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The roles assumed by public administrators: The link between administrative

discretion and representation

Article  in  Public Administration Quarterly · January 2015

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THE ROLES ASSUMED BY PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATORS: THE LINK BETWEEN
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND
REPRESENTATION

ALEXANDRU ROMAN
California State University, San Bernadino

ABSTRACT

Traditionally, studies couched within the theory of

representative bureaucracy have focused on examining outcomes for
social minorities within a specific set of administrative practices or
public policies. The concept of administrative discretion typically lies
at the core of these studies, as public servants do indeed need to enjoy a
certain level of administrative discretion in order to incorporate the
values of a given group into their everyday decision-making. Yet, while
the centrality of administrative discretion is seldom, if ever, questioned
and it is most often implicitly assumed, its actual effects are rarely
explicitly explored. This study, constructed on the theoretical insights
drawn from representative bureaucracy and role theories, examines the
relationship between administrative discretion and the assumption of
roles by public servants, in particular, the representation role of steward
of public interest. The empirical results confirm that administrative
discretion has a significant impact on the types of roles assumed by
public administrators.
596 PAQ WINTER 2015

One would be hard pressed to locate a concept that is

more central to the evolution of public administration theory and
practice than administrative discretion. From discussions on the
democratic nature of the administrative constructs to the ones on
the latest managerial technique, administrative discretion always
seems to creep into the conversation. In fact, a number of the
classical debates in public administration come down to
questions of proper handling of administrative discretion. The
Finer (1940) – Friedrich (1941) debate is a case in point. Finer
(1941) asserted that administrative decision-making can be and
should be clearly organized within the frame of well-designed
legislative and organizational mandates. Accountability,
according to Finer (1941), is a function of strong external
structures. Friedrich (1940), in contrast, asserted that public
administrators are more than capable of self-control and the
boundaries imposed by social norms and professional values
would be able to channel administrative discretion within
appropriate democratic expectations. Taken together, most of the
current public administration scholars tend to agree with
Friedrich (1940) and have resigned to the idea that
organizational constraints have significant limits in terms of
imposing exacting controls on administrative behaviors.
Discretionary power has been and remains a prevailing reality
for many public servants and their agencies and continues to be
an essential ingredient in conditioning administrative
responsiveness and accountability.1 As Wilson (1966) has once
argued, for administrators “large powers and unhampered
discretion” seem to be “the indispensable conditions of
responsibility” (p. 373).
Yet, while the centrality of administrative discretion for
public administration theory and practice is never questioned, it
is rarely explicitly analyzed and receives only a limited amount
empirical attention. In particular, very little is known about the
effects that administrative discretion has on the roles assumed by
public servants. This study was designed with the specific
purpose of examining the relationship between perceived access
to administrative discretion and the assumption of administrative
roles. The research explores whether a public administrator who
PAQ WINTER 2015 597

believes that he or she enjoys higher levels of administrative

discretion is more likely to assume the representation role of
steward of public interest. This study directly builds on the work
of Selden, Brewer and Brudney (1999) and Sowa & Selden
(2003). It extends their empirical conceptualizations by testing
previously unexamined relationships.
From the start it should be noted that many of the studies
carried under the umbrella of the theory of representative
bureaucracy have a number of common limitations. First, the
majority of the studies are, for obvious and necessary
methodological and conceptual reasons, bounded to the
organizational level (Bradbury & Kellough, 2011). Second, as a
rule, the studies driven by the theory of representative
bureaucracy often address policy specific outcomes; hence, their
generalizability is seriously challenged by their careful selection
of their eventual sampling frame. Kennedy (2013) noted that an
overreliance on convenient sources of data, such as education
data, is a particular weakness of research examining
representation. While insightful, the findings developed in these
convenient settings are limited in their generalizability and can
rarely be transferred to other policy domains. Furthermore, few
scholars venture into exploring representation outside of the
demographic-behavior link (Kennedy, 2013). Within this
context, studies that address representation on the part of
administrators at the individual level and which would focus on
administrative discretion, but without imposing policy specific
constraints, become rather warranted. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly for the purposes of this study, administrative
discretion is regularly assumed, but rarely empirically tested. A
similar condition can be identified when it comes to
administrative roles. Some (Sowa & Selden, 2003, p. 707) have
previously called for research that would examine the
“interaction between the role accepted by the administrator and
the degree of discretion perceived by that administrator.” The
research presented here was in large part undertaken with the
scope of answering such calls.
Notwithstanding the actual empirical results, there are a
number of broad, conceivably significant, contributions that this
598 PAQ WINTER 2015

article makes. First, this study combines in a somewhat original

manner insights provided by the theory of representative
bureaucracy and role theory. In a sense, it adds an important
twist to the traditional delimitation of representative behaviors
by tracing them through administrative roles rather than through
traditional demographic links. Second, this represents one of
only a few studies that empirically explored representative
bureaucracy questions at the individual level. Most studies
examined the topic within the context of institutional level
outcomes. Finally, this research was framed in a manner that
does not make it policy domain dependent; meaning, that
empirical results cut across policy issues. This provides the
possibility to generalize part of the results to the larger context of
public administration.

REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY THEORY

Based on his observation of the interaction during World

War II between middle-class oriented British civil service and
the ruling party, Kingsley (1944) argued that a bureaucracy that
is more representative of the social classes would be more
responsive to the population’s needs. Soon after, American
scholars picked up Kingsley’s (1944) idea as a possible solution
to reconciling the longstanding inherent tension between
bureaucracy and democracy. Given that social class did not
seamlessly translate into the American democratic narrative,
American scholars moved away from social class to
demographic characteristics as the primary variable of interest.
Within the American context, Levitan (1946) asserted
that the actions of agencies whose workforce composition
reflected the demographic makeup of the citizenry, would have
an easier time being accepted and interpreted as legitimate.
Referencing the ineffectiveness of external controls, Levitan
(1946) also supported representativeness as an improved choice
for enforcing bureaucratic accountability. The link between
representativeness and legitimacy was later echoed in the works
of Long (1952) and Van Ripper (1958). In fact, in his seminal
PAQ WINTER 2015 599

article on the topic, Long (1952) went as far as to suggest that

bureaucracy might be more representative than Congress.
The work of Mosher (1968) further extended the theory
and to some degree provided a turning point in its development.
Mosher (1968) clearly delineated the dynamics and implications
behind passive (descriptive) and active representation. Mosher
(1968) endorsed passive representation as a fundamental factor
for public administration in a democracy. He suggested that even
in the cases when passive representation might not lead to
obvious democratic improvements; the mere presence of such
setup in the administration provides democratic value on its own.
This perspective is currently widely accepted among scholars as
normatively appropriate and is always linked to a number of
positive outcomes. Active representation, on the other hand, was
normatively undesirable for Mosher (1968).
It may be noted that active representativeness run
rampant within a bureaucracy would constitute a major
threat to orderly democratic government. The summing
up of the multitude of special interests seeking
effective representation does not constitute the public
interest. (Mosher, 1968, p. 12)

Most scholars, as Lim (2006) has noted, have shied

away from joining Mosher (1968) in rejecting active
representation as a desirable characteristics of bureaucracy.
Many have been rather supportive, or at the very least cautiously
optimistic, of the benefits of active representation.
Another important chapter in the evolution of the theory
is provided by the work of Krislov (1974), who advanced the
theory by constructing understandings regarding organizational
socialization. For Krislov (1974), the demographic backgrounds
of public administrators offered the framework within which
certain values are created and espoused. In cases when the
organizational demographic structures mimic the backgrounds of
the population at large, the values that are shaped within
organizational interactions will reflect the demands of the
citizenry. Similar to Long (1952) and Van Riper (1958), Krislov
(1974) supported the idea that bureaucracy, through it
600 PAQ WINTER 2015

representational capacity, complimented and perhaps even filled

the association gaps between citizens and their political
structures, which are often left unmet by political institutions
such as Congress. Table 1 provides a summary of the presumed
direct and indirect social benefits of bureaucratic representation.

Table 1
Social Benefits of Bureaucratic Representation2
Bias in favor of a given social group and
Partiality (advocacy)
against other groups.
Discretionary behavior in accordance to
one's own values and beliefs - intended or
Shared values and beliefs
not - serves the interests of the social
group with which one associates.
Due to a common social background,
administrators not only share but also
Empathic understanding
understand the values and norms of a
specific social group.
Public administrators who associate with a
Checking particular social group can check the
excesses in behaviors of their colleagues.
Public administrators not associated with a
specific social group might restrain their
Restraint
behaviors for fear of being disapproved of,
exposed, or otherwise checked.
With time the mere presence of
bureaucrats from minority social groups
Resocialization
can lead to enhanced empathic
understanding of their colleagues.
The presence of minority bureaucrats can
Demand inducement stimulate more service demand on the part
of minority clients.
Minority bureaucrats might have greater
success in stimulating behavioral changes
Coproduction inducement
on the part of minorities for purposes of
improved program outcomes.
Adapted from Lim (2006)

The most recent turn in the intellectual progress of the

theory is in large part hedged on the idea of role acceptance. A
PAQ WINTER 2015 601

number of scholars (Kennedy, 2013; Meier & Bohte, 2001;

Kelly, 2013; Selden, 1997; Selden, Brudney, & Kellough, 1998;
Sowa & Selden, 2003) have argued that role acceptance provides
an enriched set of insights into understanding the
representativeness of bureaucracy, which might under different
conditions be missed by the traditional link between social
minority and representation. Although, demographic background
still remains a fundamental ingredient, scholars are now
becoming open to the idea that it might not be the most critical in
explaining representation; in fact, it might actually be secondary
to role assumption, especially outside of policy specific
questions (Kennedy, 2013). That is to say, outside of policies
that specifically target women or social minorities, variables
such as gender and race respectively, might be less useful in
predicting active representation than administrators’ expectations
regarding what constitutes their appropriate roles. “[T]he role
accepted by administrators and the amount of discretion they
perceive themselves to have exerts an impact on the outcomes
serving minority interests above and beyond the individual
characteristics of the administrators” (Sowa & Selden, 2003, p.
707).
All things considered, despite its wide acceptance and
appeal, the theory does motivate a healthy dose of well-grounded
criticism, some of which is coming directly from its supporters.
First, scholars have argued (Frederickson & Smith, 2003) that
the theory’s concept framework is fraught with ambiguity. One
of the results of this nebulousness, particularly when it comes to
the ambiguous conceptualization of core terms, is that there is
surprisingly relatively little empirical research in the area.
Furthermore, most of the empirical studies that are conditioned
by the theory follow similar customary formats, use similar type
of data and rarely venture into challenging or exploring some of
the more vague aspects within the theory. Within the same vein,
Lim (2006) was rather critical in his discussion of how partiality
is conceptualized in empirical studies, arguing that what the
instruments often capture are things other than partiality. Lim
(2006) asserted that most of the assumptions behind the possible
benefits of active representation are regularly confused with
602 PAQ WINTER 2015

those of passive representation and are frequently exaggerated,

hence limiting the usefulness of the research based on those
assumptions. Third, most studies take the relationship between
an individual’s background and a supposed group as a given
(Kennedy, 2013). This link, however, is often much weaker and
less direct than typically believed. Krislov (1974), for instance,
asserted that the most rigorous test for the representative
capacity of bureaucracy would indeed be whether passive
representation could seamlessly translate into active
representation. Fourth, as Thompson (1976) argued,
organizational socialization raises a significant challenge to the
supposed link between passive representation and active
representation. Finally, the mechanics linking passive
representation and administrative outcomes are also highly
ambiguous and not fully understood. For instance, does the
presence of passive representation increase the probability of
active representation? Or is passive representation necessary or
sufficient for active representation? Wilkins and Keiser (2006)
suggested that representation’s central question might not be
whether there is a link between passive and active representation,
but under what conditions such link exists.

ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION

There are many powerful implications that are bound to

come with any active degree of administrative discretion and
they warrant important levels of attention. In their efforts to act
as representatives of citizens’ interests, through their discretion,
in particular when it comes to interpreting public policy, public
administrators regularly wield significant levels of political
power (Mosher, 1968)) and are consequential policy makers in
their own right (Kennedy, 2013; Lipsky, 1980). The legitimacy
of this routine exercise of power, however, is often challenged
and consistently triggers heated academic debates. As Lim
(2006) has noted the line between legitimate active
representation through administrative discretion and partiality
exhibits dangerous levels of fuzziness. Many often believe that
PAQ WINTER 2015 603

they speak of the former, when in reality they are desperately

attempting to justify the later.
Scholars have yet to reach a general consensus regarding
the normative placement of administrative discretion within
public service and it is hard to envision this happening any time
soon. The theory of representative bureaucracy, at least up to this
point, provides for one of the better approaches for reconciling
the complexity associated with the attempts to properly
operationalize administrative discretion. The theory posits that
the actions and power that come with the regular access to
discretion would be more representative of the public and its
interests if the public servants would associate through their
social and demographic characteristics to the citizens whom they
serve (Denhardt & deLeon, 1995; Krislov, 1974; Meier, 1975;
Mosher, 1968; Selden, 1997). The benefits of a representative
administration, according to theory of representative
bureaucracy, are not limited to a specific policy area or agency
type. Any administrative area is set to gain from being more in
tune with the demographic make-up of the population that is
being served.
Administrative discretion is to be sure a fundamental
concept within public administration and the theory of
representative bureaucracy. It lies at its very core, especially in
terms of active representation on the part of public servants.
Scholars tend to agree that in order for administrators to engage
in representation, they need to have access to administrative
discretion first before they can decide to creatively make use of
it (Denhardt & deLeon, 1995; Meier & Bohte, 2001; Meier &
Stewart, 1992; Sowa & Selden, 2003). Depending upon the
organizational and policy contexts, public servants have the
discretion to shape the performance of their bureaus if they
embrace a representative type role. Individual preferences,
especially in terms of shaping policy interpretations, do matter
and often carry significant power, sufficient to impact policy
outcomes.
Meier and Bohte (2001) conceptualized administrative
discretion as the ability of public administrators to command a
sphere of influence to take actions that reflect the specific values
604 PAQ WINTER 2015

they might hold. Following the line of a similar argument, Sowa

and Selden (2003) defined administrative discretion as an
administrator’s perceived latitude in effecting administrative
outcomes. For the purposes of this research, the perspective
offered by Sowa and Selden (2003, p. 703) is embraced.
Administrative discretion is conceptualized and measured at the
individual level, specifically within one’s perception of one’s
levels of discretion. Given that one simultaneously shapes and is
shaped by one’s environment and that reality is often socially
filtered and constructed through one’s values and experiences
(Weick, 1995), one’s perceived level of discretion does perhaps
perform better in capturing administrative discretion than other
commonly used measures, which are based on organizational
structure. In other words, a perception based measure is
preferred because two administrators within similar
organizational structures could, depending on their sense-making
mechanics, differ significantly in their evaluation of how much
discretion they enjoy; hence, the part played by the latter in
conditioning their everyday behaviors. Measures of
administrative discretion, which are constructed on
organizational structures would miss or perhaps even distort this
link between perceived administrative discretion and behaviors.
The uses and impacts of administrative discretion are
believed to be especially important for organizations which are
not legislatively designed to engage in active representation. In
these contexts, public servants must be able to command
respectable spheres of influence in order to translate the values
they hold into policy outcomes (Meier & Bohte, 2001; Sowa &
Selden, 2003). Here, it becomes crucial to note that the mere
presence of administrative discretion does not guarantee
representative outcomes nor representation per se; neither the
literature nor the theory itself make claim to such associations.
Although administrative discretion might be necessary it is not
sufficient. Public servants still have to choose whether to
exercise it in a manner that would fit within a representation
pattern or to remain loyal to organizational doctrines.
PAQ WINTER 2015 605

ORGANIZATIONAL TENURE

Scholars (Dolan, 2000; Selden, 1997; Selden et al., 1998;

Sowa & Selden, 2003; Zimmermann & Allen, 2009) have
suggested tenure as a critical variable in explaining
representative behaviors on the part of public administrators.
Although there is a wide agreement in regards to tenure and
representation being intimately linked, the direction of the
relationship is less certain. On the one hand, with tenure, public
administrators, due to their growing experience and
organizational standing, are expected to be able to command
increasing levels of power and discretion. This, in turn, will
provide them with the necessary organizational influence and
discretionary space to engage in representation should they
decide to do so. Under this perspective, tenure is often linked
within increased levels of policy involvement and representative
type behaviors on the part of public administrators (see Svara
1990; Diggs & Roman, 2012; Roman, 2014; Roman, 2013a). On
the other hand, with tenure employees can become increasingly
indoctrinated with organizational values (Ewing, 1977; Ramos,
1981; Scott & Hart, 1979). As a result, unless representation is a
specific value mandated at the organizational level, public
administrators would be less likely to assume a representative
type role (Dolan, 2000; Selden, 1997; Sowa & Selden, 2003).

BEHAVIORAL EXPECTATIONS AND ROLES

Roles and Role Theory

Role theory derives its core from the theatrical metaphor
(Biddle, 1986). The theory postulates that within a given social
context every individual will have to assume a specific role,
which will constrain the individual to following a given “script”
and “enacting” expected behaviors. The framework focuses on
individuals and their behaviors and it provides an
accommodating perspective that bridges anthropology,
sociology, social psychology and institutionalism. Roles are
regularly applied to the study of consensus, social perception,
606 PAQ WINTER 2015

formal organizations and role conflict. It is assumed that

individuals carry commonalities in their habitual behaviors,
which are fairly predictable in cases when the context is known.
Although there are a number of definition present in the
literature (table 2), in grand lines, a role can be defined as
patterned human behavior. Roles are formed by interactions with
others and with institutional constraints. They are influenced by
one’s self-expectations, the expectations of others as well as by
contexts (Biddle, 1979, 1986).
Hickson (1966) asserted that, under one form or another,
organizational theories, despite their apparently distinct
terminologies, differ only in the degree of role specificity and
legitimacy of discretion attributed to behavior. Hickson (1966)
argued that the degree of role specificity ranges from complete
legitimate discretion to fully specified role behavior. Frank
(1964) suggested three types of roles depending of their
specificity: underdefined, well-defined, and overdefined. Public
administration scholars have associated role specificity with role
responsibilities (e.g. Selden et al., 1999). Public servants with
underdefined roles might enjoy more discretion than those with
well-defined roles.

Table 2
Role Definitions
Definition Author
An internally consistent series of conditioned responses. Cottrell (1942, p.
617)
Includes the attitudes, values and behavior ascribed by
Linton (1945, p.
the society to any and all persons occupying a specific
77),
status.
Actions of individual occupants of a position. Newcomb (1950,
p. 280)
Behavior of actors seen in the context of its functional Parsons (1951, p.
significances. 25)
Position differentiated in terms of a given social Levy (1952, p.
structure. 159)
Activities which in combination produce the Katz and Kahn
organizational output. (1966, p. 179)
An identity, a set of characteristic behaviors, or a set of Biddle, (1979, p.
expectations. 8)
PAQ WINTER 2015 607

Table 3
Conceptualizing Roles
Core Propositions
Certain behaviors are patterned and are characteristic of persons within
contexts.
Roles are often associated with sets of persons who share a common
identity.
Persons are often aware of roles, and to some extent roles are governed
by the fact of their awareness.
Roles persist, in part, because of their consequences (functions) and
because they are often imbedded with larger social systems.
Persons must be taught roles and may find either joy or sorrow in the
performances thereof.
Conceptualization of Roles
Roles are behavioral (does not include: sex, race, national origin,
attitudes, norms, values).
Roles are performed by individuals.
Roles are limited by context.
Roles are constructed on behaviors that are characteristic of a set of
persons and contexts.
Adapted from Biddle (1979)

Administrative Roles
As a rule, agencies impose on its members specific work
roles; each role is usually defined as a specific set of
expectations and behaviors required from individuals within a
certain job (Kahn et. al, 1964). Institutions themselves can be
defined on the whole as symbolic and behavioral frameworks
bound by rules, which motivate certain individual roles
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). While roles are often associated
with positions, within the context of current governance, roles
need not be position specific, as individuals within diverse
positions can engage in similar roles and vice versa. The
contours of a role are transmitted and infused into the workforce
through formal (e.g. job descriptions, meetings) and informal
channels (socialization, organizational artifacts). Within every
social context individuals might be simultaneously faced with
the demand to enact several context dependent roles; generally,
however, with time, one single role will become dominant
(Merton, 1949; Biddle, 1979; Sieber, 1974). Once
608 PAQ WINTER 2015

institutionalized, roles can become so powerful that they provide

a complete sense-making mechanism within the organizational
milieu. In fact, scholars (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer &
Rowan, 1977) asserted that roles might often persist even after
the institutional and rational motivations behind them might have
long disappeared.
For Selden et al. (1999) “an administrative role is a
cohesive set of job-related values and attitudes that provides the
public administrator a stable set of expectations about his or her
responsibilities” (p. 175). There are several important
dimensions to this definition. First, the attitudes and values are
job related. This means that one’s role will be defined by one’s
job and work environment. Second, one’s expectations represent
one’s interpretations of a given set of values. This implies that
the actual set of values need not be objective or empirically
tested, all that matters is one’s interpretation of that given value
set. Finally, and most critically, the set of expectations regarding
one’s role is assumed as being stable. The latter is highly
significant, since it would imply that expectations do not change
easily and a snapshot analysis would certainly provide an
adequate evaluation of the overall nature of roles in public
administration.
In order to truly understand the intricate dynamics
evolved in administrative roles as conceptualized through theory
of representative bureaucracy it becomes highly useful to
carefully reexamine the passive-active distinction as framed by
Mosher (1968). For Mosher (1968) descriptive representation is
concerned with the social origins of the administrators (e.g.
education, demographics, location within the social matrix) and
the extent to which their collective profile reflects the society at
large. According to Mosher (1968) passive representation can be
rather easily measured and evaluated. Unlike passive
representation, active representation is, per Mosher (1968), fully
linked to expectations. Active representation encompasses
directed efforts by administrators to press for the interests of
those whom the administrators believe to represent. Active
representation is conceptualized in its entirety through
administrators’ guiding set of expectations. Such a formulation
PAQ WINTER 2015 609

would put into question the dominance of demographic

backgrounds, passive representation in sum, as the driver behind
active representation. Mosher (1968) argued that there are no
realistic grounds to believe that a public servant with a given set
of demographic characteristics will automatically nurture the
necessary set of expectations for representing the interest of
others with a similar makeup. In fact, Mosher (1968) suggested
that administrators with a certain social background might “lean
over backwards” in order not to lead others to believe that they
engage in partiality. This view is also partially echoed by
Saltzstein (1979), who asserted that the best way to represent and
serve one’s social group in the long run is by being impartial.
Herbert (1974) suggested that by and large the
challenges associated with role assumption will be present
regardless of race. Organizations habitually generate a system of
rules that demand certain behaviors as appropriate. As such,
associations with social minorities can be often overruled by
organizational expectations. Within the context of representative
bureaucracy, then, administrative roles might often override
administrators’ ethnic or gender characteristics. Selden et al.
(1998) noted:
While minority employees can be expected to embrace
this role [representative role] most often and most
closely, nonminority administrators may also adopt it
as a result of their background or socialization…In
some circumstances, minority employees with
discretionary authority may avoid the minority
representative role. Regardless of race or ethnicity,
moreover, the attachment of public administrators to
the representative role will vary, so that they may not
always make decisions and take actions responsive to
the minority community…employee’s perception of
their work role conditions the translation of
demographic (and other) characteristics into policy
outputs. (p. 720)

Although there are a number of frameworks and

typologies of administrative behaviors and roles (see de Graaf,
610 PAQ WINTER 2015

2011; Diggs & Roman, 2012; Kennedy, 2013; O’Kelly &

Dubnick, 2005; Roman, 2013a; Selden, 1997), two models,
somewhat more than others, have developed a significant
standing in academe. Downs’ (1967) administrative role
typology represents perhaps the most recognizable categorization
currently present in the literature. Downs’ (1967) five roles -
climber, conserver, zealot, advocate and statesman – are a
common occurrence in public administration texts. Yet,
somewhat surprisingly, given their popular appeal, the roles, as
delineated by Downs (1967), have attracted only a limited
amount of empirical attention.
The role conceptualization by Selden et al. (1999)
represents the other relatively well established perspective on
administrative roles. Table 4 provides the role descriptions. It
also references the public administration literature where similar
roles have been discussed. It is important to note here that, when
compared to other roles identified by Selden et al. (1999), the
idea of the public administrator as a steward of public interest
has attracted on aggregate significantly more attention from
public administration scholars.
PAQ WINTER 2015 611

Table 4.
Administrative Roles
Similar to concepts
Role Role description
by:
Public administrators "express a desire to Abney & Lauth (1985),
participate in the formulation of good public Chandler (1984), Box
policy - that is, policies that incorporate the needs (1992), de Graaf
and concerns of all citizens, disadvantaged (2011), Hassett &
Stewards of
groups…are more committed to social and Watson (2002), Karnig
the Public
political goals than to policy efficiency...see & McClain (1980),
Interest
themselves serving the public and furthering the Kennedy, 2013),
public interest, independent of the goals of elected Lovrich (1981), Sowa
officials or management" (Selden et. al, 1999, p. & Selden (2003),
185). Wamsley et al. (1990)
Public administrators "balance equity and fairness Box (1992), de Graaf
with individual concerns. They express a (2011), Kennedy
commitment to both good management and (2013), Nalbandian
equity….the expression of these values may be (1990)
mitigated or influence by sources external to the
Adapted individual, such as rules, regulation supervisors,
Realists and legislators....they reject the general value of
neutrality...and hold the ideal social equity as
important....they recognize that they must work
within system constraints-rules and proper lines of
authority-to survive in the bureaucracy" (Selden
et al., p. 187).
Public administrators "value efficiency as an
organizational and individual goal…they are
willing to reject what more senior agency officials
tell them to do….will opt for the most efficient
solution, ensuring the public interest is
served…set limits on their quest for efficiency
that prevent them from making exaggerated
Businesslike
claims about a program for the sake of generating
Utilitarians
support...view efficiency as more important....they
reject any politicization of their role and do not
wish to advance the interests of less privileged or
minority citizens...Although they feel political
pressure from elected officials they are
ambivalent about their relationship with these
officials (Selden et al., p. 188).
612 PAQ WINTER 2015

Table 4, continued
Public administrators "see themselves as neutral Box (1992), de Graaf
agents…who know their boundaries, which (2011), Kennedy
consist of established rules and regulations and (2013), Nalbandian
Resigned expectations of supervisors and the chief elected (1990)
Custodians officials…they distinguish the appropriate role of
nonelected public employees from that of elected
public officials...they feel no inclination to play a
mediator role" (Selden et al., 1999, p. 189).
Public administrators "see themselves as highly de Graaf (2011),
responsible and professional - working efficiently, Kennedy (2013)
quickly, and accurately, while implementing and
Practical advocating policy positions and legislation in the
Idealists public interest…they do not believe they are
agents of elected officials...committed to social
equity...reject neutrality and the politicization of
the public service" (Selden et al., 1999, p. 190).

There are several reasons why the conceptualization

provided by Selden et al. (1999) was preferred. First, the study
from which these roles were derived is among the more recent
and complete discussions of administrative roles. It is also
among the few works that attempted to bridge role theory and
the theory of representative bureaucracy. Second, it is based on
Denhardt and deLeon’s (1995) framework of administrative
responsibility, which is typically believed to be one of the better
ways of capturing the complexity of everyday decision-making
challenges faced by public administrators (Selden et al., 1999;
Sowa & Selden, 2003). Third, unlike other constructs suggested
by scholars, for instance those by Downs (1967), these five
constructs have been empirically derived and generated
specifically from a public administration perspective with special
sensitivity to public service ethos. In addition, perhaps even
more importantly, the role constructs as formulated by Selden et
al. (1999) are not constrained to a given policy domain nor are
they position dependent. Their broad applicability to the universe
of public administration allows for significant levels of
generalizability that cut across policy sectors and professional
associations. Finally, the role of steward of public interest is
clearly much more representative in terms of underlining
behaviors than any one of the remaining four. This permits for
much cleaner and robust model. This means that although the
PAQ WINTER 2015 613

different roles overlap in terms of characteristic behaviors, there

is sufficient variability to allow for empirical analysis.

HYPOTHESES

Based on the insights drawn from representative

bureaucracy and role theories, this study explores three main
hypotheses. The hypotheses are framed within the context of
administrative processes and agencies that are not legislatively
designed to encourage and emphasize representation.3
H1. Public administrators who believe that they enjoy high levels
of administrative discretion are more likely to assume the role of
steward of the public interest, compared with public
administrators who believe that they have low levels of
administrative discretion.

H2. Public administrators who believe that they should be

involved in policy formulation are more likely to assume the role
of steward of public interest, compared with public
administrators who believe that they should not be involved in
policy formulation.

H3. Public administrators with higher levels of tenure are less

likely to assume the role of steward of public interest, compared
with public administrators with lower levels of tenure.

THE MODEL

The empirical literature on representative bureaucracy

behavior and outcomes (RBB&O) typically estimates the desired
variables using the following regression model:
RBB&O=βX+α+ε
where X is a matrix of individual, or organizational
characteristic, or both.
The model examined here has one categorical dependent
variable, three independent variables and ten control variables.
The five roles, as conceptualized by Selden et al. (1999),
represent the five categories of the dependent variable: steward
614 PAQ WINTER 2015

of public interest, adapted realist, business like utilitarian,

resigned custodian and practical idealist. It is hypothesized that
an administrator’s level of discretion, expectation regarding
involvement in policy formulation and tenure influence role
assumption. In order to control for other possible explanations,
ten additional variables are considered: perception of
stakeholders’ expectations, position, age, gender, minority
association, education, political ideology, the number years of
government service, job satisfaction and the number of years in
current position (see Appendix A for the rationale and detailed
discussions of the model variables).

METHODOLOGY

Sampling Frame
The membership of the National Institute of
Governmental Purchasing (NIGP) was identified as an
appropriate sampling frame for this research. There are several
important reasons why this professional sub-group of public
administrators was of particular interest and was chosen for this
study. First, although NIGP’s membership is diverse in terms of
education, gender, age and ethnicity – due to the
professionalization efforts of the last decade, there are rather
high levels of consensus regarding professional standards and
expectations with the field (Emmett & Wright, 2012; Roman,
2013b; Thai, 2001, 2008). This fact is particularly important
since this would mean that individuals will have clear and well-
developed understandings about the overall professional
expectations and their roles. Also, given their direct proximity to
financial outlays, their actions and decisions are usually under
important levels of scrutiny. The nature of their work contexts
resembles a metaphorical “stage,” in which actors have to follow
the provided “institutional script.” Consequently, it was expected
that role behaviors would be easily identifiable across
institutional levels and relatively homogeneous in character.
Second, the procurement professionals in the sampling
frame came from a variety of organizations and they were
employed by different levels of government that cut across
PAQ WINTER 2015 615

multiple policy areas. Public procurement, in general, as an area,

routinely operates across policy domains. This allows for
important levels of generalizability. Given that the sampling
frame is not constrained to specific organizations or policy
issues, the results, too, could conceivably be extended to the
broader universe of public administrators. This realization is
further strengthened by the fact that both the model and the
instrument employed to collect the data did not make any major
limiting assumptions about the nature of the administrative work
of those being examined.
Third, public procurement specialists, as a professional
sub-set, are rarely the target of systematic empirical research.
Considering the latter, this research would be able to claim
important levels of originality within an area that is relatively
underexplored. Fourth, due to previous work in the area, this
represented an accessible research environment for the
researcher, for which entrance paths were previously established.
In many ways, although not the primary motive, the selection of
this specific sampling frame was driven by convenience
considerations.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, much of the body
of extant scholarly literature would suggest that public
procurement specialists are faithful enforcers of procurement
ordinances (Thai, 2001, 2008). Any deviation from established
procurement practices, which active representation would be, is
normally discouraged and could be even penalized (Diggs &
Roman, 2012). Administrative discretion, too, is rarely
encouraged or supported. The rule-based professional rigidity
offered by the public procurement context, makes for a very
challenging environment for the enactment of representative
behaviors, hence it provides a rigorous test for the proposed
model. Confirming the hypotheses within this setting would
allow the possibility of generalizing the results to environments
which are more representation-friendly; to paraphrase some of
Fred Ebb’s most famous music lyrics if the model makes it here
it will make it anywhere.
616 PAQ WINTER 2015

Sampling Procedures
The sampling procedures for this study aimed to exploit
the benefits of random sampling. A random sample of 2,000
contacts was drawn from the contact database of NIGP
membership. In January of 2013 NIGP had a total of
approximately 16,000 members. The 2,000 contacts were
selected from the full list of members using a random sequence
generator in Microsoft Office Excel. The contact info was
obtained directly from NIGP’s research department. Given that
typically response rates for NIGP internal survey range between
15% and 25%, a large contact sample was believed necessary in
order to obtain the minimal work sample of approximately 3904
required for purposes of valid power and generalizability
estimation. Given that sample representativeness is often
considered to be more important than the sample size itself
(Gliner, Morgan, & Leach, 2009), the main goal of the sampling
procedures was securing a representative picture of NIGP
membership.

Instrument
The instrument employed by this study drew heavily on
the conceptualization provided by Selden et al.’s (1999)
research. Selden et al. (1999) have studied a diverse group of
public administrators who had no apparent professional
similarities. The instrument items proposed by the authors were
broad in their formulation, as such, offering important levels of
cross-sectional applicability. For the purpose of this study,
survey items were transformed with an emphasis on action
oriented statements and were modified as to remove any double-
barreled questions. Given the design of the original study no
reliability statistics for the role constructs were available. As
such, an important part of this research was the provision of a
reliability evaluation of survey instrument.
Each one of the five role constructs was measured using
four Likert-type items. The average rating for the four items for
each construct was used to identify the dominant role assumed
by the public administrator and the responses were coded
accordingly. The main reason for choosing average score rather
PAQ WINTER 2015 617

than total score lies within its ability to provide a decision even
in cases with missing item responses. Hence, even when a
respondent did not answer one of the items within the construct a
decision can be made. In instances when a respondent would
have a similar average across items for several different
constructs, the number of answered items was used as the first
tiebreaker. For example, if the respondent cumulated similar
averages for two constructs the respondent was coded in the role
within which he or she answered most items. Inter-item variance
was used as the second tiebreaker. All being equal, in cases of
equal averages the respondent was coded in the role that had the
smallest inter-item variance. In cases when neither the average
rating, number of completed items nor inter-item variance was
useful in coding, the respondent’s self-identification was used to
determine one’s dominant role.
A pre-final version of the instrument was self-
administered and reviewed for accuracy and language
appropriateness by ten tenured and experienced public
procurement professionals. Their reviews led to a number of
linguistic changes. The primary theme of their concerns
appeared to be the overly “academic” language used in some of
the questions. Appendix B provides the complete instrument
employed for purposes of data collection.

Data Collection
The survey instrument has been administered using the
SurveyMonkey platform.5 The on-screen presentation of the
survey was broken down into five distinct pages. The first page
included instructions only. The second page introduced the role
measuring items. The respondents were given twenty statements
and they were asked to indicate their level of agreement with
each statement. The order in which each statement appeared was
randomized for each respondent. In a similar manner the options
for question three on page four were randomized. The
randomization of the statements was introduced in order to
reduce the response bias that might have been induced by the
placement of the items. As a result, it should be expected that the
answer to one specific statement was not systematically
618 PAQ WINTER 2015

influenced by its order of appearance or by the statements

preceding it. Page four asked the respondents to self-identify
within a given role based on the provided descriptions. The last
on-screen page collected demographic and institutional level
variables as they pertained to the respondents. The model and
demographic items on page three and page five respectively,
were not randomized. The order of pages and the items on pages
four and five were identical for all respondents.
A total of 512 individuals replied to the invitation to
participate. This represents 25.6 % response rate. Out of the total
number of respondents, 493 completed and submitted the survey,
while 19 had started, but only partially completed the survey –
hence a completion rate of 96.28%. Although this response rate
appears somewhat low, it is rather characteristic for large N
Internet surveys and it falls within the upper limits for studies
driven by NIGP database. The response rate also fits within the
overall recent trends for Internet-based surveys observed in
social sciences.
For any study based on data collected through self-
administered instruments, nonresponse bias can be a serious
concern. In order to check for any possible significant
nonresponse bias independent sample t-tests for model variables
among early and late respondents were conducted. The survey
responses were ordered based on their time of receipt, with the
first 10% labeled as early responses and last 10% labeled as late
responses. The results for the independent samples t-tests raised
no concerns regarding possible nonresponse bias. The only
statistically significant difference in means (p<.05) between
early respondents and late respondents was observed for role
item 11 – “regardless of political pressure, I take the decision
which is best for my organization.” Outside of item 11 no other
statistically significant differences in means among early and late
responses were identified among the model items.

Statistical Method
For purposes of hypotheses testing, multinomial logistic
regression (MLR) was employed. MLR is an extension of binary
logistic regression that allows for more than two categories of
PAQ WINTER 2015 619

dependent variables to be examined by means of several

independent variables. MLR uses maximum likelihood
estimation procedures in order to determine the probability of a
subject being part of a specific group (Hair, Black, Babin, &
Anderson, 2010; Kwak & Clayton-Matthews, 2002; Liao, 1999).
The primary methodological appeal of MLR is that it is robust
against deviations in normality, linearity or homoscedasticity.
MLR makes fewer assumptions than discriminant analysis and
linear regression analysis, and it is robust when those
assumptions are not fully satisfied (Hair et al., 2010; Hosmer &
Lemeshow, 2000; Klenbaum & Klein, 2000). Sample size and
outliers represent critical considerations within MLR. While,
there is no exacting criterion regarding the minimum sample
size, scholars typically agree that the sample should be
sufficiently large to provide a minimum of 10 cases per
independent variable; larger ratios such as 30:1 provide
improved confidence in the results (Hair et al., 2010).
Inspection of the data revealed that there were neither
major issues regarding the assumptions being met nor regarding
data quality.6 There were some minor concerns regarding the
skewness in the distribution of two variables - number of years
in current position and the number of years with current
organization. To alleviate the concern, a logarithmic
transformation was employed for both cases. Multicollinearity,
too, did not appear to be an issue, as none of the correlation
coefficients were above 0.85. Most importantly however, due to
the fact that approximately 93% respondents indicated that they
were either white or black – in terms of the empirical analysis,
the race variable was substituted with a dichotomous variable of
minority association (whether respondent thought of oneself as a
minority). It was assumed that whether a person considered
oneself as a minority was a more accurate and descriptive
variable, and provides improved information for the purposes of
this study than the actual race label that one carries.
620 PAQ WINTER 2015

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

Roles
The five constructs used to code the respondents were
found to be adequate, with acceptable levels of internal
consistency. All five roles constructs, “steward of public
interest” (α=0.765), “adapted realist” (α=0.675), “businesslike
utilitarian” (α=0.763), “resigned custodian” (α=0.733) and
“practical idealist” (α=0.651) had Cronbach’s Alpha levels
above 0.65. The coding results uncovered “practical idealist”
and “adapted realist” as the two most commonly assumed roles
by public administrators in the sample. The role of “businesslike
utilitarian” was identified as being by a large margin the least
assumed role (table 5).

Table 5
Sample Summary by Role
Role Frequency Percent
Practical Idealist 150 30.4%
Adapted Realist 143 29.0%
Steward of Public Interest 97 19.7%
Resigned Custodian 68 13.8%
Businesslike Utilitarian 35 7.1%
Total 493 100%

Hypotheses
The results of the empirical analysis lend support to the
hypothesized associations between presence of administrative
discretion, individual expectations, tenure and the assumption
administrative roles. Expectation about involvement in policy
formulation (p < .05), perceived expectations of stakeholders
(p<0.05), administrative discretion (p <.01), tenure (p <.05) and
the number of years of public service (p <.01) are found to be
significant in explaining the assumption of at least one role. No
other variable including gender (p>.05), minority association
(p>.05) nor position (p>.05) is found to be statistically
significant. Similarly, job satisfaction (p>.05), education (p>.05)
and political ideology (p>.05) fail to reach statistical
PAQ WINTER 2015 621

significance. Overall, the model classifies correctly 45.8% of the

cases. This is significantly higher than the minimal criteria of
29.91% derived using marginal percentages. Table 6 provides
the model fit statistics and the likelihood ratio tests. Complete
parameter estimates are provided in Appendix C.
It is found that those who believe that they enjoy higher
levels of discretion are more likely to assume the role of steward
of public interest. Administrators were more likely to be
categorized as a steward of public interest than adapted realist (-
1.034, p<.01), businesslike utilitarian (-1.126, p<.01), resigned
custodian (-1.249, p <.01) or practical idealist (-1.125, p<.01)
with increased levels of discretion.
622 PAQ WINTER 2015

Table 6
Model Fit Information and Likelihood Ratio Tests
-2 Log Chi-Square Sig.
Likelihood
Intercept Only 1403.665
Final 1167.762 235.903 .000
Model
Likelihood
Fitting
Ratio Tests
Criteria
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-
Sig.
of Reduced Square
Model
Intercept 1167.762a .000 .
Expectation of policy
1178.419 10.658 .031
involvement
Stakeholders’
1178.238 10.476 .033
expectations
Administrative
1248.669 80.907 .000
discretion
Log tenure 1179.959 12.197 .016
Years in public service 1186.585 18.823 .001
Job satisfaction 1171.389 3.627 .459
Position 1172.202 4.440 .350
Years in current position
1169.809 2.047 .727
(log)
Education 1172.604 4.843 .304
Political ideology 1173.548 5.786 .216
Minority association 1171.973 4.212 .378
Gender 1170.620 2.858 .582
Age 1169.428 1.666 .797
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final
model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect
from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect
are 0.
a
. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom.
PAQ WINTER 2015 623

It is also determined that individual expectation

regarding one’s involvement in policy formulation is a powerful
predictor of role assumption. Public administrators were more
likely to be categorized as steward of public interest than adapted
realist (-.492, p<.01), businesslike utilitarian (-.509, p<.05),
resigned custodian (-.547, p <.01) or practical idealist (-.514,
p<.01) with increased expectations to be involved in policy
formulation.
Finally, it is established that one’s tenure is significant
in predicting one’s assumed role. With tenure, there is a
decreasing probability that an administrator will assume the role
of steward of public interest. With increased tenure,
administrators were more likely to be categorized as adapted
realist (1.518, p<.01), businesslike utilitarian (1.896, p<.01),
resigned custodian (1.580, p <.01) or practical idealist (1.465,
p<.01) than steward of public interest. Indeed, organizational
tenure appears to be inversely related to representative type
behavior.
Taken together, the empirical results confirm the
significance of all three hypothesized links as well as the
direction of their relationships. From the standpoint of
representative bureaucracy theory and future research the most
intriguing results might, however, be located outside the
marginal effects of the independent variables and with the
performance of the control variables. Neither gender nor race
achieved statistical significance. The latter might be explained
by at least two important factors. First, it is possible that
individual expectations and administrative discretion exert an
impact on role assumption above and beyond one’s demographic
background. Second, this might also suggest that gender and race
are perhaps important predictors of role assumption within
policy domains that directly deal with women or minority issues,
respectively; on every day basis, however, individual
characteristics might be less reliable predictors of administrative
behaviors.
624 PAQ WINTER 2015

Limitations
As it is the case with any research endeavor of this scale,
this study, through its partially-exploratory nature, is not perfect.
There were several important tradeoffs that needed to be made in
order to frame the research within its desired course. Although
these aspects are not expected to seriously challenge the validity
of the findings, they should, nevertheless, be noted and
accounted for when making any generalizations beyond the
context of the study.
Several of the assumptions that come with this type of
research, which although typical, are still significant and could
strongly influence the outcomes if not fully upheld. It is assumed
that the survey instrument can accurately capture, transmit and
collect data necessary for answering the research questions in a
manner that was envisioned in the research design. It is also
presumed that, which was confirmed by the high levels of
internal consistency and completion rates, the structure and
delivery of the instrument did not induce important levels of
confusion and was understood well by most, if not all,
respondents.7 The most important assumption that was made,
however, is that the responses provided by the public
administrators who participated in this research accurately reflect
their actions in practice. Strictly speaking, their stated behaviors
are, or at least closely mirror, their actual behaviors.8 Waldo
(1980) has noted that the study of public administration, social
science research in general, is value-laden. The values of those
being studied as well as the unrecognized values of the
researcher unavoidably seep into the research through the choice
of the study design or the wording of the survey instrument. In
this sense, then, the captured responses might actually reveal
administrators’ values more than they echo their administrative
behaviors and decision-making.
Possible concerns regarding the representativeness of the
sample provides another limitation that should be considered.
Although the data were collected using a random sample of a
national association and given the nature of the research design
there are sufficient reasons to believe that the results have a high
degree of generalizability, it should be noted that procurement
PAQ WINTER 2015 625

specialists, as a professional sub-group of public administrators,

might be much more homogeneous in terms of their everyday
behaviors and understandings than most public servants. As a
result, the reliability and validity of the findings should be
considered uncertain when significantly extended beyond the
context of this study to other sub-groups of practitioners that
might not share similar levels of homogeneity in terms of
professional expectations.

CONCLUSIONS

The dynamics involved in the relationship between

administrative discretion and representation are perhaps too
complex to allow themselves to be easily modeled. Nevertheless,
while the research presented here might miss on some important
nuances that surely warrant empirical attention, it does provide a
crude attempt to isolate the impact of administrative discretion
on the administrative roles. It does so by linking administrative
roles, as constructed through the representative bureaucracy lens,
to the behavioral insights provided by role theory. The findings
show that public administrators who perceive to have higher
levels of discretion are more likely to assume the representation
role of steward of public interest as the dominant role that guides
their habitual decision-making. Similar to Sowa and Selden
(2003), this study demonstrates that the presence of discretion is
not a mere variable that needs to enter in the equation, but it
might be at the center of explaining representative behavior. The
study extends on what has been done before by moving outside
policy and organizational specific constraints. The research
design employed here allowed representation to be studied
without consideration for the organization context or policy
setting. This could be interpreted both as strength and as a
possible limitation.
To understand the complete contribution that this study
makes, one would have to broaden one’s perspective on the
possible implications of its overall findings. Of particular interest
is the fact that roles are to be sure powerful explanatory
mechanisms. Once assumed and institutionalized, they might
626 PAQ WINTER 2015

indeed provide a behavioral map for public administrators.

Kennedy (2013) has suggested that examining questions of
representation through the use of roles and role perceptions has
the potential to overcome many of current weakness and
critiques of research on representative bureaucracy. Furthermore,
while gender and race, might be important triggers for
representation within policy matters that are directly related to
these specific associations, the key to understanding everyday
policy-independent representative behavior might lie with
administrative discretion. In fact, it would not be much of an
exaggeration to claim that active representation is reflected
within the realm of discretion; to be more precise, public
administrators without discretion cannot represent. This
realization falls in line with recent scholarship (see Brandbury &
Kellough, 2008; Kelly, 1998; Kennedy, 2013; Sowa & Selden,
2003; Selden et al., 1998; Selden et al., 1999; Slack, 2001) that
looked beyond passive representation and suggested that
variables and individual characteristics other than race and
gender might be just as important, if not more, in conditioning
representation.
There is obviously much that remains to be done here.
At the very least, future research should challenge what was
found by this study. Are the findings just a simple byproduct of
the sampling frame and research design, or can they be located in
other domains as well? In addition, while there is relatively little
hope to conclusively decide the normative debate regarding
administrative discretion, future research should look into
uncovering the accepted “normative intervals” of administrative
discretion. At what point and under what conditions does
legitimate active representation transition into partiality? Or is
the former even a pre-condition for the latter? Can we delineate
what represent “appropriate” levels of administrative discretion?
These are just a few of numerous intriguing and exciting
questions about administrative representation that remain to be
addressed. As this study has shown, administrative discretion has
a significant, traceable and direct effect on representative
behavior. Within this context, then, there are few, if any grounds,
PAQ WINTER 2015 627

for future research on representation and administrative

behaviors to avoid accounting for it.

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PAQ WINTER 2015 635

NOTES
1. It should be noted here that this perspective clashes with the classic
image of the “ value neutral” bureaucrat (de Graaf, 2011) which was
often suggested by students of public administration as an appropriate
mechanism for normatively dealing with administrative discretion (see
Fry & Nigro, 1996). But given that even neutrality is a value, the
choice to remain neutral is in itself an application of administrative
discretion (Selden et. al., 1999).

2. “Representation” is an ambiguous term and idea in its own right.

While representation can be defined in a number of ways, the definition
provided by Pitkin (1967) appears to be preferred by a number of
scholars. Pitkin (1967, p. 209) defines representation as “acting in the
interests of the represented in a manner responsive to them.”

3. For instance, agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or

the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) are unlikely to foster
environments that encourage their employees to act as stewards of
public interest. In other instances, such as the Small Business
Administration (SBA) or Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), representation might be sanctioned though the agency’s
mission or legislative setup. Locating representative behaviors within
the latter type of agencies and administrative processes would be of
limited value and perhaps somewhat misleading. There is much more
value in examining representation in administrative environments that
are not envisioned to encourage it.

4. Assuming that the population size is finite and is known to be

16,000, following Yamane (1967, p. 886) the needed sample size for
statistical inference is given by the following formula:

Where N is the population size, n is the sample size, and e is the level
of precision. At a 95% confidence level, the size of the needed sample
was determined to be approximately 390.

5. The research, including its design and instrument, was reviewed and
found to be compliant with Institutional Review Board’s (IRB)
636 PAQ WINTER 2015

requirements; it received exception status A3. The survey’s digital

invitation was sent out on February 12th, 2013. Reminders were sent on
February 26th and March 11th, 2013. A final reminder was sent on
March 18th, 2013. The survey included a cover message within the
body of the invitation email and a unique individual link to the survey
embedded into the text. The invitation message introduced the
potential participants to the scope of the research and informed the
recipients that their participation was voluntary. It was made clear that
no individual data will be made available and the results will be
presented in aggregate terms only.

6. Only minor refinements were undertaken. For instance, in certain

cases respondents used letters rather than numerical characters when
indicating their responses. In other cases, respondents used months
rather than years to indicate their tenure within a certain position or
with a given organization. When months were used, the specified
number of months was transformed in their year equivalent. Finally, in
terms of their positions, respondents at times filled in their actual
position rather than choosing among the options provided to them. In
the latter cases, their answers were recoded according to the original
options. For example, if a respondent indicated that he or she was
employed as a “buyer,” he or she would be recoded as a “non-
manager.” Given the fact that very few cases outside of the partially
completed responses had missing values, no cases were deleted from
the final data set. The final sample included 493 survey responses.

7. It is also assumed that the late respondents are representative of non-

respondents, hence the non-response bias examination is valid, which
would indeed confirm that there isn’t a significant non-response bias
concern. Although an examination of the actual non-respondents would
have provided an improved estimation, the latter was not possible
because of logistical reasons and due to the constraints imposed on
access to the membership contact list.

8. As suggested by one of the anonymous reviewers, the instrument’s

language, despite the efforts undertaken to simplify it, might still have
induced some bias due to the presence of a number of buzz words. A
particular concern might be associated with the statements provided for
question three, which were used by respondents to self-select within a
specific role. The survey fatigue that some of the respondents might
have been feeling at that point might have led some to be less careful or
detailed in the examination of the provided statements. Although the
PAQ WINTER 2015 637

statements’ order was automatically randomized for each respondent,

this still remains something that needs to be considered as a possible
methodological limitation.

Appendix A. The Independent and Control Variables

Independent Full or partial
Motivation/general explanations
Variables discussions found in:
The perception that a public servant has Kennedy (2013), Selden
Perception
regarding the levels of discretion he or (1997), Selden et al.
regarding one's
she possesses influences one's (1998), Meier & Bohte
levels of
behaviors and the type of role assumed. (2001), Sowa & Selden
discretion
(2003)
Scholars often find representation and Selden (1997), Selden et
tenure to be intimately linked. On the al. (1998), Dolan (2000),
one hand with increased tenure Sowa & Selden (2003),
administrators, due to being Zimmermann & Allen
indoctrinated with organizational (2009)
Years with
values, might be less likely to engage in
current
representation. On the other hand, with
organization -
increased tenure public administrators
tenure
are more likely to command significant
levels of organizational power; hence
they might be able to command the
necessary discretion levels to engage in
representation.
Expectations of “[R]oles are induced through the Parsons (1964, 1951),
others sharing of expectations for role Kahn et al. (1964),
(regarding behavior. Thus, those who exhibit the Loveridge (1968), Biddle
involvement in role are stimulated to do so because (1986), Nalbandian
policy they learn what behaviors are expected (1989), Box (1992), Meier
formulation) of them, while others are stimulated (1993b)
through their own expectations to teach Parsons (1964, 1951),
and enforce appropriate behaviors for Loveridge (1968), Biddle
those who are members for the (1986), Nalbandian
position” (Biddle, 1987, p. 5). "Most (1989), Box (1992),
Self- versions of role theory presume that Selden (1997), Selden et
Expectations expectations are the major generators al. (1998)
(regarding of roles, that expectations are learned
involvement in through experience, and that persons
policy are aware of the expectations they hold"
formulation) (Biddle, 1986, p. 69). As such, it can be
assumed that individuals who expect
themselves to be active in policy
formulation will be more likely to
assume representation type roles.
Control
Variables
One's position affects one's behavior. It Kahn et al. (1964),
should be noted that position and roles Palumbo (1969), Kuhn
Position
might overlap but they are not identical, (1974), Biddle (1979),
"positions are classification of human Meier (1993), Dolan
638 PAQ WINTER 2015

beings; roles are classifications of (2000), Hite et al. (2006),

behaviors" (Biddle, 1979, p. 93). Pitts (2007)

Younger public administrators are often Strodbeck & Mann (1956),

believed to behave somewhat different Strodbeck et al. (1957),
from more experienced ones. Rosenbloom & Kinnard
(1977), Biddle (1979),
Age
Selden et al. (1998), Hite
et al. (2006), Selden et al.
(1999), Brudney et al.
(2000)
A number of scholars have suggested Strodbeck & Mann (1956),
gender as an important factor in Strodbeck et al. (1957);
determining one's assumed role. For Biddle (1979); Karnig &
instance, it is believed that women with McClain (1988), Thomas
access to policymaking are more likely (1994), Kathlene (1995),
to be active on feminist matters when Selden et al. (1998),
""policy solutions fail to account for Brudney et al. (2000),
Gender women's unique needs" (Dolan, 2000, Dolan (2000), Sowa &
p. 514). Scholars have argued that Selden (2003), Hite et al.
women and men assume different (2006), Wilkins & Keiser
leadership roles, attribute different (2006), Zimmermann &
rankings to issues and might undertake Allen (2009)
importantly different behaviors in
similar contexts (Thomas, 1994;
Kathlene, 1995; Dolan, 2000).
One's ethnic background is believed to Herbert (1974), Biddle
shape one's administrative role. (1979), Murray et al.,
Minority administrators are often (1994), Selden (1997),
expected to be more involved in terms Selden et al. (1998),
Race/ethnicity
of policy advocacy and more likely to Selden et al. (1998),
engage in representation. Selden et al. (1999),
Brudney et al. (2000),
Sowa & Selden (2003)
Scholars believe that education plays an Loveridge (1968),
important role in shaping identities and Palumbo (1969),
as a consequence one's consequent Rosenbloom & Kinnard
behaviors. (1977), Biddle (1979),
Education
Selden et al. (1998),
Selden et al. (1999),
Zimmermann & Allen
(2009)
It is suggested that in the public sector, Selden et al. (1998),
Political
one's political ideology might influence Selden et al. (1999),
ideology/ party
the pattern of behavior within a given Wilkins & Keiser (2006)
identification
role.
The experience in the public sector is Selden et al. (1999)
Years in
believed to influence one's outlook on
government
one's role as well as one's typical
service
behavior.
PAQ WINTER 2015 639

Scholars assume that there is an Vroom (1969)

Job satisfaction association between breadth of roles
and job satisfaction.
As an individual is exposed to same Bales (1950); Biddle
Experience/role
context and expectation he or she will (1979); Selden et al.
specialization/
develop a role specialization, but (1999); Hite et al. (2006)
years in current
focusing on one specific role in that
position
context.
640 PAQ WINTER 2015

Appendix B. Survey Instrument

PAGE – 1
Directions:
In what follows, you are going to be provided with several statements. Please read each
statement carefully and indicate whether the statement is representative of your everyday
experience. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statement on a scale
of 1 to 7.
where:
1-strongly disagree
2-disagree
3-somewhat disagree
4-neither disagree nor agree,
5-somewhat agree
6-agree
7-strongly agree

1. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following

statements:
I use organizational channels to advocate for policy positions that I find to be important.
I seek opportunities to participate in the formulation of public policy issues that I find to
be important.
I encourage procedures that support greater public access to programs and services.
As an administrator, I encourage certain values over others.
In my work, I try to balance fairness and efficiency concerns.
I am committed to management objectives.
In my work I attempt to reflect most current managerial perspectives.
To survive in the organization, I follow the rules when strictly necessary.
In my decisions, I give priority to efficiency over fairness.
I believe efficiency is the most important goal in my work, even if my supervisors do not
agree.
Regardless of political pressure, I take the decision which is best for my organization.
If it is not the most efficient choice, I do not advance the interests of minority citizens.
I behave according to the wishes of my superiors.
I follow the rules as closely as possible.
I do not assume a public leadership role in policy issues.
In my work, I try to be as neutral as possible.
I primarily implement policy, not formulate it.
I keep politics out of my decision-making.
I am committed to my professional standards.
I attempt to be as responsive as possible.

PAGE – 2
2. Please, indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:
If I would have to choose, I would choose to work in this organization again.
I expect to be involved in policy formulation.
I constantly receive feedback in terms of what is expected of me.
I believe that my organization's stakeholders expect me to be involved in policy
formulation.
I believe that other professionals in positions and organizations similar to mine are
expected to be involved in policy formulation.
PAQ WINTER 2015 641

I feel that I enjoy a high level of discretion in terms of my decision-making.

I could face penalties if I get involved in policy formulation.
I am satisfied with my job.

PAGE – 3
3. Please read the five job role descriptions and select the one that accurately
captures your current role:
Please read the five job role descriptions and select the one that accurately captures your
current role.
-On my job, I balance equity and fairness with individual concerns. I am committed to
both management and organization. I work within system constraints, rules and proper
lines of authority.
-On my job, I advocate for policy positions and participate in the formulation of policy. I
serve the public and I attempt to further the public interest. I use my experience to
delineate what is in the best interest of the public.
-On my job, I am as efficient as possible. Sometimes I challenge what more senior
agency officials tell me to do if it is not best for the organization. I keep my promises and
I advance the interest of the minority citizens only if it is the most efficient thing to do.
-On my job, I am a neutral agent. I work within the boundaries imposed by rules,
regulations and expectations of those more senior than me and to elected officials. I don't
play a mediator role. I complete the task set for me and I do not participate in policy
formulation.
-On my job, I am as professional as possible. I work efficiently, quickly and accurately.
When possible, I advocate for policy positions and legislation. I support equity and I am
not neutral, but I do not act as an agent of elected officials.

PAGE – 4
4. Where do you work?
Federal government
State/provincial government
County/regional government
City / town government
School system
College / university
Special authority / district
Other (please specify)

5. What position category best describes you?

Non-manager
Manager
Senior executive/director
Elected official
Other (please specify)

6. How many years have you been in your current position?

7. How many years have you been with your current organization?

8. How many years have you been employed in the public sector?

9. What is the population size of the community that you serve?

642 PAQ WINTER 2015

10. Please indicate your highest level of education

Less than high school degree
High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED)
Some college but no degree
Associate degree
Bachelor degree
Graduate degree

11. Which of the following best describes the field in which you received your
highest degree?
Public Administration
Business Administration
Political Science
Economics
Mathematics
Science
Healthcare
Medicine
Computing
Engineering
Technology
Other (please specify)

12. How would you describe your political ideology?

Strongly liberal
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Strongly conservative

13. Do you consider yourself a minority?

Yes
No

14. What is your race? (mark one or more)

White
Black or African American
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
American Indian or Alaska Native
Other

15. What is your gender?

Female
Male

16. What is your age?

Thank you so much for taking the survey!

Your input is highly valuable.
PAQ WINTER 2015 643

Appendix C. Parameter Estimates

Std.
B Sig. Exp(B)
Rolea Error
Intercept 7.138 1.858 .000
Expectation of policy -.492 .175 .005 .611
involvement
Stakeholders’ expectations .248 .168 .140 1.282
Administrative discretion -1.034 .164 .000 .356
Current job satisfaction .178 .131 .172 1.195
Position .295 .259 .254 1.343
Log (years in current -.640 .511 .211 .527
position)
Log (tenure) 1.518 .493 .002 4.563
Adapted Realist
Years in public service -.066 .021 .001 .936
Education -.084 .151 .580 .920
Political ideology -.202 .182 .268 .817
Age .002 .021 .906 1.002
[Minority association =1] .094 .388 .809 1.099
[Minority association =2] 0b . . .
[Gender =1] .325 .334 .331 1.384
[Gender =2] 0b . . .
Intercept 10.394 2.500 .000
Expectation of policy -.509 .234 .029 .601
involvement
Stakeholders’ expectations .273 .229 .233 1.315
Administrative discretion -1.126 .196 .000 .324
Current job satisfaction .119 .183 .516 1.126
Position -.400 .433 .356 .670
Log (years in current -.654 .768 .394 .520
position)
Businesslike Log (tenure) 1.896 .784 .016 6.662
Utilitarian Years in public service -.072 .034 .031 .930
Education -.076 .218 .726 .926
Political ideology -.548 .274 .046 .578
Age -.040 .030 .179 .961
[Minority association =1] .613 .519 .237 1.846
[Minority association =2] 0b . . .
[Gender =1] -.114 .488 .815 .892
[Gender =2] 0b . . .
Intercept 12.447 2.181 .000
Resigned Expectation of policy -.547 .198 .006 .578
Custodian involvement
Stakeholders’ expectations -.192 .194 .321 .825
644 PAQ WINTER 2015

Administrative discretion -1.249 .178 .000 .287

Current job satisfaction .279 .154 .070 1.321
Position -.082 .359 .819 .921
Log (years in current -.474 .655 .469 .622
position)
Log (tenure) 1.580 .659 .017 4.857
Years in public service -.070 .027 .009 .933
Education -.344 .176 .051 .709
Political ideology -.444 .238 .062 .642
Age -.019 .026 .455 .981
[Minority association =1] -.163 .474 .730 .849
b
[Minority association =2] 0 . . .
[Gender =1] .128 .420 .761 1.136
[Gender =2] 0b . . .
Intercept 9.493 1.899 .000
Expectation of policy -.514 .175 .003 .598
involvement
Stakeholders’ expectations .073 .169 .666 1.076
Administrative discretion -1.125 .166 .000 .325
Current job satisfaction .143 .131 .273 1.154
Position .057 .275 .836 1.059
Log (years in current -.262 .542 .628 .769
position)
Log (tenure) 1.465 .529 .006 4.330
Practical Idealist
Years in public service -.089 .022 .000 .915
Education -.154 .154 .315 .857
Political ideology -.182 .193 .346 .834
Age .005 .021 .833 1.005
[Minority association =1] -.054 .403 .892 .947
[Minority association =2] 0b . . .
[Gender =1] .115 .347 .741 1.122
[Gender =2] 0b . . .
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