ROWARD TUBOG JD -1

USJR-LAW SY: 2020-2021

SUBJECT: Constitutional Law 1

TOPIC: Residence Requirement (Domicile v. Residence)
TITLE: Marcos v. COMELEC
CITATION: G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995

FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995,
providing that her residence in the place was seven (7) months. On
March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a
petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC charging
Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for
residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representative. In her
Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed
seven months to since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s
proclamation showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in
the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC
reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains
the highest number of votes. In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May
1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming winner of the
elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of
Leyte to satisfy the one year residency requirement to be eligible in
running as representative.
RULING:
Yes.

The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal

residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or
mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not
intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications for
the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987
Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and
maintained residences in different places. In the case at bench, the
evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as
required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin
in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly
argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a
result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. It can be
concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was
ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner’s various
places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. Having determined that
Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat
in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May
25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim
Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.