Eden Diez

May 2019
ORGC 201
Informative Group Speech Outline

Critical Errors Made By BP

That Ultimately Lead to the Deepwater Horizon Explosion

INTRODUCTION

I. Attention Getter:
A. According to the Report to President Obama by the National Commission on
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill from January 2011, deepwater drilling (in
general) is an unavoidably tough, demanding job, requiring tremendous
engineering expertise.
B. The Macondo oil well was no exception including the fact that (as Addison
mentioned earlier) just 4 years prior there was an earthquake in the Gulf of
Mexico which made the ocean floor extremely unstable.
II. Relevance: Robert Bea, an engineering professor at the University of California-
Berkeley, in a Popular Mechanics article by Carl Hoffman on Sept 2, 2010 said, “The
Deepwater Horizon disaster was a chain of important errors made by people in
critical situations involving complex technological and organization systems.”
III. Thesis: Today I will discuss
A. Two main systematic errors of DeepWater Horizon
B. The immediate decisions that led to the explosion
C. BP as the mastermind

BODY

IV. Justin Mullins from the New Scientist on Sept 8, 2010 reports that the day before
the explosion, the Deepwater Horizon crew pumped cement to the bottom of the
well to prevent oil from leaking out.
A. On the day of the explosion, April 20, tests were run to determine if the well
had been properly sealed with the cement.
B. The well was not properly sealed, which was found out later. An
uncontrollable release or “kick” of flammable oil and gas would later travel up
the well to the Deepwater Horizon and blow the rig up.
V. Joel Achenbach from the Washington Post on Sept 29, 2016 explains that the
Deepwater Horizon was never going to tap the well, a second rig was going to come
along and handle the extraction.
 A. All Deepwater Horizon needed to do was put a cap on the well and sail away.

Transition: This seemingly simple task turned into a nightmare - because every single
safety feature that was designed to stop an explosion failed.

VI. Even though the safety systems failed, it really just boils down to the chain of critical
errors made by BP executives who were eager to begin drilling for oil so they could
make money and leave the rig.
VII. The Report to President Obama by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill from January 2011 points out that the Macondo well was 6 weeks
behind schedule and $58 million over budget...so it’s easy to understand why BP was
eager to begin drilling.

Transition: Now I will discuss BP’s involvement in the events that led to the explosion.

VIII. According to the 2011 Report to President Obama by the National Commission,
critical errors began early in the morning of April 20th, when BP executives and
engineers were confident that the cement job was properly sealed at the bottom of
the well after running primininary tests.
IX. BP was so confident, they decided to send home the three-man technician team
designed to perform final tests and evaluate the cement casing. This decision
“saved” BP time and a $128,000 fee.

Transition: This false sense of security is what led things directly south.

X. The Report to President Obama by the National Commission explains what

happened during the pressure tests that are run before temporary rig abandonment
to check the integrity of the well.
A. The positive-pressure test evaluates the well’s ability to hold in pressure. The
test was successful since there were no leaks and pressure remained steady.
B. On the other hand, the negative-pressure test evaluates not only the
integrity of the well, but also the cement casing at the bottom. The drill pipe
test was unsuccessful since the pressure did not remain at zero, instead it
was at 1,400 pounds per square inch, which is scary considering it should be
at zero.
XI. BP Well Site Leader Vidrine insisted that a second negative-pressure test be run but
this time on the kill line instead of the drill pipe.
A. During a negative-pressure test the kill line and the drill pipe should always
(always, always) have identical results, but this test showed unidentical
results.
 B. The kill line test was successful since no pressure was detected, but the drill
line remained at 1,400 psi which would have only been caused by a leak in the
well.

Transition: Choosing to ignore the fact that the kill line and drill pipe results were not
identical, BP Well Site Leaders mistakenly concluded that the successful kill line test
confirmed the well’s integrity, forgot about the alarming drill pipe test results, and moved
on.

CONCLUSION

XII. According to the Report to President Obama by the National Commission, by

sending the three-man technician team home, BP chose to rely entirely on the
negative-pressure test to evaluate the integrity of the cement casing at the bottom
of the well.
A. The failure to properly interpret the negative-pressure test was the biggest
mistake.
B. BP was insensitive to the pressure readings and unwilling to accept that
maybe the cement casing was flawed. They should’ve shut the well
immediately after learning about the alarming pressure test results.
XIII. Jad Mouawad from the New York Times on May 8, 2010 outlines BP’s history of spills
and safety lapses. For example:
A. In 2005, 15 workers were killed in an explosion in Texas.
B. In 2006, 200,000 gallons of crude oil spilled over Alaska’s North Slope.

Transition: BP continues to lag in terms of reducing accidents and improving safety.

XIV. The recurring theme of missed warning signals and a lack of risk management
highlights the importance of an organizational culture and a consistent commitment
to safety, from the highest management levels on down.
XV. I discussed the critical errors made by BP that ultimately led to the Deepwater
Horizon. Now, Sanjana will talk about Transocean’s involvement.
 Works Cited

Achenbach, Joel. “Deepwater Horizon Movie Gets the Facts Mostly Right, But Simplifies

The Blame.” Washingtonpost.com. 29 Sept. 2016. Web. 14 May 2019.

Hoffman, Carl. “Special Report: Why the BP Oil Rig Blowout Happened.”

Popularmechanics.com. 2 Sept. 2010. Web. 14 May 2019.

National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. “Deep

Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling.”

Govinfo.gov. Jan 2011. Web. 14 May 2019.

Mouawad, Jad. “For BP, a History of Spills and Safety Lapses.” Nytimes.com. 8 May 2010.

Web. 14 May 2019.

Mullins, Justin. “The Eight Failures that Caused the Gulf Oil Spill.” Newscientist.com. 8 Sept.

2010. Web. 14 May 2019.