Rule 126 or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the
Searches and Seizures offense; or c) Used or intended to be used as the
Criminal Procedure
World Wide Web Corp. v. People; G.R. No. 161106
–266; 13 January 2014
On the search warrants issued, Worldwide
Web Corp. and Planet Internet Corp. were alleged to
be conducting illegal toll bypass operations (piggy-
backing) that amounts to theft, and violation of P.D.
No. 401, to the damage of PLDT.
Petitioners moved to quash the search
warrants on the ground that, among others, the
search warrants were general warrants as ‘the
descriptions therein of the objects to be seized are so
broad and all-encompassing as to give the
implementing officers wide discretion over which
articles to seize.’ The RTC granted the motion to
quash, ruling that the warrants were general
warrants. On appeal before the CA, it was reversed
and set aside, upholding the validity of the search
warrants.
On the issue of the validity of the warrants,
the Court ruled that the search warrants VALID.
Under Sec. 3, Rule 126 of Rules of Court, ‘a search
warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property: a) Subject of the offense; b) Stolen
1
means of committing an offense.
A closer look at the search warrants, it
described what items are to be seized against
Worldwide Web Corp. and the particular persons
who are conducting the operations therein, in the
particular business address of 11/F IBM Plaza
Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Cyberpark Libis,
Quezon City, to name a few: 1) computers or any
equipment or device capable of accepting
information, applying the process of the information
and supplying the results of this process; 2)
Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device
used for recording or storing information; and 2)
Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing
statements, receipts, contracts, communications and
documents relating to securing and using telephone
lines and/or equipment (Search Warrant No. Q-01-
3856). Another with Search Warrant No. Q-01-3857,
where it specifically states to whom it shall be served
against and in what particular business address to
search the specified items to seize. The same with
Search Warrant No. Q-01-3858.
Before the authorities applied for the search
warrants, they conducted ocular inspection of the
premises of petitioners and was then able to confirm
that they had utilized various telecommunications
equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables,
antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX
or switching equipment, and support equipment
such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other
documentary records to support the illegal toll
bypass operations.
With PLDT’s level of expertise in said field, it
was able to establish the connection between the
items to be search as identified in the warrants and
the crime of theft of its telephone services and
business. Although the CA, in its ruling, observed
that targets of the search warrants were not illegal
per se, and that they were "innocuous goods", the
police officers were given blanket authority to
determine whether the objects were legal or not, as
in fact even pieces of computer equipment not
involved in telecommunications or Internet service
were confiscated. According to the OSG, assuming
that the seized items could also be used for other
legitimate businesses, the fact remains that the items
were used in the commission of an offense.
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of
particularity in the description of the things to be
seized when the things described are limited to those
that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued. The things to be seized must
be described with particularity. Technical precision
of description is not required. The warrant is valid
2
when it enables the police officers to readily identify
the properties to be seized and leaves them with no
discretion regarding the articles to be seized. In this
case, considering that items that looked like
"innocuous goods" were being used to pursue an
illegal operation that amounts to theft, law
enforcement officers would be hard put to secure a
search warrant if they were required to pinpoint
items with one hundred percent precision. In People
v. Veloso, the Court pronounced that "the police
should not be hindered in the performance of their
duties, which are difficult enough of performance
under the best of conditions, by superficial
adherence to technicality or far-fetched judicial
interference."
Thus, the Supreme Court finds it proper to
uphold the CA decision, and outright dismiss these
instant petitions.
People of The Philippines vs. Cogaed
G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014
FACTS:
There are two sets of facts that may be found in this
case. One is according to the prosecution. The other
one is according to Cogaed’s testimony during trial.
Version of the Prosecution
According to the prosecution, a police officer
of San Gabriel Police Station in La Union received a
text message from an unidentified civilian informer
that one Marvin Buya would be transporting
marijuana to the Poblacion of San Grabriel, La
Union.
The police organized checkpoints in order to
intercept the suspect and assigned a certain SPO1
Taracatac to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area
of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San
Fernando City.
A passenger jeepney arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s
checkpoint. The jeepney driver disembarked and
signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male
passengers who were carrying marijuana. SPO1
Trarcatac approached the two male passengers who
were later identified as Victor Cogaed and Santiago
Dayao. Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack
while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao
about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and Dayao
told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since
they were transporting the bags as a favor for their
barriomate named Marvin. After this exchange,
Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks
of what looked like marijuana. Cogaed then
muttered, “nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoy met
3
gayam ti nagyanna,” which translates to “Marvin is a
fool, this is what is contained in the bag.” SPO1
Taracatac arrested Cogaed and Dayao and brought
them to the police station. Cogaed and Dayao were
still carrying their respective bags inside the station.
While at the station, the Chief of Police and
Investigator requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty
their bags. Inside Cogaed’s sack was suspected
marijuana fruiting tops and inside Dayao’s yellow
bag was a brick of suspected marijuana.
The PNP Crime Laboratory performed the
tests and found that the objects obtained were
indeed marijuana. A total of 17.429 kilograms were
collected from Cogaed’s and Dayao’s bags
Version of Cogaed
According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial,
he was waiting for a jeepney to take him to the
Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide.
He boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his
younger brother’s friend. Upon arrival at the
Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed
alighted from the jeepney. Dayao allegedly asked for
Cogaed’s help in carrying his things, which included
a travelling bag and a sack. Cogaed agreed because
they were both going to the market. This was
whenSPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside
thebags, Cogaed replied that he did not know. SPO1
Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed jeepney and there was no outward indication that
was not privy to their conversation. Thereafter, called for his arrest. Since the arrest was illegal, the
SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and warrantless search should also be considered illegal.
brought them to the police station.[36] These facts
However, the trial court stated that
were corroborated by an eyewitness, Teodoro
notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed
Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the parking lot
waived his right to object to such irregularity when
where Cogaed was apprehended.
he did not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after
At the police station, Cogaed said that SPO1 identifying himself, asked him to open his bag.
Taracatac hit him on the head. The bags were also
In the CA
opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside. It
Cogaed appealed the trial court’s decision.
was only later when Cogaed learned that it was
However, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal
marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with
and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs under
Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against
Republic Act No. 9165.
warrantless searches when without any prompting
In the RTC from SPO1 Taracatac, [he]voluntarily opened his
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch bag. Hence, he appealed the case before the Supreme
28 of San Fernando City, La Union. Cogaed and Court.
Dayao pleaded not guilty. The case was dismissed
ISSUES:
against Dayao because he was only 14 years old at
1. Whether or not there was a valid search
that time and was exempt from criminal liability
and seizure of marijuana against Cogaed?
under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006.
Trial against Cogaed ensued. The Regional Trial 2. Whether or not Cogaed has validly waived
Court found Cogaed guilty. his constitutional rights when he did not
object when the police asked him to open
The trial court judge initially found Cogaed’s arrest his bags?
illegal considering that Cogaed at that time was not,
at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
RULING:
was shown that he was about to do so or that had
just done so. He just alighted from the passenger

4
 1. The Supreme Court ruled that this was not
a reasonable search within the meaning of
the Constitution. According to the Court,
the evidence used against the accused
should be excluded consistent with Article
III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There
being no possible admissible evidence, the
accused should be acquitted, the Court
declared.
2. The alleged waiver of constitutional rights
by Cogaed was invalid. It was not done by
the accused intelligently, knowingly, and
without improper pressure or coercion.
Stop and Frisk Searches
According to the Supreme Court, the search
involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk”
search, but it did not comply with all the
requirements of reasonability required by the
Constitution.
The Court explained that “stop and frisk” searches
(sometimes referred to as Terry searches are
necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers
should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses. However, this should be
balanced with the need to protect the privacy of
citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution.
5
Further, the Court said that the balance lies in the
concept of “suspiciousness” present in the situation
where the police officer finds himself or herself in.
This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of
the police officer. Experienced police officers have
personal experience dealing with criminals and
criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the
ability to discern — based on facts that they
themselves observe — whether an individual is
acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic
criterion would be that the police officer, with his or
her personal knowledge, must observe the facts
leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
The Court observed that the jeepney driver had to
point to Cogaed. He would not have been identified
by the police officers otherwise. The Court thus laid
down the RULE, to wit: “It is the police officer who
should observe facts that would lead to a
reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The
police officer should not adopt the suspicion
initiated by another person. This is necessary to
justify that the person suspected be stopped and
reasonably searched. Anything less than this
would be an infringement upon one’s basic right to
security of one’s person and effects.”
No Valid Waiver
According to the Court, there can be no valid waiver
of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if assuming
that he did not object when the police asked him to Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are
open his bags. governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
The Court explained that Cogaed’s silence or
lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person
a coercive environment brought about by the police lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
officer’s excessive intrusion into his private space. weapons or anything which may have been used or
The prosecution and the police carry the burden of constitute proof in the commission of an offense
showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is without a search warrant.
one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to
coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be
the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a
presumed.
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside
The Supreme Court laid down the RULE, viz: the suspect's person and premises under his
“For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her immediate control.
constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the
This is so because "objects in the 'plain view' of an...
police officer introduce himself or herself, or be
officer who has the right to be in the position to have
known as a police officer. The police officer must
that view are subject to seizure and may be
also inform the person to be searched that any
presented as evidence.
inaction on his or her part will amount to a waiver
of any of his or her objections that the
circumstances do not amount to a reasonable
search. The police officer must communicate this
clearly and in a language known to the person who
is about to waive his or her constitutional rights.
There must be an assurance given to the police
officer that the accused fully understands his or her G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012
rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s
RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,
constitutional right to privacy requires no less.
vs.

6
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic
violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the
confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter.
FACTS:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned as
a traffic enforcer saw the accused driving a
motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him
to flag down the accused for violating a municipal
ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to
wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle; that
he invited the accused to come inside their sub-
station since the place where he flagged down the
accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that
while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a
citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance,
he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on
getting something from his jacket; that he was
alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the
contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may
have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged
and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his
jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container
about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including
two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one
(1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container,
he asked the accused to open it; that after the
7
accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon
cover and something beneath it; and that upon his
instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of
the container on the table which turned out to be
four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were
empty while the other two (2) contained suspected
shabu.
Petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not
guilty" to the charge of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself and
raised the defense of planting of evidence and
extortion.
RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. It found the prosecution evidence
sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested
for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid
search, which led to the discovery on his person of
two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The
RTC also found his defense of frame-up and
extortion to be weak, self-serving and
unsubstantiated.
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and
seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He
claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest
was erroneous, since he was not even issued a
citation ticket or charged with violation of the city
ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest,
he claims that he had never consented to the search
conducted upon him.
ISSUE:
Whether the search conducted is incidental to
a lawful arrest. NO.
RULING:
The following are the instances when a warrantless
search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in “plain
view”; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a “stop
and frisk” search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances. None of the abovementioned
instances, especially a search incident to a lawful
arrest, are applicable to this case.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order
that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with
a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but
the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to
write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said
8
to have been "under arrest." There was no intention
on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him
of his liberty, or take him into custody.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No.
98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure
to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is
penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court
(Rule 112 Section 5 (c)), a warrant of arrest need not
be issued if the information or charge was filed for
an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated
as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be
made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest
for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an
intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the
motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody,
the former may be deemed to have arrested the
motorist. In this case, however, the officer’s issuance
(or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the
possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are
inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of
the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and
calls for the acquittal of the accused.

G.R. No. 189669. February 16, 2015.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION and PETRON CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. ROMARS INTERNATIONAL
GASES CORPORATION, respondent.
FACTS:
Upon learning thru an investigation conducted by
private investigators and NBI(also conducted a tes-
buy) that Romars International is selling, offering for
sale, or distributing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
by illegally refilling the steel cylinders manufactured
by and bearing the duly registered trademark and
device of petitioner Petron (Violation of Section
9
168, in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code
of the Philippines, and/or Section 25 of R.A. No. 623,
otherwise known as An Act To Regulate the Use of Duly
Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels
and Other Similar Containers) and deposit said
cylinders in different places, one of them a store
called “Edrich Enterprises” located Iriga City, NBI
then, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Naga City (RTC-Naga), two
separate Applications for Search Warrant for
Violation of Section 155.1, in relation to Section 170 of
R.A. No. 8293 against respondent and/or its
occupants.
On October 23, 2002, the RTC-Naga City granted
said Applications and Search Warrant were issued.
On the same day, the NBI served the warrants at the
respondent’s premises in an orderly and peaceful
manner, and articles or items described in the
warrants were seized.
On November 4, 2002, respondent filed a Motion
to Quash (1ST MOTION) 2 Search Warrants where the
only grounds cited were: (a) there was no probable
cause; (b) there had been a lapse of four weeks from
the date of the test-buy to the date of the search and
seizure operations; (c) most of the cylinders seized
were not owned by respondent but by a third
person; and (d) Edrich Enterprises is an authorized
outlet of Gasul and Marsflame. In an Order dated
February 21, 2003, the RTC-Naga denied the Motion to
Quash.
However, on March 27, 2003, THRU respondent’s
new counsel, filed an Appearance with Motion for
Reconsideration (2ND MOTION). It was only in said
motion where respondent raised for the first time,
the issue of the impropriety of filing the
Application for Search Warrant at the RTC-Naga
City when the alleged crime was committed in a
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-
Iriga City.
Respondent pointed out that the application filed
with the RTC-Naga failed to state any compelling
reason to justify the filing of the same in a court
which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the
place of the commission of the crime, as required by
Section 2(b), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner opposed the Motion for
Reconsideration, arguing that it was already too late for
respondent to raise the issue regarding the venue of the
filing of the application for search warrant, as this would
be in violation of the Omnibus Motion Rule.
RTC-Naga GRANTED respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration (2ND MOTION), thereby quashing
Search Warrants.
10
Petitioner appealed but CA reaffirmed RTC’s
order as regard to quashing search warrants.
ISSUE NO. 1
Whether or not, the Court of Appeals gravely erred
in ruling that venue in an application for search
warrant is jurisdictional.
RULING:
YES, CA gravely erred. Question on venue in the
application for the search warrant does not involve
a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
because the power to issue search warrants is
inherent in all courts.
Venue is jurisdictional only in relation to a criminal
action. It is however, procedural in applications for
search warrant. Application of search warrant
merely constitutes a criminal not process and is not
itself a criminal action. The rule that venue is
jurisdictional in criminal cases does not apply
thereto.
ANALYSIS:
Evidently, the issue of whether the application
should have been filed in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-
Naga, is not one involving jurisdiction because, the
power to issue a special criminal process is
inherent in all courts. Thus, issue on venue in the
application for search warrant can only be taken
cognizance by the court if timely raised in a motion
to quash the search warrant.
SUB-ISSUE A:
APPLICATION OF SEARCH WARRANT; WHERE
TO FILE;
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides thus:
SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant
shall be filed.—An application for search warrant shall
be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial
jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the
application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall
be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been
filed, the application shall only be made in the court
where the criminal action is pending. (Emphasis
supplied)
Was petitioner’s application for a search warrant
sufficient?
11
NO. Under paragraph (b) thereof, the
application for search warrant in this case should
have stated compelling reasons why the same was
being filed with the RTC-Naga instead of the RTC-
Iriga City, considering that it is the latter court that
has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the
alleged crime was committed and also the place
where the search warrant was enforced.
It is true that inclusion of the “statement of
compelling reasons if the application is filed in a
court which does not have territorial jurisdiction
over the place of commission of the crime” is
mandatory in nature. And absence of such will
render the application defective.
Since Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution guarantees the right of persons to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and
search warrants constitute a limitation on this right,
then Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure should be construed strictly
against state authorities who would be enforcing the
search warrants.
On this point, then, petitioner’s application for
a search warrant was indeed insufficient for failing to
comply with the requirement to state therein the
compelling reasons why they had to file the application in
a court that did not have territorial jurisdiction over the
place where the alleged crime was committed.
ISSUE NO. 2
Whether or not, the CA gravely erred in ruling
that respondent’s motion to quash is not subject to
the omnibus motion rule and that may not be waived
and may even be raised for the first time on appeal.
RULING:
YES, CA gravely erred. The motion to quash the
search warrant which the accused may file shall be
governed by the omnibus motion rule.
Court has ruled in a number of cases that the
omnibus motion rule is applicable to motions to
quash search warrants. Furthermore, citing Abuan v.
People, SC stated that “the motion to quash the
search warrant which the accused may file shall be
governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided,
however, that objections not available, existent or
known during the proceedings for the quashal of
the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the
motion to suppress x x x.”
In accordance with the omnibus motion rule,
therefore, the trial court could only take cognizance
of an issue that was not raised in the motion to
quash if xxx the issue was one involving
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Obviously, the issue of the defect in the
application, being not jurisdictional, was available
12
and existent at the time of filing of the motion to
quash. Thus 2nd motion filed must be denied.
Sub-Issue:
WON RTC of Naga has jurisdiction to issue search
warrant?
YES. Thus, it was improper for the RTC-Naga to
have even taken into consideration an issue which
respondent failed to raise in its motion to quash, as it
did not involve a question of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. It is quite clear that the RTC-Naga
had jurisdiction to issue criminal processes such as
a search warrant.
PEOPLE v. CASTILLO
G.R. No. 204419
November 07, 2016
FACTS:
Judge Marcelo C. Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran,
Cagayan issued Search Warrant against Joefrey Jil
Rabino alias “Jeff” after examining under oath SPO1
RONEL P. SATURNO of the Regional Intelligence
Division based at Regional Office 2, Camp Adduru,
Tuguegarao City, the applicant herein, and his
witness. Judge Cabalbag finds probable cause to
believe that a Violation of R.A. 9165 Comprehensive
Dangerous Drug, has been and is being committed
and there are good and sufficient reasons to believe
that said accused has in his possession or control an
illegal drugs, rySHABU (Methamphetamine and
PARAPHERNALIAS.
Thereafter, to effect the above Search and Seizure
Order, a search was conducted by elements of the
PDEA and officers of the PNP yielding one (1) sachet
containing residue of suspected methamphetamine
hydrochloride inside the house of private accused-
Rabino. Thus, an Information was filed against the
accused for violation of Section 11 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165.
Before the case was set for arraignment private
respondent Rabino filed a Motion to Quash Search
Warrant and for Suppression of Illegally Acquired
Evidence on the grounds, among others, that issuing
Court must have territorial jurisdiction over the
place to be searched.
The RTC, through respondent Judge Castillo,
granted the above motion in its Joint Resolution
enunciating that the minimum penalty for illegal
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu is imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years, which penalty is way
13
beyond imprisonment of six (6) years. A fortiori,
MTC Gattaran did not have jurisdiction to entertain
the application for and to issue Search Warrant,
hence is null and void. Search Warrant was ordered
quash and dismissed the case against accused-
Rabino.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran,
Cagayan has the authority to issue Search Warrant in
cases for violation of R.A. 9165, notwithstanding the
fact that the power to hear and try the offense is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court.
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held that the respondent
judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the
search warrant on a basis other than the accepted
grounds. It must be remembered that a search
warrant is valid for as long as it has all the requisites
set forth by the Constitution and must only be
quashed when any of its elements are found to be
wanting.
The Supreme Court has provided rules to be
followed in the application for a search warrant.
Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
Sec. 2. Court where application for search
warrant shall be filed. - An application for
search warrant shall be filed with the
following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial
jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the
application, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed if
the place of the commission of the crime is
known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be
enforced.
AS provided for in Sec 2, Art. III of the 1987
Constitution provides that the requisites for the
issuance of a search warrant are:
(1) probable cause is present;
(2) such probable cause must be determined
personally by the judge;
14
(3) the judge must examine, in writing and
under oatn or affirmation, the complainant
and the witnesses he or she may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on
the facts personally known to them; (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
  Necessarily, a motion to quash a search
warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the
search warrant, such as (1) the place searched or the
property seized are not those specified or described
in the search warrant; and (2) there is no probable
cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
In this case, the application for a search warrant was
filed within the same judicial region where the crime
was allegedly committed. For compelling reasons,
the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has
the authority to issue a search warrant to search and
seize the dangerous drugs stated in the application
thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the
same judicial region. The fact that the search warrant
was issued means that the MTC judge found
probable cause to grant the said application after the
latter was found by the same judge to have been
filed for compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court was duly complied with.
 MARCELO G. SALUDAY VS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 215305; APRIL 3, 2018
SUMMARY: Marcelo G. Saluday (petitioner) found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession
of high-powered firearm, ammunition, and
explosive under PD 1866
FACTS:
Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged
down by Task Force Davao of the
Philippine Army at a checkpoint near the Tefasco
Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. SCAA Junbert M. Buco
(Buco), a member of the Task Force, requested all
male passengers to disembark from the vehicle while
allowing the female passengers to remain inside. He
then boarded the bus to check the presence and
intercept the entry of any contraband, illegal
firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals.
Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of
the passengers, but a small, grayblack pack bag on
the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He
lifted the bag and found it too heavy for its small
size. Buco then looked at the male passengers lined
outside and noticed that a man in a white shirt (later
identified as petitioner) kept peeping through the
window towards the direction of the bag.
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Buco asked who the owner of the bag was, to which
the bus conductor answered that petitioner and his
brother were the ones seated at the back. Buco then
requested petitioner to board the bus and open the
bag. Petitioner obliged and the bag revealed the
following contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber
carbine bearing serial number 64702; (2) one
magazine with three live ammunitions; (3) one
cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a ten-inch hunting
knife. SCAA Buco then asked petitioner to produce
proof of his authority to carry firearms and
explosives. Unable to show any, petitioner was
immediately arrested and informed of his rights by
SCAA Buco.
Petitioner was then brought for inquest before the
Office of the City Prosecutor for Davao City. The
latter found probable cause to charge him with
illegal possession of highpowered firearm,
ammunition, and explosive under PD 1866.
On direct examination, Saluday claims that it was
only cellphone and he did not own the bag and that
his brother who died in 2009 owns the bag.
RTC RULING: The trial court declared the
petitioner in actual or constructive possession of
firearm and explosive without authority or license
and was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of illegal possession of firearm, ammunition, and
explosives under PD 1866.
CA RULING: The Court of Appeals sustained the
conviction and affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
the CA denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration for being pro forma. Hence,
petitioner filed Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the RTC and CA misappreciated the
evidence against the petitioner
Whether or not the search was illegal
RULING:
No. In the present case, the prosecution proved the
negative fact that appellant has no license or permit
to own or possess the firearm, ammunition and
explosive. The court ruled that either the testimony
of a representative of, or a certification from, the
PNP Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a
person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second
element of possession of illegal firearms. The
prosecution more than complied when it presented
both.
Section 2, Article Ill of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
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unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
***when a search is "reasonable," Section 2, Article III
of the Constitution does not apply.
The search conducted by the Task Force at a
military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search.
The bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao
at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable
search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a
vehicle of public transportation where passengers
have a reduced expectation of privacy. Further,
SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual
and minimally intrusive inspection was even less
than the standard x-ray and physical inspections
done at the airport and seaport terminals where
passengers may further be required to open their
bags and luggages. Considering the reasonableness
of the bus search, Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution finds no application, thereby
precluding the necessity for a warrant. As regards
the warrantless inspection of petitioner's bag, the
OSG argues that petitioner consented to the search)
thereby making the seized items admissible in
evidence.
In this case, petitioner consented to the baggage
inspection done by SCAA Buco. When SCAA Buco
asked if he could open petitioner's bag, petitioner
answered ''yes, just open if' based on petitioner's
own testimony. This is clear consent by petitioner to
the search of the contents of his bag.
Reasonable search, on the one hand, and a
warrantless search, on the other, are mutually
exclusive. While both State intrusions are valid even
without a warrant, the underlying reasons for the
absence of a warrant are different. A reasonable
search arises from a reduced expectation of privacy,
for which reason Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution finds no application. Examples include
searches done at airports, seaports, bus terminals,
malls, and similar public ·places. In contrast, a
warrantless search is presumably an "unreasonable
search," but for reasons of practicality, a search
warrant can be dispensed with. Examples include
search incidental to a lawful arrest, search of
evidence in plain view, consented search, and
extensive search of a private moving vehicle.
The inspection of passengers and their effects prior
to entry at the bus terminal and the search of the bus
while in transit must also satisfy the following
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conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search.
First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the
least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the
person or persons being searched, minimizing, if not
altogether eradicating, any cause for public
embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second,
neither can the search result from any discriminatory
motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and
other similar motives. In all instances, the
fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons
with disabilities, children and other similar groups
should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the
search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety.
Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable
search, courts must be convinced that precautionary
measures were in place to ensure that no evidence
was planted against the accused.
The search of persons in a public place is valid
because the safety of others may be put at risk. Given
the present circumstances, the Court takes judicial
notice that public transport buses and their
terminals, just like passenger ships and seaports, are
in that category. Aside from public transport buses,
any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers
at the terminal and along its route is likewise
covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever
compliant with these guidelines, a routine
inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself
while in transit constitutes a reasonable search.
However, the guidelines do not apply to privately-
owned cars. Neither are they applicable to moving
vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in
the case of taxis, which are hired by only one or a
group of passengers such that the vehicle can no
longer be flagged down by any other person until
the passengers on board alight from the vehicle.
Ongcoma vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No.
182534. September 2, 2015
Facts: Petitioner Ongcoma Hadji Homar was
accosted by PO1 Eric Tan and civilian agent Ronald
Tangcoy when they saw him crossing a “No
Jaywalking” portion of Roxas Boulevard. PO1 Tan
told him to cross at the pedestrian area. The
petitioner then picked up something from the
ground, prompting the policemen to frisk him
resulting in the recovery of a knife. Thereafter, they
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also conducted a thorough search on the petitioner’s
body and found and confiscated a plastic sachet
containing what he suspected as shabu. Ongcoma
was then charged for violation of Section 11, Article
II of RA 9165 to which he pleaded not guilty during
arraignment. The RTC convicted the petitioner
saying that the policemen were presumed to have
performed their duties regularly in arresting and
conducting a search on the petitiorner. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC’s findings.
Issue: Whether or not the shabu recovered from
Ongcoma is inadmissible as evidence because it was
obtained as a result of unlawful arrest and in
violation of his right against unreasonable search
and seizure.
Ruling: Yes, the Supreme Court held that the shabu
seized from Ongcoma is inadmissible as evidence
because it was obtained as a result of unlawful arrest
and it was a violation of his right against
unreasonable search and seizure. The Supreme
Court said that there must be a valid warrantless
search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest, which must precede the search.
For this purpose, the law requires that there be first a
lawful arrest before a search can be made the process
cannot be reversed. To constitute a valid in flagrante
delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence of or within
the view of the arresting officer. In the case at bar,
the prosecution did not proffer any other proof to
establish that the requirements for a valid in
flagrante delicto arrest were complied with.
Particularly, the prosecution failed to prove that the
petitioner was committing a crime.
The respondent failed to specifically identify the area
where the petitioner allegedly crossed. They merely
stated that the petitioner "crossed the street of Roxas
Boulevard, in a place not designated for crossing."
They also failed to prove that the portion of Roxas
Boulevard where the petitioner crossed was indeed a
"no jaywalking" area. The petitioner was also not
charged of jaywalking. These are pieces of evidence
that could have supported the conclusion that
indeed the petitioner was committing a crime of
jaywalking and therefore, the subsequent arrest and
search on his person was valid. Unfortunately, the
prosecution failed to prove this in the present case.
The filing of a criminal charge is not a condition
precedent to prove a valid warrantless arrest. Even if
there is a criminal charge against an accused, the
prosecution is not relieved from its burden to prove
that there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest
preceding the warrantless search that produced the
corpus delicti of the crime.
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Neither can the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty save the prosecution’s
lack of evidence to prove the warrantless arrest and
search. This presumption cannot overcome the
presumption of innocence or constitute proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Among the constitutional
rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial
yet often disregarded is the presumption of
innocence.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order
that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the
one making the arrest.
Conclusion:
Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest,
its inadmissibility as evidence precludes conviction
and justifies the acquittal of the petitioner. Thus the
Supreme Court granted the petition of Ongcoma and
reversed and set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner Ongcoma was acquitted.
 declared that these two cases are now being
abandoned to settle the issue once and for all.

People v. Sapla G.R. No. 244045, 16 June 2020

The Supreme Court also found the text message to
ISSUE: be double hearsay: (1) the person who actually
Whether or not an informant’s tip is sufficient to received the text message was not presented, and (2)
engender probable cause and police officer may the person who received the text message merely
justify the search as consented search. relayed it to the officers who conducted the
warrantless search and seizure without the latter
HELD:
actually seeing/reading the actual text message.
No. the Supreme Court has always said that a mere
Further, the text message was not preserved. It also
informant’s tip is not sufficient to engender probable
appeared that the phone which received the text
cause. The police officer receiving the informant’s tip
message was not a government issued one – this
must rely on his senses. The police officer must not
belies the claim of the officers that the message was
adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. The
received by their hotline. Based on the testimony of
police officer, with his/her personal knowledge,
the police officers, Sapla hesitated when he was
must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an
requested to open the blue sack. This only means
illicit act and not merely rely on the information
that he did not give his consent and that his
passed on to him/her.
compliance was vitiated by the presence of the
Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of a tip.
police. With all the foregoing, the search and seizure
A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may
conducted was invalid and any evidence obtained
be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in
therefrom is inadmissible. Sapla was acquitted. The
the absence of any other circumstance that will
Supreme Court likewise emphasized the need to
arouse suspicion. The Supreme Court noted that
adhere to strict standards set by the Constitution
there were two previous decisions (Pp. vs
otherwise “A battle waged against illegal drugs that
Maspil and Pp. vs Bagista) which ruled that a
tramples on the rights of the people is not a war on drugs;
confidential tip was sufficient to engender probable
it is a war against the people.” The Bill of Rights 
cause, however, the Supreme Court in this case
should never be sacrificed on the altar of
convenience. Otherwise, the malevolent mantle of

20
the rule of men dislodges the rule of law.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Sapla is acquitted
and is ordered immediately released from
detention. 

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