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The Anglo-American Naval Conversations On The Far East of January 1938
The Anglo-American Naval Conversations On The Far East of January 1938
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THE ANGLO-AMERICAN NAVAL
CONVERSATIONS ON THE FAR EAST
OF JANUARY 1938
L
Lawrence Pratt
ATE in 1945,withthewarsinEuropeandthePacificsafelyover,
the UnitedStatesCongressbegan an investigation into the Pearl
Harbourdisasterof December 1941. In the courseof subsequent
hearings1 AdmiralRoyal E. Ingersoll,USN, revealedthatin his former
capacityas Chiefof thePlans Division of the Navy Departmenthe had
travelledto London in late December 1937 for secretexploratorytalks
on the Far East with the BritishAdmiralty.His instructions, he said,
had come directlyfromPresidentFranklinRoosevelt and were, first,
to discuss what America and Britaincould do if theybecame involved
in a war against Japan, and, second, to take up the question of the
London Treaty of 1936. Ingersolldeprecatedthe significanceof his
mission: the agreed Record of Conversationshad been supersededby
the stafftalksof 1940-41,and, beyondan exchangeof codes, littlewas
achieved. The Britishhad had to be 'a littlebit careful' because of
theirproblemsin Europe and consequentlyhad been unable to 'state
definitelywhat forcestheycould allocate to the Pacific'. No commit-
mentshad been enteredinto and the bulk of the information exchanged
was about communication, liaison and so on.
All of this was offeredratherin the spiritof an academic aside to
the main business of the hearings,the Pearl Harbour inquisition.
Perhapsbecause theyacceptedIngersoll'sopinionthatthe conversations
had not shaped later decisions,the investigatingsenatorsand congress-
men made no attemptto probe into his missionor the circumstances
which had given rise to it. This was understandable,but for those
whoseinterestlies in thedeeperoriginsof the Second WorldWar it was
also regrettable.For the Ingersollmissionwas not only a key episode
in the unexploredbackgroundto the unofficial Anglo-Americanalliance
of 1940-41,but it is also of centralimportanceto any studyof western
reactionsto the Far Eastern crisisof 1937-41. The talks were neither
as technicalnor 'low-level' an Ingersoll implied; on the contrary,
theyexploredthe foundationsof the two powers' navel strategies,and
I Testimony of February 12, 1946, before Joint Committee of Congress on the
Investigationof the Pearl Harbour Attack, 79th Congress, 1st session in Pearl
HarbourAttack,(Washington.1946),pp. 4273-4277.
745
746 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
2 All unpublishedreferences,
unless otherwisenoted,fromthe Cabinet,Foreign Office,
and Admiraltyarchivesin the Public Record Office,London. The papers of Lord
Chatfieldare cited with the kind permissionof the present Lord Chatfieldand
ProfessorA. Temple Patterson.
ANGLO-AMERICANNAVAL CONVERSATIONS ON THE FAR EAST 747
had been told to revise the JointArmy and Navy Basic War Plan
'Orange': the originalplan envisaged a war in the Pacific between
Americanand Japanesenaval forces.Partlybecause of thechangedinter-
nationalcontextand partlybecause of theArmy-Navydisagreement, this
was rescindedin November 1937. Its successorwas to revise United
StatesFleet requirementsand to be based on the possible contingencies
of a two-oceanwar and the co-operationof the BritishNavy. Neither
rearmamentnor planningcould safelyproceed withoutmore intimate
knowledgeof England's naval situation. It was this need, ratherthan
any desire for immediateaction against Japan, which seems to have
been behindRoosevelt'sagreementto staffconversations.For Washing-
ton the talks were to be an informaland non-bindingexchange of
informationand plans, and not-as Eden hoped-the prelude to an
earlydisplayof force.'3
* **
24
Adm.116/4302.
760 INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS
25
RECORDOF CONVERSATIONS
The followingmemorandum containsthe agreedrecordof the conversations
betweenCaptainIngersoll,USN, and theNaval Staffat theAdmiralty.
Composition,
stateof readinessand initial
movementof Fleets
U.S. Fleet
The U.S. Naval view is thatno gestureshouldbe made unlessthe Fleet now
in commissionis broughtup to 100% full complementand preparedin all
respectsfor war. The abilityto bringthe Fleet up to full cornplementdepends
on the issue by the Presidentof a Declarationof National Emnergency.
The presentstate of readinessof the U.S. Fleet in comnmission as regards
personnelis as follows: -
Submarinesand Aircrafton the PacificCoast 100%.
Advance Force, consistingof 2 Squadronsof heavy Cruisersand 2 Squad-
rons of Destroyersand 1 AircraftCarrieris now being completed,as far
as practicable,to full complement.
Capital Ships,Cruisers,Destroyers
and Auxiliarieson thePacificCoast, other
thanAdvanceForce, 85% complement.
AtlanticCoast-3 Battleships,WYOMING and 1 Squadron of Destroyers
are used as a trainingSquadronwithabout 50%/complement.
It is the intentionof the U.S. Navy Departmentto send firstto Honolulu
the Advance Force, togetherwith about 15 Submarines.These could leave at
any time. There are alreadyabout 75 patrolplanes and about 20 submarinesat
Honolulu.
There are 6 Submarinesand 36 aircraftin the Panama Canal zone.
It is understoodthat all available capital ships would proDbably
be sent to
Honolulu. Allowingfor 2 or 3 ships refitting and 3 on the AtlanticCoast, 9
of 10 capital ships could be ready to sail 10 to 15 days afterthe Declaration
of National Emergency.
Subsequentlythe Navy Departmentvisualise a gradual advance across the
Pacific afterair reconnaissance,makinguse of JapaneseMandated Islands as
necessary,and finallyestablishingthemselvesat Truk or some otherpositionin
the same generalarea.
They do not at presentenvisageproceedingimmediately to Manila or any
otherPhilippineport.
A Fleet SupplyTrain withabout one month'ssuppliescould sail in about 20
days, and transports,tankersand auxiliaryvessels about :30 days after the
Declarationof a National Emergency.
The U.S. Navy Departmentintendalso to despatch2 submrLarines and a small
numberof aircraftand a seaplanetenderto operatefroma base at Unalaska.
BritishFleet
The Admiraltypolicy is to send to the Far East a forcewhichis sufficient
to engagethe JapaneseFleet undernormaltacticaland strategicalconditions.In
general,thisFleet would proceedto the Far East as a singletacticalunit.
The forcewhichit is at presentintendedshould formthe Far EasternFleet
is as follows:-Some of theseshipsare alreadyin Easternwaters.
Battleships......................... 8
Battlecruiser........................ I
AircraftCarriers ................ .. 3
* 8" Cruisers ......................... 8
25 Adm.116/3922.
ANGLO-AMERICANNAVAL CONVERSATIONS ON THE FAR EAST 761
The inter-communication
procedureoutlinedabove will be subjectto adjust-
mentbetweenthe Commanders-in-Chief
of the two Main Fleets.
Interchangeof Communication Personnel
To facilitateinter-communication betweenthe two Fleets it is agreed that
the followinginter-changeof personnelwith experiencein WIT would be
desirable:
(a) 1 Officerand 1 ratingfrom U.S. Asiatic Fleet to be lent temporarily
to bothHong Kong and SingaporeW/T Stations.
(b) 1 Officer,if and when available, and 1 Chief PettyOfficerTelegraphist
to be lent temporarilyfromthe BritishChina Fleet to the U.-S.Asiatic
Fleet Flagship.
(c) 1 Officerand 1 ratingto be lentfromthe Britishand U.S. Navies to the
U.S. and BritishMain Fleet flagships
respectively.
(d) 1 BritishOfficerto be appointedfor dutywith the U.S. Navy initially
at Washington.One officer fromU.S. Navy to be attachedto the staff
of the U.S. Naval Attachein London -andto be available for communi-
cation duties.
GeneralLiaison
Both partiesagree thatno further measuresfor generalliaison purposesare
necessaryat the presenttime.
Should, however,parallel action be decided upon by the two Governments,
it would be necessaryto appointa BritishOfficerwithknowledgeof war plans
to Washingtonand a U.S. Officer withsimilarknowledgefor dutyin London.
StrategicalPolicy
Should the Governments decidedthata distantblockadeis to be established,
the BritishNaval Forces will be responsiblefor the stoppageof Japanesetrade
on a line running,roughly,fromSingaporethroughthe Dutch East Indies past
New Guinea and New Hebrides,and thenceto the Eastwardof Australiaand
New Zealand.
The U.S. Navy will be responsiblefor operationsagainst Japanese trade
throughout the WVestCoast of Northand South America,includingthe Panama
Canal and the passage roundCape Horn.
The U.S. Navy will also assume responsibilitv for the generalNaval defence
of the WestCoast of Canada.
In thesecircumstances it is agreedthatno hard and fast line of demarcation
betweenthe areas in whichthe two fleetswill.operateneed to be laid down at
thisstage.
(Sd.) R. E. Ingersoll,
Captain,UnitedStatesNavy.
(Sd.) T. S. V. Phillips,
Captain. Royal Navy.
13thJanuary,1938.