In Theory

Beyond Instrumentalism: A Relational

Approach to Negotiation
Marc-Charles Ingerson, Kristen Bell DeTienne, and
Katie A. Liljenquist

Instrumentalism, the philosophy that rational people will behave in

ways that promote self-interest, is often the default assumption that
scholars and practitioners rely upon when interpreting and predicting
human behavior in negotiations. Instrumentalism, however, need not
be the only lens through which negotiators and negotiations are
viewed. In this article, we discuss some of the problems associated with
too heavy a reliance on instrumentalism and propose an alternative
relational approach, one in which negotiators see themselves as agents
embedded in a system of relationships, who are motivated to under-
stand and advance the welfare of others. We discuss some of the
characteristics that differentiate negotiators who adopt a relational
versus instrumental approach and invite scholars and practitioners to
consider the implications of viewing negotiations through a more
relational lens.

Key words: negotiation, instrumentalism, relationality, altruism.

Marc-Charles (M-C) Ingerson is an assistant professor of management at San Jose State Univer-
sity in San Jose, CA. His email address is marc-charles.ingerson@sjsu.edu.
Kristen Bell DeTienne is the Alice B. Jones Professor of Organizational Leadership and Strategy
at Brigham Young University in Provo, UT. Her email address is detienne@byu.edu.
Katie A. Liljenquist is an assistant research professor of organizational leadership and strategy at
Brigham Young University in Provo, UT. Her email address is k.liljenquist@byu.edu.

10.1111/nejo.12078
© 2015 President and Fellows of Harvard College Negotiation Journal January 2015 31
Introduction
Scholars in the social sciences have long been interested in negotiation
(see, e.g., Rubin and Brown 1975; Druckman 1977). But, wittingly or not,
many prominent scholars have examined negotiation from a perspective
that implicitly assumes that negotiation behavior is best predicted and
explained by selfish motives (see, e.g., Karrass 1970; Rubin and Brown
1975; Young 1975; Druckman 1977; Strauss 1978; Gulliver 1979; Pruitt 1981;
Raiffa 1982; Haydock 1984; Murray, Rau, and Sherman 1996; Lewicki, Saun-
ders, and Minton 1997; Nelken 2001, 2007; Craver 2005; Thompson 2011;
Hogue, Levashina, and Hang 2013). This view is called “instrumental ratio-
nality” (or instrumentalism) (Fowers 2010).
In fact, instrumentalism has become so pervasive that it is regarded as
a fundamental assumption (Ghoshal 2005). A careful review of the litera-
ture shows that this assumption of instrumentalism has greatly influenced
modern portrayals of human nature, motivation, behavior, and relationships,
particularly in many respected articulations of the nature of the negotiator
and the negotiation process (see, e.g., Karrass 1970; Nierenberg 1973; Rubin
and Brown 1975; Young 1975; Druckman 1977; Strauss 1978; Gulliver 1979;
Pruitt 1981; Raiffa 1982; Haydock 1984; Cialdini 1993; Murray, Rau, and
Sherman 1996; Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton 1997; Nelken 2001, 2007;
Craver 2005; Thompson 2011). This instrumental lens has deep roots in
other disciplines with utilitarian outlooks, such as economics and decision
analysis.
That negotiators will have largely instrumental motivations is assumed
not only by many negotiation scholars, but is often accepted as conven-
tional wisdom by negotiators themselves. Scholars and actual negotiators
alike take it as a given that most negotiations will include some form of the
question,“What’s in it for me (or us)?” While this accurately captures at least
one (legitimate) reason why people approach the negotiating table, if this
question is asked of all behavior, it forces a means–end rationality upon
negotiators in which all actions (even benevolent ones) are reduced to
selfish motives (Fowers 2010).
Despite the prevalence of instrumentalism, some theorists have made
important efforts to formulate alternative conceptions of human nature,
motivation, behavior, and relationships that do not rely on the presumption
of instrumentalism (see, e.g., Hopman 1995; Gantt 1996, 2005; Batson 1998;
Ghoshal 2005; Grant 2007; Folger and Salvador 2008; Tenbrunsel and
Smith-Crowe 2008; Cropanzano and Stein 2009; Grant and Parker 2009).
The most common of these alternatives is what may loosely be termed as
altruism — that is, the idea that people are fundamentally constituted to act
out of a desire to contribute to the welfare of others without concern for
benefit or risk to self (Kohn 1990; Batson 1991, 1998). For most negotiation
scholars, however, the presumption of altruism has not been particularly

32 Ingerson, DeTienne, and Liljenquist Beyond Instrumentalism

persuasive because of the way in which instrumentalism and altruism have
been framed and defined, and subsequently, compared and contrasted
(Kohn 1990; Gantt 2005; Reber and Osbeck 2005).
For example, typical articulations of altruism hold that if an act is in
any way tainted by the possibility of self-interested rationales, then the act
can only be understood as selfishly instrumental in nature because only acts
that are entirely devoid of self-interest can be deemed genuinely altruistic
(Kohn 1990). When scholars and practitioners assume a pervasive instru-
mental motivation in a negotiation simply because it is possible, they make
a logical mistake — the fallacy of accident.1 In other words, when individu-
als assume that the possibility of selfishness infers the actuality of it, they
in essence eliminate the possibility of genuinely altruistic acts (Kohn 1990;
Gantt 2005; Reber and Osbeck 2005). We contend that it is not fair, or even
wise, to dismiss all other-oriented motivation and action simply because
there may be an element of self-interest in the decision-making process.
We would like to note that this article is not another attempt to take a
side in the debate between instrumentalism and altruism. Nor are we
dismissing all instrumental viewpoints. The underlying desire to satisfy a
need or interest is what brings people to the negotiation table, so some
degree of instrumentalism is unavoidably intrinsic to the event. Further-
more, instrumentalism, embodied in the strategic actions a negotiator takes
to obtain his or her desired results, effectively explains a great deal of
negotiation behavior. A dominant reliance on instrumentalism, however,
becomes problematic if we assume that it offers a complete understanding
of negotiation behavior or if we take a purely instrumental view and
automatically assume it will always produce the best results in a negotia-
tion. Thus, we present an alternative approach, what we call “relational
negotiation,” and we discuss the implications of adopting this approach in
which people are cast as inherently relational beings.

The Default Assumption of Instrumentalism

The default assumption that instrumentalism is fundamental to human
nature, motivation, behavior, and relationships has a deep hold in the social
sciences. Alfie Kohn’s (1990: 189) seminal statement on motivation in the
social sciences from nearly a quarter century ago still rings true today:
The number of drives attributed to the human may have grown
over the years, but the nature of these drives never seems to
change: it is always the satisfaction of one’s own needs that is
supposed to motivate the individual. This is taken on faith.

Let us then consider how negotiation experts and behavioral scholars

often unwittingly assume a position of instrumentalism in human motivation.
A primary explanation for why contemporary negotiation theory
defaults to instrumentalism is that such theories frame relationships in an

Negotiation Journal January 2015 33

ontologically individualistic way (Kohn 1990).2 “Ontology” is the philo-
sophical study of the nature of being, and ontological individualism refers
to the perspective that the individual is what is most real or most important
in any analysis of human nature. The individual’s wishes are thus expected
to take precedence over the wishes of others, and the individual values
independence and self-reliance over all else in making decisions (Slife and
Wiggins 2009). So long as relationships do not interfere with individual
goals, relationships can be seen as important. Brent Slife and Brady Wiggins
wrote that “although these theorists clearly take relationships seriously,
when push comes to shove their individualism ultimately places the indi-
vidual above or at least before” the relationship (2009: 18).
Accordingly, if people are viewed in an ontologically individualistic
manner, then their behavior is also assumed to be instrumentally motivated
because the self is already driven by unconscious mechanisms (e.g., biases,
schemas, heuristics, traits, and needs) that prioritize the self above every-
thing else (Slife and Williams 1995). Note here that instrumentalism never
has to be explicitly mentioned. Rather, it is simply assumed because once
one adopts the premise that humans are by nature individualistic, then all
behavior is seen as a means to an end in the service of self-assessment,
self-enhancement, and self-preservation (Fowers 2010).
Additionally, if one assumes that individuals will always consider their
self-interest before acting, then the overriding concern for self will out-
weigh altruism (Kohn 1990; Batson 1998). Therefore, according to modern
assumptions, it can be concluded that people are primarily motivated by
ontologically individual and instrumental concerns, and only secondarily
motivated by other-interested reasons.
To understand how instrumentalism implicitly creeps into negotiation
scholarship, we must also consider the two main paradigms that have
dominated the field: the competitive (or distributive) approach and the
cooperative (or integrative) approach (Conceição-Heldt 2006; McAdoo and
Manwaring 2009; Fisher, Ury, and Patton 2011). A negotiator may use either
or both approaches, employing bargaining tactics reflecting either or both
approaches. These paradigms provide parsimonious and comprehensive
approaches to negotiation practice, but they are too often assumed to arise
from instrumental motivations. The instrumentalism inherent in distributive
bargaining is fairly obvious, while integrative approaches are more subtly
undergirded by instrumentalism — integrative approaches are often implied
to be a more enlightened or sustainable means of accomplishing instrumental
ends. Although integrative approaches are more mindful of relationships and
mutually beneficial outcomes,the subtext typically casts those considerations
as savvier ways to achieve one’s personal goals. Thus, instrumentalism
pervades prescriptive advice even for “win–win” negotiations.
Another feature of negotiation scholarship that reinforces instrumen-
talism is the depiction of the individual as a complex self who carries out

34 Ingerson, DeTienne, and Liljenquist Beyond Instrumentalism

social exchange interactions (see, e.g., Emerson 1976; Bottom et al. 2006).
This complexity appears in definitions that describe a person as a self-
contained individual with a social identity driven by materialistic and
mechanistic causes that exist at both the conscious and unconscious levels
(see, e.g., Bandura 1982; Neale and Bazerman 1991; Bandura 2001; Hogue,
Levashina, and Hang 2013). Similarly, instrumental perspectives on negotia-
tion imply that negotiators engage in social exchange only insofar as they
are driven by automatic biologically and physiologically based causes, and
not out of any real or primary concern for the other person.3 Just because
biology and physiology may be necessary conditions for motivation,
however, does not mean that they are automatically sufficient causes on
their own (Slife and Williams 1995).
In addition to conflating necessary with sufficient causation, many
contemporary negotiation scholars also assume instrumentalism in the way
that they dichotomize motivation as being either instrumental or altruistic.
Unfortunately, this popular either/or fallacy gives rise to definitional oppo-
sition and sheds no light on the question of whether instrumentalism
underlies all human relations, including those within negotiations. The
default assumption, then, is that negotiators must be acting out of self-
interested motivations (Fowers 2010).
Moreover, because most examples of self-sacrificing helping behavior
can also be interpreted via instrumentalism, the possibility of altruistic
intention is usually dismissed by a more cynical instrumental explanation
for behavior (Kohn 1990). Consider the following real-life case.4 Joe, an
admired executive and skilled negotiator at a major consulting firm, faced
an ethical dilemma regarding one of his clients, a Fortune 500 company
based overseas. After negotiating a significant deal, the chief executive
officer of the client company found a problematic rider in the agreement
and called Joe and said,“You have me dead to rights on this contract, but I
don’t remember us agreeing to this. There’s nothing we can do about it if
you choose not to change it, but will you please look into this?” When Joe
inquired about the clause, he discovered that a junior employee had stra-
tegically slipped it into the contract during the negotiation process. Joe
called the chief executive officer and offered a postnegotiation concession-
ary revision to the contract, which he was not legally obligated to do.
Given the pervasive assumption of instrumentalism, what do you
suppose was the first question asked of Joe when he discussed this encoun-
ter with a class of M.B.A. students at a top-tier business school? The first
student asked why he made the change to the contract when he did not
have to. When Joe responded simply with “It was the right thing to do,”
students immediately pushed back with “Yeah, but you knew you were
going to do business with them, you knew it would affect your reputation;
you had to know it would affect your future bottom line!” The students’
comments reflect their embrace of instrumentalism as the be-all end-all

Negotiation Journal January 2015 35

guiding force for action. Joe was regarded as naïve at best, and duplicitous
at worst, if he did not confess to an instrumental motivation in behaving
relationally and morally toward the other party in a complex negotiation.

The Costs of an Exclusive Reliance on Instrumentalism

We believe there is an alternative to reducing all behavior in a negotiation
to the instrumental pursuit of self-interest. But before introducing this
perspective, we want to highlight some of the costs associated with too
heavy a reliance upon instrumentalism.
First, the assumption of instrumentalism leads to cynical interpreta-
tions of people’s behavior: per Joe’s experience, those who behave
relationally are viewed as either self-deceived or outright deceptive when
they describe their motivations nonselfishly or in terms of the relationship
(Kohn 1990). Furthermore, some have argued that this view encourages
objectification in the sense that individuals and their relationships can be
understood only as either objects of frustration or objects of gratification
(Kohn 1990). In other words, although negotiation scholars may describe
people as sense-making agents, when they assume ontological individual-
ism and instrumentalism, their scientific explanations all too often reduce
people to stimulus-response machines. This perspective paints a slanted
view of human motivation at a theoretical level, but the practical ramifica-
tions are concerning as well.
When the assumption that people will behave in a self-interested
fashion is sufficiently pervasive, the descriptive nature of the assumption
escalates into a prescriptive nature that exercises regulatory influence on
actual behavior. In a series of experiments, Rebecca Ratner and Dale Miller
(2001) observed that people were hesitant to take social action that was
incongruent with apparent self-interest, primarily because they feared nega-
tive evaluation by others. Their fear was indeed validated — when third-
party observers evaluated individuals who acted on behalf of something for
which they had no vested interest, both surprise and anger were unleashed
upon the non-self-serving target.
This inhibition to act in a nonself-serving fashion relates to another
cost of assumed instrumentalism, which is the self-fulfilling nature of instru-
mentalism. Instrumentalist assumptions give rise to social institutions that
reward and validate self-interest and thereby confirm the messaging that
people are primarily driven by self-interest (Kohn 1990; Schwartz 1997).
Additionally, Dale Miller’s (1999) work on the norm of self-interest helps
explain the powerful grip it has on people’s actions and opinions. He has
argued that when people operate under the strong norm of self-interest,
they are more likely to pursue material self-interest over their passions or
principles because they are reticent to violate the descriptive and prescrip-
tive expectations of others. He wrote, “People act and sound as though
they are strongly motivated by their material self-interest because scientific

36 Ingerson, DeTienne, and Liljenquist Beyond Instrumentalism

theories and collective representations derived from those theories con-
vince them that it is natural and normal” (1999: 1059). Thus, an assumption
of instrumentalism causes negotiators to act in more self-interested ways
because: (1) they fear that deviating from self-interest will provoke suspi-
cion or derogation, (2) they worry that acting altruistically will leave them
vulnerable to exploitation (“How can I possibly compete if I don’t play like
everyone else?”), or (3) they feel entitled to act like their peers and can
rationalize away any guilt associated with pursuit of self-interest (“If every-
one else behaves this way, why not me?”) (Frank, Gilovich, and Regan 1993;
Snyder and Stukas 1998).
Finally, another liability of this view is that it leads to a disproportionate
focus on easily quantified outcomes, usually economic ones. Unfortunately,
this means the harder to measure outcomes of the negotiation — typically
relational in nature — become marginalized and negotiators are more likely
to pursue economic gains at the expense of relational gains (Curhan,
Elfenbein, and Xu 2006).

Another Perspective: Relational Negotiation

In light of the many liabilities associated with a strictly instrumental perspec-
tive, we propose an alternative. Our alternate view is neither altruistic nor
instrumental. We call this view“relational negotiation.”Relational negotiators
see themselves as agents embedded in a system of relationships, who are
motivated to understand and advance the welfare of others. Relational
negotiation is characterized by strong relationality, a communal orientation,
asking and questioning behavior, and a focus on fair outcomes. Relationality
need not take the place of instrumentalism — instrumentalism is real and
illuminates a great deal of behavior — but relationality can coexist with
instrumentalism and protect negotiators from the myopia associated with an
exclusive reliance on instrumentalism. In this section, we provide an expla-
nation of what relational negotiation is and how it differs from instrumental
negotiation (see Table One for a summary of differentiating features). To do
this, we build on concepts from alternative dispute resolution, therapeutic
jurisprudence, and work by contemporary negotiation scholars.
Relational negotiation is characterized by strong relationality. Slife and
Wiggins (2009) defined strong relationality as a view that “the most basic
reality of the world is relationship. Things, events, and places are not first
self-contained entities that later interact and relate to other things,events,and
places. Instead, all things, events, and places are first relationships — already
and always related to one another” (2009: 18). According to this viewpoint,
the best way to see an individual is in context.As such,strong relationality can
serve as a cognitive device that negotiators can use to reframe people as
embedded in relationships (Gelfand et al.2007). This enhances the longevity
of exchange — and encourages negotiators to care as much about reputation
and relationships as they care about material well-being.

Negotiation Journal January 2015 37

 Table One
Differentiating Features of Instrumental versus Relational Approaches to Negotiation
Instrumental Negotiation
Relationality Weak relationality. Relationships matter
38 Ingerson, DeTienne, and Liljenquist
because I never know when I’ll see
someone again.
Orientation/Focus Exchange orientation. Focus is on the self. I
care what I get out of the negotiation.
Behaviors Telling/selling. Ask questions in order to push
Beyond Instrumentalism
own agenda, to solve the problem at hand,
and come to an agreement.
Outcomes More likely to evaluate the final agreement to
make sure I have captured as much of the
value as possible. Concern for self-interest.
Relational Negotiation
Strong relationality. Relationships are an
important part of our human experience.
Communal orientation. Focus is on the other
and the shared experience. I care about the
welfare of the other. Increased perspective
taking.
Listening. Ask questions not just because it will
equip me with information to solve the
problem, but because I want to understand
the interests and constraints of my
counterpart.
More likely to evaluate the final agreement to
ensure equity. Concern for justice.
 In contrast, instrumentalism is characterized by weak relationality.
The premise of weak relationality is that individuals begin in isolation.
Thus, communication and relationship only exist to serve the individual’s
idiosyncratic traits, states, drives, and needs because the isolated individual
is primary and any subsequent relationship between individuals is
secondary.
Influential mediation theorists Robert Bush and Joseph Folger (2004)
have resisted this premise and have heralded strong relationality as a central
tenet of their work. They proposed that conflict should be seen as an
opportunity for the empowerment and mutual recognition of the parties —
the parties must see and understand each other in order to “transform” the
relationship, and only then can they resolve their conflict. This model is
aligned more closely with a relational perspective than an instrumental
one, as the parties are dependent on each other and responsible to each
other to acknowledge each other’s basic humanity and each other’s reality
(Bush and Folger 2004). In this way, the parties can be seen as mutually
dependent “co-creators” of the conflict and of the conflict resolution —
they did not create the conflict as individuals and they cannot solve it
without attending to the needs of the other.
When people recognize that they are an integral part of a broader set
of relationships, they see that “actions are definitely contributive to the
circumstances as a whole, but these actions are not separate from the
circumstances” (Slife and Williams 1995: 123).5 In other words, because
relationships are fundamental to our existence, one is incapable of taking
isolated actions; rather, each individual is embedded in an interdependent
loop of behavior and responses. What this means is that if we bracket the
coprimeval assumptions of ontological individualism and instrumentalism
and instead start with the ontological assumption of strong relationality,
then any relationship, including those within negotiation, becomes less
about satisfying an individual’s amoral self-interest and more about building
and maintaining sustainable and meaningful relationships.
This is not to say that negotiators with an instrumental focus pay no
heed to relationships. We contend, however, that instrumentally minded
negotiators place value on the relationship to the extent that they believe
it will one day come back to serve their interests. In contrast, a relational
negotiator sees relationships as an inherently valuable part of our human
experience — not simply a means to an end.
Another hallmark of relationality is that such negotiators tend to have
more of a communal orientation and less of an exchange orientation. That
is, rather than focusing on what they get out of the negotiation, they value
the shared experience and are mindful of the welfare of the other in the
negotiation. Recent research undertaken by Margaret Clark and her col-
leagues has compared exchange-oriented relationships with communal-
oriented relationships. While social exchange theory and instrumental

Negotiation Journal January 2015 39

motives effectively explain exchange relationships, communal relationships
are difficult to explain from an instrumental standpoint because they
emphasize an other-focus as a worthy end unto itself. They are character-
ized by giving assistance to the other as needed, rather than as an exchange,
with lower expectations for direct reciprocation. Because communal rela-
tionships emphasize concern for the other person’s well-being, relational
negotiators will be better equipped to reap the rewards of such bonds. The
research indicates that a stronger communal orientation leads to positive
outcomes, such as lower perceptions of exploitation, greater relationship
satisfaction, and improved moods following helping behavior (Clark and
Waddell 1985; Clark and Finkel 2005).
We expect that relational negotiators will enjoy several other benefits
from taking on a communal orientation. The heightened focus on the other
(versus the self) should enhance perspective-taking ability, which is known
to foster social bonds, reduce sinister attributions, and increase cooperation
(Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000; Galinsky, Ku, and Wang 2005). Importantly,
within negotiation contexts, perspective takers are more likely to identify
creative, but hidden, solutions (Galinsky et al. 2008). Relational negotiators
should also be more attuned to discerning the emotions of their counter-
part. This critical element of emotional intelligence uniquely predicts coun-
terpart satisfaction, liking, and an increased desire to work together in the
future (Mueller and Curhan 2006).
Effective negotiation requires proficient communication, particularly
the ability to ask the right questions and to listen to discern the needs and
interests of others. While both instrumental and relational negotiators
should recognize the importance of skillful questioning, those with an
instrumental focus view such behavior as a means to extract the informa-
tion required to solve the problem and come to an agreement. In contrast,
relational negotiators asks questions not just to extract the raw materials
from which to craft solutions, but also because they genuinely care about
understanding their counterparts’ interests and constraints.
Finally, we expect that instrumental and relational negotiators will
assess outcomes differently. While instrumental negotiators may be prone
to fixate on easy-to-quantify economic outcomes, relational negotiators
will consider social capital, considering both the economic and relational
value created in the negotiation. Furthermore, when assessing economic
outcomes, instrumental negotiators will be more likely to base their sat-
isfaction on how much of the value they captured. Meanwhile, the rela-
tional negotiator will consider distributive gains against the backdrop of
equity.
Such a concern for equity carries important implications for relational
negotiators’ pursuit of justice. Deborah O’Reilly (2013) found that third
parties in negotiation (who are not the direct object of mistreatment
themselves) attempt to punish a negotiator who is mistreating another

40 Ingerson, DeTienne, and Liljenquist Beyond Instrumentalism

party. While this pursuit of justice can be explained loosely by instrumen-
talism (i.e., a desire to protect the ethics of the system in which one
participates), it may be better understood through a relational lens.
Research by Francesca Gino and Lamar Pierce (2009) is supportive of this;
they found negotiators were willing to incur personal costs to protect those
who were exploited in a social relationship. In an experiment, participants’
wealth was manipulated via winnings from a lottery, after which they had
the opportunity to help or hurt the other party through dishonest actions.
Emotions, namely guilt or envy (depending on whether they were the
advantaged or the disadvantaged party), prompted participants to act dis-
honestly in order to reestablish equity, even when such dishonesty incurred
a personal financial cost. Lest one conclude that the negotiators sought
equity simply to shed unpleasant emotions, Gino and Pierce also observed
helping behaviors when there was inequity between one’s partner and
third parties, this time motivated by empathy (again, even at personal
costs). Thus, financial self-interest (instrumentalism) cannot fully account
for the tendency to help or hurt another. Instead, the participants’ reactions
were better explained by their concern for fairness and for the relationship,
and we expect that this motive would be particularly salient for relational
negotiators.

Implications for Practice, Teaching, and Research

in Negotiation
Viewing negotiation through the lens of relationality creates interesting
opportunities to rethink the practice, teaching, and study of negotiation.
Relationality offers opportunities for practitioners to reframe what
happens during a negotiation. A relational approach can shape negotia-
tors’ a priori expectations, the behavior of both parties, and post hoc
interpretations of the interactions. For example, instead of assuming that a
negotiation counterpart is acting strictly out of self-interest, we can con-
sider the possibility that the person also cares about the well-being of
everybody at the table. Using this lens, a negotiator may be more willing
to accept claims of benevolent (or moral) action at face value. Neverthe-
less, this does not necessarily imply greater vulnerability of relational nego-
tiators as compared with those with an instrumental approach. In fact,
relational negotiators should be well equipped to navigate the wide space
between wary distrust and naïve vulnerability by employing strategies that
build relationships while still protecting themselves against exploitation
(e.g., contingent contracts that align future interests while motivating each
other to act in good faith and a tit-for-tat strategy that starts with trust and
allows for forgiveness).
Relational negotiators are also less likely to subscribe to the belief that
strengthening the relationship automatically requires one to relinquish
one’s share of the value. Research is gradually dismantling the false dilemma

Negotiation Journal January 2015 41

that pits relational outcomes against economic outcomes; studies indicate
that many of the same strategies that produce superior financial outcomes,
such as aggressive anchoring, can simultaneously create greater satisfaction
for one’s counterpart. Similarly, the technique of presenting multiple
equivalent simultaneous offers has been shown to yield better economic
outcomes while at the same time increasing the other party’s perceptions
of the negotiator as flexible and accommodating (Medvec et al. 2005).
Finally, in a compelling investigation of the compatibility of economic and
relational goals, researchers found that the creation of subjective value led
to greater long-term objective gains (although we hope that awareness of
such economic benefits will validate the relational approach instead of
refracting it back to an instrumental lens) (Curhan, Elfenbein, and
Eisenkraft 2010).
This acknowledgement that pursuit of self-interest can happily coexist
with other-interest, could, we hope, encourage negotiators to work harder
and be more creative in crafting mutually beneficial solutions (again, such
an orientation is possible within instrumentalism, but instrumental negotia-
tors may not be as motivated to persist in the search for solutions that
satisfy all parties). Consider the case of the landowner who discovered an
endangered species habitat on a parcel of land that she hoped to develop.
Rather than sell the parcel without disclosing the issue (her prior knowl-
edge of the presence of the species would have been impossible to prove)
or destroying the habitat without informing anyone, she disclosed the
discovery and entered into a complex high-stakes negotiation that resulted
in a land swap with the U.S. government (see Cushman 1996). As illustrated
in this case, a relational negotiator is motivated to find a creative way to
both create value for herself and honor the public good.
In the classroom, most negotiation training includes at its core a focus
on claiming value for the negotiator. Concern for the other is often pre-
sented as a secondary concern. We suggest that teachers introduce the
perspective that there are multiple types of value to be created and claimed
in a negotiation, specifically nonmonetary outcomes. The Subjective Value
Inventory can aid in this effort (see http://www.subjectivevalue.com;
Curhan, Elfenbein, and Xu 2006). It delineates and quantifies four areas of
central concern to negotiators: feelings about instrumental outcomes, feel-
ings about themselves, feelings about the process, and feelings about their
relationships. While the latter three forms of subjective value may already
be salient to the relational negotiator, employing the Subjective Value Inven-
tory can help open instrumentalists to the value and possibilities of non-
instrumental outcomes as well.
Researchers can also apply a relational lens as they explore the under-
lying assumptions made by and the actual approaches taken by negotiators.
Recent work by Phillip Glenn and Ran Kuttner (2013), for example, has
explored interesting ideas about how discourse can be analyzed to reveal

42 Ingerson, DeTienne, and Liljenquist Beyond Instrumentalism

underlying assumptions and to cultivate relational awareness. Experiments
could also explore the role of relational self-construal (cf., Cross, Bacon, and
Morris 2000; Gelfand et al. 2007) on negotiation attitudes and behavior.
How do negotiators primed with an instrumental versus a relational
approach differ in their goals prior to a negotiation, their willingness to act
on altruistic impulses, and their justifications for unethical behavior? How
do these behaviors affect the amount of information sharing that goes on
and the ability of the parties to create integrative agreements? These are
potentially fruitful areas for empirical research (c.f., Agle et al. 2015).

Conclusion
Theories of negotiation motivation have heavily emphasized the role of
self-interest. Given the centrality of relationships in negotiations, we believe
that other-centered motivations deserve more attention from negotiation
scholars. What we refer to as relational negotiation reconceives negotiators
as strictly self-interested agents to negotiators who strongly relate to and
care about others. We hope this alternative set of motivational and behav-
ioral assumptions encourages scholars and practitioners to think in new
ways about negotiation, the underlying motives that guide negotiation
behavior, and the beneficial outcomes that may result.

NOTES
The authors gratefully acknowledge Edwin Gantt, Richard Williams, Gerald Williams, Nancy Waters,
and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful guidance and insightful comments on earlier drafts
of this manuscript.
1. One of the many fallacies described by Aristotle.
2. At least one movement within the contemporary negotiation literature confronts Western
individualism with Eastern collectivism. Even when discussing Eastern collectivism, however,
advocates of this perspective still hold that the individuals are ontologically fundamental and that
these individuals somehow chose to submit their personal self-interests to the greater good of the
society (cf. Thompson 1998). Thus, this collectivistic interpretation is still construable as a species
of motivation that is still in the best self-interest for the individuals in that type of a collectivistic
society. Therefore, any viable alternative to instrumentalism needs to not only step outside of the
instrumentalism-altruism dichotomy, but also needs to step outside of the individualism-
collectivism dichotomy.
3. This complex conception of the self is pivotal in the history of understanding how people
think, feel, and behave. The general consensus is that experimentalists have been able to enlarge the
human understanding of the self in a predictable manner more than any previous type of behav-
ioral scholars had been able to do. Significant theoretical concerns arise from this claim (i.e., is this
conception of the self really complex?) that range beyond the scope of this article. However, for
those who are interested, please see Gantt and Williams (2002) or Williams and Gantt (2002).
4. Details have been changed to protect the identities of the relevant parties, but the rest of
the information is factually accurate.
5. This perspective is also consistent with similar approaches in other fields, such as the
concepts proposed by Sheila McNamee and Ken Gergen (2006).

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