A SURVEY OF SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS

1 The Problem of Induction

According to a widely accepted view—to be opposed in this book …… the logic of scientific
discovery would be identical with inductive logic.
From a logical point of view, it is false that we are justified in inferring universal statements from
singular ones, no matter how numerous: no matter how many instances of white swans we may
have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are white.

From the work of Hume, for the principle of induction must be a universal statement in its turn. To
justify it, we should have to employ inductive inferences; and to justify these we should have to
assume an inductive principle of a higher order; and so on.
Thus, the attempt to base the principle of induction on experience breaks down, since it must lead
to an infinite regress.

Kant tried to force his way out of this difficulty by taking the principle of induction (which he
formulated as the ‘principle of universal causation’) to be ‘a priori valid’.

A widely current doctrine, that inductive inference, although not ‘strictly valid’, can attain some
degree of ‘reliability’ or of ‘probability’.
For it is not given to science to reach either truth or falsity . . . but scientific statements can only
attain continuous degrees of probability whose unattainable upper and lower limits are truth and
falsity.
If a certain degree of probability is to be assigned to statements based on inductive inference, then
this will have to be justified by invoking a new principle of induction, appropriately modified.
And this new principle in its turn will have to be justified, and so on.
Moreover, the probability logic itself, is taken not as ‘true’ but only as ‘probable’.
Like every other form of inductive logic, the logic of probable inference, or ‘probability logic’,
leads either to an infinite regress, or to the doctrine of apriorism.

2 Elimination of Psychologism
The question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man—whether it is a musical theme, a
dramatic conflict, or a scientific theory—may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it is
irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge.

My view is that every discovery contains ‘an irrational element’, or ‘a creative intuition’, in
Bergson’s sense.
In a similar way Einstein speaks of the ‘search for those highly universal laws . . . from which a
picture of the world can be obtained by pure deduction. There is no logical path’, he says, ‘leading
to these . . . laws. They can only be reached by intuition, based upon something like an intellectual
love (‘Einfühlung’) of the objects of experience.

3 Deductive Testing of Theories

We may if we like distinguish four different lines along which the testing of a theory could be
carried out:
First there is the logical comparison of the conclusions among themselves, by which the internal
consistency of the system is tested.
Secondly, there is the investigation of the logical form of the theory, with the object of
determining whether it has the character of an empirical or scientific theory.
Thirdly, there is the comparison with other theories, with the aim of determining whether the
theory would constitute a scientific advance should it survive our various tests.
And finally, there is the testing of the theory by way of empirical applications of the conclusions
which can be derived from it.

Nothing resembling inductive logic appears in the (testing) procedure here outlined. I never
assume that we can argue from the truth of singular statements to the truth of theories. I never
assume that by force of ‘verified’ conclusions, theories can be established as ‘true’, or even as
merely ‘probable’.

4 The Problem of Demarcation

The problem of demarcation is to distinguish between the empirical sciences on the one hand, and
mathematics and logic as well as ‘metaphysical’ systems on the other.

The older positivists wished to admit, as scientific or legitimate, only those concepts (or notions or
ideas) which were ‘derived from sense experience’, such as sensations (or sense-data),
impressions, perceptions, visual or auditory memories, etc.
Modern positivists are apt to see more clearly that science is not a system of concepts but rather a
system of statements.
Accordingly, they wish to admit, as scientific or legitimate, only those statements which are
reducible to elementary (or ‘atomic’) statements of experience.
It is clear that the implied criterion of demarcation is identical with the demand for an inductive
logic.

They are constantly trying to prove that metaphysics by its very nature is nothing but nonsensical
twaddle— ‘sophistry and illusion’, as Hume says, which we should ‘commit to the flames’.
The words ‘meaningless’ or ‘nonsensical’ convey, a derogatory evaluation;
There is no doubt that what the positivists really want to achieve is not so much a successful
demarcation, but as the final overthrow and the annihilation of metaphysics.

Positivists, in their anxiety to annihilate metaphysics, annihilate natural science along with it.
Because scientific laws, too, cannot be logically reduced to elementary statements of experience.
If consistently applied, Wittgenstein’s criterion of meaningfulness, those natural laws will reject as
meaningless.

My criterion of demarcation is a proposal for an agreement or convention. As to the suitability of

any such convention opinions may differ; and a reasonable discussion of these questions is only
possible between parties having some purpose in common.
The choice of that purpose must, of course, be ultimately a matter of decision, going beyond
rational argument.
The aims of science which I have in mind are different. I do not try to justify them, however, by
representing them as the true or the essential aims of science. This would only distort the issue,
and it would mean a relapse into positivist dogmatism.
Thus, I freely admit that in arriving at my proposals I have been guided, in the last analysis, by
value judgments and predilections. But I hope that my proposals may be acceptable to those who
value not only logical rigour but also freedom from dogmatism.

5 Experience as a Method
We may distinguish three requirements which our empirical theoretical system will have to satisfy:
First, it must be synthetic, so that it may represent a non-contradictory, a possible world.
Secondly, it must satisfy the criterion of demarcation, i.e. it must not be metaphysical, but must
represent a world of possible experience.
Thirdly, as the system which represents our world of experience, it must be distinguished in some
way from other such systems.

6 Falsifiability as a Criterion of Demarcation

Now in my view there is no such thing as induction. Thus, inference to theories, from singular
statements which are ‘verified by experience’ is logically inadmissible.
Theories are, therefore, never empirically verifiable.

These considerations suggest that not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be
taken as a criterion of demarcation.
I shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be capable of being singled out, once and
for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that it must be possible for an empirical scientific
system to be refuted by experience.

7 The Problem of the ‘Empirical Basis’

We must distinguish between, on the one hand, our subjective experiences or our feelings of
conviction, which can never justify any statement (though they can be made the subject of
psychological investigation) and, on the other hand, the objective logical relations subsisting
among the various systems of scientific statements, and within each of them.

8 Scientific Objectivity and Subjective Conviction

Now I hold that scientific theories are never fully justifiable or verifiable, but that they are
nevertheless testable. Thus, the objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be
inter-subjectively tested.

Thus, if the basic statements in their turn are to be inter-subjectively testable, there can be no
ultimate statements in science: by falsifying some of the conclusions which can be deduced from
them.
For I do not demand that every scientific statement must have in fact been tested before it is
accepted. I only demand that every such statement must be capable of being tested.
ON THE PROBLEM OF A THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
11 Methodological Rules as Conventions
Methodological rules might be described as the rules of the game of empirical science. They differ
from the rules of pure logic rather as do the rules of chess, which few would regard as part of pure
logic:
Seeing that the rules of pure logic govern transformations of linguistic formulae, the result of an
inquiry into the rules of the game of science—that is, of scientific discovery— may be entitled
‘The Logic of Scientific Discovery’.

THEORIES
The empirical sciences are systems of theories. The logic of scientific knowledge can therefore be
described as a theory of theories.

12 Causality, Explanation, and the Deduction of Predictions

We have two different kinds of statement. They are (1) universal statements, i.e. hypotheses of the
character of natural laws, and (2) singular statements, which apply to the specific event in question
and which I shall call ‘initial conditions’.

The ‘principle of causality’ is the assertion that any event whatsoever can be causally explained—
that it can be deductively predicted.
If, however, ‘can’ is meant to signify that the world is governed by strict laws, that it is so
constructed that every specific event is an instance of a universal regularity or law, then the
assertion is admittedly synthetic. But in this case it is not falsifiable.
I shall, therefore, neither adopt nor reject the ‘principle of causality’; I shall be content simply to
exclude it, as ‘metaphysical’, from the sphere of science.

14 Universal Concepts and Individual Concepts

It is usual to elucidate this distinction with the help of examples of the following kind: ‘dictator’,
‘planet’, ‘H2O’ are universal concepts or universal names. ‘Napoleon’, ‘the earth’, ‘the Atlantic’
are singular or individual concepts or names.

In the same way, any attempt to define universal names with the help of individual names is bound
to fail.
This fact has often been overlooked, and it is widely believed that it is possible to rise by a process
called ‘abstraction’ from individual concepts to universal concepts.
This view is a near relation of inductive logic, with its passage from singular statements to
universal statements. Logically, these procedures are equally impracticable.

17 Some Possibilities of Interpreting a System of Axioms

The axioms may be regarded either (i) as conventions, or they may be regarded (ii) as empirical or
scientific hypotheses.

FALSIFIABILITY
19 Some Conventionalist Objections
For the conventionalist, theoretical natural science is not a picture of nature but merely a logical
construction.
It is not the properties of the world which determine this construction; on the contrary it is this
construction which determines the properties of an artificial world: a world of concepts implicitly
defined by the natural laws which we have chosen.
According to this conventionalist, laws of nature are not falsifiable by observation; for they are
needed to determine what an observation and, a scientific measurement.

21 Logical Investigation of Falsifiability

First, the class of all those basic statements with which it is inconsistent (or which it rules out, or
prohibits): we call this the class of the potential falsifiers of the theory; and secondly, the class of
those basic statements which it does not contradict (or which it ‘permits’).
We can put this more briefly by saying: a theory is falsifiable if the class of its potential falsifiers
is not empty.

22 Falsifiability and Falsification

This condition is necessary, but not sufficient; for we have seen that non-reproducible single
occurrences are of no significance to science. Thus a few stray basic statements contradicting a
theory will hardly induce us to reject it as falsified.
We shall take it as falsified only if we discover a reproducible effect which refutes the theory.

24 Falsifiability and Consistency

Besides being consistent, an empirical system should satisfy a further condition: it must be
falsifiable. The two conditions are to a large extent analogous.

THE PROBLEM OF THE EMPIRICAL BASIS

25 Perceptual Experiences as Empirical Basis: Psychologism
They believe, science is merely an attempt to classify and describe this perceptual knowledge,
these immediate experiences whose truth we cannot doubt; it is the systematic presentation of our
immediate convictions.
This doctrine founders in my opinion on the problems of induction and of universals.
The reason is that the universals which appear in it cannot be correlated with any specific sense-
experience. (An ‘immediate experience’ is only once ‘immediately given’; it is unique.)
By the word ‘glass’, for example, we denote physical bodies which exhibit a certain law-like
behaviour, and the same holds for the word ‘water’.
Universals cannot be reduced to classes of experiences; they cannot be ‘constituted’.

30 Theory and Experiment

The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about it.
Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above
a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the
swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base;
and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply
stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time
being.

DEGREES OF TESTABILITY
31 A Programme and an Illustration
A theory is falsifiable, if the class of its potential falsifiers is not empty.
We represent the class of all possible basic statements by a circular area, and the possible events
by the radii of the circle, then we can say: At least one radius—or perhaps better, one narrow
sector whose width may represent the fact that the event is to be ‘observable’—must be
incompatible with the theory and ruled out by it.
One might then represent the potential falsifiers of various theories by sectors of various widths.
And according to the greater and lesser width of the sectors ruled out by them, theories might then
be said to have more, or fewer, potential falsifiers.

Thus, it can be said that the amount of empirical information conveyed by a theory, increases with
its degree of falsifiability.

33 Degrees of Falsifiability Compared by Means of the Subclass Relation

(1) A statement x is said to be ‘falsifiable in a higher degree’ or ‘better testable’ than a statement y,
or in symbols: Fsb(x) > Fsb(y), if and only if the class of potential falsifiers of x includes the class
of the potential falsifiers of y as a proper subclass.
(2) If the classes of potential falsifiers of the two statements x and y are identical, then they have
the same degree of falsifiability, i.e. Fsb(x) = Fsb(y).
(3) If neither of the classes of potential falsifiers of the two statements includes the other as a
proper subclass, then the two statements have non-comparable degrees of falsifiability (Fsb(x) ||
Fsb(y)).

If we denote an empirical statement by ‘e’, and a tautology or a metaphysical statement by ‘t’ or

‘m’ respectively, then we may ascribe to tautological and metaphysical statements a zero degree of
falsifiability and we can write: Fsb(t) = Fsb(m) = 0, and Fsb(e) > 0.
A self-contradictory statement (which we may denote by ‘c’) may be said to have the class of all
logically possible basic statements as its class of potential falsifiers.
We have Fsb(c) > Fsb(e) > 0.*2 If we arbitrarily put Fsb(c) = 1, i.e. arbitrarily assign the number 1
to the degree of falsifiability of a self-contradictory statement, then we may even define an
empirical statement e by the condition 1 > Fsb(e) > 0.

By excluding contradiction and tautology (as well as metaphysical statements) the formula
expresses at the same time both the requirement of consistency and that of falsifiability.

CORROBORATION, OR HOW A THEORY STANDS UP TO TESTS

Theories are not verifiable, but they can be ‘corroborated’.
79 Concerning the So-called Verification of Hypothesis
But they are apt to look upon such objections as due to somewhat unnecessary scruples. It is quite
true, they say, that we cannot know for certain whether the sun will rise tomorrow;
but this uncertainty may be neglected: the fact that theories may not only be improved but that
they can also be falsified by new experiments……
but never yet has a theory had to be regarded as falsified owing to the sudden breakdown of a
well-confirmed law. It never happens that old experiments one day yield new results.

On the contrary, scientific method presupposes the immutability of natural processes, or the
‘principle of the uniformity of nature’.

80 Criticism of Probability Logic

According to my view, however, probability statements, just because they are completely
undecidable, are metaphysical unless we decide to make them falsifiable by accepting a
methodological rule.
Thus, the simple result of their non-falsifiability is not that they can be better, or less well
corroborated, but that they cannot be empirically corroborated at all.

85 The Path of Science

One may discern something like a general direction in the evolution of physics—a direction from
theories of a lower level of universality to theories of a higher level. This is usually called the
‘inductive’ direction;

Science is not a system of certain, or well-established, statements; nor is it a system which steadily
advances towards a state of finality. Our science is not knowledge(episteme): it can never claim to
have attained truth, or even a substitute for it, such as probability.
Yet science has more than mere biological survival value. It is not only a useful instrument.
Although it can attain neither truth nor probability, the striving for knowledge and the search for
truth are still the strongest motives of scientific discovery.

Normal Science and its Dangers

The first of these criticisms is, briefly, that I have completely overlooked what Kuhn calls ‘normal’
science, and that I have been exclusively engaged in describing what Kuhn calls ‘extraordinary
research’, or ‘extraordinary science’. I think that the distinction between these two kinds of
enterprise is perhaps not quite as sharp as Kuhn makes it;

What Kuhn called “normal” scientists are not that much normal.
The various stages of these transitions merge almost imperceptibly, and genuine problems rather
than ‘puzzles’ arise at every stage.
I admit that an intellectual revolution often looks like a religious conversion. A new insight may
strike us like a flash of lightning. But this does not mean that we cannot evaluate, critically and
rationally, our former views, in the light of new ones.
Thus in science, as distinct from theology, a critical comparison of the competing theories, of the
competing frameworks, is always possible.