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European Management Journal (2013) 31, 209– 222

Adam Smith
Business School

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/emj

How can management control system fairness reduce


managersÕ unethical behaviours?
a,* b
Pascal Langevin , Carla Mendoza

a
EMLYON Business School, 23 Avenue Guy de Collongue, 69134 Ecully cedex, France
b
ESCP Europe, 79 Avenue de la République, 75543 Paris Cedex 11, France

KEYWORDS Summary Empirical research has shown that as management control systems (MCS) put
Management control heavy pressure on managers to achieve their objectives, they may induce two types of
systems; unethical behaviour: creation of budgetary slack and data manipulation. Recently, studies
Ethics; have introduced Organisational Justice theory into the area of management accounting
Fairness; research and shown the positive effects of organisational justice on managersÕ attitudes
Justice; and behaviours. However, few studies have systematically analysed how MCS fairness
Slack; reduces unethical behaviours and which characteristics of MCS could increase managersÕ
Data manipulation; perception that they are treated fairly.
Organisational commit- The purpose of the paper is to contribute to this research. It formulates testable
ment; hypotheses on how some specific dimensions of MCS can enhance perceived fairness,
Trust which in turn helps to reduce the creation of slack and data manipulation through
increased Organisational Commitment and Trust in supervisor.
ª 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction organisations in developing and maintaining viable patterns


of behaviour’’ (Otley, 1999, p. 364). Firstly, MCS help man-
Management control systems (MCS) are widely used in com- agers to make the right decisions by aligning their objec-
panies. They include all the mechanisms (strategic planning; tives with the companyÕs global objectives, and by
budgeting; resource allocation; performance measurement, informing them of their performance so that they can take
evaluation and reward; responsibility centre allocation; and corrective action if necessary. Secondly, MCS are used to
transfer pricing) managers use to ensure that the behaviours motivate managers: at the beginning of the year, they
and decisions of their subordinates are consistent with enable managers to negotiate their objectives and the re-
the organizationÕs objectives and strategies (Anthony & sources necessary for their achievement; at the end of the
Govindarajan, 2007; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). More year, managersÕ performance is assessed by comparing their
specifically, ‘‘MCS provide information that is intended to results with the objectives. Organizations often link manag-
be useful to managers in performing their jobs and to assist ersÕ material rewards, such as bonuses, to how well their
unit achieves budgeted performance results (Van der Stede,
2000). The ability to meet budgetary objectives is thus a
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 478 337 987; fax: +33 478 337
critical factor in managersÕ performance evaluation. In addi-
928.
tion, managers whose units achieve their budgeted goals
E-mail address: langevin@em-lyon.com (P. Langevin).

0263-2373/$ - see front matter ª 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2012.12.001
210 P. Langevin, C. Mendoza

may more likely see themselves as ‘‘winners’’ which is a to be fair (Little, Magner, & Welker, 2002; Staley & Magner,
source of psychological rewards such as self-esteem 2007; Wentzel, 2004).
(Merchant & Manzoni, 1989). Therefore, our purpose is to combine the results pro-
However, instead of motivating managers and encourag- duced by research in both management accounting and
ing them to contribute to the achievement of company organisational justice in order to build a general framework
objectives, MCS may also induce unethical behaviours. In (Figure 1) that identifies: (1) which MCSÕ characteristics in-
particular, creation of budgetary slack (e.g., Dunk, 1993; crease their perceived fairness, and (2) how MCS perceived
Merchant, 1985; Onsi, 1973; Schiff & Lewin, 1970; Young, justice1 reduces managersÕ propensity to create slack and
1985), and data manipulation (Bitner & Dolan, 1998; DeFond manipulate data.
& Park, 1997; Merchant, 1989; Merchant, 1990; Merchant & The contribution of such an endeavour is to help academ-
Rockness, 1994; Umapathy, 1987) are two unethical behav- ics, as well as practitioners, better understand how to de-
iours largely observed in organisations. sign and implement effective MCS.
Slack is generally defined as ‘‘resources and effort to- The paper is organised as follows. In ‘‘Literature re-
wards activities that cannot be justified easily in terms of view’’, we examine the literature to clarify what is known
their immediate contribution to organisational objectives’’ to date concerning the relationships between MCS
(March, 1988, p. 4). A common type of slack occurs when components, MCS perceived justice and managersÕ propen-
managers ‘‘negotiate highly achievable targets, that is, tar- sity to create budgetary slack or manipulate data. In
gets that are deliberately lower than their best-guess fore- ‘‘Designing fair MCS to reduce unethical behaviours: identi-
cast about the future’’ (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007, p. fying key variables’’, we build a set of propositions concern-
183). When created during the management control pro- ing: (1) the most important MCS characteristics that are
cess, slack is commonly called budgetary slack (Lukka, likely to increase managersÕ perceived MCS justice and (2)
1988; Onsi, 1973; Schiff & Lewin, 1970). MCS provide man- how justice operates, that is to say, the reasons why MCS
agers with opportunities for understating revenues and/or that are perceived as fair may reduce managersÕ propensity
overstating costs. Such misrepresentation of managersÕ true to create slack or manipulate data. Finally, in ‘‘Conclusions
performance capabilities will frequently be to their advan- and future directions’’, we conclude with an exploration of
tage since it provides more readily achievable performance managerial implications and suggestions for future
targets and increases their chances to obtain monetary research.
(e.g., bonuses) and non-monetary (e.g., favourable evalua-
tions, praise) rewards (Merchant, 1985; Merchant & Van der Literature review
Stede, 2007).
The second type of unethical behaviour that researchers The unethical behaviours of budgetary slack
have examined is data manipulation. Management control
creation and data manipulation
systems include performance measurement mechanisms,
which organisations use, during the year, to verify that re-
Since the seminal work of Argyris (1952), research has
sults are in line with objectives and, at year-end, to evalu-
shown that MCS, rather than motivating managers to act
ate managersÕ performance. During these performance
in the interests of their company, may induce them to adopt
measurement steps, managers can try to look good by
unethical behaviours. According to Jones (1991), an ethical
manipulating the performance indicators (Merchant & Van
decision is defined as ‘‘a decision that is both legal and
der Stede, 2007, p. 185). Data manipulation comes in two
acceptable to the larger community. Conversely, an uneth-
basic forms: falsification and data management. Falsifica-
ical decision is either illegal or morally inacceptable to the
tion involves reporting erroneous data, whereas data man-
larger community’’ (Jones, 1991, p. 367). This definition has
agement, also labelled earnings management, can be
been used in studies looking at ethical issues in the context
defined as ‘‘any action on the part of the management
of MCS (e.g., Barsky, 2008; Stevens, 2002).
which affects reported income and which provides no true
This paper focuses on two types of unethical behaviours:
economic advantage to the organisation and may, in fact,
budgetary slack creation and data manipulation.
in the long-term, be detrimental’’ (Merchant & Rockness,
There is evidence that budgetary slack exists in many
1994, p. 79).
organisations (Libby & Lindsay, 2010; Lowe & Shaw, 1968;
Management accounting research provides considerable
Onsi, 1973; Schiff & Lewin, 1970).
evidence that these behaviours exist in organisations (Libby
Similarly, empirical studies have shown that data man-
& Lindsay, 2010; Merchant, 1985; Merchant, 1990; Onsi,
agement is commonplace in organisations (Bitner & Dolan,
1973). This is a problem because these behaviours distort
1998; Libby & Lindsay, 2010; Umapathy, 1987).
the planning and performance measurement processes,
Budgetary slack creation and data manipulation cause
motivate decisions that are contrary to the organizationÕs
two types of problems. Firstly, they have dysfunctional con-
interest, and generate useless costs in the forms of unwar-
sequences on the organisation. Slack generates a waste of
ranted rewards. An important issue, yet not much addressed
resources. Although slack may give managers protection
in the literature, is how to design MCS that avoid or, at least,
from unforeseen negative economic changes, if the eco-
limit managersÕ propensity to adopt such behaviours. How-
nomic environment eventually turns out favourable, the ex-
ever, over the past decade, a few management control
cess resources will still have been used. As for data
researchers have started to use the insights provided by re-
manipulation, it causes bias in the information system.
search on organisational justice (Cohen-Charash & Spector,
2001; Colquitt, Conlon, & Wesson, 2001) to show that these 1
Following social scientists, we use justice and fairness terms
unethical behaviours can be reduced when MCS are perceived interchangeably (Cropanzano & Stein, 2009, p. 194).
How can management control system fairness reduce managersÕ unethical behaviours 211

Budgetary
slack
creation
Characteristics of the
Management control Perceived
System Justice

Data
manipulation

Figure 1 General framework.

Consequently, performance indicators may not be reliable. The following sections examine the concept of perceived
For instance, they may not detect certain problems and this organisational justice and its effects on attitudes and
will delay corrective actions and may result in a loss of com- behaviours.
pany competitiveness in the medium or long term.
Secondly, budgetary slack as well as data manipulation Organisational justice: presentation
represent unethical behaviours and, as such, raise integrity,
objectivity and honesty issues. When managers create bud- Since French coined the term ‘‘Organisational Justice’’ in
getary slack, they present a distorted picture of business French (1964), organisational justice has become one of
possibilities to their superiors by failing to disclose all the the most popular areas in organisational behaviour
information they have. In doing so, they increase the likeli- (Colquitt, Greenberg, & Scott, 2005). It is concerned with
hood of meeting their objectives and of earning non- peopleÕs fairness perceptions in their employment relation-
deserved performance-dependent rewards (Dunk, 1993; ship. The social science approach of organisational justice is
Merchant, 1985; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2000; Onsi, based on peopleÕs perceptions, such that an act is just be-
1973). By lying on the level of performance they say they cause someone perceives it to be just (Fortin, 2008). A com-
can achieve, managers deceive the organisation and in- mon definition of fairness is ‘‘the extent to which norms of
fringe the values of integrity and objectivity. propriety or entitlement are fulfilled’’ (Lind & Tyler, 1988,
Similarly, many forms of data manipulation can be p. 3). Research on organisational justice highlights the key
viewed as unethical. Those engaging in data manipulation role it plays in encouraging positive attitudes and behav-
can obtain personal advantages through their misrepresen- iours towards the organisation.
tations, such as higher bonuses and undeserved promotions, Organisational justice encompasses three dimensions: dis-
at the expense of the others (Merchant & Van der Stede, tributive, procedural and interactional justice. Distributive
2007). Data manipulation also raises objectivity, honesty justice stipulates that managers are concerned with the fair-
and integrity issues. ness of resource distribution, such as pay, rewards, promo-
Research has demonstrated that managersÕ propensity to tions, etc. (Adams, 1963; Deutsch, 1975; Homans, 1961;
adopt such behaviours is related to the level of perceived Leventhal, 1980). The dominant approach for analysing issues
pressure to meet annual objectives. For instance, Onsi of distributive justice is AdamsÕs equity theory. According to
(1973) found a positive relationship between managersÕ this theory, people determine whether they have been trea-
needs to create budgetary slack and an authoritarian top ted fairly at work by examining their own payoff ratio of out-
management budgetary control system that places heavy comes (e.g., size of a raise) to inputs (e.g., level of
emphasis on achieving budget targets. Merchant (1985) con- performance) and comparing that ratio with the correspond-
firmed that managersÕ ‘‘propensities to create budgetary ing outcome input ratio obtained by others such as their co-
slack do appear to increase if a tight budget requires the workers (Adams, 1963; Adams, 1965). Procedural fairness is
managers to make frequent tactical responses so as not to defined as ‘‘an individualÕs perception of the fairness of pro-
incur budget overruns’’ (Merchant, 1985, p. 207). High pres- cedural components of the social system that regulate the
sure to meet objectives seems also to encourage data allocation process. The concept focuses on the individualÕs
manipulation. Several studies have documented how control cognitive map of events that precede the distribution of re-
systems that emphasise the achievement of objectives wards, and the evaluation of those events’’ (Leventhal,
motivate decisions that maximise short-run profit at the ex- 1980, p. 35). Norms that employees apply in assessing proce-
pense of long-term effectiveness and competitive strength dural fairness require, for example, that formal organisa-
(Hayes & Abernathy, 1980; Laverty, 1996; Merchant, 1990; tional procedures provide them with an opportunity to
Merchant & Bruns, 1986). voice their opinions (Thibaut & Walker, 1975) and to appeal
A number of the early behavioural management account- against unfavourable decisions (Greenberg, 1986), or that
ing studies started to identify how MCS should be designed procedures are applied consistently (Barrett-Howard & Tyler,
and implemented so as to reduce unethical behaviours 1986). Leventhal (1980) identified six criteria of perceived
(Brownell & McInnes, 1986; Dunk, 1993; Merchant, 1985; procedural fairness. Typically, procedures are perceived to
Merchant, 1990). More recently, some researchers have be fair when they are consistent across people and over time,
started to highlight how perceived fairness may be a key free of bias, accurate (relying on good information), contain
mediating variable. MCS perceived as fair may induce posi- mechanisms for correcting wrong decisions, adhere to preva-
tive attitudes and therefore decrease managersÕ propensity lent conceptions of morality and are representative (i.e. take
to engage in slack creation or data manipulation. into account opinions of all groups affected). The third
212 P. Langevin, C. Mendoza

dimension is interactional justice. Bies and Moag (1986) ex- (2005), ‘‘The best approach may be to examine specific
plained that interpersonal treatment is conceptually distinct dimensions and overall justice in combination’’ (p. 594).
from the structuring of procedures, and introduced the con-
cept of interactional justice. ‘‘By interactional justice we The effects of unfairness on behaviours
mean that people are sensitive to the quality of interpersonal
treatment they receive during the enactment of organisa- Empirical research has repeatedly demonstrated that em-
tional procedures’’ (Bies & Moag, 1986, p. 44). Interactional ployee perceptions of fairness have a vital impact on their
justice has been further broken down into informational jus- attitudes and behaviours. Perceived injustice can have
tice and interpersonal justice (Greenberg, 1993). Informa- many negative effects. It can provoke retaliation, lower
tional justice focuses on the justifications truthfully performance, and decrease morale (Cohen-Charash &
provided to people. Interpersonal justice deals with treating Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Viswesvaran & Ones,
people with respect and dignity. 2002). Indeed, one of the reasons managers may be tempted
Research offers two perspectives to explain why people to create slack or manipulate data is precisely because they
value procedural (and, later, interactional) justice. Accord- fear unfair treatment. Both the instrumental and relational
ing to the instrumental view of justice, people do not attend models of justice help understand why perceived unfairness
exclusively to their short-term outcomes. They are in the MCS might trigger unethical behaviour. The instru-
concerned with procedural fairness because it increases mental model indicates that if managers perceive the MCS
the predictability and favourability of their long-term out- as unfair, they do not expect to receive valued material out-
comes (Greenberg, 1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988). The instru- comes. Therefore, they might engage in budgetary slack
mental model focuses on material outcomes (e.g., pay, creation and data manipulation as alternative ways to en-
budgetary resource distributions). According to the rela- sure these outcomes. The relational/group engagement
tional model, or group-value model, individuals care about model indicates that an unfair MCS will convey to managers
procedural fairness because receiving fair treatment indi- that they are not valued by the organisation, which would
cates status and worth within the group. The relational undermine their sense of identity with the organisation,
model focuses on psychological outcomes (e.g., self-esteem and thereby reduce their cooperative behaviours, with bud-
stemming from high status in and respect from the organisa- getary slack creation and data manipulation being uncoop-
tion) (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & Lind, erative behaviours. Creating budgetary slack and/or
1992). manipulating data help managers offset perceived unfair-
Research has also shown that interactions exist between ness and increase their performance and the chances to ob-
the three forms of organisational justice (Ambrose & Ar- tain expected rewards and/or group recognition, possibly at
naud, 2005; Bies, 2005; Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Cro- the detriment of the organizationÕs interests.
panzano & Ambrose, 2001). For instance, research Therefore, the design and implementation of fair MCS
indicates that even when managers are unsatisfied with should contribute to reduce unethical behaviours and it is
their objectives, they may have less negative reactions if important to examine which and how MCS determinants
they believe that the procedures used to set these objec- can be perceived as fair and can contribute to reduce uneth-
tives are fair (Magner, Welker, & Campbell, 1995). Though ical behaviours.
this interaction can be described in different ways, the
key point is that the ill effect of injustice can be partially
mitigated if at least one component of justice is maintained Designing fair MCS to reduce unethical
(Cropanzano, Bowen, & Gilliland, 2007). behaviours: identifying key variables
One important debate in the justice literature concerns
the construct discrimination question (Colquitt et al., Exploring the effects of fair MCS on unethical
2001). On the one hand, some studies have revealed extre- behaviours
mely high correlations between the different justice dimen-
sions, suggesting that they might not be distinct in the Although it seems critical to better understand how MCS can
minds of many people. On the other hand, studies that have help reduce unethical behaviours through enhanced per-
examined the justice constructs separately have shown that ceived fairness, very few studies have systematically inves-
they have different correlates (Cohen-Charash & Spector, tigated this issue. Little et al. (2002) conducted a first
2001; Colquitt et al., 2001). survey of 149 managers having budget responsibilities and
Some researchers have questioned the benefits of focus- employed in 96 different companies. Their results suggest
ing exclusively on specific types of justice, suggesting a shift that managersÕ propensity to create budgetary slack is re-
toward examining overall justice judgments (Ambrose & duced when they view both the formal budgetary proce-
Arnaud, 2005; Cropanzano & Ambrose, 2001; Lind, 2001). dures and the supervisory enactment of these procedures
For example, Greenberg (2001) argued that when individu- as fair. Two years later, Wentzel (2004) did a survey at a
als form impressions of justice, they are making a holistic large urban hospital that was in the midst of a five-year
judgment. Lind (2001) considered that the different types restructuring program involving a reduction of resources.
of justice individuals experience very likely combine to form Respondents were area managers holding budgeting respon-
their overall fairness judgment. Törnblom and Vermunt sibilities. Her results suggest that budgetary slack in effi-
(1999) contended that individuals consider fairness as a ciency targets is lower when managers perceive both the
Gestalt, that the components of fairness are meaningful budgeting procedures and resource allocations to be fair.
only in relation to the overall fairness of the situation. Staley and Magner (2007) used questionnaire data from
The debate is not over. According to Colquitt et al. 1358 U.S. federal government unit heads to show that
How can management control system fairness reduce managersÕ unethical behaviours 213

procedural and interactional budgetary fairness reduce MCS, organisational commitment and the reduction of
managersÕ propensity to create budgetary slack by enhanc- unethical behaviours’’) and trust (‘‘MCS justice, trust and
ing their trust in their immediate supervisor. the reduction of unethical behaviours’’).
To our knowledge, no study has tried to identify how to
reduce the second unethical behaviour, that is to say data
manipulation. However, the results of the aforementioned Determinants of MCS that enhance perceived
studies strongly suggest that perceived MCS justice signifi- Justice
cantly affects managersÕ intended behaviours and in partic-
ular can reduce their propensity to manipulate data. MCS undoubtedly have a major impact on managersÕ percep-
Further research is thus needed to improve our knowl- tion of justice (or injustice). Firstly, MCS are at the core of
edge of how fair MCS can reduce unethical behaviours. More distributive justice issues since they affect the material out-
specifically, two aspects need to be more deeply explored. comes that managers receive. This is so because MCS are
Firstly, we need to identify more precisely which dimen- used to determine managersÕ objectives and resource allo-
sions of MCS are best able to increase their perceived cations, and this, in turn, affects managersÕ opportunities
justice. Research has started to highlight a few characteris- to obtain rewards. Secondly, MCS also contain procedural
tics that have been shown to affect perceived fairness pos- justice aspects since they rely on procedures that define
itively: participation in target-setting (Lau & Tan, 2005; Lau how objectives are set, performance measured, and year-
& Tan, 2006; Libby, 1999; Lindquist, 1995; Magner et al., end rewards granted. Managers certainly pay attention to
1995), level of formality and quality of feedback (Hartmann the fairness of those procedures. Lastly, MCS can affect
& Slapničar, 2009) and use of multiple non-financial mea- interactional justice. Managers interact with their superiors
sures (Burney, Henle, & Widener, 2009; Lau & Moser, when negotiating their budget targets, analyzing intermedi-
2008; Lau & Sholihin, 2005). However, so far, research has ate results, assessing year-end performance and discussing
produced fragmented results. Studies have explored only their rewards with their superiors and they may be sensitive
one component of the MCS at a time. In addition, when to how they are treated during these interactions.
researchers focus on participation in target setting for in- On combining both organisational justice literature and
stance, they only consider one stage of the management management accounting literature, we have identified four
control process: the establishment of objectives. Similarly, characteristics of the MCS that seem to be critical. The first
when they consider the use of non-financial measures to one is the opportunity given to managers to participate in
evaluate managersÕ performance, researchers are again the setting of their objectives; the second is the application
focusing on one specific stage of the management control of the controllability principle when defining managersÕ
process, that is to say year-end performance evaluation. objectives or evaluating their performance; the third is
Nevertheless, MCS take place throughout the year. Conse- quality of feedback; and the fourth is the use of multiple
quently, it is important to find out the key MCS characteris- performance measures. These characteristics are affected
tics that foster perceived fairness by considering the whole both by the design of the MCS as well as by how supervisors
process starting from objective setting, going through implement them. All of them represent key dimensions of
results analysis during the year and ending up with perfor- MCS: they characterise how objectives are set, results are
mance evaluation when results are issued. There has been measured and performance is evaluated. In addition, re-
no undertaking so far to establish a model bringing together search has recently started to explore the positive effects
key MCS characteristics, which increase the perception of of each of these features on perceived justice.
fairness for the managers involved.
Secondly, the process through which MCS fairness oper- Participation in target-setting
ates deserves further investigation: we need to understand The MCS literature traditionally defines participation as a
how MCS that are perceived to be fair reduce managersÕ pro- managerÕs ability to exert some influence in the target-
pensity to create budgetary slack and manipulate data. Sta- setting process. Influence suggests that employees are
ley and MagnerÕs study (Staley & Magner, 2007) suggests that afforded a degree of control over the outcomes of a deci-
the mechanism through which MCS justice operates is trust in sion-making process (Brownell, 1982). However, the justice
oneÕs supervisor: when managers consider that the MCS is literature adopts a broader concept since it suggests that
fair, they will develop trust in their supervisors and, there- positive effects of participation on perceived fairness just
fore, will be less inclined to build budgetary slack. Trust is require that the manager believes his/her views have been
probably not the only attitude involved. Indeed, organisa- given consideration, not that s/he actually influences the
tional justice literature has shown that fairness encourages objectives set. This approach is thus less restrictive than
a whole range of positive attitudes towards the company, the usual definition used in the management control
the job, peers and supervisors. Among those attitudes literature.
encouraged by organisational justice, we need to identify Based on previous research, we contend that participa-
which ones help to reduce unethical behaviours. tion is significantly related to perceived procedural justice
Adopting this two-step approach, we now combine re- and also affects perceived distributive justice.
sults from both MCS and organisational justice literatures Firstly, participation is a critical component of proce-
to establish a number of propositions regarding how some dural justice (Folger & Greenberg, 1985; Greenberg &
specific dimensions of MCS can enhance perception of fair- Folger, 1983). It is the expression of ‘‘voice’’ in a
ness (‘‘Determinants of MCS that enhance perceived Jus- management control context. Budgetary participation is
tice’’) and how fair MCS reduce budgetary slack and data likely to increase procedural justice as it contributes to
manipulation through organisational commitment (‘‘Fair Leventhal et al. Õs (1980) rules of accuracy, correctability,
214 P. Langevin, C. Mendoza

representativeness and ethicality. (1) It serves as a means of only be assessed based on what they can control (Atkinson
communication between subordinates and their superiors, et al., 1997; Choudhury, 1986; McNally, 1980).
enabling subordinates to exchange and seek information The controllability principle can be applied both when
from their superiors. This information-sharing role of partic- setting managersÕ objectives and when evaluating their per-
ipation may improve accuracy of the data used in the deci- formance. At the target-setting stage, it involves selecting
sion-making process. (2) Participation enables subordinates performance measures that include only items managers
to express their grievances and to correct any inappropriate can control or on which they may exert some influence. At
prior beliefs held by their superiors: this is consistent with the evaluation phase, it consists in removing the effects
the correctability rule. (3) It enables subordinates to ex- of uncontrollables from the performance measured. Empir-
press their concerns and values, which favours representa- ical studies into the application of the controllability princi-
tiveness. (4) Participation satisfies the criterion of ple have noted a wide variety of practices and indicate that
ethicality since it is consistent with the moral value that it is not always strictly applied (Bushman, Indjejikian, &
individuals should have the opportunity to engage in setting Smith, 1995; Dent, 1987; Drury & El-Shishini, 2005; Giraud,
goals. Langevin, & Mendoza, 2008; Merchant, 1989; Moon &
According to the relational model of organisational jus- Fitzgerald, 1996; Otley, 1990; Ugras, 1994; Vancil, 1979).
tice, voice is important in and of itself, regardless of Strictly applying the controllability principle appears to be
whether it actually influences the outcome (Lind & Tyler, difficult, because no profit centre manager ever has
1988; Tyler, 1987; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996). This mod- complete control over all the items included in the determi-
el assumes that people value being members of groups, such nation of the results for which s/he is to be held account-
as organisations. The opportunity to voice is a way for them able (Vancil, 1979). However, setting objectives based on
to affirm their status with the groupÕs decision-maker and an items managers can at least influence is a means of increas-
affirmed status acknowledges that they are valued members ing perceived fairness.
of the group. More specifically, we contend that the application of the
Empirically, there is considerable support for the posi- controllability principle is significantly related to perceived
tive association between participation and procedural fair- distributive justice and that it also improves perceived pro-
ness (Kanfer, Sawyer, Earley, & Lind, 1987; Lind, cedural justice.
Friedland, & Dickenberger, 1978; Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, If the controllability principle is not applied, and if
1985). uncontrollable events negatively affect managersÕ results,
This discussion leads to our first proposition. there is a risk that the benefits they receive do not compen-
sate for the effort they made. Conversely, implementing
Proposition 1a. Participation in target setting increases the controllability principle will protect managers from
MCS perceived procedural justice. uncertainty and increase their perception of distributive
justice by strengthening the relationship between their ef-
Secondly, participation also increases perceived dis- fort (inputs) and their rewards (outcomes). Indeed, the per-
tributive justice. According to the instrumental model ceived ratio between outcomes to inputs is a key dimension
of organisational justice, people seek involvement in of distributive justice (Adams, 1965).
processes because they are concerned with their own This leads to Proposition 2a:
outcomes (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989). People are
motivated by self-interest and they consider that the
Proposition 2a. The application of the controllability
opportunity to voice opinion will further those interests
principle increases MCS perceived distributive justice.
because they believe that their views will be taken into
consideration (Barry & Shapiro, 2000; Greenberg, 2000). We also argue that applying the controllability principle is
During the management control process, participation consistent with most of Leventhal et al.Õs (Leventhal, 1980)
provides managers with opportunities to influence their rules for procedural fairness. Firstly, by removing uncontrol-
objectives as well as the amount of resources that will be lable factors from managersÕ objectives and evaluation, the
allocated to them. Perceptions of distributive fairness controllability principle increases the conviction that mea-
therefore should increase as opportunities to procure more sured performance will be related to managersÕ efforts and
favourable targets increase. In addition, participation gives not to unforeseeable events, thus following the accuracy
them the opportunity to influence the targets, which will rule. Secondly, implementation of the controllability princi-
then be used as a reference for their assessment. Participa- ple increases the consistency of performance evaluation
tion can thus increase managersÕ chances of obtaining fairer procedures. Indeed, uncontrollable factors impact differ-
rewards since they will depend on targets that they have ently on managers. Some may be negatively affected by fac-
helped to set. Thus: tors they do not control; others may not be, or even benefit
from unforeseen circumstances. Applying the controllability
Proposition 1b. Participation in target setting increases principle introduces more consistency to managersÕ assess-
MCS perceived distributive justice. ment. In addition, uncontrollable factors may affect a given
managerÕs performance differently from one period to an-
other. Thus, their neutralisation also increases the consis-
Application of the controllability principle tency of performance evaluation over time. Thirdly,
A second dimension that has the potential to increase the implementation of the controllability principle requires
perceived fairness of the MCS is the application of the con- identification and neutralisation of uncontrollable factors
trollability principle according to which managers should that might have affected managersÕ results. When conducted
How can management control system fairness reduce managersÕ unethical behaviours 215

through discussion, this gives managers the opportunity to justice. Overall, quality of feedback should increase inter-
appeal if they consider that some uncontrollable elements actional justice.
have not been sufficiently accounted for. Fourthly, applying
the controllability principle contributes to the ethicality Proposition 3b. Quality of feedback increases MCS per-
criteria since it is supposedly more ethical not to penalise ceived interactional justice.
managers when their results are negatively affected by
uncontrollable events (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2000).
Accuracy, consistency, possibility to appeal, and ethicality Use of multiple and non-financial performance
are four of the six Leventhal et al.Õs (Leventhal, 1980) condi- measures
tions for procedural justice. Therefore, we conclude that Traditional management control systems rely on financial
applying the controllability principle should positively influ- measures with objectives often expressed in terms of costs,
ence procedural justice. margins, net income, ROI, etc. (Chenhall & Langfield-Smith,
2007). Research indicates that subordinates perceive per-
formance evaluation as fair when multiple measures are
Proposition 2b. The application of the controllability
adopted instead of solely financial measures (Burney
principle increases MCS perceived procedural justice.
et al., 2009; Lau & Moser, 2008). Performance evaluation
systems that take into account both financial and non-
Quality of feedback financial indicators provide a more complete vision of the
When applied to the management control process, feedback managerÕs performance (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). For exam-
is of two types. The first type of feedback is when superiors ple, they allow intangible assets to be valued and provide a
provide managers with clear, timely and adequate explana- balance between measures of the performance that results
tions of the reasons for their decisions at the target-setting from past effort and leading measures that drive future
stage (Magner, Johnson, Little, Staley, & Welker, 2006, p. performance.
411).The second type of feedback is ‘‘information received Firstly, multiple performance measures strongly affect
by an individual about his or her past behaviour. It provides distributive justice by measuring more accurately the real
some information about correctness, accuracy, or adequacy performance achieved. For example, if an employee exerts
of response.’’ (Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979, p. 351). Specif- efforts in managing a non-financial, yet important, dimen-
ically, performance feedback is information provided to sion of organisational performance (e.g., quality), financial
subordinates as to their performance level, at different indicators may not correctly reflect the actual contribution
moments during the year, including year-end (Steelman, of this employee who may thus be denied a deserved re-
Levy, & Snell, 2004). ward. Correctly measuring inputs appears to be a necessary
A high-quality performance feedback is significantly condition to ensure that the outcome/input ratio is per-
related to perceived procedural justice (Cohen-Charash & ceived as fair.
Spector, 2001; Taylor, Tracy, Renard, Harrison, & Carroll, Burney et al. (2009) found that multiple performance
1995). Consistency and accuracy, two of LeventhalÕs indicators facilitate an employeeÕs comparison of inputs to
(Leventhal, 1980) conditions for fair procedures, are key outcomes and that this comparison is associated with higher
traits of performance feedback quality (Hartmann & perceptions of distributive justice.
Slapničar, 2009; Landy, Barnes, & Murphy, 1978). Research
has shown that accurate feedback is perceived to be Proposition 4a. The use of multiple and non-financial
procedurally fair (Roberson & Stewart, 2006). Hartmann measures increases MCS perceived distributive justice.
and Slapničar (2009) found that higher perceived quality
of feedback results in higher trust, both directly, and Secondly, the use of multiple and non-financial mea-
through higher perceptions of procedural justice. We can sures also contributes to MCS perceived procedural fair-
thus propose the following: ness. They ensure that managersÕ multi-dimensional
efforts are more accurately reflected. Since information
accuracy is a fundamental criterion of procedural justice
Proposition 3a. Quality of feedback increases MCS per-
(Leventhal, 1980), managers may perceive the use of such
ceived procedural justice.
multiple performance measures as procedurally fair. In
Quality of feedback also affects interactional justice. addition, as opposed to financial measures, such as bud-
Providing feedback favours openness and fosters communi- get variances that may have several causes and may thus
cation between managers and their superiors (Colquitt & be difficult to understand (Fisher, 1992), non-financial
Jackson, 2006; Erdogan, 2002). Therefore, it contributes measures are able to reflect each managerÕs personal sit-
to promoting informational justice, which is one of the uation better. They may also be easier to understand
two components of interactional justice. Roberson and since they pertain to operating aspects. For instance,
Stewart (2006) showed that accurate feedback not only is non-financial measures, such as set up time and customer
considered procedurally fair, but also fosters informational satisfaction rates, may be easier to understand than
justice. In addition, superiors who spend time discussing re- aggregate financial measures such as efficiency variances
sults during the year and at year-end with their collabora- (Fisher, 1992). Thanks to this better understanding of ap-
tors may be perceived as being more respectful. Quality praisal criteria, subordinates may be more able to discuss
of feedback may indicate that recipients are valued and re- this data and to submit alternative interpretations of their
spected members of the group. As such, it may increase performance (Lau & Moser, 2008). Thus, such understand-
interpersonal justice, the second dimension of interactional ing of non-financial performance measures can provide
216 P. Langevin, C. Mendoza

managers with a better sense of control over their perfor- & Johnson, 1992; Magner et al., 1995; McFarlin & Sweeney,
mance appraisals; this being an essential criterion of pro- 1992; Tang & Sarfield-Baldwin, 1996). Justice amplifies the
cedural justice (Leventhal, 1980). feeling of belonging to a company and makes the employee
Empirical findings support this view. For example, Burney more sensitive to its interests.
et al. (2009) showed that strategic performance measure- Although there has been some debate regarding which
ment systems based on multiple performance indicators justice dimensions best explain organisational commitment,
provide employees with relevant, and in particular accu- recent literature acknowledges that all three components
rate, information and lead to increased procedural justice. of perceived justice predict organisational commitment
Lau and Moser (2008) indicated that the use of non-financial (Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005; Cropanzano et al., 2007).
measures is associated with improvement in employee Since managers who are committed to their organisation
organisational commitment and job performance, with a tend to identify with it and its goals and wish to maintain
substantial part of these effects being indirect through membership (Mowday et al., 1979, p. 225), it can be as-
the enhancement of employee perceptions of procedural sumed that a manager with a strong organisational commit-
fairness. This leads to proposition 4b. ment will be less inclined to make self-interested decisions
that are harmful to the company. Salancik (1977) showed
Proposition 4b. The use of multiple and non-financial that organisational commitment encourages citizenship
measures increases MCS perceived procedural justice. behaviours, that is to say behaviours that exceed formal
and/or normative expectations. Nouri (1994) found that a
After identifying which dimensions of MCS are best able high level of manager commitment is strongly associated
to increase their perceived fairness, we need to understand with a decreased level of budgetary slack. Nouri and Parker
how MCS that are perceived to be fair reduce managersÕ (1996) similarly found that managers who were highly com-
propensity to adopt unethical behaviours. Organisational mitted did not exploit their high budgetary participation
justice research has repeatedly shown the significant impact privileges to create budgetary slack.
of perceived justice on attitudinal and behavioural out- We may therefore hypothesise that the perceived justice
comes, such as job satisfaction, goal commitment, of MCS, by encouraging organisational commitment, will re-
organisational commitment, job-related tension, trust, duce the propensity of managers to create budgetary slack
organisational citizenship behaviours and performance and manipulate data to their advantage and against the
(Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; interests of their company.
Viswesvaran & Ones, 2002). Among the positive effects of
the perception of justice, two seem especially useful to
Proposition 5a. MCS perceived justice reduces the pro-
explain the relationship between MCS perceived fairness
pensity to create budgetary slack through increased organ-
and the reduction of unethical behaviours: organisational
isational commitment.
commitment and trust in oneÕs supervisor.
Proposition 5b. MCS perceived justice reduces the propen-
Fair MCS, organisational commitment and the sity to manipulate data through increased organisational
reduction of unethical behaviours commitment.
Organisational commitment can be defined as the relative
strength of an individualÕs identification with and involve- MCS justice, trust and the reduction of unethical
ment in a particular organisation. It can be characterised behaviours
by at least three related factors: (1) a strong belief in and
acceptance of the organizationÕs goals and values; (2) a will- Another positive effect of perceived organisational justice
ingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organi- is that it fosters trust in supervisor. ‘‘Trust is a psychological
sation; and (3) a strong desire to maintain membership in state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based
the organisation. (Mowday, Steers, & Porter, 1979, p. 226). on positive expectations of the intentions or the behaviour
According to the group engagement model, which is an of another’’ (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p.
extension of the relational model of justice (Tyler & Blader, 385). Concepts from social exchange theory help to under-
2000), fairness communicates to employees that the group stand why trust in superiors should reduce budgetary slack
values them, and makes them feel good about being part and data manipulation. According to social exchange theory
of the group (Blader & Tyler, 2003, p. 111). Specifically, (Brockner, 2002; Cropanzano, Howes, Grandey, & Toth,
the group engagement model argues that forms of proce- 1997; Cropanzano, Prehar, & Chen, 2002; Cropanzano &
dural and interactional justice originating with supervisors Rupp, 2008; Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000),
and organisations drive identity judgments (e.g., pride in organisations are forums of transactions and individuals
group, felt respect from group, and identification with form perceptions as to the fairness of those transactions.
group). Finally, identity judgments influence engagement. The experience of justice generates an obligation on the
The group engagement model helps to explain why per- part of employees to reciprocate and thus fosters the devel-
ceived MCS justice may lead to increased organisational opment and maintenance of a relationship of social ex-
commitment. change, with the expectation that such a relationship will
Moreover, there is much empirical support indicating a lead to the exchange of benefits between the parties. More-
significant impact of organisational justice on organisational over, when managers trust their supervisors, they have po-
commitment (Alexander & Ruderman, 1987; Folger & Bies, sitive expectations that their supervisors will provide them
1989; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Libby, 1999; Magner, Welker, with valued material and psychological outcomes over the
How can management control system fairness reduce managersÕ unethical behaviours 217

long run and therefore feel less need to create budgetary image of his/her supervisorÕs division performance. There-
slack or manipulate data. Empirically, organisational justice fore, organisational commitment and trust in a supervisor
has been demonstrated to enhance trust in management do not completely exclude all propensities towards unethi-
(Alexander & Ruderman, 1987; Cropanzano et al., 2002; cal behaviour. However, it seems reasonable to posit that
Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Konovsky & Pugh, 1994). Research a highly committed manager who trusts his supervisor will
has shown that all dimensions of justice (distributive, proce- be relatively less inclined to adopt unethical behaviours
dural, and interactional) are correlated with trust (Ambrose for personal advantage, which is the main issue addressed
& Arnaud, 2005; Cropanzano et al., 2007). in this paper.
In addition, Colquitt et al.Õs meta-analysis (Colquitt, In summary, we have examined how four characteristics
Scott, & LePine, 2007) revealed that individuals who are of MCS may influence specific dimensions of perceived fair-
willing to trust others tend to perform more citizenship ness, which, in turn, will influence managersÕ organisational
behaviours and commit less unethical behaviour. A few commitment and trust in their supervisor and will eventually
MCS studies have also demonstrated that trust mediates reduce managersÕ propensities to create budgetary slack or
the relationship between MCS perceived fairness and the to manipulate data. Figure. 2 represents this general
propensity to create budgetary slack. For instance, Maiga framework.
and Jacobs (2007) show that both procedural fairness and
trust in supervisor have a significant impact on budget goal
commitment, which, in turn, negatively influences manag- Conclusion and future directions
ersÕ propensity to create budgetary slack. Similarly, Staley
and Magner (2007) found that MCS interactional fairness Building on management accounting literature and on
and procedural fairness have an indirect and negative effect organisational justice literature, this paper has tried to de-
on the propensity to create budgetary slack by way of velop a framework showing how fair management control
enhancing trust in supervisor. systems can reduce managersÕ unethical behaviours. Per-
One of the reasons that cause managers to create bud- ceived fairness is central to this framework.
getary slack and manipulate data is the fear of being un- The contribution of this theoretical framework is two-
fairly treated by their company, and in particular, by the fold. Firstly, it shows that four features play a key role in
superiors who assess their performance. We can therefore enhancing MCS fairness: participation in target-setting;
hypothesise that when managers trust their superiors, they application of the controllability principle; quality of feed-
are less inclined to develop these behaviours, since ‘‘trust back; and use of multiple performance measures. Although
reflects an expectation or belief that the other party will some of these dimensions have already been examined in
act benevolently’’ (Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, management accounting studies, no attempt has been made
1998, p. 513). This leads to propositions 6a and 6b: to date to link these characteristics and examine their inter-
related effects on managersÕ perception of MCS fairness. In
Proposition 6a. MCS perceived justice reduces the pro- addition, the majority of these studies have focused on one
pensity to create budgetary slack through increased trust in single dimension of organisational justice at a time. In par-
supervisor. ticular, much attention has been devoted to procedural jus-
tice. However, research has shown that the different types
of justice interact to affect managersÕ general perception of
Proposition 6b. MCS perceived justice reduces the propen-
fairness (Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005; Cropanzano & Ambrose,
sity to manipulate data through increased trust in
2001). Our framework is in line with this multidimensional
supervisor.
approach of organisational justice and identifies the key
Thus, we suggest that two attitudinal outcomes help to variables of a MCS best able to increase one or several
understand why MCS justice reduces managersÕ unethical dimensions of MCS perceived justice.
behaviours: organisational commitment and trust in supervi- Secondly, the framework identifies two key conse-
sor. Perceived justice of MCS acts on two levels: firstly, it quences of MCS perceived justice that explain how the lat-
affects the relationship between the employee and his com- ter can help to reduce unethical behaviours: organisational
pany as a whole (organisational commitment); secondly, it commitment and trust in oneÕs supervisor. The purpose of
influences his relationships with his superiors (trust in super- MCS is to motivate managers to achieve their objectives.
visor). Organisational commitment and trust in supervisors However, when too much emphasis is put on goal achieve-
will in turn reduce employeesÕ propensity to adopt unethical ment, managers may be tempted to create budgetary slack
behaviours. and manipulate data. What our framework shows is that
However, this conclusion needs to be nuanced. We can attention paid to MCS fairness will affect managersÕ atti-
also consider that organisational commitment might induce tudes both towards their company as a whole and towards
unethical behaviours on behalf of the general interest of the their supervisors. Being committed to their company and
company. For instance, managers who are highly committed trusting their superiors are two attitudes that reduce man-
to their organisation may be tempted to hide mistakes made agersÕ propensity to adopt unethical behaviours detrimental
by the latter for example, the manufacture and sale of to the organizationÕs interests.
defective products or actions that damage the environment. In terms of managerial implications, our framework pro-
Similarly, excessive trust in oneÕs superior may remove an vides organisations with guidelines on how to improve MCS
individualÕs capacity for judgment and induce unethical perceived fairness and, more particularly, indicates that
behaviour in order to follow his/her bossÕs directives. This there are two aspects to pay attention to: the MCS design
could be, for example, data manipulation to give a good and the way it is implemented. Firstly, organisations must
218 P. Langevin, C. Mendoza

MCS characteristics
Perceived justice
Participation
in Attitudes and Behaviors
Distributive
target-setting
justice
Budgetary
Application of Organisational
slack
the controllability commitment
creation
principle
Procedural
justice
Use of multiple
performance Trust in Data
measures supervisor Manipulation
Interactional
justice
Quality of
feedback

Figure 2 MCSÕs effects on unethical behaviours through perceived justice, organisational commitment, and trust.

design their MCS carefully. For example, the objectives set (Magner et al., 1992), procedural justice (Price and Muller,
for each manager should take into account elements that s/ 1986; Colquitt et al., 2001; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992) and
he can really influence (controllability principle); proce- interactional justice (Bies & Moag, 1986) can be modified
dures should be defined to organise discussions between slightly to be applied to a management control situation.
managers and their supervisors at the target-setting stage; For instance, Hartmann and Slapničar (2009) have adapted
similarly, there should be a formalised feedback throughout McFarlin and SweeneyÕs instrument (McFarlin & Sweeney,
the year and the performance evaluation system should not 1992) to measure perceived procedural justice in determin-
include financial indicators exclusively. ing targets and evaluating performance. Measuring slack
Secondly, managersÕ perception of justice will also de- creation or data manipulation is more difficult, since people
pend on how the MCS is actually implemented. Defining pro- may not want to show or say that they adopt unethical
cedures for discussions between a manager and his behaviours. However, some instruments have been used in
supervisor during the target-setting stage is not enough; prior studies. For instance, Merchant (1990) designed an
the supervisor has to truly play the game and engage in hon- anonymous questionnaire in which managers were asked
est and open communication. Similarly, when partial results how frequently they manipulated performance measures,
are issued during the year, discussions between the manag- such as shifting funds between accounts to avoid budget
ers and their supervisors need to take place in order to ana- overruns or deferring a needed expenditure.
lyse the situation jointly and define corrective action if In terms of research methodology, cross-sectional sur-
necessary. Finally, at year-end evaluation, supervisors veys can of course be used. However, longitudinal studies
should carefully consider how uncontrollable factors might could also be relevant to take into account the possible de-
have affected managersÕ results so as to neutralise them, lays with which perceptions appear and evolve. Experimen-
specifically when they have negatively affected a managerÕs tal studies, although usually difficult to implement in
performance. Keeping a fair MCS alive is not only a question managerial contexts, would also offer the possibility to bet-
of defining rules and procedures: managers must fully ter control for contingencies. Finally, qualitative studies
appreciate the importance of fairness and be willing to in- based on interviews or case studies should not be disre-
volve themselves, knowing that fairness is a key dimension garded as they can help better understand how perceptions
of their role. and attitudes take form.
Although our theoretical framework contributes to bet- Secondly, other dimensions can be explored in order to
ter understand how MCS can limit unethical behaviours, refine the framework. A more systematic analysis of the
additional work remains to be done, which opens new per- antecedents as well as the consequences of MCS fairness
spectives for research. is needed. For example, one can examine the impact on
Firstly, the model needs to be tested. Although some of perceived fairness of other MCS components that have been
the relationships have already been empirically examined, shown, in past research, to influence attitudes and behav-
some others have never been investigated. Measurement iours (e.g., goal clarity, goal achievability, subjectivity).
instruments exist for most variables but some need to be The same can be said regarding the consequences of MCS
adapted to a management control context. For example, fairness: how does it affect other behavioural dimensions
items have been developed to measure participation in bud- (e.g., motivation, job-related tension, citizenship) and
get goals (Milani, 1975; Kenis, 1979), quality of feedback eventually performance?
(Kenis, 1979; Steelman et al., 2004) or the use of non- One should also consider contingent or moderating ef-
financial measures (Lau & Moser, 2008). Recently, Burkert, fects. For example, studies have shown that national cul-
Fischer, and Schäffer (2011) have designed an instrument ture influences the way individuals react to MCS (e.g.,
to measure the application of the controllability principle. Merchant, Van der Stede, Lin, & Yu, 2011) or form their per-
Instruments developed to measure distributive justice ceptions of fairness (Beugré, 2007) or of ethics (Ardichvili
How can management control system fairness reduce managersÕ unethical behaviours 219

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PASCAL LANGEVIN is professor of Manage-
Tang, T. L.-P., & Sarfield-Baldwin, L. (1996). Distributive and
ment Accounting & Control Systems at
procedural justice as related to satisfaction and commitent.
EMLYON business School in France. He also
SAM Advanced Management Journal (07497075), 61, 25–31.
served as the managing director of a small
Taylor, M. S., Tracy, K. B., Renard, M. K., Harrison, J. K., & Carroll,
industrial firm and as the financial director
S. J. (1995). Due process in performance appraisal: A quasi-
of an outplacement company.
experiment in procedural justice. Administrative Science Quar-
His primary research interests are in per-
terly, 40, 495–523.
formance measurement and evaluation sys-
Thibaut, J., & Walker, L. (1975). Procedural justice. A psycholog-
tems and their effects on decision-makersÕ
ical analysis. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
motivation, and performance.
Törnblom, K. Y., & Vermunt, R. (1999). An integrative perspective
on social justice. Distributive and procedural fairness evalua-
tions of positive and negative outcome allocations. Social
Justice Research, 12, 39–64. CARLA MENDOZA is Professor in the Man-
Tyler, T., Degoey, P., & Smith, H. (1996). Understanding why the agement Control Department at ESCP Eur-
justice of group procedures matters: A test of the psychological ope Paris Campus.
dynamics of the group-value model. Journal of Personality & After graduating from HEC, she worked for
Social Psychology, 70, 913–930. Bossard Consultants, a Consultancy firm
Tyler, T. R. (1987). Conditions leading to value-expressive effects in specialized in Strategy and Organization.
judgments of procedural justice. A test of four methods. Journal She holds a Ph.D. from HEC and a DHDR from
of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 333–344. University of Sophia Antipolis.
Tyler, T. R. (1989). The psychology of procedural justice. A test of Her research includes the links between ABC
the group-value model. Journal of Personality and Social and ABM, strategic tableaux de bord and
Psychology, 57, 830–838. balanced scorecards, the implementation of the Controllability
Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2000). Cooperation in groups: Principle and the effects of Management control systems on
procedural justice, social identity, and behavioral engagement. behaviours.
Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
Tyler, T. R., & Lind, E. A. (1992). A relational model of authority in
groups. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology (pp. 115–191). Academic Press, Vol. 25.

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