ALIENATION: A S O C I A L PROCESS

DIANE EINBLAU

B.A. ( H o n , ), U n i v e r s i t y of A l b e r t a , 1965

A T H E S I S SUBMITTED I N P A R T I A L FULFILMERT

O F T H E REQUIREMENTS F O R T H E D E G R E E O F

MASTER O F A R T S

i n the D e p a r t m e n t
of
P o l i t i c a l Science, S o c i o l o g y and A n t h r o p o l o g y

@ D I A N E EINBLAU, 1968
SIMON FRASER U N I V E R S I T Y

December, 1968
EXAMINING COMMITTEE APPROVAL

David B e t t i s o n
Senior Supervisor

Herbert Adam
Examining Committee

Karl P e t e r
Examining Committee
 iii

ABSTRACT
-. --
\

Marxls e a r l y w r i t i n g s on a l i e n a t i o n a r e examined; and

h i s d e f i n i t i o n of a l i e n a t i o n i n t e r p r e t e d a s t h e s e p a r a t i o n of
"whole man" from h i s " s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 1 ' of " f r e e , conscious ,
j
a c t i v i t y n through "forced l a b o r " , i n which man t r e a t s himself a s
\
a "mere p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n " . This d e f i n i t i o n i s accepted a s an -1,
hypothesis. P a r t s of Weberrs s o c i a l t h e o r y a r e examined f o r
t h e i r r e l e v a n c e t o Marx's t h e s i s , and some l i m i t a t i o n s of Weberts
v a l u e - f r e e o r normative approach a r e discussed. The c r i t i q u e of
t h i s approach i s extended t o i n c l u d e t h e work t h a t has been done
by contemporary, and e s p e c i a l l y American, s o c i o l o g i s t s . It i s
concluded t h a t t h e concept of a l i e n a t i o n has been s o transformed y

by contemporary s o c i o l o g i s t s t h a t i t has l i t t l e i f any v a l u e f o r

sociological analysis. With t h i s conclusion i n mind, Meadfs
s o c i a l theory i s considered w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o Marxls a l i e n a t i o n
hypothesis i n an attempt t o l i n k t h e two t h e o r i s t s , and through
doing so, t o make meaningful Marxls n o t i o n of " f r e e , conscious
a c t i v i t y f 1 . The purpose of t h i s t h e s i s i s t o r e i n s t a t e a l i e n a t i o n
a s a powerful concept f o r understanding human s o c i a l behavior.
I n conclusion, some hypotheses r e l a t i n g t o self-determined s o c i a l
behavior, a s s u g g e s t e d by t h e u n i t i n g of t h e s e two t h e o r i s t s , a r e
outlined.
 INTRODUCTION

Chapter
ONE: ALIENATION I N THE THEORY OF KARL MARX
1. Background
O r i g i n and e a r l y u s e s of a l i e n a t i o n
Hegeilts two uses of a l i e n a t i o n
Feuerbachls anthropology
2. Estranged Labor
A l i e n a t i o n through m a t e r i a l e x i s t e n c e
The t r a n s i t i o n from contemplation t o
action
3 . The Context
Community and s o c i e t y
O b j e c t i f i c a t i o n and r e i f i c a t i o n ; s c i e n c e
and ideology
Marx s whole man

I TWO: WEBERIS CONTRIBUTION TO MARXIS THEORY OF

ALIENATION 48
1. The r e l e v a n c e of Weberrs Work 48
Class and s t a t u s 49
Power and a u t h o r i t y 55
Bureaucracy 58
2. Webec and t h e Myth of S o c i e t y 63 .
Rationality 64
I n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y 68
THREE: THE MYTH OF SOCIETY I N AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY 75
1. Contemporary D e f i n i t i o n s

2. The S o c i o l o g i c a l Approach t o A l i e n a t i o n
Value-free sociology a s r e a l i s m
Marx's t h e o r y debased
Value-free debasement, i l l u s t r a t e d
3 . A l i e n a t i o n a s Experience and Conditions
of A l i e n a t i o n
4. Probable Man v e r s u s P o s s i b l e Man
UR THE RESOLUTION O F A L I E N A T I O N THE THEORY
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD

1. Mead's philosophy of t h e p r e s e n t
The p r e s e n t
The emergent
The s o c i a l
2. Mind a s a s o c i a l p r o c e s s of t a k i n g
perspectives
3. Marx and Mead on human s o c i e t y
CONCLUSION
 INTRODUCTION

.. .Society and p o l i t i c s only have

t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of a r r a n g i n g
everyonets a f f a i r s s o t h a t each
w i l l have t h e l e i s u r e and t h e
freedom t o pursue ( t h e a b s o l u t e ) .
camus, The Rebel
..
An i s s u e has climbed down from t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s 1
tower t o t h e s t r e e t s of everyday l i f e . Wearing v a r i o u s g u i s e s
i n d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s t h e i s s u e i s t h a t of o u r s e l v e s a s
s p i r i t u a l beings and a s p h y s i c a l c r e a t u r e s . We a r e being
f o r c e d through a number of means, and e s p e c i a l l y i n connection
with t h e development of new communication techniques, t o look
a t o u r s e l v e s i n new ways t h a t c o n t r a d i c t our t r a d i t i o n a l
1
e x p e c t a t i o n s , and t h e r e s u l t i s a most widespread dissonance.
For thousands of y e a r s Western c i v i l i z a t i o n has
grown on a conceptual foundation which c o n t a i n s a b a s i c schism-r
t h a t s e p a r a t i n g mind and body. While i n t h e p a s t t h i s seems
not t o have i n t e r f e r e d with "normal" l i v i n g , i t i s becoming
i n c r e a s i n g l y obvious t h a t today we pay a high p r i c e f o r i t s
maintenance, a p r i c e which has been s t a t e d a s a l i e n a t i o n .
d ~ h word
e s e r v e s both a s a d e s c r i p t i v e and a s a c r i t i - I

c a l device; i t d e s c r i b e s a human c o n d i t i o n and a t t h e same

time s u g g e s t s a r a d i c a l c r i t i c i s m of t h e f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t i n g
t o t h i s condition. As a c r i t i c a l d e v i c e a l i e n a t i o n q u e s t i o n s
t h e v a l i d i t y of our assumption of a s p l ? t between mind and
body, and consequently q u e s t i o n s t h e foundations of our s e l f
knowledge. Questioning t h e s e foundations r e q u i r e s two t h i n g s :
 I

a c r i t i c a l examination of our "way of l i f e " , our behavior;

and an examination of our c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e of values/ the
humanist p e r s p e c t i v e and i t s accompanying assumptions about
t h e n a t u r e of man.
\we f i n d , through our experience and i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,
t h a t our behavior and our c u l t u r a l v a l u e s a r e c o n t r a d i c t o r y /
t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n experienced a s one between humanist v a l u e s
and " p r a c t i c a l " ones, between t h e assumed e q u a l i t y of a l l men
and t h e apparent s o c i a l i n e q u a l i t y between men, between t h e
v i s i o n of men a s s e l f determining beings with freedom and r e s -
p o n s i b i l i t y and t h e experience of men a s confined by ignorance
and poverty, enslaved r a t h e r t h a n f r e e and a p a t h e t i c r a t h e r
than responsible.
The framework w i t h i n which a l i e n a t i o n ( a s i t i s h e r e
2
being used) a r o s e suggested t h e p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n s t o t h e
"problem" a s w e l l a s d e f i n i n g t h i s human c o n d i t i o n a s a prob-
lem. The s o l u t i o n s a r e e s s e n t i a l l y of two s o r t s : the f i r s t
i s d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e b a s i c s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h i n which
a l i e n a t i o n has grown, d e s t r u c t i o n i n t h e form of e l i m i n a t i n g
classes; and t h e second i s t h e c r e a t i o n of a new s o c i a l
3
o r g a n i z a t i o n , symbolically r e p r e s e n t e d by a c l a s s l e s s s o c i e t y .
The f i r s t can be accomplished w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s of t h e frame-
work i n which a l i e n a t i o n i s used a s a c r i t i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n of
human experiences, but t h e second n e c e s s i t a t e s going beyond
t h i s framework. The second s o l u t i o n n e i t h e r n e c e s s a r i l y
follows from t h e f i r s t nor does i t presuppose t h e f i r s t . A
 mistake made by i n t e r p r e t e r s of Marxls t h e o r y , i n supposing
t h a t t h e r e i s some necessary connection between t h e two s o l u -
4
t i o n s , r e s t s upon a myth t h a t S o c i e t y e x i s t s . It was with
r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s myth t h a t a l i e n a t i o n was considered t o be
a problem, and going beyond i t i s an e s s e n t i a l s t e p toward
t h e s o l u t i o n of t h e problem.
A l i e n a t i o n presupposes a l a c k of u n i t y where u n i t y
"should" be. Whether t h i s d i s s o c i a t i o n i s regarded a s one
between t h e i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l and him-
s e l f , one must n e c e s s a r i l y , w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of a mind-body
d u a l i t y , conclude t h a t S o c i e t y i s t h e source of both u n i t y
and d i s u n i t y . The development from assumption t o conclusion
occurs roughly i n t h e following manner. The mind-body d u a l i t y ,
a s e l u c i d a t e d by D e s c a r t e s ' "Cogito, ergo sum", i s handled n o t
only a s a schism between mind and body, but, a s t h e arrange-
ment of t h e words ( I t h i n k , t h e r e f o r e I am) i m p l i e s , i s por-
t r a y e d a s mind preceding and j u s t i f y i n g bodily e x i s t e n c e . In
h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y , Descartes v e r b a l i z e d and c l a r i f i e d
a c u l t u r a l assumption, which can be s t a t e d along t h e f o l l o w i n g
l i n e : The c a p a c i t y of t h e mind t o reason d i s t i n g u i s h e s man
i a s a human animal. Loss of t h i s a b i l i t y i s l o s s of humanity.
When we probe t h e o r i g i n of mind and f i n d i t t o be S o c i e t y , we

conclude: I am a member i n ( o r p a r t o f ) S o c i e t y , t h e r e f o r e I
t h i n k , t h e r e f o r e I am. This i s t h e l i n e of argument developed
2

i n t h e work of e.g. Comte & Durkheim. Where c u l t u r a l s t a n d a r d s

of " r i g h t reason" a r e transformed i n t o t h e source and j u s t i f i c a -

 t i o n of e x i s t e n c e f o r t h e " i k o l a t e d " i n d i v i d u a l , t h e
e x i s t e n c e of t h e " s o c i a l " i n d i v i d u a l i s explained by h i s
membership i n Society, expressed a s h i s " p o s i t i o n " i n t h e
Whole ( S o c i e t y ) . These two a b s t r a c t i o n s , I n d i v i d u a l and
S o c i e t y , derived by l o g i c a l deduction on t h e b a s i s of ques-
t i o n a b l e assumptions, a r e considered t o be d i s t i n c t e n t i t i e s ,
" i n t e r a c t i n g " w i t h one another. Both t h e organismic and
mechanical a n a l o g i e s tend t o lead one i n t o t h i s t r a p . Aliena-
t i o n , w i t h i n t h i s framework, i s t h e experience of a d i s u n i t y
between t h e I n d i v i d u a l and S o c i e t y ( a s p a r t and whole), o r
between t h e I n d i v i d u a l and Himself ( a s mind and body) through
t h e medium of Society. -7

capacities.
Marx c r i t i c i s e d t h e use t h a t men make of t h e i r human
It was t h i s use ( o r misuse) of t h e i r abi1"ities

i n t h e form of " c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y " t h a t he saw c r e a t i n g t h e

1
i

d i s u n i t y expressed a s a l i e n a t i o n . He thought t h a t men, i n

misunderstanding t h e i r human c a p a c i t i e s , worked a g a i n s t them-
!.
s e l v e s , a g a i n s t t h e i r human i n t e r e s t s . "Communism" r e p r e s e n -
t e d f o r him, a t l e a s t i n h i s e a r l y work, a new o r g a n i z a t i o n ,

of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s by means of which men would work f o r t h e i r

/'

, human i n t e r e s t s , and he c a r e f u l l y warned a g a i n s t r e i f y i n g t h e

a b s t r a c t i o n s " i n d i v i d u a l " and " s o c i e t y " . A p e r u s a l of a l i e n a -

t i o n theory i n American sociology i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h i s warning

i s a s r e l e v a n t today a s i t was when Marx wrote i t .
The common f e a r of q u e s t i o n i n g our way of l i f e beyond
s p e c u l a t i v e n o t i o n s i s , a t f i r s t . g l a n c e , a puzzle. It becomes
 .
understandable i f we assume t h a t people a r e a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e
c o n t e x t of t h e myth of S o c i e t y . Within t h i s c o n t e x t , tamper-
i n g with S o c i e t y t h r e a t e n s o n e ' s mind and consequently o n e l s
body. To be genuinely c r i t i c a l of S o c i e t y ( i . e . , in ~ractice)
i n v i t e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of o n e l s d e s t r u c t i o n a s a human being.
This f e a r i s r e i n f o r c e d by another myth which i s t h e
complement t o t h e former. Represented by Prometheus and
C h r i s t , t h i s myth suggests t h a t even t h o s e few who can success-
f u l l y deny t h e accepted o r d e r of t h i n g s cannot escape d e s t r u c -
tion. Prometheus and C h r i s t symbolize t h e man who can r e j e c t
" l e g i t i m a t e " a u t h o r i t y when i t c o n f l i c t s with t h e a u t h o r i t y
of h i s own experience, who can impose new meaning on t h e
world through accepting, t o t h e l i m i t s of h i s c a p a b i l i t i e s ,
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i s own a c t s , and who i s s a c r i f i c e d t o t h e
gods ( S o c i e t y ) f o r t h i s t r a n s g r e s s i o n .
A paradox appears when t h e s e two myths a r e compared.

This paradox was only b r i e f l y r e f e r r e d t o by Marx but i s of

c e n t r a l s i g n i f i c a n c e t o t h e study of a l i e n a t i o n ,
/ Marx s t a t e d
t h e paradox with r e f e r e n c e t o t h e a l i e n a t i o n of both r u l e r
and r u l e d i n c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y . A l i e n a t i o n i s expressed i n 4
t h e former through h i s being and i n t h e l a t t e r through h i s
activity. 5 The person who does n o t a c t with r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
t o h i s human c a p a c i t i e s g i v e s up h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n name
but n o t i n deed. H e i s p a s s i v e l y s a c r i f i c e d through l o s i n g
t h e " i n n e r world" of h i s humanity t o t h e " o u t e r world" and

external authority
/
 When people e x t e r n a l i z e and make a b s o l u t e t h e i r
s t a n d a r d s , t h e r e l a t i o n of t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o t h e s e s t a n d a r d s
i s of no consequence except i n s o f a r a s he i s a b l e t o "measure
t
up t o " and embody them. People t r e a t one another and them-
s e l v e s a s "mere" i n d i v i d u a l r e f l e c t i o n s of t h e s t a n d a r d s they
c r e a t e and maintain. Against t h i s background, t h e myth r e p r e -
sented by Prometheus and C h r i s t s e r v e s a s a reminder of our
human c a p a b i l i t i e s , i l l u m i n a t i n g t h e experiences of a l l
people, both a s a p o s i t i v e i d e a l and a s a source of t e r r o r a t
having t o f a c e t h e f a t e of being human.
When t h e s e two myths a r e t r a n s f e r r e d from t h e p r i v a c y
of assumption t o t h e p u b l i c i t y of e v a l u a t i o n and t h e connec-
t i o n between them i s recognized, t h e s p e l l of I n d i v i d u a l
v e r s u s S o c i e t y i s broken. The p u b l i c exposure of t h e s e myths
i l l u m i n a t e s t h e f a c t t h a t both r e p r e s e n t a s p e c t s of our common
l i f e a s p e r s p e c t i v e s t h a t we have invented t o enable us t o
comprehend t h i s ' l i f e . I may f a c e S o c i e t y a s Prometheus i n one
s i t u a t i o n but f o r another person i n another s i t u a t i o n I may
r e p r e s e n t t h e S o c i e t y with which he, a s Prometheus, must con-
tend. I f we a r e a b l e t o s e e t h e r e l a t i o n of t h e s e myths t o
our common p r a c t i c e we have a t l e a s t t h e rudiments of a new
view of man with which we can review t h e r e l a t i o n between
mind and body.
Marx provided a rudimentary new view of man through
s t r e s s i n g p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y a s t h e source of human experience.
He wrote comparatively l i t t l e on.human r e l a t i o n s a s such,
choosing t o c o n c e n t r a t e h i s ' a t t e n t i o n on a c r i t i q u e of
capitalism. I n doing s o he r a t h e r took f o r g r a n t e d t h a t men
would r e a l i z e t h e i r i d e a l human n a t u r e while r i d d i n g them-
s e l v e s of t h e " b i a s i n g 1 ' s o c i a l p e r s p e c t i v e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h
class relations. What remained rudimentary i n Marxts t h e o r y
was explored more thoroughly by Weber and became a w e l l
developed account of human r e l a t i o n s i n t h e work of George
Herbert Mead.
According t o Mead's t h e o r y of mind (mind being a
p r o c e s s of s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) men a r e s e l f - c o n s c i o u s w h i l e

t a k i n g p e r s p e c t i v e s of t h e world i n which t h e y themselves

appear a s one of t h e o b j e c t s w i t h i n t h e p e r s p e c t i v e s . This
t a k i n g of p e r s p e c t i v e s i s a s o c i a l p r o c e s s , dependent upon
our being r e l a t e d t o one a n o t h e r through a common language.
We l e a r n p e r s p e c t i v e s through one a n o t h e r and c r e a t e new ones
r e l a t i v e t o o l d ones. What we know of t h e old (what has
p a s s e d ) i s always bound by t h e new (what i s coming) w i t h i n
which t h e o l d appears n o t a s i t " r e a l l y was" but a s i t appea-rs
t o have been w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e new. The new i s
e q u a l l y a s bound by t h e o l d out of which i t a r i s e s , and i n
r e l a t i o n t o which i t f i n d s e x p r e s s i o n . We s e e o u r s e l v e s i n

t h e p r e s e n t through b e i n g a b l e t o t a k e p e r s p e c t i v e s based on
i n t e r p o l a t i n g between p a s t and f u t u r e . There i s an o v e r l a p
between t h e old and new, where t h e one p a s s e s i n t o t h e o t h e r ,
and i t i s i n t h i s o v e r l a p t h a t t h e c o n t i n u i t y between p a s t and
f u t u r e i s maintained. This c o n t i n u i t y i s based upon our
 on-going experiences i n our common l i f e .
Mead's theory can be used t o look a t t h e mind-body
problem i n a new l i g h t . It i s through our c a p a c i t y t o t a k e
p e r s p e c t i v e s of our common l i f e by means of a common language
t h a t one person can "stand on t h e i n s i d e " of h i s experience
while o t h e r s can " s t a n d on t h e o u t s i d e " of i t . Because of
t h i s c a p a c i t y we a r e a b l e t o a b s t r a c t s out of common experience
t h e n o t i o n s of mind and body ( s u b j e c t and o b j e c t , i n d i v i d u a l
and s o c i e t y ) . Both " s i d e s " , when a c o n f l i c t occurs, may be
e q u a l l y a s c e r t a i n of t h e r e a l i t y of t h e i r experience. If,
when t h i s occurs, we a r e a c t i n g on t h e assumption of t h e e x i s -
t e n c e of Society, assuming t h a t t h e world must be One, we a r e
a b l e t o consider only one p e r s p e c t i v e t o be v a l i d w i t h i n any
given s i t u a t i o n . The two must be prevented from coming i n t o
direct conflict. Our means of p r o t e c t i n g t h e one from t h e
o t h e r , t h e c r e a t i o n of two worlds, one f o r t h e s p i r i t and t h e
o t h e r f o r t h e body, i s embedded i n our customs r e g u l a t i n g
c o n t a c t with one another. We r e f e r t o t h e s e customs i n t h e
r i g h t s of p r i v a c y and i n p u b l i c o b l i g a t i o n s . Those a s p e c t s of
experience which a r e acknowledged p u b l i c l y a r e considered t o
J

be profane because they a r e s u b j e c t t o e x t e r n a l d e f i n i t i o n s .

The more p r i v a t e a s p e c t s of experience, while considered t o
be sacred, a r e n o t allowed t o i n t e r f e r e with t h e " n e c e s s i t y "
of p u b l i c o b l i g a t i o n .
Within t h i s p o l a r i z a t i o n , one approaches a " s t r a n g e r "
i n i t i a l l y through " p u b l i c f f modes of behavior and may, through
 a complicated process of shar$ng more and more " p r i v a t e "
spheres, become i n t i m a t e . The a b i l i t y t o do t h i s depends upon
o n e ' s f i r s t having developed, t o some e x t e n t , w i t h i n " p r i v a t e "
spheres. The c u l t u r a l assumption accompanying t h i s behavior
i s t h a t men, while remaining i s o l a t e d from one another, a r e
d i r e c t l y connected t o "God" and t o " n e c e s s i t y " . "God" and
" n e c e s s i t y " a r e t h e two b r i d g e s spanning t h e space between
individuals.
To say t h a t men a r e e s s e n t i a l l y i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s
r e l a t e d t o one another by n e c e s s i t y i s analogous t o sayin?
t h a t magnetic p o l e s a r e i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s r e l a t e d by t h e
% necessary c u r r e n t s p a s s i n g between them. I n f a c t , i t i s only
with r e s p e c t t o t h e i r r e l a t i o n t h a t we can s e p a r a t e them,
c a l l i n g one North and t h e o t h e r South. Similarly, it i s the
acknowledgement by people of t h e c u r r e n t s p a s s i n g between them,
t h e i r awareness of "God", t h a t l i e s a t t h e source of human
life. Deeper than p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s , h i s t o r i e s ,
t e c h n o l o g i e s , t h i s shared experience i s t h e fountain-head of
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and i d e n t i t y .
Shared experience or s e l f - o t h e r - c o n s c i o u s n e s s precedes
b
and a c t s a s an anchor f o r s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , and s e l f -
consciousness i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e e x e r c i s e of
6\
responsibility? We have a tendency i n our common use of
11
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " t o s t r e s s i t s meaning a s o b l i g a t i o n t o respond
i n p a r t i c u l a r ways i n p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s , p a s s i n g l i g h t l y
over t h e f a c t t h a t " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " i n c l u d e s t h e a b i l i t y o r
c a p a c i t y t o respond. This tendency, a s w i l l be discussed
s h o r t l y , r e f l e c t s t h e myth of S o c i e t y . I d e n t i t y emerges i n
r e s p o n s i b l e co-operations where a b i l i t y t o respond i s chan-
n e l l e d by mutually determined o b l i g a t i o n s between people.
69
I am using co-operation h e r e i n t h e l i t e r a l sense t o mean t h e
0
j o i n t a c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s e f f e c t i n g an event.
Unlike magnetic p o l e s , we have t h e c a p a b i l i t y ,
through being aware of o u r s e l v e s i n t h i s r e l a t i o n , t o d i r e c t
and c o n t r o l t h e " c u r r e n t s " p a s s i n g between us. The p o s s i b i -
l i t i e s a r i s i n g from t h i s a r e enormous and we have learned t o
p r o t e c t o u r s e l v e s from them with " i n s u l a t o r s " manifested most
10
c l e a r l y i n taboos a g a i n s t touch , and r e f l e c t e d i n t h e
11
s t r u c t u r e of our language. We move through our assumed s p a c e s , .
our " s o c i a l " spaces, guided by u n t e s t e d assumptions about t h e
world i n which we move, " o u t of touch" humanly even though we
surround one another a s s t r a n g e r s . Our experience of t h e
d r a s t i c e f f e c t s t h a t can r e s u l t from t h i s b l i n d acceptance of
assumptions i s enough t o j a r us i n t o q u e s t i o n i n g them, and
y e t t h e s e same assumptions prevent us from doing s o f o r f e a r
of l o s s of what e x i s t e n c e we do have.
0
Self-consciousness, r a t h e r t h a n being used t o e x p l o r e
new p o s s i b i l i t i e s , i s experienced a s shame a t being exposed t o
be o t h e r t h a n what i s expected and g u i l t f o r f a i l i n g t o adhere
t o p r e s c r i b e d r u l e s of behavior -- r u l e s of behavior which
13
were c r e a t e d f o r movement i n another time and space.
Responsibility i s interpreted as obligation, t h e
a b i l i t y t o respond being t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d . That we may be
demanding modes of behavior t h a t we a r e n o t a b l e t o perform
does n o t a r i s e f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . A b i l i t y and o b l i g a t i o n t o
respond emerge a s two d i s t i n c t " r e a l i t i e s f ' opposing one
another. The former i s r e f e r r e d t o a s freedom (from r e s p o n s i -
b i l i t y ) and t h e l a t t e r a s r e s t r i c t i o n on t h a t freedom if we
s t r e s s t h e a b i l i t y t o respond. When we s t r e s s t h e o b l i g a t i o n
t o respond t h e former i s c a l l e d l a c k of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and t h e
latter duty, o b l i g a t i o n , o r simply r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . In this
confusion t h e urge toward u n i t y i s p e r v e r t e d i n t o an a t t e m p t
t o escape t h e s o c i a l p r o c e s s through i n c r e a s i n g l y r i g i d formal
c o n t r o l of response; and t h e urge t o e x p l o r e , r a t h e r t h a n
being d i r e c t e d toward m a i n t a i n i n g t h e s o c i a l p r o c e s s , i-s
transformed i n t o r e b e l l i o n a g a i n s t t h e e f f e c t of t h e p e r v e r t e d
urge f o r u n i t y . Those who s t r i v e f o r u n i t y r e a c t i n t u r n t o
t h e e f f e c t of t h e p e r v e r t e d urge t o e x p l o r e , and t h e p r o c e s s
i s one of an i n c r e a s i n g s p i r a l of v i o l e n t c o n f r o n t a t i o n between
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of both If sides".
It i s t h e breakdown of i n f o r m a l communal c o n t r o l of
behavior t h a t l i e s behind t h i s development. Formal c o n t r o l
emerges i n s i t u a t i o n s t h a t cannot be handled i n f o r m a l l y , but
i t remains dependent upon forms of i n f o r m a l c o n t r o l . When
communal c o n t r o l breaks down and formal c o n t r o l i s used a s an
attempt t o compensate f o r i t , our myth of S o c i e t y and t h e
i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l f i n d s i t s f u l l f l o w e r i n g , unhampered by
communal r e a l i t y . The a b i l i t y t o respond, which could be
 lematic. The "problem" i s i n d i c a t e d i n high r a t e s of d i v o r c e ,

1i crime, and "mental" i l l n e s s , and i n conformity (confused a s

11 co-operation") with r u l e s e x t e r n a l and incomprehensible t o

the individual.
This conformity d i d n o t a r i s e a s a problem i n former
modes of communal l i f e . I n communal l i f e an i n d i v i d u a l was

I not considered t o be co-operative o r r e b e l l i o u s -- he acted

"properly" or was a h e r e t i c , t r a i t o r , o r witch, depending on
t h e q u a l i t y of h i s d e v i a t i o n from t h e " c o r r e c t " way.
I

The confusion between co-operation and conformity i s

made with r e f e r e n c e t o t h e myth of S o c i e t y . I f we detach
11
co-operation" from t h i s myth and use i t a s I have i n d i c a t e d

\
t o r e f e r t o t h e j o i n t a c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s t o e f f e c t an
event, t h e word becomes a key s t a b i l i z e r f o r a new understand-
i n g of our l i f e . Rather t h a n r e f e r r i n g t o t h e d e l i b e r a t e con-
formity of i n d i v i d u a l s t o some predetermined and/or e x t e r n a l
s e t of r u l e s f o r behavior, t h e word now emphasizes t h e mutual
a c t i v i t y of people with r e f e r e n c e t o which consciously d e t e r -
mined r u l e s a r e but one f a c t o r e f f e c t i n g t h e event. The s h i f t
i n emphasis i s an important one because i t i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e
i n t e r a c t i o n of v a r i o u s i n d i v i d u a l s i s t h e c e n t r a l f a c t o r i n
determining t h e shape of an event. It i n d i c a t e s t h a t both
t h e a b i l i t y and t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o respond r e f e r t o t h i s i n t e r -
action.

By t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , i f a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l i s
b
involved i n an event ( a f f e c t e d by i t ) he i s involved i n t h e
co-operation e f f e c t i n g t h a t event. The paradox involved i n
t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n between t h e myths of S o c i e t y and t h e Res-
p o n s i b l e I n d i v i d u a l , t h a t we cannot escape being s a c r i f i c e d
whether we choose t h e one "way" o r t h e o t h e r , i s d i s s o l v e d .
We can choose t o be p a s s i v e l y o r a c t i v e l y involved i n t h e
shaping of an e v e n t , b u t we cannot escape b e i n g involved.
That we cannot escape i s shown i n t h e e f f e c t of t h e event on
US.
14
Events occur i n " p r e s e n t s " and i t i s w i t h r e f e r e n c e
t o t h i s f a c t t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , a s both a b i l i t y and o b l i g a -
tion, gains i t s significance. Both t h e a b i l i t y and t h e o b l i -
g a t i o n depend upon t h e i n d i v i d u a l l s understanding of t h e event
w i t h i n which he responds. It i s i n terms of t h i s understanding
t h a t we can speak of a person choosing a c o u r s e of a c t i o n , t h e
o p p o r t u n i t y t o make c h o i c e s between genuinely p o s s i b l e a l t e r -
n a t i v e s d e c i d i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s i n which r e s p o n s i b i l i t y can be
exercised. Obviously, where no a l t e r n a t i v e s e x i s t ( b o t h
i m a g i n a t i v e l y and e m p i r i c a l l y ) t h e r e i s no p o s s i b i l i t y f o r
responsible action.
While a person may a t t e m p t t o avoid r e s p o n s i b i l i t y b y
r e f u s i n g t o respond ( w i t h i n t h e myth, e i t h e r t o conform o r
r e b e l ) , t h i s a t t e m p t cannot, w i t h r e s p e c t t o my d e f i n i t i o n of
c o - o p e r a t i o n , be a genuine escape. R e f u s a l t o respond becomes
e q u i v a l e n t t o a d e c i s i o n , on t h e p a r t of t h e person a t t e m p t i n g
t h e escape, t o a l l o w someone e l s e ' s response t o answer f o r h i s
own. It i s n e c e s s a r y , i n ou? complexity of r e l a t i o n s , t o
delegate responsibility ( i . e . , t o make someone e l s e ' s r e s p o n s e
answer f o r o n e ' s own), and we o r g a n i z e e l a b o r a t e " s t r u c t u r e s "
t o do t h i s , but i t i s pure f a n t a s y t o suppose t h a t t h e s e
s t r u c t u r e s i n any s e n s e r e p l a c e our p e r s o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,
( i . e . our responses t o one a n o t h e r a s p e r s o n s p The person
who allows a n o t h e r f s response t o answer f o r h i s own i s p a s s i v e -
l y r a t h e r t h a n a c t i v e l y involved i n t h e c o - o p e r a t i o n . His
a c t i v e involvement remains a p o s s i b i l i t y and i t i s t h i s f a c t
t h a t c r e a t e s t h e i n s t a b i l i t y of e v e n t s w i t h i n which a m a j o r i t y
of people a r e p a s s i v e l y involved. The i n s t a b i l i t y i s due t o
t h e f a c t t h a t while a person remains p a s s i v e , h i s acti-ve
involvement ( i . e . , t h e c h o i c e s he can make) cannot be d e t e r -
mined. H e i s an unknown f a c t o r . I n any s i t u a t i o n where r e s -
p o n s i b l e c o - o p e r a t i o n ( a s t h e a b i l i t y and o b l i g a t i o n with
r e f e r e n c e t o some s p e c i f i e d e v e n t , t m 2make c h o i c e s from among
two or more a l t e r n a t i v e a c t i o n s such t h a t t h e j o i n t a c t i o n of
t h e i n d i v i d u a l s e f f e c t i n g t h e event i s c o n s c i o u s l y c o n t r o l l e d )
i s p o s s i b l e , b o t h a c t i v e and p a s s i v e involvement have t o be
taken account o f .
I d e n t i t y , t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h e a l i e n a t i o n dilemma,
emerges i n r e s p o n s i b l e c o - o p e r a t i o n s . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t we
t r y t o c r e a t e an i d e n t i t y w i t h i n t h e framework of S o c i e t y s o
t h a t i d e n t i t y i s i n t e r p r e t e d a s a " t h i n g " which one "has" due

t o h i s l t p o s i t i o n " i n S o c i e t y , we w i l l e x p e r i e n c e t h e s t r a i n of
c o n t r a d i c t i o n between t h i s assumption and t h e
a c t u a l l y experienced by us, t h e s t r a i n of a l i e n a t i o n . I f we
regard i d e n t i t y n o t a s some " t h i n g " but a s a word r e f e r r i n g
t o a method developed and used by human beings f o r l o c a t i n g
themselves w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of an event c a l l e d a " l i f e t i m e " ,
a word r e f e r r i n g both t o t h e c o n t i n u i t y of t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s
experience of himself throughout h i s l i f e t i m e and t o t h e
c h a n g e a b i l i t y of circumstances r e l a t i n g t o t h i s event, our
focus of a t t e n t i o n moves t o t h e s o c i a l i t y of our e x i s t e n c e .
Rather than being p a s s i v e l y s e p a r a t e d from some " t h i n g " w i t h
which we have a need t o be a c t i v e l y u n i t e d , v i c t i m s s t r u g g l i n g
t o maintain an i d e n t i t y i n a world we d i d n o t c r e a t e and do
n o t comprehend, we f i n d o u r s e l v e s s t a n d i n g on a new t h r e s h o l d ,
u n c e r t a i n of what we a r e going t o d i s c o v e r but c o n f i d e n t of
our human a b i l i t y t o d i s c o v e r .
The t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i s one of a t t i t u d e which comes a s
we uncover our a c t i v i t i e s from t h e myths shrouding them. The
method by which we have c r e a t e d new i n v e n t i o n s was n o t t o des-
t r o y t h e s a i l b o a t b e f o r e i n v e n t i n g t h e steamer. Our method
has always been t o e x p l o r e new p o s s i b i l i t i e s a g a i n s t an
,\
accepted c u l t u r a l background, transforming t h e world through
i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e new and t h e o l d . The most f i r m o b s t a c l e i n
t h e way of t h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i s t h e assumption t h a t s o c i e t y
i s a t h i n g , with t h e p r o p e r t i e s of t h i n g n e s s such t h a t i t can
be destroyed and replaced with a new one, and a t h i n g , con-
sequently, t h a t has t o be p r o t e c t e d from d e s t r u c t i o n .
 CHAPTER I
*
ALIENATION I N THE THEORY OF KARL MARX

I n t h i s c h a p t e r I d i s c u s s b r i e f l y t h e major uses of
l l a l i e n a t i o n " l e a d i n g up t o Marxfs d e f i n i t i o n , with major
r e f e r e n c e t o t h o s e a s p e c t s of Hegells and Feuerbachls work
which seem t o have p a r t i c u l a r r e l e v a n c e t o Marxfs t h e o r y . I

t h e n go i n t o a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of Marxls t h e o r y of a l i e n a -
t i o n a s " e s t r a n g e d l a b o r " , and f i n a l l y , r e l a t e i t w i t h i n t h e
l a r g e r c o n t e x t of community as Marx seems t o have understood
it. I have t a k e n t h e major p o r t i o n of t h i s l a t t e r d i s c u s s i o n

from t h e German Ideology which, t o g e t h e r with t h e Economic

and P h i l o s o p h i c Manuscripts of 1844, seems t o form a b a s i c
t h e o r e t i c a l coherence which i s m i s s i n g from e i t h e r work
taken s e p a r a t e l y .

1. THE BACKGROUND

O r i g i n and E a r l y Uses of A l i e n a t i o n
The English term " a l i e n a t i o n " has i t s r o o t i n t h e
I
i
L a t i n " a l i e n a t i o " , and can be t r a c e d back t o Greek and Hebrew
sources. I n t h e Hebrew usage i t r e f e r r e d t o s e p a r a t i o n of a
/'i
person from God f o r v a r i o u s reasons such a s a "wicked n a t u r e " ,
t h e worship of f a l s e i d o l s , and "darkened understanding" caused
1
by " b l i n d n e s s of h e a r t " . This meaning was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o
t h e L a t i n use of " a l i e n a t i o n " t o i n d i c a t e what we would now
r e f e r t o as psychosis. The Greek " e c s t a s i s " , a.s i t r e f e r s t o
t h e transcendence by t h e i n d i c i d u a l of h i s u s u a l m e n t a l i t y
2
i n t o "pure contemplation", a l s o flows i n t o t h i s use. While
i n t h e Hebrew a l i e n a t i o n was g i v e n n e g a t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n and
i n t h e Greek, p o s i t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n , t h e L a t i n use i s more
n e u t r a l , i n d i c a t i n g s e p a r a t i o n of a person from some o t h e r
person, group, being, or t h i n g ; a s e p a r a t i o n which may have
p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n s , depending on t h e s i t u a t i o n .
This n e u t r a l i t y of a f f e c t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n i s i n d i c a t e d i n t h e
l e g a l c o n t e x t w i t h i n which a l i e n a t i o n was used. In this legal
s e n s e a l i e n a t i o n r e f e r r e d t o t h e t r a n s f e r e n c e of p r o p e r t y from
one person t o a n o t h e r .
3
,
The L a t i n meanings of a l i e n a t i o n were i n c o r p o r a t e d
i n t o European thought i n two d i s t i n c t d e f i n i t i o n s ; t h e one
i n d i c a t i n g a mental c o n d i t i o n and t h e o t h e r r e f e r r i n g t o pos-
s e s s i o n of p r o p e r t y . The f i r s t r e t a i n e d t h e Hebrew c o n n o t a t i o n
of n e g a t i v i t y while t h e second r e t a i n e d t h e n e u t r a l c o n n o t a t i o n
of l e g a l i t y , u n t i l Marx merged them i n h i s c r i t i q u e of c a p i t a l -
ism.

Hegelts Two Uses of A l i e n a t i o n

Hegel r e t a i n e d t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between "mental"
4
a l i e n a t i o n and a l i e n a t i o n of p r o p e r t y , concentrating his
a t t e n t i o n on t h e former. He r e f e r r e d t o "mental" a l i e n a t i o n
i n two ways; a s a c o n d i t i o n o r s t a t e of being, and a s a p r o -
c e s s of becoming. I n t h e f i r s t c a s e one i s a l i e n a t e d from
himself a n d . i n t h e second, from o t h e r s . I n both c a s e s Hegel
used t h e d i a l e c t i c t o f o r g e at u n i t y between f i n i t e and
infinite. c2
a. The' Unhappy Consciousness
Hegel u n i t e d t h e concept of a l i e n a t i o n w i t h t h e
C a r t e s i a n dilemma of t h e s e l f a s both s u b j e c t and o b j e c t , a
6
dilemma which had become, a t h i s time, a recognized " f a c t " .
As D a n i e l B e l l summarized:
A l i e n a t i o n , i n i t s o r i g i n a l c o n n o t a t i o n , (by o r i g i n a l
he means Hegelian -- DE) was t h e r a d i c a l d i s s o c i a t i o n
of t h e ' s e l f ' i n t o both a c t o r and t h i n g , i n t o a s u b j e c t
t h a t s t r i v e s t o c o n t r o l i t s own f a t e , and an o b j e c t
which i s manipulated by o t h e r s . . . . A l i e n a t i o n was an
o n t o l o g i c a l f a c t , i n t h e s t r u c t u r e of grammar a s w e l l
a s of l i f e ; f o r t h e s e l f was n o t j u s t an 1 1 1 s e e k i n g
t o shape t h e world according t o i t s i n t e n t i o n s , but
a l s o a 'me', an o b j e c t whose i d e n t i t y s b u i l t up by
t h e p i c t u r e s t h a t o t h e r s have of 'me'. 3
Hegel considered t h e Unhappy Consciousness t o be one of many

s t a g e s i n t h e development ofp\the World S p i r i t from one l e v e l

of c ~ n ~ c i o u ~
t on anotherC8'.
e ~ ~ Recognizing i t s e l f a s both
p a r t i c u l a r and u n i v e r s a l (unchanging), t h e Unhappy Conscious-
n e s s i s unable t o r e c o n c i l e i t s ' # a l i e n a t i o n " . Hegel, u s i n g h i s
d i a l e c t i c t o show t h a t mind i s " p a r t i c u l a r i t y i n g e n e r a l " ,
r e s o l v e d t h e C a r t e s i a n dilemma a s a "problem" of t h e a l i e n a t e d
soul. 9 As a "problem" of t h e mind, a l i e n a t i o n i s n o t a
n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n , but i s due t o a misunderstanding of a
necessary condition, i . e . , t h a t of t h e d u a l i t y of s e l f . The
d u a l i t y of s e l f i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e f u l l develop-
ment of t h e World S p i r i t , whose u l t i m a t e g o a l i s s e l f -
contemplation. I n o r d e r f o r It ( a s s u b j e c t ) t o contemplate
I t s e l f ( a s o b j e c t ) t h e d u a l i t y of s e l f i s e s s e n t i a l .
b. A l i e n a t i o n of s e l f from d t h e r s
I n an attempt t o v a l i d a t e h i s n o t i o n t h a t t h e g o a l
of t h e World S p i r i t i s s e l f - c o n t e m p l a t i o n (and consequently
t h e necessary e x i s t e n c e of t h e s e l f a s both s u b j e c t and o b j e c t ) ,
Hegel t r i e d t o prove t h a t consciousness of s e l f i s t h e b a s i c
10
c o n d i t i o n f o r consciousness of anything whatsoever. In so
doing, he developed h i s second use of a l i e n a t i o n .
He argued t h a t t h e o b j e c t of consciousness i s know-
ledge of t h e immediate, of what i s . Consciousness i s "I".
Knowledge of what i s i s a t t a i n e d through t h e s e n s e s , and t h e
e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e of s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y l i e s i n n e i t h e r t h e o b j e c t
1 1
II
nor i n t h e " I uY but i n t h e f a c t t h a t both a r e . When one
makes t h e statement -- I know --,t h e "I" knowing immediately

becomes an o b j e c t . Consciousness knows i t s e l f through r e f l e c -

12
tion, i.e., i t only "comes upon t h e grave of i t s l i f e " .
Consciousness coming upon t h e grave of i t s l i f e i s t h e a l i e n a -
t e d consciousness. The s e l f p a s s e s beyond t h i s s t a t e of mind.
But s i n c e consciousness has found out by experience
t h a t t h e grave of i t s a c t u a l unchangeable Being has
no c o n c r e t e a c t u a l i t y , t h a t t h e vanished p a r t i c u l a r i t y
-
q ~ $ ~ a r t i c u l a r i t i~t, w i l l g i v e up looking f o r t h e
unchangeable p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n c e a s something a c t u a l
o r w i l l c e a s e - t r y i n g t o hold on t o what has t h u s
vanished. Only so i s i t capable of f i n d i n p a r t i c u l a r i t y
i n a t r u e form, a form t h a t i s u n i v e r s a l . 15
The s e l f a s o b j e c t i s formed through medium of c u l t u r e .
Culture, which i n c l u d e s a l l means of self-development, both
i d e a s and m a t e r i a l f a c t o r s , i s t h e means b y which an i n d i v i d u a l
g e t s o b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y and c o n c r e t e a c t u a l i t y . It i s through
 I

estrangement from one a n o t h e r t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s d e f i n e one

a n o t h e r , t h i s o p p o s i t i o n and s e p a r a t i o n being e s s e n t i a l f o r
t h e development of s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . The n e g a t i o n of t h i s
negation i s the recognition t h e i r e s s e n t i a l unity. Spirit
i s t h i s negation. Men, who a r e s e p a r a t e d from one a n o t h e r
through t h e medium of c u l t u r e i n o r d e r t o develop s e l f -
consciousness, a r e u n i t e d t o g e t h e r i n t h e World S p i r i t .
" S p i r i t i s alone Reality ... i t i s s e l f - c o n t a i n e d and s e l f -
complete, i n i t s e l f and f o r i t s e l f a t once", t h e u n i t y of t h e
14
unchangeable and t h e p a r t i c u l a r .

The f i r s t use of a l i e n a t i o n d e s c r i b e s a p e r i o d i n
t h e h i s t o r i c a l development of S p i r i t and t h e second d e s c r i b e s
t h e h i s t o r y of i n d i v i d u a l development, i . e . , t h e p r o c e s s by
which i n d i v i d u a l s grow i n t o s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Both s e n s e s
i n which t h e term i s used d i s m i s s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of genuine
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between f e e l i n g , thought and behavior. Hegel
assumed t h a t a l o g i c a l s o l u t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y and s u b j e c t i v i t y '

a s such c o n s t i t u t e d a complete s o l u t i o n of a l i e n a t i o n .

Feuerbachls Anthropology
Feuerbach a t t a c k e d Hegells b a s i c assumption t h a t con-
s c i o u s n e s s of s e l f i s b a s i c t o consciousness of anything.
... Before I understand myself, I am grounded i n t h e
e x i s t e n c e of o t h e r s by n a t u r e . My t h i n k i n g only makes
me conscious of what I am a l r e a d y : a being, n o t
ungrounded, but grounded upon a n o t h e r e x i s t e n c e . Not
1 1 1 , but 1 1 and Thou1 i s t h e t r u e p r i n c i p l e of l i f e
and thought. 15
The Essence o:f C h r i s t i a n-
i t y i s devoted t o d e s c r i b i n g how
essence i s grounded i n e x i s t e n c e , and how theology i s t h e
anthropomorphism of man's own q u a l i t i e s .
I n Hegelts theory, mants consciousness of God i s t h e
self-consciousness of God. Feuerbach took i s s u e w i t h t h i s ,
asking -- Why d o s t thou a l i e n a t e man's consciousness from him,
and make i t t h e s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a being d i s t i n c t from
man, of t h a t which i s an o b j e c t t o him? --.
.., i f i t i s only i n human f e e l i n g s and wants t h a t
t h e d i v i n e tnothingt becomes something, o b t a i n s
q u a l i t i e s , t h e n t h e being of man i s alone t h e r e a l
being of God, -- man i s t h e r e a l God. And if i n t h e
consciousness which man has of God f i r s t a r i s e s t h e
self-consciousness o r God, then t h e human con c i o u s -
ness i s , p e r s e , t h e d i v i n e consciousness. lg
Ignoring t h e flaws i n t h i s Feuerbach opened up f o r
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t what i s f e l t a s d i v i n e i s
consciousness of consciousness ( a s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from p a r t i -
i
i.

c u l a r c o n t e n t s of t h i s c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) . It i s t h e a t t r i b u t e s of
human consciousness t h a t a r e a t t r i b u t e d t o God.
As we can conceive nothing e l s e a s a Divine Being
t h a n t h e R a t i o n a l which we t h i n k , t h e Good which we
love, t h e B e a u t i f u l which we p e r c e i v e , s o we know no
higher s p i r i t u a l l y o p e r a t i v e power nd expression of
power than t h e power of t h e Word. 18
The Word (language --
a s language) i s sacred, t h e instrument of
human consciousness. The p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s r e f e r r e d t o
through use of language a r e n o t s a c r e d ; the particular

r a t i o n a l thoughts, the p a r t i c u l a r good and b e a u t i f u l ; it i s

r a t h e r t h e s e forms of consciousness t h a t a r e s a c r e d ,
Feuerbach placed man w i t h i n t h e framework of t h e
n a t u r a l world, a s a s p e c i e s qf animal. As he saw i t , con-
s c i o u s n e s s of consciousness makes a q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e
between man and t h e o t h e r animals, t h i s q u a l i t y b e i n g a n t h r o -
pomorphised as God. But t h i s consciousness does n o t have
d i r e c t a c c u r a t e r e f e r e n c e t o t h e n a t u r a l world w i t h i n which
i t emerges.
A t h i n g which has a s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r me, i s
a n o t h e r t h i n g i n my i m a g i n a t i o n t h a n i n r e a l i t y . The .
t h i n g s i g n i f y i n g i s n o t i t s e l f t h a t which i s s i g n i f i e d .
What i t i s , i s e v i d e n t t o t h e s e n s e s ; what i t s i g n i -
f i e s i s o n l y i n my f e e l i n g s , c o n c e p t i o n s , i m a g i n a t i o n ,
-9
f o r me, n o t f o r o t h e r s , i s n o t o b j e c t i v e l y
p--r e sI eSnOt .n l h
Feuerbachls d i s t i n c t i o n between s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c -
t i v e i s n o t t h e same a s t h a t made by Hegel, but i s r a t h e r
c l o s e r t o t h e use t h a t Marx made of t h e s e terms. For Hegel, a
t-hing may be both s u b j e c t and o b j e c t f o r t h e Mind.- Feuerbach
saw,an ----
objec '.'
h i c h can

be known by i t s e f f e c t s -- "only t h a t which produces e f f e c t s ,

Feuerbach argued t h a t t h e m o r a l i t y of a r e l a t i o n i s
d e r i v e d from t h e s a c r e d n e s s of t h e r e l a t i o n a s such t o t h e
persons honoring i t .
P r o p e r t y d i d n o t become s a c r e d because i t was
regarded a s a d i v i n e i n s t i t u t i o n , but i t was
regarded a s a d i v i n e i n s t i t u t i o n because i t was
f e l t t o be i n i t s e l f sacred.21
The f e e l i n g of s a c r e d n e s s comes from t h e l i v i n g r e l a t i o n i n t h e
community of men, and moral s a n c t i o n s a r e a p p l i e d a s a r e s u l t
of t h i s r e l a t i o n . The i m p l i c a t i o n h e r e , which i s followed up
by Marx, i s t h a t a l l m o r a l i t y and r e l i g i o n i s dependent upon
a c t u a l concrete r e l a t i o n s . If t h e s e a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s change,
1

what was formerly f e l t t o be sacred no longer being P r e s e n t

i n r e a l i t y and new r e l a t i o n s having been formed, then m o r a l i t y
and r e l i g i o n must change correspondingly.
Feuerbach b e l i e v e d t h a t r e l i g i o n a l i e n a t e s man _from
himself by leading him t o a t t r i b u t e h i s own n a t u r e , which i s
inter-subjective, t o a s e p a r a t e being, God, and by l e a d i n g him
t o ( a t l e a s t .within t h e C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o n ) i g n o r e h i s senses
a s being base and profane. But, he i n s i s t e d , i t i s through
t h e senses t h a t we come t o know r e a l i t y , and t o deny t h e senses
22
i s t o deny r e a l i t y .
He used H e g e l f s method of s y n t h e s i z i n g t h e i n f i n i t e
and f i n i t e t o ground manls s p i r i t u a l essence i n h i s sensuous
e x i s t e n c e , and t o analyse, w i t h i n t h i s c o n t e x t , t h e r o l e of
r e l i g i o n i n a l i e n a t i n g man from himself. He simply turned over
t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e S p i r i t of Hegel, o r God, and man
so t h a t man now c r e a t e s God i n h i s image and i s n o t merely t h e
t o o l whereby God comes i n t o self-awareness. Where Hegel saw
men r e l a t e d .in t h e common Mind of World-Spirit while remaining
i s o l a t e d from one another i n t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n c e ,
Feuerbach u n i t e d men i n t h e i r sensuous i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v e e x i s -
t e n c e , and saw t h e i r minds a s being i s o l a t e d . ("what ( a t h i n g )
signifies ... i s only f o r me, n o t f o r o t h e r s , i s n o t objec-
t i v e l y present. " ) 23
 2. ESTRANGED LABOR
MARXIS A l i e n a t i o n Through M a t e r i a l E x i s t e n c e
Marxts organized t h e o r y of a l i e n a t i o n i s found i n a
r
s h o r t c h a p t e r e n t i t l e d "Estranged Labor" i n The Economic and
P h i l o s o p h i c Manuscripts of 1844. Here he e l a b o r a t e d upon f o u- r
a s p e c t s of e s t r a n g e d l a b o r ; a l i e n a t i o n from t h e p r o d u c t s of \

t h e p r o c e s s of work, from s p e c i e s l i f e , and from

Where Hegel d i s c u s s e d a l i e n a t i o n w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t
of theology ( i . e . , with r e f e r e n c e t o t h e development of t h e
W o r l d - S p i r i t ) and Feuerbach used t h e concept w i t h i n an a n t h r o -
p o l o g i c a l framework, Marx employed i t i n a r a d i c a l c r i t i c i s m
.
"

y. P o l i t i c a l economists, he argued, a c c e p t
t h e f a c- t . of
- -
-p-rivate p r o p e r t y a s r a l or inevitable,
and assume t h e r e l a t i o n s e.g. between l a b o r and c a p i t a l ,
capi d land, t o be laws. They do not t r y t o e x p l a i n t h e
26
f a c t of p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , bu The i

import of t h i s c r i t i c i s m i s made c l e a r i n t h e l i g h t of Steven

E Toulminfs convincing argument d i s t i n g u i s h i n g s c i e n c e from

natural history.
27 Toulmin d i f f e r e n t i a t e d between s c i e n c e a s

p h y s i c s , and n a t u r a l h i s t o r y ; but t h e argument h o l d s f o r a l l

f i e l d s i n which t h e s c i e n t i f i c method can be a p p l i e d . The
method of t h e n a t u r a l h i s t o r i a n i s t o look f o r e m p i r i c a l
r e g u l a r i t i e s and t o c l a s s i f y o b j e c t s i n terms of t h e s e regu-
larities. The s c i e n t i s t , on t h e o t h e r hand, looks f o r explana-
t i o n s of e m p i r i c a l r e g u l a r i t i e s . As an example of t h e d i f f e r e n c e
between t h e s e two methods, wi'th r e f e r e n c e t o l i f e forms, i t
i s t h e job of t h e n a t u r a l h i s t o r i a n t o c l a s s i f y l i f e forms
i n t o s p e c i e s , t y p e s , e t c . , and t h e job of t h e s c i e n t i s t t o
account f o r t h e occurrence of l i f e forms by i n v e n t i n g models
.
such a s t h e gene, and by being a b l e t o r e c r e a t e t h e c o n d i t i o n s
under which l i f e o c c u r s .
It i s a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t we can s e e how Marx d i s -
t i n g u i s h e d himself a s a s c i e n t i s t . The p a r t i c u l a r way i n
which he r e l a t e d t h e o r y t o p r a c t i c a l r e a l i t y c o n s t i t u t e s t h e
r e v o l u t i o n a r y n a t u r e of h i s ' a p p r o a c h , i n comparison with
Hegel and Feuerbach, t o t h e study of man. Hegel knew t h a t t h e
28
laws of l o g i c must a r i s e from t h e n a t u r e of l o g i c , but did

not question t h e nature,of logic. He can be seen a s a n a t u r a l

h i s t o r i a n of " t h e mind". Marx wanted t-o e x p l a i n t h e n a t u r e of
p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y and was, t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t he accomplished
t h i s i n t e n t i o n , a s c i e n t i s t of human s o c i e t y .
Marx n e i t h e r ignored h i s t o r y a s d i d Feuerbach, n o r .
d i d he attempt t o e x p l a i n p r e s e n t r e l a t i o n s o n l y i n terms of

h i s t o r i c a l development a s d i d He-gel. "We proceed from an

69)
economic f a c t of t h e p r e s e n t . i. e . , p r i v a t e property.
g r e e dc, ---l a s s e s ,
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s such as c ~ m p e t i t i o n , , ~- -
which were t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d , a t t h e time t h a t he wrote, as
human n a t u r e , independent of p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,
Marx hypothesized t o be c h a r- a c t ~ r i ~ s t i cofs human s o c i e t y
-I_--

induced by an economic o r g a n i z a t i o n based upon p r i v a t e pro-

perty. The s o u r c e of t h e s e " t r a i t s of human n a t u r e " i s t h e

I
p r a c t i c a l economic r e l a t i o n s )engaged i n by men, r a t h e r than
being "found" i n man a s such. Marx analysed estranged l a b o r
t o show how 30
- p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y induces t h e s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
A l i e n a t i o n of man from h i s " s p e c i e s 5 h a r a c t e r i s t i . c "
(i.e., h i s human n a t u r e ) i s both t h e leas't discussed and most
b a s i c a s p e c t of estranged l a b o r . A l i e n a t i o n of t h e process of
l a b o r and t h e consequent a l i e n a t i o n from t h e products of l a b o r
c o n s t i t u t e t h e means by which men a r e a l i e n a t e d from t h e i r
s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , and a l i e n a t i o n from s e l f and o t h e r s i s
t h e r e s u l t of a l i e n a t i o n from t h e s p e c i e s . c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .
a. A l i e n a t i o n from s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r .
Marx saw t h e relations--hi^ between man and n a t u r e a s
an e s s e n t i a l , 1
/

-Man l i v e s on n a t u r e -- means t h a t natuke i s h i s body,

2

with which he must remain i n continuous i n t e r c h a n g e

i f he i s n o t t o d i e . That rnants p h y s i c a l and s p i r i t u a l
l i f e i s l i p k e d t o n a t u r e means simply t h a t n a t u r e i s
l i n k e d t o i t s e l f , f o r man i s a p a r t of n a t u r e . 3 l
The u n i v e r s a l i t y of man c o n s i s t s of t h e " u n i v e r s a l i t y which
32
makes a l l n a t u r e h i s i n o r g a n i c body". Labor i s t h e means by
which man i s r e l a t e d t o h i s i n o r g a n i c body, a n d i t i s t h i s p a r -
t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s man from o t h e r forms of
I

life. A l l l i f e i s s u s t a i n e d i n a process of exchange between

t h e l i f e form and i t s environment. Only man has t h e c a p a c i t y

t o produce h i s means of l i f e . The s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
making t h i s c a p a c i t y p o s s i b l e i s " f r e e , conscious a c t i v i t y " .
Labor i s . . t h e means by which man i s a b l e t o r e a l i z e
h i s human n a t u r e . While t h e animal " i s i t s l i f e a c t i v i t y " ,
meaning t h a t t h e animal hunts f o r food, p r o c r e a t e s , e t c . , t o \
I
keep p h y s i c a l l y a l i v e , man does t h e s e t h i n g s i n o r d e r t o " l i v e " /
.
i
d
i n a d i f f e r e n t sense. 33
( t h e animal) .. .
produces only under t h e dominion of
immediate p h y s i c a l need, whilsrt-ma-n produces even \I L-

when he i s f r e e from p h y s i c a l n ed and only t r u l y

om therefrom.3 t, _-
l?
The purpo ective or t o actualize i n i
\
E
t h e m a t e r i a l world, mants s p e c i e s l i f e . I n c r e a t i n g h i s world
of o b j e c t s , man does n o t c r e a t e f o r himself alone or f o r h i s
children, -3

Estranged l a b o r a l i e n a t e s man f i r s t from h i s r e l a t i o n

w i t h n a t u r e and consequently from himse-lf.
1 r
It changes f o r him t h e l i f e oY t h e s p e c i e s i n t o a '
means of individuaJ l i f e . F i r s t i t e s t r a n g e s t h e
l i f e of t h e s p e c i e s and i n d i v i d u a l l i f e , and
secondly, i t makes i n d i v i d u a l l i f e i n i t s a b s t r a c t
form t h e purpose of t h e l i f e of t h e s p e c i e s , l i k e -
wise i n i t s a b s t r a c t and estranged form.35
b. A l i e n a t i o n from o t h e r s
The estrangement between men i s implied i n t h e i r
1
estrangement from t h e i r s p e c i e s n a t u r e , and i t i s i n t h e i r !I
r e l a t i o n s with each o t h e r t h a t t h e i r a l i e n a t i o n i s " f i r s t i
1
r e a l i z e d and expressed". Men a r e always o b j e c t i v e l y r e l a t e d
t o themselves i n t h e same way t h a t they a r e o b j e c t i v e l y r e l a t e d
t o each o t h e r .
Hence w i t h i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of estranged l a b o r
each man views t h e o t h e r i n accordance with t h e
standard and t h e r e l a i o n s h i p i n which he f i n d s
himself a s a worker.3 8
It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n b t e h e r e t h a t , although a l i e n a t i o n from
each o t h e r i s l o g i c a l l y t h e r e s u l t of t h e a l i e n a t i o n of t h e /
I
i n d i v i d u a l from h i s s p e c i e s n a t u r e through estranged l a b o r ,
i t i s a l i e n a t i o n from each o t h e r t h a t i s f i r s t recognized. It

i s through t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t we a r e a b l e t o t r a c e i t s
origin. A t t h i s p o i n t we g e t a c l e a r i n s i g h t i n t o Marxrs r e a -

sons f o r a n a l y s i n g s o thoroughly t h e " m a t e r i a l " o r g a n i z a t i o n

of s o c i e t y while p a s s i n g l i g h t l y over t h e "ideology" shared by
u s i n our r e l a t i o n s with one a n o t h e r . He was obviously
assuming t h a t s i n c e our r e l a t i o n s with one another stem from
our l a b o r , i f we a l t e r t h e l a t t e r t h e former w i l l be t a k e n
care of. It remained f o r Weber t o show t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n
between m a t e r i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and ideology i s much more of a
two-way flow t h a n Marx seems t o have b e l i e v e d . l x i

c. A l i e n a t i o n from t h e Drocess of ' l a b o r

Active a l i e n a t i o n occurs i n t h e process of l a b o r ,
-- -- -

where work i s n o t a source of f u l f i l l m e n t t o t h e person, but

a source of s e l f - d e n i a l and degradation. This i s t o x e d labor
r a t h e r than chosen. The i n d i v i d u a l i s coerced t o work i n
- -. -
o r d e r t o s u r v i v e so t h a t t h e l a b o r has no v a l u e i n i t s e l f f o r
t h e worker, but has v a l u e only with r e f e r e n c e k _ . a n _
exkernal
need.
This n o t i o n of forced l a b o r has t o be s e t w i t h i n an
h i s t o r i c a l context t o be p r o p e r l y understood. Marx recognized
t h a t however man r e l a t e t o t h e i r s p e c i e s n a t u r e , they.. -.-..
have
.s.----- "

But he a l s o recognized t h a t -

due t o man's c r e a t i o n and development of new means f o r

 producing t h e t h i n g s t h a t he needs t d s u r v i v e . Forced l a b o r
r e f e r s t o forms of l a b o r t h a t a r e a r b i t r a r y . It occurs through
t h e c o n t r o l by some men t o t h e e x c l u s i o n of o t h e r s of t h e
means f o r l a b o r , and t h e i r consequent c o n t r o l over t h e a b i l i t y
. o f t h o s e excluded t o do l a b o r . It i s through t h i s c o n t r o l
over t h e a b i l i t y t o work t h a t t h e work done, t h e a c t i v i t y ,
"belongs" t o t h e person c o n t r o l l i n g t h e means r a t h e r t h a n t o
t h e worker. I n forced l a b o r , t h e person i s compelled, n o t by
h i s r e l a t i o n t o h i s environment a s a member of t h e human
4 iI

s p e c i e s , n o t by h i s own r e l a t i o n t o himself a s a member of t h e

I
s p e c i e s , but by another member of t h e s p e c i e s . As such, Forced
1

1 /'
l a b o r i s t h e a c t i v i t y a l i e n a t i n g t h e person both from h i s
1

r e l a t i o n t o n a t u r e and from h i s human c a p a b i l i t i e s . It follows

t h a t l a b o r t h a t i s n o t a l i e n a t e d r e q u i r e s two c o n d i t i o n s :
-
t h a t t h e person recognizes what i s necessary f o r him i n h i s
I
r e l a t i o n t o n a t u r e , and t h a t he has t h e a b i l i t y t o make 4
choices from genuine a l t e r n a t i v e s .
d. A l i e n a t i o n from t h e products of l a b o r
/
Marx began h i s a n a l y s i s of estranged l a b o r with an
empirical proposition: t h a t t h e g r e a t e r t h e i n c r e a s e i n com-
m o d i t i e s , t h e g r e a t e r t h e d e c r e a s e i n human v a l u e s , i . e . , the I

1
v a l u e t h a t men p l a c e on themselves a s human beings. It i s
/
'
important t o n o t e , with M i l l s , t h a t t h i s i n c r e a s i n g poverty -
37
does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i n c l u d e m a t e r i a l poverty.
The worker becomes a l l t h e poorer t h e more wealth
he produces, t h e more h i s production i n c r e a s e s i n
power and s i z e . The worker becomes an even cheaper
 commodity (emphasis mine
he c r e a t e s . With t h e i n c r e a
'-
D E ) t h e more commodities
s i n g v a l u e of t h e world
of t h i n g s proceeds i n d i r e c t p r o p o r t i o n t h e devalua-
-
t i o n of t h e world of men. Labor produces not only
commodities; i t produces i t s e l f and t h e worker a s
a commodity -- and t h i s i n t h e same gen r a l propor-
t i o n i n which i t produces commodities.3 8
The product of - l a b o r , t h e commodity, i s t h e 'Lobjectification"
of l a b o r . When people a r e a l i e n a t e d i n ' t h e i r a c t i v i t y , t h e i r
\I-----

l a b o r , i t follows t h a t t h e y w i l l be a l i e n a t e d from t h e products i

\

I
of a l i e n a t e d a c t i v i t y . 1n a l i e n a t e d l a b o r th-e work i s n o t only

o b j e c t i f i e d a s t h e product, but t h e p r o d u c t , , t h e o b j e c t ,
appears t o t h e person a s a t h i n g e x t e r n a l t o him. It i s seen
a s something f o r which he i s n o t resp.onsible and whi-ch e x i s t s
independently of him. The product of l a b o r i s r e i f i e d .
The more t h e worker spends himself, t h e more powerful
becomes t h e a l i e n world of o b j e c t s which he c r e a t e s
over and a g a i n s t h i m s e l f , t h e poorer he himself --
h i s i n n e r world -- becomes, t h e l e s s belongs t o him
a s h i s own.. .. The w o r k e r - p u t s h i s l i f e i n t o t h e
o b j e c t : but now h i s l i f e no longer belongs t o him
but t o t h e o b j e c t ..., The a l i e n a t i o n of t h e worker
i n h i s product means n o t only t h a t h i s l a b o r becomes
an o b j e c t , an e x t e r n a l e x i s t e n c e , but t h a t i t e x i s t s
o u t s i d e him, independently, a s something a l i e n t o
him, and t h a t i t becomes a power on i t s own con-
f r o n t i n g him. It means t h a t t h e l i f e which he has
conferred on t h e o b ' e c t c o n f r o n t s him a s something
h o s t i l e and a l i e n . 3 3
Only when l a b o r i s done f o r t h e b e n e f i t of someone o t h e r t h a n
t h e l a b o r e r , wheh t h e l a b o r i s f o r c e d , does t h i s o b j e c t i f i c a -
40
t i o n appear a s " a l o s s of t h e o b j e c t and bondage t o i t . "
To summarize t h e r e l a t i o n s between t h e f o u r a s p e c t s
of estranged l a b o r : Men a r e s p e c i e s beings, with a s p e c i e s
n a t u r e j u s t a s a r e h o r s e s and dogs. It i s i n t h e i r u n i v e r s a l
s p e c i e s n a t u r e t h a t they g a i n t h e i r human c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
The u n i v e r s a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e human s p e c i e s i s " f r e e , con-
s c i o u s a c t i v i t y " , and t h e purpose of l a b o r , t h e means by which
man i s r e l a t e d t o h i s i n o r g a n i c body, n a t u r e , i s t o a c t u a l i z e
or " o b j e c t i f y " h i s s p e c i e s n a t u r e . I n doing l a b o r man o b j e c t i -
f i e s himself, i . e . , he canl'see" himself i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e
products of h i s l a b o r . Estranged l a b o r t u r n s t h e " l i f e " of
t h e s p e c i e s ( f r e e , conscious a c t i v i t y ) i n t o a means f o r i n d i -
vidual l i f e . People, r a t h e r t h a n l a b o r i n g t o develop t h e i r
human c a p a c i t i e s , use t h e i r human c a p a c i t i e s t o l a b o r f o r
"mere" i n d i v i d u a l s u r v i v a l . They ( a s a b s t r a c t i n d i v i d u a l s
i s o l a t e d from t h e i r s p e c i e s n a t u r e ) view themselves and o t h e r s
o b j e c t i v e l y as i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s , recognizing n o t t h e i r
common s p e c i e s n a t u r e but only t h e i r common need t o s u r v i v e .
This common need t o s u r v i v e i s viewed w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of
s c a r c i t y of opportunity which r e s u l t s i n t h e n e c e s s i t y of each
i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l t o compete with each o t h e r i s o l a t e d i n d i -
vidual f o r individual survival.
e. The Cause of Alienated Labor
Marx asked,
I f t h e product of l a b o r i s a l i e n t o me, i f i t
c o n f r o n t s me a s an a l i e n power, t o whom, t h e n ,
does i t belong? I f my own a c t i v i t y does n o t belong
t o me, i f i t i s an a l i e n , oerced a c t i v i t y , t o
whom, then, does i t belong? a 61
He outlawed ,both t h e gods and n a t u r e a s t h e " l o r d s of l a b o r " .
The a l i e n being, t o whom l a b o r and t h e product
of l a b o r belongs, i n whose s e r v i c e l a b o r i s done
and f o r whose b e n e f i t t h e product o l a b o r i s
provided, can only be man himself. e 2-
The a l i e n being i s , of course,, t h e p e r s o n ( s ) who b e n e f i t s
from t h e l a b o r of o t h e r s without himself doing l a b o r . He 2s
t h e person who owns t h e means of production.
P r i v a t e p r o p e r t y Marx understood, "as t h e m a t e r i a l ,
summary expression of a l i e n a t e d l a b o r , (emphasis mine -- DE)
1
embracing both r e l a t i o n s -- t h e r e l a t i o n of t h e worker t o work "I

and t o t h e product of h i s l a b o r and t o t h e non-worker, and t h e

r e l a t i o n of t h e non-worker t o t h e worker and t o t h e product of
43
his
I n t h i s passage, we s e e t h a t Marx recognized t h e
common a l i e n a t i o n of a l l men i n an a l i e n a t i n g s o c i a l organiza-
tion. He o u t l i n e d t h r e e ways i n which a l i e n a t i o n i s expressed
by workers and non-workers:
F i r s t i t has t o be noted t h a t everything which appears
i n t h e worker a s an a c t i v i t y of a l i e n a t i o n , of e s t r a n g e -
ment, appears i n t h e non-worker a s a s t a t e of a l i e n a t i o n ,
z s t r a n g e-m e n t.
Secondly, t h a t t h e w o r k e r f s r e a l , p r a c t i c a l a t t i t u d e i n
production and t o t h e p r o d u c t s a s t a t e of mind)
appears i n t h e non-worker c o n f r o n t i n g him a s a t h e o r e t i -
cal attitude.
T h i r d l y , t h e non-worker does everything a g a i n s t t h e
worker which t h e worker does a g a i n s t himself; but .he
does not o a g a i n s t himself what he does a g a i n s t t h e
worker. 41
A t t h i s p o i n t t h e manuscript ends, which i s most u n f o r t u n a t e

c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t h i s i s t h e only p l a c e where Marx considered

a l i e n a t i o n a s a u n i v e r s a l s o c i a l problem shared by a l l people,
a l l o t h e r r e f e r e n c e s being ones of i m p l i c a t i o n .
This i s an important passage, both f o r an understanding
of o t h e r a s p e c t s of Marxrs thought and f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g Marx's
theory i n t h e contemporary world. Throughout t h i s c h a p t e r on
estranged l a b o r , Marx r e f e r r e d ' t o t h e l a b o r e r a s being
estranged, i . e . , a s having a p a s s i v e involvement; and to' t h e I
I

I
non-worker a s t h e a l i e n power, i . e . , a s t h e agent. That he
not only saw t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e worker and non-worker t o be ,
i'
i n o p p o s i t i o n but a l s o assumed t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e worker t o
be t h e " l e g i t i m a t e " ones ( l e g i t i m a t e with r e f e r e n c e t o s p e c i e s
n a t u r e ) i s r e f l e c t e d i n h i s o t h e r works, notably i n t h e Com-
I
munist Manifesto. His n o t i o n of t h e worker as p a s s i v e v i c t i m I
lit
I?
and non-worker a s a c t i v e v i l l a i n was probably i n s t i g a t e d by /I
h i s outraged sense of j u s t i c e and r e l a t e d t o t h e t h i r d men- 4!
18

t i o n e d expression of a l i e n a t i o n i n worker and non-worker, i . e . , '19

t h a t while t h e worker a c t s a g a i n s t h i s own human i n t e r e s t s , t h e
- i!
non-worker a c t s a g a i n s t t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e worker but -
not
1
a g a i n s t h i s own. His championship of t h e worker was r e l a t e d
more t o h i s p e r s o n a l v a l u e s than t o h i s a n a l y s i s of a l i e n a t i o n ,
i.e,, i t does n o t l o g i c a l l y follow from h i s a n a l y s i s . What
does l o g i c a l l y f o l l o w from h i s a n a l y s i s i s t h a t a l l men a r e
a l i e n a t e d from t h e i r s p e c i e s n a t u r e , and t h a t a l l a l i e n a t e
themselves. There i s a co-operation ( a s defined i n my I n t r o -
d u c t i o n ) underlying c l a s s r e l a t i o n s which Weber, perhaps
u n w i t t i n g l y , uncovered.

The T r a n s i t i o n from Contemplation t o Action

Feuerbachts view of man was formulated i n o p p o s i t i o n
t o Hegelts, such t h a t while Hegel began with t h e premise of
h i s t o r i c a l consciousness i n t h e form of t h e World-Spirit,
Feuerbach began with t h e premise of n o n - h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r -
&
 I

s u b j e c t i v e " n a t u r a l " man. Marx premised h i s t o r i c a l conscious-

n e s s i n terms of man a s a s o c i a l being, n o t only i n t h e s e n s e >

of " I and Thou", but i n t h e s e n s e which involves a l l men i n - .>

community. "Man" became t h e u n i v e r s a l h i s t o r i c a l development

by t h e s p e c i e s of i t s s p e c i e s n a t u r e , i . e , , Marx saw man
c r e a t i n g h i s human world through a long development of h i s
senses. Where Feuerbach, c o n t r a r y t o Hegel, devoted h i s
a t t e n t i o n t o " t h a t p a r t of man which does n o t p h i l o s o p h i z e ,
45
which i s a g a i n s t philosophy and opposed t o a b s t r a c t thought",
Marx went beyond "simple" n e g a t i o n of H e g e l f s t h e o r y and
c a r r i e d t h e d i a l e c t i c i n t o a new realm of m a t e r i a l S O ~ ~ O -

h i s t o r i c a l existence.
There a r e many ways of viewing t h e change i n meaning
46
of a l i e n a t i o n from Hegel t o Marx . To my mind, t h e most
obvious and profound, found i n a comparison of t h e i r d i f f e r e n t
world views, i n v o l v e s t h e t r a n s i t i o n from contemplation t o
action. H e g e l f s c e n t r a l c r i t e r i o n f o r v a l i d i t y of thought was
reason, while f o r Marx i t was s c i e n c e . Between t h e one and
t h e o t h e r Feuerbach acted a s a b r i d g e , with h i s attempt t o
anchor t h e s p i r i t i n m a t e r i a l e x i s t e n c e .
Hegel, a s was p r e v i o u s l y mentioned, was f a m i l i a r with
t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between a l i e n a t i o n of p r o p e r t y and mental
a l i e n a t i o n , and chose t o maintain t h e s e p a r a t i o n between t h e s e
two uses.
I may abandon a t h i n g provided t h a t t h e t h i n g i n
q u e s t i o n i s a t h i n g e x t e r n a l by n a t u r e . Therefore
t h o s e goods, o e r a c t e r i s t i c s
which c o n s t i t u t e my own p r i v a t e p e r s o n a l i t y ana
 t h e u n i v e r s a l essence of hy s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s
and my r i g h t t o them i s i m p r e s c r i p t i b l e . 4'/
(empEsis m i n ' - d - a )
-
With r e f e r e n c e t o s p i r i t u a l a l i e n a t i o n , he d i s - 2

t i n g u i s h e d two forms. He d e s c r i b e d a l i e n a t i o n of t h e i n d i v i -
d u a l from himself a s t h e experience of t h e i n d i v i d u a l (mind)

-
by himself a s both i n f i n i t e s u b j e c t and f i n i t e o b j e c t , and
t h e experience of t h i s "double" l i f e a s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . He
solved t h e "problem" through r e l a t i n g t h i s experience t o t h e
development of t h e World-Spirit through human h i s t o r y . The
i n f i n i t e s u b j e c t became t h e World-Spirit and t h e f i n i t e object,
t h e i n d i v i d u a l person. Each i n d i v i d u a l i s , e s s e n t i a l l y , an
"eye" through which t h e S p i r i t c a n contemplate i t s e l f . The
a l i e n a t i o n , then, doek n o t l i e i n t h e s u b j e c t - o b j e c t d u a l i t y ,
but i n t h e n o t i o n of t h i s d u a l i t y being c o n t r a d i c t o r y with t h e
Oneness. of t h e World. When people f u l l y recognize
t h e i r i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y i n t h e W o r l d - S p i r i t l s development, they
pass beyond t h e n o t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . They
s e e t h a t , f o r t h e World t o be One, It needs t o comprehend
I t s e l f a s an o b j e c t ,
The second sense i n which he used a l i e n a t i o n was t o
d e s c r i b e t h e process by which a l l i n d i v i d u a l s become s e l f -
conscious ( i . e . o b j e c t s t o themselves) and a r e t h u s a b l e t o
s e r v e a s "eyes". This i s t h e development, through t h e medium
of c u l t u r e , of a sense of i d e n t i t y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g each person
from a l l o t h e r s .
Comparing t h e s e two uses of a l i e n a t i o n , t h e former
ref ers t a t e of being while t h e l a t t efers
t o a process necessary f o r people t o a t t a i n a s t a t e of b e i n g / \
('
The s t a t e of being toward which t h i s process i s d i r e c t e d i s
t h a t of self-consciousness. As such i t i s a p r o c e s s gone
through by a l l people a t a l l times i n a l l s o c i e t i e s . The
s t a t e of being r e f e r r e d t o by t h e former d e f i n i t i o n i s
experienced only by some people, i . e . , t h o s e who happen t o
l i v e w i t h i n t h e temporal span i n which t h e S p i r i t i s p a s s i n g
through Unhappy Consciousness.
Feuerbach took a l i e n a t i o n out of t h e h i s t o r i c a l
c o n t e x t and placed i t w i t h i n t h e sensuous p r e s e n t . He i n t e r -
p r e t e d God ( e q u i v a l e n t t o Hegel! s w o r l d - s p i r i t ) a s mant s
anthropomorphization of h i s own human q u a l i t i e s . It i s n o t God
t h a t expresses Himself i n man, b u t man who expresses himself
and t h e n r e i f i e s , a s God, t h e c a p a c i t y t h a t he has t o n o t i c e
himself.
Feuerbach recognized no s t a t e of a l i e n a t i o n , but
viewed i t a s a p r o c e s s c a r r i e d on by man i n t h e p r e s e n t n a t u r a l
world. He took, a s h i s f o c a l p o i n t , Hegel's n o t i o n of t h e
a l i e n a t i o n of people from one another through t h e medium of
culture. He agreed with Hegel t h a t i t i s i n our r e l a t i o n s I -5

.b
with one another t h a t we come t o i d e n t i f y o u r s e l v e s a s persons, ;-
but t h i s i s n o t a process of a l i e n a t i o n . These r e l a t i o n s a r e
intersubjective. It i s i n t h e s e i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n s
t h a t we g a i n our i d e n t i t y , and i t i s t h e s e same r e l a t i o n s t h a t
we e x t e r n a l i z e a s a sacred "worldtt. We t h e n p l a c e t h i s s a c r e d
"world" over and above o u r s e l v e s , m y s t i f y i n g and denying our
r e a l ( i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v e ) sensuous c o n t a c t with each o t h e r .
c
Marx, i n h i s a n a l y s i s of estranged l a b o r , u n i f i e d L t h e
two d e f i n i t i o n s of s p i r i t u a l a l i e n a t i o n and a l i e n a t i o n from
property. He n o t only r e j e c t e d H e g e l f s d i s t i n c t i o n between
" t h i n g s e x t e r n a l by n a t u r e " and " p r i v a t e p e r s o n a l i t y " , but
denied t h a t t h e r e a r e any " t h i n g s e x t e r n a l by n a t u r e " . In
Marxls theory t h e r e i s an exchange between man and h i s environ-
ment such t h a t t h e " e x t e r n a l " , t h e "objective", -
i s man1 s r e l a -
t i o n t o t h e environment. Purposive a c t i v i t y ( l a b o r : free,
conscious a c t i v i t y ) d e f i n e s both s u b j e c t and obje'ct, and t h e w

r e l a t i o n between them.
For Marx, man's " r i g h t t o " h i s " p r i v a t e p e r s o n a l i t y "
and t h e " u n i v e r s a l essence of ( h i s ) s e l f -consciousness" i s
determined by h i s r e l a t i o n t o " t h i n g s e x t e r n a l by n a t u r e " .
As w e l l a s a l i e n a t i o n of p r o p e r t y being r e l a t e d t o s p i r i t u a l
a l i e n a t i o n , p r o p e r t y i t s e l f , as p r i v a t e property, i s " t h e
summary expression of" a l i e n a t e d l a b o r . Thus i t i s i n t h e
work of Marx t h a t .
a l i e n a t i o n was, f o r t h e f i r s t time, s o l i d l y
\ ,,
grounded i n t h e m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s of l i f e .
The s o l u t i o n t o a l i e n a t i o n , as given by Hegel, i s
" c o r r e c t thoughtf'. Marxl s s o l u t i o n i s " c o r r e c t p r a c t i c e " , a
s y n t h e g i s of thought and a c t i o n .

3.. THE CONTEXT

Community and S o c i e t y
Throughout h i s e a r l y work Marx made a c o n s i s t e n t
d i s t i n c t i o n between comrnunity'and s o c i e t y . The exact n a t u r e
( 48
of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n v a r i e s i n d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of h i s work,
but t h e r e remains a g e n e r a l coherence of meaning. Society
man s h a r e s with o t h e r anfmals, a s t h e means by which t h e
i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r s p e c i e s a r e u n i t e d with t h e i r
environments, f o r t h e common s u r v i v a l of t h e s p e c i e s . The
d i f f e r e n c e between human s o c i e t y and t h a t of o t h e r animals
i s t h a t men c r e a t e the'ir*v'sbcietythrough t h e i r a b i l i t y t o pro-
duce t h e i r means of s u b s i s t e n c e . S o c i e t y , f o r men, i s not
only t h e i r means f o r s u r v i v a l , but i s a l s o used by them a s a
b a s i s f o r another " o r d e r of l i f e " , i . e . , t h e development of
t h e i r human c a p a c i t i e s . S p e c i f i c a l l y human c a p a c i t i e s a r e
developed w i t h i n communities, or community i s t h e development
and maintenance of human c a p a c i t i e s . Community, t h e r e f o r e , i s
necessary f o r p e r s o n a l freedom.
Only i n community with o t h e r s has each i n d i v i d u a l
t h e means of c u l t i v a t i n g h i s g i f t s i n a l l d i r e c -
t i o n s . Only i n t h e commun'ty, t h e r e f o r e , i s
p e r s o n a l freedom p o s s i b l e . 49
The development of t h e d i v i s i o n of l a b o r has marked
t h e development of manls p o t e n t i a l f o r human l i f e . But i n

t h i s d i v i s i o n of l a b o r " s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s t a k e on an inde-
pendent e x i s t e n c e , It

... t h e r e appears a d i v i s i o n w i t h i n t h e l i f e of each

i n d i v i d u a l , i n s o f a r a s i t i s p e r s o n a l and i n s o f a r a s
i t i s determined by some branch of l a b o r and t h e con-
d i t i o n s p e r t a i n i n g t o i t . 50
It i s t o t h a t p a r t of t h e p e r s o n r s l i f e which i s determined by
l a b o r t h a t t h e terms " c l a s s i n d i v i d u a l " , " c i t i z e n t ' , " p a r t i a l
man", r e f e r . It i s t h i s p a r t t h a t i s l t a c c i d e n t a l l ' t o t h e
whole man.
The d i v i s i o n of l a b o r has developed i n f ' n a t u r a l ' f
r a t h e r t h a n "voluntary" a s s o c i a t i o n . Man has been governed
by r a t h e r t h a n governor of s o c i e t y .
The s o c i a l power, i . e . , t h e m u l t i p l i e d productive
f o r c e , which a r i s e s through t h e co-operation of
d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s a s it i s determined w i t h i n
t h e d i v i s i o n of l a b o r , appears t o t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l s ,
s i n c e t h e i r co-operation i s n o t voluntary but
n a t u r a l , n o t a s t h e i r own u n i t e d power but a s an
a l i e n f o r c e e x i s t i n g o u t s i d e them, of t h e o r i g i n and
end of which they a r e i g n o r a n t , which they t h u s
cannot c o n t r o l , which on t h e c o n t r a r y passes through
a p e c u l i a r s e r i e s of phases and s t a g e s independent
of t h e w i l l and t h e a c t i o n of man, nay, even being
t h e prime governor of t h e s e . 5 1
Natural s o c i e t y i s f u r t h e r c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a d i s s o c i a t i o n of
p a r t i c u l a r and common i n t e r e s t s , a s s o c i a t e d with t h e d i v i s i o n
w i t h i n t h e l i f e of each i n d i v i d u a l .
As long a s man remains i n n a t u r a l s o c i e t y , t h a t i s ,
a s long a s a cleavage e x i s t s between t h e p a r t i c u l a r
and t h e common i n t e r e s t , a s long t h e r e f o r e a s a c t i -
v i t y i s not voluntary, but n a t u r a l l y , divided,
man's own deed becomes an a l i e n power opposed t o
him, which enslaves him i n s t e a d of being- c o n t r o l l e d
by him. 52
The common i n t e r e s t of men i s t h e development and maintenance
of s o c i e t y , t h e p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s r e f e r r i n g t o each mants
development of h i s human c a p a c i t i e s : complementary i n t e r e s t s .
In natural society, the State i s a substitute f o r
community, an " i l l u s o r y " community, i n which people a r e bound
r a t h e r than f r e e d . It i s independent of and "divorced from
t h e r e a l i n t e r e s t s of i n d i v i d u a l and community." 53 Men a r e
w i t h i n i t , but i t i s n o t w i t h i n them, If men a r e t o g e t
society in1' them, i . e . , s o t h a t they use t h e t o o l s they have
developed f o r t h e i r own purposes, they have t o develop t h e
a b i l i t y t o do so, and t h i s r e q u i r e s communism.
The t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , through t h e d i v i s i o n of l a b o r ,
of p e r s o n a l powers ( r e l a t i o n s h i p s ) i n t o m a t e r i a l
powers, cannot be d i s p e l l e d by d i s m i s s i n g t h e
g e n e r a l i d e a of i t from o n e ' s mind, but only by
t h e a c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s i n a g a i n s u b j e c t i n g t h e s e
m a t e r i a l powers t o themselves and a b o l i s h i n g t h e
d i v i s i o n of l a b o r . This i s n o t p o s s i b l e without
t h e community. 54
Modern u n i v e r s a l i n t e r c o u r s e can be c o n t r o l l e d b
individuals ....,only when c o n t r o l l e d by a l l . 55
To c o n t r o l s o c i e t y , t o develop t h e a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l i t , t h e y
ha-ve t o transcend t h e l i m i t a t i o n s of n a t i o n a l i t y ( s t a t e ) ,
c l a s s e s , t r i b e and family, a l l of which form t h e b a s i s of t h e
" i l l u s o r y " community. I n t r a n s c e n d i n g t h e s e l i m i t a t i o n s , each
i n d i v i d u a l i s f r e e d t o a s s o c i a t e v o l u n t a r i l y with a l l o t h e r s ,
and i n doing t o develop t h e c a p a c i t y control society.
... t h e communal r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t o which t h e i n d i -
v i d u a l s of a c l a s s e n t e r e d , and which was determined
by t h e i r common i n t e r e s t s over a g a i n s t a t h i r d p a r t y ,
was always a community t o which t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l s
belonged only a s average i n d i v i d u a l s , only i n so f a r
a s they l i v e d w i t h i n t h e c o n d i t i o n s of e x i s t e n c e of
t h e i r c l a s s -- a r e l a t i o n s h i p i n which they p a r t i -
c i p a t e d n o t a s i n d i v i d u a l s but a s members of a c l a s s .
With t h e community of r e v o l u t i o n a r y p r o l e t a r i a n s on
t h e o t h e r hand, who t a k e t h e i r c o n d i t i o n s of e x i s t e n c e
and t h o s e of a l l members of s o c i e t y under t h e i r con-
t r o l , i t i s j u s t t h e reverse; i t i s as i dividuals
t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l s p a r t i c i p a t e i n i t , 52
O b j e c t i f i c a t i o n and r e i f i c a t i o n ; s c i e n c e and ideology
O b j e c t i f i c a t i o n i s t h e method, according t o Marx, by
which men become s e l f - c o n s c i o u s and a c q u i r e c o n t r o l over t h e i r
> '

world. Tools a r e such o b j e c t i f i c a t i c n s .

 I

An instrument of l a b o r i s a t h i n g , o r a complex
of t h i n g s , which t h e l a b o r e r i n t e r p o s e s between
himself and t h e o b j e c t of h i s l a b o r , and which
s e r v e s a s t h e conductor of h i s a c t i v i t y ....
Leaving out of c o n s i d e r a t i o n
of s u b s i s t e n c e ...
... ready-made means
t h e f i r s t t h i n g of which t h e ,
l a b o r e r possesses himself i s n o t t h e o b j e c t of l a b o r
but i t s instrument. Thus Nature becomes one of t h e
organs of h i s a c t i v i t y , one t h a t he annexes t o h i s
own bodily organs ... (Machines, e t c . ) a r e i n s t r u -
ments of t h e human b r a i n c r e a t e d by t h e human hand;
they a r e m a t e r i a l i z e d power of knowledge. 57
Self-consciousness i s not e q u i v a l e n t t o thought i n Marxts
theory, but i s an a c t i v i t y i n c l u d i n g a l l of t h e s e n s e s .
Man i s affirmed i n t h e o b j e c t i v e world not on1
a l l h i s senses. $gin
t h e a c t of t h i n k i n g , but with -
Each of h i s human r e l a t i o n s t o t h e world -- s e e i n g ,
hearing, smelling, t a s t i n g , f e e l i n g , t h i n k i n g , obser-
ving, experiencing, wanting, a c t i n g , l o v i n g -- i n
s h o r t , a l l t h e organs of h i s i n d i v i d u a l being ...
a r e i n t h e i r o b j e c t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n or i n t h e i r o r i e n -
t a t i o n t o t h e o b j e c t , t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of t h a t
o b j e c t . 39
To make o b j e c t i v e , then, i s t o make m a t e r i a l . La,nguage,
w r i t i n g , music, p a i n t i n g , machines, f i l m s , e t c . , a r e a l l objec-
t i f i c a t i o n s of man! s human c a p a c i t i e s .
R e i f i c a t i o n i s t h e t r a n s f e r e n c e of human powers from
t h e i r human c o n t e x t t o an " o u t s i d e " source. Objects a r e an
a s p e c t of human s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , b u t , i n r e i f y i n g them, men
-*
t r e a t o b j e c t s a s a l i e n powers,
Things "become t h e measure of
60
man through t h e r e i f i c a t i o n of human self-consciousness",

Marx p a r t i c u l a r l y warns a g a i n s t e s t a b l i s h i n g ' s o c i e t y f

a s an a b s t r a c t i o n over a g a i n s t t h e i n d i v i d u a l . The
i n d i v i d u a l i s a s o c i a l being as t h e s u b j e c t i v e ,
experienced e x i s t e n c e of s o c i e t y . 6 1
Man r e i f i e s t h i n g s when he does n o t r e l a t e t o them a s a
 42.

62
" p o s i t i v e , d e p e r s o n a l i z e d ob j k c t i f i c a t i o n of h i m s e l f . I' Keif i-
c a t i o n i s f a l s e consciousness.
Ideology, e q u i v a l e n t i n Marxfs t h e o r y t o i l l u s i o n , '
i s a form of r e i f i c a t j o n . I d e o l o g i e s a r e symbolic r e p r e s e n t a -
t i o n s of a c t u a l s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s and have t h e i r major
purpose i n j u s t i f y i n g a c t u a l power r e l a t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d with . i

t h e organizations.
63
Not a l l i d e a s a r e i d e o l o g i c a l . Those
a s s o c i a t e d with t h e s c i e n t i f i c method, e s p e c i a l l y , a r e n o t
ideological.
Marxls b e l i e f i n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y ( a c t u a l l y , t h e
i n e v i t a b i l i t y , i n t h e long r u n ) of community c o n t r o l over
s o c i e t y was based on h i s understanding of t h e s c i e n t i f i c method
and h i s b e l i e f t h a t i t could be used t o understand s o c i e t y .
Arguing a g a i n s t " t h e Hegeliansl I' s o l u t i o n s t o f a l s e conscious-
n e s s , Marx gave a p a r a b l e about t h e man who b e l i e v e d t h a t
people drown only because t h e y have t h e i d e a of g r a v i t y .
I f t h e y were t o knock t h i s i d e a out of t h e i r heads
by s t a t i n g i t t o be a s u p e r s t i t i o n , a r e l i g i o u s
i d e a , t h e y would be sublimely proof a g a i n s t any
danger from water. His whole l i f e long he fought
a g a i n s t t h e i l l u s i o n of g r a v i t y , of whose harmful
r e s u l t s a 1 s t a t i s t i c s brought him new and manifold
evidence. k4
This passage n o t only i l l u s t r a t e s Marxfs argument with t h e
p h i l o s o p h e r s of h i s time, but i t i n d i c a t e s as w e l l h i s aware-
n e s s t h a t i d e a s do n o t e x i s t on t h e i r own, and t h a t i f an i d e a
i s only a r e f l e c t i o n of e x p e r i e n c e ( i . e . , superstition) it i s
n o t enough simply t o deny t h e v a l i d i t y of i t . Simple d e n i a l
does n o t e l i m i n a t e t h e e x p e r i e n c e a s s o c i a t e d with t h e i d e a .
His answer was t o r e p l a c e t h e ' s u p e r s t i t i o u s i d e a with an
L

" o b j e c t i v e t t one.
Marxf s Whole Man
Marx s a i d t h a t h i s primary i n t e r e s t was i n "man a s
such and as a whole" r a t h e r t h a n i n man a s a " p a r t i c u l a r
f u n c t i o n and n o t a s a complete human b e i n g . " The whole man
i s n o t subsumed under any p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n such a s
economic man, p o l i t i c a l man, a l i e n a t e d man, moral man, e x i s -
t e n t i a l man. These p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s a r e perspec-
t i v e s t h a t men t a k e of themselves with r e f e r e n c e t o p a r t i c u l a r
f u n c t i o n s t h a t t h e y can d i s t i n g u i s h . Man making t h e s e c l a s s i -
f i c a t i o n s i s man e x e r c i s i n g h i s human ( s p e c i e s ) c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
of f r e e , conscious a c t i v i t y .
That f r e e , conscious a c t i v i t y i s a s p e c i e s charac-
t e r i s t i c means t h a t i t i s common t o a l l c u l t u r e s . In fact,
t h e p r e s e n c e of d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s w i t h d i s t i n c t languages,
mores, e t c . , can be construed a s evidence of such a s p e c i e s
characteristic. I f we a c c e p t , f o r purposes of t h e development
of h i s argument, h i s assumption of f r e e , conscious a c t i v i t y a s
a s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , we a r e s t i l l l e f t with t h e q u e s t i o n
of t h e r e l a t i o n between manfs s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c and h i s
11 1

Jl

a l i e n a t i o n from i t . It i s q u i t e c l e a r i n Marxts t h e o r y t h a t
$'\I
i'
man i s ' a l i e n a t e d from t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c through f o r c e d l a b o r . 4
' []
He denied t h a t t h e agent of f o r c e d l a b o r was God o r Nature. '1

This p o i n t i s a l s o c l e a r . He thought t h a t -
men enslaved men
and t h a t t h i s f o r c e d l a b o r has never been n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e
s u r v i v a l of t h e s p e c i e s . He d i d ' n o t deny t h a t a l i e n a t i o n was
n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e development of c i v i l i z a t i o n t o t h e time at
which he l i v e d , nor d i d he deny t h e c o n t i n u i n g n e c e s s i t y of
f o r c e d l a b o r i f we choose t o m a i n t a i n c i v i l i z a t i o n as we now
know i t .

Marx suggested t h a t man could overcome a l i e n a t i o n by

/
a b o l i s h i n g d i v i s i o n of l a b o r . He a l s o s a i d t h a t d i v i s i o n of
l a b o r a s s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r t h e s u r v i v a l of t h e s p e c i e s
could never be d i s c a r d e d ; t h a t s o c i e t y i s t h e b a s i s of human
l i f e , and as long a s humans s u r v i v e t h e y w i l l do s o i n s o c i e t y .
He f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t i f man i s t o c o n t r o l h i s human d e s t i n y
must c o n t r o l h i s s o c i e t y .

When he spoke of a b o l i s h i n g d i v i s i o n of l a b o r , and

l a b o r a s such, he d i d s o with r e f e r e n c e t o h i s n o t i o n of
classes. He was n o t , i n t h i s c o n t e x t , r e f e r r i n g t o s p e c i a l i z a -
t i o n of t a s k s based upon communal agreement and communal con-
t r o l where a l l people involved i n s o c i e t y a r e a l s o members of
r
t h e community c o n t r o l l i n g s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . The d i v i s i o n
of l a b o r t o which he r e f e r r e d was t h e d i v i s i o n i n t o workers and
i
non-workers. It was i n t h e s e terms t h a t he d i s t i n g u i s h e d I
I

between t h e " i l l u s o r y " community r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e S t a t e , and /

t h e l a r g e r "human" community of "whole men".
I n t h e " i l l u s o r y " community, l a r g e numbers of people
a c t a s i f and a r e t r e a t e d a s i f , i n t h e i r l a b o r , t h e y a r e n o t
whole men. Since t h e i r l a b o r t a k e s up t h e m a j o r i t y of t h e i r
time, t h e y a c t and a r e t r e a t e d a s i f t h e y a r e n o t whole men t h e
m a j o r i t y of t h e time. They do n o t , a s members of the4"human"
community, c o n t r o l t h e i r own a c t i v i t i e s , but a r e c o n t r o l l e d
by t h e s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n which appears e x t e r n a l t o them.

The freedom of t h o s e who do t r e a t themselves a s whole men,

i.e., t h o s e who c o n t r o l t h e s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , i s a f a l s e
freedom because i t depends, n o t upon t h e i r membership i n t h e
"human" community, but upon t h e " enslavement" of t h e m a j o r i t y
.'
of men t o t h e s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n .
Marx d i d n o t c o n s i d e r t h e problem of a l i e n a t i o n t o be
one of making men whole, but saw i t r a t h e r a s a p r a c t i c a l prob-
lem of b r i n g i n g s o c i e t y i n t o t h e c o n t r o l of men who a r e whole.
66
He saw men n o t a s one-dimensional o r fragmented67, but as
t r e a t i n g themselves and one a n o t h e r , i n s o c i e t y , a s i f t h e y
were one-dimensional and fragmented. I f men a r e n o t assumed
t o be whole, t h e r e i s no b a s i s upon which t h e y can t r a n s c e n d
their alienation. I n f a c t , i t i s t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n , i n Marxrs
t h e o r y , between t h i s assumed f r a g m e n t a t i o n and t h e a c t u a l i t y
of wholeness t h a t makes a l i e n a t i o n problematic.
I n a l i e n a t e d s o c i e t y men r e a l i z e ( a c t u a l i z e , o b j e c t i f y )
t h e i r human c a p a c i t i e s only t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t i s n e c e s s a r y
i n t h e " s e r v i c e " of s o c i e t y . The more r o u t i n i z e d l a b o r
becomes, t h e more p a r t i c u l a r i z e d , t h e l e s s n e c e s s i t y t h e r e i s
far t h e whole man t o e x e r c i s e h i s f u l l c a p a c i t i e s i n h i s work,
and t h e more he becomes aware of l a b o r a s a p a r t i a l f u n c t i o n .
The man becomes a " p a r t i c l e " i n t h e s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , but a t
t h e same time, s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n becomes a " p a r t i c l e " i n h i s
 $

life.
Now a d i s t i n c t i o n can be d r a m between two uses t h a t
Marx made of t h e term " s o c i e t y " . On t h e one hand, t h e term
r e f e r s t o t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h o s e a c t i v i t i e s r e q u i r e d t o
m a i n t a i n t h e l i f e of t h e s p e c i e s . On t h e o t h e r hand, i n a
broader sense, t h e term r e f e r s t o t h e a s s o c i a t i o n of people
with one another f o r whatever purpose. When Marx d i s c u s s e d
man c o n t r o l l i n g s o c i e t y i n community, he meant t h a t man could
c o n t r o l " s o c i e t y " ( i n t h e former s e n s e ) -
i n "society" ( i n t h e
l a t t e r s e n s e ) where t h e former i s t r e a t e d a s a " t h i n g " and t h e
l a t t e r i s a p r o c e s s , an a c t i v i t y .
This a c t i v i t y was what he meant by p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y .
Men, i n t h e i r p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n s with t h e i r environment,
c r e a t e t h e i r means of p r o d u c t i o n ( i n c l u d i n g both f o r c e s -
and
r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n ) . These means can t h e n be t r e a t e d a s
" t h i n g s " , t o be used and manipulated, i . e . , t h e y have been
objectified. If men want t o c o n t r o l a " t h i n g " , t h e n a t u r e of

which i n c l u d e s r e l a t i o n s h i p s between people ( r e l a t i o n s of pro-

d u c t i o n ) , a l l people involved i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s have t o
a g r e e t o t h e use of t h e " t h i n g " . When people can do t h i s ,
t h e y a r e n o t only " i n " s o c i e t y ( i . e . , fulfilling particular
f u n c t i o n s ) , but s o c i e t y i s " i n " them ( i . e . , w i t h i n t h e i r sub-
jective control).
I n o r d e r f o r people t o a g r e e t o use s o c i e t y i n one
way o r a n o t h e r , t h e y must be a b l e t o communicate t h e i r wishes
and p l a n s t o one a n o t h e r . Marx held t h a t t h e d e c i s i v e b a r r i e r
t o such communication i s t h e f s c t t h a t some members ( i n h i s
c a s e , most) of t h e "human" community a r e t r e a t e d as i f they
a r e only p a r t s i n t h e " t h i n g " and, a s such, need only be mani-
t

p u l a t e d i n t h e " i l l u s o r y " community a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e S t a t e .

Marxts p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , h i s s u g g e s t i o n s t o workers
of modes of a c t i o n t h a t can be t a k e n , was n o t a l o g i c a l s t e p
from h i s t h e o r y of s o c i e t y . It was based much more upon h i s
r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e power of "whole man" t o c o n t r o l himself a s '

" p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n " , i n combination with h i s outraged s e n s e

of j u s t i c e . He d i d n o t r e c o g n i z e t h a t , w h i l e i n many s e n s e s
"workers" can be seen a s v i c t i m s , t h e y v i c t i m i z e themselves.
I do n o t mean t o imply, i n t h e simple minded s e n s e , t h a t

p a r t i c u l a r men p r e v e n t themselves from g e t t i n g an e d u c a t i o n , a

-
good job, e t c . , but t h a t i n community ( o r l a c k o f ) men p e r -
petuate alienating activity.
I f t h e r e i s any v a l i d i t y t o Marx's t h e o r y of a l i e n a -
t i o n , i f men a r e whole and only a c t a s i f and a r e t r e a t e d a s i f /
they a r e " p a r t i c u l a r functions" i n Society, i t follows t h a t
they a r e a c t i v e a g e n t s i n a l i e n a t i n g themselves. The q u e s t i o n
i s no longer one of who i s t o blame but of how do t h e y do t h i s
t o themselves.
 48.

CHAPTER

41
1. THE RELEVANCE OF WEBERl S WORK
I have d i s c u s s e d among o t h e r t h i n g s Marxls a l i e n a t i o n
Y
t h e o r y a s a h y p o t h e s i s t h a t man ( a s whole man) a l i e n a t e s him- .--
.--
s e l f from h i s s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of " f r e e , c o n s c i o u s
j
a c t i v i t y " by t r e a t i n g h i m s e l f a s a "mere p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n " , - .i
\
il
and t h a t h i s a l i e n a t i o n o f h i m s e l f i s p r a c t i s e d i n f o r c e d 1/
\I
labor. I f t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t man a l i e n a t e s h i m s e l f i n t h i s 1I?
way i s a c c e p t e d f o r s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n , we need t o f i n d o u t
iI
1
w h e t h e r t h e h y p o t h e s i s i s a v a l i d one. T h i s can be done by

trying t o discover -
how man a l i e n a t e s h i m s e l f from h i m s e l f . ?
d
Ij
I would l i k e , now, t o i n t e r p r e t some a s p e c t s of ,
I'

Weberts s o c i a l t h e o r y w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o Marxls a l i e n a t i o n
theory; and t o show how Weberls work b o t h c l a r i f i e d and s o l i -
I
d i f i e d Marxts h y p o t h e s i s . Weber a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y I
1

t o t h e s t u d y of a l i e n a t i o n by drawing a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a c t 1

t h a t our p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n s o c i e t a l organization i s d i r e c t l y ,-
j
r e l a t e d b o u r i r r a t i o n a l f e a r s and h o p e s . By drawing a t t e n -
t i o n t o t h i s f a c t , h e n o t o n l y s u p p o r t e d Marx1s c o n t e n t i o n

t h a t c a p i t a l i s m i s , w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o man's s p e c i e s c h a r a c -
t e r i s t i c , a n i r r a t i o n a l mode'of o r g a n i z i n g , b u t d e s c r i b e d t h e
i
i

b a s i s upon which -
any mode o f o r g a n i z i n g c a n b e e v a l u a t e d a s t o
i t s r a t i o n a l i t y f o r man1 s g o a l s .
I f mants p a r t i c u l a r i n v o l v e m e n t s i n s o c i e t a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n a r e r e l a t e d d i r e c t l y t o h i s hopes and f e a r s ;
when h i s hopes and f e a r s m o t i v a t e him t o behave i n p a r t $ c u l a r
ways ( s o c i e t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n ) , and when t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r ways
of behaving do n o t r e s o l v e t h e f e a r s and r e a l i z e t h e hopes
m o t i v a t i n g them, t h e n man's behavior i s i r r a t i o n a l .
Weber d i d n o t q u e s t i o n t h e o r i g i n of m o t i v a t i o n and,
consequently, d i d n o t c o n s i d e r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t p a r t i c u l a r
hopes and f e a r s a r e c r e a t e d i n r e l a t i o n t o p a r t i c u l a r ways of
behaving. Marx, w i t h h i s t h e o r y of a l i e n a t i o n , d i d c o n s i d e r
t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , and suggested a s t a n d a r d e x t e r n a l t o p a r t i -
c u l a r hopes and f e a r s , and p a r t i c u l a r modes of behavior.
With modes of behavior reduced t o f e a r and hope, human g o a l s ,
of c o u r s e , a r e s i m i l a r l y reduced, both being r e - o r i e n t e d toward
" p r a c t i c a l " human l i f e . This l a t t e r theme w i l l be t a k e n up i n
depth i n Chapter IV.

Class and S t a t u s
Marx d i d n o t c l e a r l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e between " c l a s s t t
and " s t a t u s f ' i n h i s work, and i n d i c a t e d i n The Communist Mani-
f e s t o t h a t he thought t h e two t o be e q u i v a l e n t .
I n t h e e a r l i e r epochs of h i s t o r y , we f i n d almost
everywhere a complicated arrangement of s o c i e t y
i n t o v a r i o u s o r d e r s , a manifold g r a d a t i o n of s o c i a l
-rank. I n a n c i e n t Rome we have p a t r i c i a n s , k n i g h t s ,
p l e b e i a n s , s l a v e s ; i n t h e idd die Ages, f e u d a l - l o r d s ,
v a b s a l s , g u i l d m a s t e r s , journeymen, a p p r e n t i c e s , s e r f s ;
and i n almost a l l of t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s e s , a g a i n ,
o t h e r s u b o r d i n a t e g r a d a t i o n s . 1 (Emphasis mine -- D E )
Without d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between " s o c i a l rank" and t f c l a s s e s " , he
went on t o say t h a t i n modern i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y " s o c i e t y a s a
 ,ie
50. C

I
7

whole i s more and more s p J i t t l n g i n t o two g r e a t h o s t i l e , c a m p s , ,-

-
i n t o two g r e a t c l a s s e s d i r e c t l y f a c i n g each o t h e r ... .2 11
-.'
I
'41
j
The f a c t t h a t t h i s has n o t occurred, t h a t i f anything we have
a more "manifold g r a d a t i o n of s o c i a l rank" t h a n was e v i d e n t
i n " e a r l i e r epochs of h i s t o r y " , has served a s one c e n t r a l
p o i n t f o r c r i t i c i s m of Marx's s o c i a l t h e o r y . Both Dahrendorf
and C. W. M i l l s , f o r example, have d i s c u s s e d t h i s problem i n
Marx's t h e o r y . 3' As I argued p r e v i o u s l y , Marx's p o l i t i c a l
t h e o r y does n o t l o g i c a l l y f o l l o w from h i s a n a l y s i s of s o c i e t y , h'lj

111
.it,

but r a t h e r r e f l e c t s t h e man and t h e time a t which he l i v e d . 1111

III

id\
C r i t i c i s m of h i s p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y cannot s e r v e as a b a s i s f o r ldl/

c r i t i c i s m of h i s a n a l y s i s of s o c i e t y .
Weber, i n t e r e s t e d i n showing how i d e a s a c t a s an
independent v a r i a b l e i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e form of s o c i e t y r a t h e r 10
t h a n being mere r e f l e c t i o n s of economic r e l a t i o n s , made a
c a r e f u l and p r e c i s e a n a l y s i s of s t a t u s r e l a t i o n s and d i s -
t i n g u i s h e d s t a t u s from c l a s s Q Leaving a s i d e t h e d i f f e r e n c e s
i n Marx's and Weberfs d e f i n i t i o n s of c l a s s which a r e i r r e l e v a n t
t o my argument, Weber agreed w i t h Marx t h a t
' P r o p e r t y t and ' l a c k of p r o p e r t y ! a r e ... the basic-
c a t e g o r i e s of a l l c l a s s s i t u a t i o n s . 5
He agreed t h a t c l a s s could be t h e b a s i s f o r s o c i a l r a n k i n g i n
s o c i e t y , but d i s a g r e e d t h a t s o c i a l rank i s n e c e s s a r i l y based
on c l a s s r e l a t i o n s . S t a t u s i s t h e n e c e s s a r y b a s i s of s o c i a l
I

1; I3
!I I

I
rank. 1 I/!
1 y.

I n c o n t e n t , s t a t u s honor i s normally expressed by

t h e f a c t t h a t above a l l e l s e a s p e c i f i c s t y l e of
l i f e can be expected rom a l l t h o s e who wlsh t o
ETCjng t o t h e c i r c l e . g
 Weber d i f f e r e n t i a t e d d l a s s from s t a t u s by d e f i h n g I
I

c l a s s i n terms of " p r o p e r t y and l a c k of p r o p e r t y " , and s t a t u s -

i n terms of " s t y l e of l i f e " . When he d i s c u s s e d t h e r e l a t i o n '
between t h e two, he considered " p r o p e r t y " a s one of many
f a c t o r s determining s t a t u s .
P r o p e r t y as such i s n o t always recognized a s a s t a t u s
q u a l i f i c a t i o n , but i n t h e long run i t i s , and with
extraordinary regula.rity. 7
But s t a t u s honor need n o t n e c e s s & i l y be l i n k e d with
a ! c l a s s s i t u a t i o n ! . On t h e c o n t r a r y , i t normally
s t a n d s i n s h a r p p p o s i t i o n t o t h e p r e t e n s i o n s of
sheer property. 8 1111

8 /I

I n c o n s i d e r i n g " p r o p e r t y f ' ( a s ownership of t h e means of econo-

II
mic p r o d u c t i o n ) a s one p o s s i b l e and u s u a l s t a t u s q u a l i f i c a t i o n , /11~

II
Weber t r e a t e d i t a s one form of " p r o p e r t y " i n a broader s e n s e . 11

11

I f s t a t u s i s expressed i n l i f e s t y l e s , p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u s e s
can be determined by s t u d y i n g t h e behavior r e q u i r e d f o r them.
Some i n d i c a t i o n s of s t a t u s a r e mannerisms, t a s t e i n c u l t u r a l
p r o d u c t s , speech. A l l of t h e s e can be considered t o be "pro-

p e r t y " of t h e i n d i v i d u a l s e x p r e s s i n g them, i n t h e sense t h a t

people can be s a i d t o "have" mannerisms, t a s t e s , speech h a b i t s .
By t r e a t i n g c l a s s i n t h i s way a s one v a r i a b l e r e l a t e d t o
s t a t u s , and f a i l i n g t o r e v e r s e t h e r e l a t i o n , c o n s i d e r i n g
s t a t u s a s a v a r i a b l e r e l a t e d t o c l a s s , Weber r a n i n t o a d i f f i -
c u l t y i n d i c a t e d throughout h i s work. The d i f f i c u l t y , of
course, i s h i s f a i l u r e t o c o n s i d e r t h e f a c t o r s determing s t y l e
of l i f e .
To i l l u s t r a t e h i s p o i n t t h a t s t a t u s honor "normally
s t a n d s i n sharp o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e p r e t e n s i o n s of s h e e r
p r o p e r t y " , Weber used t h e exanlple of t h e r e c e p t i o n given t h e
entrepreneur by t h e a r i s t o c r a c y i n t h e e a r l y s t a g e s of Capi-
talism. This example i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of v e r t i c a l m o b i l i t y
i n g e n e r a l a s r e l a t e d t o s t a t u s , and v e r t i c a l m o b i l i t y i s pro-
bably t h e most obvious s i n g l e i n d i c a t o r of t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between c l a s s and s t a t u s . The treatment of a
new-comer by a s t a t u s group i n d i c a t e s t h e presence of a r e l a -
t i o n s h i p between c l a s s and s t a t u s , but does not i n d i c a t e t h e
n a t u r e of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p .
Weber himself, although he d i d not seem t o r e a l i z e
i t , gave some e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e n a t u r e of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p
between c l a s s and s t a . t u s , and a t t h e same time s o l i d i f i e d h i s
argument f o r t h e independent e f f e c t on s o c i e t y of i d e a s , i n
h i s d i s c u s s i o n of t h e r e l a t i o n between c l a s s and s t a t u s , and
communal a c t i o n .
I n our terminology, ~ c l a s s e sa~r e not communities;
they merely r e p r e s e n t p o s s i b l e , and f r e q u e n t bases
f o r communal a c t i o n . 9
Weber l i s t e d s p e c i f i c c o n d i t i o n s under which communal a c t i o n

-
may occur a s a r e s u l t of c l a s s s i t u a t i o n . I s t r e s s ' "ma.yl' h e r e
because Weber s t r e s s e d t h e f a c t t h a t even given t h e necessary
information f o r communal a c t i o n , i t s t i l l remains f o r t h e
i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e community t o choose t o a c t .
For however d i f f e r e n t l i f e chances may be, t h i s
f a c t i n i t s e l f , according t o a l l experience, by no
means g i v e s b i r t h t o l c l a s s a c t i o n ! (communal
a c t i o n by t h e members of a c l a s s ) . The f a c t of
being conditioned and t h e r e s u l t s of t h e c l a s s
s i t u a t i o n must be d i s t i n c t l y recognizable. For
only then t h e c o n t r a , s t of l i f e chances can be f e l t
 n o t a s an a b s o l u t e l y given f a c t t o be accepted,
but a s a r e s u l t a n t from e i t h e r (1) t h e given d i s -
t r i b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y , o r ( 2 ) t h e s t r u c t u r e of
t h e c o n c r e t e economic o r d e r . It i s only t h e n
t h a t people may r e a c t a g a i n s t t h e c l a s s s t r u c t u r e
n o t only through a c t s of i n t e r m i t t e n t and i r r a -
t i o n a l p r o t e s t , but i n t h e form of r a t i o n a l
a s s o c i a t i o n . 10
I n t h i s passage Weber p o i n t e d out t h e importance of t h e a t t i -
t u d e s of people, a s w e l l a s t h e i r c l a s s s i t u a t i o n , i n d e t e r - *

mining t h e i r a c t i o n s . Marx was aware of t h e importance of

a t t i t u d e s a s r e i f i c a t i o n i n t h e i l l u s o r y community and o b j e c -
t i f i c a t i o n i n t h e human community. These s p e c i f i c c o n d i t i o n s
o u t l i n e d by Weber, n e c e s s a r y f o r communal a c t i o n based on c l a s s
s i t u a t i o n , were c o n d i t i o n s t h a t Marx assumed i n h i s p o l i t i c a l .

theory. The importance of Weberts work h e r e i s t h a t by

s p e c i f y i n g t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s he, by i m p l i c a t i o n , d i r e c t e d
a t t e n t i o n t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s under which communal a c t i o n w i l l
not a r i s e i n r e l a t i o n t o c l a s s s i t u a t i o n .
Weber went on t o say t h a t " i n c o n t r a s t t o c l a s s e s ,
11
s t a t u s groups a r e normally communities1'.
Communal a c t i o n r e f e r s t o t h e a c t i o n which i s
o r i e n t e d t o t h e f e e l i n g of t h e a c t o r s t h a t t h e y
belong t o g e t h e r . l2

This d e f i n i t i o n of community a s we-feeling i n c l u d e s both of

Marxfs "communities". Weber d i d n o t make value-judgments about

t h e bases on which communities a r e formed. His d e f i n i t i o n i s
a normative one. Marx, on t h e o t h e r hand, hypothesized t h e
e x i s t e n c e of a s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c common t o men, and used
t h e r e l a t i o n between men and t h e i r assumed s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s -
t i c a s an independent s t a n d a r d a g a i n s t which normative
r e l a t i o n s could be e v a l u a t e d .
S t a t u s groups, by t h e i r n a t u r e as communities, 1

" h i n d e r t h e s t r i c t c a r r y i n g through of t h e s h e e r market p r i n -

ciplefl . 13 With t h e s e a s s o c i a t i o n s between c l a s s and s t a t u s ,
and community, i n mind, t h e t r e a t m e n t given a newcomer t o a
s t a t u s group, and t h e o p p o s i t i o n of s t a t u s groups t o "mere
p r o p e r t y f f a r e e a s i l y understood. An i n d i v i d u a l who i s v e r t i -
c a l l y mobile can thoroughly l e a r n a s t y l e of l i f e only by 'ri
'J
a s s o c i a t i n g with members of t h e s t a t u s group i n which he wants & I

t o belong. ( i n t h e c a s e of downward m o b i l i t y , i t may be a

m a t t e r of t h e i n d i v i d u a l being f o r c e d t o a s s o c i a t e with members
111lh
of a s t a t u s group through l a c k of a v a i l a b i l i t y of o t h e r groups.)
He may have t h e means t o l i v e a s t h e o t h e r s do, but cannot
know how t o use t h e s e means i n terms p r e s c r i b e d by t h e s t a t u s
group. Complete acceptance by t h e newcomer and h i s f a m i l y c a n , -
14
and u s u a l l y does, t a k e g e n e r a t i o n s .
To c o n s i d e r t h e q u e s t i o n s and problems t h a t a r i s e from
Weberfs d e f i n i t i o n of s t a t u s would s e r v e t o d e t r a c t from my
argument. I would j u s t l i k e t o r e i t e r a t e my p o i n t , a c c e p t i n g

h i s d e f i n i t i o n , t h a t while t h e r e s u l t s of i n d i v i d u a l movement
from one s t a t u s group t o a n o t h e r i n d i c a t e s t h a t a d i s t i n c t i o n
between c l a s s and s t a t u s i s a v a l u a b l e one, t h e s e r e s u l t s do / i11l
I
n o t i n d i c a t e t h e n a t u r e of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between c l a s s and 61
1
11
'.

status.
It i s c l e a r t h a t c l a s s s i t u a t i o n i s , f o r any given
i n d i v i d u a l , only one of t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s of t h e s t a t u s groups
t o which he may belong. Other ' ~ p o s s e s s i o n s "which can i n f l u e n c e
t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s chances a r e , t o name a few, beauty, i n t e l l i -
gence, r a c e , r e l i g i o n , and n a t i o n a l i t y . The q u e s t i o n s t h a t
have t o be answered a r e : what a r e t h e f a c t o r s determining t h e
" p o s s e s s i o n " of t h e s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , and what e x p l a i n s t h e i r '
being used a s determinants of s t a t u s ; q u e s t i o n s which l e a d t o
a c o n f r o n t a t i o n with Marx's t h e o r y of c l a s s e s .

Power and Authority

Marx d i d n o t e x p l i c i t l y d e f i n e power. He i n d i c a t e d
h i s understanding of t h i s term through h i s use of i t . His
usage i n d i c a t e s t h a t with r e f e r e n c e t o people he understood
power, i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e p o s s e s s i o n ' o f t h e means of produc-
t i o n , a s t h e a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l t h e f a c t o r s determining modes
of human l i f e . He was concerned more with p a r t i c u l a r u s e s of
power, i . e . , t o d i r e c t s o c i e t y , r a t h e r t h a n with power a s such.
Weber 'was i n t e r e s t e d i n d e f i n i n g power independently of t h e
v a r i o u s purposes f o r which i t might be used.
I n g e n e r a l , we understand by 'power' t h e chance of
a man o r of a number of men t o r e a l i z e t h e i r own
w i l l i n a communal a c t i o n even a g a i n s t t h e r e s i s -
t a n c e of o t h e r s who a r e p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e a c t i o n . l 5
According t o Weber then, men may e x e r c i s e power i n d i v i d u a l l y or
i n c o n c e r t with o t h e r s and t h e a c t i o n i s t a k e n w i t h i n a com-
munal c o n t e x t . This d e f i n i t i o n i s confusing because i t does
n o t s p e c i f y whether a l l people who a r e " p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e
a c t i o n " a r e a l s o involved i n "communal a c t i o n " . Weber a l s o
defined another form of a c t i o n which he c a l l e d " s o c i e t a l
a c t i o n " which i s " o r i e n t e d to' a r a t i o n a l l y motivated ad j , u s t -
16
ment of i n t e r e s t s " . Both communal and s o c i e t a l a c t i o n
depend on t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e i n d i v i d u a l s involved i n t h e
.r
a c t i o n s , s i n c e , i n t h e former a c t i o n i s o r i e n t e d t o t h e f e e l i n g
of belonging t o g e t h e r , and i n t h e l a t t e r a c t i o n i s o r i e n t e d t o
r a t i o n a l l y motivated adjustment of i n t e r e s t s .
For my argument, t h e important p o i n t h e r e i s t h a t
s o c i e t a l a c t i o n can be taken independently of community and
communal a c t i o n can be t a k e n independently of r a t i o n a l l y moti-
v a t e d adjustment of i n t e r e s t s . It a l s o f o l l o w s from h i s d e f i -
n i t i o n s of communal and s o c i e t a l a c t i o n t h a t , with r e f e r e n c e
t o t h e e x e r c i s e of power, while power must be e x e r c i s e d i n
communal a c t i o n , t h o s e r e s i s t i n g t h e a c t i o n may n o t be doing
s o communally. Communal and s o c i e t a l i n t e r e s t s can a l s o con-
f l i c t f o r members of a group o r f o r i n d i v i d u a l s . The p o s s i b l e
r e l a t i o n s between communal and s o c i e t a l a c t i o n and t h e r e l e -
vance of c o n s i d e r i n g them f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g a s p e c t s of a l i e n a -
t i o n a r e c l a r i f i e d by Weberls d i s c u s s i o n of a u t h o r i t y .
Weber saw t h a t t h e b a s i s f o r power i s t h e a b i l i t y t o
use f o r c e . A u t h o r i t y i s t h e means by which t h e use of f o r c e
i s legitimized. Weber d i s t i n g u i s h e d between t h r e e t y p e s of
" l e g i t i m a t e power" o r " a u t h o r i t y f t: charisma, t r a d i t i o n a l and
legal-rational, of which t h e t h i r d he f e l t t o be t h e most

p r e v a l e n t i n modern i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . L e g a l - r a t i o n a l autho-
r i t y r e f e r s t o t h e " b e l i e f i n t h e v a l i d i t y of l e g a l s t a t u t e s
17
and f u n c t i o n a l competence based on r a t i o n a l l y c r e a t e d r u l e s " .
Weber pointed out t h a t method; of l e g i t i m i z i n g power do n o t
answer t o some e x t e r n a l c o n t r o l . They a r e " i n n e r j u s t i f i c a -
t i o n s " f o r use of power.
It i s understood t h a t , i n r e a l i t y , obedience i s
determined by h i g h l y r o b u s t motives of f e a r and
hope -- f e a r of t h e vengeance of magical powers
o r of t h e power-holder, hope f o r reward i n t h i s
world o r i n t h e beyond -- ... However, i n asking
f o r t h e f l e g i t i m a t i o n s 1 of t h i s obedience one
meets with t h e s e t h r e e 'purer types 18 ....
Weber defined power " i n r e a l i t y " a s t h e chances of an i n d i v i d u a l
or a number of them t o r e a l i z e t h e i r w i l l even a g a i n s t t h e
o p p o s i t i o n of o t h e r s . Types of a u t h o r i t y , as modes of j u s t i -
f y i n g some uses of power (and, of course, r e j e c t i n g o t h e r s ) ,
a r e " i n r e a l i t y " modes of e x p r e s s i n g f e a r s and hopes. Weber
considered legitimacy t o be normative. I f a u t h o r i t y i s nor-
mative we can q u e s t i o n t o what c o n d i t i o n s " i n r e a l i t y " do t h e
norms r e f e r , which l e a d s d i r e c t l y back t o Marxts t h e o r y of
alienation.
Weberrs " a u t h o r i t y " answers t o Marx's "ideology" a s
t h e r e i f i c a t i o n of s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . I n t h e c a s e of l e g a l -
r a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y , man r e i f i e s r u l e s he c r e a t e d i n t o " l e g a l
s t a t u t e s " and " f u n c t i o n a l competence" which become s t a n d a r d s

-
over man t o which he must answer a s i f t o an e x t e r n a l f o r c e .
His r e l a t i o n t o them i s a s t o " t h i n g s " t h a t he d i d n o t c r e a t e ;

-
f o r which he i s n o t r e s p o n s i b l e but t o which he i s responsible.
7

Marx d i s t i n g u i s h e d between community a s human and as

-------
i l l u s o r y , t h e former being based on man's c a p a c i t i e s as a
s p e c i e s and t h e l a t t e r based on t h e S t a t e . I n human community
a l l a c t i o n not only flows from manfs s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,
but i s c o n t r o l l e d by h i s knowledge of t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c and
.
d i r e c t e d toward t h e development of human c a p a c i t i e s suggested
by t h i s I n c i v i l s o c i e t y ( i l l u s o r y community)
manfs a c t i o n s flow h i s s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c but a r e not
c o n t r o l l e d by of i t and a r e n o t d i r e c t e d toward
/
development of human c a p a c i t i e s . The development of human
capacities i n c i v i l s o c i e t y i s a c c i d e n t a l and l i m i t e d by t h e
conditions ( i n c l u d i n g i d e o l o g y ) which a r e r e q u i r e d t o maintain
c i v i l society.
The major d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t I wish t o draw h e r e
between Marx and Weber i s t h a t while Weber described what he
saw normatively, Marx denied t h e v a l i d i t y of normative beha-
v i o r a s , , s u c h . He s e t up manfs s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a s an
a b s o l u t e standard, i . e . , an o b j e c t i v e standard e x t e r n a l t o
p a r t i c u l a r norms, a g a i n s t which normative behavior can be evalu-
a t e d a s t o i t s b e n e f i t s or harmfulness t o man a s man.

Bureaucracy
Weber considered bureaucracy, a s a s t a b l e mode of
organizing f o r t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of g o a l s , t o be t e c h n i c a l l y
s u p e r i o r t o o t h e r forms of o r g a n i z a t i o n because i t ensures
" t h a t t h e o f f i c i a l business of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n be discharged
p r e c i s e l y , unambiguously, continuously, and with a s much speed
a s p o s s i b l e " . 19 I

The f u l l y developed b u r e a u c r a t i c mechanism compares

with o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s e x a c t l y a s does t h e machine
with t h e non-mechanical modes of production. 20
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n b u r e a u c r a c y , i s c a r r i e d o u t with r e f e r e n c e t o
II o b j e c t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s " , which means " a d i s c h a r g e of b u s i -
*
n e s s according t o and !without r e g a r d f o r
persons 1 . I' ideally, i s
s o c i e t a l action. Weberrs c r i p t i o n of bureaucracy a s a
"machine", and a d m i n i s t r a t i as societal action parallels
Marxfs d e s c r i p t i o n of s e l g - c o n s c i o u s n e s s o b j e c t i f i e d i n t o
s o c i e t y a s a " t h i n g " , and t h e r e i f i c a t i o n of t h i s o b j e c t
through d i s r e g a r d i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s between i t and t h e p e r s o n s
who c r e a t e and m a i n t a i n i t .
Bureaucracy i s p e r f e c t e d through t h e "dehumanizing1'
of o f f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s .
I t s s p e c i f i c n a t u r e , which i s welcomed by c a p i t a l -
ism, develops t h e more p e r f e c t l y t h e more bureau-
c r a c y i s fdehumanizedf, t h e more completely i t
succeeds i n e l i m i n a t i n g from o f f i c i a l b u s i n e s s l o v e ,
h a t r e d , and a l l p u r e l y p e r s o n a l , i r r a t i o n a l , and
emotional elements which escape c a l c u l a t i o n . 22

He equated "dehumanization1' w i t h t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of " p e r s o n a l ,

i r r a t i o n a l , and emotional elements which escape c a l c u l a t i o n " .
Within t h e framework of Marxfs t h e o r y of a l i e n a t i o n , "dehuman-
i z a t i o n " of o f f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s does n o t , i n i t s e l f , n e c e s s a -
r i l y imply t h e dehumanization of man, A l i e n a t i o n does n o t
f o l l o w from t h e d e p e r s o n a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s i n s o c i e t y
( a s a t h i n g ) but from t h e -
use t h a t man makes of t h i s o b j e c t ,
s o c i e t y , t h a t he has c r e a t e d . I n h i s communistic s o c i e t y ,
man " p o s s e s s o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y " .
... through t h e f a c t t h a t a l l obcjects a r e f o r him
a p o s i t i S e , d e p e r s o n a l i z e d o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of him-
s e l f . H e i s t h e man t o whom t h e w o r l d . i n d e e d
belongs, because i t s manner of p r o d u c t i o n does n o t
a l i e n a t e him, but e s t a b l i s h e s him. 23
 He a l s o s a i d , i n h i s d i s c u s s i d n of human requirements, and
t h e "emancipationff of t h e human s e n s e s , t h a t men i n human
c ommunit y
... rela,$e themselves t o t h e
of t h e t h i n g , but t h e t h i n g
t i v e human r e l a t i o n t o
v i c e v e r s a . Need or
lost their
i t s mere u t i l i t y by use becoming human use.,
Weber t o o recognized a d i s t i n c t i o n between s o c i a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n a s a t o o l and t h e human use of i t . His recogni-
t i o n of i t i s i n d i c a t e d i n h i s a s s o c i a t i o n of power with com-
munal a c t i o n , and i n h i s f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n of communal and
s o c i e t a l a c t i o n with r e f e r e n c e t o bureaucracy.
Once i t i s f u l l y e s t a b l i s h e d , bureaucracy i s among
t h o s e s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s which a r e t h e h a r d e s t t o
d e s t r o y . Bureaucracy i s - t h e means of c a r r y i n g
lcommunity action1 over i n t o r a t i o n a l l y ordered
' s o c i e t a l action!. Therefore, a s an instrument f o r
' s o c i e t a l i z i n g t r e l a t i o n s of power, bureaucracy has
been and i s a power instrument of t h e f i r s t o r d e r --
f o r t h e one who c o n t r o l s t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c a p p a r a t u s . 25

It follows t h a t c o n t r o l of b u r e a u c r a t i c apparatus h e a v i l y
weights t h e chances of an i n d i v i d u a l o r a group of i n d i v i d u a l s
t o r e a l i z e t h e i r w i l l i n communal a c t i o n .
Under otherwise e q u a l c o n d i t i o n s , a ' s o c i e t a l a c t i o n ! ,
which i s methodically ordered and l e d , i s s u p e r i o r
t o every r e s i s t a n c e of 'mass' or even of tcommunal
a c t i o n " . And where t h e b u r e a u c r a t i z a t i o n of adminis-
t r a t i o n has been completely c a r r i e d through, a form
of power r e l a t i o i s e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t i s p r a c t i c a l l y
u n s h a t t e r a b l e . 29
!"
Weberls b e l i e f i n t h e i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y of power r e l a -
t i o n s based on c o n t r o l of b u r e a u c r a t i c apparatus i s dependent
upon h i s assumption t h a t a change i n power r e l a t i o n s would
r e q u i r e t h e breakdown of t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c machine. This
I

assumption i s q u e s t i o n a b l e s i n c e communal a c t i o n can be cay-

r i e d on independently of p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,
and i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t power r e l a t i o n s expressed i n bureau-
c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n can be changed on
might e n t a i l a change i n t h e uses made
would n o t n e c e s s a r i l y e n t a i l t h e breakdown of b u r e a u c r a c i e s .
Weber thought t h a t such r e - o r g a n i z a t i o n would be a t l e a s t
h i g h l y u n l i k e l y because of t h e n a t u r e of b u r e a u c r a t i c organi-
zation.
The i n d i v i d u a l bureaucrat cannot squirm out of t h e
apparatus i n which he i s harnessed. In contrast t o
t h e h o n o r i f i c o r a v o c a t i o n a l ' n o t a b l e ' , t h e pro-
f e s s i o n a l bureaucrat i s chained t o h i s a c t i v i t y by
h i s e n t i r e m a t e r i a l and i d e a l e x i s t e n c e . I n t h e
g r e a t m a j o r i t y of c a s e s , he i s only a s i n g l e cog i n
an ever-moving mechanism which p r e s c r i b e s t o him an
e s s e n t i a l l y f i x e d r o u t e of march. The o f f i c i a l i s
e n t r u s t e d with s p e c i a l i z e d t a s k s and normally t h e
mechanism cannot be put i n t o motion or a r r e s t e d by
him, but only from t h e very top. The i n d i v i d u a l
bureaucrat i s t h u s forged t o t h e community of a l l
t h e f u n c t i o n a r i e s who a r e i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e
mechanism. They have a common i n t e r e s t i n s e e i n g
t h a t t h e mechanism continues i t s f u n c t i o n s and t h a t
t h e s o c i e t a l l y e x e r c i s e d a u t h o r i t y c a r r i e s on. *7
The continuing f u n c t i o n i n g of bureaucracy i s i n t h e i n t e r e s t s
of t h e v a s t m a j o r i t y of people.
The r u l e d , f o r t h e i r p a r t , cannot dispense with or
r e p l a c e t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c apparatus of a u t h o r i t y
once i t e x i s t s . For t h i s bureaucracy r e s t s upon
e x p e r t t r a i n i n g , a f u n c t i o n a l s p e c i a l i z a t i o n of
work, and an a t t i t u d e s e t f o r h a b i t u a l and v i r t u o s o -
l i k e mastery of a s i n g l e y e t methodically i n t e g r a t e d
f u n c t i o n . If t h e o f f i c i a l s t o p s working, or if h i s
work i s f o r c e f u l l y i n t e r r u p t e d , chaos r e s u l t s , and
i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o improvise replacements from among
t h e governed who a r e f i t t o master such chaos. This
holds f o r p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a s w e l l a s f o r p r i v a t e
economic management. 28
Weber has shown t h a t d e s t r u c t i b n of b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n
*
would l e a d t o chaos and would t h u s be i n no o n e ' s i n t e r e s t s ,
n e i t h e r t h o s e of t h e r u l e r s nor of t h e r u l e d . He has n o t shown
how he can j u s t i f y h i s assumption t h a t t h i s f a c t e n t a i l s t h e

n o t shown t h e n e c e s s a r y connection between t h e u s e

c r a c y and t h e e x i s t e n c e of bureaucracy.
fl
n e c e s s i t y of m a i n t a i n i n g power r e l a t i o n s a s t h e y e x i s t .
bureau-

Weber was, i n f a c t , unable t o show any such n e c e s s a r y

connection. He u n w i t t i n g l y equated b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n
with c a p i t a l i s m , i . e . , he equated t h e o b j e c t and one p a r t i c u l a r
use of i t . He recognized t h a t modern forms of bureaucracy
were f i r s t developed i n r e l a t i o n t o c a p i t a l i s m .
The b u r e a u c r a t i c s t r u c t u r e goes hand i n hand w i t h
t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of t h e m a t e r i a l means of manage-
ment i n t h e hands of t h e m a s t e r . This c o n c e n t r a t i o n
occurs, f o r i n s t a n c e , i n a well-known and t y p i c a l
f a s h i o n , i n t h e development of b i g c a p i t a l i s t e n t e r -
prises,which find t h e i r e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n
t h i s p r o c e s s . *9
Alongside t h i s development of bureaucracy i n c a p i t a l i s t e n t e r -
p r i s e s . i s a corresponding development of bureaucracy i n p u b l i c
organizations. Because bureaucracy a r o s e p a r a l l e l with c a p i t a l -
ism, Weber assumed t h a t , once f u l l y developed, i t could n o t be
s e p a r a t e d from c a p i t a l i s m .
More and more t h e m a t e r i a l f a t e of t h e masses depends
upon t h e s t e a d y and c o r r e c t f u n c t i o n i n g of t h e
i n c r e a s i n g l y b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s of p r i v a t e
c a p i t a l i s m . The i d e a of e l i m i n a t i n g t h e s e o r g a n i z a -
t i o n s becomes more and more u t o p i a n . 30
The e q u a t i o n of a s o c i a l o b j e c t with t h e use t o which i t was
o r i g i n a l l y put i s a f a l s e equation. The beauty of Marxfs
t h e o r y of a l i e n a t i o n i s i t s q u e s t i o n i n g of t h i s e q u a t i o n , b u t
one need n o t r e s o r t t o Marx's t h e o r y t o show t h e inadequacy
of i t . The development of s o c i a l o b j e c t s -
i s a p r o c e s s of
c r e a t i n g s o c i a l o b j e c t s , s e p a r a t i n g them from t h e i r o r i g i n a l
use, and u s i n g them i n new ways. One example of t h i s p r o c e s s
i s t h e development of t r a v e l by water. ~ a i l j d o a t s , which were
once a primary means of t r a v e l , were by steamers a s
a primary means. But t h e s a i l b o a t s
S a i l i n g has become a means of r e c r e a t i o n . 31 1
2. WEBER AND THE MYTH OF SOCIETY

I n my d i s c u s s i o n of Weberls work I have been l a y i n g

t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r my argument t h a . t h i s a n a l y s i s of a u t h o r i t y
i s an a n a l y s i s of one of t h e methods by which people a l i e n a t e
themselves from t h e i r s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . His a n a l y s i s of
communal and s o c i e t a l a c t i o n , power and a u t h o r i t y , and bureau-
c r a c y i s i n v a l u a b l e t o t h e study of a l i e n a t i o n . He c l e a r l y
showed how i d e a s must be t r e a t e d as an independent v a r i a b l e i n
manr s understanding of s o c i e t y . He a l s o c l a r i f i e d and, perhaps
u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y , added weight t o Marxls c o n t e n t i o n t h a t i f man
wants t o overcome a l i e n a t i o n he has t o understa.nd and c o n t r o l
h i s relation t o social objects.
But Weber, w i t h h i s phenomenal range and depth of
i n t e r e s t , went f a r beyond a simple c l a r i f i c a t i o n and a f f i r m a -
t i o n of Marx's t h e o r y . It was with r e f e r e n c e t o h i s d i s c u s s i o n
of r a t i o n a l i t y a s a g e n e r a l c u l t u r a l development u n d e r l y i n g a l l
a s p e c t s of modern l i f e t h a t Weber reached beyond Marxfs r a t h e r
simple c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of t h e aLienated a s worker and t h e
a l i e n a t o r a s owner, and c o n t r i b u t e d independently t o an under-
s t a n d i n g of a l i e n a t i o n i n t h e contemporary world.

Rationality
32
Weber used t h e term " r a t i o n a l " i n a v a r i e t y of wa.ys
of which I am going t o c o n s i d e r t h r e e : r a t i o n a l action,
r a t i o n a l systems, and r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n a s an a t t i t u d e toward
t h e world. Of Weberls d e f i n i t i o n of r a t i o n a l a c t i o n T a l c o t
Parsons noted,
Weber u n f o r t u n a t e l y does n o t g i v e us an e x p l i c i t
s t a t e m e n t of ( t h e ) c r i t e r i a , b u t t h e y can be i n f e r r e d
from h i s d i s c u s s i o n . An a c t i s r a t i o n a l i n s o f a r
a s ( a ) i t i s o r i e n t e d t o a c l e a r l y formulated unambi-
guous g o a l , o r t o a s e t of v a l u e s which a r e c l e a r l y
formulated and l o g i c a l l y c o n s i s t e n t ; ( b ) t h e means
chosen a r e , according t o t h e b e s t a v a i l a b l e knowledge,
adapted t o t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e g o a l . 33

R a t i o n a l a c t i o n , then, i n c l u d e s o r i e n t a t i o n toward a g o a l , t h e
means used t o achieve t h e g o a l , and some judgment of t h e
adequacy of t h e means f o r t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e g o a l .
O f t h e second usage t h a t I wish t o c o n s i d e r , Weber

s t a t e d simply, I' l R a t i o n a l ! may a l s o mean a l s y s t e m a t i c arrange-

ment ! .
"
34 A s y s t e m a t i c arrangement i s a method which i s

"unambiguously o r i e n t e d t o f i x e d goals"35, which f o r m a l l y

i n c l u d e s i t i n t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n of t h e above d e f i n i t i o n of
rational action l i s t e d a f t e r ( b ) . My reason f o r c o n s i d e r i n g
t h e two uses s e p a r a t e l y i s t h a t , while r a t i o n a l a c t i o n f o c u s e s
a t t e n t i o n on t h e a c t o r s , r a t i o n a l system f o c u s e s a t t e n t i o n on
t h e method.
 R a t i o n a l i z a t i o n a s an a t t i t u d e toward t h e world,
r e f e r s n o t t o any i n c r e a s e d r a t i o n a l i t y on t h e p a r t of t h e
i n d i v i d u a l but t o t h e assumption by i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t t h e world
i s r a t i o n a l (as systematically arranged). I n "Science as a
36
Vocation" Weber d i s c u s s e d " i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n "
a s t h e b e l i e f t h a t , although one has no i n c r e a s e d knowledge of
t h e c o n d i t i o n s under which one l i v e s , one could, i f one wished,
d i s c o v e r what t h e y a r e . It i s t h e b e l i e f t h a t a l l t h i n g s can

be mastered by c a l c u l a t i o n , and t h a t t h e r e a r e no mysterious

and i n c a l c u l a b l e f o r c e s i n t h e world, a b e l i e f r e l a t e d t o t h e
development of t h e s c i e n t i f i c method.
Weber saw t h e development of t h e s c i e n t i f i c method
h i s t o r i c a l l y from S o c r a t e s t o t h e Renaissance w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t
of t h e s e a r c h f o r " t r u e a r t " . He p o i n t e d out t h a t f o r t h e
e a r l y experimentors s c i e n c e wa.s t h e p a t h t o t r u e a r t and t h u s
t o t r u e nature. But t h i s f a i t h i n s c i e n c e i s no longer t e n a b l e .
A f t e r N i e t z c h e ' s d e v a s t a t i n g c r i t i c i s m of t h o s e ' l a s t
men1 who 1 invented happiness 1 ,* I may l e a v e a s i d e a l t o -
g e t h e r t h e n a i v e optimism i n which s c i e n c e -- t h a t i s ,
t h e t e c h n i q u e of m a s t e r i n g l i f e which r e s t s upon
s c i e n c e -- has been c e l e b r a t e d a s t h e way t o happi-
ness .... 37
He asked what meaning we can make of s c i e n c e ,
... now a f t e r a l l t h e s e former i l l u s i o n s , t h e 'way t o
t r u e b e i n g ' , t h e 'way t o t r u e a r t ! , t h e 'way t o t r u e
n a t y r e f , t h e 'way t o t r u e God!, t h e 'way t o t r u e
happiness 1 , have been d i s p e l l e d ? Tolstoy has given
t h e s i m p l e s t answer with t h e words: ' S c i e n c e i s
meaningless because i t g i v e s no answer t o our q u e s t i o n ,
t h e only q u e s t i o n important f o r u s : "what s h a l l we
do and how s h a l l we l i v e ? " 1 That s c i e n e does not
g i v e an answer t o t h i s i s i n d i s p u t a b l e . 36
Weber concluded t h a t t h e v a l u e of s c i e n c e i s t h a t i t can g i v e
us c l e a r means f o r reaching our g o a l s , but we o u r s e l v e s must
specify those goals f o r ourselves.
I n t e l l e c t u a l i s t r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n i s an a t t i t u d e toward
t h e world based on a misconception which i s t h a t , because
s c i e n c e g i v e s e x p l a n a t i o n but no meaning, t h e r e i s no meaning
i n t h e world a s i d e from t h e mundane c a l c u l a b i l i t y of i t . It
was toward t h i s a t t i t u d e t h a t Weber d i r e c t e d h i s o b s e r v a t i o n
t h a t t h e world i s "disenchanted".
We l i v e as d i d t h e a n c i e n t s when t h e i r world was n o t
y e t disenchanted of i t s gods and mmons, only we l i v e
i n a d i f f e r e n t sense. As H e l l e n i c man a t times s a c r i -
f i c e d t o Aphrodite and a t o t h e r times t o Apollo, and,
above a l l , a s everybody s a c r i f i c e d t o t h e gods of h i s
c i t y , so do we s t i l l nowadays, only t h e b e a r i n g of
man has been disenchanted and denuded of i t s m y s t i c a l
but inwardly genuine p l a s t i c i t y . Fate, and c e r t a i n l y
n o t ' s c i e n c e ' , holds sway over t h e s e gods and t h e i r
struggles. ...Our c i v i l i z a t i o n d e s t i n e s us t o r e a l i z e
more c l e a r l y t h e s e s t r u g g l e s again, a f t e r our eyes
have been blinded f o r a thousand y e a r s -- b l i n d e d by
t h e a l l e g e d l y o r presumably e x c l u s i v e o r i e n t a t i o n
towards t h e grandiose moral f e r v o r of C h r i s t i a n
e t h i c s . 39
Weber was n o t deluded by a longing f o r some romantic p a s t . He
believed t h a t t h e s e "gods and t h e i r s t r u g g l e s " would have t o
be d e a l t with i n p r a c t i c a l l i f e , i n "meeting t h e 'demands of
t h e day'
40
I' His n o t i o n was t h a t we a r e coming i n t o a time
c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e n e c e s s i t y of f a c i n g t h e "gods" of t h e
a n c i e n t s without t h e p r o t e c t i o n e i t h e r of t h e i r myths o r of
our own - our h e r i t a g e of J u d e o - C h r i s t i a n i t y . I n a sense, he
"prophesied", a s d i d Marx, a "new world" ; but where Marx
s t r e s s e d t h e p o s i t i v e a s p e c t s of man g a i n i n g h i s freedom from
s o c i e t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , Weber s'tressed t h e f a n t a s t i c amount of
e f f o r t and d i s c i p l i n e r e q u i r e d t o d e a l w i t h our " c i v i l i z a t i o n " .
As we w e l l know now, Weberrs p o i n t of view cannot be passed .
off a s "mere" pessimism.
Weber showed how our s o c i e t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i s becoming
i n c r e a s i n g l y r a t i o n a l i z e d i n b u r e a u c r a t i c systems. He a l s o
d e s c r i b e d t h e s u b j e c t i v e a t t i t u d e s which have developed
p a r a l l e l with t h i s i n c r e a s i n g e m p i r i c a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . ' What
he f a i l e d t o do was t o d i s t i n g u i s h c l e a r l y between t h e one and
t h e o t h e r , and t o i n d i c a t e t h e n a t u r e of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p
between them, an important d i s t i n c t i o n f o r t h e study of a l i e n a -
tion.
For example, Weber p r e s e n t e d h i s t h r e e forms o f l ' l e g i -
t i m a t e power" a s " i d e a l t y p e s " , emphasizing t h a t none i s e v e r
found i n a pure form i n r e a l i t y . As i d e a l t y p e s t h e y a r e con-
s t r u c t s t h a t we can employ t o g e t a c l e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of
human behavior i n any s o c i e t y . H i s t o r i c a l l y , i n Western
c i v i l i z a t i o n , he b e l i e v e d t h a t our s o c i e t y i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by
a g e n e r a l development of t h e l e g a l - r a t i o n a l t y p e with a decrease
i n both c h a r i s m a t i c and t r a d i t i o n a l . He r e l a t e d t h e d e c l i n e i n
t r a d i t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y t o t h e development of s c i e n c e i n European
culture; and t h e d e c l i n e i n charisma t o t h e d i m i n i s h i n g impor-
t a n c e ok t h e i n d i v i d u a l and of t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of i n d i v i d u a l
action i n s o c i e t a l organization. Applied t o a c o n c r e t e

example, such as t h e development of European c i v i l i z a t i o n , t h e

i d e a l t y p e of l e g a l - r a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y now r e f e r s both t o a
/
 $

f a c t u a l e m p i r i c a l development of r a t i o n a l systems based on

t h e use of s c i e n t i f i c method, and t o t h e o r i e n t a t i o n (of - 1
' .
a t t i t u d e s ) of people t o t h e s e r a t i o n a l systems. As Marx shawedb
t h e two can be s e p a r a t e d , t h e one being t h e o b j e c t i v e develop-
ment of mants c a p a c i t i e s and t h e o t h e r t h e r e i f i c a t i o n of t h e s e ,

"objects" .
Weber saw t h e i n c r e a s i n g appeal t o r a t i o n a l l y c r e a t e d
rules a s a method of j u s t i f y i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n and use of
power, t o be an a s p e c t of t h e g e n e r a l t r e n d of r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n
The g e n e r a l t r e n d of r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , a s an a t t i t u d e toward
t h e world, i s based upon c e r t a i n assumptions, a s I have d i s -
4 41
cussed, about science. These assumptions r e i f y s c i e n c e , and*
consequently a r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y implied i n t h e e m p i r i c a l
r a t i o n a l systems. They i n d i c a t e , not t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e
systems man has c r e a t e d , but t h e -
use of t h e s e systems by man.

I n d i v i d u a l and Society
It i s by c o n f r o n t i n g Weberrs i d e a s about t h e
r e l a t i o n between t h e i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y with Marx's under-
s t a n d i n g of man t h a t I wish t o complete my argument. The
v a l i d i t y of Marxfs t h e o r y of a l i e n a t i o n r e s t s f i n a l l y on
h i s assumption t h a t man i s "whole man" and not "merely a p a r -
t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n r ' , t h a t he may t r e a t himself as a mere
p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n , and t o do s o i s t o a l i e n a t e himself
from h i s " s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c " of " f r e e , conscious
activity", f.e., t o deny h i s wholeness, a c t i n g out of i t with-
out r e c o g n i t i o n of doing so. I f man has no " n a t u r e , i f he
 69

i s determined only by e n v i r o n q e n t a l s i t u a t i o n s , a "mere

r e f l e c t i o n " of h i s c u l t u r e ; o r i f men a r e i s o l a t e d i n d i v i -
-
d u a l s r e l a t e d t o g e t h e r only through shared myths and shared
n e c e s s i t y , t h e n t h e r e i s no need t o c o n s i d e r a l i e n a t i o n a s a
problem. The e x p e r i e n c e t o which t h e term " a l i e n a t i o n " r e f e r s
can i n d i c a t e , i n t h e f i r s t c a s e , a t most, c o n t r a d i c t i o n s
between d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s of a g i v e n c u l t u r e , c o n t r a d i c t i o n s
r e f l e c t e d i n man; and i n t h e second c a s e can i n d i c a t e , a t
most, t h e n a t u r a l i s o l a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s and t h e i r n a t u r a l
c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t . These a r e t h e two s e n s e s i n which Hegel
considered a l i e n a t i o n , and i n both c a s e s t h e r e can be no
genuine " s o l u t i o n " t o a l i e n a t i o n . There can be only t h e recog-
n i t i o n of a n e c e s s a r y human c o n d i t i o n and acceptance of i t .
I would l i k e t o c o n t i n u e my "defense" of a l i e n a t i o n

t h e o r y with an a p p e a l t o t h e f a c t t h a t , while t h i s t h e o r y
encompasses t h e r e l a t i o n s d e s c r i b e d by Weber, he o f f e r e d no
a l t e r n a t e t h e o r y e x p l a i n i n g t h e e x p e r i e n c e s t o which " a l i e n a -
tion" refers. Weber never e x p l i c i t l y formulated h i s i d e a s
about t h e n a t u r e of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e i n d i v i d u a l
-.
and s o c i e t y , b u t t h e y a r e implied i n h i s work.
attempting t o define h i s " r e a l " thoughts, h i s writing i n d i c a t e s
Without
-1 j

a t h e o r e t i c a l assumption t h a t men a r e n a t u r a l l y i s o l a t e d i n d i - I'

v i d u a l s , r e l a t e d t o g e t h e r i n s o c i e t y through shared bonds of

-
1
myth and n e c e s s i t y .
Weber took t h e i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y " a s g i v e n " ,
recognized t h e " d i s t a n c e " between p r i v a t e and p u b l i c l i f e , and
saw t h a t p r i v a t e l i f e a s given has v e r y l i t t l e , i f any, e f f e c t
on p u b l i c l i f e .
The f a c t of our time i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by r a t i o n a l i z a -
t i o n , i n t e l l e c t u a l i z a t i o n and, above a l l , by t h e
(disenchantment of t h e w o r l d ' . P r e c i s e l y t h e u l t i m a t e
and most sublime v a l u e s have r e t r e a t e d from p u b l i c
l i f e e i t h e r i n t o t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l realm of mystic
l i f e o r i n t o t h e b r o t h e r l i n e s s of d i r e c t and p e r s o n a l
human r e l a t i o n s . 42
B e l i e v i n g t h a t power i n t h e hands of a few t o c o n t r o l t h e l i v e s
of t h e many goes hand i n hand w i t h l a r g e - s c a l e b u r e a u c r a t i c
o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h a t , a r a d i c a l change i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of
power i m p l i e s d i s r u p t i o n of bureaucracy and consequently "chaos",
and b e l i e v i n g i n t h e i n c r e a s i n g i n d e s t r u c t i b i l i t y of bureau-
c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n , Weber thought t h a t t h e only t h i n g f o r men
t 6 do i s f a c e up t o t h e r e a l i t i e s of l i f e as t h e y a r e w i t h
individual integrity.
... We want t o draw t h e l e s s o n t h a t n o t h i n g i s gained
by y e a r n i n g and t a r r y i n g a l o n e , and we s h a l l a c t
d i f f e r e n t l y . We s h a l l s e t t o work and meet t h e
(demands of t h e d a y ' , i n human r e l a t i o n s as w e l l as
i n our v o c a t i o n . This, however, i s p l a i n and simple,
i f each f i n d s and obeys t h e demon who holds t h e
f i b r e s of h i s v e r y l i f e . 43

What he l e f t unquestioned was t h e c o n t e n t of thefdemands of t h e

day!.
R e j e c t i n g t h e i d e a t h a t t h e (demands of t h e day1 f a l l
on t h e s h o u l d e r s of i n d i v i d u a l s ( a s i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s ),

what th'ese demands c o n s i s t of depends on t h e ways i n which

people a r e prepared t o o r g a n i z e themselves i n r e l a t i o n t o
s o c i e t a l organization. Weber saw t h e i n d i v i d u a l a s h e l p l e s s
i n t h e f a c e of i n c r e a s i n g r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of s o c i e t y , t h e only
channel f o r e f f e c t i v e power being b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n .
I n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of power, he defined i t i n terms of an i n d i -
v i d u a l o r i n d i v i d u a l s i n c o n c e r t being a b l e t o " r e a l i z e t h e i r
own w i l l i n a communal a c t i o n even a g a i n s t o t h e r s who a r e
participating i n the action". Since communal and s o c i e t a l
a c t i o n can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d , any p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t a l organiza-
t i o n , such a s bureaucracy, i s only one of t h e means by which
" w i l l s " can be " r e a l i z e d " . Since power i s t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of
i n d i v i d u a l w i l l s i n communal a c t i o n , and s o c i e t d l o r g a n i z a t i o n
i s one means by which power i s e x e r c i s e d , a t l e a s t some i n d i -
v i d u a l s a r e f a r from h e l p l e s s i n our s o c i e t y .
R e j e c t i n g Weberts assumption t h a t one p a r t i c u l a r use
of bureaucracy i s a necessary use of i t , i t follows t h a t t h e
power d i s t r i b u t i o n now r e l a t e d t o bureaucracy i s n o t a neces-
s a r y one. Weber saw l e g a l - r a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y a s a j u s t i f i c a -
t i o n f o r e x i s t i n g power r e l a t i o n s . I n Marxls t h e o r y t h i s
p a r a l l e l s t h e r e i f i c a t i o n of law i n t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e
"ruling" class. Weber saw t h a t such j u s t i f i c a t i o n was e q u a l l y
i n t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e r u l e d , r e f e r r i n g t o both t h e i r hopes and
their fears. However, a s long a s such j u s t i f i c a t i o n stems from
hopes and f e a r s without a c t u a l l y r e s o l v i n g f e a r s and r e a l i z i n g

hopes, i t i s based on i r r a t i o n a l f e e l i n g s ( l o v e ; h a t r e d , and

a l l p u r e l y p e r s o n a l , i r r a t i o n a l , and emotional elements which
escape c a l c u l a t i o n ) and i s n o t r a t i o n a l a c t i o n , a s he defined
t h e term. As an i r r a t i o n a l means of d e a l i n g with " r e a l " hopes
, I

and f e a r s , i t i s a f a i l u r e of man t o use h i s s o c i e t a l o r g a n i z a t i m

 72.

i n h i s human i n t e r e s t ; a r e i f , i c a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n an o b j e c t i -
f i c a t i o n of h i s powers. Legal-rational authority, as a
r e i f i c a t i o n , a t t r i b u t e s power belonging t o i n d i v i d u a l s i n
r e l a t i o n t o one a n o t h e r ( r e g a r d l e s s of t h e complexity of t h e s e
r e l a t i o n s ) t o r u l e s which a r e b e l i e v e d t o have an e x i s t e n c e
independent of t h e men u s i n g them. J u s t i f i c a t i o n of power
r e l a t i o n s i s a communal a c t i v i t y , a.nd t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t men
i n community r e i f y t h e i r o b j e c t i v e power r e l a t i o n s , t h e y
d e f i n e themselves i n d i v i d u a l l y a s h e l p l e s s i n t h e f a c e of
mass s o c i e t y . Each i n d i v i d u a l i s h e l p l e s s because a l l i n d i -
v i d u a l s i n community d e f i n e themselves a s such and a c t on
t h e i r communal agreement.
R a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of s o c i e t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , a s t h e
o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of manls powers, does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y imply
individual helplessness. Weber r e a l i z e d t h a t s o c i e t a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n can be used a s a t o o l f o r communal g o a l s . The
q u e s t i o n t h a t has t o be answered h e r e i s which "community"
( o r communities) i s u s i n g e x i s t i n g s o c i e t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n t o
i t s own advantage. By Weberls d e f i n i t i o n , i n d i v i d u a l men can
o r g a n i z e i n many d i f f e r e n t kinds of community, depending on
t o what t h e y a r e r e f e r r i n g f o r t h e i r "we-feeling". By Marxl s

d e f i n i t i o n , men can r e f e r t o one of two communities f o r t h e i r

"we-feeling", t o an i l l u s o r y one o r t o t h a t based on t h e i r
s p e c i e s n a t u r e , i n c l u d i n g a l l members of t h e s p e c i e s .
The d i s t i n c t i o n between Weberls normative and " v a l u e -
f r e e " approach and Marxls s u g g e s t i o n of a s t a n d a r d e x t e r n a l

t o c u l t u r a l norms by which normative behavior can be e v a l u a t e d

 -- 1

i s important t o t h e study of A l i e n a t i o n . Both approaches a r e ,

" v a l u e - f r e e " i n t h e s e n s e of b e i n g amoral. Marx and Weber

,
used t h e i r a n a l y s e s of s o c i e t y t o make moral e v a l u a t i o n s of
i t , but t h e i r m o r a l i t y i s n o t implied i n t h e i r a n a l y s i s . Marx
/*

i n t e r p r e t e d " f r e e , conscious a c t i v i t y " w i t h i n a IgC framework.

Weberfs p e n e t r a t i n g a n a l y s i s of normative a u t h o r i t y took us
beyond Marx's r a t h e r simple optimism, but d i d n o t answer
Marxfs b a s i c h y p o t h e s i s t h a t man i s whole and only t r e a t s him-
s e l f as a p a r t i a l function i n forced labor. Nor have we who
a r e f u l l y w i t h i n t h e 20C done s o .
We have s t u d i e d f a i r l y e x t e n s i v e l y , i n f u n c t i o n a l
a n a l y s e s of s o c i e t y and i n r o l e and games t h e o r y , ways i n which
man t r e a t s himself as a p a r t i c u l a r functi,on. Weber a n t i c i p a t e d
t h e problems i n h e r e n t i n t h i s kind of s t u d y when i t i s unchecked
by being placed w i t h i n a more encompassing understanding of
man. With r e f e r e n c e t o t h e use of f u n c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s , he had
t h i s t o say:
For purposes of s o c i o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s two t h i n g s can
be s a i d . F i r s t t h i s f u n c t i o n a l frame of r e f e r e n c e i s
convenient f o r purposes of p r a c t i c a l i l l u s t r a t i o n and
f o r provisional orientation. In these respects i t i s
n o t only u s e f u l b u t i n d i s p e n s a b l e . But a t t h e same
time i f i t s c o g n i t i v e v a l u e i s overestimated and i t s
concepts i l l e g i t i m a t e l y f r e i f i e d f , i t can be h i g h l y
dangerous. 44
F u n c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s of " s o c i e t y " , a s t h e o b j e c t i f i e d power of
man, i s one way of d e s c r i b i n g s o c i e t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . It i s ,
t o use Toulminfs terminology, a method of n a t u r a l h i s t o r y and
not a s c i e n t i f i c explanation. It n e i t h e r e x p l a i n s human
behavior, nor does i t i l l u m i n a t e our understanding of man's
r e l a t i o n t o s o c i e t a l organization. If t h e r e s u l t s of func-

t i o n a l a n a l y s e s of " s o c i e t y " a r e n o t r e f e r r e d t o "whole man",

t h e method c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n , i n our c u l t u r e ,
of t h e myth of S o c i e t y .
What has y e t t o be accomplished i n t h e s o c i a l
s c i e n c e s i s an e x p l a n a t i o n of -
how man i s r e l a t e d t o himself
a s a p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n , and consequently, -
how he a l i e n a t e s
himself. Weber c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e beginning of such an explana-
t i o n by h y p o t h e s i z i n g t h a t our j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r power r e l a -
t i o n s , and consequently our use of s o c i e t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , a r e
based on our f e a r s and hopes.
 CHAPTER

THE MYTH OF SOCIETY I N AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY

I n t h i s c h a p t e r my main i n t e n t i o n i s t o show how con-

temporary d e f i n i t i o n s of a l i e n a t i o n do n o t touch on Marxts
b a s i c h y p o t h e s i , ~ : t h a t a l i e n a t i o n i s a r e l a t i o n between man and
h i s species characteristic (i.e., t h a t which d i s t i n g u i s h e s him
a s a s p e c i e s from o t h e r s p e c i e s of l i f e ) , such t h a t man uses h i s
s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c without c o n s c i o u s l y r e a l i z i n g what he i s
- 7
doing. Contemporary t h i n k e r s i n America have c o n c e n t r a t e d on
what Marx considered t o be t h e a c t i v i t y of a l i e n a t i o n ( i . e . ,
f o r c e d l a b o r , r e i f i c a t i o n ) , but have approached t h i s a c t i v i t y a s
a " t h i n g " without r e f e r r i n g t h e " t h i n g " t o t h e people t o whom i t
relates. They c o n s i d e r a l i e n a t e d man (man t r e a t i n g himself a s
a p a r t i c u l a r function; c i v i l man) t o be t h e whole man and,
i n doing s o , f a i l t o g e t beyond normative models of man Tn
society. I argue t h a t contemporary t h i n k e r s have r e t a i n e d

a l i e n a t i o n a s an e v a l u a t i v e concept, r e f e r r i n g t o inhumane
t r e a t m e n t of man a s inhuman t r e a t m e n t , and r e d u c i n g Marx's
n o t i o n of s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t o e t h i c a l v a l u e s p e c u l i a r t o
one c u l t u r e and one period of time. I n contemporary t h e o r y , v'
a l i e n a t i o n r e f e r s mainly t o a comparison between c u l t u r a l
v a l u e s and s o c i e t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , and t o c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between
t h e two. This usage i s more c l o s e l y a f f i l i a t e d w i t h Durkheimls
n o t i o n of anomie, and e s p e c i a l l y a s t h e term has
been developed by Robert Merton, t h a n t o Marxls a l i e n a t i o n .
I

One would have t o a g r e e with Kaufman t h a t a l i e n a t i o n , as used

i n t h i s manner, i s n o t a f r u i t f u l concept f o r s c i e n t i f i c
a n a l y s i s of s o c i e t y .
My argument i s t h a t t h e contemporary usage of t h e
term i s a d i s t o r t i o n of Marx's d e f i n i t i o n , which can be s t a t e d
i n t h e form of a h y p o t h e s i s , i f e x t r i c a t e d from i t s narrow
19C humanist v a l u e o r i e n t a t i o n . Marxrs t h e o r y was s t a t e d , a s
he himself p o i n t e d o u t , i n t h e form of a rough and incomplete
o u t l i n e , and he himself d e r i d e d i d e a l i s t i c humanism. I raise

t h e s e p o i n t s a s an attempt t o j u s t i f y my s e p a r a t i o n of c e r t a i n
a s p e c t s -of h i s g e n e r a l t h e o r y from t h e t r a d i t i o n a l "Marxian"
framework, with t h e c o n v i c t i o n t h a t h i s t h e o r y of a l i e n a t i o n
can be used as a h y p o t h e s i s with r e f e r e n c e t o which e m p i r i c a l
d a t a can be meaningfully i n t e r p r e t e d .

I. CONTEMPORARY DEFINITIONS
1
E r i c and Mary Josephson, i n Man Alone , devoted a
r a t h e r e x t e n s i v e i n t r o d u c t o r y c h a p t e r t o a survey of t h e
v a r i o u s ways i n which " a l i e n a t i o n " has come t o be used. Their
survey i l l u s t r a t e s t h e wide range of i n t e r e s t i n t h e concept,
an i n t e r e s t spanning t h e d i s t a n c e between p o e t s and p o l i t i -
2
cians. Walter Gerson c o n s t r u c t e d a l e s s e x t e n s i v e and l e s s
d e t a i l e d l i s t of uses t o which t h e concept has been p u t by
p s y c h o l o g i s t s and s o c i o l o g i s t s . He suggested t h a t , even though
incomplete, h i s l i s t shows " a s i z e a b l e m a j o r i t y of p e r s o n s
3
l i v i n g i n our advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y " t o be a l i e n a t e d .
 l v i n Seeman4 attempted a l o g i c a l h i s t o r i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n
I

of kinds of a l i e n a t i o n which he hoped t o be of use a s a b a s i s

f o r empirical research. 5
6
On t h e c r i t i c a l side,and r e l e v a n t t o my t h e s i s , Horton
has questioned whether contemporary d e f i n i t i o n s of a l i e n a t i o n
a r e value-free, " o r a r e we w i t n e s s i n g a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n from
r a d i c a l t o conformist d e f i n i t i o n s and v a l u e s under t h e g u i s e
of v a l u e - f r e e s o c i o l o g y ? " I n an unpublished paper e n t i t l e d
" A l i e n a t i o n and Anomie", Stephen Lukes 7 argued t h a t a l i e n a t i o n
has been debased i n f a v e r of t h e d i v e r g e n t "contemporary p r e -
occupations" of r e s e a r c h e r s , r e s u l t i n g i n " t h e common c o r e of
8
Marxls concept" having been l o s t . Kaufman , finally, has sug-
g e s t e d t h a t s i n c e a l i e n a t i o n i s a concept p r i m a r i l y used i n
moral c o n t e x t s i t should be recognized as such and e l i m i n a t e d
from t h e s c i e n t i f i c vocabulary of s o c i o l o g y .
I f t h e c o n t e n t i o n s of Lukes, Horton and Kaufman a r e
w e l l founded, and a p e r u s a l of t h e l i t e r a t u r e p e r t a i n i n g t o
a l i e n a t i o n suggests t h a t they are9, a question a r i s e s as t o
what v a l u e t h e r e i s i n t h e contemporary work being done.
While a g r e e i n g with Lukes t h a t t h e common c o r e of Marxrs con-
c e p t has been l o s t ( o r perhaps n o t y e t f o u n d ) , I would f u r t h e r
argue t h a t , with r e s p e c t t o t h e approaches of s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s
t o a l i e n a t i o n , t h e contemporary d e f i n i t i o n s i n d i c a t e t h e
p r e s e n c e of t h e Myth of S o c i e t y .
This myth, stemming from t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l mind-body

problem, t a k e s d i f f e r e n t forms i n d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t s , e . g . ,
 ,
s o c i e t y a s a whole v e r s u s i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l , and i n d i v i d u a l
( a s p a s s i v e c l a y ) determined by s o c i e t y a s a whole; but t h e
e s s e n t i a l r e f e r e n t of t h e myth remains t h e assumption of a
s e p a r a t i o n between "mental c o n s t r u c t s " and "sensuous e x i s -
t e n c e " , without any attempt t o c o n s i d e r t h e o r i g i n of t h i s
separation. The g e n e r a l form i n which t h e myth i s expressed g'
and implied v i a Durkheim and Weber i s : with r e f e r e n c e t o
Durkheim, t h a t " s o c i e t y " i s normative and p l a c e s moral r e s -
10
t r i c t i o n s on o t h e r w i s e a n a r c h i s t i c i n d i v i d u a l men ; and w i t h
I

r e f e r e n c e t o Weber, t h a t " s o c i e t y " i s normative and i n d i v i -

11
d u a l s r e l a t e t o "it" motivated by f e a r and hope.
John Clark has remarked t h a t i n s p i t e of t h e p r o l i - /'
f e r a t i o n of d e f i n i t i o n s of a l i e n a t i o n ,
an i s o l a b l e f e a t u r e of a l l of them i s manrs f e e l i n g
of l a c k of means (power) t o e l i m i n a t e t h e discrepancy
between h i s d e f i n i t i o n of t h e r o l e he i s p l a y i n g and
t h e one he f e e l s he should be p l a y i n g i n most s i t u a -
tions". 12
Two o t h e r s who e x p l i c i t l y a g r e e w i t h Clark a r e Arnold Kaufman,
f o r whom"'a1ienation' might be d e f i n e d as such and such a
f e e l i n g which r e s u l t s from c e r t a i n b e l i e f s t o g e t h e r w i t h
c e r t a i n o b j e c t i v e s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s " , t h e a l i e n a t e d persons
having a r e l a t i o n s h i p t o something e l s e such t h a t a v o i d a b l e
13
d i s c o n t e n t o r l o s s of s a t i s f a c t i o n r e s u l t s ; and F r i t z
Pappenheim who placed a l i e n a t i o n , a s s o d e f i n e d , w i t h i n an
h i s t o r i c a l perspective.
This "common c o r e " d e f i n i t i o n of a l i e n a t i o n a s a
 L

discrepancy between what one e x p e c t s and what one f i n d s t o be

true - a discrepancy which i s unnecessary o r a v o i d a b l e , and
a t t h e same time a t h r e a t - highlights the fact that aliena-
t i o n cannot be s e p a r a t e d from v a l u e s ( a s e x p e c t a t i o n s ) . It
makes no r e f e r e n c e t o 1) t h e s o u r c e of t h e e x p e c t a t i o n , 2 ) t h e
s o u r c e of t h e o b j e c t i v e s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s , o r 3 ) t h e r e l a t i o n
between e x p e c t a t i o n and a c t u a l c o n d i t i o n s i n terms of t h e i r
respective sources. The d e f i n i t i o n i s a normative one, t a k i n g
v a l u e s a s given and s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s a s given, without
a t t e m p t i n g t o e x p l a i n both r e l a t i v e t o some e x t e r n a l s t a n d a r d .
This o r i e n t a t i o n toward a l i e n a t i o n i s r a d i c a l l y
d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of Marx, who s t r e s s e d a l i e n a t i o n a s a p r a c -
t i c a l a c t i v i t y ( i n f o r c e d l a b o r ) , and t h e o b j e c t i v e e x t e r n a l
f a c t o r of s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . He d i s t r u s t e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
of " a c t u a l r o l e s " v e r s u s i d e a s of what "should1' be, except
within t h i s p r a c t i c a l context. Outside of p r a c t i c a l c o n t e x t s

t h e study of a l i e n a t i o n can, a s he w e l l knew, d e g e n e r a t e i n t o

a form of romantic i d e a l i s m .
Pappenheimt s h i s t o r i c a l approach i s of v a l u e today i n
t h a t i t checks t h e tendency of American s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s t o
i g n o r e t h e c u l t u r a l p a s t and view a l i e n a t i o n only i n our s o c i a l
14
p r e s e n t , and s p e c i f i c a l l y with r e f e r e n c e t o modern technology.
I n t h e course of h i s t o r y a l i e n a t i o n has undergone '1
s i g n i f i c a n t q u a l i t a t i v e changes ( s o ) t h a t i t s
meaning today i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from what i t was
i n p r e v i o u s e r a s . I n t h e p r e s e n t s t a g e of h i s t o r y
man has means of s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n a t h i s command
which were unknown t o him i n former p e r i o d s ....
 Once t h i s concept of t h e i n d i v i d u a l ~ ss o v e r e i g n t y
has been awakened i n t h e minds of men, a new
c l i m a t e i s prepared. The consciousness t h a t man's
y e a r n i n g f o r s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n i s thwarted becomes
a c r u s h i n g e x p e r i e n c e which could n o t have e x i s t e d
i n p r e v i o u s s t a g e s . I n such a s i t y a t i o n t h e a l i e n a -
t i o n of man i s n o t any l o n g e r accepted as an
i n e v i t a b l e f a t e ; more t h a n ever b e f o r e i n h i s t o r y
i t i s f e l t a s a t h r e a t and a t t h e same time a
c h a l l e n g e . 15
A l i e n a t i o n i s n o t , he reminds us, a p e c u l i a r l y modern problem,
but i s an age-old problem which t a k e s d i f f e r e n t g u i s e s a t
d i f f e r e n t times: i t becomes a problem, perhaps, f o r c o n s i d e r a -
t i o n i n a new c o n t e x t , more of a " c r u s h i n g experienceT',and
obviously, with t h e power of s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o
16
modern man, a much g r e a t e r t h r e a . t .
The major q u e s t i o n which comes out of an examination
of contemporary uses of " a l i e n a t i o n " i s t h a t of t h e c r i t e r i a
f o r e v a l u a t i n g b o t h v a l u e s and c o n d i t i o n s of l i f e . Kaufman ,/
r a i s e d t h e p o i n t t h a t t h e d i s c o n t e n t experienced by t h e
" a l i e n a t e d person'' i s a v o i d a b l e , but s i n c e both e x p e c t a t i o n s
and o b j e c t i v e s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s a r e t o some e x t e n t a r b i t r a r y ,
t h e q u e s t i o n remains one of -
h w a l i e n a t i o n ca.n be avoided.
This q u e s t i o n , which I have been posing throughout t h i s t h e s i s ,
i s u s u a l l y handled today a s a q u e s t i o n of "adjustment". To
what e x t e n t can people be expected t o " a d j u s t " t o p r e s e n t /
"condityons 6f l i f e " and t o what e x t e n t can t h e y change t h e s e
c o n d i t i o n s t o s u i t t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s ? l7 Which of our v a l u e s
a r e l e f t - o v e r s from environments t h a t no l o n g e r e x i s t and can
e x i s t no l o n g e r , and which a s p e c t s of our new environment a r e
 18
u n d e s i r a b l e and avoi d a b l e ? The q u e s t i o n r a i s e d by Marx of
an o b j e c t i v e method of e v a l u a t i n g manrs e x p e c t a t i o n s i n r e l a -
t i o n t o h i s experience remains t h e b a s i c problem i n a l i e n a t i o n
t h e o r y and remains unanswered.

Keeping i n mind Marxls d e f i n i t i o n of a l i e n a t i o n a s a

r e l a t i o n s h i p expressed i n h i s p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y , i n which he
t r e a t s himself as a mere p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n , between whole
man and h i s s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r , I w i l l move i n t o a more s p e c i f i c
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e problems r a i s e d by Horton, Lukes and
Kaufman.

Value-free Sociology a s Realism

Contemporary a l i e n a t i o n t h e o r y i s being approached i n
two ways. On t h e one'hand t h e r e a r e t h o s e who a r e t r y i n g t o
extend and/or improve upon t h e work done by Marx; and on t h e
o t h e r t h e r e a r e t h o s e who, t o use Horton1s p h r a s e , a r e
a t t e m p t i n g t o study a l i e n a t i o n w i t h i n t h e framework of " v a l u e -
f r e e sociology1'. Those who can be placed i n t h e l a t t e r c a t e -
gory a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d as " r e a l i s t s " .
They have a t t r a c t e d
19
c r i t i c i s m , more s o r e c e n t l y , from many d i r e c t i o n s . Helen

Lynd, f o r example, c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h i s approach a s " l e s s t h a n

f u l l realism".
.
I n f i n d i n g conscious i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s with and beyond
our own time and s o c i e t y , much t u r n s upon t h e way we
conceive r e a l i s m , what meaning we g i v e t o ! f a c i n g
reality!. C o n t i n u a l l y we a r e urged by t h e r a p i s t s ,
 by r e a l i s t s i n f o r e i g n p d l i c y , by p r a c t i c a l
persons of v a r i o u s kinds t o abandon s e n t i m e n t a l
dreams, i d e a l i s t i c u t o p i a s , and romanticism,
and t o f a c e r e a l i t y . R e a l i t y when s o used
almost always means l i m i t a t i o n . The r e a l i t y
we should f a c e i s t h e l i m i t a t i o n s i n o u r s e l v e s ,
i n o t h e r people, i n t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of human
s o c i e t y . Rarely a r e we urged t o f a c e t h e
r e a l i t y of t h e s l a n t i n g l i g h t of e a r l y morning
and l a t e a f t e r n o o n , of B e r l i o z f l l u c e a t ! ' , o r
of B r a q u e f s c o l o r s , of human courage and i n t e g r i t y
under s t r e s s , of d e l i g h t i n w i t and l a u g h t e r ,
of a c h i l d ' s expectancy, of t h e r e v e l a t i o n of
new human e x p e r i e n c e i n unimagined openness and
communication with a n o t h e r person, of t h e ranges
of t h e p o s s i b l e . . ..
Statements of r e a l i s m , o r of t h e r e a l i t y p r i n -
c i p l e , as acknowledgment of l i m i t a t i o n , of
a d j u s t i n g t o t h e i s r a t h e r t h a n dreaming of t h e
p o s s i b l e , a r e welrknown. A l l of them a r e some
v e r s i o n of M a c h i a v e l l i f s c e n t r a l t e n e t :
... how one l i v e s i s s o f a r d i s t a n t from how one
ought t o l i v e t h a t he who n e g l e c t s what i s done
f o r what ought t o be done sooner e f f e c t s h i s r u i n
than h i s preservation ...
Realism t h a t excludes t h e l o n g e r , enduring pur-
poses of men and menfs u n r e a l i z e d dreams i s l e s s
t h a n f u l l r e a l i s m . 20
Lyndfs c r i t i c i s m s u g g e s t s t h a t when men r e f e r t o " r e a l i t y " , I/

t h e " r e a l i t y " may be one t h i n g i n one c o n t e x t and a n o t h e r i n

a d i f f e r e n t context. This i s a theme t h a t w i l l become c e n t r a l
i n my d i s c u s s i o n of Meadfs t h e o r y , b u t f o r t h e p r e s e n t i t i s
s u f f i c i e n t t o n o t e t h a t t h e " r e a l i t y " t o which advocates of
" v a l u e - f r e e sociology" r e f e r i n d i c a t e s a s much v a l u e a s r e a l i t y
i.e., t h e v a l u e of " f a c i n g an implied u n p l e a s a n t n e c e s s i t y . "

Marxl s Theory Debased t

Lukes, d i s c u s s i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between Marxfs o u t l o o k

on s o c i e t y and t h a t of Durkheim, saw t h e b.asic d i s t i n c t i o n
between them i n t h e i r r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t v i s i o n s of t h e
 I

r e l a t i o n between t h e i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y .
Compare Marxfs statements t h a t l i t i s above a l l
necessary t o avoid p o s t u l a t i n g " s o c i e t y " once
again a s an a b s t r a c t i o n c o n f r o n t i n g t h e i n d i v i -
d u a l ! and t h a t communism c r e a t e s t h e b a s i s f o r
! r e n d e r i n g i t impossible t h a t anything should
e x i s t independently of i n d i v i d u a l s 1 with Durkheim s
t h a t s o c i e t y i s f a r e a l i t y from which e v e r y t h i n g
t h a t m a t t e r s t o us flows!, t h a t i t ' t r a n s c e n d s t h e
i n d i v i d u a l f s consciousnessf and t h a t i t f h a s a l l
t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a moral a u t h o r i t y t h a t
imposes r e s p e c t ! . Marx begins from t h e p o s i t i o n
t h a t t h e independent o r l r e i f i e d f and determining
c h a r a c t e r of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s and norms i s
p r e c i s e l y what c h a r a c t e r i s e s human f p r e - h i s t o r y 1
and w i l l be abolished by t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y t r a n s i -
t i o n t o a "truly-human" s o c i e t y , whereas Durkheim
assumes t h e 1I normality" of s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n , t h e
l a c k of which l e a d s t o t h e morbid, s e l f - d e s t r u c t i v e
s t a t e of "non-socialf1 o r Hobbesian anarchy e v i d e n t
i n unregulated c a p i t a l i s m . S o c i a l c o n s t r a i n t i s I/

f o r Marx a . d e n i a l and f o r Durkheim a c o n d i t i o n of

human freedom and s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n . 21
It i s t r u e , as Lukes argued, t h a t where Marx s t r e s s e d
t h e " r i g h t s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l " , Durkheim s t r e s s e d t h e moral
a u t h o r i t y of s'ociety. But t h i s does n o t g e t a t t h e e s s e n t i a l
d i f f e r e n c e between t h e i r world views with r e f e r e n c e t o a l i e n a -
tion: a d i f f e r e n c e a s r e l e v a n t today a s a t t h e times they
wrote. I f one i s t o g r a s p f i r m l y t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n between
Marx and Durkheim, one must c o n s i d e r t h a t where Marx saw men
i n s o c i a l i n t e r c o u r s e c r e a t i n g themselves and t h e i r world,
Durkheim saw men i n s o c i a l i n t e r c o u r s e being c r e a t e d and con-
t r o l l e d ' b y t h e " c o l l e c t i v e conscience".
Without going i n t o a d i s c u s s i o n of which view i s t h e
more g e n e r a l l y adequate f o r s o c i o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s , I would
l i k e t o s t r e s s t h e p o i n t t h a t with r e s p e c t t o a l i e n a t i o n , t h e
Marxian o r i e n t a t i o n i s a n e c e s s a r y one. Alienation i s not a
meaningful concept when used w i t h i n a t h e o r e t i c a l framework
t h a t assumes man t o be p a s s i v e and powerless ( e i t h e r a s an
e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d assumption o r a s an implied one, by t a k i n g
manls e x p r e s s i o n s of p a s s i v i t y and powerlessness a t f a c e vall
without a t t e m p t i n g t o e x p l a i n t h i s e x p r e s s i o n ) . I n Marxls
t h e o r y p a s s i v i t y and powerlessness i n d i c a t e a l i e n a t i o n . If one

now assumes p a s s i v i t y and powerlessness t o be " n a t u r a l " t o man

o r a c c e p t s them a s "given", one has p r e s e n t e d no a l t e r n a t e
t h e o r y of a l i e n a t i o n (i.e . , i s g i v i n g no a l t e r n a t e ' e x p l a n a t i o n
f o r t h e phenomena r e f e r r e d t o by t h e concept " a l i e n a t i o n " ),
and has r e l e g a t e d a l i e n a t i o n t o a f e e l i n g s t a t e , independent of
I

practical activity.

Value-free Debasement, I l l u s t r a t e d '

I have chosen B l a u n e r t s A l i e n a t i o n and Freedom a s t h e %'

s a c r i f i c i a l lamb i n a n o t a l t o g e t h e r a r b i t r a r y manner, s i n c e
t o d a t e he has done t h e most thorough, e m p i r i c a l study of
11
a l i e n a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s " , and has e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d h i s i n t e n t i o n
t o " f u s e an e m p i r i c a l , r e a l i s t i c approach with t h e v a l u a b l e
humanistic t r a d i t i o n of a l i e n a t i o n t h e o r y t h a t views a l l human
beings a s p o t e n t i a l l y c a p a b l e of e x e r c i s i n g freedom and con-

trol ....
* " 22 My c r i t i c i s m of B l a u n e r ' s approach t o a l i e n a t i o n
i s meant n o t a s an a t t a c k on h i s work s p e c i f i c a l l y , but on h i s
work a s an example of a g e n e r a l tendency among American s o c i o -
l o g i s t s i n t e r e s t e d i n studying a l i e n a t i o n .
 ,
Blauner l i m i t e d h i s d i s c u s s i o n of a l i e n a t i o n i n
modern s o c i e t y t o t h e b l u e c o , l l a r worker, w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n
of e x p l a i n i n g t h e "uneven d i s t r i b u t i o n " of a l i e n a t i o n among
I
f a c t o r y workers i n American i n d u s t r y . He s t u d i e d f o u r k i n d s I
!

of i n d u s t r y : p r i n t i n g , t e x t i l e s , automobiles and chemicals;

23
each i n d u s t r y being t y p i f i e d by a technology p a r t i c u l a r t o i t .
Blauner defined a l i e n a t i o n a s " a q u a l i t y of p e r s o n a l d"
e x p e r i e n c e r e s u l t i n g from s p e c i f i c kinds of s o c i a l a r r a n g e -
24
ment s !' , and used a modified v e r s i o n of Seemants dimensions
23
of a l i e n a t i o n a s a working d e f i n i t i o n of t h e c o n c e p t u a l one.
The f o u r dimensions o r modes of a l i e n a t i o n , a s modified by v"
Blauner, a r e powerlessness, meaninglessness, s o c i a l i s o l a t i o n
and s e l f - e s t r a n g e m e n t ; h i s c o n c e n t r a t i o n of i n t e r e s t being
upon t h e mode of powerlessness.
I n h i s usage, powerlessness r e s u l t s when a person i s
t r e a t e d as an o b j e c t and i s unable t o a c t as a s u b j e c t t o
change or c o n t r o l t h e c o n d i t i o n s i n which he f i n d s h i m s e l f .
The p o l a r o p p o s i t e of powerlessness i s freedom, a s t h e a b i l i t y

t o control these conditions. Lack of freedom e x i s t s when t h e

'/

\
person has no " r e a l c h o i c e s " , while l a c k of c o n t r o l r e f e r s t o
t h e person being u n w i l l i n g l y dominated by o t h e r s . Blauner

d i s t i n p i s h e d f o u r modes of powerlessness: the separation

from ownership of t h e means of p r o d u c t i o n and t h e f i n i s h e d

p r o d u c t , t h e i n a b i l i t y t o i n f l u e n c e g e n e r a l managerial p o l i -
c i e s , t h e l a c k of c o n t r o l over t h e c o n d i t i o n s of employment,
and t h e l a c k of c o n t r o l over t h e immediate work p r o c e s s . He
 L

suggested t h a t t h e t h i r d and f o u r t h modes a r e most important

f o r t h e b l u e c o l l a r worker, and devoted t h e major p a r t of h i s
s t u d y t o a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e v a r i a t i o n s i n c o n t r o l over t h e
immediate a c t i v i t y of work w i t h i n t h e d i f f e r e n t kinds of i n d u s -
try. The form of c o n t r o l he thought t o be of c e n t r a l impor-
t a n c e i s t h e c o n t r o l over pace of work, which r e l a t e s t o o t h e r
i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r s such a s freedom of p h y s i c a l movement, freedom
t o c o n t r o l t h e q u a n t i t y of p r o d u c t i o n , and c o n t r o l over t h e '
q u a l i t y of work.
Meaninglessness, a c c o r d i n g t o Blauner, e x i s t s when
t h e employee l a c k s an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e purpose of h i s work
and i t s c o - o r d i n a t i o n w i t h t h e o t h e r a s p e c t s of t h e i n d u s t r y .
Under such c o n d i t i o n s t h e workerrs a b i l i t y t o a c t " i n t e l l i -
g e n t l y " i n given s i t u a t i o n s d e c l i n e s . He has l i t % l e i n s i g h t
i n t o t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of e v e n t s , and consequently, l i t t l e
i d e a of what h i s work i s " f o r " .
S o c i a l i s o l a t i o n r e f e r s t o t h e f e e l i n g of t h e worker
t h a t he does n o t belong. He i s unable or u n i n t e r e s t e d i n
i d e n t i f y i n g with t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n and i t s g o a l s .
,-
%
, 2
S e l f -estrangement, a l i e n a t i o n from t h e " i n n e r s e l f I'
i s a b s e n t under two c o n d i t i o n s : when t h e work i s s a t i s f y i n g
i n i t s e l f , o r when t h e work i s i n t e g r a t e d with t h e t o t a l l i f e
of t h e i n d i v i d u a l . Self-estrangement i s experienced a s a
heightened awareness of time w i t h a s p l i t between p r e s e n t
a c t i v i t y and f u t u r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Non-alienated a c t i v i t y
\1
c o n s i s t s i n immersion i n t h e p r e s e n t -- t o t a l involvemen
Blauner s t r e s s e d t h a t t h e r e i s no necessary connection between
s o c i a l i s o l a t i o n and self-estrangement, so t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l
might be both s a t i s f i e d and s e l f - e s t r a n g e d .
Blauner, fol$.owing Seeman, t r e a t e d t h e f o u r modes of
26 ,I'

a l i e n a t i o n a s independent from one another. Marx considered

t h e s e f o u r concepts a s a s p e c t s of a l i e n a t i o n , a s p e c t s of one
process, i n s e p a r a b l e p r a c t i c a l l y and s e p a r a b l e only concep-
27 It i s q u e s t i o n a b l e ,
t u a l l y , f o r t h e purpose of a n a l y s i s .
i n simple common sense terms, whether t h e s e f o u r concepts can
be u s e f u l l y t r e a t e d i n t h e way t h a t Blauner and Seeman choose.
With r e f e r e n c e t o t h e dimension of meaninglessness, one might
q u e s t i o n how a person can be expected t o \ h a v e a s e n s e of pur-
pose i n h i s work i f he i s s u b j e c t t o a l l f o u r of t h e modes of
powerlessness, o r even t o some of them. I f t h e products he

makes do n o t belong t o him, i f he has no i n f l u e n c e over

managerial p o l i c i e s , i f he cannot c o n t r o l o r i n f l u e n c e t h e
c o n d i t i o n s of h i s employment, i f he has no say i n t h e pace of
work, how can he p o s s i b l y have a s e n s e of purpose i n h i s work?
The same holds more c l e a r l y with r e f e r e n c e t o s o c i a l i s o l a t i o n .
What p o s s i b l e reason could a person have f o r being i n t e r e s t e d I

I ,
i n " i d e n t i f y i n g with t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n and i t s g o a l s " when t h e ( 1

o r g a n i z a t i o n and i t s g o a l s a r e i r r e l e v a n t t o him p e r s o n a l l y ,
and he i s p e r s o n a l l y i r r e l e v a n t t o them ( i . e . , powerless)?
As Blauner defined self-estrangement, t h e only way i n which
work under c o n d i t i o n s of powerlessness could be non-alienating,
 88.

i.e., be i n t e g r a t e d with t h e ' t o t a l l i f e of t h e i n d i v i d u a l ,

would be i f t h i s powerlessness were t o be extended i n t o t h e
whole l i f e s i t u a t i o n of t h e worker.
One can understand q l a u n e r l s f a i l u r e t o s e e t h e con-
1
n e c t i o n between h i s modes of a l i e n a t i o n a s an i n d i c a t i o n of
h i s f a i l u r e t o grasp, a s Nisbet would say, t h e " p e r s p e c t i v e of 1
28 i
alienation". That he d i d use t h e concept without compre- - I,

hending t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of i t i s evident through c a s u a l 1

remarks he made throughout t h e book, of t h e following s o r t -- 2

11
... few people i n p r e - i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s seem t o be a l i e n a - i
29
t e d ( t h e powerlessness of t h e masses might be t h e exception).''
He could a s s e n s i b l y have s a i d t h a t few peop<e i n i n d u s t r i a l
.
s o c i e t y seem t o be a l i e n a t e d ( t h e powerlessness of t h e masses 1
might be t h e e x c e p t i o n ) , i n which c a s e one would q u e s t i o n t h e
I
purpose f o r h i s study on a l i e n a t i o n and freedom among b l u e
c o l l a r workers i n i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y , i . e . , t h e masses.
Blauner r e l a t e d t h e f o u r modes of a l i e n a t i o n t o an
underlying fragmentation, with each mode r e p r e s e n t i n g a d i f -
f e r e n t kind of fragmentation. Powerlessness i s a s p l i t
between t h e person a s s u b j e c t and o b j e c t , meaninglessness
between t h e p a r t and t h e whole, i s o l a t i o n between t h e i n d i v i -
d u a l and s o c i a l components of human behavior and motivation,
and self-estrangement between t h e temporal c o n t i n u i t y of
experi&ce with a c t i v i t y a s a means t o an end r a t h e r t h a n
being an end i n i t s e l f .
The r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e concepts used by Blauner
i
can be i n t e r p r e t e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g manner: I
MODES OF FRAGMENTATION SYMPTOM POLAR
ALIENATION OF MODE OPPOSITE
powerlessness subject-object man a s mere potency t o
qbject, act,
impotent t o c o n t r o l of
c o n t r o l con- conditions
ditions
meaninglessness part-whole cannot s e e connected-
connection ness
of a c t i v i t y
t o whole
isolation individual- cannot r e l a t e organic
society self t o relation
activity
self - present-future activity is activity
estrangement means t o i s end i n
end itself

I q u e s t i o n t h e relevance of such a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . In relation

t o Marxfs theory, t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s a r e i f i c a t i o n of
a l i e n a t i o n , t h e supreme i r o n y . There i s no r e f e r e n c e t o t h e
man who t r e a t s himself i n t h i s fragmentary f a s h i o n , nor t o t h e
r e l a t e d n e s s of t h e s e modes of a l i e n a t i o n " i n r e a l i t y " . Is
t h e r e n o t , f o r example, some connection " i n r e a l i t y " between
self-estrangement and s u b j e c t - o b j e c t fragmentation, between
i s o l a t i o n and being unable t o s e e a connection between o n e ' s
a c t i v i t y and t h e "whole"?
The major p o i n t s made by Blauner a r e : t h a t each of
t h e dimensions of a l i e n a t i o n v a r i e s i n form and i n t e n s i t y
according t o t h e i n d u s t r i a l s e t t i n g ; that alienation i s dis-
t r i b u t e d unevenly i n i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y ; and t h a t t h e kinds
of b l u e - c o l l a r occupations, e. g., assembly-line work ( u s u a l l y
 I

a s s o c i a t e d with a l i e n a t i o n by commentators), i n c l u d e a s m a l l
p r o p o r t i o n of t h e t o t a l work f o r c e , something under one f i f t h .
He a l s o p o i n t s out t h a t , i n terms of h i s t o r y , t h e i n d u s t r i a l
world i s s h i f t i n g from c r a f t technology t o continuous-process
technology. What we experience i n assembly-lines and i n
machine-tending jobs i s a p a s s i n g phase i n technology. With
t h e development of continuous-process technology many of t h e
problems r a i s e d by technology which tend t o a l i e n a t e persons
w i l l be solved, but t h e development i s going t o t a k e a long
while and we must f a c e t h e problems of t h e more s e v e r e l y
a l i e n a t i n g technologies now. His assumption i s t h a t workers
i n continuous-process technology a r e l e s s a l i e n a t e d t h a n i n
t h e o t h e r kinds of technology, g i v i n g a s evidence t h e f a c t
t h a t they a r e becoming more l i k e white c o l l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n
men.
That white c o l l a r workers a r e l e s s a l i e n a t e d t h a n
blue c o l l a r workers i s a q u e s t i o n t h a t q u i t e a few people
would be w i l l i n g t o argue with him, n o t a b l y Riessman, Fromm,
Ericson, and Whyte
30 , a s w e l l a s some s t u d e n t s of p o l i t i c a l

alienation.
Blauner's a s s e r t i o n t h a t t e c h n o l o g i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n
a s s u c h , i s t h e cause and s o l u t i o n t o a l i e n a t i o n i g n o r e s t h e
c o n t r i b u t i o n of Weber t o a l i e n a t i o n theory. A t best, it i s a
v u l g a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Marxfs . n o t i o n of economic d e t e r -
minism.
31
 91.

Blaunerls attempt t o " f u s e e m p i r i c a l realism" with

t h e humanist t r a d i t i o n f a i l e d because he d i d n o t succeed, i n
h i s t h e o r e t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n t o h i s empiriqal data, a t freeing
t h e "whole man" from h i s " p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n " , h i s r o l e a s
employee/employer. By i g n o r i n g t h e f i r s t and second modes of I
powerlessness ( s e p a r a t i o n from ownership of t h e means of pro-
d u c t i o n and t h e f i n i s h e d product, and t h e i n a b i l i t y t o i n f l u e n c e
-.Ir
g e n e r a l managerial p o l i c i e s ) and c o n c e n t r a t i n g on t h e t h i r d and ii
f o u r t h modes ( l a c k of c o n t r o l over t h e c o n d i t i o n s of employment, 1
l
and l a c k of c o n t r o l over t h e immediate work p r o c e s s ) , Blauner
4
d
r e f r a i n e d from q u e s t i o n i n g t h e e s s e n t i a l power r e l a t i o n s , i . e . ,
I1
ownership and c o n t r o l of t h e means of production. By h i s own
d e f i n i t i o n , workers remain p a s s i v e o b j e c t s . His p o i n t t h a t
employers a r e coming more and more t o s e e t h e worker a s a
human r a t h e r t h a n a s a p a r t of t h e machinery i s i r r e l e v a n t .
F i r s t l y , he has n o t demonstrated t h a t employers ever d i d " s e e "
t h e worker a s p a r t of a machine. Marx's c o n t e n t i o n was t h a t
workers a r e t r e a t e d a s and t r e a t themselves a s o b j e c t s . It i s
q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t employees have always "seen" employees a s
humans, but t h e q u e s t i o n i s , what do they "see" a s "human". \J

He a l s o f a i l e d t o c o n s i d e r t o what e x t e n t employers t r e a t
themselves a s " p a r t of t h e machinery". Weber 1 s study of
bureaucracy showed t h a t , with r e f e r e n c e t o "human" considera-
t i o n s , t h e bureaucrat i s e q u a l l y a s h e l p l e s s (and perhaps more

SO) a s t h e worker t o make r a d i c a l changes i n t h e s t r u c t u r e of

,
I
 I

s o c i e t a l organization.
The l i h i t a t i o n s of t h e " r e a l i s t i c 1 ' approach exempli-
f i e d i n B l a u n e r l s become obvious through c o n t r a s t i n g t h i s
approach with a n o t h e r kind of " r e a l i s m " . Compare B l a u n e r l s
comments :
A c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of machine i n d u s t r y t h a t u s u a l l y
contributes t o social integration i f the large
number of female employees. Male workers f e e l
t h a t t h e i r s t a t u s i s h i g h e r and t h a t t h e y a r e
recognized as more important t h a n t h e women.
They have somewhat i n c r e a s e d chances $'or promo-
t i o n i n t o t h e m i n o r i t y of jobs w i t h s k i l l o r
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Women, who tend t o be more
s a t i s f i e d t h a n men w i t h t h e prevailLng u n s k i l l e d
r o u t i n e jobs, lcushionl t h e o c c u p a t i o n a l f l o o r i n
machine i n d u s t r i e s , r a i s i n g t h e c e i l i n g s l i g h t l y
f o r t h e men who might o t h e r w i s e be f r u s t r a t e d i n
low p o s i t i o n s . 3 2
People with l i m i t e d e d u c a t i o n a r e most concerned
with being f r e e from r e s t r i c t i v e and o p p r e s s i v e
c o n d i t i o n s . The absence of o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o
develop i n n e r p o t e n t i a l , t o e x p r e s s i d i o s y n c r a t i c
a b i l i t i e s , and t o assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and d e c i -
s i o n making f u n c t i o n s may n o t be a source of
s e r i o u s d i s c o n t e n t t o most workers today. For t h i s
reason, e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s show t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y of
i n d u s t r i a l workers a r e s a t i s f i e d with t h e i r work
and with t h e i r jobs. 33

with t h o s e of V i r g i n i a Woolf and Arthur Quiller-Couch:

The news of my legacy reached me one n i g h t about
t h e same time t h a t t h e a c t was passed t h a t gave
v o t e s t o women.... Of t h e two -- t h e v o t e and t h e
money -- t h e money, I own, seemed i n f i n i t e l y t h e
more important. Before t h a t I had made my l i v i n g
by cadging odd jobs from newspapers, by r e p o r t i n g
a donkey show h e r e o r a wedding t h e r e ; I had earned
a few pounds by a d d r e s s i n g envelopes, r e a d i n g t o o l d
l a d i e s , making a r t i f i c i a l f l o w e r s , t e a c h i n g t h e
a l p h a b e t t o s m a l l c h i l d r e n i n a k i n d e r g a r t e n . Such
were t h e c h i e f occupations open t o women b e f o r e 1928.
I need n o t , I am a f r a i d , d e s c r i b e i n any d e t a i l t h e
h a r d i n e s s of t h e work, f o r you know perhaps women who
have done i t ; nor t h e d i f f i c u l t y of l i v i n g on t h e
money when i t was earned, f o r you may have t r i e d .
But what s t i l l remains with me a worse i n f l i c t i o n j
/I
li

t h a n e i t h e r was t h e poison of f e a r and b i t t e r n e s s I I

which t h o s e days bred i n me, To begin with, I k
always t o be {doing work t h a t one d i d n o t wish t o i .
'
1-,
. I t 4 ,

do, and t o do i t l i k e a s l a v e , f l a t t e r i n g and \ A / ' : 6 ,

fawning, not always n e c e s s a r i l y perhaps, but i t ; ;

seemed necessary and t h e s t a k e s were t o o g r e a t t o \)
r u n r i s k s ; and then t h e thought of t h a t one g i f t 1
which was d e a t h t o h i d e -- a small one but dear t o
t h e possessor -- p e r i s h i n g and with i t myself, my
s o u l -- a l l t h i s became l i k e a r u s t e a t i n g away t h e
bloom of t h e s p r i n g , d e s t r o y i n g t h e t r e e a t i t s
h e a r t . However, a s I say, my aunt died; and
whenever I change a t e n s h i l l i n g n o t e a l i t t l e of
t h a t r u s t and c o r r o s i o n i s rubbed o f f ; f e a r and
b i t t e r n e s s go. Indeed, I thought, s l i p p i n g t h e
s i l v e r i n t o my purse; i t i s remarkable, remem-
b e r i n g t h e b i t t e r n e s s of t h o s e days, what a change
of temper a f i x e d income w i l l b r i n g about. No
f o r c e i n t h e world can t a k e from me my f i v e hundred
pounds. Food, house and c l o t h i n g a r e mine f o r e v e r .
Therefore not merely do e f f o r t and labour c e a s e , V"
but a l s o h a t r e d and b i t t e r n e s s . I need n o t h a t e
any man; he cannot h u r t me. I need n o t f l a t t e r any
man; he has nothing \ t o g i v e me.... I n a year o r
two .., t h e g r e a t e s t r e l e a s e of a l l came, which i s
t h e freedom t o t h i n k of t h i n g s i n themselves....
Indeed, my a u n t ' s legacy unveiled t h e sky t o me....
34
V i r g i n i a Woolf

What a r e t h e g r e a t p o e t i c a l names of t h e l a s t
hundred y e a r s or s o ? Coleridge, Wordsworth, Byron,
S h e l l e y , Zandor, Keats, Tennyson, Browning, Arnold,
Morris, R o s s e t t i , S ~ i n b u r n e-- we may s t o p t h e r e .
O f t h e s e , a l l but Keats, Browning, R o s s e t t i were
U n i v e r s i t y men; and of t h e s e t h r e e , Keats, who died
young, c u t o f f i n h i s prime, was t h e only one who
was n o t f a i r l y w e l l t o do. It may seem a b r u t a l
t h i n g t o say, and i t i s a sad t h i n g t o say; b u t ,
a s a m a t t e r of hard f a c t , t h e theory t h a t p o e t i c a l
genius blbweth where i t l i s t e t h , and e q u a l l y i n
POOP and r i c h , holds l i t t l e t r u t h . As a m a t t e r of
hard f a c t , n i n e out of t h o s e twelve men were Uni-
v e r s i t v men: which means t h a t somehow or o t h e r they
procured t h e means t o g e t t h e b e s t education England
can g i v e .... The Poor Poet has not i n t h e s e days,
nor has he had f o r two hundred y e a r s , a . d o g ' s chance,
Believe me -- and I have spent a g r e a t p a r t of t e n
 y e a r s i n watching some t h r e e hundred and twenty
elementary schools -- we may p r a t e of democracy,
but a c t u a l l y , a poor c h i l d i n England has l i t t l e
more hope thah had t h e son of an Athenian s l a v e
t o be emancipated i n t o t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l freedom
of which g r e a t w r i t i n g s a r e born.
35
Arthur Quiller-Couch
The two statements made by Blauner a r e " r e a l i s t i c " --
# i s i d e a s about women and about t h e uneducated a r e backed up
by e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s which have been done. But so a r e t h e
q u o t a t i o n s from Woolf and ~ u i l l e r - c o u c h " r e a l i s t i c " -- one t h e
d e s c r i p t i o n of a p e r s o n a l experience of a woman i n t h e economic
sphere, and t h e o t h e r an e v a l u a t i o n , based on experience and
observation, of t h e chances of working c l a s s boys.
What d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e two kinds of " r e a l i s m " i s t h e
way i n which t h e observer i s prepared t o i n t e r p r e t h i s " f a c t s " ,
h i s " e m p i r i c a l evidence". The kind of " r e a l i s m " which asks us
t o " f a c e up t o n e c e s s i t y " has t o be examined f o r t h e assumed
c o n t e n t of " n e c e s s i t y " . I f t h e assumption i s t h a t what -9i s
n e c e s s a r i l y i s , t h e approach cannot be considered a s c i e n t i f i c
one and i s , i n s t e a d , t h e approach of t h e n a t u r a l h i s t o r i a n who
accepts "what i s " a s given and attempts t o c l a s s i f y o b j e c t s
w i t h i n t h i s framework. Marx hypothesized t h a t a l i e n a t i o n i s
r e l a t e d t o c l a s s r e l a t i o n s , and Weberts work served t o strengthen
t h e hypothesis. Contemporary s t u d e n t s of a l i e n a t i o n i n America
have n o t considered a l i e n a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o Marxts " c l a s s e s "
nor i n r e l a t i o n t o Weberls " s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n " . They have,
i n t h e main, assumed t h a t some form of s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i s a
d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y from t h e n o t i o n t h a t t h e p a r t i -
-

c u l a r kind of s o c i a ' l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n t h a t we now have i s a

necessary a s p e c t of human s o c i a l l i f e .
--
I n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of mants r e l a t i o n t o h i s work, t h e
c e n t r a l theme of Blaunerts book, he r e j e c t e d Marxts c o n t e n t i o n
t h a t " a s soon a s no p h y s i c a l o r o t h e r compulsion e x i s t s , l a b o r
i s shunned l i k e th-e plague". He r e j e c t e d i t on t h e grounds '1
t h a t both observation and r e s e a r c h have disproven i t . The 1
r e s e a r c h c i t e d by him t o support h i s p o s i t i o n c o n s i s t s of t h e
f a c t t h a t 80%of a n a t i o n a l sample s a i d they would keep working
I
I
i f they i n h e r i t e d enough money t o l i v e comfortably. In order i
!
t o be meaningful, t h i s kind of d a t a would have t o be balanced i
by a study of t h o s e who a r e independently wealthy; of how they
spend t h e i r time and, i f they work, what kind of work t h e y do
and f o r what reasons. Otherwise t h e d a t a i s n o t amenable t o
meaningful i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , because a person l i v i n g i n one
s o c i a l environment cannot say with r e l i a b i l i t y what he would
or would not do given d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s with which he i s n o t
a t present familiar. Blaunerts o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t "even i n t h e
most u n a l i e n a t e d c o n d i t i o n s , work i s never t o t a l l y p l e a s u r a b l e ;
i n f a c t , t h e f r e e s t work, t h a t of t h e w r i t e r o r a r t i s t , u s u a l l y
36
involves long p e r i o d s of v i r t u a l s e l f - t o r t u r e " indicates his
n e g l e c t of Marx's d i s t i n c t i o n between v o l u n t a r y and forced /"
l a b o r , one of t h e e s s e n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n s i n a l i e n a t i o n t h e o r y .
Blauner a l s o supported h i s p o s i t i o n by r e f e r r i n g t o
t h e f a c t t h a t i n America t h e r e i s l i t t l e c l a s s consciousness
i n t h e Marxian s e n s e , and t h a t c l a s s consciousness i s r e p l a c e d
by job consciousness. As Landecker 37 has argued, c l a s s con-
s c i o u s n e s s i s a concept r e f e r r i n g t o a complex phenomenon, and
t h e f a c t t h a t c l a s s consciousness i s v i r t u a l l y n o n - e x i s t e n t
does n o t , as Blauner seems t o have assumed, imply t h a t t h e r e
no o b j e c t i v e problems of c l a s s i n America. The " s a t i s f a c t i o n "
i n d i c a t e d by workers with t h e i r p o s i t i o n may be an i n d i c a t i o n
of t h e i r ignorance of any r e a l a l t e r n a t i v e s , such awareness of
a l t e r n a t i v e s being one of t h e b a s i c r e q u i s i t e s f o r c l a s s con-
s c i o u s n e s s . 38
Blauner assumed t h a t a l i e n a t i o n i s a modern problem
brought about by t h e l a r g e - s c a l e o r g a n i z a t i o n s and impersonal
bureaucracies i n i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s . To l i m i t a l i e n a t i o n t o
t h i s modern s e t t i n g and i n t e r p r e t i t w i t h i n t h e framework of
i n d u s t r i a l society i s misleading. It ignored t h e l a r g e r
q u e s t i o n posed by Marx of t h e r e l a t i o n between man and h i s
s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , and r e s u l t s i n a l o s s of awareness of
t h e b a s i c i s s u e i n h e r e n t i n t h e concept of a l i e n a t i o n . In
Marxls t h e o r y , i t i s whole men who happen t o f u l f i l l t h e func-
t i o n a l r o l e of manager ( p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n ) and o t h e r whole
men who happen t o f u l f i l l t h e f u n c t i o n a l r o l e of worker ( p a r -
t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n ) who a l i e n a t e themselves a s whole men from

t h e i r common s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of " f r e e , conscious

a c t i v i t y " , through t h e i r r e l a t i o n s a s p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n s .
 I

A l l e m p i r i c a l information gained about men and t h e i r

r e l a t i o n s with one another has i m p l i c a t i o n s r e l a t i v e t o t h e

v a l u e s t h a t men have; and a l l s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s who g a t h e r
t h i s information b r i n g i n t o t h e i r study v a l u e s and assumptions
about men, which i n f l u e n c e t h e kind of d a t a they organize and
t h e way i n which i t i s o r g a n i z e d . Many s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s a r e
w i l l i n g t o pay l i p s e r v i c e t o t h i s f a c t , and y e t a r e a b l e t o
s e e " s o c i e t y " a s a t h i n g independent of men, t h e i r v a l u e s and
t h e i r methods of organizing. I n t h e American school, a t l e a s t ,
and e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e a r e a of s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n and bureau-
c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e tendency of s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s i s t o
p r e s e n t information i n such a way t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r e $hey a.re
d e s c r i b i n g appears t o be not only f a c t , but f a c t independent
of p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r modes
of thought, p a r t i c u l a r v a l u e s held by men who p e r p e t u a t e t h e
organization. As Alain Gouldner has summarized:
For t h e i r o n law of wages, which maintained t h a t
workers could never improve t h e i r m a t e r i a l s t a n -
dards of l i f e , some s o c i o l o g i s t s have s u b s t i t u t e d
t h e i r o n law of o l i g a r c h y , which d e c l a r e s t h a t
men cannot improve t h e i r p o l i t i c a l s t a n d a r d s of
l i f e . Woven t o a g r e a t e x t e n t out of t h e o r e t i c a l
whole c l o t h , much of t h e d i s c u s s i o n of bureaucracy
and of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l needs seems t o have provided
a s c r e e n onto which some i n t e l l e c t u a l s have pro-
j e c t e d t h e i r own d e s p a i r and pessimism, r e i n f o r c i n g
t h e d e s p a i r of o t h e r s . Perhaps t h e s i t u a t i o n can
be 'illuminated with an analogy. For many y e a r s
now i n f a n t i l e p a r a l y s i s has k i l l e d and maimed
s c o r e s of people. For many y e a r s a l s o d o c t o r s ,
b i o l o g i s t s , and chemists have been s e a r c h i n g f o r
t h e causes and c u r e of t h i s d i s e a s e . Consider t h e
p u b l i c r e a c t i o n i f , i n s t e a d of r e p o r t i n g on t h e i r
newest vaccines, t h e s e s c i e n t i s t s had i s s u e d t h e
following announcement : 'We have not reached any
 I

conclusions concerning t h e causes of t h e d i s e a s e ,

nor has our r e s e a r c h i n v e s t i g a t e d defenses '
a g a i n s t i t . The p u b l i c seems t o have perfec-
t i o n i s t a s p i r a t i o n s of f l a w l e s s h e a l t h , they
have "utopian" i l l u s i o n s concerning t h e p o s s i -
b i l i t i e s of immortality and i t i s t h i s -- n o t
t h e d i s e a s e -- t h a t i s t h e danger a g a i n s t which
t h e p u b l i c needs t o be armed. We must remember
t h a t t h e human animal i s n o t immortal and t h a t
f o r d e f i n i t e reasons h i s l i f e s p a n i s f i n i t e . 39
Gouldner concluded t h a t t h e s e men would be c a s t i g a t e d f o r
"having usurped t h e p r e r o g a t i v e s and f u n c t i o n s of clergymen".
O f c e n t r a l r e l e v a n c e t o contemporary work on a l i e n a -

t i o n i s Marxts i n s i g h t i n t o t h e r e l a t i o n s between ments n o t i o n s

of what should be and t h e a c t u a l l i v e s they lead. For Marx,
i d e a s about what should be a r e a s open t o q u e s t i o n a s a r e t h e
s o c i e t a l i n s t i t u t i o n s t o which t h e y r e f e r . His a l i e n a t i o n J

theory assumes t h a t men c r e a t e themselves (both t h e i r v a l u e s

and o r g a n i z a t i o n s ) i n t h e i r d a i l y a c t i v i t y , and poses t h e
questions: c r e a t e d by whom, of what, f o r what, and f o r whom.
I f men c r e a t e themselves and t h e i r world, they do s o by t h e i r
n a t u r e a s a s p e c i e s of animal. Since t h e y c r e a t e out of t h i s
" n a t ~ r e ' ~they
, llshouldll make d e c i s i o n s with r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s
"nature". This i s t h e only "should1' n e c e s s a r i l y implied i n
Marxts theory of a l i e n a t i o n . His s p e c i f i c s u g g e s t i o n s f o r
p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n do not l o g i c a l l y follow from and a r e n o t
necessary t o h i s a n a l y s i s . I f we r e l e g a t e t h i s "should" t o
t h e s t a t u s of j u s t one more value-judgment, none of us can
answer f o r our s a n i t y because t o do so i s t o r e l e g a t e t h e a f f i r -
mation of l i f e t o t h e s t a t u s of j u s t one more value-judgment.
 I

3. ALIENATION AS EXPERIENCE AND CONDITIONS OF ALIENATION

Kaufman's d e f i n i t i o n of a l i e n a t i o n a s being dependent
upon both b e l i e f s and o b j e c t i v e s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s l e a d s t o a
d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t has been made only r e c e n t l y , between a l i e n a -
d
t i o n a s i t i s f e l t o r experienced and t h e c o n d i t i o n s which
produce t h i s f e e l i n g . A l a r g e s e c t i o n of t h e l i t e r a t u r e on

a l i e n a t i o n has been devoted t o a t t e m p t s t o d e s c r i b e t h e

experience and t o measure i t , with very l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n paid
t o c o n d i t i o n s producing t h e f e e l i n g . According t o Kaufman,
t h e f e e l i n g of a l i e n a t i o n i s a product of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n
between b e l i e f s and o b j e c t i v e s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s , both of which
a r e t o some e x t e n t a r b i t r a r y , and t h e r e f o r e open t o q u e s t i o n .
B e l i e f s can be examined independently of o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s
and o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s can be examined independently of
b e l i e f s , and t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between them can be s t u d i e d .
Some of t h e work t h a t has been done on p o l i t i c a l
a l i e n a t i o n examines t h e reasonableness of p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s
40 41
and e x p e c t a t i o n s . Reissman & Maccoby and Levin & Eden
consider the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t p o l i t i c a l alienation i s r e a l i s t i c
and n o t due t o some a n t i - s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o r psychologi-
42
c a l d e f e c t of t h e v o t o r . With r e f e r e n c e t o t h e American
e t h i c of r e a l i s m , Reissman & Maccoby suggest t h a t " o f t e n ,
' r e a l i s m ' becomes no more than t h e o p p o s i t e of i d e a l i s m ,
C
J
reasonableness, o r m o r a l i t y " . 43 They suggest t h a t f e e l i n g s
of h e l p l e s s n e s s a r e r e a l i s t i c i n f a c e of q u e s t i o n s about r e a l
s o c i a l problems such as "what can you do about n u c l e a r war?"
Levin and Eden, i n a d i s c u s s i o n of " ~ o l i t i c a l
S t r a t e g y f o r t h e Alienated Votor" suggested,
I n some p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s , t h e views of a l i e n a -
t e d v o t e r s a r e c o r r e c t . Their a l i e n a t i o n i s
testimony t o t h e i r powers of r a t i o n a l p e r c e p t i o n . 44
Aside from t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i r use of " a l i e n a t i o n " i s more
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of Durkheimrs "anomie" than of Marxrs use,
they r a i s e a p o i n t t h a t i s r e l e v a n t t o t h i s study.
According t o Levin and Eden, t h e p o l i t i c a l expecta-
\
I
t i o n s of t h e " a l i e n a t e d " which a r e n o t being r e a l i z e d a r e :
t h e r i g h t t o be p o l i t i c a l l y e f f e c t i v e , t h e a b i l i t y t o c a s t a d
v o t e based on adequate information, and government by due 4
process of law without r e c o u r s e t o b r i b e r y . 45 The q u e s t i o n 1!
of t h e reasonableness of t h e s e e x p e c t a t i o n s i s dependent upon,
a s i d e from t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of them being a b l e t o be r e a l i z e d ,
whether t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s a r e more h i g h l y valued by people
than a r e t h e e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s . Most of t h e a r t i c l e s i n
p e r i o d i c a l s imply t h a t t h e i r a u t h o r s s e e a l i e n a t i o n a s a
" f a u l t " of t h e i n d i v i d u a l , a problem t h a t he has with ' f a c i n g
t h e r e a l i t y of e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s . 46 They assume t h a t i t
i s e a s i e r t o change t h e b e l i e f s and e x p e c t a t i o n s of people s o
t h a t t h e s e b e l i e f s a r e i n l i n e with e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a n
i t i s t o change i n s t i t u t i o n s s o t h a t they a r e i n l i n e with
b e l i e f s and e x p e c t a t i o n s . Both Riessman and Maccoby, and
Levin and Eden q u e s t i o n t h i s assumption, s u g g e s t i n g a more
c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e toward e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s .
 Many s t u d i e s have beeh done on o b j e c t i v e s o c i a l
c o n d i t i o n s conducive t o a l i e n a t i o n , w i t h major focus on working
conditions.
47 The c e n t r a l f a c t o r r e l a t i n g t o a l i e n a t i o n t h a t

has emerged out of t h e s e s t u d i e s i s t h a t of o r g a n i z a t i o n , both

p h y s i c a l and i n t e r p e r s o n a l . Weberfs work on bureaucracy p i o -
neered t h e way f o r a good d e a l of c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n of l a r g e -
s c a l e , h i g h l y s t r a t i f i e d , impersonal organizat,ions, with
I
emphasis on how t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e conducive t o a l i e n a - 1
I

tion.
48 %
A few w r i t e r s , however, have been i n t e r e s t e d i n
i
Lb
studying t h e p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s of o r g a n i z a t i o n . Neal and 11

i"
49, f o r example, have pointed out t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n '1
Seeman 1 I

i
mediates between t h e i s o l a t e d p o t e n t i a l l y powerless i n d i v i d u a l 11
I

~lf
and t h e massive s t a t e . One might q u e s t i o n t h e i r i d e a of I 'i

fl
/I//\

" i s o l a t e d p o t e n t i a l l y powerless i n d i v i d u a l " v e r s u s "massive

s t a t e " , but t h e i r work does remind us t h a t i t i s n o t organiza- 14
t i o n a s such which i s a l i e n a t i n g , but c e r t a i n kinds of o r g a n i - v* Ij/!

zation. The only e x t e n s i v e attempt t o d e l i n e a t e d i f f e r e n t

li";
/I
I :
'kinds of o r g a n i z a t i o n s and t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o a l i e n a t i o n has 11
i
been done by Robert Blauner i n h i s study of A l i e n a t i o n and
50
Freedom, discussed e a r l i e r . Regardless of h i s q u e s t i o n a b l e

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of h i s d a t a , B l a u n e r f s attempt t o d i s t i n g u i s h
and make comparisons between d i f f e r e n t kinds of o r g a n i z a t i o n
?I1
il
i s an important s t e p i n t h e study of a l i e n a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s . I ti
Goffman
51 has s t u d i e d some a s p e c t s of i n t e r p e r s o n a l

o r g a n i z a t i o n which a r e conducive t o a l i e n a t i o n . He r e l a t e d
 I

a l i e n a t i o n t o l a c k of s p o n t a n e i t y i n c o n v e r s a t i o n , and
a s s e r t e d t h a t , i n our p r e s e n t s o c i e t y , a l i e n a t i o n i s t h e r u l e
and spontaneous c o n v e r s a t i o n t h e e x c e p t i o n . Goffman l i s t e d
f o u r modes of a l i e n a t i o n , o r b a r r i e r s t o spontaneous conversa-
tion: s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , e x t e r n a l preoccupation, i n t e r a c t i o n
consciousness, and o t h e r - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . The e f f e c t of t h e s e
b a r r i e r s i s t o p r e v e n t people from attention t o the
4
c o n t e n t of c o n v e r s a t i o n o r t h e a c t i v i t y going on. Goffman d i d
n o t probe i n t o t h e reasons f o r t h e s e b a r r i e r s , beyond d e s c r i b i n g
t h e s u p e r f i c i a l connections between them and i n d i v i d u a l motiva-
tion. For example, i n t e r a c t i o n - c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s grounded i n
f e e l i n g s of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on t h e p a r t of persons f o r t h i n g s
-
52
t o go w e l l .
53
Helen Lynd, i n On Shame and t h e Search f o r I d e n t i t y ,
d i d probe more deeply i n t o t h e s e forms of awareness, and con-
cluded t h a t t h e y may be i l l u m i n a t i n g r a t h e r t h a n a l i e n a t i n g
e x p e r i e n c e s , depending on how t h e person e x p e r i e n c i n g them i s
a b l e t o cope with h i s awareness. The forms of consciousness
considered by Goffman a r e forms of exposure of s o c i a l l i f e , and
t h e s e exposures a r e g e n e r a l l y accompanied by f e e l i n g s of shame
and g u i l t . It i s t h e e x p e r i e n c e of shame and g u i l t t h a t Lynd
found i n t e r e s t i n g and, c o n t r a d i c t i n g Goffmants c o n c l u s i o n , saw
them a s p o t e n t i a l c l u e s t o i d e n t i t y .
Of t h o s e who have s t u d i e d a l i e n a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s ,
s o c i o l o g i s t s have been more concerned with s t u d y i n g p h y s i c g l
o r g a n i z a t i o n and e s p e c i a l l y w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o work s i t u a t i o n s .
S t u d i e s of i n t e r p e r s o n a l o r g a r h z a t i o n have been done mainly
by s o c i a l p s y c h i a t r i s t s and p s y c h o l o g i s t s , o f t e n with no
r e f e r e n c e t o a l i e n a t i o n a s a concept d e s c r i b i n g t h e phenomena
with which t h e y d e a l . A c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e s e p e o p l e l s work

and t h e r e l e v a n c e of i t t o t h e s t u d y of a l i e n a t i o n would con-

s t i t u t e a thesis i n i t s e l f . Within t h e l i m i t a t i o n s of my
work, I can only make s h o r t r e f e r e n c e t o t h e i r s .
The s u c c e s s of E r i c s o n l s t h p r a p e u t i c approach
54 sug-

g e s t s t h a t men a r e i n f a c t whole men, and t h a t t h e y t r e a t

themselves as p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n s with r e f e r e n c e t o t h e i r
symbolic systems. The power of t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o c r e a t e
himself and t h e f a c t t h a t he does s o i n terms of h i s p e r s o n a l
emotional r e l a t i o n s with o t h e r s i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n B e t t l e h e i m f s
55
study of "Joey, t h e Mechanical Boy" . The conformity s t u d i e s
of Asch show t h e v u l n e r a b i l i t y of t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o "group
consensus", and h i s dependence upon i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e
56
s i t u a t i o n i n which he f i n d s h i m s e l f . Group t h e r a p y t e c h n i a u e s

i l l u s t r a t e ' h o w very much more s u c c e s s f u l i s p e r s o n a l i t y change

when i t i s c a r r i e d on "communally" r a t h e r t h a n by t e c h n i q u e s
o r i e n t e d toward " i s o l a t e d " i n d i v i d u a l s .
57 S t u d i e s of sensory

d e p r i v a t i o n and of f e r a l men i n d i c a t e t h a t , except i n a very

crude s e n s e ( i . e . , a s o b j e c t i v e l y d i s t i n c t b i o l o g i c a l organism),
58
d
t h e r e i s no such t h i n g a s an " i s o l a t e d " i n d i v i d u a l i n r e a l i t y .

That " i n d i v i d u a l " i s an a b s t r a c t i o n from r e a l i t y , a s i s

II
s o c i e t y 1 ' , cannot be denied i n t h e l i g h t of t h e r e s u l t s of
 /

these studies. They i n d i e a t 6 t h a t "man" i s a Concept i n c l u d i n g

v e r y complex r e l a t i o n s among t h e human organism, p h y s i c a l

environment,and s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . A l l of t h e s e s t u d i e s , as

w e l l a s many o t h e r s on p e r c e p t i o n , when r e l a t e d t o g e t h e r ,
u p s e t r a d i c a l l y our t r a d i t i o n a l assumptions about man, and
r a i s e t h e q u e s t i o n of whether we "know" (knowledge h e r e being

used a s formalized s y s t e m a t i c e x p l a n a t i o n ) anything about -9him

#
a s man.

4. MAN AS PROBABLE AND MAN AS POSSIBLE

I n a t t e m p t i n g t o understand a l i e n a t i o n , one i s con-
t i n u a l l y thrown back t o t h e q u e s t i o n of man a s man, i n d e p e n t l y
of p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e s and p a r t i c u l a r times. The myths of
S o c i e t y and Prometheus o u t l i n e d i n my I n t r o d u c t i o n can be
looked a t w i t h i n a n o t h e r framework: t h a t of man a s p r o b a b l e
( r e l a t i n g t o t h e myth of S o c i e t y ) and man a s p o s s i b l e ( r e l a t i n g
t o t h e myth of prometheus). An i n t e r e s t i n g r e l a t i o n between
t h e two "views" of man i s uncovered i n t h i s framework.
The Concise Oxford D i c t i o n a r y d e f i n e s " p o s s i b l e " a s
" t h a t can e x i s t , be done o r happen", and "probable" a s " t h a t
may be expected t o happen or prove t r u e , l i k e l y " . 59 s t a t i s t i -
c a l l y , t h e s e two concepts a r e u s u a l l y a p p l i e d t o e v e n t s w i t h i n
a s t a t i c frame of r e f e r e n c e , such t h a t t h e most p r o b a b l e e v e n t

i s t h a t event which i s most l i k e l y t o occur, measured by t h e

r a t i o of t h e f a v o u r a b l e c a s e s t o t h e whole number of p o s s i b l e
60
cases. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e two concepts i s such
t h a t an event must be p o s s i b l i i n o r d e r f o r i t t o be con-
s i d e r e d t o ' h a v e some p r o b a b i l i t y : t h e major i n t e r e s t being
focused on " p r o b a b i l i t y ' r a t h e r t h a n on " p o s s i b i l i t y " . If

t h e s e two concepts a r e considered w i t h i n t h e framework of

change over time, t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between them i s transformed,
n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y , but i n r e a l i t y . With t h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ,
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of t h e occurrence of e v e n t s i s
0
c o n s t a n t l y conditioned by t h e emergence of new p o s s i b i l i t i e s
becomes t h e major focus of i n t e r e s t . It i s t h e emergence of

new p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t t r a n s f o r m s t h e world of man. An example

of such an event i s t h e i n v e n t i o n of t h e p h o n e t i c a l p h a b e t , a
tremendous improvement on s y l l a b l e - w r i t i n g and p i c t u r e w r i t i n g .
As Hogben n o t i c e d ,
Writing by a l p h a b e t - s i g n s f o r t h e s e p a r a t e consonant
and vowel sounds i n a s y l l a b l e has turned up once and
once only i n h i s t o r y . The p o s s i b i l i t y i s n o t by any
means obvious; and i t i s doubt u l i f i t could have
happened i n more t h a n one way. •’1
Not only man's i n v e n t i o n s , b u t man himself can be seen
i n t h e s e terms. Man, a s a s p e c i e s of l i f e , was one of many
p o s s i b l e s p e c i e s of l i f e , but having occurred, became a pro-
b a b l e event i n t h e world, and a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r new
possibilities. His p a r t i c u l a r l i f e as a human animal i s a l s o
one of many p o s s i b i l i t i e s . S o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i s t s and p s y c h i a -
t r i s t s have come t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t men, a s b i o l o g i c a l organisms,

a r e a c t i v e non-directed c r e a t u r e s . D i r e c t i o n and p e c u l i a r l y

human l i f e a r e gained i n organized s o c i a l l i f e . D i r e c t i o n and,

consequently, p r o b a b l e b e h a v i o r , a r e c o n d i t i o n e d by t h e
p a r t i c u l a r p o s s i b i l i t i e s whidh a r e h i s t o r i c a l l y c r e a t e d o r
62
which emerge over time i n s o c i e t y . What i s a mere p o s s i b i l i t y
a t one " s t a g e " i n time becomes a necessary c o n d i t i o n f o r p o s s i -
b i l i t i e s a t another " s t a g e " , and t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of events i s
c o n d i t i o n a l upon t h e emergence of new p o s s i b i l i t i e s .
This temporal r e l a t i o n s h i p between p o s s i b i l i t i e s and
p r o b a b i l i t i e s i s an important one when t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s and
p r o b a b i l i t i e s t h a t we a r e c o n s i d e r i n g r e l a t e d i r e c t l y t o man.
One can e a s i l y make a mistake, when viewing s o c i e t y a s a s t a t i c
o r g a n i z a t i o n , of s e e i n g t h e events o c c u r r i n g i n i t a s necessary, /
n o t only with r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s t a t i c s i t u a t i o n being con-
s i d e r e d , but over time as w e l l . When one c o n s i d e r s events t o
be necessary -
a n d . i n e v i t a b l e one dismisses from c o n s i d e r a t i o n
events which a r e improbable given " t h i n g s as they a r e " i n an
a b s t r a c t ( s t a t i c ) r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e a c t u a l world. But
d i s m i s s a l from c o n s i d e r a t i o n does n o t dismiss them from t h e
a c t u a l world, and i n t h e a c t u a l world change occurs i n terms
1
of a r e l a t i o n s h i p between probable events and p o s s i b l e e v e n t s ,
between t h e "old" and t h e "new".
R e l a t i n g t h i s back t o a l i e n a t i o n theory, P e t r o v i c ,

following t h e l i n e of Marxfs thought suggested t h a t "man r e a l l y

i s man when t h e r e i s no s p l i t between h i s essence and h i s
f a c t u a l existence",
63 and defined manfs essence a s " h i s t o r i -

c a l l y c r e a t e d human p o s s i b i l i t y " , such t h a t "man i s a t one w i t h d I

himself i f he s t a n d s on t h e l e v e l of h i s p o s s i b i l i t i e s " . He 1
 107.

example of t h e l a t t e r being a' war c r i m i n a l . With r e f e r e n c e t o

t h e f a c t t h a t , b i o l o g i c a l l y , t h e human animal i s n o n - d i r e c t e d ,
P e t r o v i c l s n o t i o n of human and inhuman p o s s i b i l i t i e s i s
r e v e a l e d a s a humanist o r i e n t e d value-judgment. While a g r e e -
i n g with him t h a t mants "essence" i s " h i s t o r i c a l l y c r e a t e d i

human p o s s i b i l i t y " , and t h a t t h e r e can be no e x p r e s s i o n of

human " n a t u r e " a p a r t from h i s t o r i c a l l y c r e a t e d human v a l u e sI'
i t seems important t h a t we r e c o g n i z e both humane and inhumane
e x p r e s s i o n s of human " n a t u r e " as human p o s s i b i l i t i e s . If we

want t o m a i n t a i n t h e v a l u e of a l i e n a t i o n t h e o r y we must e x t r i -
c a t e i t from 19C humanism, and r e c o g n i z e t h a t , as a b i o l o g i -
1
c a l l y non-directed c r e a t u r e , man i s e t h i c a l l y n e u t r a l . It i s / I,
I
only with r e f e r e n c e t o e t h i c a l n e u t r a l i t y t h a t we can meaning- i
f u l l y speak of man a s having a n a t u r a l c a p a c i t y t o make
c h o i c e s , and i t i s with r e f e r e n c e t o manfs c a p a c i t y t o choose
h i s "essence" t h a t a l i e n a t i o n t h e o r y i s a p p l i c a b l e i n t h e
- .
contemporary world.
De Jouvenel 64, while r e c o g n i z i n g t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s
involved i n Utopian i d e a l s , d i d n o t abandon t h e b e l i e f i n
people being a b l e t o work toward them. He suggested t h a t
Utopian i d e a s which a r e simple f a n t a s y be s e p a r a t e d from
i d e a s which can be r e a l i z e d and which a r e l a b e l l e d Utopian
on t h e grounds t h a t t h e y a r e n o t now being r e a l i z e d . His
major p o i n t i s t h a t t o b r i n g Utopias i n t o e x i s t e n c e we have
t o t h i n k of d a i l y l i f e i n a l l i t s a s p e c t s i n s t e a d of pro-
ceeding a n a l y t i c a l l y from a few accepted premises. Here a g a i n - '
we h e a r t h e echo of Marxfs Voice, w i t h h i s i n s i s t e n c e on
examining p r a c t i c a l d a i l y l i f e f o r c l u e s t o t h e f a c t o r s con-
d i t i o n i n g t h e behavior of men. Rut where Marx s t r e s s e d
economic o r g a n i z a t i o n a s t h e e s s e n t i a l f a c t o r , de Jouvenel
c a u t i o n s us t o look a t a l l d a i l y a c t i v i t y .
*
The development from Marx t o people l i k e P e t r o v i c
and de Jouvenel i s a s u b t l e but a profound one. The r e a l i z a -
t i o n and s e l f - c o n t r o l of our s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c w i t h i n
t h e humanist o r i e n t a t i o n has come g r a d u a l l y t o be seen l e s s
a s something which i s i n e v i t a b l e o r even h i g h l y p r o b a b l e , and
more a s one p o s s i b i l i t y . But we can c a r r y t h i s development
much f a r t h e r . I would l i k e t o s u g g e s t t h a t a l i e n a t i o n t h e o r y ,

a s formulated by Marx, does n o t have a s i t s c e n t r a l concern

man's r e a l i z a t i o n of h i s humane c a p a c i t i e s , but i s c e n t r a l l y
o r i e n t e d toward, and has i t s l a s t i n g v a l u e with r e f e r e n c e t o , 4
manfs r e l a t i o n t o t h e s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which d i s - i
t i n g u i s h e s him a s human a p a r t from o t h e r forms of l i f e , I- 1
4

would f u r t h e r suggest t h a t Marx's 1gC humanist o r i e n t a t i o n !

has been maintained by contemporary t h i n k e r s while h i s s o c i o -

l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s has been ignored. I suggest, as well, t h a t i

h i s n o t i o n of a l i e n a t i o n i s dependent upon h i s awareness of s c i -

e n t i f i c methodology, i . e . , on t h e n o t i o n t h a t we can d i s c o v e r ,

l a w f u l & e l a t i o n s i n t h e world and can u s e our knowledge of

t h e s e r e l a t i o n s t o c r e a t e new p o s s i b i l i t i e s . The misunder- ,

s t a n d i n g of Marx's t h e o r y i s r e l a t e d t o a g e n e r a l misunder-
 L

o u t l i n e d by Weber i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of i n c r e a s i n g r a t i o n a l i z a -
t i o n i n our c u l t u r e .
We do n o t , through " d i s c o v e r i n g " laws of t h e u n i v e r s e ,
0
come t o c o n t r o l t h e u n i v e r s e . What we do, through t h e use of
t h e s e laws, i s t o c o n t r o l our human environment by c r e a t i n g
new " o b j e c t s " out of our knowledge of t h e s e laws. We c o n t r o l
o u r s e l v e s i n doing t h i s . C e r t a i n l y , we i n f l u e n c e s m a l l a r e a s
of t h e u n i v e r s e -- our own p l a n e t -- and p o s s i b l y w i l l
i n f l u e n c e l a r g e r a r e a s i n t h e f u t u r e , but t h e major r e f e r e n t
of our s c i e n t i f i c methodology i s o u r s e l v e s . The development
of uses of atomic energy and our r e c e n t growing u n d e r s t a n d i n g
of how l i f e l i v e s a r e t h e proof of t h i s . Our major concern
with r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s knowledge i s how we a r e going t o a f f e c t
o u r s e l v e s through u s i n g i t .
With our s c i e n t i f i c methodology we r e l a t e our common
e x p e r i e n c e of t h e p h y s i c a l world t o models t h a t we c o n s t r u c t
of r e l a t i o n s between o b j e c t s i n t h e p h y s i c a l u n i v e r s e , and we
t r a n s f o r m our common e x p e r i e n c e w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s r e l a t i o n .

If we a r e going t o apply t h i s method t o human s o c i e t y , we have

t o r e l a t e our common e x p e r i e n c e of t h e s o c i a l ( p h y s i c a l ) world

t o models of t h e s o c i a l , and expect our common e x p e r i e n c e t o
be transformed.
I n t h e p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s common e x p e r i e n c e a c t s as

a s t a n d a r d a g a i n s t which our models can be t e s t e d , and our

models a c t a s a s t a n d a r d a g a i n s t which our common e x p e r i e n c e
can be t e s t e d . Marxfs a l i e n a t i o n t h e o r y , i n s o f a r as i t
h y p o t h e s i z e s a r e l a t i o n s h i p 'between manls common e x p e r i e n c e of

#
h y p o t h e s i s which can be r e f e r r e d back t o common e x p e r i e n c e .
This t h e o r y of a l i e n a t i o n i s a s m a l l f i r s t s t e p i n g e t t i n g
beyond our " c u l t u r a l s c r e e n " , our assumption t h a t we "knowI1
ourselves. The t h e o r y s p e c i f i e s t h e f a c t o r s t h a t we can s t u d y
i n o r d e r t o begin t o "know" o u r s e l v e s .
1I
George Herbert Mead a l s o assumed a species character-
i s t i c " and, i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of i t , suggested a method by
which we can study t h e f a c t o r s s p e c i f i e d by Marx, comparable
t o t h e s c i e n t i f i c method used i n p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s , i . e . , a
method based upon t h e s c i e n t i f i c a t t i t u d e of doubt and s y s -
t e m a t i c e x p l o r a t i o n , which t a k e s us o u t s i d e of t h e a t t i t u d e
w i t h which we p e r p e t u a t e t h e myth of S o c i e t y .
 I

CHAPTER I V
THE RESOLUTION OF ALIENATION I N THE THE OR^ OF
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD

Before e n t e r i n g i n t o a d i s c u s s i o n of Meadls t h e o r y ,
I would l i k e t o summarize t h e development t h a t I have i n t e n d e d

t o t h i s point. I n Chapter I, d i s c u s s i n g t h e change i n usage

of t h e concept " a l i e n a t i o n " from Hegel t o Marx, I suggested
t h a t H e g e l f s work could be c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s a " n a t u r a l h i s t o r y " I

of t h e mind while Marx was a t t e m p t i n g a s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n

of human s o c i e t y . I s e p a r a t e d Marx's a l i e n a t i o n t h e o r y from

a p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t f o r a n a l y t i c a l purposes, a r g u i n g t h a t t h e
a n a l y s i s of a l i e n a t i o n i s l o g i c a l l y connected n e i t h e r with
1
Marxfs d i s c u s s i o n of worker a s a l i e n a t e d and non-worker a s
a l i e n a t o r nor with h i s p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y f o l l o w i n g from t h i s
I
I
1

discussion, I i n t e r p r e t e d h i s d e f i n i t i o n of a l i e n a t i o n a s

t h e s e p a r a t i o n between "whole man1' and h i s " s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s -

t i c of " f r e e , conscious a c t i v i t y " through t h e medium of " f o r c e d
labor1'. I argued t h a t i t i s c o n s i s t e n t with h i s g e n e r a l t h e o r y

of t h e r e l a t i o n s among man, community and s o c i e t y t o understand

a l i e n a t i o n a s t h e a c t i v i t y of man a s a whole, both "workers"
and "non-workers1' c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h i s a l i e n a t i o n ; and
concluded t h a t with t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h e q u e s t i o n of blame
becomes i r r e l e v a n t f o r s o c i o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s and -
how man
a l i e n a t e s himself becomes t h e moot q u e s t i o n .
With t h e q u e s t i o n of how man a l i e n a t e s himself i n
 112.

, ' d
contributions t o alienation theory. I i n t e r p r e t e d Weberrs

d e s c r i p t i o n of i n c r e a s i n g r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n i n Western c i v i l i z a -
t i o n , w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o Marxls * t h e o r y of a l i e n a t i o n , a s a
d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e development i n Western s o c i e t y of " f o r c e d
l a b o r " , i. e . , t h e means, both " o b j e c t i v e " a s r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n
of i n s t i t u t i o n s and " s u b j e c t i v e 1 ' a s i n t e l l e c t u a l r a t i o n a l i z a -
t i o n , by which man t r e a t s himself a s a " p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n "
i n contemporary s o c i e t y . Weberrs d e s c r i p t i o n of kinds of
a u t h o r i t y as j u s t i f i c a t i o n s of power r e l a t i o n s based on f e a r
and hope s t r e n g t h e n e d Marxfs argument t h a t " n a t u r a l s o c i e t y 1 ' ,
" i l l u s o r y community", i s an i r r a t i o n a l form of o r g a n i z a t i o n
with r e s p e c t t o man's r e l a t i o n t o h i s s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .
I c r i t i c i s e d Weberls normative approach t o t h e a n a l y s i s of
s o c i e t y a s f a i l i n g t o c o n s i d e r Marx's t h e s i s t h a t t h e s e
normative s o c i e t i e s a r e t h e means by which man a l i e n a t e s hirn-
self.
I n my d i s c u s s i o n of contemporary a l i e n a t i o n t h e o r y

i n America, I a p p l i e d t h e same c r i t i c i B m a s t o Weber's approach,

and suggested t h a t contemporary d e f i n i t i o n s of a l i e n a t i o n more
c l o s e l y approximate Durkheim r s concept of "anomie" a s developed
by Robert Merton.

R e l a t i n g George Herbert Meadls thought t o Marxls

t h e o r y of a l i e n a t i o n , I r e f e r a g a i n t o Chapter One and my d i s -

c u s s i o n of Marx. Mead d i d n o t use " a l i e n a t i o n , " i n h i s a n a l y s i s

of human s o c i e t y , but h i s t h e o r y can be a p p l i e d t o t h e s t u d y of
a l i e n a t i o n as d e f i n e d by Marx.
 113.

Marx drew our a t t e n t i o n t o p r a c t i c e as t h e e x p r e s s i o n

by man of h i s s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . Mannheim, c o n s i d e r i n g

t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a s c i e n c e of p o l i t i c s , noted
I
I f we seek a s c i e n c e of t h a t which i s i n t h e
p r o c e s s of becoming, of p r a c t i c e and f o r
p r a c t i c e , we can r e a l i z e i t o n l y by d i s c o v e r i n g
a new framework i n which t h i s kind of knowledge
can f i n d adequate e x p r e s s i o n . 1
His o b s e r v a t i o n holds t r u e with r e f e r e n c e n o t only t o p o l i t i c s ,
but t o a l l forms of human a c t i v i t y . a

I n t h i s c h a p t e r I would l i k e t o d i s c u s s Mead's work

a s t h e "discovery" o r c r e a t i o n of a new framework of t h e s o r t

I'
Mannheim envisaged. His t h r e e major works, Philosophy of t h e
2
I -
Act, Philosophy of t h e P r e s e n t , and Mind, S e l f and S o c i e t y ,
c e n t r e around t h e common theme of what c h a r a c t e r i z e s man a s a
s p e c i e s of animal d i s t i n c t from o t h e r l i f e forms. Mead d i d
not use t h e phrase 11
s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c " , but i t is a
p h r a s e adequate t o d e s c r i b e t h e s u b j e c t of h i s work, and s e r v e s

as a c o n c e p t u a l l i n k between h i s t h e o r y and t h a t of Marx.

O f t h e two works t o which I w i l l r e f e r i n t h i s

c h a p t e r , Mind, S e l f and S o c i e t y i s devoted t o a d e s c r i p t i o n

-. of t h e p r o c e s s of human s o c i a l i z a t i o n , i . e . , humanization, and

of t h e r e l a t i o n of man t o s o c i e t y . I n The Philosophy of t h e

P r e s e n t Mead o u t l i n e d h i s t h e o r y of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between
mind and sensory experience.

1. MEAD'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRESENT

I n t h e development of h i s philosophy Mead r e f e r r e d
 .,
terms of t h e f o u r dimensional time-space p e r s p e c t i v e suggested

dimensional Newtonian " t i m e l e s s " s p a c i a l p e r s p e c t i v e .

.
by E i n s t e i n l s work r a t h e r t h a n w i t h i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l t h r e e -
Marx,
i n h i s t h e o r y of s o c i e t y , a n t i c i p a t e d t h i s four-dimensional
p e r s p e c t i v e , but he had no f o r m a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r y , o f t h e
universe; and h i s d i s c u s s i o n of m a n f s r e l a t i o n t o t h e
p h y s i c a l u n i v e r s e s u g g e s t s t h a t he assumed, " i n t h e back of
r
h i s mind", a t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l Newtonian u n i v e r s e . The most
b a s i c d i f f e r e n c e , w i t h r e l a t i o n t o my d i s c u s s i o n of a l i e n a t i o n ,
between t h e two u n i v e r s e s r e s t s i n t h e f a c t t h a t , w h i l e i n t h e
Newtonian u n i v e r s e e v e r y t h i n g can be reduced t o c o n c r e t e e n t i -
t i e s and t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s , i n t h e E i n s t e i n i a n one, every-
t h i n g i s reduced t o t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s of energy s o t h a t c o n c r e t e
e n t i t i e s a r e " c o n c r e t e " and " e n t i t i e s " only i n a r e l a t i v e s e n s e .
A " t h i n g " may be c o n c r e t e with r e f e r e n c e t o one system (one s e t

of r e l a t i o n s between e l e m e n t s ) and l o s e i t s " t h i n g - n e s s " w i t h

reference t o another. For example, an "organism" i n one
system i s a " c o n s t e l l a t i o n " of atoms i n a n o t h e r and an o r g a n i -
z a t i o n of energy t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s i n a t h i r d . The r e a l i t y of
t h e s e d i f f e r e n t systems i n which " t h i n g s " a r e l o c a t e d i s
demonstrated by, f o r example, t h e e f f e c t s of atomic r e a c t i o n s
upon o r g a n i c l i f e and, i n t u r n , t h e e f f e c t s of o r g a n i c l i f e
(man) on p h y s i c a l systems, a s i n t h e s p l i t t i n g of t h e atom.
P h i l o s o p h e r s have i n t h e p a s t q u e s t i o n e d m a t t e r , but w i t h

E i n s t e i n f s t h e o r y we have f o r t h e f i r s t time a s c i e n c e which

 , *.
q u e s t i o n s i t , and which e x p l a i n s a way i n which m a t t e r and

energy a r e e q u i v a l e n t .
Mead's understanding of E i n s t e i n ' s t h e o r y i s b a s i c t o
h i s s o c i a l ~ p h i l o s o p h y . I n a t t e m p t i n g t o e x p l a i n t h e f a c t of

t h e occurrence of d i f f e r e n t systems and t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s ,

and t h e common experience of them by men, Mead developed t h r e e

fundamental concepts, most c l e a r l y s t a t e d i n a s e t of f o u r

l e c t u r e s d e l i v e r e d t o t h e American P h i l o s o p h i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n
i n 1930 a t Berkeley. These l e c t u r e s have been i n c l u d e d i n a
book published posthumously, The Philosophy of t h e P r e s e n t .
These concepts, " t h e p r e s e n t " , " s o c i a l i t y f ' and "emergent", a r e
important keys t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g h i s t h e o r y about human s o c i e t y .

The P r e s e n t
The p r e s e n t , according t o Mead, i s t h e " l o c u s of
dQe
reality1':-" It i s i n t h e p r e s e n t t h a t we e x p e r i e n c e , our
e x p e r i e n c e occurs v i a our s e n s e s , and i t i s t o t h i s sensuous
e x p e r i e n c i n g i n t h e p r e s e n t t h a t thought r e f e r s . Mead sugges- \

t e d t h a t thought ( a b s t r a c t i o n ) which " l e a d s t o a m e t a p h y s i c a l

s e p a r a t i o n of what i s a b s t r a c t e d from t h e c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y
from which t h e a b s t r a c t i o n i s made", i s "improper usdl of "a

t o o l f f , t h e proper use of which i s " i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n t r o l a f t h a t

reality".
5 One must be c a r e f u l h e r e , a s with Marx's r e l a t i n g
of thought t o " p r a c t i c e " , n o t t o mistake t h i s i d e a a s
s c i e n t i s m gone mad. The p o e t , t h e p a i n t e r , t h e composer of
music, a l l use a b s t r a c t i o n f o r t h e c o n t r o l of t h e p a r t i c u l a r
11
perspective of r e a l i t y with 'which t h e y d e a l . The p e r -
s p e c t i v e of t h e p h i l o s o p h e r i s i n t e l l e c t u a l , and i t was toward
p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought t h a t Mead d i r e c t e d t h i s argument.

P a s t s and f u t u r e s , i n r e a l i t y , a r i s e out of p r e s e n t
e x p e r i e n c e , and

t h e d i f f e r e n t p a s t s of e x p e r i e n c e a r e (- n o t ) sub-
j e c t i v e r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ( o f ) a p a s t which i s
independent of t h a t o r any p r e s e n t 1 ' . 7
Mead was arguing h e r e with t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of our changing
human h i s t o r y which assumes one r e a l world of which we have

p a r t i a l knobledge, which we " s u b j e c t i v e l y " r e i n t e r p r e t a s we

develop new t o o l s ( e . g . , t e c h n i q u e s of s t u d y i n g g e o l o g i c a l
evidence of former human s o c i e t i e s ) . ' This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of

human h i s t o r y assumes a "metaphysical s e p a r a t i o n " between sub-

j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and t h e " c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y " t o which i t
refers. To t h i s p o s i t i o n , he r e p l i e d t h a t
... a r e a l i t y t h a t t r a n s c e n d s t h e p r e s e n t must
e x h i b i t i t s e l f i n t h e p r e s e n t . This a l t e r n a t i v e
i s t h a t found i n t h e a t t i t u d e of t h e r e s e a r c h
s c i e n t i t , whether he c o n f e s s e s i t i n h i s d o c t r i n e
or not. W
How c l e a r l y we can h e a r t h e v o i c e of Marx over t h e span of one
hundred y e a r s --
Do n o t l e t us go back t o a f i c t i t i o u s p r i m o r d i a l
c o n d i t i o n . . . . Such a p r i m o r d i a l c o n d i t i o n e x p l a i n s
n o t h i n g ; i t merely pushes t h e q u e s t i o n away i n t o
a g r e y nebulous d i s t a n c e . It assumes i n t h e form
of a f a c t , of an e v e n t , what t h e economist ( s i c
s c i e n t i s t ) i s supposed t o deduce -- namely, t h e
n e c e s s a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p between two t h i n g s --
between, f o r example, d i v i s i o n of l a b o r and
exchange. Theology i n t h e same way e x p l a i n s t h e
o r i g i n of e v i l by t h e f a l l of man; t h a t i s , i t
 t ,
2

assumes a s a f a c t , i n h i s t o r i c a l form, what has t o

be e x p l a i n e d .
We proceed from an economic f a c t - of t h e p r e s -
ent.9
,*
The s i m i l a r i t y between Mead! s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of " a b s t r a c t i o n s
l e a d i n g t o t h e metaphysical s e p a r a t i o n of what i s a b s t r a c t e d
from t h e c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y from which t h e a b s t r a c t i o n i s made"
ck3
and knowledge used a t o o l f o r i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n t r o l of r e a l i t y ;
A
and Marxls concepts of r e i f i c a t i o n and o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n , i s
striking. Rather t h a n speaking of If t r u e " and " f a l s e " knowledge,
Mead d i s t i n g u i s h e d between p r o p e r and improper use of a t o o l .
The d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e i d e a s about u s e s of
knowledge a r e e q u a l l y a s s t r i k i n g . Marx l e f t t h e r e l a t i o n
between s u b j e c t and o b j e c t p r e t t y much a s an assumption i n h i s
work. That he assumed, a s d i d Mead, t h e boundaries between
s u b j e c t and o b j e c t t o be c o n v e n t i o n a l , i s i n d i c a t e d i n h i s d i s -
c u s s i o n of t h e d i f f e r e n c e between " c i v i l manf' and "whole man1'.
His i d e a was t h a t c i v i l man i s c o n v e n t i o n a l ( i .e . , a r b i t r a r y ) ,
but whole man i s n o t . Mead d i d n o t make t h i s kind of b i f u r c a -
t i o n , and t r e a t e d t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l i n a c o n s e r v a t i v e manner.
To g i v e an example i l l u s t r a t i n g h i s argument: the
s c i e n t i f i c method i s used t o d i s c o v e r r e l a t i o n s t h a t hold
r e g a r d l e s s of p a r t i c u l a r occurrences i n p a r t i c u l a r p r e s e n t s ,
e.g., t h e laws of g r a v i t y and of o p t i c s ; yet these discoveries
a r e made under d e f i n i t e c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n p a r t i c u l a r p r e s e n t s .
A b i o l o g i s t s t u d y i n g t h e DNA molecule i s a t t h e same time

s i t t i n g i n a l a b o r a t o r y l o o k i n g through a microscope, o r
perhaps s t a r i n g a t a w a l l a c r o s s t h e room, t h i n k i n g . His
a c t i v i t y i s a l s o r e l a t e d t o o t h e r p r e s e n t s i n which he w i l l J

r e l a t e h i s d i s c o v e r i e s t o o t h e r s c i e n t ' s t s , i n which t e s t s w i l l
be c a r r i e d out on animals r e l a t i v e t o h i s d i s c o v e r i e s , and i n
which new l i f e forms may appear a s a " r e s u l t " of t h e s e p a r t i -
cular a c t i v i t i e s i n particular presents. The b i o l o g i s t f s
t h e o r y ( i f he c r e a t e s one) t r a n s c e n d s p a r t i c u l a r p r e s e n t s , but
i s c r e a t e d , proved v a l i d , and used, i n p a r t i c u l a r p r e s e n t s .
The u l t i m a t e i m p l i c a t i o n of Mead's argument, i n c o n t r a s t
with t h e n o t i o n of " s u b j e c t i v e r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " of an e x t e r n a l
( o b j e c t i v e ) r e a l i t y , 5s t h a t both t h e " s u b j e c t i v e " and t h e
ll
o b j e c t i v e ' ' a s p e c t s of human l i f e emerge i n p r e s e n t s , t o g e t h e r
and i n r e l a t i o n t o one a n o t h e r , a s a means of l o c a t i n g t h e
organism i n t h e p r e s e n t . Mead argued t h a t our a b i l i t y t o
c l a s s i f y e x p e r i e n c e i n t o ' s u b j e c t - o b j e c t dichotomies i s l e a r n e d I
1
through our involvement i n human s o c i e t y , v i a t h e " s i g n i f i c a n t \
symbol". c9
Mead observed t h a t t h e p a s t i s " a s h y p o t h e t i c a l a s t h e
11
1
future". He d i d n o t mean by t h i s t h a t we can w i l f u l l y r e -
I
c r e a t e t h e p a s t , changing what has happened and c a u s i n g something , 1
I

e l s e t o occur.
...The i r r e v o c a b i l i t y of t h e p a s t event remains even
i f we a r e u n c e r t a i n what t h e p a s t event was....
It may be t h i n k a b l e t h a t viewed from some v a s t d i s -
t a n c e t h e o r d e r of some of what we c a l l t h e same
e v e n t s might d i f f e r i n d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s , but
w i t h i n any p e r s p e c t i v e what has passed cannot
recur.. .. There i s an u n a l t e r a b l e temporal d i r e c -
t i o n i n what i s t a k i n g p l a c e .... In general, since
passage i s i t s e l f g i v e n i n e x p e r i e n c e , t h e d i r e c t i o n
of changes t h a t a r e going on p a r t l y c o n d i t i o n s what
. w i l l t a k e p l a c e . 12
The h y p o t h e t i c a l n a t u r e of 'both p a s t and f u t u r e i s a c o n d i t i o n J

of our knowledge.
The event t h a t has t a k e n p l a c e and t h e d i r e c t i o q of
t h e p r o c e s s going on form t h e b a s i s f o r t h e r a t i o n a l
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e f u t u r e . The i r r e v o c a b l e p a s t
and t h e o c c u r r i n g change a r e t h e two f a c t o r s t o
which we t i e up a l l our s p e c u l a t i o n s i n r e g a r d t o
t h e f u t u r e . 13
Both p a s t and f u t u r e --
a r e only -
f o r us i n our e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e
present.
Knowledge has h e r e been r e l a t e d t o " r e a l i t y " i n a
p e c u l i a r way. Mead saw i t a s an a s p e c t of t h e i n d i v i d u a l
( s e l f ' s ) relations i n the ,
world, a s a p r o c e s s o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n
t h e more i n c l u s i v e p r o c e s s of l i v i n g . As such i t i s both p a r t
of t h e i n d i v i d u a l l s equipment f o r s u r v i v a l , and i s an a s p e c t
of " r e a l i t y " , t h e n a t u r a l u n i v e r s e . Because i t i s both an

v i d u a l s , people can use i t d e l i b e r a t e l y t o i n f l u e n c e themselves 1

i n t h e n a t u r a l universe. The d i f f i c u l t y t h a t we have i n recog-
n i z i n g knowledge as an ongoing p r o c e s s i n p r e s e n t a c t i v i t y
1
a r i s e s from t h e f a c t t h a t
... t h e emergent has no sooner appeared thatqwe s e t
about r a t i o n a l i z i n g i t , t h a t i s , we undertake t o
show t h a t i t , or a t l e a s t t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t d e t e r -
mine i t s appearance, can be found i n t h e p a s t t h a t
l a y behind i t . Thus t h e e a r l i e r p a s t s out of which
i t emerged a s s o n e t h i n g which d i d n o t i n v o l v e i t a r e
t a k e n up i n t o a more conprehensive p a s t t h a t does
l e a d up t o i t . 1 4
Mead argued t h a t c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e occurrence of an
event a r e n e c e s s a r y -
a-f--
t-e-r t h e f a c t .
 ... I n our use of t h e term i r r e v o c a b i l i t y we a r e
p o i n t i n g toward what must have been, and i t i s a
s t r u c t u r e and p r o c e s s i n t h e p r e s e n t which i s t h e
s o u r c e of t h i s n e c e s s i t y . . . . The f o r c e of i r r e v o c a -
b i l i t y t h e n i s found i n t h e e x t e n s i o n of t h e neces-
s i t y w i t h which what has j u s t ha ened c o n d i t i o n s
what i s emerging i n t h e f u t u r e . y8
We only begin t o t r a c e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e occurrence
of a phenomenon when t h e r e i s something about t h a t phenomenon
which i s new t o us. The n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s which we " d i s -
cover" a r i s e o u t of t h e p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t we t a k e r e l a t i v e t o
t h e phenomenon, and t h i s p a r s p e c t i v e a r i s e s out of a ( b e l i e v e d ,
p e r c e i v e d , conceived, e x p e r i e n c e d ) c o n t r a d i c t i o n between what
we were prepared t o e x p e r i e n c e on t h e b a s i s of our knowledge
of t h e worlc? i n .the p a s t and whtit we e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e p r e s e n t .
I f we experienced no new t h i n g s , t h i n g s f o r which we a r e n o t
prepared, we would have no n o t i o n of p a s t , p r e s e n t o r f u t u r e .
A l l would simply be; n o t h i n g would be becoming.

... where being i s e x i s t e n c e but n o t becoming t h e r e

i s no p a s t , and ...
t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n involved i n
passage i s a c o n d i t i o n of a p a s t but n o t i t s r e a l i z a -
t i o n . 16
Mead! s t r e a t m e n t of t h e concept "knowledge" i s n o t a unique
one, b u t f o l l o w s t h e l i n e of argument p o s i t e d by C. H. P e i r c e ,
who d i d n o t a c c e p t t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l s e p a r a t i o n of " b e l i e f " and
"knowledge". P e i r c e reduced a l l knowledge t o opinkon ( b e l i e f ),
commenting t h a t - "It now begins t o look s t r o n g l y a s i f perhaps
17
a l l b e l i e f might i n v o l v e e x p e c t a . t i o n a s i t s essence" , and
s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e purpose of an expl-anation i s " t h e e s t a b -
lishment of a h a b i t of p o s i t i v e e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t s h a l l n o t
 18 ,
be d i s a p p o i n t e d " . We g e n e r a l l y t e n (
b e l i e f with s u s p i c i o n , and t o t r u s t knowledge, as e . g . ,
t i f i c knowledge. But, contended P e i r c e ,
scien-
I
t h e s o l e o b j e c t of i n q u i r y ( r e a s o n i n g ) i s t h e
s e t t l e m e n t of opinion. We may fancy t h a t t h i s
i s n o t enough f o r u s , and t h a t we s e e k , n o t
merely an opinion, but a t r u e opinion. But p u t
t h i s fancy t o t h e t e s t , and i t proves g r o u n d l e s s ;
f o r a s soon a s a f i r m b e l i e f i s reached we a r e
e n t i r e l y s a t i s f i e d , whether t h e b e l i e f be t r u e
o r f a l s e . 19
I f we r e j e c t , f o r example, t h e o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s and a c c e p t
s c i e n t i f i c ones, we a r e n o t exchanging "mere opinion" f o r 7 ' t r u e
1

o p i n i o n " , b u t a r e changing: t h e c r i t e r i a f o r a c c e p t a b l e opinion,

on t h e grounds t h a t opinion (knowledge) based on t h e s c i e n t i - I

1
I
f i c method has proved, by e x p e r i e n c e over time, t o be l e s s
"disappointing" than theological explanations. Mead accepted

P i e r c e ' s "pragmatic" t h e o r y of knowledge, and used i t a s a 1

b a s i s f o r h i s t h e o r y of s o c i e t y .

The Emergent /I
il

I n t h e d i s c u s s i o n of Mead's n o t i o n of " p r e s e n t " a s I

t h e c e n t e r of r e a l i t y , with r e f e r e n c e t o which p a s t s and I

I
f u t u r e s a r e c r e a t e d , we saw t h a t t h e p r e s e n t i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d
by n o v e l t y , and t h a t t h e occurrence of n o v e l t y i s n e c e s s a r y
f o r our r e c o g n i t i o n of p a s t - p r e s e n t - f u t u r e . Very c r u d e l y , he

has simply argued t h a t we can r e c o g n i z e change only because

change occurs. Change occurs i n t h e p r e s e n t , and i s t h e
occurrence of emergent e v e n t s .
The c h i e f r e f e r e n c e of a p r e s e n t i s t o t h e emergent
e v e n t , i . e . , t o t h e occurrence of something which
 i s more t h a n t h e p r o c e s s e s t h a t have l e d up t o i t
and which by i t s change, continu-ance, o r d i s a p -
pearance, adds t o l a t e r passages a c o n t e n t t h e y
would not o t h e r w i s e have possessed. 20
We reoognize emergents a g a i n s t t h e background of our knowledge
of t h e world. They appear a s unique e v e n t s which can n e i t h e r
be p r e d i c t e d from t h e knowledge we have b e f o r e t h e i r appearance
nor be reduced t o t h e elements out of which they emerged. To
understand t h e appearance of a unique event we c r e a t e a p a s t
by which we can e x p l a i n i t s emergence, and i n doing t h i s , i n
11
d i s c o v e r i n g " t h e necessary c o n d i t i o n s of i t s emergence, we
c r e a t e a f u t u r e as well.
Given an emergent e v e n t , i t s r e l a t i o n s t o antecedent
p r o c e s s e s become c o n d i t i o n s o r causes. Such a s i t u a -
t i o n i s a p r e s e n t . It marks out and i n a s e n s e
s e l e c t s what has made i t s p e c u l i a r i t y p o s s i b l e . It
c r e a t e s with i t s uniqueness a p a s t and a f u t u r e . As
soon a s we view i t , i t becanes a h i s t o r y and a pro-
phecy. I t s own temporal diameter v a r i e s with t h e
e x t e n t of t h e e v e n t . 21
An emergent, t h e n , can have a g r e a t e r o r l e s s e r e f f e c t on t h e
world, depending on i t s r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r e v e n t s . I t s "tem-
p o r a l diamet~er" emerges with t h e e v e n t . This n o t i o n i s
extremely i n t e r e s t i n g when a p p l i e d t o c u l t u r a l change. An
i n d i v i d u a l ( e g ~ r i s t o t l e )l i v e s i n a p a r t i c u l a r time and p l a c e
and t h e r e a c h of h i s i n f l u e n c e a s organism i s l i m i t e d
by t h a t time and space, b u t through h i s a b i l i t y t o use language

( a s s i g n i f i c a n t symbols) he can have an i n f l u e n c e on o t h e r

i n d i v i d u a l s i n d i f f e r e n t times and p l a c e s , thousands of y e a r s
a f t e r he no l o n g e r l i v e s .
Mead h e l d t h a t p a s t s and f u t u r e s a r e l o c a t e d i n mind
which belongs t o organisms, " t, o emergent e v e n t s whose n a t u r e
i n v o l v e s t h e tendency t o m a i n t a i n themselves" through " a d j u s t -
ment l o o k i n g toward a p a s t , and s e l e c t i v e s e n s i t i v i t y l o o k i n g
22
toward a f u t u r e 1 ' . Mind i s an a s p e c t of t h i s maintenance,
and i s i t s e l f an emergent. It r e s i d e s n e i t h e r w i t h i n nor

o u t s i d e of t h e organism, but emerges i n t h e s o c i a l p r o c e s s of

l i f e which i n c l u d e s both t h e organism and i t s environment.
The e x i s t e n c e of an organism i s a n e c e s s a r y b u t n o t a s u f f i -
c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e emergence of mind. F e r a l men exemplify
l i v i n g organisms with no "mind".
With mind, t h e organism i s a b l e t o t r a n s c e n d t h e sensuous
p r e s e n t of i t s e x i s t e n c e .
The f i e l d of mind ...
i s t h e l a r g e r environment
which t h e a c t i v i t y of t h e organism c a l l s f o r but
which t r a n s c e n d s t h e p r e s e n t . 23
... The f i e l d of mind i s a temporal e x t e n s i o n of
t h e environment of t h e organism 24 ....
Mead t r e a t e d mind as a phenomenon of t h e n a t u r a l world, denying
t h a t inanimate bodies a r e more " n a t u r a l " t h a n animate ones, and
s u g g e s t i n g t h a t mind i s a n a t u r a l p r o p e r t y of some animate
bodies.
He c o n t r a s t e d t h e study of animate and i n a n i m a t e
bodies, n o t i n terms of t h e one being more " r e a l " o r " n a t u r a l "
t h a n t h e o t h e r , but i n terms of t h e d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s
r e q u i r e d f o r t h e i r understanding. The p e r s p e c t i v e r e q u i r e d f o r
t h e understanding of inanimate bodies r e j e c t s "form" and

environment a s e x p l a n a t o r y d e v i c e s .
 I

No t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a f f e c t s t h e r e a l i t y of t h e
p h y s i c a l system .... The e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e of
t h e d o c t r i n e ( r e l a t i v i t y t h e o r y ) has been t h a t
r e a l i t y does n o t l i e i n t h e form -- f o r t h e r e
may be e n d l e s s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s -- b u t i n t h e
m a t t e r , mass o r e n e r g y . . . . The p a r t i c u l a r form
of an inanimate body i s i r r e l e v a n t t o !what i t
is!. For such bodies t h e environment i s as
u n e s s e n t i a l a s t h e o b j e c t . 25
The.process of l i f e cannot be understood w i t h t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e ,
but r e q u i r e s one which r e c o g n i z e s a s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e explana-
t i o n of l i f e , t h e r e l a t i o n between form and environment.
We f i n d i n t h e l i v i n g form an i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g
t h a t m a i n t a i n s i t s e l f through t h e mutual d e t e r -
m i n a t i o n of t h e form and i t s environment. 26
The p r o c e s s of l i f e i n v o l v e s t h e i n t e r a c t i o n of t h e l i v i n g
t h i n g w i t h t h e t h i n g s around i t s o t h a t t h e " p r o c e s s of l i f e
a s r e a l l y c o n f e r s c h a r a c t e r upon t h e environment a s i t does
27
upon t h e p l a n t or t h e animal".
Mead argued t h a t l i f e emerged out of n o n - l i f e , and
human l i f e emerged out of animal l i f e , a l l n a t u r a l p r o c e s s e s ;
1/
and t h a t once t h e "event" emerged i t could n o t be explained 1
1

by t h e same p e r s p e c t i v e with which t h e former s t a t e of a f f a i r s !I

i
could be explained. Emergent e v e n t s such a s l i f e and mind 11

1
i m p l i e s t h e emergence of new " s o c i a l " systems, which i n t e r a c t
l

with t h e o l d , changing t h e whole c h a r a c t e r of " r e a l i t y " .

Mead d e f i n e d mind i n such a way t h a t i t i s p e c u l i a r I

t o man. Communication v i a s i g n i f i c a n t symbols d i s t i n g u i s h e s I

I
mind a s t h e c a p a c i t y of t h e human organism d e l i b e r a t e l y t o
a f f e c t i t s e l f and i t s environment. Mind i s n o t a c o n s t a n t i n
human l i f e , and i s n o t i d e n t i c a l with t h e occurrence of s e l v e s
(persons).
1
The u n i t y of t h e mind i s n o t i d e n t i c a l with t h e I
u n i t y of t h e s e l f . The u n i t y of t h e s e l f i s con-
s t i t u t e d by t h e u n i t y of t h e e n t i r e r e l a t i o n a l I
p a t t e r n of s o c i a l behavior and e x p e r i e n c e i n I
which t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s i m p l i c a t e d , and which i s
r e f l e c t e d i n t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e s e l f ; but many
a s p e c t s o r f e a t u r e s of t h i s e n t i r e p a t t e r n do n o t
e n t e r i n t o t h e consciousness, s o t h a t t h e u n i t y
o f t h e mind i s i n a s e n s e a n , a b s t r a c t i o n from t h e
more i n c l u s i v e u n i t y of t h e . s e l f . 28
I

The person i s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s when he t a k e s a p e r s p e c t i v e which

i n c l u d e s himself a s one of t h e o b j e c t s i n h i s awareness. Only
when t h e person i s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s can he d e l i b e r a t e l y a f f e c t
himself. He can a f f e c t himself w i t h o u t d e l i b e r a t i o n through
d e l i b e r a t e l y a f f e c t i n g h i s environment without c o n s c i o u s l y
i n c l u d i n g himself as p a r t of t h a t environment. Meadls t r e a t -
ment of "mind" s u g g e s t s t h a t i t can be c o n t r o l l e d by i n d i v i -
d u a l s f o r d i f f e r e n t purposes. The way i n which i t i s con-
t r o l l e d would depend upon t h e p e r s p e c t i v e t a k e n by minding
i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e i r " p r e s e n t e x i s t e n c e " , and t h e p e r s p e c t i v e
t a k e n would depend upon t h e g o a l s of t h e minding i n d i v i d u a l s .
29
T h e i r "procedure answers t o t h e i r g o a l s " .
This t h e o r y of mind i s p r e c i s e l y i n l i n e with Marx's
i d e a s about man a s a p r o d u c t i v e animal (i.e . , d e l i b e r a t e l y
a f f e c t i n g himself and h i s environment), and man's " s p e c i e s
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c " ' of " f r e e , conscious a c t i v i t y " . Mead has
d e f i n e d mind a s f r e e ( i . e . , can be c o n t r o l l e d f o r d i f f e r e n t
purposes, and may n o t be c o n t r o l l e d ) conscious ( v i a s i g n i f i -
c a n t symbols) a c t i v i t y ( a s an a s p e c t of t h e l a r g e r a c t i v i t y
of t h e organism i n environment).
 t

There i s a f u r t h e r s i m i l a r i t y between t h e two

thinkers. Where Marx, i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of p o l i t i c a l economy,
i n s i s t e d t h a t i f one wants t o e x p l a i n t h i s phenomenon he must
"proceed from f a c t s of t h e p r e s e n t " , and must pay a t t e n t i o n
t o c o n c r e t e e m p i r i c a l r e l a t i o n s , Mead extended t h i s argument
beyond t h e p a r t i c u l a r p e r s p e c t i v e of p o l i t i c a l economy, and
i n t o a l l a s p e c t s of human l i f e . "If we a r e t o escape i l l u s i o n

and h a l l u c i n a t i o n " , he h e l d , we must r e f e r t o " t h e p h y s i c a l

t h i n g of c o n t a c t experience". 30
We f i n d h e r e t h e fundamental r e l a t i o n between t h e
f u t u r e and t h e p a s t i n t h e p r e s e n t ....
In the
immediate p e r c e p t u a l world what we can handle i s
t h e r e a l i t y t o which what i s seen and heard must
be brought t o t h e t e s t . . . . 3 1

The human organism w i l l i n f l u e n c e i t s e l f and i t s environment,

r e g a r d l e s s of whether i t i s "minding" o r n o t , and r e g a r d l e s s
of whether i t i s c o n t r o l l i n g i t s "minding", because of i t s
c h a r a c t e r a s a form of l i f e . But where i t minds without
t a k i n g i t s p r e s e n t self-in-environment i n t o account, i t i s
subject t o delusion. I t s mental a c t i v i t y i s i r r e l e v a n t t o
i t s e x i s t e n c e i n t h e p r e s e n t , a s a s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g being.

The S o c i a l
The mind, i n Meadls t h e o r y , i s an a c t i v i t y of t h e
organism by which i t p a s s e s from one p e r s p e c t i v e t o another,
and t h i s passage -
may be d e l i b e r a t e l y c o n t r o l l e d by t h e
organism t o e f f e c t i t s s e l f and environment. The mind e x i s t s
i n t h e p r e s e n t , i s an emergent i n t h e p r e s e n t , and i s
 I

c h a r a c t e r i z e d by " s o c i a l i t y " . "--

S o c i a l i t y i s t h e c a p a c i t y of
-
being s e v e r a l t h i n g s a t once. 32 \
II
\
I n c o n t r a s t t o t h e conventional usage of t h e term
\
\

" s o c i a l " , Mead proposed :

W
Now t h a t we a r e accustomed t o c a l l s o c i a l i s only
a s o - c a l l e d consciousness of such a p r o c e s s , but
t h e process i s not i d e n t i c a l with t h e conscious-
n e s s of i t , f o r t h a t i s awareness of t h e s i t u a t i o n .
The s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n must be t h e r e i f t h e r e - i s t o
be consciousness of i t . 3 3
It i s t h e passage from one p e r s p e c t i v e t o another t h a t charac-
t e r i z e s s o c i a l i t y , and t h i s passage occurs i n t h e n a t u r a l world.
The s c i e n t i s t proceeds by t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s , but
they a r e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s which a r e p o s s i b l e only
a s t h e observer g r a s p s t h a t i n h i s own s i t u a t i o n
which involves h i s p l a c i n g himself i n t h e s i t u a -
t i o n of t h a t which he observes. Although t h i s
i s more complicated, i t comes back i n i t s f i n d i n g s
t o p e r c e p t u a l occasions. Now t h i s i s only p o s s i b l e
i f t h a t s o c i a l i t y of thought i n which we occup t h e
a t t i t u d e i s a l s o a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of n a t u r e . 3 c
Mead has grounded mind i r r e v o c a b l y i n t h e n a t u r a l world. He
has, by c o n s t a n t l y maintaining a v i s i o n of man a s an animal
organism, s k i r t e d around a number of metaphysical mind-body
problems. He saw t h e r e l a t i o n between mind and body w i t h i n t h e
l a r g e r c o n t e x t of l i f e , which i n c l u d e s both so t h a t mind can be
seen a s an a s p e c t of body and body can be seen as an a s p e c t of
mind. Mind i s an emergent out of organic l i f e which can c a r r y
on without i t ; but having emerged, mind changes t h e c h a r a c t e r
of t h e n a t u r a l world. It changes t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e world
through i t s i n t e r a c t i o n with non-mind (the organic) i n a s o c i a l
process. This i n t e r a c t i o n occurs i n t h e ongoing a c t i v i t y of
individuals i n society (i.e., i n d i v i d u a l s being s e v e r a l t h i n g s
a t once r e l a t i v e t o one another, through t h e i r common use of
s i g n i f i c a n t symbols ) .
The i n t e r a c t i o n between "mind" and "body", then, i s
a s o c i a l process i n t h e n a t u r a l world. We a r e aware of i t s
occurrence i n our conventional u s e of t h e word s o c i e t y , but
" t h e process i s n o t i d e n t i c a l with t h e consciousness of i t " .
I n t h e conventional use of t h e term, we tend t o t h i n k of s o c i e t y
a s a " t h i n g " e x t e r n a l t o us a s i n d i v i d u a l persons, r a t h e r t h a n
recognizing i t a s a process i n which we a r e involved, and which
i s necessary f o r our a b i l i t y t o a b s t r a c t out t h e n o t i o n s
" i n d i v i d u a l f ' and If society". We f e e l our involvement a s p l e a s u r e
and p a i n , but cannot e x p l a i n t h e source of t h e p l e a s u r e and
pain,

2. MIND AS A SOCIAL PROCESS OF TAKING PERSPECTIVES

" P r e s e n t " , "emergent", and " s o c i a l i t y " a r e t h r e e con-
c e p t s b a s i c ' t o ~ e a d f tsh e o r y of human s o c i e t y . He discussed
some of t h e problems involved i n our understanding t h e o r i g i n
of consciousness, commenting t h a t
The primary d i f f i c u l t y i n d e a l i n g with t h e s e m a t t e r s
l i e s i n our tendency t o c u t o f f l i f e and conscious-
n e s s a t t h e boundaries of t h e organism. S e l e c t i o n
undoubtedly l i e s i n t h e l i v i n g form, but such a form
can only l i v e i n a p h y s i c a l environment of a d e f i n i t e
s o r t . Living processes i n c l u d e a c t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s
with o b j e c t s i n an environment, and conscious l i v i n g
processes a l s o i n c l u d e such o b j e c t s . The response of
t h e organism t o Zts own response t o food undoubtedly
l i e s w i t h i n t h e organism, but only a s a p a r t of a
whole process of e a t i n g t h a t i n c l u d e s a l s o t h e food. 35
 I

The terms "organism" and "environment" a r e a b s t r a c t i o n s from

t h e s o c i a l process organism-environment, and a r e u s e f u l
a b s t r a c t i o n s f o r c e r t a i n purposes. Mead was not suggesting
t h a t we begin t o ignore t h e f a c t t h a t j w e can d i s t i n g u i s h b e t -
ween, e.g., a t i g e r and a t r e e , e s p e c i a l l y i f we have a choice
of being confronted with t h e one o r t h e o t h e r . He was suggest-
i n g t h a t i f we want t o understand and e x p l a i n l i f e and con-
sciousness we have t o understand t h e p r i n c i p l e s underlying our
specious world, s e e i n g t h e organism a s an emergent i n t h e
n a t u r a l world, and with i t s emergence, t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of
a s p e c t s of t h e n a t u r a l world t o i t s "environment". We have t o
be a b l e t o s e e consciousness a s an emergent, and t h e t r a n s f o r -
mation of a s p e c t s of t h e n a t u r a l world t o i t s "environment",
i.e., p a r t of t h e environment of t h e organism r e l a t i v e t o
which consciousness emerges.
Mead argued t h a t t h e "environment" or " f i e l d " of con-
s c i o u s n e s s i n c l u d e s a s p e c t s of t h e organism being conscious.
... L i f e becomes conscious a t t h o s e p o i n t s a t which
t h e organism's own responses e n t e r as a p a r t of t h e
o b j e c t i v e f i e l d t o which i t r e a c t s . 36
Consciousness occurs when t h e " i n d i v i d u a l " experiences h i s "self"
1
a s p a r t of t h e " o b j e c t i v e " f i e l d w i t h i n which he i s a c t i n g .
Consciousness i n c l u d e s processes n o t only w i t h i n t h e organism,
but between organisms, and between organism and t h e n a t u r a l
world w i t h i n which i t e x i s t s .
Mead p o s i t e d f e e l i n g a s t h e most b a s i c form of con-
sciousness.
 ... When we say t h a t t h e iowest form of conscious-
n e s s i s f e e l i n g , what i s implied i s t h a t when l i v i n g
forms e n t e r such a s y s t e m a t i c process t h a t they
r e a c t purposively and as wholes t o t h e i r own condi-
t i o n s , consciousness a s f e e l i n g a r i s e s w i t h i n l i f e . 37
Feeling i s dependent upon t h e organism's a b i l i t y t o d i s t i n g u i s h
p l e a s u r e and pain. Feeling-consciousness i s t h e b a s i s out of
which mind emerges -- mind r e f e r r i n g t o i d e a s , images, sensa-
tions. Mind emerges a t t h e p o i n t where one i n d i v i d u a l i s a b l e
t o t a k e t h e a t t i t u d e of another i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o t h a t he
i s a b l e t o pass from one mutually e x c l u s i v e system (perspec-
t i v e ) i n t o another.
From t h i s d i s c u s s i o n we can s e e t h a t Mead considered
mind t o be a s p e c i a l c a s e of consciousness which a r i s e s when
ofie organism "sees" i t s e l f i n r e l a t i o n t o another, i . e . , when
i t i n c l u d e s both i t s own a t t i t u d e and t h a t of another i n i t s
consciousness. He explained:
... Let us ... accept passage a s t h e c h a r a c t e r of
r e a l i t y , and recognize t h a t i n passage t h e r e i s
change i n t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h i n g s , and t h a t because
of passage o b j e c t s can occupy d i f f e r e n t systems.
If we then recognize t h a t t h e r e i s a form of
s o c i a l i t y w i t h i n which we can go from t h e one t o
t h e o t h e r by means of a system of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s ,
and s o occupy both systems, i d e n t i f y i n g t h e same
o b j e c t s i n each, i t becomes p o s s i b l e f o r passage t o
t a k e pBace between a l t e r n a t i v e systems t h a t a r e
simultaneously mutually e x c l u s i v e . The s e t of t r a n s -
formations and t h e mathematical s t r u c t u r e b u i l t upon
i t a r e a s much p a r t s of n a t u r e a s anything e l s e .
They a r e a t t i t u d e s answering t o meanings of t h i n g s
brought under our c o n t r o l by symbols. Passage from
a system i n motion t o t h e same system a t r e s t , while
t h e r e s t of t h e world p a s s e s from r e s t t o motion,
means passage from t h e one t o t h e o t h e r i n what we
c a l l a mind. These two a s p e c t s e x i s t i n n a t u r e , and
t h e mind i s a l s o i n n a t u r e . The mind passes from one
t o t h e o t h e r i n i t s c o - c a l l e d consciousness, and t h e
 world i s a d i f f e r e n t world from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of
one a t t i t u d e from what i t i s from another. We say
t h e world cannot occupy both neanings, i f they a r e
mutually e x c l u s i v e ; but passage i n a mind enables
i t t o do so by means of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s . A l l t h a t
we need t o recognize i s t h a t t h e world had t h e one
a s p e c t from one p o i n t of view, and t h a t t h e r e has
been t h e same passage i n n a t u r e from t h e one t o t h e
o t h e r a s has taken p l a c e i n t h e mind, j u s t a s t h e r e
i s a passage from one p r i c e t o another i n s t o c k s on
t h e market because of t h e changing a t t i t u d e i n
men% minds. 38
What I want t o d i s c u s s h e r e , with r e f e r e n c e t o t h e t r a d i t i o n
i n Western c i v i l i z a t i o n of an e i t h e r - o r philosophy, i s an
i m p l i c a t i o n of h i s o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t "We say t h e world cannot
occupy both meanings, i f they a r e mutually e x c l u s i v e ; but
passage i n a mind enables i t t o do so by means of transforma-
tions". According t o Mead, when we say t h a t t h e world i s
e i t h e r one way or another, e . g . , t h a t it i s either basically
good o r b a s i c a l l y e v i l , we a r e n o t making s t a t e m e n t s about
n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s of r e a l i t y , b u t about two a l t e r n a t e
choices, and t h a t t h e one e n t a i l s one world, t h e o t h e r , another.
J u s t a s t h e p r i c e s i n t h e s t o c k market f l u c t u a t e because of
"changing a t t i t u d e s i n menfs minds", t h e n a t u r a l world changes
when men t a k e one a t t i t u d e o r another. Here we can s e e t h e
f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n of h i s argument t h a t " t h e d i f f e r e n t p a s t s of
experience a r e -
n o t s u b j e c t i v e r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of a p a s t which

r
i s independent of t h a t o r any p r e s e n t . " The n a t u r a l world i s

I a p o t e n t i a l chaos, "brought under our c o n t r o l by symbols",

We have t o be c a r e f u l a t t h i s p o i n t t o keep from assuming t h a t
mind w i t h i n t h e framework of ' t h e organism i n t h e n a t u r a l world,
and t h a t mind i s s u b j e c t t o t h e "laws" of t h i s world, t h a t i t
i s a n a t u r a l p r o c e s s i n i n t e r a c t i o n with o t h e r n a t u r a l pro-
cesses. But a t t h e same time we can r e c o g n i z e t h e power a t
which he i s h i n t i n g a t t h e d i s p o s a l of minding organisms, a
power which t h e y can use t o c o n t r o l atomic energy f o r d e s t r u c -
t i o n and c r e a t i o n ; and t h e r e i s no reason t o suppose t h a t t h e
c o n t r o l of atomic energy i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of any more t h a n a
s m a l l f r a c t i o n of t h e i r f u l l c a p a c i t i e s , i . e . , f u t u r e emer-
gents .
Mead d e s c r i b e d t h e world a s c o n s i s t i n g of a f i n i t e
number of o b j e c t s occupying simultaneously many systems. One
g e t s t h e impression t h a t he imagined a t e m ' p o r a l - s p a t i a l
s t r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h e world, of systems w i t h i n systems, s o
t h a t , f o r example, we can d i s t i n g u i s h between atoms as objects,
o r g a n i s m s ~ so b j e c t s and persons a s o b j e c t s . The passage of
persons from one system t o a n o t h e r i s an e x p e r i e n c e common
t o everyone: both i n t h e s e n s e t h a t everyone e x p e r i e n c e s
passage from one t o a n o t h e r , and i n t h e s e n s e t h a t t h e passage
occurs only by communal agreement. For example, a " f a t h e r a t
home" p a s s e s i n t o a " m o t o r i s t on t h e road" i n t o a " p r o f e s s o r
a t university". The person, i n t h i s passage, moves p h y s i c a l l y
from one l o c a t i o n t o a n o t h e r , a c t i n g i n ways s p e c i f i c t o t h e
d i f f e r e n t "temporal-spacesf', and h i s p h y s i c a l movement means
f a t h e r - m o t o r i s t - p r o f e s s o r by communal agreement. The meaning,

and t h e performance, of t h e p h y s i c a l a c t i v i t y depends on t h e

 I

"mental" a t t i t u d e s of t h e members of a community.

Mead's o r i e n t a t i o n toward t h i s common e x p e r i e n c e
i l l u m i n a t e s some of t h e problems involved i n d e l i b e r a t e s o c i a l
change, and r e f l e c t s on Marxrs i d e a t h a t r a d i c a l s o c i a l change
most probably ( i .e . , i n most c a s e s ) r e q u i r e s v i o l e n t r e v o l u -
tion. His t h e o r y s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e s m a l l e r a group, t h e
e a s i e r r a d i c a l change w i l l be, t h e s m a l l e s t group being d e f i n e d
a s a " s e l f " ( c o n s i s t i n g of "I1'and "me" , which enables t h e .
i n d i v i d u a l t o address i t s e l f a s s e l f and o t h e r ) ; and t h e
l a r g e r a group ("group" presupposing some s o r t of o r g a n i z a t i o n ,
excluding a g g r e g a t e s and mobs) t h e more d i f f i c u l t i t w i l l be
t o e f f e c t r a d i c a l change. It a l s o s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e k i n d of
change w i l l be p e c u l i a r t o t h e s i z e of t h e group. For examp
t h e i n d i v i d u a l can "change h i s mind" much more r e a d i l y t h a n
h i s i n t e r - p e r s o n a l h a b i t s , which i n c l u d e a t l e a s t some o t h e r
people i n t h e "group" t o which t h e y r e f e r .
It s u g g e s t s t h a t , i f we want d e l i b e r a t e l y t o make
r a d i c a l changes, r e g a r d l e s s of t h e s i z e of t h e group moving
from one p e r s p e c t i v e ( s y s t e m ) t o a n o t h e r , we need t o have a
c l e a r understanding of t h e p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t we now occupy,
and a c l e a r understanding of t h e methods t h a t we c a n employ t o
move from one system t o a n o t h e r , i . e . , d i r e c t our own emergence.
With r e f e r e n c e t o Marxls t h e o r y of v i o l e n t r e v o l u t i o n ,
Meadls t h e o r y s u g g e s t s t h a t i t i s u n l i k e l y t o be a method
adequate t o t h e g o a l of moving from one system t o a n o t h e r .
 I

It may be t h a t v i o l e n c e ( p h y s i c a l i n t e r p e r s o n a l o r o t h e r w i s e )

i s an a s p e c t o r i n d i c a t i o n of r a d i c a l change, but i t i s n o t
a method. Both our h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e with v i o l e n t
r e v o l u t i o n and Meadls t h e o r y imply t h a t i t i s only a t o o l of
d e s t r u c t i o n , and n o t a method of d e l i b e r a t e c r e a t i o n . Violent
r e v o l u t i o n a l o n e , a s Marx recognized, r e s u l t s n o t i n a r a d i c a l
( b a s i c ) change, but i n a "mere" r e v o l u t i o n ( t u r n i n g o v e r ) .
What Marx d i d n o t r e c o g n i z e , i n t h e l i g h t of Meadfs t h e o r y ,
i s t h e e x t e n t t o which we c o n t r o l ( o r a r e capable of con-
t r o l l i n g ) o u r s e l v e s , and t h e " i n t e r m i n g l i n g " of mind with our
c u l t u r a l l y created society. Meadfs t h e o r y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e
s t r e e t s , c a r s , b u i l d i n g s , c l o t h e s , e t c . , a l l a r e "entangled"
with mind so t h a t choosing t o make r a d i c a l changes i n v o l v e s
much more t h a n simply making a conscious d e c i s i o n ( i . e . , have
an i n t e n t i o n ) and t h e n a c t i n g on i t . It i n v o l v e s continuous
d e l i b e r a t e a t t e n t i o n focused on t h e p r e s e n t .
Of t h e s e l f , t h e minding organism, Mead s a i d ,
The s e l f by i t s r e f l e x i v e form announces i t s e l f as
a conscious organism which i s what i t i s only s o
f a r a s i t can p a s s from i t s own system i n t o t h o s e
of o t h e r s , and can t h u s , i n p a s s i n g , occupy both
i t s own system and t h a t i n t o which i t i s p a s s i n g .
That t h i s should t a k e p l a c e i s e v i d e n t l y not t h e
a f f a i r of a s i n g l e organism. Shut up w i t h i n h i s
own world -- t h a t which answers t o h i s s t i m u l a t i o n s
and responses -- he would have no e n t r a n c e i n t o
p o s s i b i l i t i e s o t h e r t h a n t h o s e which h i s own
organized a c t involved. It i s only as h i s a c t i v i t y
i s a p a r t of a l a r g e r organized p r o c e s s t h a t such
a p o s s i b i l i t y can open. Nor i s t h i s t h e only p r e -
r e q u i s i t e . The s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of a m u l t i -
c e l l u l a r form i s one i n which each c e l l i n l i v i n g
i t s own l i f e l i v e s t h e l i f e of t h e whole; b u t i t s
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n r e s t r i c t s i t s expressions t o t h e
 s i n g l e f u n c t i o n t o which i t has become adapted.
Only i n a p r o c e s s i n which one organism can i n
some s e n s e s u b s t i t u t e f o r a n o t h e r could an i n d i -
v i d u a l f i n d i t s e l f t a k i n g t h e a t t i t u d e of a n o t h e r
while s t i l l occupying i t s own. I t s own d i f f e r e n t i a -
t i o n must never be so complete a s t o r e s t r i c t i t
t o f u l f i l l i n g a s i n g l e f u n c t i o n only. 39
I
Mead has named two p r e r e q u i s i t e s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e occurrence I

of a s e l f : t h e a c t i v i t y of t h e organism i s p a r t of a l a r g e r
i

organized p r o c e s s , and t h e organisms a r e "in'some sense"

c a p a b l e of s u b s t i t u t i n g f o r one a n o t h e r such t h a t t h e y a r e
a b l e t o " t a k e t h e a t t i t u d e of t h e o t h e r " while s t i l l occupying
t h e i r own.
The mechanism "by which t h e i n d i v i d u a l l i v i n g h i s own
l i f e i n t h a t of t h e group i s placed i n t h e a t t i t u d e of t a k i n g
t h e r o l e of another'' i s " t h a t of communication".
40) He disagreed

with t h e use of "communication" t o d e s c r i b e a l l i n t r a and i n t e r -

o r g a n i c i n t e r a c t i o n , and argued,
There may be a t y p e of communication i n which t h e
c o n d i t i o n s of one organ s t i m u l a t e s o t h e r s t o t h e i r
a p p r o p r i a t e responses. There i s i n t h e p h y s i o l o g i -
c a l system such a system of communication c a r r i e d
out by t h e hormones. But t h i s i s only an e l a b o r a -
t i o n of t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n of h i g h l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d
organs f u n c t i o n i n g i n a common l i f e - p r o c e s s .
Communication a s I s h a l l use i t always i m p l i e s t h e
conveyance of meaning; and t h i s i n v o l v e s t h e
a r o u s a l i n one i n d i v i d u a l of t h e a t t i t u d e of t h e
o t h e r , and h i s response t o t h e s e r e s p o n s e s . 4 1
Mead d i s t i n g u i s h e d between communication common t o s e v e r a l
s p e c i e s of animal and communication which appea.rs t o be unique
t o man a s " c o n v e r s a t i o n of g e s t u r e s " and " c o n v e r s a t i o n of s i g -
n i f i c a n t symbols". Conversation of g e s t u r e s i s a mode of
conveying f e e l i n g c o n s c i o u s n e s s , while c o n v e r s a t i o n of
 136.

s i g n i f i c a n t symbols i s t h e method of "mental" communication,

dependent upon t h e f a c u l t y f o r language ( a s o r g a n i z a t i o n of
v o c a l sounds).
F e e l i n g consciousness i s bound by t h e p r e s e n t i n which
f e e l i n g occurs, and i t i s only with mind t h a t t h e p r e s e n t i s
transcended, and a p a s t and f u t u r e c r e a t e d , i . e . , t h a t con-
s c i o u s n e s s becomes r e f l e x i v e .
... The animal could never r e a c h t h e g o a l of becoming
an o b j e c t t o i t s e l f a s a whole u n t i l i t could e n t e r
i n t o a l a r g e r system w i t h i n which i t could p l a y
v a r i o u s r o l e s , s o t h a t i n t a k i n g one r o l e i t could
s t i m u l a t e i t s e l f t o p l a y t h e o t h e r r o l e which t h i s
f i r s t r o l e c a l l e d f o r . It i s t h i s development t h a t
a s o c i e t y whose l i f e p r o c e s s i s mediated by communi-
c a t i o n has made p o s s i b l e . It i s h e r e t h a t mental
l i f e a r i s e s -- with t h i s c o n t i n u a l p a s s i n g from one
system t o a n o t h e r , with t h e occupation of both i n
passage and w i t h t h e s y s t e m a t i c s t r u c t u r e s t h a t each
i n v o l v e s . It i s t h e realm of c o n t i n u a l emergence. 42
Mind i s a s o c i a l p r o c e s s , a "temporal e x t e n s i o n of t h e e n v i r o n -
ment of t h e organism", t h e " l a r g e r system w i t h i n which i t " ,
t h e animal, can " p l a y v a r i o u s r o l e s " .
I n t h e above passage Mead r e f e r r e d t o "mental l i f e " a s
t h e p r o c e s s i n which t h e animal i s an o b j e c t t o i t s e l f a s a
whole. R e l a t i n g t h i s t o Marxfs a l i e n a t i o n h y p o t h e s i s , i n t e r -
lI
p r e t e d a s : "Man a s a whole" a l i e n a t e s himself from h i s species
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c " of " f r e e , conscious a c t i v i t y 1 ' through p r a c -
t i s i n g "forced labor"; Mead made no use of t h e term a l i e n a t i o n
but d e f i n e d mind i n a way c o n s i s t e n t with Marxrs " f r e e , con-

s c i o u s a c t i v i t y " , and s a i d t h a t t h e organism i s an o b j e c t t o

i t s e l f a s a whole when i t p r a c t i s e s "mental l i f e " . Marx r e l a t e d
 137. !

I
1
I

d
f o r c e d l a b o r t o t h e d i v i s i o n i n human s o c i e t y between mental
and p h y s i c a l a c t i v i t y . He argued t h a t t h i s i s a f a l s e d i s -
t i n c t i o n , and t h a t , i n o r d e r f o r a l i e n a t i o n t o be overcome,
f o r c e d l a b o r needed t o be a b o l i s h e d , implying t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n
between mental and p h y s i c a l a c t i v i t y has t o be a b o l i s h e d .
Mead d i d a b o l i s h t h i s d i v i s i o n i n t h e o r y . The methods by which
a l i e n a t i o n ( i n Meadfs terminology, i l l u s i o n , h a l l u c i n a t i o n ) can
be overcome i n p r a c t i c e a r e implied i n h i s t h e o r y and only
c a u t i o u s l y h i n t e d a t by him o v e r t l y .
Mead understood mind t o be l o c a t e d i n n a t u r e , as a
c o n t i n u a l emergent; an i n t , e r a c t i o n between s e l v e s - i n - e n v i r o n -
ment i n s y s t e m a t i c i n t e r r e l a t i o n s . These r e l a t i o n s a r e
c h a r a c t e r i z e d by s o c i a l i t y , s e l v e s having t h e c a p a c i t y t o s l i p
from one system i n t o a n o t h e r , i n t h e p r e s e n t , marked by passage.
If we t r y t o look a t an i n d i v i d u a l , o r a group of i n d i v i d u a l s ,

o u t s i d e of passage, we w i l l s e e him (them) i n only one system.

This way of looking a t i n d i v i d u a l s and groups i s c h a r a c t e r i s -
t i c of t h e o r i e n t a t i o n t y p i f i e d by t h e Newtonian t h r e e -
dimensional u n i v e r s e , i n which t h e system appears t o be of
i n f i n i t e extent; and i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e s t r u c t u r a l /
f u n c t i o n a l i s t approach t o s o c i e t y . It i s i n t h i s approach t h a t
man i s regarded a s a p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n , i . e . , each man i s a
p a r t i c u l a r function. Seen w i t h i n t h e l a r g e r framework of
Meadls t h e o r y , t h e s t r u c t u r a l / f u n c t i o n a l approach can have
g r e a t v a l u e , a s a method of s t u d y i n g systems i n i s o l a t i o n . AS

i s w e l l known i n t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , t h i s approach cannot

e x p l a i n change i n s o c i e t y , and Meadls t h e o r y i s an e x p l a n a t i o n
of why i t cannot. Change i s a p r o c e s s i n v o l v i n g t h e movement
from one system t o another.
Mead suggested t h e d i r e c t i o n i n which s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s
can look ( t h e p e r s p e c t i v e t h e y can t a k e ) i n order t o determine
s o c i a l change.
Our problem i s t o determine j u s t what i t i s t h a t
has preceded what i s t a k i n g p l a c e s o t h a t t h e
d i r e c t i o n of temporal p r o g r e s s may determine what
t h e world i s going t o be. There i s a c e r t a i n
temporal p r o c e s s going on i n e x p e r i e n c e . What has
t a k e n p l a c e i s s u e s i n what i s t a k i n g p l a c e , and i n
t h i s passage what has occurred determines s p a t i o -
t e m p o r a l l y what i s p a s s i n g i n t o t h e f u t u r e . So
f a r t h e n a s we can determine t h e c o n s t a n t s of motion
we can f o l l o w t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and our a n a l y s i s
seeks t o r e s o l v e t h e happening i n s o f a r a s may be
i n t o motion. I n g e n e r a l , s i n c e passage i s i t s e l f
g i v e n i n experience, t h e d i r e c t i o n of changes t h a t
a r e going on p a r t l y c o n d i t i o n s what w i l l t a k e p l a c e .
The event t h a t has taken p l a c e and t h e d i r e c t i o n of
t h e p r o c e s s going on form t h e b a s i s f o r t h e r a t i o n a l
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e f u t u r e . 43
I f we could "determine t h e c o n s t a n t s of motion" i n human s o c i e t y ,

we could " f o l l o w t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n " , i . e . , p r e d i c t change i n

society. Change i n human s o c i e t y can be e f f e c t e d by c o n t r o l l i n g
"mental l i f e " i n t h e p r o c e s s of "mental l i f e " .
One of Mead's c a u t i o u s h i n t s f o r e f f e c t i n g s o c i a l
change i s i n d i c a t e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g p a s s a g e :
I wish t o make a s emphatic a s p o s s i b l e t h e r e f e r e n c e
of p a s t s and f u t u r e s t o t h e a c t i v i t y t h a t i s c e n t r a l
t o t h e present. I d e a t i o n extends s p a t i a l l y and
t e m p o r a l l y t h e f i e l d w i t h i n which a c t i v i t y t a k e s
p l a c e . The p r e s e n t s , t h e n , w i t h i n which we l i v e a r e
provided with margins, and f i t t i n g them i n t o a l a r g e r
independent c h r o n i c l e i s a g a i n a m a t t e r of some more
extended p r e s e n t which c a l l s f o r a wider horizon.
 ,
But t h e widest h o r i z o n belongs t o some undertaking,
whose p a s t and f u t u r e r e f e r back t o i t . For
i n s t a n c e , t h e p r e s e n t h i s t o r y of t h e sun i s r e l e -
v a n t t o t h e undertakings of u n r a v e l l i n g t h e atom
and, given a n o t h e r a n a l y s i s of t h e atom, t h e sun
w i l l have a n o t h e r h i s t o r y and t h e u n i v e r s e w i l l
be launched i n t o a new f u t u r e . The p a s t s and t h e
f u t u r e s a r e i m p l i c a t i o n s of what i s being undertaken
and c a r r i e d out i n our l a b o r a t o r i e s . 44
I n t h e p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s we s t u d y t h e r e l a t i o n between such
" o b j e c t s " a s t h e atom and t h e sun, r e l a t i n g microscopic systems
t o macroscopic ones. We understand t h e " h i s t o r y of t h e sun"
i n terms of our " a n a l y s i s of t h e atom". Mead suggested t h a t
we apply t h e same a t t i t u d e t o human s o c i e t y , r e l a t i n g t h e
II
u n i v e r s a l " p r o c e s s of i d e a t i o n t o persons e x i s t i n g i n f i n i t e
presents. By a n a l y s i n g o u r s e l v e s i n our p r e s e n t a c t i v i t i e s
and r e l a t i n g our a c t i v i t y t o i d e a t i o n , we can c o n t r o l o u r s e l v e s .
He suggested, a s an i m p l i c a t i o n of h i s t h e o r y , t h a t
This view t h e n f r e e s us from bondage e i t h e r t o p a s t
o r f u t u r e . We a r e n e i t h e r c r e a t u r e s of t h e n e c e s s i t y
of an i r r e v o c a b l e p a s t , nor of any v i s i o n given i n
t h e Mount. Our h i s t o r y and our p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n s w i l l
be sympathetic with t h e u n d e r t a k i n g s w i t h i n which we
l i v e and move and have our being. Our v a l u e s l i e i n
t h e p r e s e n t , and p a s t and f u t u r e g i v e us only t h e
schedule of t h e means, and t h e p l a n s of campaign, f o r
t h e i r r e a l i z a t i o n . 45
This means t h a t r e g a r d l e s s of whether we choose t o be aware of
i t , r e g a r d l e s s of whether we choose t o c o n t r o l our s o c i a l e x i s -
t e n c e , by t h e f a c t t h a t we p r a c t i s e human l i v i n g i n t h e p r e s e n t ,
we c o n d i t i o n human l i f e i n t h e f u t u r e and c r e a t e our human
history. "Our h i s t o r y and p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n s w i l l be sympathetic
with t h e u n d e r t a k i n g s w i t h i n which we l i v e . and move and have
our being." Mead's t o n e i n t h i s passage was triumphant and
 140.

o p t i m i s t i c , but one i s reminded of Weberfs c a u t i o n i n g words:

1
"The f a t e of our times i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n and ' I
1

i n t e l l e c t u a l i z a t i o n and, above a l l , by t h e 'disenchantment of

t h e world1", 46 and h i s r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t "academic prophecy,
f i n a l l y , w i l l c r e a t e only f a n a t i c a l s e c t s but never a genuine
communityll.
47 Being f r e e d from t h e bondage t o p a s t and f u t u r e
c a r r i e s w i t h i t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n of an awesome r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
i n the present. We can o r i e n t toward t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n
v a r i o u s ways, j u s t a s e a s i l y f a l l i n g i n t o d e s p a i r over t h e
enormity of t h e s i t u a t i o n and t h e i g n o r a n c e with which we f a c e
i t a s r i s i n g up t o t h e c h a l l e n g e w i t h eagerness t o l e a r n . The
a t t i t u d e t h a t we t a k e toward our s i t u a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s "what
w i l l be", because t h e s e a t t i t u d e s have o b j e c t i v e e x i s t e n c e .
.. the principle (that the individual enters into
t h e p e r ' s p e c t i v e s of o t h e r s , i n so f a r a s he i s a b l e
t o t a k e t h e i r a t t i t u d e s , o r occupy t h e i r p o i n t s of
view) ... has s e r i o u s i m p l i c a t i o n s ...
i f one a c c e p t s
t h e o b j e c t i v i t y of p e r s p e c t i v e s , and r e c o g n i z e s t h a t
t h e s e p e r s p e c t i v e s a r e made up of o t h e r s e l v e s with
minds; t h a t h e r e i s no n a t u r e t h a t can be c l o s e d t o
mind. The s o c i a l p e r s p e c t i v e e x i s t s i n t h e e x p e r i e n c e
of t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n s o f a r a s i t i s i n t e l l i g i b l e ,
and i t i s i t s i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y t h a t i s t h e c o n d i t i o n
of t h e i n d i v i d u a l e n t e r i n g i n t o t h e p e r s p e c t i v e s of
o t h e r s , e s p e c i a l l y of t h e group. 48
"There i s no n a t u r e t h a t can be c l o s e d t o mind", a l o g i c a l imp-
l i c a t i o n of h i s t h e o r y of human s o c i e t y , r e s t i n g on t h e accep-
11
t a n c e of t h e o b j e c t i v i t y of p e r s p e c t i v e s " . This i s , of
course, a h y p o t h e s i s , open t o e m p i r i c a l v e r i f i c a t i o n .
As a p r i n c i p a l evidence t h a t p e r s p e c t i v e s a r e o b j e c t i v e ,
Mead c i t e d t h e i n f l u e n c e t h a t our use of t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l
method has had on us.
It i s i n s t r u c t i v e t o n o t e t h a t never has t h e charac-
t e r of t h a t common p e r s p e c t i v e changed more r a p i d l y
t h a n s i n c e we have gained f u r t h e r c o n t r o l over t h e
t e c h n i q u e by which t h e i n d i v i d u a l p e r s p e c t i v e
becomes t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e most u n i v e r s a l com-
munity, ... t h a t i s , t h e t e c h n i q u e of t h e e x p e r i -
mental method. We a r e deluded, by t h e e a s e w i t h
which we can, by what may be f a i r l y c a l l e d t r a n s -
, formation formulae, t r a n s l a t e t h e e x p e r i e n c e of
o t h e r communities i n t o t h a t of our own, i n t o g i v i n g
f i n a l i t y t o t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of our own thought .....
We have never been s o u n c e r t a i n a s t o what a r e t h e
v a l u e s which economics undertakes t o d e f i n e , what
a r e t h e p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s of c i t i z e n s ,
what a r e t h e community v a l u e s of f r i e n d s h i p , of
p a s s i o n , of parenthood, of amusement, of beauty, of
s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y i n i t s unnumbered forms, o r of
t h o s e v a l u e s which have been g a t h e r e d under t h e r e l a -
t i o n s of man t o t h e h i g h e s t community o r t o God. On
t h e o t h e r hand t h e r e has never been a time a t which
men could determine s o r e a d i l y t h e c o n d i t i o n s under
which v a l u e s , whatever t h e y a r e , can be secured. I n
terms of common c o n d i t i o n s , by t r a n s f o r m a t i o n formulae,
we can p a s s from one v a l u e f i e l d t o a n o t h e r , and t h u s
come n e a r e r f i n d i n g out which i s more v a l u a b l e , o r
r a t h e r how t o conserve each. The common p e r s p e c t i v e
i s c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y , and c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y i s t h e
s t a t e m e n t i n terms of common s o c i a l . c o n d i t i o n s . 49
Men a r e now i n a p o s i t i o n t o determine t h e c o n d i t i o n s under
which v a l u e s ... can be s e c u r e d " , and t h e p e r s p e c t i v e through
which t h e y can do t h i s i s t h e common one of comprehens'ibility,
" t h e s t a t e m e n t i n terms of common s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s f ' . Common
s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s a r e t h o s e t h a t have an e f f e c t on a l l p e o p l e
i n society. The e f f e c t s may n o t be uniform because d i f f e r e n t
people occupy d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e s with r e f e r e n c e t o common con-
ditions. Through s t u d y i n g t h e v a r i o u s a t t i t u d e s with r e f e r e n c e
t o t h e common s i t u a t i o n , we can begin t o "comprehendf' our s i t u a -
tion.
More s p e c i f i c a l l y , Mead s a i d of t h e common
 perspective,
I n t h e p r o c e s s of communication t h e i n d i v i d u a l
i s an o t h e r b e f o r e he i s a s e l f . It i s i n
a d d r e s s i n g himself i n t h e r o l e of an o t h e r t h a n
h i s s e l f a r i s e s i n experience. The growth of t h e '
organized game out of simple p l a y i n t h e e x p e r i e n c e
of t h e c h i l d and of organized group a c t i v i t i e s i n
human s o c i e t y , placed t h e i n d i v i d u a l t h e n i n a
v a r i e t y of r o l e s , i n s o f a r a s t h e s e were p a r t s of
t h e s o c i a l a c t , and t h e v e r y o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e s e
i n t h e whole a c t gave them a common c h a r a c t e r i n
i n d i c a t i n g what he had t o do. He i s a b l e t h e n t o
become a g e n e r a l i z e d o t h e r i n a d d r e s s i n g himself
i n t h e a t t i t u d e of t h e group o r t h e community.
I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n he has become a d e f i n i t e s e l f
over a g a i n s t t h e s o c i a l whole t o which he belongs. 5O

The most comprehensive " g e n e r a l i z e d o t h e r " r e f e r s t o t h e

r e l a t i o n between t h e h d i v i d u a l and a l l o t h e r s , o r , i n Marxfs
terminology, t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l who " t r e a t s himself a s a'
u n i v e r s a l and t h e r e f o r e a f r e e being". 51 The b r o a d e s t r e l a t i o n

( i n d i v i d u a l t o a l l ) , t h e macroscopic, i s r e l a t e d t o t h e
narrowest ( i n d i v i d u a l t o s e l f ), o r microscopic. But i n
r e l a t i n g t h e s e two systems we have t o remember t h e s o u r c e of
s e l f i s i n communication between organisms. Neither Marx nor
Mead were i n t e r e s t e d i n " i s o l a t e d " i n d i v i d u a l i s m . Social
change i m p l i e s t h e involvement of more t h a n . o n e i n d i v i d u a l .

, The s o c i a l i n d i v i d u a l can e f f e c t change " i n " himself through

h i s s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r a s a s e l f , a s w e l l a s being a b l e t o a c t
i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h o t h e r s t o e f f e c t change. As a f u l l y i s o -
l a t e d organism, it has no s e l f and can e f f e c t no human s o c i a l
change.
3. MARX AND MEAD ON HUMAN SOCIETY

Hegel used t h e d i a l e c t i c method t o d e s c r i b e t h e p r o -

 I

c e s s of i d e a t i o n a s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between f i n i t e o b j e c t s and
i n f i n i t e s u b j e c t (world s p i r i t ) . Marx took t h i s method o u t of
t h e Hegelian c o n t e x t and a p p l i e d i t t o t h e m a t e r i a l world t o
show how a c t i v i t y and n o t "mere" thought changes t h e world.
For Marx t h e g r e a t mover of s o c i e t y was t h e d i a l e c t i c between
t h e f o r c e s and r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n . I n making t h i s t r a n s i -
t i o n Marx bridged a gap between thought and a c t i o n such t h a t
anyone who r e a d s and comprehends h i s t h e o r y ( i . e . , looks a t
t h e m a t e r i a l world around him and a t himself i n t h i s world
with r e f e r e n c e t o t h e t h e o r e t i c a l framework provided by ~ a r x )
t r a n s c e n d s t h e s e p a r a t i o n of thought and a c t i o n , r e g a r d l e s s of
whether o r n o t he a g r e e s w i t h Marx's s p e c i f i c d i a g n o s i s . Marx
c r e a t e d a crude s c i e n t i f i c method f o r a n a l y s i n g human s o c i e t y .
I n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of p r a c t i c e , he s t r e s s e d a c t i v i t y
more t h a n t h o u g h t f u l a c t i v i t y . Immersed i n t h e assumpti'on of
a t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l u n i v e r s e , he assumed t h a t t h e p h y s i c a l

environment i s a c o n s t a n t i n which t h e r e a r e c a u s a l connections

between t h i n g s independent of man's r e l a t i o n t o them. He seems

t o have assumed t h a t we have only t o understand t h e -------

laws
-
a s s o c i a t e d with t h e s e c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n s and we w i l l be a b l e
t o use them t o c o n t r o l our own l i v e s . The q u e s t i o n of what we
would do w i t h them was n o t a problem f o r him.
Mead, w i t h t h e advantage of a four-dimensional p i c t u r e
of t h e u n i v e r s e i n which r e l a t i o n s between " p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s "
a r e j u s t a s q u e s t i o n a b l e a s a r e r e l a t i o n s between "mental
c o n s t r u c t s 1 ' , was a b l e t o go a s t e p f u r t h e r t h a n Marx and
 I

a n a l y s e t h e phenomenon of p r a c t i c e , Marx assumed t h a t i n

p r a c t i c e , without r e i f i c a t i o n , t h e r e a l i n t e r e s t s of p e o p l e
would become apparent t o them, t h e i r r e a l i n t e r e s t s being
o b j e c t i v e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e r e a l world of p r a c t i c e . Mead
analysed p r a c t i c e as a s o c i a l emergent o c c u r r i n g i n a p r e s e n t ,
i n c l u d i n g both thought and a c t i o n , i. e. , as "mental l i f e n .
Marx used t h e d i a l e c t i c t o a n a l y s e movement o r p a s s a g e
i n t h e m a t e r i a l world, but was unable t o s e e t h e l o g i c a l e x t e n -
s i o n i n h e r e n t i n t h i s method i f a p p l i e d i n a four-dimensional
universe -- a u n i v e r s e i n which many mutually e x c l u s i v e systems
can c o - e x i s t . I n t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e u n i v e r s e , an
o b j e c t may be a t h e s i s T1 r e l a t i v e t o an a n t i t h e s i s A1 i n one
system, and a t h e s i s T 2 r e l a t i v e t o -an a n t i t h e s i s A2 i n another,
t h e o b j e c t having t h e c a p a c i t y t o e x i s t i n s e v e r a l systems a t
once. The r e s o l u t i o n of t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n between Tl, A1 and
between T2, A2 may n o t t a k e t h e form of a s y n t h e s i s of each
w i t h i n t h e d i f f e r e n t systems, but may be i n t h e form of an
emergent which i n c 6 r p o r a t e s both systems and many o t h e r s . Marx
\

assumed t h a t t h e r e can be only one human s o c i a l system, and

suggested t h a t communism i s t h e b e s t one. Mead, on t h e o t h e r
hand, assumed a l i m i t e d number of o b j e c t s occupying many s y s -
tems a t once, s o t h a t we can have a v a r i e t y of systems i n our
human l i f e , none being n e c e s s a r i l y t h e b e s t , each answering t o
specific goals.
R e i f i c a t i o - n a s a form of mental b l i n d n e s s , a way of
d i s g u i s i n g r e a l connections between r e a l c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e
 145.

o b j e c t i v e world, which e x i s t independently of t h e yphantoms

i n ments minds" 52, became i n Meadls t h e o r y , i l l u s i o n and
/I
hallucination. R e i f i c a t i o n means thought which i s n o t of I
I
p r a c t i c e , and i t r e s u l t s i n i r r a t i o n a l a c t i o n . Irrationality I

l
and r e i f i c a t i o n a r e d i r e c t l y connected with each o t h e r . Marx I

c o n c e n t r a t e d h i s a t t e n t i o n on economic a c t i v i t y , and r e f e r r e d 1
-1
t o c a p i t a l i s m , f o r example, a s an i r r a t i o n a l mode of o r g a n i z i n g
h
f o r human purposes. Through Meadfs c r i t i q u e of t h e whole of 1

human l i f e a s we now know i t , Marxfs t h e o r y of a l i e n a t i o n

i
through f o r c e d l a b o r i s u n i t e d w i t h p s y c h o l o g i c a l and p s y c h i a -
t r i c t h e o r y of "mental i l l n e s s " , i . e . , t h e study of methods
by which people h a l l u c i n a t e and delude themselves.
53
\

Marx suggested t h a t what i s p a r t i c u l a r t o human beings

i s t h e r e l a t i o n of t h e whole man t o h i s s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,
man a c t i n g a s a human being when he t r e a t s himself a s a " u n i -
v e r s a l and t h e r e f o r e f r e e being1'. Mead s a i d t h a t t o understand
human behavior, "It i s t h e r e l a t i o n of t h e i n d i v i d u a l perspec-
t i v e t o t h e common p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t i s of importance". 54 P e r -
s p e c t i v e s c o n s t i t u t e t h e n a t u r a l world, i . e . , are not " r e f l e c -
t i o n s off1o r "approximations o f " more " r e a l " o b j e c t s " o u t
there". Both t h e p e r c e p t i o n of t h e i n d i v i d u a l and t h e o b j e c t
being perceived "belong" t o p e r s p e c t i v e s . Thus t h e importance
of touch, p h y s i c a l c o n t a c t , f o r t h e " s a n i t y " ( p r e v e n t i o n of
h a l l u c i n a t i o n ) of i n d i v i d u a l s .
Both t h e i n d i v i d u a l p e r s p e c t i v e and t h e common p e r -
s p e c t i v e a r i s e t o g e t h e r i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e organisms-in-
environment. I n ongoing p a r t i c u l a r human s o c i e t i e s t h e
i n d i v i d u a l g a i n s h i s p e r s p e c t i v e r e l a t i v e t o t h e common p e r -
s p e c t i v e - b y l e a r n i n g "where he s t a n d s " i n r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r s
i n a particular society. He l e a r n s t o be both s e l f and o t h e r .
By l e a r n i n g both t h e i n d i v i d u a l and common p e r s p e c t i v e s he i s
a b l e t o a c t out of t h e i n d i v i d u a l p e r s p e c t i v e with r e f e r e n c e t o
a l l o t h e r s ( i n c l u d i n g himself as one among many). This h o l d s

+
f o r a l l "occupations" of p e r s p e c t i v e s , i l l u s t r a t e d by e . g . , the
occupations of f a t h e r , d o c t o r , a r t i s t , e t c . Once t h e i n d i v i -
d u a l has l e a r n e d how t o be a s e l f , he can c r e a t e new "occupa-
t i o n s " f o r himself and f o r o t h e r s , and can r e d e f i n e t h e
boundaries of a l r e a d y , e x i s t i n g p e r s p e c t i v e s , A r t i s t s and
s c i e n t i s t s have a s t h e i r s p e c i f i c "occupation" t h e purpose of
doing t h i s .
Within t h i s framework, Marx's work on a l i e n a t i o n can
be seen, w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o f o r c e d l a b o r , as h i s i n s i g h t i n t o
t h e f a c t t h a t i n " n a t u r a l s o c i e t y " , and e s p e c i a l l y w i t h i n t h e
p a s t few hundred y e a r s , l a b o r ( i n t h e economic system) i s a t

t h e same time a r b i t r a r y t o t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e whole man, and

overshadows a l l o t h e r " o c c u p a t i o n s " (of p e r s p e c t i v e s ) t o t h e

e x t e n t t h a t i t i s a major determinant of t h e form t h a t o t h e r

occupations w i l l t a k e . Man t r e a t s himself as e s s e n t i a l l y one
dimensional, r a t h e r t h a n r e a l i z i n g himself t o be by h i s human
" n a t u r e " multi-dimensional, a s o c i a l being, c a p a b l e of b e i n g
s e v e r a l t h i n g s a t once.
The word a l i e n a t i o n c a l l s a t t e n t i o n t o t h e ways i n
 I

whi ch human animals f i n d themselves t o be s t r a n g e r s t o them-

s e l v e s , one another and t h e i r common environment. The word
r e f e r s both t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l a n d common p e r s p e c t i v e s , such
t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l experiences himself a s a s t r a n g e r i n t h e
world ( a s i n d i v i d u a l , d i s t i n c t from t h e common), and t h e
experience i s a common one, a l l i n d i v i d u a l s having t h e
experience. "Alienation" r e f e r s t o t h i s experience a s a
"problem" which i s s o l v a b l e . The s o l u t i o n i s i n man a s a
whole t r e a t i n g himself a s man as a whole, and not a s a "mere"
p a r t i c u l a r function. The experience of being a s t r a n g e r i n
t h e world i s an o b j e c t i v e one. People a c t u a l l y -
are strangers
t o themselves, t o o t h e r s and t o t h e world. The beginning of
t h e p r a c t i c a l s o l u t i o n t o a l i e n a t i o n i s t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of i t ,
i n s o f a r a s i t i s a problem, as a common problem, i . e . , -
we a r e
s t r a n g e r s t o o u r s e l v e s , one another, and t h e u n i v e r s e , , r a t h e r
than -
I am a s t r a n g e r t o myself among " t h o s e o t h e r s " i n " t h a t
world out t h e r e " . a

It i s not t h e new and u n f a m i l i a r , i . e . , strange, i n

i t s e l f t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s a l i e n a t i o n , but t h e ways i n which man
approaches himself, o t h e r s and t h e environment with r e f e r e n c e
t o the strange. The f a c t of new and u n f a m i l i a r experiences i s
\u

b a s i c t o human l i f e by i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of emergence. The

experience of s t r a n g e n e s s i s a p o t e n t i a l l y meaningful one, and
t h e s c i e n t i f i c a t t i t u d e , t h e experimental method,is an example
of one way i n which s t r a n g e n e s s i s p a r t o f ' a meaningful
experience. The p a r t i c u l a r kind of estrangement c o n s t i t u t i n g
 I

a l i e n a t i o n i s t h a t between body and mind a s expressed w i t h i n

t h e individual; between bodies and minds a s expressed between
individuals; and,with r e f e r e n c e t o t h e universe, between mind
t o " a l l " , t h e oneness of t h e u n i v e r s e , and body t o " p a r t i c u -
l a r i t y ' ' , t h e p h y s i c a l d i s c r e t e n e s s of a l l o b j e c t s , i . e . , the
s e p a r a t i o n of " r e l i g i o u s " experience and s c i e n c e .
"Alienation" draws a t t e n t i o n t o t h e a r b i t r a r y n a t u r e
of our i n d i v i d u a l p e r s p e c t i v e s r e l a t i v e t o t h e common p e r -
spective (e.g., p a r t i c u l a r occupations i n t h e economic system),
p o i n t i n g t o t h e f a c t t h a t o u r , i n d i v i d u a l p e r s p e c t i v e s a r e not
due t o i n h e r e n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n ouP b i o l o g i c a l make-up but a r e
t h e r e s u l t of a combination of a c c i d e n t and choice i n t h e s o c i a l
world. (This i s a statement of g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n s , and i s not
meant t o apply t o e.g., t h e e f f e c t of p o s s i b l e i n n a t e d i f f e r -
ences which c o n t r i b u t e t o Van Gogh p a i n t i n g d i f f e r e n t l y from
P a u l Klee.) The r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e e x t e n t t o which p a r t i c u l a r
p e r s p e c t i v e s a r e a c c i d e n t a l l e a d s t o t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e
e x t e n t t o which we a r e capable p o t e n t i a l l y of c o n t r o l l i n g them,
and t h e r e c o g n i t i o n , through experience i n t h e world a s i t now
i s , of t h e very complex s e t of c o n d i t i o n s p r e v e n t i n g u s from
a c t u a l l y c o n t r o l l i n g them.
We can study t h e r e l a t i o n between p o t e n t i a l and a c t u a l
c o n t r o l of s o c i e t y through a n a l y s i n g e x i s t i n g power r e l a t i o n s ,
i.e., p a r t i c u l a r uses of energy, a s they now e x i s t . Marx
discussed power r e l a t i o n s a s a problem w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of
 149.

socio-economic o r g a n i z a t i o n where a few people use t h e organiza-

t i o n t o "exploit" t h e majority . He s t u d i e d t h i s " e x p l o i t a t i o n "
a s "forced l a b o r " , and considered t h e e x p l o i t e d , i n t h e i r p a s s i -
v i t y , t o be a c t i n g out of " f a l s e consciousness". He t r e a t e d
" f a l s e consciousness" a s a r a t h e r simple ( a s opposed t o com-
p l e x ) problem i n h i s s o c i a l t h e o r y , t h e s o l u t i o n t o i t being
t h e r e a l i z a t i o n by t h e e x p l o i t e d of t h e i r c l a s s p o s i t i o n , i . e . ,
of " c l a s s c o n s c i o ~ s n e s s ' ~ .
Weber defined power i n a more g e n e r a l way, allowing
f o r a c l e a r e r understanding of t h e problem Marx r a i s e d , power
being
... t h e chance of a man o r of a number of men t o
r e a l i z e t h e i r own w i l l i n a communal a c t i o n even
a g a i n s t t h e r e s i s t a n c e of o t h e r s who a r e p a r t i -
c i p a t i n g i n t h e a c t i o n . 55
His d e f i n i t i o n presupposes, a s c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e execution of
power: I ) t h e e x i s t e n c e of a " w i l l " , which must n e c e s s a r i l y
i n c l u d e ( a ) i n t e n t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h o s e a c t i n g and ( b ) a
p l a n of a c t i o n of some s o r t , and 2 ) i n t e r p e r s o n a l a c t i o n , i . e . ,
communal a c t i o n . His d e f i n i t i o n does n o t imply t h a t where
power i s e x e r c i s e d , t h e r e must n e c e s s a r i l y be r e s i s t a n c e t o i t .
R e a l i z a t i o n of power a g a i n s t t h e r e s i s t a n c e of o t h e r s i s only
one p o s s i b i l i t y ; another p o s s i b i l i t y being t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of
power by i n d i v i d u a l s i n communal a c t i o n such t h a t t h e r e a r e no
members who r e s i s t , or even would r e s i s t i f they had t h e w i l l
to.
Weberts d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e combination of l a r g e s c a l e
b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n and c a p i t a l i s t ownership of t h e
means of production ( p r o p e r t y ) s u g g e s t s t h a t t h i s combination,
i s n o t only a use of s o c i e t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n which p r e v e n t s a
l a r g e number of people f r o m r e a l i z i n g t h e i r " w i l l " , but suggests
a s w e l l t h a t i t i s a use of s o c i e t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n which prevents

people, through t h e kind of involvement r e q u i r e d by t h e i r p a r -

t i c i p a t i o n i n i t , from forming " w i l l s " t h a t they might t h e n
t r y t o realize. Weber d e f i n e d power i n such a way t h a t power
i s t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l use of energy. The enormous s i z e of
b u r e a u c r a t i c machinery g i v e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l s involved i n i t
t h e impression t h a t they a r e d e a l i n g with an impersonal
(consequently, inhuman) f o r c e , and d i r e c t s t h e i r a t t e n t i o n
away from t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y a r e d e a l i n g w i t h one another.
Marx's theory of forced l a b o r , e x p l o i t a t i o n , e t c . , i s
an hypothesis t h a t can be t e s t e d . To t e s t i t one would f i r s t
have t o analyse i n d e t a i l t h e s p e c i f i c f a c t o r s i n contemporary
socio-economic o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t "prevent" people from forming
" w i l l s " ( i .e., d i s c o v e r whether t h e r e a r e such f a c t o r s ) . Since
power i s an i n t e r p e r s o n a l use of energy, and s i n c e i n t e r p e r s o n a l
a c t i v i t y i s mediated through communication, t h e beginning of
such an a n a l y s i s could be undertaken by a study of communica-
t i o n channels. F a m i l i a l , r e c r e a t i o n a l , p o l i t i c a l , and economic
o r g a n i z a t i o n s a l l can be seen as channels of communication.
The q u e s t i o n s t o be answered by a study 02 t h e s e organizations
(systems) would be communication of what, by -9whom f o r what, and
f o r whom. That i s , who does what, where, when, why, t o whom and
how i s
- i t done.
The t a s k , however,is enormous enough, f o r i t i n v o l v e s
n o t simply breaking down p a s s i v e b a r r i e r s such as
t h o s e of d i s t a n c e i n space and time and v e r n a c u l a r ,
but t h o s e f i x e d - a t t i t u d e s of custom and s t a t u s i n
which our s e l v e s a r e imbedded. Any s e l f i s a s o c i a l
s e l f , but i t i s r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e group whose r o l e s
i t assumes, a_nd it w i l l never abandon i h i s s e l f u n L z
l~~itself7er?:tegrj---g @~g-the..Jarger s o c i e t y and
maintaining
...--
----YILL.--
itsqJz$=.the*
*"
y^+..~ ."* - The whole h T ~ ' t o r ~ -war- ~~of
f a r e between s o c i e t i e s and w i t h i n s o c i e t i e s shows how
much more r e a d i l y and with how much g r e a t e r emotional
t h r i l l we r e a l i z e o u r s e l v e s i n o p p o s i t i o n t o common
enemies t h a n i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n with them. 56
 I

CONCLUSION

The 19C humanist p e r s p e c t i v e was one with which men

c r i t i c i s e d t h e i r s o c i a l organization w i t h reference t o t h e i r
t r a d i t i o n a l values. It seems t h a t i n o r d e r t o g e t beyond
a l i e n a t i o n i n t h e 20C men need t o be c r i t i c a l of both t h e i r
t r a d i t i o n a l v a l u e s and t h e i r s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . Men have a
method by which they a r e now a b l e t o do t h i s , t h e s c i e n t i f i c
method, and t h e a t t i t u d e with which i t i s a s s o c i a t e d . In the
broadest sense, t h e method c o n s i s t s of ways of checking our
e x p e c t a t i o n s about some s p e c i f i c event with t h e a c t u a l
occurrence of t h a t event. I f we a r e going t o adopt t h i s method
with r e f e r e n c e t o human behavior, we have a l s o t o t a k e t h e
a t t i t u d e accompanying i t , t h e a t t i d u d e being c h a r a c t e r i z e d by
"healthy scepticismf', i . e . , by d e l a y i n g h a b i t u a l responses,

suspending h a b i t u a l e x p e c t a t i o n s about how people behave.

Marx's work, among o t h e r t h i n g s , showed how men a r e ,
i n g e n e r a l , unable t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e i r v a l u e s from t h e i r sen-
sory experience, and consequently, i n t h e process of r e i f i c a -
tion, f a i l t o control either. He a l s o developed t h e n o t i o n
t h a t s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n can more o r l e s s allow f o r human
expression, depending on t h e kind of o r g a n i z a t i o n and t h e
goals a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i t . He suggested t h a t a l l o r g a n i z a t i o n
i s d i r e c t e d t o some end, and i n f a c t , t h a t people only organize
f o r ends.
Marx assumed t h a t s o c i a l p e r s p e c t i v e s a r e , i n general,
b i a s i n g , and t h a t o b j e c t i v e knowledge i s independent of such
bias. S o c i a l p e r s p e c t i v e s as b i a s i n g he termed r e i f i c a t i o n ,
i n c o n t r a s t with o b j e c t i v e knowledge. Marx assumed t h a t i f
t h e b i a s i n g p e r s p e c t i v e s were exposed f o r what t h e y r e a l l y a r e ,
men would be f r e e t o a c t humanly, seemingly t h a t human behavior
i s i n e v i t a b l e i n t h e absence of r e i f i c a t i o n and f o r c e d l a b o r ,
Mead approached knowledge from a n o t h e r d i r e c t i o n ,
b e l i e v i n g t h a t s o c i a l p e r s p e c t i v e s a r e ba.sic t o knowledge,
i.e., -
a r e knowledge. Mead suggested t h a t t h e r e i s one a t t i t u d e
common t o a l l of humanity, t h e a t t i t u d e of c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y I

which i s most b a s i c t o human l i f e . He suggested t h a t w i t h t h e

s c i e n t i f i c method we a r e l e a r n i n g t o t e s t t h e p a s t a g a i n s t t h e
present.
Applying t h i s n o t i o n t o a l i e n a t i o n , we a r e l e a r n i n g
t o cope with t h e a u t h o r i t y of our a n c e s t o r s . We a r e a t p r e s e n t
w i t n e s s i n g a c o n f r o n t a t i o n between a u t h o r i t y a s such and
i n d i v i d u a l p e r s p e c t i v e s which deny t h e use of a u t h o r i t y which
i s e x t e r n a l t o them.

Mead suggested t h a t h i s a n a l y s i s of human s o c i e t y

f r e e s us from t h e p a s t , t a k i n g us beyond t h e n e c e s s i t y of
adhering t o old m o r a l i t i e s and a u t h o r i t y , and p r o v i d i n g us w i t h
t h e freedom t o choose. The old m o r a l i t i e s and a u t h o r i t y assume
t h a t people a r e i n c a p a b l e of t a k i n g i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,
and t h a t t h e y must be cared f o r a s c h i l d r e n by e . g . , t h e Church
and t h e S t a t e . Mead d i d n o t , a s Marx d i d , assume t h a t man w i l l
t a k e i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n a "new world"; he assumed
 I

t h a t he -
can do so, through a d o p t i n g t h e common a t t i t u d e of
comprehensibility. With t h e adoption of such an a t t i t ' u d e , -
t h e r e can be no a b s o l u t e s o c i a l p e r s p e c t i v e i n t h e s e n s e of
one b e s t way, one t o t a l ideology. Nothing which i s open t o
t h e conscious s c r u t i n y of people can t o t a l l y c a p t u r e them.
The a b i l i t y t o imagine and a n a l y s e t h e s i t u a t i o n s i n which we
f i n d o u r s e l v e s makes t h e s e s i t u a t i o n s a r b i t r a r y r a t h e r t h a n
total.
With t h i s a t t i t u d e our myths a r e exploded, and we a r e
unable t o j u s t i f y our a c t i o n s with r e f e r e n c e t o t o t a l ideologies.
I n s t e a d , we a r e l e d t o q u e s t i o n , t o t e s t t h e v a l i d i t y of our
assumptions -- t o d i s c o v e r under what c o n d i t i o n s people w i l l
a c t i n one way o r a n o t h e r , and t h e laws a s s o c i a t e d with t h e i r
behavior.
One consequence or symptom of a l i e n a t i o n i n our con-
temporary world i s t h e l a c k of s i g n i f i c a n c e i n t h e l i v e s of
many, t h e m a j o r i t y o f , people. Most people most of t h e time
move " b l i n d l y " o r h a b i t u a l l y through t h e e v e n t s comprising t h e i r
l i v e s , and a r e r e f e r r e d t o by some contemptuously, as " t h e
masses". Only when we become aware, w i t h i n a l a r g e r framework
of- our movement, does our a c t i v i t y t a k e on s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r u s .

Men make t h e i r a c t i o n s human ( i . e . , g i v e them s i g n i f i c a n c e ) by

r e f e r r i n g them t o l a r g e r frameworks, by s e e i n g themselves
through t h e i r a c t i o n s i n t h e world. The s u g g e s t i o n h e r e i s
t h a t removal of f o r c e d l a b o r may be a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r
going beyond a l i e n a t i o n , but i t i s n o t a s u f f i c i e n t one. It i s
 ,
a l s o n e c e s s a r y f o r mento make t h e i r l i v e s meaningful, i . e . , in
Marx's s e n s e , t o work f r e e l y t o c r e a t e themselves.~
From t h e combination of Marxfs t h e o r y of a l i e n a t i o n
and Meadfs t h e o r y of human s o c i e t y , I have deduced some b a s i c
hypotheses about t h e ways i n which men do and can make t h e i r
l i v e s s i g n i f i c a n t , through c o n t r o l l i n g themselves and t h e i r
interrelations.
I n d i v i d u a l s can c o n t r o l e v e n t s only if
a. t h e y a r e involved i n e f f e c t i n g t h e e v e n t s
b. they a r e a b l e t o understand some p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t e
l i n e s of a c t i o n t h a t can be t a k e n t o e f f e c t t h e e v e n t .
The l e s s understanding t h e r e i s of t h e p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a -
t i v e s , t h e l e s s ont troll able i s t h e e v e n t .
Any i n d i v i d u a l f s understanding of an event ( i n terms of
t h e p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t e l i n e s of a c t i o n ) d e r i v e s from an
understanding common t o a l l i n d i v i d u a l s involved i n t h e
event and r e f e r s back t o t h a t common understa.nding f o r
i t s validation.

It i s e q u a l l y a s n e c e s s a r y , f o r each p e r s o n ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g
of an event, to.know t h e l o c a t i o n s ( p e r s p e c t i v e s , a s s o c i a -
t e d with i d e n t i t y ) of a l l persons involved, s i n c e a l l
involved c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e r e s u l t s and e x p e r i e n c e t h e
e f f e c t s of t h e co-operation.
Only t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t one knows t h e l o c a t i o n ( i d e n t i t y )
of a l l persons involved i n an event does he know h i s own
location.
 I

The fewer number of people, r e l a t i v e t o t h e t o t a l number,

d e l i b e r a t e l y e f f e c t i n g an e v e n t , t h e fewer number of l o c a -
t i o n s t h a t can be i d e n t i f i e d .
The fewer number of l o c a t i o n s , t h a t can be i d e n t i f i e d , t h e
l e s s complete w i l l be t h e common u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e
event. ( l e a d i n g back t o 2 )
The l i m i t s of s e l f - c o n s c i o u s c o - o p e r a t i o n ( s e l f - d e t e r m i n a -
t i o n ) a r e d e f i n e d by t h e maximum s i z e of a group i n which
a l l a f f e c t e d by t h e event can d e l i b e r a t e l y e f f e c t t h e
event.
The maximum s i z e of a group i n which a l l a f f e c t e d a l s o
d e l i b e r a t e l y e f f e c t t h e a c t i o n would depend, i n t u r n , upon
t h e n a t u r e of t h e a c t i v i t y . (Two f a c t o r s involved i n t h e
l i m i t a t i o n s imposed by t h e n a t u r e of t h e a c t i v i t y would be
t e c h n i c a l s k i l l a t o r g a n i z i n g and a v a i l a b l e communication
channels )
common understanding, I am r e f e r r i n g t o Meadfs common a t t i -
-. \

t u d e of c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y .
A l l of t h e s e hypotheses r e f e r t o one e v e n t , and I have
a p p a r e n t l y ignored Mea,d 7 s b a s i c c o n t e n t i o n t h a t s i g n i f i c a n c e
emerges i n t h e confron-tation between one system and a n o t h e r .
It seems t o me t h a t i t would be i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e c o n f r o n t a -
t i o n between d i f f e r e n t systems t h a t men would s e e t h e a l t e r n a -
t i v e s f o r a c t i o n with r e f e r e n c e t o one system, i . e . , t h a t they
can understand one event only i n r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r e v e n t s i n
which t h e y a r e involved. This i s Meadfs b a s i c n o t i o n of
 I

sociality. It can be i l l u s t r a t e d q u i t e simply: one can a s k

what a t t i t u d e a person has toward e . g . , a s p e c i f i c s o r t of
c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y , a s a " f a t h e r " , a s a "judge", a s a "criminal",

a s a " p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t " , a s an " a r t i s t " , e t c . , g e t t i n g

d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s on t h e same " o b j e c t " , o r e v e n t . It i s
n o t t h e s p e c i f i c c o n t e n t of any " r o l e " t h a t i s human b e h a v i o r ,

but r a t h e r t h e c a p a c i t y t o move from one " r o l e " t o a n o t h e r ,

t o choose r o l e s , i n v e n t new ones, e t c . , t h a t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
of a l l humans. We can s e e t h i s a s a f a c t from c r o s s c u l t u r a l
comparisons. It i s toward t h i s c a p a c i t y t h a t s c i e n t i s t s ( a s
opposed t o n a t u r a l h i s t o r i a n s ) must d i r e c t t h e i r a t t e n t i o n
i f they choose t o understand human behavior.
 I

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

See Leon F e s t i n g e r ' s A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance,

S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1957, esp. Ch.1. Festinger
r e f e r s t o c o g n i t i o n as mapping " r e a l i t y " , and * t o cog-
n i t i v e dissonance as an e x p e r i e n c e due t o " t h e r e a l i t y
impinging on a person" and e x e r t i n g " p r e s s u r e s i n t h e
d i r e c t i o n of b r i n g i n g t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c o g n i t i v e
elements i n t o correspondence with t h a t r e a l i t y " .

I am r e f e r r i n g t o Marx's t h e o r y of a l i e n a t i o n , and con-

s i d e r t h e o r i e s p r e v i o u s t o h i s , e . g . t h o s e of Hegel
and Feuerbach, t o be p a r t i a l t h e o r i e s . Hegel uses
a l i e n a t i o n t o d e s c r i b e a s t a t e of mind, and Feuerbach
uses i t with r e f e r e n c e t o s e n s u a l e x p e r i e n c e . Marx
was t h e f i r s t t o ground b o t h mind and s e n s u a l
experience i n p r a c t i c e .

" C l a s s l e s s s o c i e t y " i s a symbolic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h i s

second s o l u t i o n because we cannot assume t h a t e l i m i n a -
t i o n of c l a s s e s w i l l r e s u l t i n t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of
a l i e n a t i o n . Simple d e s t r u c t i o n of one way of l i f e
does n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y imply t h e c r e a t i o n o r con-
s t r u c t i o n of a n o t h e r t o t a k e i t s p l a c e . "Classless"
t e l l s us what w i l l n o t e x i s t , but does n o t a d e q u a t e l y
d e s c r i b e what w i l l e x i s t . Only i n t h e development of
a new form of s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n can t h e symbolic be
actualized.

This myth has been expressed i n d i f f e r e n t ways--e.g. a s

t h e Hebrew' s "Jehova", P l a t 0 1 s "Forms", Durkheim' s
" C o l l e c t i v e Conscience. "
See K a r l Marx, The Economic andP-Philosophical Manuscripts
of 1844, t r . M. M i l l i g a n , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s ,
New York, 1964, p . 119,

See George Herbert Mead, Mind, S e l f & S o c i e t y , U n i v e r s i t y

of Chicago P r e s s , Chicago, 1934, w ' t h s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n
t o P a r t 111, "The S e l f " , p.p.135-222.
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y i m p l i e s t h e c a p a b i l i t y of an i n d i v i d u a l t o
c o n s c i o u s l y make c h o i c e s from among a l t e r n a t e l i n e s of
a c t i o n , and t o r e c o g n i z e himself a s making t h e s e
choices. It presupposes self-consc.iousness.
I d e n t i t y a s t h e r e c o g n i t i o n by t h e person of "where he
s t a n d s n - - b o t h a s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t , given d i f f e r e n t
 c o n d i t i o n s , he would s t a n d somewhere e l s e , and of t h e
c o n t i n u i t y of being t h e same i n d i v i d u a l making
d i f f e r e n t choices i n d i f f e r e n t circumstances.
i n r e s p o n s i b l e a c t i v i t y can an i n d i v i d u a l "discover"
and c r e a t e h i s i d e n t i t y . I would l i k e t o n o t e tOhn layt
no temporal sequence i s intended h e r e .
jl
This use of co-operation a p p l i e s f o r o t h e r forms of l i f e
a s w e l l a s f o r men. Bees, a n t s , wolves, co-operate
t o e f f e c t events. The d i s t i n c t i o n I am making i s one
between a l l animals co-operating t o e f f e c t events and
mants c a p a b i l i t y f o r r e s p o n s i b l e (consciously d e t e r -
mined) co-operation. /
See Edward T. Hall, The Hidden Dimension, Doubleday & Co,,
New York,- 1966,- f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e c o n t r o l of
s o c i a l space i n d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s .
P r o p e r t y can be seen a s an extension of t h e s e l f , marking
boundaries between i n d i v i d u a l s , and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of
o u t s e l v e s through p r o p e r t y r e l a t i o n s i s i n d i c a t e d i n
our uses of "me" and "mine", "you" and "yours".
See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of T o t a l i t a r i a n i s m , New
York, 1951; and Gabriel Marcel, Man Against Mass
Society, Henry Regnery Co., Gateway E d . , Chicago, 1962,
Tor two e x c e l l e n t d i s c u s s i o n s on t h i s problem. The
c l e a r e s t and most aweful d e s c r i -p t i o n t h a t I have found
of t-he h e I ~ l e s s n e _ s _ g ~ ~ ~ $ - ~ c f~ea lnt- _bx-
b e~e~~-le---kd?en
_
faced w i t h _ _s i - t u a-t i o n s_ -i n whi-ch t h e i r old assumpt&_n_s
I

-4"-."-_-

h-
- .a - ~ f f e ~ t ' i s given by ~ u d o l fVrba i n I Cannot
Forgive, Bantum, Toronto, 1964, i n which he d e s c r i b e s
with c o o l i n t e l l i g e n c e h i s experiences a s a p r i s o n e r
i n Auschwitz.
Both Erikson and Lynd study shame and g u i l t a s p o s s i b l e
avenues toward t h e discovery of i d e n t i t y . "L
E r i k H. Erikson, Childhood and S o c i e t y , Norton, 1950;
Helen M. Lynd, On Shame and t h e Search f o r I d e n t i t y ,
Science Ed., New York, 1951.
This s p e c i a l use of t h e word p r e s e n t was developed i n
~ e a d f Philosophy
s of t h e P r e s e n t , and w i l l be d i s -
cussed more f u l l y i n Ch.4. It was through developing-
some of t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n sin in stein s
General he or^ of R e l a t i v i t y t h a t Mead a r r i v e d a t t h i s
usage of t h e word. A t p r e s e n t i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o ,
n o t e t h a t he r e f e r r e d t o t h e p r e s e n t a s t h e " l o c u s of 1
r e a l i t y " , i n which t h e s e l f f i n d s i t s e x p r e s s i o n and 1
t o which mind r e f e r s .
5 Gerth & M i l l s , i n t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o From Max Weber,
Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , New York, 1958, P.P. 71-73,
d i s c u s s Weberls i d e a of freedom i n our complex
s o c i e t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . Weber "...conceived of i n d i -
v i d u a l man a s a composite of g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
d e r i v e d from s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s ; t h e i n d i v i d u a l a s
an a c t o r of s o c i a l r o l e s . . . ( only i n s o f a r a s he does
not) ... transcend t h e r o u t i n e s of everyday i n s t i t u -
t i o n s . " (p.73) The p o i n t i s t h a t men - can d e f i n e
themselves a s cogs i n a machine, and can a c t on t h i s
d e f i n i t i o n , and can understand, p r e d i c t a n d c o n t r o l
t h e i r behavior o f i h e b a s i s of t h e i r s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n
and t h e i r a c t i n g out of i t . They do n o t have t o , b u t
choose t o do t h i s . Marx's argument, with r e f e r e n c e
n s i s s u e , was t h a t i f men choose t o do t h i s ,
t h e y a r e n o t a c t i n g i n t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e i r human
n a t u r e . Mead went f a r t h e r and showed how human
n a t u r e i s t h e transcendance of " t h e r o u t i n e s of
everyda~institutions" .
16. S o c i a l i t y i s another word t h a t g a i n s a p a r t i c u l a r
d e f i n i t i o n i n Mead's work. It r e f e r s t o t h a t u n i -
v e r s a l p r o c e s s which a l l o w s f o r t h e occurrence of
new phenomena. Mind i s a s o c i a l p r o c e s s which allows
t h e i n d i v i d u a l "minding" t o t a k e d i f f e r e n t perspec-
t i v e s with r e f e r e n c e t o t h e same o b j e c t . The o b j e c t
being regarded i s a s o c i a l p r o c e s s a s w e l l , by h i s
d e f i n i t P o n of s o c i a l i t y a s " t h e c a p a c i t y of b e i n g ,
s e v e r a l t h i n g s a t once."
d
CHAPTER I

The Holy B i b l e , King James Version, John C. Winston Co.,

P h i l a d e l p h i a , s e e Ephesians, 4, 17-19, Colossians, l , 2 1 ,
Psalms, 58, 3, and E z e k i a l , 14, 506.
See N. R o t e n s t r e i c h , "On t h e E c s t a t i c Sources of t h e
Concept of liena at ion", Review of Metaphysics, 16,
March, 1963, p.550-51.
See R o t e n s t r e i c h , op. c i t . , p.550.
See R o t e n s t r e i c h , op. c i t . , p.551.
Both J. B. Bury he Idea of P r o g r e s s , Dover, New York,
1932, esp. Ch. X I I I , "German S p e c u l a t i o n s on ~ r o g r e s s " ,
pp.238-59) and Arthur 0. Lovejoy (The Great Chain of
Being, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1960, esp. Ch.IX-
X I ) i s c u s s e d t h e g r e a t concern of p h i l o s o p h e r s i n
~ e g e l f times with t h e i d e a of t h e h i s t o r i c a l develop-
ment of man. Hegel, along w i t h h i s f r i e n d Goethe,
accepted t h e i d e a of e t e r n a l change, while s t i l l
m a i n t a i n i n g t h e n o t i o n t h a t man i s p e r f e c t a b l e , (Bury,
p.259) S e l f - c o n s c i o u s S p i r i t being t h e f i n a l s t a g e of
manfs development.
d'
Hegel developed t h e d i a l e c t i c method t o d e s c r i b e t h i s
development a s t h e c o n t i n u a l merging of f i n i t e and
i n f i n i t e i n t h e p r o c e s s of becoming. His n o t i o n was
t h a t while t h e s u b j e c t a s i n f i n i t e and t h e o b j e c t a s
f i n i t e a r e n o t contained w i t h i n t h e same being, t h e r e
i s c o n t i n u a l change, i . e . , becoming. When t h e s u b j e c t
and o b j e c t a r e u n i t e d i n t h e same being, S e l f , which
i s both f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e , t h e n e g a t i o n of t h e one
by t h e o t h e r i s a s e l f - n e g a t i o n .
The n e g a t i o n of t h i s s e l f - n e g a t i o n , t h e s y n t h e s i s of
t h e f i n i t e and t h e i n f i n i t e , i s b e i n g - f o r - s e l f , o r
self-contemplation, i . e . , Self-conscious S p i r i t .

See Karl L o w i t h f s d i s c u s s i o n i n "Estrangement a s t h e

Source of H e g e l f s R e c o n c i l i a t i o n " , From Hegel t o
Nietzsche, Holt, R i n e h a r t , Winston, New York, 1964,
PP 162- '(3
" I n Search of Marxist Humanism", S o v i e t Survey, 32,
April-June, 1960, pp. 21-31.

I n Hegelf s Phenomenology of Mind, ( ~ r J. . B. B a i l l i e ,

New York. 1931) -- , he t r a c e d t h e development of t h e World
, S p i r i t t h o u g h t h r e e stages : Stoicism, Scepticism,
and t h e A l i e n a t e d Consciousness. Each s t a g e , he
 b e l i e v e d , r e p r e s e n t s a new " l e v e l of consciousness", o r
t h e S p i r i t coming more completely t o be conscious of
i t s e l f . The b a s i c p r i n c i p l e of S t o i c i s m i s t h a t con-
s c i o u s n e s s i s e s s e n t i a l l y " t h a t which t h i n g s " .
S t o i c i s m i s t h e n e g a t i o n of o t h e r n e s s , i . e . , of a n y t h i n g
which i s n o t thought. Because i t i g n o r e s e x i s t e n c e
S t o i c i s m does n o t n e g a t e e x i s t e n c e i n an a b s o l u t e s e n s e .
S c e p t i c i s m does a b s o l u t e l y n e g a t e e x i s t e n c e by doubting
e x i s t e n c e . It i s t h e " r e a l i z a t i o n of t h a t of which
S t o i c i s m i s merely t h e n o t i o n , and i s t h e a c t u a l
e x p e r i e n c e of what freedom of thought i s ; i t i s i n
i t s e l f and e s s e n t i a l l y t h e n e g a t i v e , and s o must e x h i b i t
i t s e l f " . (p.246) S t o i c i s m answers t o t h e n o t i o n of
independent consciousness; S c e p t i c i s m corresponds t o
i t s r e a l i z a t i o n . S t o i c i s m r e c o g n i z e s only p u r e t h o u g h t ;
S c e p t i c i s m r e c o g n i z e s e x i s t e n c e and d e n i e s i t .
The Unhappy Consciousness has gone beyond both S t o i c i s m
and Scepticism through r e c o g n i z i n g both p u r e thought
and p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n c e . The Unhappy Consciousness
has transcended pure t h o u g h t , " s o f a r a s t h i s i s t h e
a b s t r a c t thought of S t o i c i s m , which t u r n s away from
p a r t i c u l a r s a l t o g e t h e r , and a g a i n t h e merely r e s t l e s s
thought of Scepticism--so f a r , i n f a c t , a s t h i s i s
merely p a r t i c u l a r i t y i n t h e s e n s e of a i m l e s s c o n t r a d i c -
t i o n and t h e r e s t l e s s p r o c e s s of c o n t r a d i c t o r y t h o u g h t .
It has gone beyond both of t h e s e ; i t b r i n g s and keeps
t o g e t h e r p u r e thought and p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n c e , but has
n o t y e t r i s e n t o t h a t l e v e l of t h i n k i n g where t h e p a r t i -
c u l a r i t y of consciousness i s harmoniously r e c o n c i l e d
with pure t h o u g h t . i t s e l f . It r a t h e r s t a n d s midway, a t
t h e p o i n t where a b s t r a c t thought comes i n c o n t a c t with
t h e p a r t i c u l a r i t y of consciousness qua p a r t i c u l a r i t y .
I t s e l f i s t h i s a c t of c o n t a c t ; i t i s t h e union of p u r e
t h o u g h t a n d i n d i v i d u a l i t y ; and t h i s t h i n k i n g i n d i v i -
d u a l i t y o r pure thought a l s o e x i s t s as o b j e c t f o r i t ,
and t h e unchangeable i s e s s e n t i a l l y i t s e l f an i n d i v i d u a l
e x i s t e n c e . But t h h t t h i s i t s o b j e c t , t h e unchangeable,
which assumes e s s e n t i a l l y t h e form of p a r t i c u l a r i t y , i s
i t s own s e l f , t h e s e l f which i s p a r t i c u l a r i t y of con-
sciousness--this i s - n o t e s t a b l i s h e d f o r i t " . (pp.256-57)
Phenomenology of Mind, p.253.
Ibid., Ch.14, pp.217-267.
Ibid., pp .I@-55.
 id., C~.VI, B.

L. Feuerbach, The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , T r . G. E l i o t ,

Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1957, p. 230.
A major f l a w i n Feuerbacht s argument i s t h e assumption
t h a t i f an event, A, a r i s e s o u t of c o n d i t i o n s X,Y,Z;
t h e n t h e c o n d i t i o n s X,Y,Z a r e e q u i v a l e n t t o event A.
George Herbert Mead argued a g a i n s t t h i s assumption
with h i s n o t i o n of "emergence", which w i l l be d i s c u s s e d
i n Chapter I V of t h i s t h e s i s . An a u t h o r i t a t i v e argu-
ment on t h i s s u b j e c t , w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e emergence
of l i f e out of n o n - l i f e , can be found i n t h e b i o l o g i s t .
Ludwig von ~ e r t a l a nffy f& book, Problems of L i f e ,
- 2

Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1960.

Feuerbach, o p . c i t . , p.79.
Ibid., p.244.

I b i d . , p.245. For a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l
r e l a t i o n between Hegel and Feuerbach, s e e Lowith,
o p . c i t . , pp.71-82.

See L o w i t h f s d i s c u s s i o n , o p . c i t . , p.76.
See n o t e 19 above.
Lowith, o p . c i t . , p.76.
See Marx's The Economic and P h i l o s o p h i c Manuscripts of
1844, T r . M. M i l l i g a n , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s ,
New York, 1964, esp. p.111, p a r a . 4 , and p.112, p a r a . 2 .
That Marx c o n s i s t e n t l y r e f e r r e d t o a s p e c t s of a l i e n a -
t i o n becomes r e l e v a n t i n my d i s c u s s i o n i n Chapter I11
of contemporary t h i n k e r s ' h a n d l i n g of t h e concept.
Seeman, f o r example, ("On t h e Meaning of m lien at ion" ,
American S o c i o l o g i c a l Revi ew, 24, Dec., 1959, pp. 783-91)
d i s t i n g u i s h e d f o u r k i n d s , r a t h e r t h a n a s p e c t s , of
a l i e n a t i o n , arguing t h a t they a r e l o g i c a l l y d i s -
t i n g u i s h a b l e . Marxts r e f e r e n c e was t o t h e e m p i r i c a l
world; and t h e way i n which Seeman has handled t h i s
concept, without r e f e r e n c e t o e m p i r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s of
a l i e n a t i o n , misses t h e p o i n t of Marxts argument, and
r e s u l t s i n - a n empty c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system.
i

t
26. The Economic and P h i l o s o p h i c Manuscripts of 1844, p. 107.
 27. The Philosophy of Science, Harper Torchbooks, New York,
1960, Chapter One, Two, P P . ~ - % .

29. For some f a s c i n a t i n g new i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e p o s s i b l e

,
?*
L-?
(2 ,
,
s o u r c e of p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y i n t h e t e r r r i t o r i a l i t y of
animals; and f o r a d i s c u s s i o n on t h e d i f f e r e n t u s e s
e~C",: b e " s o c i a l space i n d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s , s e e r e s p e c t i v e l y ,
(v\
Robert ~ r d r a ysf A f r i c a n Genesis, ~ o l l i n s ,London, 1961;
and Edward ,T. H a l l ' s The Hidden Dimension, Doubleday, .
New York, 1966.
The Economic and P h i l o s o p h i c Manuscripts of 1844, p.107.
Ibid., p.112.
I b i d . , p.112.
See Marxl s c h a p t e r on "Human Requirements", op. c i t . ,
pp. 147-164.
Ibid., p.113.
I b i d . , p.112 f f .
Ibid., p.115.

See C. Wright M i l l s ! The M a r x i s t s , D e l l , New York, 1962,

n F

The Economic and P h i l o s o p h i c a l Manuscripts, p.107.

Some contemporary t h e o r i s t s who a r e concerned with
man1 s t r e a t m e n t a s a commodity a r e , t o name only a few,
William H. Whyte, Marcuse, F r o m , G a b r i e l Marcel,
Helen Lynd, Pappenheim, Bettleheim,and Arendt, whose
works a r e r e f e r r e d t o i n my Bibliography.

Ibid., p.108. /'

Ibid., p.108.

I b i d . , p.115.

Ibid., p.115.
I b i d . , p.119.

Ibid., p.119.
Lowith, op.cit., p.76.
See, for example, Berlin, Karl Marx, His Life & Environ-
ment, Galaxy, New York, 1963; Marcuse, Reason and
Xevolution, Beacon, Boston, 1960; Tucker, Philosophy
and Myth in Karl Marx, Cambridge University Press,
1965; Plamenatz,and Society, Vo1.2, Longmans,
London, 1963;.-dna
Rotenstreich, op.cit., p.553.
See Plamenatz, Man and Society,op.cit., Ch.6, pp.351-408,
for a discussion of Marxfs understanding of "society",
and "community1' .
See Marx & Engels, The German Ideology, Ed. Pascal,
International Publishers, New York, 1965, p. 74.
Ibid., ~.76.
Ibid., p.24.
Ibid., p.22.
Ibid., p.23.

Ibid., p.67.
Ibid., p.75.
See T. B. Bottomore and M. Rubel, Karl Marx: Selected
Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy,
I v l M

The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 140.

Ibid., p.138.
From Hegel to Nietzsche, op.cit., p.155.
See L. Easton, "Alienation and History in the Early Marx",
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
From Hegel to Nietzsche, op.cit., p.281.
For a more detailed discussion of the various ways in
which Marx defined "ideology", see Plamenatz, op. cit .,
pp.323-50.
The German Ideology, op. c i t ., p. 2.
See K., Lowith, "Man's s e l f - ~ l ' i e n a t i o ni n t h e Early
W r i t i n g s of Marx" , S o c i a l Research, Summer, 1954,
p.204.
See Marcuse's use of "one-dimensional" i n One-Dimensional
Man, Beacon, Boston, 1964.
-
See Floyd W. Matson, The Broken Image, B r a z i l l e r , New York,
1964; and Joseph R. Royce, The Encapsulated Man,
van Nostrand, Toronto, 1964.
 I

CHAPTER I1

1. K a r l Marx & F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Washington

Square P r e s s , New York, 1964. p.58.
2. Class & Class C o n f l i c t i n I n d u s t r i a l S o c i e t y , S t a n f o r d
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , S t a n f o r d , 1959, s e e Ch.14, pp.117 f f .
and C. W. M i l l s , The M a r x i s t s , L a u r e l e d . , D e l l ,
New York, 1962, s e e Ch.6, pp.105 f f .
3. Ibid., pp.58-9.

4. E r n s t F i s c h e r , i n The N e c e s s i t y of A r t ( T r . A. Bostock,
Penguin, 1963 ) noted t h a t "Marx and Engels both warned
a g a i n s t dogmatic and m e c h a n i s t i c o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s
of t h e i r fundamental t h e s i s ' ' ( i . e . , i n t e r p r e t e d as
economic determinism, a g a i n s t which Weber argued i n
f a v o r of t h e i n f l u e n c e of i d e a s independently of
economics upon s o c i a l change) ( p . 1 2 8 ) . He quoted
passages from l e t t e r s w r i t t e n by Engels t o Joseph Bloch
and Starkenburg, e x p l a i n i n g t h e approach Marx took t o
h i s s u b j e c t m a t t e r . To Bloch he wrote, "According t o
t h e m a t e r i a l i s t view of h i s t o r y , p r o d u c t i o n and r e p r o -
d u c t i o n of r e a l l i f e a r e , i n t h e l a s t i n s t a n c e , t h e
determining f a c t o r i n h i s t o r y . Neither Marx nor I have
a s s e r t e d more t h a n t h a t . If anybody t w i s t s t h i s i n t o
a claim t h a t t h e economzc f a c t o r i s t h e only d e t e r -
mining one, he t r a n s f o r m s our s t a t e m e n t i n t o a meaning-
l e s s , a b s t r a c t , absurd p h r a s e . The economic s i t u a t i o n
i s t h e b a s i s , but a l l t h e f a c t o r s of t h e s u p e r s t r u c t u r e -
p o l i t i c a l forms of t h e c l a s s s t r u g g l e and i t s r e s u l t s ,
c o n s t i t u t i o n s adopted by t h e v i c t o r i o u s c l a s s a f t e r
winning a b a t t l e , forms of law, and more t h a n t h a t , t h e
r e f l e c t i o n s of a l l t h e s e r e a l s t r u g g l e s i n t h e minds of
t h e people involved, p o l i t i c a l , l e g a l , and p h i l o s o p h i c a l
t h e o r i e s , r e l i g i o u s views both i n t h e i r e a r l y and t h e i r
more developed, dogmatic f o r m - - a l l t h e s e f a c t o r s a l s o
i n f l u e n c e t h e c o u r s e of h i s t o r i c a l s t r u g g l e s and i n many
c a s e s p l a y t h e dominant r o l e i n determining t h e i r form".
(p.128) Engels r e p e a t e d t h e same theme i n h i s l e t t e r
t o Starkenburg: " P o l i t i c a l , j u r i d i c a l , p h i l o s o p h i c a l ,
r e l i g i o u s , l i t e r a r y , hnd a r t i s t i c developments, e t c .
a r e based on economic development. But, i n a d d i t i o n ,
they a l l r e a c t upon one a n o t h e r and a l s o on t h e economic
basis. The economic s i t u a t i o n i s n o t an o r i g i n a l c a u s e
which a l o n e i s a c t i v e w h i l e a l l e l s e i s merely p a s s i v e
effect. There i s , r a t h e r , mutual a c t i o n on t h e b a s i s of
economic n e c e s s i t y , which always proves t h e determining
f a c t o r i n t h e l a s t i n s t a n c e . " (P. 128)
See Hans Gerth & C. W. M i l l s , From Max Weber, Galaxy,
New York, 1958, p. 182. For f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n of t h e
s i m i l a r i t i e s between Marxrsand Weberrs a n a l y s e s of
c a p i t a l i s m , s e e Birnbauml s a r t i c l e "The R i s e o f
C a p i t a l i s m : Marx and ~ e b e r " , i n N e i l J . S m e l s e r r s
Readings on Economic S o c i o l o g y , P r e n t i c e - H a l l ,
New J e r s e y . 1965, -,- - - -
pp.3-5. H i s a r t i c l e can a l s o b e
found i n t 6 e B r i t i s h J o u r n a l of S o c i o l o m . 4. 1953.

Ibid., p.186.

Ibid., p.187.
Ibid., p.181.

Ibid., p.184.

Ibid., p.186.

Ibid., p.183.
Ibid., p . 185
S t u d i e s on t h e " m a r g i n a l man" have shown t h a t t h i s i s t r u e
f o r movement from one s o c i e t y t o a n o t h e r a s w e l 1 . a ~f o r
movement w i t h i n a s o c i e t y . See E v e r e t t V. S t o n e q u i s t ,
The M a r g i n a l Man, a S t u d y i n P e r s o n a l i t y and C u l t u r e
C o n f l i c t , C h a r l e s S c r i b n e r r s Sons, 1937, pp.139-58.

From Max Weber, o p . c i t . , p.180.

Ibid., p.183.
Ibid., p.79.
I b i d . , p . 79. (/'

Ibid., p.215.

Ibid., p.214.
Ibid., p.215.
Ibid., p.216.
From Hegel t o N i e t z s c h e , o p . c i t . , p.281. See h i s n o t e a s
well.
The Economic & P h i l o s o p h i c ' ~ a n u s c r i -
p t s ,o p . c i t . , P . 139.

From Max Weber, o p . c i t . , p.228.

Ibid., p.228.

Ibid., p. 228-29.

Ibid., p.229.
Ibid., p.221.

Ibid., p.229.

Arnold H a u s e r , i n The S o c i a l H i s t o r y o f A r t ( T r . S. Godman,

New York, Knopf, 1 9 5 2 ) , d i s c u s s e d t h e r e l a t i o n of
c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s t o t h e s o c i e t y i n which t h e y a r i s e ,
and t h e i r c a r r y - o v e r i n t o d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s .

From Max Weber, o p . c i t . , p.293.

See Weberrs The Theory o f S o c i a l and Economic O r g a n i z a -

t i o n Ed. IF. ~
-9
a ~ r s o ~ 1

From Max Weber, o p . c i t . , p.293.

Ibid., p.294.

Weber, " S c i e n c e a s a V o c a t i o n " , i n From Max Weber, o p . c i t . ,

p . 129.
Ibid., p.143.

Ibid., p.143.

Ibid., pp.148b4g.

Ibid., p.156.

The Theory of S o c i a l and Economic O r g a n i z a t i o n , o p . c i t . ,

p.103.
From Max Weber, o p . c i t . , p.155.

Ibid., p.158.
The Theory of S o c i a l and Economic O r g a n i z a t i o n , o p . c i t . ,
p.103.
CHAPTER I11

Op.cit., D e l l , Laurel Ed., 1962, I n t r o . PP. 9-53

lienat at ion i n Mass S o c i e t y : Some Causes and Responses",
Sociology and S o c i a l Research, ~ 0 1 . 4 9( 2 ) , 1965,
pp. 142-52. J

Ibid., p.144.

11 On t h e Meaning of liena at ion", American S o c i o l o g i c a l

Review, vo1.24, Dec., 1959, pp.783-91.
Seemants d i s c u s s i o n of a l i e n a t i o n has been used a s a
b a s i s f o r e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h , both h i s own and t h a t of
o t h e r people. Some of t h e s t u d i e s which have made use
of h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a r e : Seeman & m a n s , " A l i e n a t i o n
& Learning i n a H o s p i t a l S e t t i n g " , American S o c i o l o g i c a l
Review, v o l . 27, Dec., 1962, pp. 772-82; Neal & R a t t i g ,
" ~ i m e n s i o n s of A l i e n a t i o n among Manual and Non-manual
Workers", American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 28, Aug., 1963,
pp.599-608; Neal & Seeman, " O r g a n i z a t i o n s & Powerless-
n e s s : A T e s t of t h e Mediation Hypothesis", American
S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 29, A p r i l , 1964, pp. 216-bb;
meal & K a t t i g , "On t h e M u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l i t y of Aliena-
t i o n " , American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 32, Feb., 1967,
pp.54-64; ~ b b e r t B l a u n e r , o nand Freedom, t h e
Factory Worker and h i s i n d u s t r y , Chicago, U n i v e r s i t y of
Chicago P r e s s , 1964.

"DehumanJzation of Anomie and A l i e n a t i o n : A Problem i n

t h e Ideology of Sociology", B r i t i s h J o u r n a l of Sociology,
15, Dec., 1964, 283-300; p.283.
" A l i e n a t i o n and Anomie", seen by t h e a u t h o r through t h e
c o u r t e s y of T. B. Bottemore, t h e n Head of t h e Department
of P o l i t i c a l Science, Sociology and Anthropology a t
Simon F r a s e r U n i v e r s i t y , now a t Sussex i n E n g l a n d , s h o r t l y
t o be published.
"On A l i e n a t i o n " , I n q u i r y , 8, P a r t 2, 1965, pp. 141-65.
Many of t h e s t u d i e s employing " a l i e n a t i o n " a s a t o o l f o r
r e s e a r c h have confused r a t h e r t h a n c l a r i f i e d t h e prob-
lem. John F. Clark, ("Measuring A l i e n a t i o n Within a
S o c i a l System", American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 24,
Aug., 1959, 849-52) c r i t i c i z e d N e t t l e r ( " A Measure of
A l i e n a t i o n " , American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 22, 1957,
Dec., 670-77) and Dwight Dean ( " A l i e n a t i o n & P o l i t i c a l
Apathy", Unpublished Ph.D. T h e s i s , The Ohio S t a t e
U n i v e r s i t y , 1956), s p e c i f i c a l l y , and o t h e r s , by
i m p l i c a t i o n , who followed t h e same approach a s N e t t l e r
 and Dean i n t r y i n g t o measure a l i e n a t i o n . C l a r k f s
c r i t i c i s m was t h a t t h e i r measuring s c a l e s f a i l e d t o be
s i t u a t i o n a l l y s p e c i f i c . He argued, "It i s necessary
f o r man t o consider himself deserving a r o l e i n t h e
s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n before he can experience f e e l i n g s of
alienation within i t ..." (p.849). S c a l e s which a r e
n o t s p e c i f i c t o s i t u a t i o n s imply some normative
behavior i n t h e s o c i e t y a s a whole, an assumption which
i s unwarranted and which needs t e s t i n g . With r e f e r e n c e
t o N e t t l e r l s s c a l e , which i s an attempt t o measure
estrangement from popular c u l t u r e , a person may be d i s -
i n t e r e s t e d i n f i t e m s f of popular c u l t u r e without being
alienated.
A l i e n a t i o n s c a l e s which a r e based upon t h e assumption
of normative behavior i n s o c i e t y a r e meaningless
w i t h i n t h e Marxian d e f i n i t i o n of t h e word. This
approach p u t s t h e onus on t h e i n d i v i d u a l who i s seen
as a deviate, r a t h e r than c r i t i c a l l y assessing t h e
r e l a t i o n between i n d i v i d u a l s and t h e i r s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s .
Neal and R e t t i g ( o p . c i t . , r e f . 5 ) discussed t h e many
meanings assigned t o " a l i e n a t i o n " by d i f f e r e n t s o c i o l o -
g i s t s i n t h e i r attempts t o o p e r a t i o n a l i z e t h e term,
and concluded t h a t " i n t h e 'absence of agreement on t h e
meanings of t h e major v a r i a b l e s involved, a l i e n a t i o n
r e s e a r c h , taken c o l l e c t i v e l y , m a n i f e s t s a s e r i e s of
d i s c r e t e and u n r e l a t e d s t u d i e s , r a t h e r than cumulative
a d d i t i o n s t o a coherent body of e m p i r i c a l l y v e r i f i e d
propositions". ( p . 63 ) They suggested t h a t " c a r e f u l
e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s of a l i e n a t i o n should e v e n t u a l l y pro-
v i d e a b a s i s f o r s y n t h e s i z i n g numerous s o c i o l o g i c a l and
p s y c h o l o g i c a l concerns with man and s o c i e t y " . (p. 6 3 f f )
It seems t o me, a s I argue i n t h i s paper, t h a t t h e
problem with a l i e n a t i o n s t u d i e s i s n o t one of a l a c k of
" e m p i r i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n " , but one of t h e assumptions t h e
r e s e a r c h e r s b r i n g i n t o t h e i r study of a l i e n a t i o n .
The Division of Labor i n S o c i e t y , T r . G. Simpson, The Free
P r e s s , New York, 1966, p.3, "Human p a s s i o n s s t o p only
before a moral power they r e s p e c t . If a l l a u t h o r i t y of
t h i s kind i s wanting, t h e law of t h e s t r o n g e s t p r e v a i l s ,
and l a t e n t or a c t i v e , t h e s t a t e of war i s n e c e s s a r i l y
chronic.
I do n o t mean t o d i s p a r a g e t h e p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of
t h e s e t h e o r i s t s , but merely t o u n d e r l i n e t h e l i m i t a -
t i o n s i n h e r e n t i n t h e i r a n a l y s e s due t o t h e assumptions
t h a t they c a r r i e d i n t o t h e i r a n a l y s e s of s o c i e t y .
12. Op.cit., r e f . 9, p.849.
13. "On A l i e n a t i o n " , I n q u i r y , 8, P a r t 2, 1965, pp.143-44.
14. See Robert B l a u n e r f s A l i e n a t i o n and Freedom, o p . c i t . ,
r e f . 5 , a s an example of t h i s tendency.
15. See Pappenheim, The A l i e n a t i o n of Modern Man; an i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n based on Marx and Tonnies, New York, Monthly
Review P r e s s , 1959, and Josephson, o p . c i t . , ~ ~ . l 6 - 2 1 .

16. Nearly a l l of t h e books l i s t e d i n my Bibliography a r e

concerned i n some way with t h e t h r e a t of a l i e n a t i o n .
S p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n might be given t o Marcuse, -
One
Dimensional Man , Matson, The Broken Image; Laing,
The Divided S e l f ; and Bettleheim, The Informed Heart;
t o name only a few.

17. For a c l a s s i c study of some of t h e e f f e c t s of "adjustment"

t o c o n d i t i o n s i n suburban d i s t r i c t s , s e e Whytefs -
The
Organization Man, Garden C i t y , New York, Doubleday,
1957. See, a l s o , Alan H a r r i n g t o n l s " L i f e i n t h e C r y s t a l
P a l a c e " , i n Man Alone (op. c i t . ) pp. 133-43.

18. See t h e books by Lewis Mumford and by Ashley Montagu i n my

Bibliography with r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s problem of man's
adjustment t o h i s environment and i t t o him.
!e e s p e c i a l l y , Edward A. T i r y a k i a n , Sociologism and
E x i s t e n t i a l i s m , two p e r s p e c t i v e s on t h e i n d i v i d u a l and
society. Prentice-Hall. ~ n ~ l e w o oC
" <
d 'l i f f s . New J e r s e- "v , .
1962; G i l b e r t Ryle, ~ 6 concept
e of ~ i n d i
Barnes and
Noble. New York. 1965: -/ / and
.-- Charles
- - - -- - - -
S. - - -- - - I E
Peirce. - -s s
- -a"v s- in
t h e ~ 6 i l o s o ~ofh Sc-i ~ .once. Fir? T T - T n r n ~ s . Anhhs-Merri 1
New York, 1957, f
of what i s r e f e r r e d t o h e r e a s t h e " r e a l i s t " approach.
20. On Shame and t h e Search f o r I d e n t i t y , Science E d i t i o n s ,
New York, 1961, p. 217ff.

23. The p r i n t i n g i n d u s t r y i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by c r a f t technology;

t h e chemicals i n d u s t r y by continuous-process; the
t e x t i l e s by machine-tending; and automobile i n d u s t r y
by t h e assembly-line t e c h n i q u e . C r a f t technology i s
d i s t i n g u i s h e d by l a c k of s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n , r e l a t i v e l y
low l e v e l of mechanization, a h i g h p r o p o r t i o n of workers
w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l s k i l l s , and i t i s t h e p r o t o t y p e of
 pre-industrial society. Machine-tending is the proto-
type technique of early industrialism., The products
in this industry are highly standardized and the hand
work which existed in pre-industrial manufacture of
textiles has been eliminated. The job of the worker
is to tend a large number of machines, a job which
requires very little skil1,but demands attention of
the worker. The social and economic structure of the
automobile industry (assembly-line) is bureaucratic
rather than traditional in contrast to the printing
and textiles industries. The typical automobile
factory is large and has an impersonal atmosphere,
with even greater standardization of the product than
in machine-tending technology; large centralized
factories, compressed wage and skill distribution,
infrequent advancement opportunities and relatively few
close-knit, functional work groups. The continuous-
process technology common to chemical plants is
characterized by large plants with relatively few
workers, decentralization, a balance of skill distri-
bution, highly elaborate system of job classification,
variety of work and responsibility, and a relaxed work
pace. Blauner noted that the loyalty of the chemical
operator to the firm for which he works approaches that
of the white collar organization man.
24. Ibid., p.15.
2. See Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of s lien at ion".
26. Seeman argued that his five uses of "alienation" are
"logically distinguishable", but one can question the
value of such a distinction since the five modes of
alienation as defined by him are interrelated and not
separable in reality. For example, with reference to
his definition of powerlessness and meaninglessness:
powerlessness is "the expectancy or probability held
by the individual that his own behavior cannot deter-
mine the occurrence of the outcomes, or reinforcements,
he seeks" (p.784); and meaninglessness occurs when
"the individual is unclear as to what he ought to
believe--when the individualfs minimal standards for
clarity in decision making are not met". (p.786)
By definition, if a person experiences meaninglessness
he must also experience powerlessness, indicating that
the two are not independent of one another. It might
also be debated whether a person can feel powerless in
situations which are meaningful for him.
27. See my discussion of alienation, Ch. One.
 !e David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd; ? a study of t h e
changing American c h a r a c t e r , w i t h R. Denney N. Glaz
New Haven, Yale U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1950; E r i c h Fromm,
Escape from Freedom, New York, Avon, 1965; and The
Sane S o c i e t y , New York, R i n e h a r t , 1955; E r i k ~ r i c s o n
Childhood and S o c i e t y , 2nd Ed. Rev. & Enl., N.Y. Nort
1963; and William H. Whyte, The O r g a n i z a t i o n Man,
Garden C i t y , New York, Doubleday, 1957.
31. See n o t e 3, Ch. Two.

33. Ibid., p.183.

3 V i r g i n i a Woolf, A Room of One's Own, Harcourt, Brace. & Co.,

New York, 1929, pp.63-67.
35. S i r Arthur Quiller-Couch, On t h e A r t of W r i t i n g , Cambridge
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1928.

37. "Class C r y s t a l l i z a t i o n & Class ~ o n s c i o u s n e s s ~ American

',
S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 28, 1963, Apr., pp. 219-29.

38. For a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e " u n r e a l a l t e r n a t i v e s f ' considered

by f a c t o r y workers, s e e Ely Chinoy, Automobile Workers
and t h e American Dream, Garden C i t y , New York, Doubleday,
1955.
39. "Metaphysical Pathos and t h e Theory of ~ u r e a u c r a c y ~i ~n ,
Sociology: The P r o g r e s s of a . Decade, ad. L i p s e t and
Smelser, Englewood C l i f f s , New J e r s e y , P r e n t i c e - H a l l ,
1961, p.81.
40. "The American C r i s i s : P o l i t i c a l I d e a l i s m and t h e Cold War",
Commentary, 29,b, Spring, 1960, pp.461-72.
1 " P o l i t i c a l S t r a t e g y f o r t h e Alienated Votorf', P u b l i c
Opinion Q u a r t e r l y , 26,1, S p r i n g , 1962, pp. 4 T
42. See Riesman and Maccoby, o p . c i t . , and Lewis Coser,
"Comments on Bauer and Bauertt, J o u r n a l of s o c i a l I s s u e s ,
16, 3 , 1960, pp.78-84; B. B. Seligman, "On Work,
A l i e n a t i o n and L e i s u r e " , American J o u r n a l of Economics ,
24, Oct., 1965, pp.337-60; i n c o n t r a s t w i t h Anthony
Davids 1 a r t i c l e " A l i e n a t i o n , S o c i a l Apperception and
Ego S t r u c t u r e " , J o u r n a l of Consulting Psychology,
 19, 1, 1955, pp.21-27, which p i c t u r e d t h e a l i e n a t e d man
a s being e g o c e n t r i c , d i s t r u s t f u l , p e s s i m i s t i c , a n x i e t y
riddenLand f i l l e d w i t h resentment.

Ibid., p. 4 9 f f .
Most o f . t h e e m p i r i c a l work t h a t has been done on a l i e n a -
t i o n confuses a l i e n a t i o n w i t h anomie, t h e f o c u s of
a t t e n t i o n being on t h e i n d i v i d u a l a ) a s a d e v i a n t from
some assumed norm and/or b ) w i t h s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e t o
h i s estrangement from " s o c i e t y " . See John Clark,
"Measuring A l i e n a t i o n w i t h i n a S o c i a l System", American
S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 24, Aug. 1959, pp. 849-52; Anthony
Davids, " A l i e n a t i o n , S o c i a l Apperception & Ego S t r u c t u r d ' ,
J o u r n a l of Consulting Psychology, 19, 1, 1955, pp.21-27;
Davids, " G e n e r a l i t y and Consistency of R e l a t i o n s between
t h e A l i e n a t i o n Syndrome and Cognitive P r o c e s s " . J o u r n a l
qf Abnormal and s o c i a l ~sychol&g, 51, 1955, ~ i l y ,
bl-b7; Dwight Dean, " A l i e n a t i o n and P o l i t i c a l pa thy" ,
S o c i a l Forces, 38, 3 , Mar., 1960, 185-89; Dean,
' A l i e n a t i o n : i t s Meaning and ~ e a s u r e m e n t " . American
S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 26,-0ct. , 1961, 753-56; Gof fman,
l lien at ion from ~ n t e r a c t i o n " , Human R e l a t i o n s , 10, 1,
1957, 47-60; D. Gold, "Independent Causation i n Multi-
v a r i a t e A n a l y s i s : t h e Case of P o l i t i c a l A l i e n a t i o n and
A t t i t u d e toward School Bond I s s u e " , American S o c i o l o g i c a l
Review, 27, Feb., 1962, 85-87; Jan Hajda, " A l i e n a t i o n
m t e g r a t i o n of Student I n t e l l e c t u a l s " . American
~ o c i o l o ~ ~ Review,cal 26, 1961, Oct., 758-j7; C. R.
J e f f e r y , "An I n t e g r a t e d Theory of Crime and Criminal
Behavior", J o u r n a l of Criminal Law, Criminology and
P o l i t i c a l Science, 49, Mar. -Apr., 1959, 533-52;
k. P. Lowry, "The Functions of A l i e n a t i o n i n ~ e a d e r s h i p " ,
S o c i a l Research, 46, 4, 1962, 11-26-35; E. L. McDill and
J. C. R i d l e s . " S t a t u s , Anomie. P o l i t i c a l A l i e n a t i o n and
P o l i t i c a l ~ a r t i c i ~ a t i & "~, m e r i c a nJ o u r n a l of Sociology,
2, S e p t . , 68, 1962, 205-13; Gwynn N e t t l e r , "A Measure
of A l i e n a t i o n " , American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 22, Dec.,
1957, 670-77; L. I. P e a r l i n , " A l i e n a t i o n from Work: a
Study of Nursing P e r s o n n e l " , American S o c i o l o g i c a l
Review, 27, June, 1962, 314-2b; A. L. Rhodes, "Authori-
t a r i a n i s m and A l i e n a t i o n : t h e F - s c a l e and t h e S r o l e
s c a l e a s p r e d i c t o r s of p r e j u d i c e " , S o c i o l o g i c a l
Q u a r t e r l y , 2, 3, J u l y , 1961, 195-203; A. Hose, "Aliena-
t i o n and P a r t i c i p a t i o n : A Comparison of Group Leaders
and t h e "Mass". "; American ~ o c ~ o l o ~ i ~ceavli e w , 27,
Dec., 1962, 834-38; J, L. Simmons, " L i b e r a l i s m ,
 A l i e n a t i o n and P e r s o n a l D i s t u r b a n c e " , Sociology and
S o c i a l Research, 49, J u l y , 1965, 456-64; Smythe,
w g e r i a f s fMarginal Menf ' I , Phylon, 19, 3, F a l l , 1958,
268-76; an&-F. S. Waisanen, I' S t a b i l i t y , A l i e n a t i o n and
Change", S o c i o l o g i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , 4, 1, Winter, 1963,
18-3 1.
47. See, a p a r t from B l a u n e r f s book h e r e d i s c u s s e d , Norman
Kaplan, "The Role of t h e Research A d m i n i s t r a t o r " ,
Admin. Science Q u a r t e r l y , 4, 1, June, 1959, 20-24;
D a n i e l B e l l , "The ~ e d i s c o v e r yof liena at ion" , J o u r n a l
of Philosophy LVI, 24, Nov., 1959, 933-53; Pearlin,
op.cit., ref.48; B. B. Seligrnan, "On Work, A l i e n a t i o n
and L e i s u r e " , American J o u r n a l of Economics, 24, Oct.,
1965, 337-60; Zurcher e t a l , "Value O r i e n t a t i o n , Role
C o n f l i c t and A l i e n a t i o n from work", American Socio-
l o g i c a l Review, 30, Aug., 1965, 539-48; Neal and R e t t i g ,
nDimensions of A l i e n a t i o n among Manual and Non-manual
Workers", American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 29, Apr. 1963,
599-608; George Friedman, I n d u s t r i a l S o c i e t y : t h e
emergence of t h e human problems of automation; ed. H. L.
Sheppard, Free P r e s s , New York, 1955; Friedman, - The
Anatomy of Work; Labor, L e i s u r e , and t h e I m p l i c a t i o n s
of Automation, Free P r e s s , New York, 1961; Herbert
Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, C. W. M i l l s , The Power
E l i t e , Ely Chinoy, Automobile Workers and t h e American
Dream. and W. Faunce, "Automation and t h e D i v i s i o n of
~ a b o r " , S o c i a l ~ r o b l e m s , 13, 2, 1965, 149-60, a s a n
example of t h e range of s t u d i e s i n t h i s a r e a . For
c o n t E a s t i n g approaches t o t h e i d e o l o g y of i n d u s t r i a l i s m ,
s e e Clark Kerr e t a l , I n d u s t r i a l i s m and I n d u s t r i a l Man,
Galaxy, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1964, and Reinhard
Bendix, Work and A u t h o r i t y i n I n d u s t r y , I d e o l o g i e s of
Management i n t h e Course of I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , Harper
Torchbooks, New York, 1963.

48. See Weber, The Theory of S o c i a l and Economic O r g a n i z a t i o n ,

and Gerth and M i l l s , Yrom Max Weber f o r Weberts i d e a s
on b u r e a u c r a t i c organ'lzation.

49. " O r g a n i z a t i o n s and Powerlessness: A T e s t of t h e Mediakion

~ ~ p o t h e s i s "American
, S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 29, A P ~ . ,
1964, 216-26.

50 Refer t o n o t e 23, t h i s Chapter.

51- " A l i e n a t i o n from ~ n t e r a c t i o n " , op. c i t .
52. Ibid., p.50.
53. On Shame and t h e Search f o r I d e n t i t y , o p . c i t .
54. Childhood and S o c i e t y , op. c i t .
55. I n Josephson, Man Alone, pp. 437-46. See B e t t l e h e i m t s
The Informed Heart: Autonomy i n a mass age, Glencoe
I l l . , Free P r e s s , 1960, and The Empty F o r t r e s s :
I n f a n t i l e Autism and t h e B i r t h of t h e S e l f , New York,
Free P r e s s , 1967, f o r a - w i d e r view of h i s approach.
56. " E f f e c t s of Group P r e s s u r e uDon t h e M o d i f i c a t i o n and Dis-
t o r t i o n of ~ u d ~ m e n t "i ,n k. Guetzkow ( e d ) Groups,
Leadership and Men, P i t t s b u r g h : Carnegie P r e s s , 1951;
"Opinions and S o c i a l P r e s s u r e " , S c i . Amer., 193, 1955,
31-35; " S t u d i e s of Independence and Conformity. A
Minority of one a g a i n s t a Unanimous M a j o r i t y " ,
P s y c h o l o g i c a l Monograph, 70, 9, 1956 (whole no. 416).
57. See Abraham Luchins, Group Therapy, a guide, New York,
Random House, 1964; James Johnson, Group Therapy, a
p r a c t i c a l approach, New York, B l a k i s t o n D i v i s i o n ,
McGraw-Hill, 1963; R. Speers and C . Lansing, Group
Therapy i n Childhood P s y c h o s i s , Chapel H i l l , U n i v e r s i t y
of North Carolina P r e s s .,, 1965;
- - , and Hubert Coffey and
L. Wiener, Group Treatment of A u t i s t i c Children,
Englewood C l i f f s , New J e r s e y , P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1967.

e Kingsley Davis, " F i n a l Note on a Case of Extreme

I s o l a t i o n " , American J o u r n a l of Sociology, L I I , 5, 1947,
432-37; J. A. L. Singh, Wolf Children and F e r a l Man,
Hamden, Conn., Archon Books, 1966; and Solomon P h i l l i p s
e t a l , Sensory D e p r i v a t i o n : a symposium h e l d a t Harvard
Medical School, Cambridge, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,
1965
59. The Concise Oxford D i c t i o n a r y , p.949, p.973.

60. See S e l l i t z e t a l , Research Methods i n S o c i a l R e l a t i o n s ,

r e v . ed., Holt-Dryden, 1960; Hubert Blalock, S o c i a l
S t a t i s t i c s , McGray-Hill, Toronto, 1960; Ferguson,
S t a t i s t i c a l Analysis i n Psychology and Education,
McGray- ill, Toronto, - 1959.
61. The Wonderful World of Communication, Ga.rden City Books,
Garden C i t y , New York, 1959, p.15.

62. For a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e o r g a n i c approach t o t h e study of

l i f e s e e L. von B e r t a l a n f f y f s Problems of L i f e , Harper
Torchbook, New York,. 1952; -- and f o r a d i s c u s s i o n a l o n g
t h e same i i n e s of human l i f e i n p a r t i c u l a r , s e e R.E.L.
F a r i s , S o c i a l Psychology, ~ o n a l dP- r e s s , New York, 1952,
esp. Ch. 4 , 5 ; and Leeper and Madis on, Toward Under-
s t a n d i n g ~ u m a n~ e rosn a r i t i e s , Apple ton-Century-Crofts,
New York, 1959, P a r t 'Three.
63. " M a r x f s Theory of liena at ion", P h i l o s o p h y and Phenomeno-
l o g i c a l Research.

64. "Utopia f o r P r a c t i c a l ~ u r p o s e s " , Daedalus, 94, 2, Spring,

1965, 437-53.
CHAPTER I V

Ideology and Utopia, Harvest, Harcourt, Brace Co.,

New York, 1936, p. 171.
None of which he wrote with t h e i n t e n t i o n of p u b l i c a t i o n .
These t h r e e volumes a r e comprised of n o t e s g a t h e r e d
from l e c t u r e s , and from Mead's own n o t e s . See M o r r i s ' s
introductions-for details. The Philosophy of t h e Act,
ed. C. Morris, Chicago, U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s ,
1964; The Philosophy of t h e P r e s e n t , ed. A. Murphy,
Open Court P u b l i s h i n g Co., La S a l l e , I l l . , 1959;
Mind, S e l f and S o c i e t y , ed. C. Morris, Chicago,
U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1963.
See The Philosophy of t h e Act, P a r t I V , essay X X V I I , he
Back of our Mind", pp.479-93.
See The Philosophy of t h e P r e s e n t , p.1, and The Philosophy
of t h e Act, pp.31-33, 56, 627-29, 119, 274-75, and
364-65, f o r Meadfs d e f i n i t i o n of " r e a l i t y " . He wrote,
f o r example, "Appearance i s t h e adjustment of t h e
environment t o t h e organism--that i s , t h e e f f e c t which
t h e environment has upon t h e organism because of t h e
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e organism. R e a l i t y i s t h e e f f e c t
which t h e environment has upon t h e organism - when t h e
organism has responded t o t h e primary i n f l u e n c e of t h e
environment upon t h e organism", (p.627) and "This world,
which i s t h e t e s t of a l l o b s e r v a t i o n and a l l s c i e n t i f i c
h y p o t h e t i c a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n has i n i t s e l f no system
t h a t can be i s o l a t e d as a s t r u c t u r e of laws, o r uni-
f o r m i t i e s , though a l l laws and f o r m u l a t i o n s of uniformi-
t i e s must b e ~ b r o u g h tt o i t s c o u r t f o r i t s imprimatur. 11
(p.31) This i s t h e world cf " t h i n g s and e v e n t s , which
a r e what t h e y a r e " . For a view of t h e world sympathetic
w i t h t h a t of Mead, s e e Wallace S t e v e n s ' p o e t r y , and h i s
book The Necessary Angel, where he d i s c u s s e s r e a l i t y a s
t h i n g s which a r e what t h e y are,and t h e " p r e s s u r e s of
r e a l i t y " on t h e imagination. Essays on R e a l i t y and t h e
Imagination, London, Faber, 19

The Philosophy of t h e P r e s e n t , pp.20-21.

Mead s a i d of p e r s p e c t i v e s , e . g. , a r g u i n g a g a i n s t Whiteheadfs
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of r e l a t i v i t y ) 'In h i s o b j e c t i v e s t a t e -
ment of r e l a t i v i t y t h e e x i s t e n c e of motion i n t h e
passage of e v e n t s depends n o t upon what i s t a k i n g p l a c e
i n an a b s o l u t e space and time, but upon t h e r e l a t i o n of
a c o n s e n t i e n t s e t t o a p e r c i p i e n t e v e n t . Such a r e l a -
t i o n s t r a t i f i e s n a t u r e . These s t r a t i f i c a t i o n s a r e n o t
only t h e r e i n n a t u r e but t h e y a r e t h e only forms of
 nature t h a t are there. This dependence of n a t u r e upon
t h e p e r c i p i e n t event i s n o t a r e f l e c t i o n of n a t u r e i n t o
consciousness. Permanent spaces and times, which a r e
s u c c e s s i o n s of t h e s e s t r a t a , r e s t and motion, a r e t h e r e ,
but they a r e t h e r e only i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o p e r -
c i p i e n t e v e n t s o r organisms. We can t h e n go f u r t h e r
and say t h a t t h e sensuous q u a l i t i e s of n a t u r e a r e t h e r e
i n n a t u r e , but t h e r e i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o animal
organisms. We can advance t o t h e o t h e r v a l u e s which
have been regarded a s dependent upon appetence, appre-
c i a t i o n , and a f f e c t i o n , and t h u s r e s t o r e t o n a t u r e a l l
t h a t a d u a l i s t i c d o c t r i n e has r e l a g e d t o consciousness,
s i n c e t h e s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l s t r u c t u r e of t h e world and
t h e motion with which e x a c t p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e i s
occupied i s found t o e x i s t i n n a t u r e only i n i t s r e l a -
t i o n s h i p t o p e r c i p i e n t e v e n t s o r organisms". (p. 1 7 1 )
A p e r s p e c t i v e , then, i s a r e l a t i o n between t h e " p e r -
c i p i e n t event'' and n a t u r e .
Ibid., p.10.

Ibid., p.11.
The ~cbnornicand P h i l o s o p h i c a l Manuscrips of 1844, ~ . l 0 7 .

"A ( s i g n i f i c a n t ) symbol does tend t o c a l l out i n t h e

i n d i v i d u a l a group of r e a c t i o n s such as i t c a l l s out
i n t h e o t h e r , but t h e r e i s something f u r t h e r t h a t i s
involved i n i t s being a s i g n i f i c a n t symbol: t h i s r e s -
ponse w i t h i n o n e ' s s e l f t o such a word a s ' c h a i r ' o r
' d o g ' , i s one which i s a s t i m u l u s t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l a s
w e l l a s a response. This i s what, of c o u r s e , i s
involved i n what we term t h e meaning of a t h i n g , or i t s
significance .... t h e n we speak of t h e meaning of what we
a r e doing we a r e making t h e response i t s e l f t h a t we a r e
- o n , t h e p o i n t of c a r r y i n g out a s t i m u l u s t o our a c t i o n . "
(Mind, S e l f , and S o c i e t y , p.72)
The Philosophy of t h e . P r e s e n t , p.12.

Ibid., p.13.
Ibid., p. 14.
I b i d . , pp.14-15.

Ibid., p.16.
Ibid., p.19.
Essays i n t h e Philosophy of Science, Bobbs-Merrill,
New York, The L i b e r a l Arts P r e s s , 1957, p . v i i i .
 Ibid., p.ix.
Ibid., p.x.
Ibid., p.23.
Ibid., p.23.
Ibid., p.24.
Ibid., p.24.
Ibid., p.25.
Ibid., p.34.
Ibid., p.33.
27. Ibid., p.34.
28. Mind, ~ e l ? ) a n d S o c i e t y , p.44.
29. The Philosophy of t h e P r e s e n t , p.35.
30. Ibid., pp.36-37.
31. Ibid., pp.36-37.
32. Ibid., p.49.
33. Ibid., p.48.
34. Ibid., p.62.
35. Ibid., p.72.
36. Ibid., p.73.
37. Ibid., p.69.
38. Ibid., p.80
39. Ibid., p.83.
40. Ibid., p.83.
4 . Ibid., p.83.
42. Ibid., p.85.
43. Ibid., pp.13-14.
Ibid., pp.88-89.
Ibid., p.90.

From Max Weber, p.155.

Ibid., p.155.
The Philosophy of t h e P r e s e n t , pp.165-66.
Ibid., pp.166-67.
Ibid., p.168.

The Economic and P h i l o s o p h i c Manuscripts of 1844, p. 112.

The German Ideology, pp. 3 -5.
\

For two conCemporary i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of " i n s a n i t y " t h a t

a r e sympathetic w i t h Meadcs t h e o r y (I. s e e L a i n g l s
t h r e e books), The Divided S e l f , a Study of S a n i t y and
Madness, London, Tavistock P u b l . , 1960; The S e l f and
Others, f u r t h e r s t u d i e s i n s a n i t y and madness, London,
m o c k P u b l . , 1961; and The P o l i t i c s of Experience,
New York, Pantheon Books, 1967; ( 2 . and S z a s z r s two
books), P a i n and P l e a s u r e : a s t u d y of b o d i l y f e e l i n g ,
New York, Basic Books, 1957; and The Myth of Mental
I l l n e s s , New York, Hoeber-Harper, 1961.
The Philosophy of t h e P r e s e n t , p. 167.
From Max Weber, o p . c i t . , p.180.

The Philosophy of t h e P r e s e n t , p. 194.

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