Project Report

On

Centralizing Tendency of Federalism in India: Critical

Analysis

Submitted to:

MATS LAW SCHOOL, MATS UNIVERSITY, RAIPUR

Submitted by:

Ishu Deshmukh

LLM (1Y), Semester II

Submitted On: 10/06/2021

MATS UNIVERSITY, RAIPUR

 Acknowledgements

I, Ishu Deshmukh, feel myself elated, as it gives me immense pleasure to come

with the work on topic, “Centralizing Tendency of Federalism in India: Critical
Analysis”. Words fail to express my deep sense of glee to my teacher, who enlightened me
on my every difficulty in completion of task. I acknowledge the blessings and support which
my mother and father gave in finishing of this task.

I would like to forward my hearty thanks to my University and Vice-Chancellor

for providing all the necessary requirements which aided me to achieve my goal. I also thanks
Librarian MATS University, Raipur, for assisting me and allowing me to use the library of
the University.

I feel a deep sense of thankfulness to all my seniors, my friends who helped me in

achieving my target.

Ishu Deshmukh
SEMESTER-II
ROLL NO.-MU20LLM1Y025

2
 Introduction

Federalism is a device by which plural qualities of a society are articulated and protected. It is
devised to secure both regional autonomy and national unity. It is a product of historical
forces in plural societies. If the forces of national unity are very strong in such society, the
central government shall have more powers. The strength of these regional and national
forces changes from time to time in view of changing social, economic and political
conditions and compulsions. Thus federalism has been reflecting these changing historical
conditions and compulsions.1
Federalism is a modem conception. Its theory and practice in modem times is not older than
the American Federation which came into existence in 1787. The federal idea- the plan of
government of a number of contiguous territories in association and neither separated nor
combined in one- is very old and had been practiced in ancient Greece, but it has been
employed on a larger scale only during the last two centuries.2
A federal system, in other words, is not an immutable one but needs to undergo re
examination at intervals, the aim being to re-adjust or at any rate, reconfirm the equilibrium
in the light of emerging situational compulsions. All federal systems encounter problems and
imbalances in the area of centre- state relations, no matter how detailed and elaborate is
distribution of the functions and resources between the two levels. The federal process is a
dynamic one.3
The framers of the Indian Constitution were not as free as the framers of the United States
Constitution who had only declaration of a few principles to guide them. As such, the
constitution of India makes the centre stronger than the states and provides a quasi - federal
polity to the nation.4 Indian Federalism is also going through such pangs of socio-economic
and political developments.5
In view of the continental size of its population on one hand, and the diverse nature of its
society on the other, the constitution makers of India resolved to opt for a federal system
instead of a unitary one. But at the same the euphoria of independence, the trauma of
partition, the problem of integration of princely states and the need for planned economic

1
Patil, S.H., Central Grants and State Autonomy, Atlantic Publishers, New Delhi, 1995, P.13.
2
Fadia, B.L., Indian Government and Politics, SahityaBhavan Publication, Agra, 2002, P.191.
3
Maheshwari, S.R., Indian Administration, VI Edn., Orient Longman Limited, New Delhi, 2001, P.376.
4
Patil, S.H., Op.Cit., Pp. 376.
5
Patil, S.H., Op.Cit., Pp.13-14.

3
development for removing backwardness, poverty and food shortage prompted them to
establish a strong centre in it.

So, in this project an attempt has also been made to reveal the meaning of federalism, nature
of federalism, evolution of Indian federalism, the meaning of federalism in India, and
important features of federal system.

4
 CONTENTS

1. Introduction............................................................................................................03

2. Objectives of The Study........................................................................................06

4. Methodology..........................................................................................................06

5. Nature of the Indian Federal System......................................................................07

6. Federal Features of the Indian Constitution…………………………..……....…08

7. Unitary Features of the Indian Constitution…………..........................................10

8.Legislative Relations……………………………...……………………....….….10

9. Administrative Relations……….…..…………………….………………….…..18

10. Financial Relations...............................................................................................21

11. Conclusion...........................................................................................................26

12. References............................................................................................................27

5
 Objectives of the Study
Following are the objectives of my study:

1. To analyze the meaning pattern of Federalism in India.

2. To understand the Centralizing tendency in Indian Federalism and the reason behind it.

Methodology of the Study

This project is based on Doctrinal Research, which included collection of materials
from library and nearby sources. It includes secondary data sources. This also includes web
search.

6
Nature of the Indian Federal System: A Matter of Controversy
Some scholars describe India as a quasi-federal state, and some even regard it as more unitary
than federal. It is really a debatable issue.

1. K.C.Wheare, a well-known British authority on federalism, says, “the Constitution is

quasi-federal,” and classifies India as “a unitary state with subsidiary federal principles rather
than a federal state with subsidiary unitary principles.”6
2. Sir. Ivor. Jennings feels, that India is a federation, with a strong centralizing tendency.7
3. For Norman D. Palmer, “The Republic of India is a federation, although it has many
distinctive features, which seem to modify the essentially federal nature of the state.”8
4. According to K.M.Munshi, the constitution made India “a quasi-federal union invested
with several important features of a unitary government.”9
5. P.B.Gajendragadkar, a former Chief Justice of India, opined that though the Constitution
“part takes of some of the characteristics of federal structure, it cannot be said to be federal in
the true sense of the term.”10
6. W.H.MorrisJones,held the view that “Indian federalism was a kind of cooperative
federalism where bargaining took place between the centre and the states, but ultimately a
solution came out and both agreed to co-operate.”11
7. Benjamin N. Schoenfeld, opines that, “there was a tendency of centralism in the Indian
Federalism, but that was not because of its structural framework but because of its socialistic
goals and centrally devised plan development.”12
8. Prof. P.K.Tripathi, formerly member of the Law Commission of India, finds “federalism
in India a myth and not reality.”13
Thus, numerous scholars, reflecting on the vast powers left with the Government of India and
the subordinate role of states, and also the crucial powers of the union to practically
annihilate an existing state, doubt whether India is a federation at all. Some have called it a
‘pseudo - federation’. Others feel that it would be more appropriate to call it a ‘quasi
federation’. However, many political thinkers have suggested that there is no such tiling as a

6
Fadia, B.L., Op. Cit., P.193.
7
Fadia, Babulal., State Politics in India, VoLl, Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1984, P.67.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.

7
quasi-federation, and that a system is either a federation or it is not a federation and that India
should be grouped among the federations by virtue of its constitution.
Here, a question may arise as to why the framers of the Indian constitution thought of giving
more powers to the union or made union government stronger than the state governments in
the fashion of a true federation. The answer to this particular question could be found in the
long historical background of India.

Federal Features of the Indian Constitution: The Constitution is

Federal in Form
The main features of Indian Federal system are as follows:
1) Division of Powers :
The division of powers between two levels of governments is an essential feature of
federalism. Federalism means the distribution of powers of the state between the central and
the state governments. The basis of such distribution of power is that in matters of national
importance, in which a uniform policy is desirable in the interest of the units, authority is
entrusted to the centre and matters of local concern remain with the states.
In a Federation there should be clear division of powers so that the units and the centre are
required to enact and legislate within their sphere of activity and none violates its limits and
tries to encroach upon the functions of others. The Seventh schedule contains three legislative
lists which enumerate subjects of administration viz., Union, State and Concurrent lists. The
residuary powers have been vested in the central government.

2) Supremacy of the Constitution:

A federal state derives its existence from the constitution. The constitution in a federal state
constitutes the supreme law of the land. As Prof. K. C. Wheare rightly says, “these two
institutions the supremacy of the constitution and the written constitution are, then essential
institutions to a federal government. The Supremacy of the Constitution is essential if the
government is to be federal; the written constitution is essential if the federal government is
to work well.”14

3) A Written Constitution:

14
Wheare, K.C., Op. Cit., P.56.

8
A Federal constitution must almost be a written constitution. It will be practically impossible
to maintain the supremacy of the constitution and division of powers between the centre and
the states, unless the terms of the constitution have been reduced into writing. Accordingly,
the Indian constitution is a written document containing 448 Articles and 12 Schedules, and
therefore fulfills this basic requirement of a federal government. In fact the Indian
constitution is the most elaborate constitution of the world.

4) Rigid Constitution:
A rigid constitution, as we know, is one which cannot be changed easily. The Indian
constitution is largely a rigid constitution. All the provisions of the constitution concerning
federal state relations can be amended only by the joint actions of the state legislatures and
the union parliament. Such provisions can be amended only if the amendment is passed by a
two-third majority of the members present and by voting in the parliament, and is ratified by
at least one half of the states.

5) Independent Judiciary:
For a federation, it is also essential that the judiciary is impartial and independent. A Federal
court is indispensable to a federation. It acts as the guardian of the constitution. The
constitution has provided for a Supreme Court, and every effort has been made to see that the
judiciary in India is independent and supreme. The Supreme Court of India can declare a law
as unconstitutional if it contravenes any provisions of the constitution. In order to ensure the
impartiality of the judiciary, our judges are not removable by the executive and their salaries
cannot be curtailed by the Parliament.

In India too, the federal judiciary is the highest court of the land. It also acts as a tribunal in
solving the disputes between the centre and the states.

6) Bicameral Legislature:
A bicameral system is considered essential in a federation because it is in the Upper House
alone that the units can be given equal representation. The Constitution of India also provides
for a bicameral legislature at the Centre consisting of the LokSabha and the RajyaSabha.
While the LokSabha consists of the elected representatives of people, the RajyaSabha mainly
consists of representatives elected by State Legislative Assemblies.

9
Unitary Features of the Indian Constitution: A Strong Central
Government

Legislative Relations
The pivotal point in a federation is the allocation of law-making powers between the Centre
and the constituent units. To some extent, rigidity of the federal systems has been mitigated
by techniques of co-operative federalism, but these techniques are of limited, efficacy and are
resorted to because better and more effective methods are not available.

 There are three lists: List I contains matters with respect to which the Centre has
exclusive right to make laws; List II enumerates matters for exclusive legislation by
the States; and List III contains matters for concurrent law-making of both the Centre
and the States. Matters in List I are such which need a uniform law for the whole
country; those in List 11 admit of local variations, while in List III fall matters where
local treatment may be found wanting and uniformity may have to be secured. Each
of the three Lists is elaborate and contains a number of entries. There are 97 entries in
List 1, 66 in List II and 47 in List III. The power of the State Legislature to legislate
with respect to State List matters have been made subject to the power of the
parliament in respect of List I and List III and the entries in the State list have to be
interpreted accordingly. By virtue of Article 248, the residuary power under the
Indian constitution vests with the Parliament.

 In National Interest (Article 249): Article 249 of the constitution clause 1 empowers
the Union Parliament to legislate on the subjects included in the State list whenever
the council of states declare so by resolution supported by not less than two thirds of
the members present and voting, such legislation being necessary and expedient in
national interest. Such resolution may remain in force for period mentioned therein,
but cannot exceed one year. It is a very useful provision which mitigates the
traditional rigidity of federalism. This article can be used for the national interest
demand for urgent and immediate legislation. Considering the brevity of period for
which the union gets power, there is no serious threat to state’s autonomy. The
procedure is of strictly temporary efficacy as the resolution’s effect is limited to one
year. If past experience is any guide, this method will be resorted to only when

10
 national interest demonstrably so demands and to, tide over a situation of a temporary
nature.

 During Proclamation of Emergency under Article 250: Clause 1 of the Article

states that while a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the Parliament has,
power to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India with respect to
any of the matters enumerated in the State List. It is true that the Indian Constitution,
by virtue of Article 250, confers a wide power on the Parliament. The reason can be
understood by considering various disruptive forces have in them, a great potentiality
of doing immense mischief to India’s National existence and considering also the fact
that effective prosecution of a modern war might require complete mobilisation of
country’s resources which the Central government can secure only under Article 250
of the constitution, this broad power has to be tolerated with dire necessity.

 Legislation by Agreement with States: Two or more States can delegate power to
Parliament to legislate on a specified State matter for example, States of Bihar and
Bengal authorised Parliament to legislate for example, setting up the Damodar Valley
Corporation.
Again, a number of States delegated to the Centre power to enact a law to regulate
price competitions, a State subject, but for which a uniform all-India law was needed
because usually these competitions were run by out-of-state journals which a State
law could not touch. Article 252(1) of the constitution lays down that if it appears to
the legislatures of two or more states to be desirable that any of the matters with
respect to which the parliament has no power to make laws for the States except as
provided in Article 249 and 250 of the constitution, should be regulated in such states
by the Parliament by law and if resolutions to that effect are passed by all the houses
of legislature of those states, it shall be lawful for the Parliament to pass an Act for
regulating the matter accordingly and any act so passed shall apply to such States and
to any other state by which it is adopted afterwards by resolution passed in that behalf
by the house or, where there are two Houses by each house of the Legislature of that
state. The resolution operates as an abdication of power of the State legislature with
respect to the matter, which is subject matter of the resolution, and such matter is

11
 placed entirely in the hands of the Parliament and parliament alone can legislate with
respect to it.
Again, a number of States delegated to the Centre power to enact a law to regulate
prize competitions, a State subject, but for which a uniform all-India law was needed
because usually these competitions were run by out-of-state journals which a State
law could not touch. The expedient was used again for enabling the Centre to enact a
comprehensive law levying estate duty on agricultural as well as non-agricultural
property. Jurisdiction in this respect is fragmented under the Constitution that is while
agricultural property falls within the State sphere, the non-agricultural property is
under Central ambit. It was felt that it would be inequitable to tax only non-
agricultural property and not the other. There were problems of aggregation of the
assessee’s entire property- for tax purposes, and so a Central law was thought to be a
desideratum.
In the case of Krishna BhimraoDeshpande v. Land Tribunal, Dharwad 15, the
Supreme Court held that a resolution under Article 252(1) of the constitution
authorizing the Parliament to enact a law for imposition of ceiling on urban
immovable property and acquisition of such property in excess of ceiling does not
deprive the State legislature from making laws under that entry in respect of other
matter such as regulation of relation between landlord and tenant or regulation of
Agrarian reforms.

 Legislation for giving effect to international agreements: It is also evident that

treaty-making power is an aspect of external sovereignty. Article 253 of the
Constitution of India runs thus: “Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing
provisions of this Chapter, Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or
any part of the territory of India for implementing treaty, agreement or convention
with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international
conference, association or other body." Thus the Parliament may invade the state
sphere to implement any treaty obligation of India. The Parliament cannot pass a law
for cessation of any part of ‘territory of India’.

In Berubari Union case16 the Supreme Court accepted in principle that for the award
of ascertainment of disputed boundaries, there is no need of any legislation as it is an
15
1993 (1) SCC 287.
16
AIR 1960 SC 845.

12
 executive act. But for the cessation of any part of territory of India, the amendment of
constitution is essential.

In Ram Jawaya v. State of Punjab 17, the Supreme Court went further in asserting the
necessity of enacting of a law even if there is no ‘cessation matter’ involved. The case
followed the position of England in this regard and ruled that private rights cannot be
affected by a treaty or executive action by way of its implementation unless there is
an Act of Parliament to that effect.

 Emergency powers to the President: The Indian constitution has given emergency
powers to the president. During the time of emergency, the central government will
become powerful. Even it makes the laws on the state list also; the states will lose
their voice. Articles 352, 356 and 360 will play dominant role. The President
proclaims emergency in the country under Article 352, if there is an internal or
external threat to the country’s security, unity and integrity. If the constitutional
machinery fails in the concerned state, then the President will impose the President’s
rule in that state under Article 356. During this period, the state legislative Assembly
will be suspended or dissolved. The entire state administration will come under the
control of the central government. If there is a threat to the country’s finance, then the
President will declare financial emergency under Article 360. During emergency, the
centre gives financial directions to the states to observe the specified canons of
economy. Even the state governments have to reserve the money bills for the consent
of the President. Our constitution has given the vast emergency powers to the centre.
The duration of such proclaimation shall ordinarily be for 2 months.

In the case of S.R.Bommai v. Union of India18, the learned judges elaborated upon the
scope, and justified use of power conferred on the president by Article 356 which will
not restrict the scope of the independent powers of the respective states for every state
is constitutional political unit and has to have an exclusive Executive and Legislative
elected and constituted by the same process as the Union Government. Hence it was
held that the power under the article is an exceptional power and has to be resorted to
only occasionally to meet the exigencies of special situations. Also, it is a settled law

17
(1955) 2 SCR 225.
18
AIR 1994 SC 1918.

13
 in India that superior courts possess the power to make judicial review of the
proclamation made by the President.

 Repugnancy: The entries in List I have a primacy over the entries in the other two
lists, and those in the Concurrent List over the entries in the State List. Then, in case
of repugnancy between a Central law and a State law, the former prevails over the
latter19. All this ensures Centre’s strength as against the States.

In case of PremNath v. State of Jammu and Kashmir 20, the Supreme Court has held:
“The essential condition for the application of Article 254(1) is that the existing law
must be with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list.

In Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh,21 the validity of UP Act was challenged, the
Supreme Court held that the two laws operated in respect of the subject matter in the
same field and the state law, to the extent of repugnancy, was void.
The effect of repugnancy is that the State law becomes void to the extent of
repugnancy.

 Centre can Change Name and Boundaries of States: In a federation, the centre has
no right whatever to change die boundaries of the states. But in India the centre has a
right to change the boundaries of the state and to carve out one state out of the other.
In the fifties, Andhra Pradesh was carved out of the then Madras state. There is
perhaps no state whose boundaries have not been changed at one stage or another.
The right of the centre to change the boundaries of the states is against the federal set
up.22

The State’s powers of legislation, on the other hand, though not so broad as that of the
Centre, are nevertheless significant and touch the people perhaps more intimately.
They have to Maintain law and order. Agriculture and irrigation, on which depends
the whole future prosperity of the country, fall within their domain. They, can regulate
industry and mines after what has been left over by the Centre. Education is their
19
Article 254
20
AIR 1959 SC 749.
21
AIR 1959 SC 648.
22
Fadia, Babulal.,Op.Cit., P.87.

14
 preserve and the Centre’s powers, in the area are limited. Health falls in their
jurisdiction as well as roads, water ways, trade and commerce. They can legislate in
the concurrent field to the extesit left unoccupied by the Centre, and even when the
Centre has made a law on any matter, a State, law can be kept alive, although
inconsistent with the Central law, by the expedient of presidential assent23.

Usually, the distribution of powers in a federation between the Centre and the States
is rigid. The balance drawn between the two governments cannot be disturbed
unilaterally by one of them. The process of constitutional amendment is also rigid and
not capable of being effectuated easily. Gradual adjustments in the balance of powers
are effected by the process of judicial interpretation, but there are times when it fails
to rise to the occasion and make the needed adjustments to meet given situations. To
some extent, rigidity of the federal systems has been mitigated by techniques of co-
operative federalism, but these techniques are of limited, efficacy and are resorted to
because better and more effective methods are not available. There have been times in
the federations of the U.S.A., Canada and Australia, when lack of necessary powers in
the Centre has been keenly felt as pressing problems have demanded solutions. India
in this respect breaks new ground as the Constitution contains a few unique
provisions, not to be found in other constitutions, for making temporary adjustments
in the Centre-State distribution of Powers which introduce an element of flexibility in
an inherently rigid federal structure.

The theory underlying the provision is that the Council represents the States as such as it is
elected by the State Legislatures on the basis of proportional representation, more or less. on
a population basis. The House thus reflects the Political forces in the country, and if too many
States are opposed, then it may be difficult to mobilize necessary support in the House for
passing the resolution for making temporary adjustment. But then, it is also a fact that the
House is divided on party basis and voting has never taken place on a State basis, and,
therefore, if the ruling party can muster the needed strength, it can have the resolution carried
through. The procedure is of strictly temporary efficacy as the resolution effect is limited to
one year. If past experience is any guide, this method will be resorted to only when national
interest demonstrably so demands and to, tide over a situation of a temporary nature. Lastly,
certain entries in the Union List have been so worded as to make the. ambit of the Central
23
Art. 254 (2).

15
power flexible, enabling Parliament to legislate to the extent necessary in a given situation
leaving the rest of the area to the States.

Then, even in the field open to the States, the Centre can control State Legislation in certain
areas. Thus a State law compulsorily acquiring or requisitioning property needs the
President’s assent to be valid. This provision enables the Centre to keep under control State
power to acquire property and ensures payment of compensation for the same 24. Again,
certain types of land-legislation have been freed from the restriction of fundamental rights,
but a State law can claim this immunity only if the President assents to it. This ensures that
only a justifiable use is made of the legislative power by the States. Central assent is also
needed when a State law endangers the constitutional position of the High Court or imposes a
tax in respect of water or electricity stored, generated, consumed or sold by an interstate river
authority constituted by Parliament or imposes reasonable restrictions on freedom of trade,
commerce and intercourse within the State. These are specific situations where Central assent
to State Legislation is necessary for its validity. But, then a general provision authorizes the
State Governor to reserve a bill passed by the State Legislature for presidential consideration
and assent. No norms have been laid down in the Constitution as to when the Governor can
exercise this power, or when the President can refuse to give his assent to a State bill, and, on
its face, it appears to be a blanket power.
In the case of State of West Bengal v. Union of India25The Supreme Court supporting the
principles of plenary power of legislature, upheld the constitutionality of the Coal Bearing
Areas (Acquisition and development) Act, 1957 and rejected the arguments which were
contended to put limitations on the powers of the Parliament to acquire property of a State.
The entry 42 in List II of Seventh Schedule, which reads ‘acquisition and requisition of
property’, implies no limitations or prohibitions on the power of the legislature acting under
this Entry.

Ordinance Making Power:

In the case of RC Cooper vs. Union of India26, the Supreme Court, while examining the
constitutionality of the Banking Companies (Acquisition of Undertakings) Ordinance, 1969
which sought to nationalise 14 of India’s largest commercial banks, held that the President’s

24
Art. 31 (3).
25
AIR 1963 SC 1241
26
1970 AIR 564

16
decision could be challenged on the grounds that ‘immediate action’ was not required; and
the Ordinance had been passed primarily to by-pass debate and discussion in the legislature.

38th Constitutional Amendment Act (1975) inserted a new clause (4) in Article 123 stating
that the President’s satisfaction while promulgating an Ordinance was final and could not be
questioned in any court on any ground.

44th Constitutional Amendment Act (1978) deleted clause (4) inserted by the 38th CAA and
therefore reopened the possibility for the judicial review of the President’s decision to
promulgate an Ordinance.

In AK Roy v. Union of India27, while examining the constitutionality of the National Security
Ordinance, 1980, which sought to provide for preventive detention in certain cases, the Court
argued that the President’s Ordinance making power is not beyond the scope of judicial
review. However, it did not explore the issue further as there was insufficient evidence before
it and the Ordinance was replaced by an Act. It also pointed out the need to exercise judicial
review over the President’s decision only when there were substantial grounds to challenge
the decision, and not at “every casual and passing challenge”

In DC Wadhwa v. State of Bihar 28, it was argued in DC Wadhwavs. State of Bihar (1987) the
legislative power of the executive to promulgate Ordinances is to be used in exceptional
circumstances and not as a substitute for the law making power of the legislature.  Here, the
court was examining a case where a state government (under the authority of the Governor)
continued to re-promulgate ordinances, that is, it repeatedly issued new Ordinances to replace
the old ones, instead of laying them before the state legislature.  A total of 259 Ordinances
were re-promulgated, some of them for as long as 14 years.  The Supreme Court argued that
if Ordinance making was made a usual practice, creating an ‘Ordinance raj’ the courts could
strike down re-promulgated Ordinances.

Administrative Relations

27
AIR 1982 SC 710
28
AIR 1987 SC 579

17
The framers of the Indian Constitution never intended to create administrative co-operation
and co-ordination between the centre and states. The executive power of the State is to be
exercised in such a way as to ensure compliance with the laws made by the Parliament.

 Power to give Directions: the Union Executive is empowered to give directions to a

State, if necessary, for the requisite purpose. The Union Government can issue
directions to the States to ensure compliance with the laws of the Parliament for
construction and maintenance of means of communications, declared to be of national
and military importance, and also on the measures for the protection of Railways. In
addition to all this, the Parliament can alone adjudicate on inter-state river disputes.
Also, a provision has been made for constituting an Inter- State Council to advise the
president on inter-state disputes.

Even the State governments may delegate some of its administrative functions
relating to the State subjects, to Union Government for a specified period. The Union
Government has wide powers to issue directions based on the subjective view of the
Union and may, therefore, interfere with the state autonomy in the field of
administration. Ordinarily, the central police force and Army are posted to the states
at the request of the State Government. However, there have been occasions when the
CRPF of BSF have been deployed in states much against the state wishes of the State
Government. Thus, the center plays a very important role in the administrative sphere
of activity concerning theStates

 Welfare of the minorities A special obligation has been placed on the Centre to look
after the welfare of the minorities, and, therefore, it can direct the States to draw up
and execute schemes for the welfare'of the scheduled tribes29or to provide
facilities for instructionin the mother tongue at the primary stage to the children of the
linguistic minorities30

 All India Services: The Constitution of India has certain special provisions to ensure
uniformity of the administrative system. These include the creation of All India
Services such as IAS and IPS and placing members of these services in key
administrative positions in the states. The presence of All India Service Officers

29
Art. 339.
30
Art. 350 A.

18
 further paves way for the Central Government to exercise its authority and control
over the states. The members of these services are recruited by the Centre but are
appointed in the States. No disciplinary action can be taken against them by the State
Governments without the permission of the Centre. The Constitution also makes
provision for the creation of new All India Service by the Parliament on the
recommendation of the RajyaSabha. The President also puts the entire control of the
state administrative machinery under the control of the Union which you will study
indetails while going through the lesson on emergency provisions.

 Appointment of Governor by President: The President appoints die Governors of

the concerned states. They hold office during the pleasure of the President. In
America, the Governor of the States are elected directly by the people. This system
has been adopted both at the centre and the states in India. Under the parliamentary
system of government, the ministers in the states are also elected directly by the
people, whereas, the Governor is appointed by the President of India. The Governor is
the constitutional head of the state, like the President at the centre. At the state level,
the executive authority is vested in the Governor. Article 154 vests all the executive
powers with the Governor. Article 200 and 201 of the constitution empower the
Governor to withhold his assent to a bill passed by the concerned state legislature.
Sometimes the Governor reserves the bill for the President’s consent. This again
shows the Central’s dominating power over the state administration.

In B. P.Singhal v. Union of India 31, it was held that power under Article 156(1) cannot
be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner and only in rare and
exceptional circumstances for valid and compelling reasons.” Court can call upon the
Union Government to disclose, the material upon which the President had taken the
decision to withdraw the pleasure if prima facie the removal was arbitrary, mala fide,
capricious or whimsical.

 The Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General: The Comptroller and Auditor
General is appointed by the President. He keeps a careful vigilance over the finances
not only of the centre but also of the states. He controls the issue of public money. As
an auditor, he audits the accounts of both central and state government and reports to
Government of India annually. Here also, the states have no voice.
31
(2010)6SCC331

19
  Appointment of the High Court Judges: In India, there is a single integrated
judicial system. Under this judiciary hierarchy, the President appoints the judges of
the State High Courts. He can transfer the judges from one High Court to another. The
President will not consult the state authorities in this matter. Only, Parliament has the
power to remove the

Supreme Court and High Court Judges through the process of impeachment. The state
legislatures have no voice in this field.

In Union of India (UOI) v. .SankalchandHimatlalSheth and Anr.32, it was held that

Consent of Judge concerned has to be taken, not so much as a constitutional necessity
but as a matter of courtesy in view of high position that is held by him."

In Supreme court advocates on record association v. Union of India 33, it was held that
CJI had to keep vigilant watch in protecting integrity and guarding independence of
judiciary and in such capacity CJI evaluates merit of candidate with regard to
professional attainments, legal ability and offer opinion - there are innumerable
impelling factors which motivate, mobilise and import momentum to concept that
opinion of CJI given in process of consultation entitled to have right of primacy.

In Re: Appointment and Transfer of Judges34, Supreme Court arrived at conclusion

that 'consultation with CJI' in Article 217 (1) and 221 (1) requires consultation with
plurality of Judges in formation of opinion of CJI and sole individual opinion of CJI
does not constitute consultation - transfer of Judges is judicially reviewable only to
extent that recommendation that has been made by CJI not been made in consultation
with four senior most Judges of Supreme Court or that views of Chief Justices of
relevant High Courts not obtained. CJI is obliged to comply with norms and
requirement of consultation process in making his recommendations to Government
of India - recommendations made without complying with norms are not binding
upon Government.

 Supervisory Control of the Union over States: Article 355 of the constitution vests
in the Union a very important poer i.e. power to exercise ssupervisory control over the

32
(1977) 4 SCC 193
33
(2016) 5 SCC 1
34
AIR 1999 SC 1

20
 States inthe maintenance of public order. Under this article, Central intervention is
called for when there is internal disturbance in a State or a failure of Constitutional
machinery. The question arises about when does a situation of law and order end and
a situation of internal disturbances begin.

 Settlement of Disputes: Article 262 of the constitution empowers the Parliament to

provide for the adjudication of any dispute or complaint with respect to the use,
distribution or control of the waters of any inter-state river or river valley and to bar
the jurisdiction of all courts, including the Supreme Court, in respect of such dispute
or complaint.

Financial Relations
The distribution of financial resources is especially critical in determining the nature of the
State’s relationship with the Centre. Both the Union and the State have been provided with
independent sources of revenue by the Constitution. The Parliament can levy taxes on the
subjects included in the Union List. The States can levy taxes on the subjects in the State List.
By and large taxes that have an inter-state base are levied by the Centre and those with a local
base by the State. The Union List consists of items of taxation which fall under the following
categories:
(i) Taxes levied by the Union but collected and appropriated by the State such as stamp
duties and duties of excise on medicinal and toilet preparations etc.
(ii) Taxes levied and collected by the Union but assigned to the States viz. railways, sea
or air etc.
(iii) Taxes levied and collected by the Central and may be distributed between the Central
and the states if the Parliament by law so provides, such as union excise duties,
excise on toilet preparations etc.
(iv) Taxes levied and collected and retained by the Centre such as customs, surcharge
on income tax etc.
(v) Taxes levied and collected by the Centre and distributed between the union and the
states such as taxes other than agriculture etc.

It is clear that in the financial sphere too the Centre is better equipped. The Centre can
exercise control over the state finances and grants-in-aid both general and special to meet

21
the expenditure on developmental schemes. During financial emergency, the President has
the power to suspend the provisions regarding division of taxes between the Centre and the
State. He can also impose other restrictions on the expenses of the State. State plans are
framed within the priorities of the central plan and they are executed with the approval of the
Planning Commission. Further, the States have to carry out the centre sponsored schemes for
which the Centre gives grants and the conditions under which these are to be made. The
Planning Commission has created an over-centralized planning system. No initiative is left to
the states and the centrally formulated schemes have been inappropriately and
unimaginatively imposed upon them.

 Financial Dependence of the States :The States in India have been depending on the
centre for their finances.Especially, during the time of floods and drought, the states
have to depend onlyupon the center’s financial help.In a Federation, the states should
be financially self-sufficient. They shouldenjoy the maximum autonomy. The Finance
extremely complicated aspects offederal relations. For this purpose, the Indian
Constitution has established aFinance Commission. This Commission allocates and
adjusts the receipts fromcertain sources. No other Federal Constitution has made such
provisions.The Government of India Act 1935 has tried to allocate every possible
source of revenue between the centre and the provinces. But the real drawback of the
Act was the extremely limited revenue resources were given to the provinces.
According to the present existing scheme of distribution, the taxing powers of the
states and the centre have been completely separated. The Indian Constitution has not
been provided the concurrent jurisdiction in the financial field. But it exists in other
federations of the world. Especially it is there among the Non-Congress ruling states.
Till today, the states have been depending only onthe centre for the financial help. But
it is not healthy for the working of a true federation.

 Demand for Greater Autonomy for the States: The founding fathers of the Indian
Constitution were deeply concerned about ensuring the unity and integrity of the
country. They were aware of the forces of disruption and disunity working within the
country. These dangers at the time of independence could be handled only by a strong
government at the Centre. Therefore, the framers of the Constitution assigned a
predominant role to the Centre. At the same time they made provisions for the

22
 establishment of a co-operative federalism. The working of the Indian federation
during the last five decades clearly shows that the relations between the Centre and
the States have not always been cordial. The administrative Reforms Commission and
several other Commissions were appointed by the Government of India from time to
time to regulate Centre State relations. The Union Government appointed Sarkaria
Commission to suggest ways and means to improve Centre-State relations. The
recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission assume importance so as to evolve an
appropriate policy in the areas of legislative, administrative and financial relations. It
has not suggested wholesole structural changes in the fundamental fabric of the
Constitution. It felt that federalism is more a functional arrangement for co-operative
action than a static institutional concept. The Commission strongly recommended the
establishment of permanent Inter-State Council. In addition, it desired that both the
Centre and the States should have the concern for the development of backward
territory or areas. If the economic development of these backward regions are
undertaken in a planned manner, the separatist tendencies will be automatically
controlled. Differences between the Union and the States should be resolved by
mutual consultation. It has taken a favourable view on the demand of the States to
provide more financial resources at their disposal. In order to improve Centre-State
relations in the country, it has suggested economic liberalization and suitable
amendments to the Constitution.

Main factors that explain the Trend of Centralization are:

1. Complex Problems: The problems of the 20th Century are more serious than those
of the 19th Century just as those of the 19th Century were more complex than those of
the 18th Century. They are war, economic depression, the growth of the social
services and the mechanical revolution in transport and industry', the last named so
familiar that its existence and significance are often overlooked. To express the same
things in different words, they were power politics, depression politics, welfare
politics and the internal combustion engine.

2. Expansion of Social Service: - The concept of the welfare state calls upon all
democratic governments including those having the federal pattern to render various
kinds of social services. These are steadily expanding in recent years, and it becomes

23
 necessary to increase the powers of the centre to some extent the cost of social
services has been greatly increased in times of economic depression and this meant
that the general government had to come to the assistance of the regions. But, the
growth of the social services went on quite independent of war andeconomic
depression. Educational and Health Services were developed in times of peace. In
most federations these matters were under the control of the regions, but in all, it was
found that the regions required financial assistance from the general government. And
finally the revolution in transport and industry made so much of life inter state instead
of intra-state, that large area of activity came within the ambit of the general
government control, until finally, in the United States, crime itself become a matter
for the Congress. And thus the power of the general government increased.

3. War & Economic Depression- The war of the present century also favoured
centralization. War and Economic depression demand unitary control if their
problems are to be effectively treated, and they impose financial strains which only
the general governments have been able to bear. And all general governments grew
stronger in times of war and economic depression. First of all it seems clear that the
revolution in transport is a permanent & fundamental factor insinuation, and to that
extent the increase of power in the general government is fairly certain to continue,
and so war and economic depression unavoidably produce an increase in the power of
general government. If federations are to face these crises successfully they must
exercise large measure of unitary control. However, the process of centralization
makes Scholar; think that the future of federalism is dark. But this is not the case.
Increase in the power of the centre does not mean that units have become subservient
to the centre. Constitutionally Speaking, their position has not changed to one of
Subordination to the centre. K.C. Wheare points out that if the functions of the are
deliberately degraded by the whim and fancies of interested politician at the centre.
But, whenever there was centralization in countries like the U.SA it was not without
justification in the U.S.A, Switzerland and Australia. Centralization manifested itself
to meet the urgent need of the changing times. Federation is spreading in the world. In
recent years, countries which got independence have adopted a federal system India
can be quoted as an example. The functioning of federal government in the U.SA,
Switzerland, Australia, Canada hold out great hope for federalism in future. In these
countries, perhaps a unitary system would have failed miserably. Federalism is also
24
 the best remedy for curing the ills of the world. In the days to come when states
decide to surrender sovereignty and wish to have a world government, they will have
to choose a federal system, and not a unitary one.

However, in India, federalism is bound to take another decade to evolve and to stabilize. In
the era of coalition polity which lays ahead, political parties are bound to be preoccupied with
tactical issues, and are hardly likely to advocate any radical restructuring. Large number of
scholars have made studies and published on the dynamic nature of Indian federal system,
and besides socio-economic conditions they are also determining the emerging framework of
the centre -state relations.

25
Conclusion
In a federal system of government there is a need for clear cut division of power between the
Union and States. This also requires a written and rigid constitution and an independent
judiciary to decide disputes between the Union and the States. Though the Indian
Constitution has all such features of a federal state, it is indeed difficult to put the Indian
Constitution in the category of true federations.
The framers of the Constitution have incorporated certain non-federal features in it such as
single citizenship, single judiciary, a strong centre, appointment of the Governor by the
President, unequal of representation in the RajyaSabha and so on. All these indicate a tilt
towards strong centre. The states have to work in close co-operation with the centre. The
constitution is federal in form but unitary in spirit. The study of Centre-State relationship in
legislative, administrative and financial spheres also clearly shows that the Centre is stronger
as compared to the states. The Centre has been assigned a dominant role which became
necessary keeping in view the dangers to the unity and integrity of the nation. Therefore,
there are provisions for a co- operative federalism.
The working of the Indian Constitution over the year indicates that relations between the
centre and the States have not remained very co-ordinal. The states have started demanding
more autonomy. Various commissions have been appointed by the Government of India to
review the centre- state relations. The Sarkaria Commission has also examined the problem
and recommended changes in the area of federal, legislative, administrative and financial
relations.

26
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