risks are often foreseeable based on past experience in workplace
settings—as demonstrated by accident reporting, illnesses monitoring statistics, or reports of similar
hazards in other domains (e.g. environmental hazards). Many other risks are only foreseeable through
basic research on the toxicological and physico-chemical properties of various substances and products.
How these concepts are brought together into practice involves the use of a risk management framework
that integrates the flow of available information and arrives at a sound decision about how to deal with a
specific risk.
Risk Management
TABLE 2.1: EXAMPLES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORKPLACE HAZARDS AND WORKPLACE RISKS (from
QL p.7)
Hazard Risk
Work Environment: The likelihood that a worker may suffer from carbon monoxide poisoning because
confined space they are using a petrol operated pump in a well (ie. An inadequately ventilated
space).
Energy: electricity The likelihood that a worker may be electrocuted because they are exposed to
electrical wires while using a deep fryer that has inadequate insulation on the power
cable.
Manual Handling The likelihood that a worker may suffer back strain from manually lifting 40 kg bags.
Noise The likelihood that workers and others in the area may suffer irreparable hearing
damage because they work near someone continuously using a jack hammer
which emits noise over 85 dB(A)
Noise The likelihood that office workers may suffer stress in the form of fatigue, anxiety
and or aggression because they are exposed to constant low level noise of below
75 dB(A)
Substance: The likelihood that a worker may sustain a needlestick injury and become infected
infected blood while taking a blood sample from an infected patient.
Plant: printing The likelihood that a worker’s hand may be crushed while using a printing machine
machine because unguarded rollers drew in the worker’s hand.
• distinguish between the related concepts of hazard and risk.

• provide a working definition of ‘reasonably foreseeable’ risks.
• recognize some common examples of workplace hazards and their corresponding
workplace risks.
2.4 Core Activities in the Risk Management Process

(Primer 1-4 to 1-5)
In making decisions within a risk management framework, one normally undertakes a systematic process
that utilizes information to gauge the importance of the risk, and to take measures to control the risk if it is
deemed to be dangerous. Three tasks constitute the central activities in any risk management framework,
they are:
1) risk estimation,
2) risk evaluation, and
3) risk control
Risk estimation is a process that attempts to quantify the amount of risk pertaining to a given health
hazard, using scientific information on the nature of the hazard and analytical methods to calculate the
estimated degree of risk in the exposed population.
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Risk evaluation addresses less quantifiable non-scientific aspects of the risk problem—the economic,
social, and legal factors. Since economic analysis is to some extent quantifiable in terms of the expected
monetary costs and benefits of a risk control program, risk estimation and economic analysis activities are
sometimes combined under the label of 'risk analysis' or 'quantitative risk assessment'.
Risk control deals with the identification and selection of possible risk control options, and their
appropriate means of implementation. This may be a technological control method (eg. a particle filtering
system for polluted exhaust gases) or a control method that is a social, economic, or policy intervention.
In addition, the role of risk communication has become increasingly predominant, as a means of enabling
the active informed participation of all concerned parties, including stakeholder consultation within the
decision-making process. This aspect is of particular importance in occupational health and safety risk
management systems, where it may be necessary to engage representatives of management, labour,
and government in a transparent, cooperative, non-confrontational series of deliberations.
The application of risk management processes to evaluate the safety of new technologies or potential
hazards that may have global significance (e.g. climate change, nanotechnology, and trans-boundary
pollution) has resulted in a relatively new concept of risk governance. This process attempts to define
appropriate policy development and regulation for risks that extend outside of traditional governing
structures.
2.5 Why Does Risk Management Need to be a Process

A risk management process ensures that appropriate steps are taken in all stages of the estimation,
evaluation, and control phases. This includes an adequate investigation of causes and effects, control
strategies, costs and that appropriate communication is conducted throughout the assessment.
There has been a spectrum of views on the responsibilities of each group acting within the process. One
of the first formalized RM processes was undertaken by the US Environmental Protection Agency. In this
process, the scientists and health professionals had a large responsibility for identifying, estimating and
also controlling the risks of hazardous pollutants. This process was criticized when some risk issues
absorbed a considerable amount of management resources while other important considerations were
left under-managed.
In later versions of the process the responsibility for the estimation and of the control functions has been
separated into two separate (but communicating) management bodies. This is generally perceived to be
an improvement in the process as it incorporates a broader perspective to balance the importance of risk
issues, and to use management resources more effectively.
There is another very important reason to formalize the RM process. The issues that include an
evaluation of risk often have very significant consequences for public health, worker safety, corporate and
governmental reputations, finances, and the environment. By formalizing risk management it improves
the impartiality of the process. This should lead to more effective and equitable decision-making if the
process is not flawed. In addition, a good process should provide a standard for other decisions and
judgements to be measured against, such that a common set of equitable management responses can
be developed.
• identify and define the three key processes that are considered most central to any risk
management framework.
• identify several others key issues and activities typically required for effective risk management.
Risk Management
2.6 Risk Management Frameworks

(Primer 1-5 to 1-11)
The activities and tasks to be undertaken in any risk management process are specified as a series of
discrete steps within a risk management framework. These steps are defined carefully within a given
framework to provide a systematic approach to risk management within an organization, or more broadly
within an industrial sector, a particular hazard domain, or a regulatory jurisdiction. Many different risk
management frameworks have been developed, usually according to national or international consensus
bodies comprised of a suitable array of government, scientific, environmental, and labour organizations.
A risk management framework is not a regulatory standard, and usually it does not attempt to set explicit
requirements for compliance with regulatory criteria—except in the United States, where most
environmental health and some occupational risk assessment frameworks (e.g. ergonomic hazards) are
considered as having the force of legal regulation.
To help assure consistent terminology and activities (or at least equivalence) across different risk
domains, risk frameworks for health have become increasingly well-defined and similar in their structure
in recent years. In Canada, two of the most influential risk frameworks have been:
Canadian Standards Association (CSA): CSA-Q850: Risk Management: a guideline for decision-
makers
Health Canada - Health Protection Branch: (HPB): Risk Determination: a model for risk assessment
and risk management
The key steps included in the CSA-Q850 and HPB framework are summarized below.
Risk Management
TABLE 2.2 A COMPARISON OF MAIN STEPS IN THE CSA-Q850 AND THE HEALTH CANADA HPB RISK
M ANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS
CSA-Q850 RISK M ANAGEMENT HPB RISK DETERMINATION
INITIATION
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS / HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
RISK ESTIMATION RISK ESTIMATION
DEVELOPMENT OF OPTIONS
RISK EVALUATION
OPTIONAL ANALYSIS
RISK CONTROL
DECISION / IMPLEMENTATION
MONITORING & EVALUATION
ACTION / MONITORING
REVIEW
The HPB risk management framework is the older of the two and has recently been updated (not shown
here). Because of its widespread use for dealing with environmental issues such as hazardous chemicals
(under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act - CEPA) it remains an influential model framework.
The CSA risk management is more recent, and has the additional advantage of being closer in format
and terminology to various international risk frameworks in other countries in Europe and the Pacific
Region (although not the United States).
This guide does not specify one particular model over another. Regardless of which model is used, the
candidate should be familiar with the steps in the generic process format. The six key steps in the risk
management process under the CSA-Q850 definitions are operationally defined in a standardized fashion
according to the following definitions:
Step 1 Initiation: defines the overall context of the problem and the organizational structure by which a
specific risk management problem will be addressed.
Step 2 Preliminary Analysis / Risk Identification: assesses the scientific evidence that a substance or
process constitutes a potential health hazard, and the probable health consequences.
Step 3 Risk Estimation: attempts to quantify the amount of health risk incurred by various levels of
exposure (or frequency of exposure incidents). The risk estimation step includes three essential activities:
1) dose-response assessment;
2) exposure assessment; and

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3) risk characterization.
The risk characterization summarizes the estimated amount of risk as calculated according to the strength
(potency) of the harmful agent and the level (extent) of exposure to the agent. In addition to a numerical
risk estimate, a narrative describing the key sources of evidence and the remaining scientific uncertainties
are also provided.
Step 4 Risk Evaluation: performs a review of factors not readily quantifiable—such as social, political,
economic, and legal factors. Often the balance of the expected economic costs and health benefits is
projected, either informally by consensus, or formally by cost-benefit analysis and similar quantitative
methods.
Step 5 Risk Control: seeks to (1) identify control options; (2) evaluate control options; and (3) provide for
a stakeholder assessment of options. The final option selection task will necessarily involve value
judgments on such issues as the acceptability of residual small risks and the reasonableness of the
incremental costs of control.
Step 6 Implementation and Action/Monitoring: The final step comprises the implementation of
regulatory or voluntary actions, and monitoring compliance with and effectiveness of the actions.
Several additional important aspects of many modern risk management frameworks typically include:
(1) emphasis on the importance of risk communication and the use of multistakeholder consultation
throughout the process; and
(2) provision for a series of multiple decision points at various stages of the risk management process;
and
(3) allowance for re-visiting or re-evaluating evidence as more information becomes available, so that the
risk management process becomes iterative (repeated periodically) or cyclical (repeated continually).
The importance of Risk Communication warrants some discussion on one facet of the process in more
detail. In early models, the communication of the risk was a task that was left to a final reporting of the
process outcomes. This may have the effect of alienating critical stakeholders from the process. In
addition, it can create a perception of the process to one that is secretive and aloof. Consequently, many
recent models have encouraged the view that communication of the risk should be a continuous
endeavor with the stakeholders. Important considerations in the risk management issue can be identified
and information is useful to the process can be communicated. In some cases, the decision-making
points in the process (e.g. Identification of a suitable safety level, choice of control technology or
measures) may also be communicated to enhance the suitability of the process to the problem at hand.
Risk Communication has been studied in formalized university research programs. If the OHS
practitioner becomes engaged in this role, they are encouraged to investigate it further.
• recognize some of the more important health risk management frameworks commonly used in
Canada.
• know the proper sequence of major steps and working definitions within a standard risk
management framework, such as the CSA-Q850 Risk Management framework.
• recognize analogous risk management steps (or combinations of steps) that have different
identifying labels but similar activities.
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2.7 Likelihood, Consequence, and Risk

(QL 10-12)
As explained previously, risk is the likelihood of death, injury or illness that could result from exposure to a
hazard. Therefore to assess risk, one needs to consider:
1) likelihood of exposure (this may be how often the exposure occurs, and at what intensity of
exposure) to a given hazard, and
2) the corresponding severity of consequences arising from that exposure or event.
For example, a worksite may have physical hazards associated with hot surfaces. The frequency of the
contact with the surfaces is the probability of contact. The severity is a different measure and may be a
mild sensation (a low consequence) of heat, or an ability to burn and maim the employee (a severe
consequence).
2.7.1 Likelihood
This is the frequency or probability over a period of time that an event may occur. In risk analysis,
likelihood is defined differently for discrete hazards as opposed to continuous hazards
Discrete hazards are those that are either present or absent from the exposed worker—such as
electrical faults, unsafe mechanical devices, or fire hazards. We can assume that any exposure to such
hazards presents potentially serious consequences, so there cannot be any tolerable threshold of
exposure that would permit the occurrence of 'mild shocks' or 'minor burns', etc. The risks from discrete
hazards are usually defined as the probability (or likelihood) that a harmful incident might occur in the
present workplace, keeping in mind existing control measures.
TABLE 2.3 A SIMPLE SCALE FOR EXPRESSING THE LIKELIHOOD (PROBABILITY) OF A HARMFUL INCIDENT IN THE
WORKPLACE (from QL p10).
Likelihood Frequency Example
Very Likely Could happen frequently Motor oil spills in vehicle service area
Likely Could happen occasionally Fuel overspills during loading of tanker cars
Unlikely Could happen, but rarely Tanker accident occurs and spills in populated
area
Very Unlikely Could happen, but probably never Massive fuel spill enters pedestrian concourse
will
Continuous hazards are those that occur all the time at varying levels of exposure—such as hazardous
dusts, toxic chemicals, noise levels, and radiation. The risks from exposure to continuous hazards are
usually defined by the level of exposure to each individual worker over time periods that range from
minutes (peak exposure) to hours (short-term exposure) to years (time-weighted average exposure).
Thus likelihood of adverse health effects in the case of continuous hazards is considered in the context of
their dose-response (exposure-response) characteristics. If there are sufficient sources of scientific
evidence, it may be concluded that low levels of exposure fall below a toxicity threshold, such that very
low doses are essentially without significant probability of harmful health consequences. Higher
workplace exposure levels approaching the threshold of toxicity would be expected to produce a small but
significant probability of harmful health effects in the most heavily exposed and/or most susceptible
workers, and such exposures must be reduced or eliminated.
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2.7.2 Consequence
The consequences of a harmful exposure, whether discrete or continuous, are normally expressed as the
severity of adverse health effects to workers. An example of this range would be the difference between a
minor burn that did not require medical treatment, and an extreme consequence such as a worker’s
death.
Risk managers have considerable difficulty assessing the scale of severity of adverse health effects. In
contrast to incident probabilities or exposure levels, health consequences are generally unquantifiable in
any objective sense. In order to simplify this severity measurement, a simple consequence scoring
system can be developed in several different ways. It is common for a four or five stage scale to be used
to describe the increasing severity of a potential event. The characteristics of the hazard itself may
indicate the most likely consequence—for example, electrical hazard: electrocution risk or carcinogenic
hazard: cancer risk. Alternatively, consequences may be scaled more objectively according to the
observed frequency of various levels of severity in the affected industry or activity.
TABLE 2.4. A SIMPLE SCALE FOR EXPRESSING THE SEVERITY OF CONSEQUENCES OF ADVERSE HEALTH
EFFECTS IN THE WORKPLACE (from QL p11).
Rating of Severity Example

Consequence
Extreme Death or permanent disablement
Major Serious bodily injury or serious work caused illness
Moderate Moderate injury or illness requiring casualty treatment
Minor Minor injury or illness requiring first aid only, no lost time.
The scale in Table 2.4 has been developed within the context of worker safety. The scale can also be
used in a similar manner for public health severity (e.g risk of harm to residents surrounding an industrial
facility).
There are several other “measures” that can be employed. The scale can be translated to
economic/financial impacts (e.g. the cost of an accident may be measured in costs that include insurance
premiums, facility downtime, etc.) and the cost range may run from minor (less than $1000) to severe
(several million dollars) in consequences for an event.
Similarly, the consequences on the environment can be rated using this scale. A minor consequence
may not impair a habitat at all, while a major consequence can be considered to be wide-scale, long-term
irreparable damage to an ecosystem.
The scale has also been translated to rate the negative impact on the reputation of a company or
organization in the event of a serious accident. For example, the consequences of the Exxon Valdez oil
tanker accident was considered to be “catastrophic” in terms of environmental damage, costs in
damages, and to the reputation of the corporation.
2.8 Decision-Making in Risk Management

There are several methods to estimate the magnitude of risk in the workplace. Many methods have been
developed to estimate the potential outcomes of technological failures such as train derailments, missile
mis-firings, and chemical facility explosions. Other health-oriented methods have been developed to
estimate the outcomes associated with disease and injuries. The safety professional should consider
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these to be a toolbox of methods that can be employed to small or large-scale hazards in the workplace.
Two methods are briefly described here; they are the (i) Risk Measurement Matrix, and (ii) Event Tree
Analysis. They are based on current best practices in risk estimation and are useful to the practicing
safety professional. In particular, they provide a logical framework for the professional to estimate risks,
and this will reduce errors in decision-making.
2.8.1 The Risk Measurement Matrix
Risk can then be calculated as the product of two key variables:
1) the likelihood of effects and

2) severity of effects.
This can be summarized as the relationship:
Risk = Frequency x Severity
This relationship is often depicted as a matrix that can be used to determine a 'risk score', by plotting the
scales for likelihood and consequence as illustrated in table 2.5.
Note that such risk-ranking schemes provide no absolute quantifiable values, and therefore by
themselves do not constitute a quantitative risk assessment (risk estimation). They are valuable, however,
as tools for setting priorities for workplace hazard control programs, and assisting in the decision-making
process for risk reduction. They rely on the same basic conceptual underpinnings as more sophisticated
quantitative risk assessment methods.
TABLE 2.5 AN EXAMPLE OF A LIKELIHOOD:CONSEQUENCE MATRIX USED FOR RANK-ORDERING WORKPLACE

RISKS ACCORDING TO A RISK PRIORITY SCALE (from QL p.12)
RISK PRIORITY CHART
Consequences: How severely could it affect health and safety?

Likelihood
Extreme (death or Major (serious Moderate (injury or Minor (injury or
How likely could it
permanent bodily injury or illness requiring illness requiring first
happen?
dismemberment) serious work-caused casualty treatment) aid only, no lost
illness) time)
Very Likely (could 1 2 3 4
happen frequently)
Likely (could happen 2 3 4 5
occasionally)
Unlikely (could 3 4 5 6
happen, but rare)
Very Unlikely (could 4 5 6 7
happen, but probably
never will)
Score Action
1, 2 or 3 Do something about these risks immediately
4 or 5 Do something about these risks as soon as possible
6 or 7 These risk may not need immediate attention
Although the risk matrix is a simplified form of the calculation, it can be very useful. The matrix provides
the means for estimating the risk form several different hazards. It has a simple ability to quantify the risk,
and allows the different risks to be ranked and prioritized. It is a very useful tool. In addition, the results
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of the matrix can be communicated easily. This communication is important when safety initiatives need
to be implemented within an organization and the cooperation of others is needed to be successful.
2.8.2 Event Tree Analysis
Event Tree Analysis is a technique that was developed in engineering science to estimate the outcomes
from a single event. The event may be very specific (e.g. what happens when an electrical power failure
occurs in a chemical facility), but it may generate a multitude of consequential events that may be
undesirable. The Event Tree assists with the delineation and estimation of the secondary outcome
events (NIOSH IX-3 to IX-7).
The Event Tree is based on a single primary event that generates subsequent secondary and tertiary
events. Each event generates a success and a failure branch (binary branches) and diagrammatically
this can be extended to estimate the probable endpoints of concern. The probability of each event can be
included within the event tree. Usually, these probabilities are estimated or based on historical records of
occurrence.
The Event Tree is particularly useful for understanding the outcomes of an initiating event and this
includes the usefulness of emergency response measures. The development of event trees can improve
emergency response capabilities. It is common for response efforts to focus on the main failure event
(e.g. power outage) and overlook secondary and tertiary outcomes that may require resources. An
example of this is that a power outage at a chemical production facility may be caused by a storm-related
failure. The power outage is the main event and this may be the focus of emergency responders.
However, the power failure also limits the ability of the crew to reduce flooding due to excessive rainfall
and pump systems cannot be used to limit other plant failures during the storm event. The use of the
Event Tree during emergency planning will assist in the identification of these secondary events and
provide a measure of their importance (NIOSH IX-3 to IX-7).
• distinguish between discrete and continuous hazards in the workplace.

• define the concept of likelihood/level of exposure in the context of discrete and continuous
hazards.
• recognize the levels of adverse health effects commonly used to define the severity of
consequences from harmful exposure to a workplace hazard.
• understand the use of a likelihood: consequence matrix table in determining the rank-order of
priority risks.
• describe the use of an Event Tree.
2.9 Some Guiding Principles for Decision-Making

(Primer 1-12 to 1-18)
Clear decision-making within a risk management process is a key aspect of the ability of risk managers
and administrators to arrive at effective risk control measures. There is considerable disagreement within
the risk management community as to the extent that decisions about environmental or occupational
health risks should be based strictly on scientific and technical criteria (i.e. 'trust the experts'), as opposed
to more subjective criteria such as transparency and openness of the process, adequate consultation,
perceived fairness, equity of treatment, stakeholders' perceptions and preferences, and social
determinants of risk tolerance (i.e. 'participatory consensus-making').
Usually both aspects of decision-making play some considerable role in risk decision-making, depending
on the context of the risk problem, and the willingness of participants to collaborate in a cooperative
fashion. Decision-making that derives its mandate from legislated government regulatory powers, for
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example occupational exposure standards for hazardous chemicals, often tends to be more adversarial
and legalistic than those risk management approaches that seek to create 'voluntary' or 'consensus-
based' guidelines (i.e. non-enforceable standards) derived by non-governmental organizations or by
industry-labour agreements at the sectoral or local level.
Regardless of how the risk management decision is finally achieved, certain critical decision-criteria will
generally need to be considered carefully in most environmental or occupational health risk decisions—
these include the following:
2.9.1 Weight-Of-Evidence
The weight-of-evidence approach seeks to ensure that the process of considering the evidence about the
existence and magnitude of a risk is scientifically defensible, such that the available evidence is of
sufficient strength, coherence, and consistency to support the conclusion that a serious hazard may exist.
2.9.2 Precautionary Principle
In cases where the available scientific evidence is incomplete or contradictory, the precautionary principle
implies decision-makers toward timely preventive action whenever a serious or irreversible health hazard
is believed to exist as a significant possibility. This principle is especially important in situations where the
decision is time-urgent because: (1) a newly discovered risk is imminent or already present; (2) exposure
to the hazard is likely to produce harmful effects rapidly within the immediate future; (3) the potential
consequences would be serious and perhaps widespread. Not every suspected occupational hazard can
be dealt with according to the precautionary principle, as such hazards are too numerous to address
immediately, and many may be remote or inconsequential. In addition, the preliminary scientific evidence,
while incomplete, must at least provide a sufficient weight-of-evidence to support a plausible inference of
potential harm.
2.9.3 Sound Science
The principle of sound science assumes that appearances can often be deceiving if they are based on
incomplete or biased information or inadequate scientific studies. The principle tends therefore to
emphasize the need for collection of better quality and more complete scientific information before a risk
decision is made, to avoid erroneous or excessive responses to trivial or non-existent hazards. Thus the
precautionary principle and the principle of sound science are often seen to be in dynamic opposition with
each other, although a reasonable middle ground is usually achievable if different stakeholders (e.g.
management, labour) are willing to modify their respective starting positions.
2.9.4 The ALARA Principle
The ALARA principle is an acronym for 'As Low As Reasonably Achievable'. It is a pragmatic technology-
based approach to minimizing health risk that seeks to reduce potentially harmful exposures to known
hazards to the greatest extent possible, consistent with technical feasibility and 'reasonable achievable'
costs. The difficulty here lies in defining what exactly constitutes a technically feasible and reasonably
achievable control measure.
2.9.5 Reasonable Relationship
This concept proposes that the costs of control for environmental or occupational hazards should bear a
"reasonable relationship' with respect to the corresponding reduction in health risk that are likely to be
achieved.
It must also be recognized that even the most stringent adherence to scientific objectivity in risk
assessment will inevitably be influenced to some extent by the unintended inclusion of value
assumptions, that is, subjective interpretations and judgements of evidence that are based on personal or
societal values. Many psychological factors may also intrude on the subjective perception of risk by
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various parties, depending on the inherent contextual qualities of hazards—such as voluntary versus
involuntary, commonplace versus uncommon, dreaded versus tolerated, known versus unknown,
immediate versus delayed. Such risk perception characteristics, while not directly related to the numerical
estimates of risk, nonetheless may play a major role in the subjective risk tolerance for various types of
hazards and may bias the judgment of one of the affected parties towards or away from effective risk
control actions.
Very low levels of exposure to hazards may be estimated to produce attendant risks that are so low for
any exposed individual as to be considered trivial for practical purposes—this is commonly designated by
risk managers as the de minimis (insignificant) risk level. However, the numerical definition of 'de minimis'
varies from place to place across a range of values from 10-6 (1 in million) to 10-4 (1 in 10,000) for a
working lifetime. Moreover, the argument is sometimes advanced that occupational risks should be more
tolerable to workers at a higher level of likelihood than the general public, because their exposure is
'voluntary' and brings them substantial benefits in terms of wages. Such arguments are obviously
contentious, and illustrate how value judgements and risk perception characteristics can often influence
risk decision-making.
• define the nature and relevance to risk decision-making of the definitions for the following terms:
weight-of-evidence, precautionary principle, sound science, ALARA principle, reasonable
relationship.
• recognize the role of subjective value assumptions in risk decision-making.
• identify some of the risk perception characteristics of hazards that might influence the public’s
tolerance of different types of risks.
• provide a working definition for the concept of de minimis risk, and recognize why this definition is
variable depending on the situation.
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3.0 Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems

3.1 What is an OHS Management System?
(OSH 11-12)
By intention, risk management frameworks are relatively non-specific with respect to dealing with risks in
a particular hazardous domain, such as occupational health and safety. As frameworks, they attempt to
define broad evidence-gathering and decision-making principles and lay out a consistent set of steps for
addressing hazards, without necessarily delineating the precise system to be used. Therefore in the
domain of occupational health and safety, a descriptive risk management framework usually needs to be
translated into a more prescriptive series of required (or recommended) activities that comprise an
occupational health and safety management system (OHSMS).
Let us define the two terms of “management system”.
A system is the deliberate linking and sequencing of processes to create a repeatable and identifiable
way of managing OHS (occupational health and safety). Corrective actions and system improvements
flow from the cycle (characterized as Plan, Do, Check, Act in the quality literature) of monitoring, audit,
and review, central to a systematic approach.
A management system is the allocation of accountabilities, responsibilities, and resources from senior
management through all employees to enable decisions to be made on OHS matters. It is one aspect of
the overall management system used in the organization.
from: Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems: Information Paper

National Occupational Health and Safety Commission, Australia (NOHSC 1999)
Under this type of OHSMS, the risk management aspects of occupational health and safety are
considered as part of the overall management process of the organization, rather than being treated as
separate domain unrelated to the productive activities of the industry. The approach is to merge the
processes of risk management within the occupational health and safety system of the organization. In
theory, the more they can be integrated the more effective the risk minimization practice is within the
organization.
Advocates of this approach believe that significant benefits, largely efficiency and lower costs, can be
obtained within an organization by integrating the management approach to that of health and safety,
thereby creating a 'holistic approach'.
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Should management systems be integrated?
source: NOHSC 1999

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3.2 A Brief Overview of Canadian Standards Development

Many varieties of OHSMS exist in various jurisdictions or industries, but most can be characterized as
having some combination of components derived from the risk management consensus standards (e.g.
CSA-Q850) and components derived from the consensus standards for quality management and
environmental management systems.
Historically, the International Standards Organization (ISO) has been responsible for developing and
coordinating two series of ISO management standards:
1) the ISO 9000 Quality Management series, which deals with the management of the productive
and administrative aspects of companies from the perspective of total quality management (TQM)
and continuous process improvement; and
2) the ISO 14000 Environmental Management Systems series, which addresses issues of
environmental control systems.
While not legally enforceable as regulatory standards, in most industrialized countries the ISO 9000 and
14000 series of consensus standards (actually voluntary guidelines) are considered as the benchmark by
which the performance of companies is assessed by their customers, employees, governments, and the
general public. However, from the perspective of occupational health and safety, these guidelines were
inadequate because they did not directly address workplace health and safety, and they did not have any
provision for consultation and participation of workers or labour organizations.
In the mid-1990's, the ISO began to extend their mandate to include international consensus standards
for occupational health and safety (OHS) management systems. The ISO in turn elected to try to adopt
and modify an existing OHS guideline produced in the early 1990's by the British Standards Institute (BS
8800). However, the proliferation of OHSMS models and approaches to OHS management increased in
the mid-to-late 1990's, leading to concerns internationally about a confusing situation arising.
After considerable debate between the proponents of the draft ISO standard and the International Labour
Organization (ILO), in 1997 the ISO decided not to pursue an OHS standard, instead the ILO would
develop their own international OHSMS guideline. By 2001, the ILO-OHS standard was completed and
officially sanctioned through the member countries of the ILO, which is a United Nations agency.
In Canada, the Canadian General Standards Board (CGSB) has elected to base its certification program
on BSI-OHSAS 18001, an Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Systems specification produced
jointly by the national standards authorities of thirteen countries. Derived largely on the BS 8800
guideline, this standard does not have ILO or ISO approval but serves as the OHSMS model for many
countries that prefer to adopt the ISO-style management systems approach. This is not an ISO standard
but seems like it.
The OHSAS 18000 is the BSI’s own view of a OHS system, largely based on ISO 14000, that
organizations can use if they want to have their OHS system third-party registered for certification.
OHSAS 18001 describes the requirements for an OHS management system that enables an organization
to control its OHS risks and to improve its performance. It does not specify OHS performance criteria, nor
does it give detailed requirements for the design of the management system.
Most labour organizations generally favour the ILO-OHS standard which they see as more favourably
disposed to the protection of workers by explicit requirements, while many governments and industries
prefer the OHSAS 18000 approach, which allows managers somewhat more latitude in developing their
OHS system in concert with their production activities and with their ISO 9000/14000 audit and
certification programs. Organized labour sometimes claims that OHSAS 18000 and similar systems are
primarily interested in establishing elaborate paper trails that document their health and safety
management activities in order to establish the legal defense of 'due diligence' (i.e. having adhered to
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required preventive procedures) as a protection against future liability claims for industrial accidents. In
reality, it is not yet entirely clear whether the two systems are compatible or not—or whether the ILO-OHS
or the OHSAS 18000 systems are preferable for worker protection.
• define the basic characteristics of a modern occupational health and safety management system
(OHSMS), and how these provide for an integrative approach to OHS activities.
• recognize some of the relationships, commonalities, and differences between various OHSMS
models, including ISO 9000/14000, BS 8800, OHSAS 18000, and ILO-OHS 2001.
• understand the relevance of OHSMS to the legal/regulatory concept of ‘due diligence’.
• recognize the concerns that organized labour might have regarding certain aspects of some
OHSMS models.
3.3 Main Components of OHS Management Systems

(IOSH 9-10)
The overall flow of tasks within a typical OHSMS of the ISO-type include four key activities, listed under
the acronym 'PDCA':
Plan — includes Policy, Planning, and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
Do — includes Implementation and Operation
Check — includes Performance Assessment (active monitoring and reactive incident reporting)
Act — includes Review and Continual Improvement
This type of PDCA model was first developed many decades ago, largely by the pioneering efforts of
Deming and his collaborators in the field of 'quality management' and 'continual improvement' for
industrial production processes. The Deming approach to quality management was adopted early by
Japanese companies, and much later by North American and European companies. By 1986, the first
ISO-9000 standard was issued, which codified best-practice in quality management.
The main components of a typical OHSMS of the ISO-type include the following essential elements:
• policy
• planning
• organization
• worker representatives
• communicating
• consulting
• implementation and operation
• measuring performance
• corrective and preventive actions
• management review
• continual improvement
Different frameworks will have different terminology, emphasis and placements for these components but
will on a generic basis show several similarities between them.
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• provide the proper order of steps and supply a working definition of each step in the PDCA model
of quality management systems.
• recognize how OHSMS and the PDCA system are interrelated by their key elements.
• recognize the similarities and differences of risk management and OHS management systems.
3.4 Key Features of an Effective OSHMS

IOSH 16-22
Since the inception of modern OHSMS models in the 1990's, there has been ongoing debate as to
whether such systems are in fact demonstrably more effective in assuring workplace health and safety
compared to traditional OHS models that rely on compliance with government regulations and
encouragement of safer employee work practices through 'behavioural management' strategies. So far, it
appears that introduction of a modern OHSMS into an organization will not bring about improvements in
OHS outcomes, unless the system includes four essential elements:
3.4.1 Continual Improvement
Given that most modern organizations are in a constant state of flux, it is important that the OHSMS be
adaptive to rapid changes through continual improvement in work processes and activities. Often
expanded automation or new processes can reduce workplace risk, but unfamiliar activities may increase
risk temporarily or may present hidden risks that only become apparent after a serious accident.
Continual improvement is a relatively easy concept to understand, but more difficult to maintain in a
complex workplace. Continual improvement in an OHSMS can have four different aspects:
• improvement in OHS results year-over-year—measured by falling rates of injuries, ill health, and
damaging events
• reduced OHS resource demands due to self-improvement and better targeting of preventive
efforts
• changes in the climate and culture of an organization towards a new state of effectiveness and
efficiency concerning OHS (note that corporate climate is influenced by short-term changes that
can often be achieved quite rapidly by introducing new management systems; corporate culture
is often entrenched by historical circumstances and thus requires the longer-term evolution of
changes)
• improvements in the OHSMS itself, towards better integration, easier understanding, and greater
comprehensiveness
To accomplish these aims, it is important to assure there is a process in place to capture, evaluate,
implement, and monitor suggested improvements to work processes. Often such improvements are often
best captured from front-line workers and supervisors, rather than being imposed by management or
OHS consultants.
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3.4.2 System Activities
The documentation supporting the establishment and operation of an OHSMS will need to include
detailed descriptions of a series of high-level objectives. In turn, these must then be broken down into a
number of detailed OHSMS activities. How this happens depends on the type of OHSMS model
employed and on several organization-specific factors:
• type of hazards to be managed by the system (e.g. few vs. many; simple vs. complex)
• type of organization (e.g. corporate structure and activities)
• range of technologies (e.g. relevant GMP, SOP, and technical standards)
• legislative and other applicable corporate standards (e.g. Responsible Care programs)
All of the key OHSMS activities need to be expressed in the form of performance benchmarks that can be
evaluated by an audit process according to predefined 'goal-setting' criteria, which include the following:
• a current health and safety policy statement signed by the responsible manager
• a register of relevant hazards to be held in each work section, including summaries of key
controls and any current improvement plans (i.e. risk assessments)
• all reported work accidents to be categorized by potential harmful outcome—whether or not
actual harm was done (e.g. reporting of all 'near-miss' events and non-injurious incidents is
strictly required)
• investigation of accidents and incidents includes root-cause analysis with priorities based on the
potential for harm—suitable recommendations are made to prevent recurrence and are tracked to
ensure compliance.
The use of goal-setting criteria describes the broad objectives to be achieved, but does not provide
detailed prescriptive procedures of what actually happens in the workplace. This approach helps minimize
the need to constantly revise operation OHSMS elements when work processes change.
3.4.3 Stakeholder Involvement (Internal and External)
The stakeholders in the OHSMS are defined as those parties that are potentially affected by its results
and are therefore interested in its content and effectiveness. Both internal stakeholders within the
organization and external stakeholders outside the organization must be involved in the ongoing OHSMS
processes.
The internal stakeholders generally include the following:

• the organization's directors, trustees and senior officers (representatives of management)
• the workforce (as individuals)
• the worker representatives (labour unions, Joint Health and Safety Committees)
• OSH professionals (as consultants or as bodies of good-practice)
The external stakeholders may include many of the following:

• government regulators (OHS regulations and process/equipment safety codes and standards)
• investors and insurers
• CSR (corporate social responsibility) programs, including public corporate reporting (e.g.
Responsible Care programs in the chemical sector)
• NGO (non-governmental organization) guidelines (e.g. ASSE/IOSH guidelines on Global best
practices in contractor safety)
• global bodies—the ILO (International Labour Organization), WHO (World Health Organization),
UNEP (United Nations Environmental Program); other United Nations bodies
• multilateral trade organizations—most notably NAFTA (North American Free Trade Association)
and the WTO (World Trade Organization)
In the near future, the role of the multilateral trade organizations such as NAFTA and WTO will become of
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increasing importance in occupational health and safety management, as the goods and services traded
across international boundaries must be created by workforces with 'equivalent' protection' against
harmful working conditions. One of the reasons for the current popularity of international OHSMS
consensus standards (such as OHSAS 18000) is that they help ensure a 'level playing field' for trading
nations, so that none can undercut the other by lowering their production costs by the exploitation of
vulnerable workforces through sub-standard OHS systems.
3.4.4 Auditing/Verification
Auditing is the assessment of an OSH process through periodic sampling of corporate documentation,
procedures and records, carried out by a competent person or organization independent of that process.
When a series of audits is verified according to a recognized external standard (e.g. ISO 14000 or
OHSAS 18000), a certificate of compliance is issued which allows for corporate certification according to
that standard. Although normally not having legal status as a OHS regulatory standard—and therefore
often not seen as legitimate by organized labour—the OHSMS certification is usually viewed as a
valuable attainment by the organization for the purposes of corporate prestige, contractual bidding
requirements, legal protection and due diligence, corporate governance, and overall corporate quality
management and risk management. Not all OHSMS are auditable or certifiable—for example, OHSAS
18000 is certifiable while ILO-OSH is not. Each organization must determine in advance the type of
OHSMS most suitable to them, and whether OHSMS audit/certification is a corporate objective.
Learning objectives:
• define and describe the four essential elements required for a successful OHSMS to operate:
continual improvement, activities, stakeholder involvement, and auditing/verification.
• define and describe the role of internal and external stakeholders in the OHSMS process.
• recognize which OHSMS are auditable or certifiable and which are not.
4.0 Measuring Health and Safety Performance
4.1 Traditional Approaches to Measuring Health and Safety Performance (HSE 4-

6)
Traditional OHS measures of risk management often rely exclusively on statistical measures of injury and
work-related illness. Health and safety differs from many areas measured by managers because success
in OHS is seen as the absence of an outcome (injury/illness) rather than a presence. But a low rate of
injury/illness over a limited period of time does not necessarily indicate that risks are being adequately
controlled, nor does it guarantee that problems will not occur in the future. This is especially true in
organizations where there is a low probability of accidents, but where major hazards are nonetheless
present. For such low-probability / high-consequence situations, the historical record can be a deceptive
indicator of safety performance.
Some of the important problems often encountered by an exclusive reliance on traditional health and
safety statistics include:
• under-reporting of injury/illness incidence rates (incidents may be suppressed to maintain a 'good

record of safety')
• chance occurrences (and non-occurrences) of low probability/high-consequence events
• lack of accounting for the severity of an accident or illness
• lost-time statistics do not objectively measure severity
• lack of relationship between minor accident reports and serious major accident or toxic hazards
• low injury rates leading to complacency
• low injury rates producing sparse data unsuitable for statistical analysis
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• injury statistics reflect outcomes, not underlying (root) causes
Organizations must therefore realize that they cannot rely on a single limited number of health and safety
performance measures. What they need is a 'battery' of various reliable measures that reflect different
aspects of the OHS system performance.

• recognize some of the weaknesses of traditional approaches to OHS.
• understand how the historical record can be a deceptive indicator of safety performance for low
probability / high-consequence risks in the workplace.
4.2 Why Measure Performance? (HSE 6-9)

Measurement of OHS performance is a key aspect of any workplace management process, and serves
as the basis for continual improvement in any OHSMS model. Measurement is seen as an integral part of
the Plan-Do-Check-Act quality management process defined by the ISO 9000/14000 standards and the
OHSAS system. If measurement is not carried out correctly, the effectiveness of the OHSMS is
compromised—there is no reliable information to inform risk managers how well health and safety risks
are being controlled: You can't manage what you can't measure.
The major purposes of performance measures in OHS management systems can be described as
follows:
(1) Providing Information

• on how the system operates in practice
• identifying areas where remedial action is necessary
• providing the basis for continual improvement
• providing feedback and motivation
(2) Answering Questions

• how effectively is the system in terms of controlling our hazards and risks
• are risks being reduced over time and are they lower than other comparable organizations
• is the organizational culture supportive of the risk management process
(3) Decision-Making
• where you are relative to where you want to be
• what progress is necessary and reasonable under the circumstances
• how that progress might be achieved against particular restraints (e.g. time, budget)
• the way progress might be achieved
• priorities and effective use of resources
(4) Addressing Different Information Needs

• both internal and external corporate accountability is usually required
• corporate information needs may range from the local and multinational scale
• higher hazard industries have their own special needs to demonstrate safety
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• understand the relationship between the PDCA quality management concept and performance
measures.
• recognize the major purposes of performance measures in OHS management systems.
4.3 What to Measure? (HSE 9-15)

To effectively examine the question of health and safety performance, measurements should be based on
a diverse and balanced approach that monitors four types of elements:
Input - measuring the hazard burden, to address the following questions:

• what are the hazards associated with our activities?
• what is the significance of the hazards (high or low probability/consequence)?
• how does the nature and significance of the hazards vary across the different parts of the
organization?
• how does the nature and significance of the hazards vary across time?
• are we succeeding in eliminating or reducing hazards?
• what impact are changes in our business having on the nature and significance of hazards?
This information supplies important inputs into the planning and implementation processes to ensure that
proportionate effort, prioritization, and emphasis are accorded to the risk control tasks.
Process - measuring the health and safety management system to evaluate measures of success in the
implementation of adequate risk controls—the key elements of OHS management are defined as: policy,
organizing, planning and implementation, measuring performance, and audit and review.
Output/Outcome - measures of failures (adverse outcomes in injuries, illnesses or loss) through reactive
monitoring of incidents and accidents to address the following questions:
• are failures occurring (injuries, illnesses, loss incidents)?

• where are they occurring?
• what is the nature of the failures?
• how serious are they?
• what were the potential consequences?
• what are the reasons (root causes) for the failures?
• what are the costs?
• what improvements in the health and safety management system are required?
• how do all the above issues vary with time?
• are we getting better or worse?
Health and Safety Culture - an organization's health and safety culture reflects the long-term established
attitudes and beliefs of management and workers that have arisen from past historical practices and
events—to varying degrees this can be either positive or negative. The health and safety management
system can be an important positive influence of the safety culture, or it may fail to influence established
negative cultures or even be counter-productive if imposed in a top-down fashion without adequate
planning and consultation.
The related term health and safety climate is used to describe the tangible outputs of an organization's
health and safety culture as perceived by individuals and work groups at a given point in time. Thus
culture changes slowly, if at all, while climate is more amenable to short-term changes based on active
workplace interventions. Many of the activities that support the development of a positive safety culture
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need to be measured. These organizational measures can be summarized as the 'four-C's':
• control
• communication
• cooperation
• competence
However, to the extent that many workplace interventions tend to focus extensively on 'behavioural
management' strategies to alter workers' knowledge, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours regarding
occupational hazards, these may be seen as manipulative or intrusive by workers or their unions, as part
of a 'blaming-the-victim' culture within autocratic organizations. A recent HSE approach that appears to
advocate behavioural management strategies has received considerable criticism from organized labour
for this reason.
• specify and define the four basic types of elements required to monitor OHSMS performance—
input, process, output/outcome, and health and safety culture.
• understand the relationship between an organizational culture and an organizational climate with
respect to workplace health and safety.
• recognize the potential pitfall of a ‘blame-the-victim’ approach when instituting ‘behavioural
management’ strategies for OHS.
4.4 How to Measure Performance (HSE 22-26)

To derive effective performance measures, a management planning system must be in place to produce
the necessary specifications and performance standards for risk control systems. Each risk management
system should have a built-in monitoring process. This may be achieved by developing a checklist or
inspection form that covers the key issues to be monitored in a specific work area or organization. The
key steps in developing a performance measurement system can be summarized as follows:
1) identify the key processes

2) analyze the key management arrangement and risk control systems to produce a process map or
flow chart
3) identify critical measures for each management arrangement and risk control system
4) establish baselines for each measure
5) establish goals or targets for each measure
6) assign responsibility for collecting and analyzing the data
7) compare actual performance against targets
8) decide on corrective action
9) review the measures
• describe the key steps in developing a performance measurement system.

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5.0 Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning

5.1 Basic Guidelines to Preparing an Emergency Response Plan
There are many possible events that will result in negative consequences to a community. These include
natural events such as hurricanes and windstorms, excessive precipitation, floods, tidal waves,
earthquakes, prolonged heat or cold, infectious diseases and associated epidemics and many others.
The list of human-made events has extended to include fires, hazardous spills and releases, criminal acts
or terrorist attacks, transportation and engineering failures and many others.
Prevention is the best way to reduce the probability of any event occurring. Risk reduction should be a
key component of any management plan. The intent is to minimize the possibility of any risk event and
their consequences before they may occur. However if an event does occur, the consequences of the
emergency can be minimized by implementing an appropriate response. Emergency response is an
effective and strategic way to counter the effects and severity of the event. This has become even
clearer after the analysis of many historical high risk events. Reviews of nuclear accidents, wildfires,
terrorist attacks, and other major events have shown that an improved emergency response strategy and
organization would have saved lives and reduced losses after the event.
Why is EP&RP needed?

An Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) is needed to minimize the impacts and
outcomes of a significant event. These include the minimization of the effect on:
• The health and livelihood of the public,

• employees of the facilities,
• the natural environment,
• facilities, equipment and the built environment, and
• the operations and business of the economy.
Who has responsibility to do this?
There are several public service organizations including the police, the fire department, the coast guard,
and in some cases the military, that have responsibility to protect the public. However, private
organizations and businesses have a responsibility to provide emergency response resources that will
protect their own employees, facilities, and sites and the public and natural environment that may be
impacted by an event. The event may be initiated at the business site. However, it is apparent that many
off-site events may cause on-site secondary emergencies. For example, regional flooding may cause
engineering failures on the site of the business, and this may in turn affect the public.
The federal and provincial governments have legislation in place that set out responsibilities associated
with public and private event emergencies. The section below describes the general jurisdictional
responsibilities for public emergency events within Canada.
The Federal System

Traditionally, and in accordance with “A Federal Policy for Emergencies,” the responsibility to
deal with emergencies is placed first on the individual and then on successive levels of
government, as the resources and expertise of each are needed. This recognizes that when an
emergency occurs people normally see to their own safety to the extent possible, and then they
seek assistance from local and provincial or territorial governments if necessary. Those
governments in turn seek federal support if an emergency moves beyond their capabilities. This
assistance may entail the coordination of supplies and services for response and recovery
activities, the deployment of the Canadian Forces to aid civil authorities or the allocation of
financial assistance to the provinces and territories (P/Ts).
From “Annex L: Federal Emergency Preparedness and Response System (2006)”

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The description provides a general reasoning for the use of public emergency response systems. A
business may not have the same entitlement to all resources and after event securities as the public. In
addition, the business may require specialized emergency response expertise, methods, and equipment
that are not available from public responders. Insurance requirements on businesses usually require a
level risk minimization and a capability to respond to risk events to maintain coverage.
How has EP&RP changed since 2001?
A survey of literature shows that the terrorist attacks since 2001 have had a great impact on re-shaping
the traditional concepts and applications of risk reduction and emergency response. Prior to this time, the
primary emphasis of EP and RP was on natural disaster events and engineering failures. After the 9-11
terror attack in New York city, the governments of the US and several other countries have re-directed
risk management efforts to include terror-based event responses within the traditional EP and RP set of
priorities.
Many countries have legislated policies to create federal disaster management organizations. For
example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the USA, the Department of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada have both been given new mandates to focus resources
towards emergency planning. In addition, there has been renewed effort to allow collaboration and
coordinated responses that cross jurisdictions and departmental boundaries. Considerable effort has
been applied to developing shared resources, communication and planning systems that can be effected
during an appropriate response requirement.
5.2 Planning For Emergencies

Perhaps the first question is “what type of emergency do we need to prepare for?” As the chief safety
officer of a business or a facility, you are aware of the internal risk events that may occur. This should
have been generated from your HAZOP analysis or Risk Assessment. This may include a range of
possible events arising from personal workplace injuries, to fires, chemical releases, and material
explosions.
Workplace emergency planning usually includes a number of disaster events that may be internal or
external in origin, such as:
• flooding
• weather events
• wildland fires
• tsunamis
• earthquakes
• backcountry accidents
• wildlife encounters
• disease outbreaks
• landslides
• avalanches
• HAZMAT releases and spills
• drought
• engineering failures
• transportation emergencies
• utility power, water and waste disposal failures
• terrorist events
By the nature of emergencies, they may not be foreseeable and may strike at random times. This makes
preparing for them exceedingly difficult. However, preparations for emergency events can be made and
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prioritized according to the likelihood of occurrence and the consequences they present to the community
and workplace.
Preparations should try to prioritize events to optimize your:
• planning,
• training requirements,
• resource and equipment needs,
• first aid requirements,
• communication systems, and
• financial resources.
An understanding of the type of events that are most important will also impact your communication and
reliance on other emergency responders (e.g. Police and Fire Departments, Coast Guard, HAZMAT
teams, local Militia, medical and hospital staff).
Industrial Fire Brigades: An industrial fire brigade is an essential part of every plant emergency plan.
The size, nature, and expectations of the industrial fire brigade will vary depending on the size, location
and value of the plant. Management must decide what type and size of fire brigade is required and must
support the brigade through the provision of resources, equipment and training. NFPA 600, Industrial Fire
Brigades, provides guidelines for organizing an industrial fire brigade. There are five basic responsibilities
that should be fulfilled by an industrial fire brigade:
i) supervise evacuation drills.

ii) operate firefighting equipment (extinguishers and hoses).
iii) provide emergency scene first aid and CPR if needed.
iv) conduct inspections.
v) implement emergency shutdown procedures.
From BCRSP Fire Protection domain, 2014
5.3 Site Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place

An Emergency Response Plan must ensure the safety of employees and the public that are impacted by
an emergency. Depending on the nature of the emergency, this will likely involve a means to evacuate
the area to safer locations. To that end, the Emergency Response Plan should:
• state the types of emergency that require evacuation, for example fires, chemical spills and
gaseous releases, and dangerous site conditions,
• a designation of primary and secondary evacuation routes complete with signage, appropriate
emergency-ready lighting,
• maintenance of pathways, corridors, and stairwells in a clear and accessible manner,
• designation of wardens that will manage the evacuation, attend to those that need assistance,
and assist in accounting of employees.
Communications: The Plan should also set out command and communication systems to enable a safe
evacuation when it is needed. The communication system should be defined for operations within the
workplace. Of equal importance, is the communication system to ancillary responders such as fire and
police departments, and medical support that will be required in the event of some emergencies. This
plan should state specific communication technologies (e.g. two-way radios, cellphones, etc) that will be
in operation in the event of the emergency, and the command structure for communicating with
employees and responder groups.
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Procedures, Maps, and Directions: The plan should specify documentation for evacuation processes
and have it posted in visible locations within the workplace. The intent is to inform the employees and
visitors prior to an emergency event.
Emergency Drills: Drills are used to train and reinforce the evacuation plan before an emergency
occurs. It is also a way to test the efficiency and overall practicality of the evacuation and response effort.
Drills should be conducted at least once a year or as new employees are integrated into the workplace.
Records of the drills need to be retained.
Employee Accounting and Personal Information: The Plan should include some method of
accounting for employees that are present and evacuated during the emergency. Fundamental
information about the identity of the employees, their medical considerations, contact, and next-of-kin is
important in the event of an emergency. It also must be administered with strict confidentiality to ensure
the privacy of the personal information.
Assembly Areas: Safe locations for evacuees need to be identified within the plan. The location is
important not only for the fact that it is safe from the hazard, but also because it allows employees to be
accounted for, and health and injuries to be attended to, if necessary. A suitable first aid kit should be
located in each assembly area.
Shelter-in-Place: In some emergencies, evacuation may not be the safest option. If this is the case, the
employees or public should maintain shelter where they are if it is safer than moving to an evacuation
assembly area. For example, safe shelters may be rooms or buildings that are secure from an external
toxic gas leak, extreme outdoor weather conditions, acts of violence, or a terrorist threat.
The concept of shelter-in-place has been identified as the best safety option for certain events that are
becoming more frequent, in particular certain acts of violence and terrorism. Reviews of several alarming
shooting events in schools, workplaces, and public spaces have found that shelter-in-place combined
with secure lockdown of entrances and passageways may be the best immediate response to this type of
threat. Evacuation is a secondary safety strategy but after the initial threat has been reduced.
This threat is significant enough that the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has
published an Evacuation Planning Matrix that can be used for workplaces to plan for a response to these
types of incidents. This planning tool identifies certain workplaces as being more likely targets of an
event on the basis of three semi-quantitative measures, they are:
1) “vulnerability”, an estimate of value of the site as a target for a terror event. For example, sites
that contain hazardous materials, provide essential services to the public, high-rise buildings that
have limited means of egress, and transportation carriers such as ships and airplanes.
2) “threat”, an estimate of the presence of an adversarial person or group with the intent to harm,
3) “significant impact” and estimate of the “perceived success” of an attack, in terms of casualties,
media attention, civil disruption, and terror.
The OSHA recommendation is for Yellow and particularly the Red Zone workplaces and facilities to have
evacuation and/or shelter-in-place management plans in place. This style of risk assessment is different
from traditional engineering forms of RA on the basis that the likelihood of an event is not based on
accidents or engineering failures. Instead, the risk measure is partially based on the willfulness of an
individual or group to do harm.
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Figure 5.1 By extension of the

target classification, the location
is identified as:
Green (low vulnerability, low
threat, low impact) and unlikely
targets
Yellow (significant in one of the
three categories, but not in the
other two) and moderate targets,
and
Red (significant in two of
vulnerability, threat, and impact),
and of high target value.
5.4 Education and Training

Education and training is a necessary component of the ERP. There are several levels of specialization
that are possible. The level of specialization and the overall sophistication of the responding team(s) is
dependent on the emergency. This is discussed further in the section on Incident Command Systems
(ICS).
Emergency Response Directors: Directors responsible for emergency command structures require a
specific knowledge of systems associated with command and authority, communications, finance, and
communicating with the media. During large operations these responsibilities are often delineated to
other individuals and teams, but the Directors must have a basic understanding of their roles and
capabilities.
Technical Specialists: Technical specialists must have specific training in equipment and in working in
response teams. This may be in specific ER equipment (such as self contained breathing apparatus, fire
extinguishers and strategies, etc.), or in other equipment specializations (e.g. heavy machinery
operations).
Employee Responders: In most workplaces, employees are trained to support the emergency response
plan. Specific duties and designations such as:
• evacuation wardens,
• first aid support,
• technical support for operational shutdown, and
• fire wardens
are often assigned to capable employees.
Associated with these duties and designations is a responsibility and a need for proper training in these
tasks. Some specific instruction is required to understand the emergency response plan and the
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command/communication structure of the response. In addition, the employees should be informed

about:
• their roles and responsibilities during the emergency,

• what types of emergencies may occur and what types of threats, hazards and protective actions
should be taken,
• protocols associated notification and emergency announcements,
• evacuation plans, routes, and safe areas, and the shelter-in-place strategy,
• accountability procedures to be used during and after the event and how to contact family
members,
• the modes of communication and the specific technology required to communicate during the
event,
• the equipment that will be used in an emergency.
The duties associated with these responsibilities are usually associated with the employee’s role in the
organization as a technical specialist or area leader.
Other non-responders: This group includes other employees, site guests, customers, students, and
members of the public that do not have an official role in the emergency response plan. To improve the
effectiveness of the ERP, these groups need to have visible and audible access to posted evacuation
route maps, safety areas, and announcements.
It is notable that many courses are available to emergency responders, and many courses and programs
of study include designations and certifications indicative of a maturing educational field.
5.5 Equipment Requirements

The risk management plan should have identified key risk events that are possible and this can be used
by the Emergency Response Planner to identify resources that are necessary to mitigate the effects of
the event if it should occur. This can be done in several stages by identifying:
• Equipment that is required on a local basis at facility. This may include fire protection and fire
fighting equipment, Hazmats suits and kits, warning and alarm systems, signage and
communication equipment needed in preparation and during an emergency, and other
specialized equipment to deal with site specific technologies (e.g. toxic gas leaks) and
transportation requirements.
• Equipment and resources that may be needed on a local basis using public response units (fire,
police, medical and other emergency depts.).
• Other resources that are available to be employed from regional and provincial response
organizations (e.g. aerial support such as water bombers, helicopters, coast guard support, and
others).
• Equipment and resources that may be required from private emergency organizations such as
CANUTEC.
A clear listing of the resources and equipment, and their locations and contact information is needed in
the event of an emergency.
5.6 First Aid

First aid response operates at many levels. For small local emergencies a trained attendant and an
appropriate first aid kit may be enough to respond effectively. In contrast, large-scale disaster events
may require several levels of aid reaching up to the regional health authority. Large-scale responses
require medical support coordination and planning.
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It is useful to determine the level of first aid equipment and training that is needed by each location and
site. Emergency responders are often required to contact first aid and should be trained and equipped to
do so. At some locations a first aid site will be needed to respond to potential casualties. If the
emergency is large and has many casualties, local medical and ambulance staff will require service
areas.
5.7 Finance
Emergency response is not performed in the continuity of normal work and resource requirements.
Emergencies are expensive, require extended specialist support, and the immediate implementation of
equipment and resources. The financial support and documentation of emergency response activities is
important and require a unique set of guidelines to ensure funds are spent appropriately.
In Canada, they are associated with the cost of response, and with recovery. Emergency response costs
are associated with activities required to save lives, reduce suffering, protect property and measures to
reduce the immediate impact of the emergency. Typically, they do not include regular payroll, training,
and preparation costs. During recovery operations the costs of returning public services to pre-
emergency conditions are included in the finance responsibility.
Organizations will normally set out an approval criteria so that expenses in the emergency can be
approved by an officer or director of sufficient financial authority.
5.8 Public Communication

Sites and industries that have hazardous materials and processes will initiate programs to inform local
public members of emergency planning actions. Most industrial zones are separated from commercial
and residential lands and this reduces the risk to the public in the event of a large industrial accident.
However in some towns and agricultural areas this has not occurred for historical planning reasons and
residences or farms may be very close to industrial facilities. Actions to reduce the risk to these properties
may be implemented through the emergency planning strategy. This may include consultation in the
emergency plan preparation so that residents understand the risks and the actions that are to be
implemented if an event were ever to occur.
Learning Objectives
• understand what is ER and RP, and why is it needed.

• describe the planning process and considerations in developing an Emergency Response Plan.
• identify key concerns associated with team structure, equipment, first aid, training, and public
consultation
• identify requirements of evaluation planning and shelter-in-place strategies.
• identify general learning requirements of emergency responders.
Reference Reading Sites
http://www.worksafebc.com/publications/health_and_safety/by_topic/assets/pdf/emergency_response_gu
ide.pdf
http://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/emergency
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/mrgnc-rspns-pln/index-eng.aspx
http://www.ready.gov/sites/default/files/documents/files/EmergencyResponsePlan.pdf
Learning Objectives
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6.0 Incident Command Systems

6.1 Conceptual Basis of an ICS
The Incident Command System (ICS) is a systematic methodology designed to apply to any emergency
response event. In particular, it lays out a system that includes a command structure and a set of policies
that allow responders to work together effectively in their response process no matter how large and
complex the incident becomes. By extension of the organizational plan, the ICS includes personnel,
funds, resources, facilities, and equipment management within the command structure.
The ICS should be scalable and be able to respond to the incident as a unified centrally organized team.
By the nature of emergency incidents this often requires several organizations or different units to
function within the same structure and communicate using a common terminology.
The Incident Command System has its origin in 1970. Severe wildfires in California resulted in several
deaths and significant property damage. A review of the response to the fire event found that the
physical response and equipment supplies were not deficient, but that the management and
communication within the multi-agency response required significant improvement. ICS was developed to
improve the organization behind the response. It needed to be a proven system that could be
implemented for a wide range of emergencies. It also had to be “scalable” such that small emergencies
can be supported with a small organization, and large emergencies could be supported with larger multi-
agency management structures.
As a result of the need for more clearly defined emergency organizational structures after the terrorist
events of September 11, 2001, ICS has become a subcomponent of the US national Incident Command
System. In Canada, the ICS system has been adopted by several government organizations and private
corporations as a methodology to respond to natural disasters, railway accidents and chemical and
petroleum spills.
6.2 Events that Require an ICS

Historically, emergency events have been classified as natural disasters (floods, earthquakes, forest fires,
etc), and man-made events such as transportation accidents and failures, chemical and oil spills, and
power system failures. More recently, terrorist attacks have been recognized as events that require
several multi-agency responders to coordinate their response.
Significant events may cause several secondary risk events. However, oftentimes there are faint
boundaries between events. For example, an earthquake is a seismic event initially, but may result in a
tsunami and emergency flooding, that in turn results in power failures and in the case of the Fukushima
disaster, a leak of radioactive material from a power facility. The events mean that structures are
insecure, residents and workers need to be moved to safe locations and rescued from perilous
conditions. Medical assistance and response crews and equipment need to be relocated. The immediate
initial response to the event is only part of the obligation. As the event evolves other needs are met by
other responders and services involved with recovery.
6.3 Command Structures and Flexibility

A fundamental principle of ICS states that every individual participating in an operation reports to only one
individual. This is designed to minimize conflicting supervisory directions, and to improve the unity of
command.
ICS employs a single set of terms for emergency response events. This is designed to minimize
confusion and errors associated with different sets of meanings used by the various responding agencies.
A set glossary of terms must be understood and used by all respondents to the emergency.
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The command structure is designed to be “scalable”. A small emergency should only need a small
command structure, but if the emergency changes and becomes more significant in its potential
consequences, the command structure should change as well. Normally, the first-on-the-scene assumes
command until the event becomes larger and more resources are required for an appropriate response.
At that time the command will be passed to a more senior officer and the response roles may be re-
delegated. Under ICS, the number of supervisory responsibilities managed by one individual should be
between three and seven team members, with five being the optimum number.
from British Columbia Ministry of the Environment

Incident Command Systems
6.4 Action Plans

The response to an event should be set out in an incident action plan. The plan may be related verbally
or in written form. If the event is of duration longer than a few hours the plan should be written. Incident
action plans for responses to hazardous material incidents must be in written form. The action plan
needs to set out the objectives, the strategy for accomplishing the objectives, and specific tactics and
resources that may be required in the plan. It should state the individual responsibilities, the mode and
timeliness of communications, and the course of action if someone is injured.
6.5 Coordination
There are five components to the ICS organization and they are sectioned according to their functions.
They are:
• Command: Setting response objectives and coordinating
• Operations: Provision of tactical response actions
• Planning: Developing and assessing the technical basis of the action plans
• Logistics: The provision of equipment and services supporting the plan actions, and
• Finance: Responsible for the management of financial resources and response administration.
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Although an Incident Commander may be assigned as one of the first actions in the response, the rest of
the organization tends to build from the bottom upwards as the response team becomes larger. If the
emergency escalates and a more complex operations and management structure is required, then a
different incident commander may be designated that is more suited to the team organization.
From Forest Fires to Hurricane Katrina: Case Studies of

Incident Command Systems
6.6 Team Composition

All of the members of the response team should understand its modular structure and how it can change
to meet the demands of the emergency. All members have specific duties and objectives within the team.
Some of the team members and the associated terms for the organization are listed:
Incident Commander: This individual is the commander and final authority for decision making for the
team. Initially, this will be the first responder on the scene, but will be re-designated as the complexity of
the structure increases, if that is necessary.
It may be necessary for more than one person to have duties associated with the Incident Commander.
This may occur when there are two or more jurisdictions, or departments involved. This is termed Unified
Command and the commanders are expected to act as one entity.
In large operations the Incident Commander may be assisted by substitute command staff. Command
staff may include a Safety Officer, a Public Information Officer, and a Liaison Officer. These staff have
specialized expertise and functions that are needed to assist with the response effort.
Operations Sections Chief: This individual directs all operations that are employed in the emergency.
Other section Chiefs may be assigned for the functions of Planning, Finance, and Logistics in support of
the operations.
Directors: Directors manage Branch staff. The Branch staff may be members of a pre-existing fire
department, rescue team or other organization.
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Supervisors: Within the Operations Section there may be further Divisions along geographic or
jurisdictional partitions, or Groups that have specific operational functions. These Divisions are led by
Supervisors.
Leaders: The separation of responders and resources into units of three to seven individuals is the
smallest grouping within the response organization. Unit Leaders provide direction and communication
lines at this level.
It is notable that the structure is hierarchal for the purpose of creating a command structure that is unified
under a single coordinated response planning directive. This is considered to be very important to having
a response that is directed towards a single set of outcomes, and that does not compromise safety.
6.7 Facilities and Equipment

In most emergency response actions the local fire department should have the necessary equipment and
facilities to attend to the emergency. However, some emergencies, particularly ones that cross any
jurisdictional or departmental boundaries will need access to special and alternative technologies and
facilities to successfully respond to the event(s). Consequently, the ICS needs to be modular in design,
such that specialized units (e.g. a groundwater remediation unit, hydro-electric tower repair unit, or bomb
disposal unit, for example) and specialized technologies (e.g. heavy machinery including mobile cranes,
front-end loaders, or firefighting vehicles and aerial units) can be added to the ICS.
As noted above, this usually requires the unit to be represented within ICS with a Director or Supervisor
and a communication line that does not subdivide the unit but allows it to contribute to the response
wherever and however it is required.
6.8 Command Transfer

Generally, the first officer at the incident takes on command until a more appropriately skilled or qualified
commander is present. At that point, a communication will relate the history, current status, and issues
associated with the emergency from the current to the incoming commander. It is common for the
complexity of issues to increase as the emergency evolves and consequently a more qualified
commander or one that has multi-jurisdictional authority may be needed to take on command. As an
emergency is resolved and countered, the command may also change to free up time and resources the
initial emergency commitment.
Learning Objectives
• describe an ICS.
• have a basic knowledge of the terms associated with ICS structures.
• define the importance of the command structure in terms of unity of command and modular
associations of units.
• understand the concepts associated with command transfer.
http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/topic.page?id=FCA7954D1335433686A938616F03B9CD
https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/ics/index.html
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/report/forest-fires-hurricane-katrina-case-studies-incident-
command-systems
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7.0 Business Continuity Planning

7.1 The Role of Prevention
An unexpected emergency may cause significant damage to a business. The business site, resources,
employees, systems, and reputation may all be impacted by the damage an emergency can achieve. A
business continuity plan can help minimize the damages and allow the business to re-start with a
minimum of downtime and lost revenue. The aim of the planning is to evaluate the most likely and/or most
damaging risks, determine ways to minimize their impacts, and achieve capabilities within the business to
allow it to continue operations after an event occurs.
7.2 Business Impact Analysis

To better understand the vulnerable operations of a business it is important to conduct an impact
assessment. This assessment attempts to identify the operations and systems that may be impaired or
lost during an event. The BIA will attempt to identify and estimate the consequences of an emergency
event. What systems and operations may fail, and how critical are they to the continuation of the
business? How rapidly can the operational capability be regained? These questions should be asked and
explored prior to an event. It is useful to include others in the organization such that an organizational
intelligence can be developed to improve the resilience of the business in the event of a possible
emergency event.
i. A useful starting point is the Risk Assessment (RA) study that has been done for your
site. This should provide an examination of the type of hazards that exist and what
portions of the facility site are at risk. If the scope of the RA is not broad enough (e.g.
perhaps the RA evaluates chemical hazards but does not include natural disasters and/or
vandalism risks), it should be expanded. The intention is to set out all the possible
emergencies that pose a risk. Each hazard should have some estimate of its probability
of occurrence, and the consequences of it happening at the site.
ii. Develop this information for a questionnaire that can be used to inquire with other parts of
the organization about the operational and system weaknesses and strengths of the
facility. If possible, use interviews and follow-up meetings to discuss the information
provided.
iii. Organize the results, document, and prioritize the vulnerabilities of the business during
and after an event.
7.3 Developing Recovery Strategies

On the basis of the BIA information, identify strategies to minimize the vulnerability of the systems and
operations within the organization and facility. Conduct a gap analysis to assess the difference between
what will be available before and after an emergency event, and what is needed to continue doing
business. Where there are significant gaps there are potential obstacles to continuing business. This
may require looking for more robust systems or having back-up resources to use in the case of an
incident. Select appropriate strategies that have the support of management and work to have these in
place.
7.4 Business Continuity Plan Development

The information and organizational resources that are developed in the first two stages are then put into a
formalized plan of action. The plan may include a summary of the intent of the BCP and how it will be
achieved. This may include:
• A description of the recovery team(s),

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• Procedures for emergency shut-down and start-up of operations, preservation of electronic

information and software systems, fallback communication systems, and public interface
strategies,
• Descriptions of medical and health support systems, and
• Security systems.
The plan needs to have input and agreement from all facets of the organization. Consequently, the report
document needs to be validated, approved, and communicated.
As part of the roll-out of the plan, there needs to be training and assignment of responsibilities to ensure
the plan is effected. Training modules may also be needed for consultants to the facility and the public
that are impacted by facility operations.
7.5 Follow-up Testing and Review

The Business Continuity Plan should be tested through practice and emergency drills designed to
simulate emergency events. Not only does this improve the organizational intelligence and ability to
respond to real-life events, but it also helps identify weaknesses in the plan so that they can be modified.
It is advisable to have the plan evaluated and brought up to current standards periodically. This may
done on a regular basis just as emergency response plans are periodically reviewed. It is good
management practice to assign responsibility for this and pre-set meetings and information update events
to maintain currency in the plan.
Business Continuity Plan, Ready.gov

http://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/continuity
Learning Objectives
• identify the key components of an environmental scan showing the items that may limit the ability
to conduct business in the time following a risk event.
• identify methods that can mitigate and reduce business downtime following an event.
• list some of the important components of the Business Continuity Plan.
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/bsnss-cntnt-plnnng/index-eng.aspx
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http://www.ready.gov/business
http://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/continuity
8.0 Prevention of Workplace Violence

This subtopic was developed by Dianne E.G. Dyck, RN, DPHN, BN, MSc, COHN(C), CRSP, Calgary, AB.
Workplace violence is defined as any act in which a person is abused, threatened, intimidated, or
assaulted in his or her employment. Workplace violence includes:
• Threatening behaviour - such as shaking fists, destroying property, or throwing objects.

• Verbal or written threats - any expression of intent to inflict harm.
• Harassment - any behaviour that demeans, embarrasses, humiliates, annoys, alarms, or verbally
abuses a person and that is known or would be expected to be unwelcome. This includes words,
gestures, intimidation, bullying, or other inappropriate activities.
• Verbal abuse - swearing, insults, or condescending language.
• Physical attacks - hitting, shoving, pushing, or kicking. 1
Rumours, swearing, verbal abuse, pranks, arguments, property damage, vandalism, sabotage, pushing,
theft, physical assaults, psychological trauma, anger-related incidents, rape, arson, and murder are all
examples of workplace violence. 2
Violence can happen in any workplace. However, people whose jobs involve any of the following factors
are at increased risk for workplace violence:
• Contact with the public.

• Exchange of money.
• Delivery of passengers, goods, or services.
• Having a mobile workplace (such as a vehicle).
• Working with unstable or volatile people.
• Working alone or in small numbers.
• Working late at night or during early morning hours.
• Guarding valuable property or possessions.
• Working in community-based settings (for example, Home Care).
OHS professionals should encourage the development and implementation of workplace violence
prevention programs. In most Canadian provinces and territories, the management of workplace violence
is a legal requirement under OHS legislation or part of the employer’s responsibility to provide a safe and
healthy workplace.
Key components of a workplace violence prevention program include:
• a workplace violence prevention policy;

• violence risk assessment;
• violence risk control;
• worker education and training; and
• response to incidents.
1
CCOHS. (2012). OHS Answers: Violence in the workplace. Available at www.ccohs.ca
2
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Learning Objectives
The candidate should:

• have an understanding of the negative impact of workplace violence.
• understand the features of and the positive impact that workplace violence prevention programs
can offer an organization.

• define workplace violence.
• describe the work factors that increase the risk for workplace violence.
• identify the work groups at greatest risk for workplace violence.
• assess whether or not a workplace is at risk for workplace violence.
• identify key features of a workplace violence prevention program.
• explain the benefits of a workplace violence prevention program.
• identify the pieces of Canadian legislation that address workplace violence.
ACTIVITIES:
1. Suggested Reading:
CCOHS. (2012). OSH Answers: Violence in the workplace. Available at

www.ccohs.ca
CCOHS. (2006). OSH Answers: Violence in the workplace – negative

interactions. Available at www.ccohs.ca
CCOHS. (2006). OSH Answers: Violence in the workplace – warning signs.

Available at www.ccohs.ca
Labour Canada. (2010). Guide to Prevention of Violence in the Work Place, Cat.
No. HS24-85/2010. Gatineau, PQ: Human Resources ad Skills Development
Canada. Available at www.hrsdc.gc.ca/
2. The definition of workplace violence is provided above and is also available in the CCOHS
(2012) fact sheet, and the Labour Canada document, page 3.
3. The work factors that increase the risk for workplace violence are provided above, but are
more fully explained in the CCOHS (2012) fact sheet, as well as in the CCOHS (2006) fact
sheet on Violence in the Workplace – Negative Interactions.
4. The work groups at greatest risk for workplace violence are identified in the CCOHS (2012)
fact sheet.
5. The assessment process for identifying whether or not a workplace is at risk for workplace
violence is provided in the CCOHS (2012) fact sheet. Basically it entails:
• Review any history of violence in your own workplace.

o Ask employees about their experiences, and whether they are concerned for
themselves or others.
o Review any incidents of violence by consulting existing incident reports, first aid
records, and health and safety committee records.
o Determine whether your workplace has any of the risk factors associated with
violence.
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o Conduct a visual inspection of your workplace and the work being carried out.
Focus on the workplace design and layout, and your administrative and work
practices.
• Evaluate the history of violence in similar places of employment.
o Obtain information from any umbrella organizations with which you are
associated; e.g., your industry association, workers' compensation board,
occupational health and safety regulators or union office.
o Seek advice from local police security experts.
o Review relevant publications.
o Collect newspaper or magazine clippings relating to violence in your industry.
• Contact legislative authorities to determine if specific legislation regarding workplace
violence prevention applies to your workplace.
• Organize and review the information you have collected. Look for trends and identify the
occupations and locations that you believe are most at risk. Record the results of your
assessment. Use this document to develop a prevention program with specific
recommendations for reducing the risk of violence within your workplace.
6. The key features of a workplace violence prevention program are provided in the Labour
Canada document.
7. The benefits a workplace violence prevention program are identified in the CCOHS (2012)
fact sheet.
8. The CCOHS fact sheets and Labour Canada document identify the relevant pieces of
Canadian legislation. However, the OHS professional should be aware of the applicable OHS
legislation for their jurisdiction.
Conducting a Violence Prevention Risk Assessment
A review of the risk elements in the workplace can assist in developing an appropriate violence
prevention plan. A risk assessment may list and evaluate several parameters, including:
• What is the nature of employee interactions?

o Is money transferred?
o Is the selling of drugs or alcohol involved?
o Are healthcare or social services delivered?
o Is there a security or regulatory enforcement service being delivered?
• What are the attributes of workers?

o What is the training and experience of the employee?
o What age and gender are the employees?
o What is the appearance, health, personality features, and attitude of the employee?
• What is the nature of the work environment?

o What is the work location (is it isolated or busy?)
o How many workers are present at any one time?
o What is the workplace layout?
o Is the workplace space restricted (are people in waiting lines for extended amounts of
time?)
o Is there adequate lighting and security provisions?
o What are the hours of operation?
• Identify past incidents of violence in the workplace.

o What is the number and frequency of incidents?
o What was the severity of the incidents?
o When did they occur and under what conditions?
o Who was involved and what attributes did the individuals possess?
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o What was the nature of the interaction?
These are some of the questions that may used to develop your risk assessment. The intention of the
assessment is to further understand the potential for violence to occur in the future and how to reduce the
probability and/or severity of the events.
Preparing a Prevention Plan
The prevention plan should be created to suit the workplace environment with respect to the physical
surroundings, the employee group, the nature of the work and set of transactions that occur, and the
availability of resources to minimize workplace violence.
i) A violence prevention plan should state and clearly communicate the organizational policy and
approach to preventing workplace violence. This should include the:
• The direction and support of senior management,

• Clearly outline the responsibilities and expectations on management, supervisors, employees,
• Identify the nature of the risks of violence in the workplace, and
• Include a glossary of terms, definitions, and other information to ensure employees understand
the nature of workplace violence.
ii) There should be regular risk assessments conducted to identify changes in environment and workplace
features that may contribute to workplace violence incidents.
iii) The prevention plan may include specific changes to the:
• Physical environment to reduce the risk of violence. For example, an appropriately designed
service waiting space can alleviate many tensions and stress in service areas. A spacious room,
with seating, adequate lighting and clear service directions such as “position in line numbering”
may serve to limit tension associated with long line-ups in public service locations. Protective
glass may be used at service desks as a protective transparent barrier.
• Administrative Design such as the hours of operation schedule may be optimized to provide
lower risk work times. Security attendants may shift the frequency of their patrol to minimize
risks.
• Point of Interactions may be modified to reduce violence risks. If there are points of interaction
that are tension related, or are more likely to result in an incident, can they be modified in
structure to minimize and reduce the likelihood or consequences of an event.
• Specific personnel changes may be made if there has been a history of violent or threatening
behavior from an individual or group of employees.
• Employee and supervisor training should include appropriate response procedures in the
event of an incident, and ensure the plan is understood and effected. In the event of an incident,
there is a requirement for accurate records to be created and maintained to document the
incident(s). In addition, the organization has to respond appropriately in the time after an event
occurs, including investigations and corrective actions to minimize repeat events. The employee
also has a responsibility to provide medical care and counseling to victims in a hostile event.
• A review of the Prevention Plan Review is needed on a periodic basis.
A few areas where and when violence may occur are listed below:
• Travelling to and from work, whether driving, parking, walking to and from your place of work.
• When working alone,
• When dealing with irate customers,
• During the act of crime such as robberies,
• When securing the transfer money,
• During labor disputes, and
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• During personnel corrective actions and dismissal,
References and Reading Sites

1
9.0 The Hierarchy of Controls

9.1 Conceptual Basis
The Hierarchy of Controls is a systematic method of reducing or eliminating a hazard. It is based on the
premise that certain types of controls are more effective than others. The method has been accepted by
many regulatory organizations and is used as a basis for decision-making in developing new strategies to
improve safety.
9.2 Types of Controls

There are five types of control and they have a specific order of implementation. The diagram below lists
these controls in order of priority of application with the most desirable option at the top and the least
desirable at the bottom (note that the triangle is often depicted in an inverted form so that the point faces
the bottom of the page, but with the most desirable option at the top). The levels of the control triangle
are listed is order of their effectiveness, from greatest to least.
Workplace Health and Safety Training Resource Kit

Australia
9.2.1 Elimination: This is the removal of the hazard from the workplace environment entirely. It is the
preferred option for safety and worker health because the hazard is not present. This option may be
difficult and/or expensive to implement, particularly in pre-existing operations. It is easier to implement in
the early design stages of an operation. An example of this may be found in the construction or
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demolition of elevated systems. Instead of having workers work at hazardous heights, the work may be
done at the ground level and then relocated to the height after it is mostly complete.
9.2.2 Substitution: The second best option is to replace a hazard with a non-hazardous substitute. If
elimination of the hazard is not possible, substitution is the next best option. An example of this may be
found in the painting and coating process. In traditional uses, the paints used thinners and solvents that
are now considered toxic and unacceptable for use in the workplace. Paints are now formulated with
solvents that are non-toxic and these have been used within many industries to remove the hazard of
older coatings.
9.2.3 Engineering Controls: The third option is to reduce the hazard by using a constructed method to
minimize worker exposure to the hazard. An example of this is the use of local ventilation systems to
reduce the exposure to vapors and particles in the air at a worksite, using a fume hood and glovebox for
dangerous material handling situations, or using noise reduction dampers in environments where hearing
loss is possible. Controls are useful for lowering the risk of the hazard exposure, and are often used in
environments where the original site design did not plan to minimize or remove the risk of the hazard.
9.2.4 Administrative Controls: Administrative controls are policies and procedures that are
implemented to reduce the exposure or the probability of a hazardous occurrence. An example is to
schedule workers in short shifts to minimize their exposure to undesirable conditions such as high heat or
poor air quality. This type of control also includes training workers about hazards in the specific
environment and providing adequate labels and signage to create an awareness of the hazards.
Although this has elements of good workplace practice, it is not as desirable an option as the complete
removal of the hazard. It also places some responsibility for hazard avoidance on the worker, when
optimum choices will be to remove the hazard from the environment.
9.2.5 Personal Protection: Personal protective equipment includes the use of gloves, respirators,
protective clothing, and ear plugs and eyewear. This option minimizes the hazard by protecting the
worker within a potentially hazardous environment.
It is usually considered to be the least desirable control option. This is because the hazard in the
environment is not removed or eliminated. In addition the equipment must be maintained and may fail
allowing exposure to the hazard. Usually the protective equipment is uncomfortable and does not provide
optimum freedom of movement or sensory perception. If the equipment causes fatigue, then this is also
an additional hazard.
Some protective equipment is considered necessary for many tasks. Protective glasses and/or ear plugs
are used in almost every environment where sensory damage may occur due to flying objects or loud
noises.
It is notable that more than one control system may be used to maximize safety. For example, a
particularly hazardous material in the workplace may be substituted with a less dangerous one, and
constructing an engineering control such as fume hoods to reduce exposures to the vapor.
9.3 Implementation
The objective of implementing one or more controls is to provide an adequate level of safety for the
workplace and by extension the environment. It may be difficult to determine an appropriate level of
safety and the magnitude of control necessary. This question ultimately comes back to risk estimation
and the calculation/estimation of risks in terms of the frequency of hazardous incidents and the magnitude
of the consequences of these events. Some controls will reduce the frequency of the event, and other
controls will reduce the consequences of events once they do occur. Some controls reduce both
frequency and consequences.
There are a few methods of approach the OHS professional can take towards establishing a baseline of
safety and the level of controls needed to attain a safe status in the workplace.
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Historical Safety/Accident Records: A comprehensive review of the frequency and consequences in

the historical record of accidents and hazardous incidents is one approach. If there has been a pre-
existing record of workplace accidents and their effects that runs several years in duration, this can be
used to set current risk estimates. If the workplace environment is new or has been changed significantly
with the implementation of new processes, the historical record may be non-existent or unreliable for the
estimation of risks.
Industry-standard Risk Estimates: Industry associations may maintain standards of accidents and
consequences that relate adequately to the workplace under review. Due to the differences in
workplaces, training, and management practices this source of records may not provide an ideal match to
the workplace, but there is an added benefit of a using a larger database of records for review and this
may allow some low frequency incidents to be identified.
Introducing controls and reinforcing their effectiveness is ultimately the responsibility of management, but
workers and unions have responsibility to promote their implementation.
Learning Objectives

• identify the hierarchy of controls in an image.
• identify the five levels of controls and their order in the hierarchy.
• provide examples of specific controls methods and the level they would belong to.
• sort and order an example of controls and select the best option in accordance with this system.
https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/safetyhealth/comp3.html
http://www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/hsprograms/hazard_control.html
https://www.osha.gov/dte/grant_materials/fy10/sh-20839-10/hierarchy_of_controls.pdf
http://www.safework.sa.gov.au/contentPages/EducationAndTraining/HazardManagement/Electricity/TheA
nswer/elecAnswerHierarchy.htm
http://www.safework.sa.gov.au/contentPages/EducationAndTraining/TrainingKits/WHSTrainingResource
Kit/whsKit/top3_7.htm
10.0 Hazard Communication

10.1 The Function of Hazard Communication
Employees and visitors to a workplace area must understand the presence and form of any hazard that is
present. The communication should provide information, and be readily available, about the location and
type of hazard, and provide some information on the hazard level of danger. The communication takes
the form of signage, labeling, Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS), and hazard awareness training. The
communication includes chemical, physical and biological hazards. Not only does this provide workers
with information about the potential dangers of their workplace, but also provides information to rescue
and medical professionals that are responding to a hazardous event.
In Canada, the federal Hazardous Products Act is the legislation that establishes the national standard for
chemical classification and hazard communication. This federal statute is the basis for worker’s “right-to-
know” legislation. The federal, provincial and territorial governments have all passed legislation that
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facilitates a single consistent national system. This is important because hazardous materials are
transported from province to province. In addition, the Canadian labour force is considered to be mobile
and should have a uniform communication system in workplaces across all jurisdictions. (Health Canada-
Workplace Hazardous Materials Information System – Official National Site)
10.2 Hazard Communication Standards

The agencies responsible for different jurisdictions are responsible for setting communication standards.
In Canada, the Workplace Hazardous Materials Information System is used. In the United States, the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration uses a Hazard Communication Standard. Over the past
several years, these and other standards have been harmonized into a Globally Harmonized System of
Classification and Labeling of Chemicals (GHS), and this has obvious benefits in the communication for
hazards that are transported across international borders.
The Global Harmonized Standard (GHS) has been promulgated in the European Union, Canada, United
States, Brazil, Australia, Japan, Korea, and China. In North America, the final implementation date for
GHS is in 2015. Canada and the US have committed to the “align and synchronize implementation of
common classification and labeling requirements for workplace hazardous chemicals” since 2011. These
alignments in policy also encompass the GHS standard. The implementation of the international
standards requires that they be adopted under the Canadian Hazardous Products Act and that revised
Regulations be set. (Health Canada-Environmental and Workplace Health – Implementing the GHS in
Canada)
10.3 Hazard Symbols

Hazard symbol signage is used in workplaces for labeling containers or specific workplace environments,
and another set for the transportation of dangerous goods.
The GHS categorizes the hazards into three types, they are:
Physical Hazards
• Explosives
• Flammable
• Oxidizing
• Compressed Gas
• Corrosive
Health Hazards
• Toxic
• Corrosive
• Irritant
• Health Hazard (specific cell mutagens and sensitizers)
Environmental Hazards
• Environmentally Damaging
Within these categories are subcategories relating to the specific classification of the material or effect.
Some other hazard symbols are used but may not be within the GH System. These include the Infectious
Substances and the Radioactive Materials signs.
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Figure 10.1 Hazards and the associated pictogram used in the GHS
10.4 Safety Data Sheets

Hazards that exist in the workplace must be identified and evaluated. For each chemical and physical
hazard there must be a Safety Data Sheet. The Safety Data Sheet (SDS) provides concise information
on the hazard. In the proposed GHS, this is normally 16 sections and will include identification names
and numbers, the nature of the hazard, composition, hazard response information and a number of
sections relating to forms of toxicity, disposal, transport, and regulations. Usually an up-to-date SDS
should be available from the chemical manufacturer but it is management’s responsibility to maintain the
SDSs in an accessible and current condition.
In the past, these were Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS), and any controlled product would have
needed a Workplace Hazardous Materials Information System (WHIMS) MSDS. The specifications of the
MSDS were slightly different than those of GHS. During the GHS implementation period, the 16 heading
format will be recognized as acceptable under current regulations (the Controlled Products Regulations
CPR). (Health Canada-Environmental and Workplace Health – Use of the GHS Safety Data Sheets and
Labels Prior to GHS Implementation in Canada).
10.5 Labeling
Hazardous materials that are stored in the workplace require labels to identify them. The label must be
affixed to the container or material packaging and in clear view of the chemical user. This is in addition to
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the other workplace signage and the Safety Data Sheets that are stored in an accessible location. Labels
on material containers must contain the following:
• The name, address, and telephone number of the supplier,

• A product identifier,
• A signal word,
• A hazard statement,
• Precautionary statements,
• A Pictogram identifying the class of hazard.
An example of the label is shown in figure 10.2
Figure 10.2 A generic label that is consistent with GHS criteria.
It is generally the responsibility of the supplier to ensure the label is attached and in good condition, but
the user has a requirement to maintain the label integrity and to modify the label if the material is changed
in some way.
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Figure 10.3 These two labels show how hazardous chemical information is communicated on the (a)
packaging label, and (b) during transport in the United States. There are some significant differences
between the two types of labels. These are similar to the Canadian requirements.
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10.6 Hazard Awareness Training

The employer must provide employees with effective information and training on hazardous chemicals in
their workplace. This training must provide information and practice to enable the employee to detect the
presence or release of the chemical, physical, or health hazard. It must also include protective measures
to minimize the hazard and prevent exposure. An explanation of the labeling, signage and Safety Data
Sheets for the hazard must also be provided. This training is consistent with the employee’s right-to-know
principles. As an extension of this, the employer is required to maintain up-to-date documentation on the
action they take to comply with the GHS.
Learning Objectives

• Demonstrate an understanding of hazard communication including symbols, safety data sheets,
labeling, database research resources, hazard awareness training, etc.
• demonstrate an understanding of the legislation regarding GHS and its implementation in
Canada.
Learning Resources
There are two primary resources to access on this subject. They are:
The government of Canada website about implementing GHS in Canada

www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ewh-semt/occup-travail/whmis-simdut/ghs-sgh/
And the GHS website at the United Nations Economic Commission For Europe
(www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/ghs/ghs_rev05/rev05files_e.html)
The latter reference has several downloadable pdfs describing specific signage, labels, Safety Data
Sheets, and classification of several materials and mixtures.
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11.0 Example of a Workplace Health and Safety Risk Management

System
11.1 Workplace Health and Safety Risk Management-Queensland Advisory
Standard 2000
Within a particular regulatory jurisdiction or organizational group, the broad risk management framework
and the selected OHS management model must be combined to create a functional occupational health
and safety management system. A good example of such a functional OHS system is one introduced by
the Workplace Health and Safety agency in Queensland State, Australia. As described in the document
Workplace Health and Safety Risk Management: Advisory Standard 2000, this system adheres closely to
the basic risk management steps in similar risk frameworks in Canada, most notably the CSA-Q850
standard. This is not surprising, given the similarity of workplace issues and the existing commonality of
concepts and terminology among risk management researchers in both countries.
The Advisory Standard defines a systematic workplace health and safety risk management process within
a series of basic steps as summarized in Figure 11.1:
Figure 11.1: The Workplace Health and Safety Risk Management Process (from QL p.5)
With the exception of the Initiation Step, which is omitted, the steps are virtually identical in terminology
and content with CSA-Q850, and the entire system is treated as a cyclical process so that new OHS
issues and new information can be periodically revisited. A notable omission, however, is the absence of
any detailed specification for risk communication and stakeholder consultation, although sections 2.3 and
3.2 briefly allude to ongoing consultation with workers at each stage of the process as required by the
Queensland OHS Act. This is somewhat unusual considering the emphasis placed on proactive risk
communication in the Australian/New Zealand Standard for Risk Management (AS/NZS 4360:1999).
Despite this shortcoming the Advisory Standard provides detailed guidance for all the major steps:
Risk Management
Step 1: Identify Hazards (QL 8-9)

There are several ways to identify hazards in a workplace. These may include walk-through inspections,
consultations with workers and the safety representatives in the environment. Physical tests of
equipment and safety audits are also important. In addition, historical accident records and reviews of
original design criteria for process equipment may provide a basis of hazard assessment.
There are also obligations upon the risk manager with respect adhering to the requirements of:
1) Regulations;
2) Advisory Standards or Industry Codes of Practice, and
3) Guidance Material.
Step 2: Assess Risk (QL 10-12)

The assessment of risk has been described in the section 2.8 (see Table 2.5 for the summary of methods
for risk assessment). A summary of this is described in the box below. It should be noted that this is a
simplified example and that most quantitative risk assessments will be much more complex, but do not
differ fundamentally in their conceptual basis.
Risk Assessment Method:

a) for each of the risks:
• estimate the likelihood of the incident occurring at the workplace, bearing in mind existing control
measures,
• estimate the consequences of an incident occurring at the workplace, bearing in mind existing
control measures,
• combine the likelihood and consequence estimates to estimate the level of risk of each incident.
b) using the ratings of each risk, develop a prioritized list of workplace risks requiring action.
Step 3: Decide on Control Measures (QL 13-14)

The selection of control measures for the risk should address the highest priority risks. But even within a
selected risk event, the control measures may be prioritized.
Control Priorities
Start at the top of the priority list of risks and work down.
1) Firstly, try to eliminate the hazard
2) If this is not possible, prevent or minimize the exposure to the risk by one or a combination of:
• substituting a less hazardous material, process, or equipment
• redesigning the equipment or work process
• isolating the hazard
3) As a last resort, when exposure to the risk cannot be eliminated or minimized by other means:
• introduce administrative controls
• use appropriate personal protective equipment
Note that these control options are prioritized in the order of their preferred outcomes from the standpoint
of optimal worker protection—thus the elimination of a hazard is preferable to minimizing exposure, which
is in turn preferable to the use of personal protective equipment (the latter measure is generally
objectionable to workers and labour unions except when a temporary measure or otherwise unavoidable).
In addition, any control measures under consideration should:

(1) adequately control exposure to the risk
(2) not create another hazard
(3) allow workers to do their work without undue discomfort or distress
Risk Management
Step 4: Implement Control Measures (QL 15)

The activities involved in implementing control measures include:
• developing work procedures
• communication with workers (note that the Standard refers to the requirement to 'inform'
workers—this is a departure from the modern risk management principle that a two-way risk
communication channel must be ensured to allow active consultations with workers)
• providing training and instruction (this aspect is especially sought after by most workers and
labour unions, and is often seen as insufficient in many workplaces)
• supervision
• maintenance of control measures (often seen as deficient by labour unions in times of corporate
downsizing or cost-cutting)
Step 5: Monitor and Review (QL 16)

The final step in the process is to monitor and review the effectiveness of measures. This can utilize
three key questions:
• whether the selected control measures have been implemented as planned
• whether the control measures are working
• are there any new problems
The review requires new information and measures of workplace health and safety performance and can
be in several forms:
• consultations with workers, supervisors, and OHS representatives
• periodic monitoring of the levels of individual and area exposure to workplace hazards
• monitoring incident and accident reports; monitoring work-related illness reports
Learning Objectives

• explain the similarities and differences between a general risk management framework such as
CSA-Q850 and a specific workplace health and safety risk management process such as
QUEENSLAND ADVISORY STANDARD 2000.
• summarize the major steps in the OHS risk management process for an OHS system such as the
one specified in the QUEENSLAND ADVISORY STANDARD 2000.
12.0 Case Studies

12.1 Classification of OHSMS Case Studies According to System Types
The OHSMS case studies to be described in this part of the study guide are classified as belonging to
different system types according to a classification recently developed by Gallagher (see NOHSC 2001).
Based on observational studies of how various organizations manage their occupational health and safety
systems within a given corporate culture, Gallagher first defines two basic approaches to a control
strategy—safe person or safe place:
Safe Person Control Strategy

• Prevention strategy focused on the control of employee behaviour
Safe Place Control Strategy

• Prevention strategy focused on the control of hazards at source through attention at the design stage
and application of hazard identification, assessment and control principles
Second, he defines two basic approaches to management of the OHSMS—traditional management or

innovative management:
Risk Management
Traditional Management
• The key persons in health and safety are the supervisor and/or any OHS specialist
• A low level of integration of health and safety into broader management systems and practices (for
example, integration of OHS within general procedures or interfunctional activities)
• Employees may be involved, but their involvement is not viewed as critical for the operation of the
OHSMS, or alternatively a traditional health and safety committee is in place
Innovative Management
• Senior and line managers have the key role in health and safety
• A high level of integration of health and safety into broader management systems and practices (which
connect OHS to business planning, or quality/best practice management initiatives)
• Employee involvement is viewed as critical to system operation and there are mechanisms in place to
give effect to a high level of involvement
Finally, based on the control strategies and management approaches previously described, Gallagher
then provides a 2 x 2 classification matrix (table) that defines the four categories of OHSMS according to
the predominant control strategy and management approaches present within a given organization.
TABLE 12.1 OHSMS System Types according to Gallagher Classification (NOHSC 2001 p.8)
Category 1 Category 2
innovative / safe person innovative / safe place
SOPHISTICATED BEHAVIOURAL ADAPTIVE HAZARD MANAGERS
Category 3 Category 4
traditional / safe person traditional / safe place
UNSAFE ACT MINIMIZERS TRADITIONAL ENGINEERING AND DESIGN
While these are idealized forms of more complex real-world systems, they have considerable value in
understanding the underlying corporate culture that influences the selection and perpetuation of a
particular type of OHSMS, and its corresponding strengths and weaknesses. No one type of OHSMS is
necessarily superior to the others in all cases—the relative strengths and weaknesses will depend on the
nature of an organization's main productive activities, its size and complexity, the degree of health and
safety risks attendant to its activities, and the regulatory system under which it operates.
• distinguish between a safe person control strategy and a safe place control strategy.
• distinguish between traditional management and innovative management approaches.
• define the four categories of OHSMS system types according to the Gallagher classification table.
Risk Management
For each of the case studies that follow, the reference material is located in:
EU 2002. The use of occupational safety and health management systems in the member states of
the European Union: experiences at company level. European Agency for Safety and Health at Work,
European Union. Luxembourg, 2002.
© European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, 2002

Reproduction is authorized provided the source is acknowledged.
For each of the four Case Studies that follow, the candidate should be able to:
• recognize which category of the Gallagher classification table best applies to a given case study.
• identify the respective strengths and weaknesses in the OHSMS process for each of the
organizations described in the case studies.
12.2 Case Study #1 Powell River Kraft Pulp Mill, British Columbia
12.2.1 Background
A kraft pulp mill on the coast of British Columbia had a chemical release accident. The release of
chlorine dioxide gas may have caused significant harm and possibly death to site workers and nearby
residents of the community, except that the prevailing winds dispersed the gas plume to uninhabited
portions of the location. In the aftermath, the company embarked on a risk assessment and safety
program to prevent similar accidents in the future.
12.2.2 Facts
The accident appears to have been initiated by a technological failure, or a human error. The exact
cause is not known. A very large wooden stave tank holding pulp and pulp wash water overfilled to a
level that caused the tank to fail and release its contents on the chlorine dioxide tank located within two
meters away. It is possible the fill stop mechanism failed, or that control technologists did not respond to
the alarm mechanism. The weight of the liquid/pulp release crushed the chlorine dioxide tank and it too
released its contents to the paved area around the tanks. This area is outdoors and within 100 meters of
the Discovery Channel coastline.The chlorine dioxide off-gassed to the surrounding area and the wind
carried to the northwest away from the site and the nearby town. This occurred in the very early hours of
the morning, in darkness and the emergency response was limited and slow. Eventually the spill was
managed and was released to the coastal area once local approvals were obtained.
Due to the severity of the release and the threat of legal action, the company embarked on a plan to
improve their safety systems and this included risk analyses and emergency response improvements.
Other mills with similar technologies also followed this plan over the next several years.
12.2.3 Assessment
The OSHMS of Powell River Mill is a semi-integrated system with several links and common
elements. However, it has not yet reached the target of a fully-integrated management system.
This company decided on a comprehensive assessment of many aspects of their operations. Although
the accident had been reported in the local media there appeared to be only minor reputational damage
in the public consciousness. In contrast, the provincial government was willing to take regulatory action
Risk Management
to ensure better safety and a preventative program to mitigate future events at Powell River and all other
mills. The industry perceived this as an undesirable option and the Council of Forest Industries proposed
that the industry would initiate their own program to improve facilities and procedures if the government
endowed that responsibility to them. This occurred, and it was clear that the Powell River facility had lost
reputational currency with its industry peers. The event also heightened concerns by the company’s
insurers over their operations at Powell River, and elsewhere.
Over the following three years the company contracted a comprehensive risk assessment and evaluation
of their Powell River operations. The initial focus was on the technology, chemical use and siting, and the
spill response capabilities of the mill operations. Later, this included organizational changes and the
development of policies and procedures designed to reduce accidents and to respond to them more
effectively.
A few of these studies are described briefly:
• Each of the hazardous chemical materials were evaluated for their siting, technological handling,
spill probability, spill severity, and the usefulness they served to the mill. Over 60 spill scenarios
were developed and evaluated in terms of their release probability and hazard. The resultant
information provided a risk categorization matrix. High risk materials and events were targeted
for further action.
• Emergency response systems were also evaluated. The availability of proper materials, clothing,
information systems, communication systems, personnel dispatch procedures, and facility-wide
understanding of response processes were evaluated and raised in importance. This included a
meteorological station and gas release modeling software systems.
• The company made efforts and was partially successful in creating a larger “buffer area” between
the facility grounds and nearby residents. Prior to the spill, some homes were located within a
street width from the front gates and along the fence line. The company was able to purchase
many of these locations in the following years and increase the safety zone around the mill.
• The corporation legal team approached concerns with their insurers to alleviate risk and fiduciary
concerns.
• The company also communicated their program development and deployment with their industry
peers through their association and Council of Forest Industry meetings.
After this period of time the mill had made several improvements to the facility, although the original
chlorine dioxide technology was still in place. The organization had also improved their effectiveness in
promoting safe practices and mitigating accidents and the outcomes of events. In addition, many other
mills had also taken the same or similar steps to mitigate the risk at other sites.
12.3 Case Study #2 Agfa-Gevaert N.V. , Mortsel (Belgium)

12.3.1 Background
Agfa-Gevaert N.V. in Mortsel (Belgium) is the headquarters of the Agfa-Gevaert Group and employs
about 5 590 people. In spite of its well-known products within the photographic and film industry, Agfa-
Gevaert’s main business consists in the creation of innovative solutions for the graphic and photographic
industries and the medical imaging market. Agfa-Gevaert products are on the market in about 150
countries. The company has structured its activities around five business groups:
• consumer imaging,
• graphic systems,
• medical imaging,
• non-destructive testing, and
• industrial imaging.
Risk Management
The company’s main suppliers are from the metal, packaging materials and chemical industries. The
enterprise itself supplies only finished products.
One important issue concerning hazards and risks at work is that there are many different chemical
products on the work floor. The two main problems are that employees must be able to read a chemical
card in order to understand the chemical codes, and the rate of industrial accidents, which, according to
the safety manager, is still too high.
12.3.2 Facts
For a long time, Agfa-Gevaert had a prevention policy that aimed at improving/maintaining the safety and
health of their staff. The subject is now coordinated in one of Agfa’s supporting services: the ‘Coordination
cell for quality, occupational health and safety and environmental management systems’.
The basis for Agfa’s OSHMS is the Belgian labour regulations that require a dynamic risk control system.
Further, Agfa-Gevaert has the ISO 14001 at its disposal and lives up to standards according to the
‘Responsible Care Code’ as set out by the union for the chemical industry.
The enterprise’s OSHMS is part of a global management system, which is based on the principles of ISO
9001 and also includes environmental and quality topics. Its main OSH-related goal is the achievement of
a zero rate of industrial accidents. In the beginning, the OSHMS was initialised by the ‘Prevention and
Protection Committee’, which consists of employees’ and employers’ representatives. After this, each
department started to formulate points of focus in the effort to realise a safer and healthier environment.
Ever since, the level of employee participation has been as high as possible. A special step and method
was the foundation of ‘ARBO groups’ which stand for attention towards safety and health, reaction to
unfavourable conditions, assessment of risks, and encouraging a positive attitude towards OSH and the
environment. ARBO groups meet six times a year in order to discuss industrial accidents, unsafe
situations, new actions, etc. There are also ARBO mini-groups, which allow for the participation of every
single employee. This network of ARBO groups constitutes the basis for communication — both from the
top to the bottom and from the bottom to the top.
Moreover, an annual action plan sets objectives focused on a specific theme. There is a relatively high
involvement of employees and the different ARBO groups are very well integrated into the company’s
management system. There is a steering group that determines the annual action plan and a committee
that must give its final consent. Afterwards the annual action plan is passed on to the other group leaders
who have to discuss this topic in their group.
Every year the safety manager visits every single department in order to assess the development of OSH
subjects. Together with a representative of the committee and the head of the department, he writes an
evaluation report, which is then returned to the department. Afterwards, the department develops a plan
for further action, taking into account both the investigation report and their own ideas. This plan has to be
reported to the committee together with actions that have been carried out and problems that have been
encountered.
Agfa-Gevaert has developed two types of training for their workers:
• an OSH package including videos, newspapers, guidelines, posters and other easily
understandable tools which raise the awareness of the employees with respect to OSH;
• a specific training for everybody who changes or starts a job and thus has to deal with new
procedures and machines.
At Agfa-Gevaert constant improvement is stimulated by a permanent reflection on work situations and on

instructions by the communication network of the ARBO groups. Internal and external audits are also
carried out.
The management seems to be aware of some weaknesses and is attempting to further develop the
current OSHMS. All in all it seems that Agfa-Gevaert uses an OSHMS which has standards higher than
Risk Management
those set out under Belgian law.
12.3.3 Assessment
The OSHMS of Agfa-Gevaert is a semi-integrated system with several links and common
elements. However, it has not yet reached the target of a fully-integrated management system.
The effects of introducing an OSHMS have been successful. Several advantages have become obvious.
Agfa-Gevaert has succeeded in establishing numerous ‘mini ARBO groups’, thereby involving large
numbers of people in the project and motivation among staff seems to be high. Even though Agfa-
Gevaert lies much below the average rate of occupational accidents, they still aim at increasing the safety
levels and perceive their current results as too weak.
Other advantages are those of an integrated system: it is much more transparent than a number of
separate management systems and it requires only one single audit. It is possible to take advantage of
the existing written procedures of every work process. Although the theoretical concept of the OSHMS is
well planned and developed, some differences remain in its implementation. Not all ARBO groups and
employees live up to the standards that were established or they regard only one or two of these points
as being their focus and responsibility. Another disadvantage is the complicated code of the chemical
card. For this reason Agfa-Gevaert has already planned a new and much easier system. Problems and
prevention measures are formulated on the basis of the action lists. Consequently, carrying out risk
analyses is, for Agfa-Gevaert, not the only source from which to formulate prevention measures. Because
an action list is already being used, risk analysis is often considered redundant.
12.4 Case study #3 The Homecare Unit in the Municipality of Herlev, Herlev
(Denmark)
12.4.1 Background
Like all the other 274 municipalities in Denmark, the Municipality of Herlev is responsible for carrying out
a large proportion of the tasks involved in the Danish social welfare system. One of these tasks is to
provide home care for elderly, disabled people and others (primarily people suffering from mental
illnesses) in need of home care. In the Municipality of Herlev approximately 1 000 clients receive home
care. The responsibility for providing home care rests with the Home Care Unit, which employs about 200
home care assistants.
The main hazards for the home care assistants are back and shoulder pains caused by the physical
requirements of the job, which involves, for example, vacuum cleaning, carrying heavy shopping bags
and lifting of people. Another obstacle is connected to the fact that private homes are rarely designed with
care-taking activities in view. This makes it difficult to use lifting and moving aids in the home, and makes
cleaning difficult. Many of the problems are related to a poor working environment, caused by a high
workload added to the pressure of having to deal with angry clients. In 1992 a working group consisting of
area managers and safety representatives began implementing the OSHMS. In 1994, all home care units,
retirement homes and day-care centres became legally obliged to register with the Occupational Health
Service in Denmark, an institution founded under the Ministry of Labour, which provides advice on
occupational health and safety issues, as well as training and educational schemes. The Occupational
Health Service in Denmark has been a major contributor to the development of the current OSHMS in the
Home Care Unit in Herlev. In addition, since 1997 all enterprises have been legally required to make a
written workplace assessment.
12.4.2 Facts
The Home Care Unit has two goals in particular:

Risk Management
• to have a safe work place; and

• to maintain a good working environment.
From the very beginning worker involvement was seen as critical, and this has been a continued element
in the OSHMS. Some elements of the OSHMS are directly linked to OSH issues, while others are
established in order to create a supportive structure in the workplace. The OSHMS consists of the
following elements:
• workplace assessment
• courses and training
• communication systems
• absence interviews
• support teams
• performance measures
• paper on service standards
• work teams
• management review
• flexible timetables.
The system integrates all levels of personnel and the City Council. Training and courses are conducted
by trained ergo-therapists and physiotherapists. Many advantages have risen from the implementation of
the OSHMS. The main result has been that days lost through illness have decreased dramatically.
Furthermore clients are more satisfied with the services provided by the Home Care Unit.
12.4.3 Assessment
The type of OSHMS in Herlev is a mix between a sophisticated behavioural approach and
an adaptive hazard management approach.
The system’s strength lies in the high degree of employee involvement, and the fact the system focuses
equally on controlling work related hazards and creating a good working environment for the home care
assistants. Workplace assessment and the training programme, as well as the establishment of a
supportive structure, are very important elements in this respect.
Over the last decade the OSHMS has evolved from a very traditional management system, with little
employee involvement, into an innovative system with a high degree of employee involvement. It also
seems that the OSHMS is a mix between a ‘safe place’ and a ‘safe person’ control strategy. On the one
hand most of the work-related injuries are not caused by singular incidents but by long-term damage and
a behavioural control approach is very important in this respect. On the other hand an efficient system,
which can identify and assess hazards, is very important, because of the changeable nature of the
workplace. The type of OSHMS in Herlev is therefore a mix between a sophisticated behavioural
approach and an adaptive hazard-management approach.
The concluding recommendation on how to set up an OSHMS can be summed up as follows:
• Involve the employees in the risk identification and problem solving stages of implementation.
• Allocate sufficient resources for the proper functioning of the OSHMS.
• Change the organizational structure, in order to establish direct communication between
managers and employees.
• Integrate the OSHMS in the overall management system, by involving both strategic and
operational levels of management in the OSHMS.
• Establish an educational system.
Risk Management
12.5 Case Study #4 Berglandmilch Company, Graz (Austria)

12.5.1 Background
Berglandmilch is an enterprise in the food industry and has about 1 000 employees. Its main activities
consist of the production and marketing of a variety of milk products such as milk, cheese and yoghurt.
The company’s main customers are supermarkets and its main suppliers are dairy farmers. The company
merged from six agricultural cooperative societies in the mid-1990s. There are ten production sites with
an annual turnover of about 529 Mio EUR (1999). In 1998 the enterprise won the Austrian Quality Award
(AQA) for Business Excellence.
In this period there was an increase in the number of occupational accidents. This was one of the main
reasons for the implementation of an OSHMS in the company. In order to achieve the main objectives of
a lower accident rate and a safer workplace, the focus was on:
• the improvement of communication with the authorities; and

• compliance with OSH obligations.
OSH efforts should be intensified, and also the synergy between the OSH management, quality
management and environmental management should be strengthened.
12.5.2 Facts
Some important elements of an OSH management system already existed before the establishment of
the present OSHMS:
• the systematic analysis and assessment of risks;

• the setting of adequate measures to reduce these risks;
• the existence of OSH representatives.
During the implementation process, the following main steps were carried out:
• analysis and assessment of risks

• setting of improvement measures
• employee instructions and training
• safety inspections
• audits
• implementation of continuous improvement system, and
• near-accident registration system.
The following issues were prioritized within the establishment and implementation process.
• the commitment of business management towards OSH

• a systematic basic training for new employees for quality, environment, OSH and hygiene.
There is also a need for constant training and instruction for all employees.The employees are
encouraged to set up initiatives and measures of improvement by implementing self assessment teams,
carrying out internal audits and establishing improvement and innovation teams. All this is aimed at
creating and encouraging employee awareness of prevention. Near-accidents have to be registered
systematically and the relevant causes must be eliminated. Facilities were inspected systematically and
work-related risks evaluated, analysed and assessed. Measures have been set based on the required
improvement. Internal and external audits, reviews, risk analyses and assessments are a systematic
element of the system and give further inputs for progress. A hazard control system considers the
Risk Management
measures and system elements described above.
There exist OSH representatives and an occupational medicine as well as an emergency management
system and a bulletin for contractors dealing with safety, environment and hygiene. The analysed
enterprise now registers the traditional OSH relevant performance indicators of ‘lost time accidents’ and
‘number of staff away sick’. On the basis of the OSHMS standard SCC, the OSH relevant legal
obligations and the principles of total quality management (TQM), the performance regarding OSH is
being measured systematically. Constant improvement is an inherent element of the OSHMS. The
management system is developed and improved by using the outputs of the performance measurements.
Basic elements of the EU legislation concerning OSH are the identification, evaluation and assessment of
risks. Berglandmilch finished its initial analysis and assessment of risks three years before legally
required.
On one side there is the requirement to document the evaluation and hazard/risk assessment by law,
while on the other there exists a so-called ‘generic management system’. Based on the 20 elements of
the ISO9000:1994- further topics like environment and OSH are added. Basic training for new employees
is offered, concerning topics such as quality, environment, OSH and hygiene. One main barrier to be
overcome during the implementation of the OSHMS was the employees’ sceptical attitude towards
management systems. The most important group for implementing the OSHMS were the employees.
The organisation always seeks ways to achieve ongoing improvement of overall business performance.
TQM provides the overall management system framework. Here theme centres’ management systems for
quality, environment and OSH are embedded but because of the company’s size and its complexity there
is a need to separate the management system topics. Several successes can be put down to the
implementation of the OSHMS. Lost time days per employee caused by accidents fell from 1.23 in 1998
to 0.65 in 1999 although no figures exist for a longer period. The accident frequency as defined by the
standard SCC decreased from 47.56 in 1998 to 37.02 in 1999.
12.5.3 Assessment
This case most resembles a semi-integrated management system with several links and
common elements.
As a TQM-oriented enterprise, Berglandmilch has implemented an effective overall communication

system, which integrates quality, environment and OSH tasks. Furthermore, the highly-advanced TQM
businesses widely demonstrate a distinct OSHMS. Additionally, implementing TQM requires extensive
employee qualification. Qualification measures are one means to empower people. In connection with the
principles of empowerment this will also lead to a health-promoting situation for the employees.
The analysis in this case study shows an overall picture of a pronounced training culture and extensive
training efforts. This is expressed in increasing training budgets during the last few years. Benefits in all
aspects of business performance are evident because of the systematic OSH management. This ranges
from employee satisfaction to hard facts, e.g. accident frequency and sick leave. The standard SCC
shows only reduced management system understanding, ostensibly not fitting for a large-scale business.
The case study business also carried out a certification of its OSHMS according to the standard SCC for
obtaining third-party input and feedback. The SCC elements provide some important initial hints regarding
the elements of OSHMS. Based on these, further steps can be undertaken, which are even more far-
reaching than SCC.

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Last Revision: 2015

RISK MANAGEMENT (RM)

Originally Developed: 2003 Last Revision Completed: 2015

5.7 Finance ........................................................................................................................................ 38

The following materials are provided:

Part A. Risk Management Principles

Part B. Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems (OHSMS)

5) Advantages and disadvantages of OHSMS approaches

Part C. Measuring Health and Safety Performance

Part D. Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning

Part D. Example of a Workplace Health and Safety Risk Management System

Part E. Case Studies

1.2 Course Reading Materials

CAN-CSA Q850. Risk management framework. Canadian Standards Association. 1997

D. CASE STUDY SOURCES:

2.0 RISK MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES

2.1 Why Manage Health and Safety

According to the AWCBC (Association of Worker’s Compensation Boards of Canada), in Canada it is

• third-party insurance (in some cases)

• sick-pay (for illnesses not directly attributable to workplace hazards),

The candidate should be able to:

2.2 What is Risk Management?

process for safety and health issues.

The candidate should be able to:

2.3 Hazard and Risk

The candidate should be able to:

• distinguish between the related concepts of hazard and risk.

2.4 Core Activities in the Risk Management Process

2.5 Why Does Risk Management Need to be a Process

The candidate should be able to:

2.6 Risk Management Frameworks

CSA-Q850 RISK M ANAGEMENT HPB RISK DETERMINATION

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS / HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

RISK ESTIMATION RISK ESTIMATION

MONITORING & EVALUATION

2) exposure assessment; and

The candidate should be able to:

2.7 Likelihood, Consequence, and Risk

2) the corresponding severity of consequences arising from that exposure or event.

Likelihood Frequency Example

Rating of Severity Example

Major Serious bodily injury or serious work caused illness

Moderate Moderate injury or illness requiring casualty treatment

2.8 Decision-Making in Risk Management

2.8.1 The Risk Measurement Matrix

Risk can then be calculated as the product of two key variables:

1) the likelihood of effects and

This can be summarized as the relationship:

Risk = Frequency x Severity

TABLE 2.5 AN EXAMPLE OF A LIKELIHOOD:CONSEQUENCE MATRIX USED FOR RANK-ORDERING WORKPLACE

RISK PRIORITY CHART

Consequences: How severely could it affect health and safety?

2.8.2 Event Tree Analysis

The candidate should be able to:

• distinguish between discrete and continuous hazards in the workplace.

2.9 Some Guiding Principles for Decision-Making

2.9.2 Precautionary Principle

2.9.3 Sound Science

2.9.4 The ALARA Principle

2.9.5 Reasonable Relationship

The candidate should be able to: