Defects Found with Ammonia PlantStacks

During Plant Overhaul Examination

During an ammonia plant shutdown, defects and deformations, as well as severe corrosion, were
discovered with several plant stacks. The causes of and solutions to these problems are discussed, as
well as efforts to prevent recurrence.

Duncan E. Anderson
ICI C&P Ltd., Billingham, England

Introduction with a 24-in. (610-mm) tip (Figure 1). The flare stack
and header system were lagged for acoustic reasons.
The stack was scheduled to be examined during the

T
he Ammonia 4 1,450-te/d ammonia plant oper-
ated by ICI C&P Ltd. at Billingham, England
was commissioned in 1977. In January 1997
the plant was shut down for its major quarterly over-
haul, and in the course of this defects were found with
several of the plant stacks. On removal of the lagging
at the base of one stack, it was. found that the 90° bend
was deformed and flattened at the point of contact
with the "duck foot" support. Severe corrosion was
also found to have taken place under the acoustic lag-
ging of three stacks.
Collapse of Bend of Stack
Background
The E stack is the main plant front-end blowoff flare
stack- It is fed from a header system which can receive
make gas from five locations. It is 47 m (154 ft) tall
overhaul, and the acoustic lagging was removed in
several places for inspections. On removing the lag-
ging from the bend at the base of the stack, it was dis-
covered that the bend was deformed and flattened at
the point of contact with the "duck foot" support
which had pushed up into the bend (Photos 1 and 2).
Investigation
An investigation was immediately instigated to deter-
mine the cause of the deformed bend with two theories
considered possible:
(1) Thinning of the pipe due to corrosion or
(2) Overheating of the pipe at the bend.
Both lead to loss of strength in the bend metal allow-
ing it to be deformed by the weight of the stack.
Initial indications suggested the latter theory to be
the most likely:
(1) There wasn't any excessive external corrosion

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 14 1998

 Photo 1. Deformed bend at base of E flare stack. Photo 2. Deformed bend at base of E flare stack.

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Figure 1. E flare stack vent header system. Figure 2. E flare stack drainage lute.

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 15 1998

and the bend metal appeared sound;
(2) The bend had deformed uniformly. If corrosion
had been the cause, it was expected that parts of the
bend would have thinned more than others due to pit-
ting and so on causing the bend to buckle unevenly;
(3) The bend metal was discolored, and examination
by materials experts indicated that this was consistent
with the bend having seen a temperature in the order
of 500-600°C (930-1,110°F).
Thinning due To corrosion
The bend was cut out from the bottom of the flare
stack, and on removal it was found the metal was in
good condition and had not suffered from any internal
corrosion. This confirmed that loss of strength from
excessive corrosion had not been the cause of the
problem.
Overheating of the bend
The stack has a design temperature of 123°C (253°F)
and a review of the operation of the plant was under-
taken to determine if the stack could have seen the
higher temperatures indicated due to the discoloration
from any process conditions. The review determined
that the highest temperature the stack could see from
process gases is around 220°C (428°F) when venting
from downstream of the LT shift inlet boiler. This case
does not appear to have been considered in the design
temperature of the flare stack, but doesn't account for
the high temperature (500-600°C; 930-1,110°F) seen,
and would have been insufficient to soften the metal
enough to cause it to deform. Therefore, this was dis-
counted as the root cause of the problem.
The other cause of high temperatures occurring with-
in the stack is combustion. For this to occur, oxygen
must enter the stack to cause a flammable mixture and
this can be either by diffusion of oxygen down the
flare stack or by a hole or opening in the vent header
system allowing air to be drawn in due to the chimney
effect of the stack.
During normal plant operation, no combustible gases
enter the stack so a flammable atmosphere could not
be created, and during venting there will be sufficient
flow through the header to ensure a positive pressure
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
so no air can be drawn hi nor diffuse down the stack.
However, it was known that on several occasions
front-end blowoff valves had been leaking and thus
allowing make gas to leak into the vent header system
giving conditions under which a flammable atmos-
phere could be created.
Oxygen diffusion down the stack
The E stack is purged with steam from the plant 20
bar (290 psi) steam system to prevent diffusion of
oxygen down the stack. Originally, the steam flow rate
was set by a rotameter, but this had been modified hi
the past and the steam purge to the stack is now set by
letdown through an orifice plate. Calculations show
that the flow rate of steam into the header was 60 kg/h
(132 Ib/h) with a volumetric flow rate immediately
downstream of the restriction orifice of 147 m3/h
(5,190 ftVh). This agrees closely with the recommend-
ed purge rate for a 24 in. (610 mm) stack in an internal
ICI design specification. However, the steam purge is
introduced at the start of the vent header system 170 m
(558 ft) upstream of the stack tip, and it is estimated
that on a cold day (0°C, 32°F) approximately 2/3 of
the steam will condense in the vent header. This would
give a drastically reduced steam purge rate of around
20 kg/h (44 Ib/h) or 33 rtf/h (1,165 ft3/h) at the stack
tip.
Discussion with authorities in stack design, both
within ICI and externally, indicated that steam is no
longer a preferred purging medium, partly due to the
problems of it condensing, and that current recommen-
dation is for a far larger purge rate of around 500 kg/h
(1,100 Ib/h) of steam for a stack of this size. This
therefore revealed that insufficient purging was taking
place to prevent oxygen diffusion down the stack.
However, it was considered unlikely that this was the cause of
any internal combustion in the vent header causing overheat-
ing at the bend because this is not characteristic of the prob-
lems encountered with oxygen diffusion down a stack.
Hole or opening in vent header allowing air to be
drawn in
When venting gases lighter than air (such as steam
and hydrogen rich gas), a chimney effect is created in
16 1998
 Photo 3. Corrosion under lagging of F stack.
the stack. With a low flow rate and hence small pres-
sure drop down the stack this can give rise to a nega-
tive pressure of typically around -20 m barg
(-8 in w.g.) at the stack base. This will suck air in from
any holes in the vent header allowing a flammable
atmosphere to be created.
The E stack is fitted with a drainage lute at its base,
approximately l m (3 ft) upstream of the deformed
bend. During the investigation into the cause of the
deformation, it was discovered that the lute had been
incorrectly installed and did not provided a water seal
to the drain point. This effectively gave a hole in the
vent header at the base of the stack (Figure 2). With
the low steam purge rate and a small quantity of make
gas entering the vent header from a passing blowoff
valve, conditions which were known to have occurred
in the past, ideal conditions would be created for air to
be sucked into the header via the drainage lute. Due to
the large flammability range of the hydrogen rich
make gas, this would easily give rise to a flammable
atmosphere.
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
Photo 4. Cut out sections of stacks showing
corrosion.
Analysis
It is most likely that air has been drawn into the vent
header via the drainage lute adjacent to the base of the
stack. This is supported by the absence of heat damage
or marking to other sections of the header upstream of
the lute. Ennis (1997) states that if the mixture in the
stack becomes flammable then the flame from the
pilot at the top of the stack may propagate back down
the stack. It is possible for the mixture to run up to
detonation under these conditions; however, this is
unlikely in a vented straight stack. The maximum
pressure experienced in the stack would be in the
order of 2.5 barg (36 psig). If the air ingress point had
been more than a few meters into the header system,
then it is likely that the deflagration would have run up
to a detonation which may have caused damage to
both the vent header and process equipment.
In this case a stable flame appears to have been
formed immediately downstream of the air ingress
point causing localized heating of the pipework. The
17 1998
effects of this were worsened by the presence of
acoustic lagging, which increased the local tempera-
ture above that for an unlagged pipe and prevented the
detection of the problem.
Conclusion
The bend at the base of the stack was overheated due
to localized internal combustion. Ah- was sucked into
the vent header via the incorrectly installed drainage
lute while make gas was also entering the system from
a passing valve. Insufficient purging of the vent header
allowed a flammable atmosphere to be created within
the stack. The flammable gas was ignited by the pilots
at the flare tip and propagated back down the stack
creating a stable, self-sustaining internal flame at the
base of the stack. This heated the bend, which was
insulated, sufficiently to soften the metal such that the
weight of the stack caused the bend to deform.
There is evidence to suggest that the bend had been
in the deformed state for approximately two years, as
during this time process operators had started to com-
plain of drainage lutes at the upstream end of the vent
header system blowing during venting operations.
Prevention
During the overhaul, the deformed bend was cut out
and replaced. To prevent a recurrence of the incident,
the drainage lute at the base of the stack has been
modified so that it is now installed correctly and the
steam purge rate to the stack has been increased to 500
kg/h as per current recommendations. Provision has
also been made so that an oxygen analyzer can be
installed on the stack in the near future to continually
monitor for any air ingress into the vent header sys-
tem.
Corrosion Found Under Stack Lagging
Background
During the overhaul, several of the plant stacks were
scheduled for inspection and to facilitate this their
acoustic lagging was removed in a number of places to
allow thickness checks to take place. When the lags
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
were removed from the two vent stacks D and F (both
front-end relief valve vent stacks), severe localized
external corrosion was found to have occurred just
above lagging support rings. This had progressed to
the extent on the F stack that when the rust was
knocked off several holes were created in the stack
(Photos 3 and 4). Subsequent investigation found that
a third stack, the E flare stack, had also suffered from
severe localized corrosion under its lagging which had
been missed on an initial inspection.
Investigation
After the discovery of excessive localized corrosion
on the D and F stacks, it was decided to remove
acoustic lagging from more places on the stacks and
their header systems to determine the extent of the
problem. This revealed that pipework had only suf-
fered from excessive corrosion on the vertical sections
examined and that all horizontal sections of the
pipework were sound. The worst corrosion was found
just above lagging support rings. From these findings,
it was decided to remove the lagging from all vertical
sections of the plant stacks and their headers to carry
out further inspections and thickness checks. As a
result of this, one other stack, the E flare stack, was
found to have suffered from localized corrosion under
its acoustic lagging which had not been discovered on
its initial inspection. No problems were found with an
any of the other plant stacks.
Analysis
The three affected stacks (D, E and F) are common hi
that they are all purged with steam as opposed to the
other plant stacks which are either purged with nitro-
gen or have no purging. This means that they will
always be kept warm with their acoustic lagging
reducing heat loss, providing ideal conditions for cor-
rosion to take place if the lagging gets wet.
It is most likely that rainwater has entered the lag-
ging on vertical sections of the stacks due to ineffec-
tive sealing of the lagging at the top of these sections.
The water has then soaked into the lagging and
drained down through it to collect on the top of the
lagging support rings where it is retained. This has
18 1998
lead to severe localized corrosion taking place just
above them.
The lagging on the stacks is provided for acoustic
insulation purposes and it was questioned whether it
was actually required. The original design philosophy
of the plant had sought to reduce operating noise as
much as possible, and this was why insulation had
been fitted. The ICI Engineering Technology Noise
and Vibration Section were commissioned to carry out
some modeling work to estimate the noise level pro-
duced from the stacks during venting to determine if
there was a requirement to refit the acoustic lagging.
This work concluded that there was no requirement to
refit acoustic lagging to the stacks for either employee
protection (the plant is an ear protection area) or for
environmental considerations (atmospheric attenuation
will be high) (Taylor, 1997).
To Sum Up
Ineffective sealing of acoustic lagging at the top of
vertical sections of stacks has allowed water ingress
which has drained down and collected above lagging
DISCUSSION
A. J. Gupta, TATA Chemicals: Why are you not
changing over to nitrogen purge for the stacks?
Anderson: At the moment we don't have enough
nitrogen on the site to supply all the stacks.
Gupta: The nitrogen requirement for 24-in. size
stacks, I would guess, would be on the order of 15 to
20 normal m3/h. I think that's quite a small quantity.
Then you could also get rid of the insulation as well.
Anderson: The long-term plan is to move to nitrogen
purging with an oxygen analyzer on the stack to check
for any ingress of oxygen.
L. Zafar, Fauji Fertilizer Companies, Pakistan: In the
photographs that you have shown it seems that the
vessel and the stack were severely corroded. The prob-
lem could have been avoided by effective monitoring
and combating of the corrosion in the first place.
Perhaps the vessel and the stack were the problem
area. Could you comment on that?
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
support rings. This has provided ideal conditions for
severe localized corrosion to take place on the warm
pipework of steam purged vent stacks just above lag-
ging support rings. Due to the localized nature of this
corrosion, it can easily be missed if only small sec-
tions of the stacks are examined as part of then" inspec-
tion.
Prevention
The excessively corroded sections of the F stack
were cut out and replaced, thinned sections of the D
stack were overplated, and the E flare stack was com-
pletely renewed. The vertical sections of stack
pipework was repainted but not relagged, however, the
lagging on horizontal sections has been left and
resealed.
Literature Cited
Ennis, A., "Ammonia 4 Flare Stack Purging," ICI
Internal Report (February 2,1997).
Taylor, G., ICI Internal Memo (February 14,1997).
Anderson: It was a weakness. Our inspection philoso-
phy and regime didn't focus heavily enough on
inspection of stacks and inspection of the headers that
entered those stacks.
H. van Praag, Terra Nitrogen: Do your stacks have
molecular sieves at the top?
Anderson: No. Our stacks are straight through, steam
purged. They have no molecular sieves.
B. Geimard, Grande Paroisse: Does the pilot flame
burn continuously at the top of the flare?
Anderson: Yes. Our pilots, which are John Zink SDF
pilots, are pretty reliable. They don't have thermocou-
ple monitoring but we have a visual check every shift
on the stacks.
Guimard: Have you experienced explosive ignition in
the past when you flared gases?
Anderson: We've never had any explosions at the top
of the stack.
19 1998
T. L. Huurdeman, DSM Fertilizers: When you inves-
tigated the cause of this problem, did you consider
putting pressure monitoring on the flare system on the
stacks to monitor for any obstructions, because this is
your last line of defense when the relief valve blows?
You need to know that your stack is wide open.
Anderson: There is no pressure monitoring on the
stack at the moment that would indicate any obstruc-
tion in the stack. The trouble with putting a pressure
monitor on is that you've introduced another way for
the system to fail, another defect if the pressure moni-
toring fails. We went down the road of visual inspec-
tion and we still feel that visual inspection by stripping
the lagging off and checking the integrity of the exteri-
or of the stack, rather than relying on another instru-
ment, is by far the best method. And, as we all know,
instrumentation does fail.
Huurdeman: We put nitrogen on these stacks to give
an inert atmosphere and yet, a couple of times, we
have experienced low nitrogen flow and since, eventu-
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
ally, you always have some hydrogen available in the
system we had explosions at the top of the stack where
the pilots were located. These big bangs made us
aware that the nitrogen flow was insufficient.
Anderson: There's no doubt that having explosions
anywhere near the top of a stack is a dangerous busi-
ness to be in. We don't have any flow monitoring at
this time for it.
V. Pattabathula, Incitée, Brisbane, Australia: Is the
stack you talked about different from the primary
reformer stack?
Anderson: No, it's the same type of stack. There are
three stacks that are steam purged, and they are all
pretty much the same.
Pattabathula: Do you normally have oxygen in the
gas coming to that stack?
Anderson: No. Normally there would be no oxygen in
the stack, header, or riser. The stack would be steam
purged to keep the velocity up. The oxygen was intro-
duced through the defect.
20 1998