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A concept paper in the field of Constitutional Law 2, Bill of Rights particularly on

the Due Process of law
By: Balindan, Pamela S., Cabrales, Kristine Allen G., and Del Castillo, Lester V.
Block 2, Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila

Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

Origin of Due Process

Due process originated in 1215 with the English Magna Carta, which contained
the provisions that embodied the solemn vow that “no man shall be taken or imprisoned
or disseized or outlawed, or in any manner destroyed; nor shall we go upon him, nor
send upon him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” In 1355,
the popular phrase “law of the land” was replaced with “due process”. It was used for
the first time when, in King Edward III’s Statute 28, it was declared that “no man, of what
state or condition whoever he be, shall be put out of his lands, or tenements, nor taken,
nor imprisoned, nor indicted, nor put to death, without he be brought in to answer by
due process of law.”
Consequently, the primordial view of due process was understood to require that
deprivations of individual rights could only be accomplished in accordance with law.

Evolution of Due Process

Prior to Dartmouth College Case, the due process of law was regarded as the
observance of the procedure laid down by the law, regardless of its intrinsic validity. The
power of the Parliament was unlimited— its acts could not be abrogated by the King or
annulled by the courts, and the law of the land. The power of the Crown in dealing with
the life, liberty or property of its subjects was restrained in accordance with the law of
the land, which was understood to be enacted by the Parliament. Came the Dartmouth
College Case, Daniel Webster was to declare that the law of the land meant “the
general law, a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial.”
The growth of the doctrine continued apace when it was introduced in the United
States. A new form of government was established there providing for three co-equal
and separate branches among which legislative, executive, and judicial powers were
distributed. Shortly thereafter, in the pronouncements of Chief Justice John Marshall,
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the justice asserted the power of the judiciary to determine the validity of laws enacted
by the Congress in the first place, which was later on regarded as the substantive due
process, as a limitation on the legislature itself.

Meaning of Due Process

The Due Process clause in the 1987 Constitution enshrined in Article 3, Section
1 provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.
In this jurisdiction, the due process clause has no precise or definite meaning so
as not to confine and prevent the judiciary from adjusting it to the circumstances of
particular cases and to the ever-changing conditions of society.
Due process therefore continues to be dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every
situation calling for its application. The very elasticity of the provision makes this
possible and thus enlarges the rights of the individual to his life, liberty, and property.
The courts likewise hesitated to provide their own specification of the guaranty,
preferring instead that the common requirement to be able to conform to due process is
fair play, respect for justice, and respect for the rights of others. This, instead of
constricting itself to a precise definition, will serve as a standard of due process by any
court that will apply in every case.
Thus, in the words of Justice Fernando, due process is the “responsiveness to
the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.” Differently stated, Justice
Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, regarded due process as nothing more and
nothing less than “the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.”
Due process is a guaranty against any arbitrariness on the part of the
government, whether committed by the legislature, the executive, or the judiciary. In
simple terms, it is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear “the other side” before an
opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment (Ynot v. IAC,
1987). It covers any governmental action which constitutes a deprivation of some
person’s life, liberty, or property.
Due process of law guarantees notice and opportunity to be heard to persons
who would be affected by the order or act contemplated.

Person
All persons, natural, whether citizens or aliens, without regard to any difference
of race, religion, color, or nationality, are protected under the due process clause.
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Artificial persons like corporations and partnerships are also covered by the protection
but only insofar as their property is concerned.

Deprivation
To deprive, in its general meaning, is to “take away forcibly, to prevent from
possessing, enjoying or using something.” As applied to due process, deprivation
means denial of the right to life liberty, or property.
Deprivation per se is not necessarily unconstitutional. What is prohibited is
deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Hence, the right to life,
liberty or property may be validly claimed by the State by virtue of its police power.

Life
Life is understood under the due process clause connotes in the first place the
integrity of the physical person. The meaning is that it is not permissible for the
government to deprive the individual of any part of his body, and this is true even if it be
as punishment for crime.
“Life” should embrace the enjoyment by the individual of all the God-given
faculties that can make his life worth living. Included in the guaranty therefore is the
right to give full rein to his attributes, to expand the horizons of the mind, to widen the
reach for his capabilities, to enhance those moral or spiritual values that can make
one’s life meaningful and rewarding.
Under the New Civil Code and in the case of Imbong v. Ochoa, “life commences
upon conception, that is fertilization.” Hence, the obligation of the State is to equally
protect the life of the mother as well as her unborn child and to prevent the legislature to
enact a law legalizing abortion.

Liberty
Liberty is the freedom to do right and never wrong. It is ever guided by reason
and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual. Liberty under the due
process clause is regulate by law, not by license. The individual, as a creature of
society, is free to act but as he exercises his rights, he must not injure others. This is in
recognition of the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
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Property
Property is anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the
subject of contract. This includes all things real, personal, tangible, and intangible that
are within the commerce of man, like lands, jewelry, automobiles, buildings, goodwill,
inheritance, intellectual creations, future earnings, works of art, animals, mortgages,
insurance proceeds, etc.
However, one cannot have a vested right to a public office, as this is not
regarded as property. If created by statute, it may be abolished by the legislature.
The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of
due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in the right reason and
natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action.
Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. While one may not be
deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.

Noted exceptions to Due Process (Ynot v. IAC)

a. The conclusive presumption bars the admission of contrary evidence as long
as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational
connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed.
b. There are instances when the need for expeditious action will justify omission
of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a
mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on the sight because of the
immediate danger it poses to the safety of the people.
c. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat, and narcotic drugs are inherently
pernicious and may be summarily destroyed.
d. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled,
without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled.
e. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public
health and bawdy house to protect the public morals.

In these cases, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without the violation of due
process in view of (1) the nature of the property involved or (2) the urgency of the need
to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
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Chapter 2
RELATIVITY AND SCOPE OF DUE PROCESS

I. Substantive Due Process

Substantive due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with
the rights of the person’s life, liberty, or property. Substantive due process asks whether
the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or
property. In other words, substantive due process looks whether there is sufficient
justification for the government’s action (City of Manila v. Laguio). This objective must
be pursued in a lawful manner or that the means employed must be reasonably related
to the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive.
Substantive due process is an aspect of due process which serves as a
restriction on the law-making and rule-making power of the government. The law itself,
not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, should be fair,
reasonable, and just. It guarantees against the arbitrary power even when exercised
according to proper forms and procedure.
Laws which interfere with life, liberty, or property satisfy substantive due process
when there is (1) lawful object, that is, the interests of the public in general require the
intervention of the State, and (2) lawful means, that is, the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
on individuals (US v. Toribio).

II. Judicial Due Process

Whether in civil or criminal judicial proceedings, due process requires that there be:
1. An impartial and disinterested court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it;
2. Jurisdiction lawfully acquired over the defendant or the property which is the
subject matter of the proceeding;
3. Notice and opportunity to be heard be given to the defendant; and
4. Judgment to be rendered upon lawful hearing.

A. Impartial and Competent Court

A court affected by bias or prejudice cannot be expected to render a fair and

impartial decision. As our supreme court has declared, every litigant is entitled to
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
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Due process is intended to ensure that confidence by requiring compliance with

what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal
Justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already
committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only
to be formalized after the litigants shall undergone the charade of a formal
hearing. Judicial (and extrajudicial) are not orchestrated plays in which the
parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according
to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will
reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are
filed, on the basis of established facts and the pertinent law.
By competent court has meant one vested with jurisdiction over a case as
conferred upon it by law. For example, a regional trial court is competent to try a
prosecution for murder but not for violation of a municipal ordinance. The
competent court in the latter case would be the metropolitan or municipal trial
court. Only the Supreme Court is competent to review a decision of the
Commission on Audit, but jurisdiction over ordinary appealed cases involving
only questions of fact is vested in the Court of Appeals.
This impartiality is likewise expected in the conduct of preliminary investigations
which, like court proceedings, are subject to the requirements of both substantive
and procedural due process. While it is true that a preliminary investigation
conducted by the Department of Justice is an executive function and not a
judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, the investigating public prosecutor, like a
quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive department exercising powers
akin to those of a court of law. Preliminary investigation is considered as a
judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer, by the nature
of his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer. The authority of a prosecutor or
investigating officer duly empowered to preside over or to conduct a preliminary
investigation is no less than that of a municipal judge or even an RTC Judge.

B. Jurisdiction

In actions in personam, such as a complaint for recovery of a loan, jurisdiction

over the defendant is acquired by the court by his voluntary appearance or
through service of summons upon him. This may be effected personally, or by
substituted service, or, in exceptional cases, by publication. In actions in rem or
quasi in rem such as land registration proceedings or the foreclosure of a real
estate mortgage, the jurisdiction of the court is derived from the power it may
exercise over the property. Jurisdiction over the person is not essential, provided
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the relief granted by the court is limited to such as can be enforced against the
property itself. Notice by publication is sufficient in these cases.

The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action

or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law.

C. Hearing

Notice to a party is essential to enable it to adduce its own evidence and to meet
and refute the evidence submitted by the other party. Every litigant is entitled to
his day in court. He has a right to be notified of every incident of the proceeding
and to be present at every stage thereof so that he may be heard by himself and
counsel for the protection of his interests.

In one case, a person's certificate of title to a piece of land was annulled although
she was not made a party to the proceeding. The Supreme Court declared that
the decision could not in any way bind her because of the denial from her of the
right to be heard.

1) Appeal

The right to appeal is not essential to the right to a hearing. Except when
guaranteed by the Constitution, appeal may be allowed or denied by the
legislature in its discretion. If allowed by statute, it must be exercised strictly
in accordance with the provisions of the law and rules. The requirements of
due process are deemed satisfied as long as the litigant is given his day in
court at the trial of his case, and he cannot demand as a matter of right
another day in the appellate court.

But as long as the law allows him to appeal, denial of that remedy is a denial
of due process. Furthermore, the legislature itself cannot deprive him of the
right to appeal in those cases coming under the minimum appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as specified in Article VIII, Section 5(2), of
the Constitution, to wit:

(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
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(2)
All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or
any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(4) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.
(5) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
2) Exceptions

Nevertheless, there are cases in which the essential requisites of notice and
hearing may be omitted without violation of due process. Among these are
the cancellation of the passport of a person sought for the commission of a
crime, the preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative
charges, the distraint of properties for tax delinquency, the padlocking of
restaurants found to be insanitary or of theatres showing obscene movies,
the issuance of temporary protection orders and writs of preliminary
attachment or writs of possession and the abatement of nuisances per se.

a) Nuisances

A nuisance per se is objectionable under any and all circumstances

because it presents an immediate danger to the welfare of the community.
This kind of nuisance may be abated summarily, that is, without the
necessity of judicial authorization. The classic example is that of a mad
dog running loose, which can be killed on sight, regardless of its value,
because of the threat it poses to the safety and lives of the people.

A nuisance per accidens is objectionable only under some but not all
circumstances, there being situations when it is perfectly legitimate and
acceptable. It has been described as "the right thing in the wrong place,"
like a patis factory in a residential area. The rule is that it may be abated
only upon judicial authorization as it is difficult to ascertain or identify this
kind of nuisance. The exception, as announced in Lawton v. Steele, 88 is
where the legislature has authorized its summary abatement, provided the
nuisance per accidens is of trifling value only.

b) Presumptions

Would a statutory presumption deny the right to a hearing insofar as the

person affected is precluded from introducing evidence to rebut the
presumption? The accepted view is that it would not, provided there is a
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rational or natural connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed from such fact. As long as the presumption is based
on human experience, as where child born within one hundred eighty days
of the marriage 1s presumed legitimate if the husband before such
marriage, knew of the pregnancy of the wife, it will be deemed not violative
of due process.

D. Judgment

The right to a hearing would be meaningless if in the end the judge could
disregard the evidence adduced by the parties and decide the case on the basis
of his own unsupported conclusions. To insure against such arbitrariness, due
process requires that the judgment be based upon the lawful hearing previously
conducted. And to augment this requirement, Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution provides that "no decision shall be ' rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based."

III. Administrative Due Process

In administrative proceedings, the procedural due process requisites of are the

following:
(1) The right to a hearing, which include right to present one's case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) The decision must have something to support itself.
(4) The evidence must be substantial.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. (Ang Tibay v. CIR)
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IV. Judicial Standard of Review

A. Rational Basis Test

The classification should bear a reasonable relation to government’s purpose
and the legislative classification is presumed valid. It should be bear in mind that
it is important to take into consideration if there is no plausible difference
between the disadvantaged class and those not disadvantaged. It is also equally
important when the government attaches a morally irrelevant and negative
significance to a difference between the advantaged and the disadvantaged.

B. Strict Scrutiny Test

This test is triggered when a fundamental constitutional right is limited by a law.
This requires the government to show an overriding or compelling government
interest so great that it justifies the limitation of fundamental constitutional rights.

C. Intensified Means Test

In this situation, the Court accepts the articulated purpose of the legislation, but
it should closely scrutinize the relationship between the classification and the
purpose based on a spectrum of standards, by gauiging the extent to which
constitutionally guaranteed rights depend upon the affected individual interest.

D. Immediate Scrutiny Test

A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted
by the US Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy.

E. Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine

An act is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common

intelligence must necessarily guess at its common meaning and differ as to its
application. It is subject to the principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For
one, it is also an analytical tool for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech
cases (David v. Arroyo).

The statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:

a) It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid.
b) It leaves the law enforcers an unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions.
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SUMMARY OF RELEVANT CASES

Kwong Sing v. The City of Manila

G.R. No. 15972, October 11, 1920

FACTS:
Petitioner Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who
has general and the same interest, filed a complaint against the city of Manila assailing
the validity of Ordinance No. 532 of the city of Manila, requiring receipts in duplicate in
English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by
laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. Petitioner Kwong Sing prayed for a
preliminary injunction, afterwards to be made permanent, prohibiting the city of Manila
from enforcing the Ordinance, and for a declaration by the court that the said ordinance
was null and void.
The lower court granted the preliminary injunction, but the permanent injunction
was not granted. Hence, this petition.
The appellant’s claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors legislation; that it unjustly
discriminates between persons in similar circumstances; that is constitutes an arbitrary
infringement of property rights. The plaintiffs presented that there are more than forty
(40) Chinese laundries in Manila City. The laundrymen and employees in Chinese
laundries do not, as a rule, speak, read, and write English or Spanish. However, some
of them are able to write and read numbers.
Further, Kwong Sing also contended that the ordinance is invalid, because it is
arbitrary, unreasonable, and not justified under the police power of the city.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Ordinance No. 532 is a valid exercise of police power.
2. Whether Ordinance No. 532 is a class legislation that infringes property rights.
HELD:
1. Yes. The government of the city of Manila had the power to enact Ordinance No.
532 and that as said ordinance is found not to be oppressive, nor unequal, nor
unjust, it is valid. The city of Manila possesses the power to enact Ordinance No.
532. Section 2444, paragraphs (I) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 2774, Section 8, authorizes the municipal board of the city
of Manila to regulate laundries.
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The word “regulate”, as used in subsection (I), section 2444 of the Administrative
Code, means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but
“regulate” should not be construed as synonymous with “suppress” or “prohibit.”
Consequently, under the power to regulate laundries, the municipal authorities
could make proper police regulations as to the mode in which the employment or
business shall be exercised. And, under the general welfare clause (subsection
[ee], section 2444 of the Manila Charter), the business of laundries and dyeing
and cleaning establishments could be regulated, as this term is above construed,
by an ordinance in the interest of the public health, safety, morals, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience, prosperity, and the general welfare.

The purpose of the said Ordinance was to avoid disputes between laundrymen
and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to
decipher Chinese character from being defrauded. The object of the Ordinance
was, accordingly, the promotion of peace and good order and the prevention of
fraud, deceit, cheating, and imposition. The convenience of the public would also
be served in a community where there is a Babel of tongues by having receipts
made out in the two official languages. Reasonable restraints of a lawful
business for such purposes are permissible under the police power. The
legislative body is the best judge of whether or not the means adopted are
adequate to accomplish the ends in view.

2. No. The rights of Chinese laundrymen are not less because they may be aliens.
The life, liberty, or property of these persons cannot be taken without due
process of law; they are entitled to the equal protection of the laws without regard
to their race; and treaty rights, as effectuated between the United States and
China, must be accorded to them.

Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal or
property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory no unreasonable in its
operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they
belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without
exception, and each of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance.
There is no privilege, no discrimination, no distinction. Equally and uniformly the
ordinance applies to all engaged in the laundry business, and as nearly as may
be, the same burden is casted upon them.
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Gilda G. Cruz and Zenaida C. Paitim v. The Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 144464, November 27, 2001

FACTS:
On September 9, 1994, the Civil Service Commission received a letter from a
private individual, Carmelita B. Esteban, claiming that, during the examinations for non-
professional in the career civil service on July 30, 1989, Zenaida C. Paitim, the
Municipal Treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan, falsely pretending to be the examinee,
Gilda Cruz, a co-employee in the said office, took the examinations for the latter.
On September 20, 1994, the Erlinda A. Rosas, Director IV of the Commission,
issued a Memorandum to Eliseo Gatchalian, the Director of the Management
Information Office of the Commission, requesting the latter to furnish her with the picture
seat plan of the room where Gilda G. Cruz was during the said examination, to
ascertain the veracity of the letter-complaint. Gatchalian did furnish Rosas with certified
true copies of the picture seat plans of the rooms where Cruz was assigned not only in
the 1989 but also in the 19987 and 1988 career service (sub-professional)
examinations.
On November 8, 1994, Rosas thereby wrote a Memorandum to Commissioner
Thelma P. Gaminde declaring that based on the record, she found a prima facie case
against Zenaida Paitim and Gilda G. Cruz. Hence, on the basis of said memorandum, a
fact-finding investigation was conducted. On March 31, 1995, a formal charge was filed
against Gilda Cruz and Zenaida C. Paitim with the Civil Service Commission.
In their Answer, the petitioners denied the charges filed against them. They also
declared that they were electing a formal investigation on the matter. The petitioners
subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that if the investigation will continue,
they will be deprived of their right to due process because the Civil Service Commission
was the Complainant, the Prosecutor, and the Judge, all at the same time. However, the
CSC denied their motion, as well as their motion for reconsideration.
After conducting a formal administrative investigation, the CSC issued an
investigation report finding petitioners guilty of “Dishonesty” and ordering their dismissal
from the government service.
On July 1, 1998, the CSC issued a resolution finding the petitioners guilty of the
charges and ordered their dismissal from the government service.
The petitioners appealed before the Court of Appeals, the CA, in turn, dismissed
the same. Hence, this petition.
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ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are denied of their right to due process
HELD:
No. The Court upheld the findings of the CA, where the appellate court explained that
the CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative case instituted by it or instituted
before it directly or on appeal including actions of its officers and the agencies attached
to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, which states:
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it
directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions
and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. Officials and
employees who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be
liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall
be final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days
from receipt of a copy thereof;
The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could not
be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based on substantial
findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being considered experts in their
fields, are binding on the Supreme Court. The records clearly disclose that the
petitioners were duly investigated by the CSC and found that the petitioners are indeed
guilty of the offense charged against them.
It cannot be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that
a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly informed of the
charges. They submitted an Answer and were given the opportunity to defend
themselves. Petitioners cannot, therefore, claim that there was a denial of due process
much less the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the CSC to take cognizance of the case.
We do not find reversible error with the decision of the Court of Appeals in upholding the
CSC Resolution.
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People of the Philippines v. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.

G.R. No. 160897, November 16, 2016

FACTS:
On November 27, 1989, the PCGG charged respondent Cojuangco Jr. with
violation of Section 4(b) in relation to Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The information alleged that he had illegally acted as a nominee/dummy
of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos in acquiring shares of stock in the Bulletin
Today Publishing Company and Liwayway Publishing, Inc.
An ex parte motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest was thereafter filed by
the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan, however, the latter denied the motion on the
ground that the PCGG’s preliminary investigation had established no probable cause
against the respondent.
Hence, the PCGG filed anew an amended information before the
Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Information and directed the
issuance of a warrant for the arrest of respondent. The respondent filed to annul the
warrant of arrest; however, it was dismissed by the Court. The Court further directed the
Sandiganbayan to resume the proceedings in the said case.
In compliance with the Court’s ruling, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with the
case. Due to several postponements of the pre-trial, on September 18, 2002, the
prosecution was directed to submit a Memorandum in support of its position that the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over respondent.
The PCGG filed their memorandum. On October 28, 2002, respondent filed a
Reply Memorandum assailing the preliminary investigation it has conducted and the
Information filed against him. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan declared null and void
the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG and the Information filed pursuant
thereto.
Petitioners then moved for reconsideration, but the motion was likewise denied
by the Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred when it declared null and void the
preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG and the Information filed pursuant to
that investigation
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HELD:
No. The Court held that the Sandiganbayan correctly dismissed the Information filed
against respondent pursuant to its ruling in Cojuangco v. PCGG.
In Cojuangco case, the Court declared the preliminary investigation conducted by the
PCGG null and void on due process grounds. It was noted that prior to the conduct of
the preliminary investigation, the PCGG had gathered evidence against respondent,
issued a sequestration order against him, and filed a civil case for recovery of ill-gotten
wealth based on the same facts involved in the criminal cases. Based on those
circumstances, the Court found that the PCGG could not have possibly acted with the
“cold neutrality of an impartial judge” during the preliminary investigation proceedings,
since the latter had already formed conclusions on the matter.
Considering that the PCGG initiated a civil complaint against respondent for the same
acts alleged in the present Information, it is evident that it had already formed its
conclusions even prior to conducting the preliminary investigation in this case. Further,
since the PCGG itself gathered the additional evidence in support of the Information, the
reinvestigation it carried out could not have been the fair and impartial review
contemplated by law. As it noted in Cojuangco, the PCGG cannot gather evidence
against a respondent, file a criminal complaint, and then conduct a preliminary
investigation of the case without contravening the basic tenets of due process. The due
process violation was compounded by the fact that the PCGG had filed a civil complaint
against the same respondent alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal act.
In our criminal justice system, the law enforcer who conducted the criminal
investigation, gathered the evidence and thereafter filed the complaint for the
purpose of preliminary investigation cannot be allowed to conduct the
preliminary investigation of his own complaint. It is to say the least arbitrary and
unjust. It is in such instances that We say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at the
same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a law
enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with impartiality the preliminary
investigation of his own complaint, this time as a public prosecutor. The
circumstances of the instant petition are even worse. To repeat, the PCGG and the
Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil complaint against petitioner and
intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject of the
subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for preliminary
investigation. While ostensibly, it is only the Solicitor General who is the complainant in
the criminal cases filed with the PCGG, in reality the PCGG is an unidentified co-
complainant. Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders
against petitioner's properties, it was on the basis of a prima facie finding that the same
were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of coconut levy
Page 17 of 20

funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG cannot possibly conduct the
preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints with the "cold neutrality of
an impartial judge," as it has prejudged the matter. Add to this the fact that there are
many suits filed by petitioner and the intervenors against the PCGG and vice
versa. (Emphases supplied)
Consistent with the above-quoted Decision of this Court in Cojuangco, we find that
respondent's right to due process was violated in the preliminary investigation
proceedings conducted by the PCGG in this case. The investigation conducted and the
Information filed pursuant thereto must therefore be declared null and void.

Zenon R. Perez vs. People of The Philippines

G.R. No. 164763 (February 12, 2008)

FACTS:
An audit team conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who
was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. In the course of the audit,
the amount of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner. The audit team embodied
their findings in the Report of Cash Examination, which also contained an inventory of
cash items.  Based on the said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total
amount of P94,116.36, instead of the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57.
When asked by the auditing team as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner
verbally explained that part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late
brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his
medicine.

            As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum dated

January 13, 1989 addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending the filing
of the appropriate criminal case against petitioner.

            Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public
funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code  

ISSUE: Whether Sandiganbayan violated the petitioner’s right to speedy disposition of

his case and due process when it unduly and unreasonably delayed the decision of the
case for over thirteen years

RULING:
No. Due process of law as applied to judicial proceedings has been interpreted to mean
"a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds on inquiry, and renders
judgment only after trial." Petitioner cannot complain that his right to due process has
Page 18 of 20

been violated. He was given all the chances in the world to present his case, and the
Sandiganbayan rendered its decision only after considering all the pieces of evidence
presented before it. While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite
distinctly from the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always zealously
espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to the party
involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's individual rights should not work
against and preclude the people's equally important right to public justice. It appears to
us that the delay in the disposition of the case prejudiced not just the accused but the
people as well. Since the accused has completely failed to assert his right seasonably
and inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of the case on
the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and equitable to give
the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense) substantial justice in the
premises.

Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators vs. City Mayor of Manila

G.R. No. L-24693 (July 31, 1967)

FACTS:
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for
being violative of the due process clause, contending that said ordinance is not only
arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also vague, indefinite and uncertain, and
likewise allege the invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-
incrimination.

Ordinance No. 4760 has the following provisions:

1. Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a
prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
3. prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old; 
4. usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200%
respectively (tax issue also);
5. making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
6. cancellation of license for subsequent violation.

The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 4760 is against the due process clause

HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by
Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of
invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts
and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise
Page 19 of 20

of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely
enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize
prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any
business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the LGU concerned. And
taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The due process contention is
likewise untenable; there is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a
standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of
life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of
due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free
the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out
and unfairness avoided. Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s
nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.

On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24

hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good
of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the
general well-being. The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted the
injuction on the Ordinance in question.

Gsis vs. Montesclaros

G.R. No. 146494 (July 14, 2004)

FACTS:
Nicolas Montesclaros, a 72-year-old widower married Milagros Orbiso, who was
then 43 years old, on 10 July 1983. Nicolas filed with the GSIS an application for
retirement benefits under the Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977.

In his retirement application, he designated his wife as his sole beneficiary. GSIS
approved Nicolas’ application for retirement effective 17 February 1984, granting a lump
sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly annuity after.

Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with the GSIS a claim for
survivorship pension under PD 1146 but was denied the claim because, under section
18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving
spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension.

Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of
retirement on 17 February 1984. Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action
for declaratory relief questioning the validity of Sec. 18 of PD 1146.
Page 20 of 20

The trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for survivorship
pension and ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits including interest. Citing Articles
115and 117 of the Family Code, the trial court held that retirement benefits, which the
pensioner has earned for services rendered and for which the pensioner has
contributed through monthly salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions. Since
retirement benefits are property the pensioner acquired through labor, such benefits are
conjugal property. The trial court held that the prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is
deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the Family Code, a later law. The Family
Code has retroactive effect if it does not prejudice or impair vested rights.

The trial court held that Section 18 of PD 1146 was repealed by the Family Code,
a later law. GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s
decision. Hence, this appeal.

In a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she has
accepted GSIS’ decision disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension and that
she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. However, the Court will still resolve the
issue despite the manifestation of Milagros because social justice and public interest
demand the resolution of the constitutionality of the proviso.

ISSUE: Whether the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146 is unconstitutional for being

violative of the denial of due process

HELD:
YES. The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides
that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." The proviso is unduly
oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouse's claim for survivorship pension if
the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year
prohibited period. There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse
without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. The proviso undermines
the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive and integrated social
security and insurance benefits to government employees and their dependents in the
event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the government employees. Under
Section 18 of PD 1146, it prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship
pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension. The Court holds that such proviso is discriminatory
and denies equal protection of the law.

Wherefore, the proviso in Section 18 of PD No. 1146 is void for being violative of the
constitutional guarantee of due process and equal protection of the law.