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Keohane e Katzenstein - Anti-Americanism
Keohane e Katzenstein - Anti-Americanism
^ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (Cornell
University Press, 2007).
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Anti-Americanisms
greater than the consequences of opinion.
The distinction between opinion and bias has implications for policy, and
particularly for the debate between left and right on its significance. Indeed,
our findings suggest that the positions on anti-Americanism of both left and
right are internally inconsistent. Broadly speaking, the American left focuses
on opinion rather than bias — opposition, in the left's view largely justified,
to American foreign policy. The left also frequently suggests that anti-
Americanism poses a serious long-term problem for U.S. diplomacy. Yet
insofar as anti-Americanism reflects ephemeral opinion, why should it have
long-lasting effects? Policy changes would remove the basis for criticism and
solve the problem. Conversely, the American right argues that anti-
Americanism reflects a deep bias against the United States: People who hate
freedom hate us for what we are. Yet the right also tends to argue that anti-
Americanism can be ignored: If the United States follows effective policies,
views will follow. But the essence of bias is the rejection of information
inconsistent with one's prior view: Biased people do not change their views
in response to new information. Hence, if bias is the problem, it poses a
major long-term problem for the United States. Both left and right need to
rethink their positions.
The view we take in the volume is that much of what is called anti-
Americanism, especially outside of the Middle East, indeed is largely opin-
ion. As such, it is volatile and would diminish in response to different poli-
cies, as it has in the past. The left is correct on this score, while the right
overestimates resentment toward American power and hatred of American
values. If the right were correct, anti-Americanism would have been high at
the beginning of the new millennium. To the contrary, zoo2 Pew polls show
that outside the Middle East and Argentina, pluralities in every country
polled were favorably disposed toward the United States. Yet with respect to
the consequences of anti-American views, the right seems to be on stronger
ground. It is difficult to identify big problems for American foreign policy
created by anti-Americanism as such, as opposed to American policy. This
should perhaps not be surprising, since prior to the Iraq war public opinion
toward the United States was largely favorable. The right is therefore broad-
ly on target in its claim that much anti-Americanism — reflecting criticisms
of what the United States does rather than what it is — does not pose seri-
ous short-term problems for American foreign policy. However, if opinion
were to harden into bias, as may be occurring in the Middle East, the conse-
quences for the United States would be much more severe.
Anti-Americanisms
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Anti-Americanisms
war on terror specifically.
Hypocrisy in American foreign policy is not so much the result of the ethi-
cal failings of American leaders as a byproduct of the role played by the
United States in world politics and of democratic politics at home. It will
not, therefore, be eradicated. As long as political hypocrisy persists, abun-
dant material will be available for liberal anti-Americanism.
Social anti-Americanism. Since democracy comes in many stripes, we are
wrong to mistake the American tree for the democratic forest. Many democ-
ratic societies do not share the peculiar combination of respect for individual
liberty, reliance on personal responsibility, and distrust of government char-
acteristic of the United States. People in other democratic societies may
therefore react negatively to America's political insti-
tutions and its social and political arrangements that There will be
rely heavily on market processes. They favor deeper nhundant
state involvement in social programs than is politi-
cally feasible or socially acceptable in the United material for
States. Social democratic welfare states in liberal anti-
Scandinavia, Christian democratic welfare states on
the European continent, and developmental industri- Americanism
al states in Asia, such as Japan, are prime examples ^5 long as
of democracies w h o s e institutions a n d practices con- , . I f ]
trast i n m a n y w a y s with those o fthe United States. ^
Social anti-Americanism is based on value con- hypOCrisy.
flicts that reflect relevant differences in many spheres
of life that are touching on "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." The
injustice embedded in American policies that favor the rich over the poor is
often decried. The sting is different here than for liberals who resent
American hypocrisy. Genuine value conflicts exist on issues such as the
death penalty, the desirability of generous social protections, preference for
multilateral approaches over unilateral ones, and the sanctity of internation-
al treaties. Still, these value conflicts are smaller than those with radical anti-
Americanism, since social anti-Americanism shares in core American values.
Sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism. A third form of anti-
Americanism focuses not on correcting domestic market outcomes but on
political power. Sovereign nationalists focus on two values: the importance
of not losing control over the terms by which polities are inserted in world
politics and the inherent importance and value of collective national identi-
ties. These identities often embody values that are at odds with America's.
State sovereignty thus becomes a shield against unwanted intrusions from
America.
The emphasis placed by different sovereign nationalists can vary in three
ways. Eirst, it can be on nationalism: on collective national identities that
offer a source of positive identification. National identity is one of the most
important political values in contemporary world politics, and there is little
evidence suggesting that this is about to change. Such identities create the
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plane in 2001), explicit anti-Americanism appears quickly.
Radical anti-Americanism. We characterize a fourth form of anti-
Americanism as radical. It is built around the belief that America's identity,
as reflected in the internal economic and political power relations and insti-
tutional practices of the United States, ensures that its actions will be hostile
to the furtherance of good values, practices, and institutions elsewhere in the
world. For progress toward a better world to take place, the American econ-
omy and society will have to be transformed, either from within or from
without.
Radical anti-Americanism was characteristic of Marxist-Leninist states
such as the Soviet Union until its last few years and is still defining Cuba and
North Korea today. When Marxist revolutionary
zeal was great, radical anti-Americanism was associ- The perceived
ated with violent revolution against U.S.-sponsored -i yy.^y. friUp
regimes, if not the United States itself. Its Marxist-
Leninist adherents are now so weak, however, that it various forms,
is mostly confined to the realm of rhetoric. Eor the from eaualitV
United States to satisfy adherents of this brand of
radical anti-Americanism, it would need to change / ^ ^ WOmen tO
the nature of its political-economic system. belief in the
The most extreme form of contemporary radical . . r
anti-Americanism holds that Western values are so Superiority Of
abhorrent that people holding them should be Christianity.
destroyed. The United States is the leading state of
the West and therefore the central source of evil. This perceived evil may
take various forms, from equality for women, to public displays of the
human body, to belief in the superiority of Christianity. Eor those holding
extreme versions of Occidentalist ideas, the central conclusion is that the
West, and the United States in particular, are so incorrigibly bad that they
must be destroyed. And since the people who live in these societies have
renounced the path of righteousness and truth, they must be attacked and
exterminated.
Religiously inspired and secular radical anti-Americanism argue for the
weakening, destruction, or transformation of the political and economic
institutions of the United States. The distinctive mark of both strands of
anti-Americanism is the demand for revolutionary changes in the nature of
American society.
It should be clear that these four different types of anti-Americanism are
not simply variants of the same schema, emotions, or set of norms with only
slight variations at the margin. On the contrary, adherents of different types
of anti-Americanism can express antithetical attitudes. Radical Muslims
oppose a popular culture that commercializes sex and portrays women as
liberated from the control of men and are also critical of secular liberal val-
ues. Social and Christian democratic Europeans, by contrast, may love
American popular culture but criticize the United States for the death penal-
2 Philippe Rogeii The American Enemy: The History of French Anti-Americanism (University of Chicago
Press, 2005).
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Europe were found in Spain and especially Greece — both countries that
had experienced civil wars; in the case of Spain the United States supported
for decades a repressive dictator. Legacy anti-Americanism can be explosive,
but it is not unalterable. As the Philippines and Vietnam — both highly pro-
American countries today — show, history can ameliorate or reverse nega-
tive views of the United States as well as reinforce them.
'* Bernard-Henri Levy, American Vertigo: Traveling America in the Footsteps of Tocqueville (Random
House, zoo6).
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Anti-Americanisms
the world's "huddled masses" that expresses a basic belief in America as a
land of unlimited opportunity.
The United States has a vigorous and expressive popular culture, which is
enormously appealing both to Americans and to many people elsewhere in
the world. This popular culture is quite hedonistic, oriented toward material
possessions and sensual pleasure. At the same time, however, the U.S. is
today much more religious than most other societies. One important root of
America's polyvalence is the tension between these two characteristics.
Furthermore, both American popular culture and American religious prac-
tices are subject to rapid change, expanding further the varieties of expres-
sion in the society and continually opening new options. The dynamism and
heterogeneity of American society create a vast set of
choices: of values, institutions, and practices. Like the United
America's openness to the rest of the world is K! t'
reflected in its food and popular culture. The '
American fast-food industry has imported its prod- Hollywood is
ucts from France (fries), Cermany (hamburgers and (pQffj jfi America
frankfurters) and Italy (pizza). What it added was
brilliant marketing and efficient distribution. In ^ ^ " Of the
many ways the same is true also for the American world. And SO
movie industry, especially in the past two decades.
Hollywood is a brand name held by Americans and ^^ America
non-Americans alike. In the 1990s only three of the itself.
seven major Hollywood studios were controlled by
U.S. corporations. Many of Hollywood's most celebrated directors and
actors are non-American. And many of Hollywood's movies about America,
both admiring and critical, are made by non-Americans. Like the United
Nations, Hollywood is both in America and of the world. And so is America
itself — a product of the rest of the world as well as of its own internal char-
acteristics.
"Americanization," therefore, does not describe a simple extension of
American products and processes to other parts of the world. On the con-
trary, it refers to the selective appropriation of American symbols and values
by individuals and groups in other societies — symbols and values that may
well have had their origins elsewhere. Americanization thus is a profoundly
interactive process between America and all parts of the world. And, we
argue here, it is deeply intertwined with anti-American views. The interac-
tions that generate Americanization may involve markets, informal net-
works, or the exercise of corporate or governmental power — often in vari-
ous combinations. They reflect and reinforce the polyvalent nature of
American society, as expressed in the activities of Americans, who freely
export and import products and practices. But they also reflect the varia-
tions in attitudes and interests of people in other societies, seeking to use,
resist, and recast symbols that are associated vi^ith the United States. Similar
patterns of interaction generate pro-Americanism and anti-Americanism,
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Anti-Americanisms
tient of the smallest censure and insatiable of praise. . . . They
unceasingly harass you to extort praise, and if you resist their
entreaties they fall to praising themselves. It would seem as if,
doubting their own merit, they wished to have it constantly exhib-
ited before their eyes.^