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Design for safety

 No major hazard accident has occurred or is likely to occur unless there has been a loss of
containment

 Safety in the process industries is largely dependent on the elimination of losses through good
design and maintenance

Design for safety

It is clear that choices made early in design can reduce the possibility for large releases and can reduce
the effects of releases
The opportunity for maximum inherent safety is greatest during early stages of design

Different phases of a project

• Research/process development/conceptual
design
• Process or chemical engineering design
• Engineering design:
mechanical/instrumentation/control systems
• Construction
• Start-up
• Operation

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Design for safety

 The focus is to avoid and mitigate major releases of process materials by implementing safety
reviews at all stages of design from conceptual design to process design, site selection and plant
layout, and civil and structural design

 The quality of the basic design is more critical in determining the safety of the plant than specific
safety features added to minimize the hazards

 The aim is to eliminate the hazard rather than devise measures to control it

 To find ways to maximize process safety in the conceptual design and layout stages of plant
design itself

 Decisions made at the conceptual stages are crucial in forming the basis for process design.
Before beginning the design of the plant, safety elements should receive consideration by the
product and process research and development team, designers and management

Design for safety

Process or chemical Mechanical/instrumentation Any faults in the hardware design or

engineering design
In any project, be it turnkey or expansion of
an existing plant etc., the first step will
normally be a process or chemical
engineering design
The raw materials needed, the end product
and by-products, as well as air
temperatures, flow-rates, weight, dynamic
activities, etc. will need to be considered,
together with the feasibility and cost-
effectiveness of the design
and control engineering design
Once the functional design and geometry of
the plant has been laid down by the process
experts, the concepts will be passed on to
mechanical engineers who will design the
hardware, instrumentation, and software
for the process operation
instrumentation could lead to disaster
Should anything go wrong, even the most
toxic, explosive or flammable material,
provided it is confined or contained
inadequately designed equipment, will not
bring about a disaster so long as that
containment is maintained throughout the
lifetime of the plant

At this stage health and safety will not be a

factor

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Process design
 Process flow diagrams are developed to show major equipment items including sizes, duties,
selected operating pressures and temperatures, major control loops and the process flow
arrangement

 The material and energy balances are also included on the process flow diagrams

 Some of the safety elements that can be included on the flow sheets are:
• Process materials properties
• Process conditions (pressure, temperature, composition)
• Inventory
• Emergency and waste releases
• Process control philosophy

Process design
Process materials properties
General Properties

 Boiling point
 Vapor pressure
 Freezing point
 Molecular weight
 Critical pressure and temperature
 Electrical conductivity
 Fluid density and viscosity
 Thermal properties enthalpy, specific heat, heat of mixing

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Process design
Process materials properties
Reactivity

The reactivity of a chemical substance not only influences process

reactions but influences hazard potential in accidental releases.

Chemical reactivity data are available in:

NFPA 49 and 491M, Handbook of Reactive Chemical Hazards

(Bretherick 1990), "A Method of Determining the Compatibility of
Hazardous Wastes" (EPA 1980)

Guidelines on Chemical Reactivity Evaluation and Applications to

Process Design (CCPS in press).

Process design
Process materials properties
 Exothermic reactions pose hazards because the heat evolved raises the temperature of the
reactants leading to increased reaction rate or vaporization of materials

• In an open system, when high temperature is reached, the materials may ignite or explode
• In a closed system, high temperature can lead to vessel rupture from overpressurization
caused by accelerated reaction.

 Reaction with water: Some materials react violently upon contact with water, generating
considerable heat. For example, some strong acids may evolve large amounts of hazardous fumes
when contacted with water or moisture in the air. It is important to recognize this aspect when
preparing fire fighting contingencies.

 Reaction with air: Pyrophoric substances react violently with air, resulting in spontaneous
ignition. Such substances are typically handled by methods that prevent contact with air, often by
submerging the substance in water or a compatible oil.

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Process design
Process materials properties
 Reaction with oxidizing or reducing agents: Other chemicals react violently with oxidizing or
reducing agents. Oxidants may generate heat, oxygen, and flammable or toxic gases. Reducing
agents react with a variety of chemicals and may generate hydrogen, as well as heat, and
flammable or toxic gases. Storage and usage of strong oxidizing and reducing agents requires
special precautions that are unique to the particular substance in question.

 Polymerization/decomposition reactions: Some chemicals polymerize or decompose at elevated

temperature or if contaminated by polymerization initiators or catalysts. Common substances,
such as water or dust, can initiate polymerization reactions. When polymerization is initiated,
exothermic reaction may occur leading to high temperature and pressure, possibly resulting in
explosion or release of flammable or toxic substances. Such decomposition and polymerization
reactions may be prevented by incorporating safety systems, inhibitors and safe operating
procedures.

Process design
Process materials properties
Flammability

 Another important material characteristic requiring attention in early stages of process design is
flammability

 The most common measures of flammability potential for materials are

• Flash point
• Autoignition temperature
• Flammability limits – upper and lower flammable limit
• Self -heating
• Minimum ignition energy

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Process design
Process materials properties
Toxicity

• Threshold limit values

• Emergency exposure limits
• Lethal concentration LC50
• Lethal dose LD50
• Exposure Effects

 Toxic release under unfavorable conditions is normally regarded as having a disaster potential
greater than fire or explosion; therefore, recognizing the toxicity of materials is important in
process design

 There are three primary routes of entry of toxic chemicals into the body of a living creature:
inhalation, ingestion, and dermal contact

 The common types of physiological damage due to exposure to toxic chemicals are: irritation,
narcosis, asphyxiation, and systemic damage

Process design
Process materials properties
Selected Primary Data
Sources for Toxic
Exposure Limits

The threshold limit value (TLV) of a

chemical substance is believed to
be a level to which a worker can
be exposed day after day for a
working lifetime without adverse
effects

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Process design
Process materials properties
 Stability
• Thermal stability
• Chemical stability
• Shelf life
• Products of decomposition

 Effect of Impurities
• Impurities in process streams may jeopardize desired reactions and possibly pose threats to plant
safety
• These impurities may be traces of compounds typically present in raw materials (e.g., pyrophoric
iron sulfides in petroleum or catalyst poisoning agents)
• Sometimes impurities are the same substance but in a different physical form, such as solids in a
liquid stream or liquid slugs in a gas stream
• Effects of impurities should be critically analyzed before beginning process design

Process design
Process Conditions
 Process conditions, such as pressure and temperature, have their own characteristic problems
and hazards

 High pressures and temperatures create stresses that must be accommodated by design

 Extreme temperatures or pressures individually are usually not the problem, but rather their
combination

 A combination of extreme conditions results in increased plant cost due to the need for material
with high mechanical strength and corrosion resistance

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Process design
Process Conditions: High pressure
 High pressure increases the amount of potential energy available in the process plant

 For these plants, in addition to the energy of compressed gases and of fluids kept under pressure
in the liquid state, there may also be a concern of chemical reactivity under pressure, or an
adverse reaction from rapid depressurization

 Leakage is much more pronounced in high pressure operations

• Because of the large pressure difference, the amount of fluid that can discharge through a
given area is greater
• This has a considerable impact on the consequences of a release, as the hazard zone extends
to a larger area

Process design
Process Conditions: High temperature
 High temperature also poses material failure problems, most frequently due to metal creep and
hydrogen embrittlement

 The use of high temperature conditions usually increases plant cost, not only due to materials of
construction but also due to the requirement for special supports to handle the stresses
generated

 Process design should take these stresses into account. The design should aim at minimizing such
stresses, especially during startup and shutdown

 High temperatures are often obtained with the use of fired heaters, which have additional
hazards like tube rupture and explosions

 It is a good idea to consider using steam heaters, where possible, instead of fired heaters to
prevent such hazards

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Process design
Process Conditions: Low pressure
 Low pressure operation usually does not pose much of a hazard in comparison with other
operating conditions

 However, in the case of vacuum applications where flammable materials are present, the
potential for ingress of air does create a hazardous situation, which can result in the formation of
a flammable mixture leading to fire and/or explosion

 It is essential that this aspect is reviewed and adequate measures provided in the process design
to prevent air ingress

 For equipment not designed for vacuum, damage frequently occurs because of failure to vent
while draining, allowing heated equipment to cool while blocked-in, or failure of a vacuum relief
device due to pluggage

Process design
Process Conditions: Low temperature
 The safety elements to be considered in designing low temperature process units are:

• Low temperature embrittlement due to inadvertent flow of low temperature fluids into
systems constructed of mild steel

• Thermal stresses

• Possibility of failure of refrigerant or coolant systems which are normally provided to

maintain low temperature.

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Process design
Inventory
 A common factor in major disasters in the chemical industry is a large release of a hazardous material

 One of the best ways to make a plant safer is to minimize the potential quantity of hazardous materials
that could be released

 The principal approach is to minimize inventory, so that even if there is a leak or explosion, the
consequences are minimized

• Low inventories result not only in a safer plant but in a cheaper one too

• Lower inventories can be achieved by using smaller or fewer vessels

• If fewer vessels are used, fewer protective devices, such as alarms, valves, trips, and smaller flare
systems maybe required, further reducing plant cost

Process design
Methods to reduce inventory

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Process design
Inventory
 If reduction of the inventory of hazardous material is not feasible, attempts should be made to
use less hazardous conditions, such as low pressure and temperature storage; use of gaseous
material instead of liquid; or use of a safer solvent

 If neither limiting the inventory nor operating the plant under less hazardous conditions are
viable options, other ways to make the plant safer should be considered, such as substituting less
hazardous materials, for example, consider using steam as heat transfer medium instead of a
flammable material

Site selection
Plant siting plays an important role in process safety. Important factors in plant siting typically
include the following items:

 Population density around the site

 Occurrence of natural disasters, such as earthquake, flood, hurricane
 Accessibility to raw materials
 Accessibility to markets
 Transportation
 Availability of land
 Availability of power and utilities
 Labor
 Interface required with other plants
 Government policies, such as siting permits and investment incentives
 Means of effluent disposal

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Site selection
 Safety considerations may take precedence over other factors, possibly causing otherwise
attractive sites to be eliminated for process or general safety concerns

 A plant must be located near sources of workers, but not so close that neighbors can be injured
by gas release, fire, or explosion

 A process safety management program initiated during the development phases of a new project
will identify and explain the nature of hazards associated with the proposed plant

 Based on these discoveries, a site can be selected after considering many of the recognized
hazards

Site selection
 Frequently, the most important consideration in plant siting is providing an adequate buffer zone
between hazardous plant operations and nearby plants, communities and public facilities such as
schools, hospitals, highways, waterways, and airways

 Distance usually mitigates the consequences of loss-of-containment incidents and reduces

casualties in case of undesired incidents; however, the importance of distance depends upon the
nature of the hazard

 Dispersion and other types of exposure studies for off-site areas help determine the amount of
open area needed between potentially hazardous process units and the general public

 This should be continually analyzed for the life of the plant as communities grow. Bhopal was a
"safe" site until a town was allowed to develop outside the plant fence

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Site selection
Some Important Safety Considerations in Plant Siting

Site selection
 Distance to nearby hazardous installations is also important
• All of the considerations mentioned above apply in reverse when new facilities are sited near
existing facilities
• Consider the possibility that new facilities and their employees can be exposed to vapor releases,
fires, or explosions from neighboring plants
• If possible, try to anticipate and model problems at nearby facilities to determine consequences
for proposed units
• Hopefully, plant sites can be chosen where dangerous effects from neighboring facilities are
minimal

 Suitable emergency response support, such as medical resources in nearby communities, is vitally
important in emergency situations

 Other considerations are adequate fire fighting water supply and availability of fire fighting equipment
in nearby plants which can be relied upon in large-scale emergencies

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Site evaluation
Sites must be evaluated for potential risks to human populations. Factors to be evaluated include:

 Credible "worst case" scenarios

 Reasonable definition of local meteorological conditions and possible extremes
 Population density and the numbers of people likely to be involved
 The general planning and development guidelines for the region
 The ability to control movement of people in an emergency

Site evaluation
 Determining consequences of the "credible worst case" scenario is the first step in evaluation of
sites

 The process safety management program should ensure that the analysis is based on reasonable
and consistent assumptions, as this is vital when alternate sites are compared

 It is impossible to completely eliminate the risk to the public from hazardous plants

 It is often not cost effective to keep a large buffer area or sterile zone surrounding a plant where
land value is at a premium

 Therefore, in some selected situations, the use of quantitative risk analysis techniques in site
selection may be appropriate (Risk assessment is a technique used to quantify the total risk by
evaluating the consequences and probabilities)

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Plant layout
 The arrangement of process units and buildings are crucial factors in the safety and economics of
a chemical plant

 The plant layout (plot plan) should incorporate safety while providing access for operations and
maintenance

 Some of the safety benefits of a good layout are:

• Minimal explosion damage, since explosion overpressure falls off rapidly with distance from
the center of the explosion.
• Minimal thermal radiation damage, as the intensity of thermal radiation also falls off with the
distance.
• Less property damage caused by a given incident.
• Easier access for emergency services such as fire fighting.
• Easier access to equipment for maintenance and inspection.
• Efficient and safe construction.
• Optimum balance among loss control, maintenance, and operation requirements.

Plant layout
 Plant layout can have a large impact on plant economics

 Additional space increases the investment due to high capital costs (more land, piping, cabling,
etc.) and operating costs. On the other hand, additional space tends to enhance safety. It is
important, therefore, to carefully weigh these issues to optimize the plant layout.

 Important Safety Factors in Plant Layout

• Containment of accidents
• High hazard operations
• Segregation of different risks
• Exposure to possible explosion overpressure
• Exposure to fire radiation
• Minimization of vulnerable piping
• Drainage and grade sloping
• Prevailing wind direction
• Future expansions

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Plant layout
 As a general guideline, the layout of the units is based on the flow principle so that the material
flow follows the process flow diagram

 The goal is to minimize the transfer of materials both for economic and safety reasons, and allow
a release to be contained at its source

 Plant layout is largely constrained by the need to observe minimum safe separation distances

 Adequate separation is often achieved by dividing up a plant into process blocks of similar hazards
(e.g., process units, tank farms, loading/unloading operations, utilities, waste treatment, support
areas), and then separating individual operations or hazards within each block

Some definitions
“Safety” and “Loss prevention”
 The word "safety" used to mean the older strategy of accident prevention through the use of hard
hats, safety shoes, and a variety of rules and regulations. The main emphasis was on worker
safety

 Much more recently, "safety" has been replaced by "loss prevention." This term includes hazard
identification, technical evaluation, and the design of new engineering features to prevent loss.

 But, for convenience, the words "safety“ and "loss prevention" are used synonymously

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Some definitions
“Safety/Loss prevention”, “Risk” and “Hazard”
 Safety or loss prevention: the prevention of accidents through the use of appropriate
technologies to identify the hazards of a chemical plant and eliminate them before an accident
occurs

 Hazard: a chemical or physical condition that has the potential to cause damage to people,
property, or the environment

 Risk: a measure of human injury, environmental damage, or economic loss in terms of boththe
incident likelihood and the magnitude of the loss or injury

Safety

 A good safety program identifies and eliminates existing safety hazards

• A good safety program eliminates the existing hazards as they are identified

 An outstanding safety program has management systems that prevent the existence of safety
hazards
• An outstanding safety program prevents the existence of a hazard in the first place

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Defeating the Accident Process

Steps in a typical Desired effect Procedure
accident sequence
Initiation Diminish Grounding and bonding
Inerting
Explosion proof electrical
Guardrails and guards
Maintenance procedures
Hot work permits
Human factors design
Process design
Awareness of dangerous properties of chemicals
Propagation Diminish Emergency material transfer
Reduce inventories of flammable materials
Equipment spacing and layout
Nonflammable construction materials
Installation of check and emergency shutoff valves
Termination Increase Firefighting equipment and procedures
Relief systems
Sprinkler systems
Installation of check and emergency shutoff valves

Inherent Safety
 Often, the traditional approach to managing chemical As per Crowl:
process safety accepts the existence and magnitude of
hazards in a process, and works to add sufficient
safeguards to reach the desired level of risk by
reducing the likelihood or consequences of process
safety events

 Inherently safer design is defined as a way of thinking

about the design of chemical processes and plants that
focuses on the elimination or reduction of hazards,
rather than on their management and control

 An inherently safe plant relies on chemistry and physics

to prevent accidents rather than on control systems,
interlocks, redundancy, and special operating
procedures to prevent accidents

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Inherent Safety
When to apply?

As per Crowl:
 Although a process or plant can be modified to
increase inherent safety at any time in its life cycle,
the potential for major improvements is the
greatest at the earliest stages of process
development

 At these early stages process engineers and

chemists have the maximum degree of freedom in
the plant and process specifications, and they are
free to consider basic process alternatives, such as
changes to the fundamental chemistry and
technology

Inherent Safety
Other advantages
 Where feasible, an inherently safer design has the potential to make the chemical processing
technology simpler and more economical in many cases, and enables more robust and reliable
risk management

• Smaller equipment, operated at less severe temperatures and pressures, has lower capital
and operating costs

• A process that does not require complex safety interlocks and elaborate procedures is
simpler, easier to operate, and more reliable

 Thus, inherently safer plants are often the most cost effective and more tolerant of operator
errors and abnormal conditions

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Inherent Safety
Strategies for designing inherently safer processes

Minimize •Use small quantities of hazardous materials, reduce the

size of equipment operating under hazardous conditions
(Intensification) such as high temperature or pressure

Substitute
• Use less hazardous materials, chemistry, and processes
(Substitution)

Moderate •Reduce hazards by process alternatives which operate at

(Attenuation and limitation of effects) less hazardous conditions, dilution, refrigeration

Simplify •Eliminate unnecessary complexity, design “user friendly”

(Simplification and error tolerance) plants

Crowl’s Lion Farm

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Crowl’s Lion Farm

Hazard: Lions

Incident: Driver loses control of pick-up truck.

Scenario: Truck drives thru Lion cage fence.

Lions walk thru hole in fence.
Lions prowl around community.
Incident Outcome:
Local community is alarmed, people are attacked, several
dogs disappear.

Crowl’s Lion Farm

Inherently Safer Design Approach:

If we are cultivating the lions only for meat, why
not use lambs instead?

This way, the hazard is eliminated,

control is simplified,
fences are reduced in strength, and
emergency response is eliminated

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Substitute

= Replace with a less hazardous

material

– Reduces/eliminates available
chemical energy
– Reduces/eliminates potential
accident severity

Substitute - Ammonia

Many years ago (pre-1930):

Toxic, flammable refrigerants:
• Ammonia, light hydrocarbons, sulfur dioxide
• Quantity – very large in commercial refrigeration

Inherently safer alternative (1930s):

CFCs: not toxic or flammable!

Discovery of environmental issues (1980s):

“Green” alternatives: HCFC, others.

Back to the Past (Today):

Ammonia!

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Minimize

= Reduce hazardous material/energy quantity

– Reduces energy
– Reduces potential accident severity

Minimize: Nitration
Catalyst (usually
sulfuric acid) feed
or pre-charge

Organic Substrate and Nitric acid gradual

solvents pre-charge addition

100 gallon batch

Batch Reactor continuous reactor
~6000 gallons Much smaller
quantity,
6000 gallon
better control of
semi-batch reactor temperature.

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Moderate
= Use under less hazardous
conditions
– Available energy may be the same,
but
– Passively reduces potential loss
event impacts
– For chemical processes, this usually
means lower temperatures,
pressures, concentrations, etc.

Moderate – Less Severe Conditions

Ammonia Manufacture:
– 1930s - pressures up to 600 bar
– 1950s - typically 300-350 bar
– 1980s - plants operating at pressures of 100-150
bar were being built

Result of improvements:
Lower pressure plants are cheaper, more
efficient, and safer.

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Simplify

= Reduce unnecessary complexity

– Reduces likelihood of an accident

Simplify

• Eliminate unnecessary complexity to

reduce the risk of human error
• QUESTION ALL COMPLEXITY! Is it
really necessary?

Often a trade-off:
Flexibility vs
Simplicity

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Traditional Methyl Acetate Process

Acetic Acid
Methanol
Catalyst

Methyl
Acetate

Reactor Methanol
Recovery
Solvent
Recovery

Splitter
Extractive
Distillaton
Water

Decanter

Extractor

Color
Column

Flash
Az eo Column
Column

Heavies

Flash
Column

Water
Water

Eastman Reactive Distillation Process

Methyl
Acetate

Acetic Acid

Trade off:
Sulfuric
Acid overall process is
simplified
Methanol

Reactor
Column
Impurity
Removal
Columns Heavies

Water

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Minimize Substitute Moderate Simplify

• Entails reducing the hazards
by using smaller quantities
of hazardous substances in
the reactors, distillation
columns, storage vessels,
and pipelines.
• When possible, hazardous
materials should be
produced and consumed in
situ
• This minimizes the storage
and transportation of
hazardous raw materials and
intermediates
• Safer materials should be
used in place of hazardous
ones
• This can be accomplished by
using alternative chemistry
that allows the use of less
hazardous materials or less
severe processing conditions
• When possible, toxic or
flammable solvents should
be replaced with less
hazardous solvents (for
example, water-based paints
and adhesives and aqueous
or dry flowable formulations
for agricultural chemicals)
• Using a hazardous material
under less hazardous
conditions
• Less hazardous conditions or
less hazardous forms of a
material include:
•(1) diluting to a lower
vapor pressure to reduce the
release concentration,
•(2) refrigerating to lower
the vapor pressure
•(3) handling larger particle
size solids to minimize dust,
and
•(4) processing under less
severe temperature or
pressure conditions
• Simpler plants are friendlier
than complex plants because
they provide fewer
opportunities for error and
because they contain less
equipment that can cause
problems
• Often, the reason for
complexity in a plant is the
need to add equipment and
automation to control the
hazards.
• Simplification reduces the
opportunities for errors and
misoperation

Inherent Safety Techniques

Type Strategy Typical techniques

Minimize Use small quantities of hazardous
(intensification) materials, reduce the size of
equipment operating under
hazardous conditions such as high
temperature or pressure
Substitute Use less hazardous materials,
(substitution) chemistry, and processes
Change from large batch reactor to a smaller continuous
reactor
Reduce storage inventory of raw materials
Improve control to reduce inventory of hazardous
intermediate chemicals
Reduce process hold-up
Use mechanical pump seals vs. packing
Use welded pipe vs. flanged
Use solvents that are less toxic
Use mechanical gauges vs. mercury
Use chemicals with higher flash points, boiling points, and
other less hazardous
properties
Use water as a heat transfer fluid instead of hot oil

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Inherent Safety Techniques

Type Strategy Typical techniques

Moderate Reduce hazards by Use vacuum to reduce boiling point

(attenuation process alternatives Reduce process temperatures and pressures
and limitation of which operate at less Refrigerate storage vessels
effects) hazardous conditions, Dissolve hazardous material in safe solvent
dilution, refrigeration Operate at conditions where reactor runaway is not possible
Place control rooms away from operations
Separate pump rooms from other rooms
Acoustically insulate noisy lines and equipment
Barricade control rooms and tanks
Simplify Eliminate unnecessary Keep piping systems neat and visually easy to follow
(simplification complexity, design Design control panels that are easy to comprehend
and error “user friendly” plants Design plants for easy and safe maintenance
tolerance) Pick equipment that requires less maintenance
Pick equipment with low failure rates
Add fire- and explosion-resistant barricades
Separate systems and controls into blocks that are easy to comprehend
Label pipes for easy "walking the line"
Label vessels and controls to enhance understanding

Layers of Protection – modified by ISD

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The order of preference for general process safety

design strategies
 Inherent: Eliminate or greatly reduce the hazard by changing the process or materials to use materials
and conditions which are nonhazardous or much less hazardous.

 Passive: Passive strategies minimize hazards using process or equipment design features which reduce
the frequency or consequence of an incident without the active functioning of any device. A
containment dike is an example of a passive safeguard. A passive safeguard can degrade with time, for
example, a concrete dike can develop cracks and holes, so they must be inspected accordingly.

 Active: Active strategies include process control systems, safety interlocks, automatic shutdown
systems, and automatic incident mitigation systems such as sprinkler systems to extinguish a fire.
Several elements have to function for active systems to work. These systems must therefore be tested
in a regular basis.

 Procedural: Procedural safety features include standard operating procedures, safety rules and
procedures, operator training, emergency response procedures, and management systems.

Analysis of hazards

Identify Evaluate Control

 Identify the hazards: what can possibly go wrong

 Evaluate the hazards: what are all the causes and how bad it can be

 Control the hazards: what should be done about it

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Material hazard
 These are mainly because of quantity, concentration, or physical or chemical characteristics of the
materials which poses a significant present or potential hazard to human health and safety or to
the environment
• Combustible solids, liquids or gases
• Highly flammable materials
• Radioactive materials
• Reactive materials
• Oxidizing materials
• Corrosive materials
• Nuclear materials
• Toxic materials

 Apart from this, some materials react with water to produce a combustible gas and some
materials subjects to spontaneous heating, polymerization, or explosive decomposition

 It is important to keep such materials separate during both use and storage

Process hazard
 General process hazard

 Special process hazard

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Process hazards
General process hazards
The general process hazards might arise due to several factors, some of which are listed below

 Exothermic chemical reaction, in this case there is a strong possibility of the reaction getting out of control

 Endothermic reaction that could react due to an external heat source such as fire or combustion of fuel

 Material handling and transfer, accounts for the hazard involved in the handling, transfer/pumping and
warehousing of the material

 Enclosed or indoor process units, accounts for the additional hazard where the process units preventing
dispersion of the escaped vapors

 Limited access for emergency equipment

 Drainage and spill control, inadequate design of drainage would cause large spills of the flammable material
adjacent to process equipment

Process hazards
Special process hazards
The special process hazards are the factors that are known from experience to contribute to the
probability of incident involving loss

 Toxic materials: after an incident the presence of toxic material at site will make the work of
emergency personnel more difficult. The factor applied in this case ranges from 0 to 0.8. Zero
implies for non toxic material and 0.8 for materials that can cause death after short exposure

 Low pressure process operating at sub atmospheric conditions allows for the hazard of air leakage
into equipment

 Operation in or near flammable limits covers for the possibility of air mixing with material in
equipment or storage tanks, under conditions where the mixture will be within the explosive
range

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Process hazards
Special process hazards
The special process hazards are the factors that are known from experience to contribute to the
probability of incident involving loss

 Dust explosion risks may arise in processes which involve handling of materials that could create
dust. The degree of risk is largely determined by the particle size and nature of the material

 Relief pressure hazard results from the potentially large expansion of fluid to the atmosphere
from elevated pressure. Equipment design and operation becomes more crucial as the operating
pressure in increased. The factor to apply in this case depends on the relief device setting and
physical nature of the process materials.

 Low temperature processes allows for the possibility of the embrittlement of carbon steel vessels,
or other metals, at low temperatures.

 Quantity of flammable material the probable loss will be greater, if greater the quantity of the
flammable material in the process or in storage.

Process hazards
Special process hazards
 Corrosion and erosion of the process unit structure even with good design and material selection, some
corrosion and problems may arise in the unit process, both internally and externally. Anticipated
corrosion rate predicts the penalty factor. The severest factor is applied if stress corrosion is likely to
occur.

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Process hazards
Special process hazards
 Leakage around packings and joints this factor allows for the possibility of leakage from gasket,
pump and other shaft seals, and packed glands. The severity of the factor varies where there is a
minor leak to the process that have sight glasses, bellows or other expansion joints.

 Use of fired heaters providing a ready ignition source boilers and furnaces are heated by the
combustion of the fuel and the presence of such units increases the probability of ignition due to
leak of combustible material from the process unit. The risk involved depends on the siting of the
fired equipments and the flash point of the process material.

 Hot oil heat exchange systems in most of the cases heat exchange fluids are flammable and are
often used above their flash points, therefore their use in the unit increases the risk of fire or
explosions.

Process hazards
Special process hazards
 Rotating equipment this covers the hazards that arise from the use of large pieces of rotating
equipment: compressors, centrifuge, mixers.

 Apart from these, in many cases equipment or instruments in the process fails due to
thermocouple burnt out, loss of electrical power, steam or cooling water failure, plugging of lines
or equipment, etc.

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General Unit Operations and Their Failure Modes

 Pumps, compressors and fans
 Heat Exchange Equipment
 Mass Transfer; Distillation, Leaching and Extraction, Absorption
 Mechanical Separation / Solid-Fluid Separation
 Reactors and Reactive Hazards
 Fired Equipment
 Storage

Pumps, compressors and fans

 Pumps, compressors and fans are used to move fluids from one point to another. In doing so, they
impart energy, in the form of pressure and temperature, to the fluid being moved.

 If they are run with the inlet and or outlet blocked they can heat the contained fluid, which can have
consequences depending on the characteristics of the fluid.

 This can create hazards that will depend on the properties of the fluid being moved

 As rotating equipment items, they will have seals around rotating shafts, whose failure can lead to
leaks

 Again, the hazards from leaks will depend on the fluid being moved

 Finally, they can just fail to run or run for too long, leading to potential hazardous consequences to
other parts of the process.

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Pumps, compressors and fans

 Common failure modes for pumps and compressors include
• Stopping
• Deadheading and isolation
• Cavitation/surging
• Reverse flow
• Seal leaks
• Casing failures
• Motor failures

 Knowledge of the properties of the fluid is necessary to assess the hazards of the potential
failures of fluid transfer equipment

Pumps, compressors and fans

 Deadheading or isolation of pumps and compressors can lead to uncontrolled reactions,
exothermic decomposition, and explosion hazards when moving chemicals that are reactive, have
thermal stability issues, or are shock sensitive because pumps and compressors impart energy to
the fluid

 Example: Pumping of Ammonium Nitrate (AN) solutions, which become more sensitive to
deflagration and detonation at high temperatures

 If loss of containment due to a seal failure occurs, then the release of materials that are
flammable can lead to fire and explosion hazards, also corrosive or toxic materials can create
personnel hazards

 A low boiling fluid can flash, so knowledge of the vapor pressure/temperature is needed

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Pumps, compressors and fans

Damage from fire caused by mechanical seal failure Pump explosion from running isolated

The pump in the picture above was destroyed
because the mechanical seal failed. The light
hydrocarbon being pumped was released; it
ignited and burned – causing extensive local
damage.
A 75 HP centrifugal pump was operated with both suction and
discharge valves closed for about 45 minutes. It was believed to
be completely full of liquid. As mechanical energy from the
motor was transferred to heat, the liquid in the pump slowly
increased in temperature and pressure until finally the pump
failed catastrophically. One fragment weighing 2.2 Kg was
found over 120 meters away.

Pumps, compressors and fans

 When pumps and other rotating equipment are running, the process fluid can leak from between
the rotating shaft and the body of the pump

 Leaks can result in fires or toxic releases if the fluids are flammable or toxic. There are different
types of seal configurations to prevent these leaks.

 The selection of pump and seal type is usually dependent on process considerations

 There are process safety implications for every type of pump and seal

 With compressors, liquid entry into the compressor can cause catastrophic failure

 Protection should be provided upstream of compressors to remove liquids and associated

shutdown should systems should also be provided

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Pumps, compressors and fans

Centrifugal pumps: leaks
 Centrifugal pumps are susceptible to leaks, deadheading,
running isolated, cavitation and reverse flow.

 Centrifugal pumps, as with other rotating equipment, need

shaft seals between the process fluid and the external
environment

• The simplest form of a seal is a packing material. This

can degrade with time and leak.

• Mechanical seals are the next type. In a mechanical

seal pump, a seal face is kept in contact between the
shaft and casing. These seals leak less than packing,
but do require a lubricating fluid that must be
compatible with the process fluid.

Centrifugal pumps: leaks

 A seal is simply a method of containing fluid within a vessel (typically pumps, mixers, etc.) where a
rotating shaft passes through a stationary housing or occasionally, where the housing rotates
around the shaft.
 When sealing a centrifugal pump, the challenge is to allow a rotating shaft to enter the ‘wet’ area
of the pump, without allowing large volumes of pressurized fluid to escape.

 To address this challenge there needs to be a seal between the shaft and the pump housing that
can contain the pressure of the process being pumped and withstand the friction caused by the
shaft rotating.

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Centrifugal pumps: leaks

Traditional sealing method
 Gland packing is a braided, rope like material that is packed around the shaft - physically stuffing
the gap between the shaft and the pump housing.

 Limitations:
 The friction of the shaft rotating wears away at the packing over time, which leads to increased
leakage until the packing is adjusted or re-packed.
 The friction of the shaft also means that packing needs to be flushed with large volumes of water
in order to keep it cool.
 Packing needs to press against the shaft in order to reduce leakage – this means that the pump
needs more drive power to turn the shaft, wasting energy.
 Because packing needs to contact the shaft it will eventually wear a groove into it, which can be
costly to repair or replace.
 Mechanical seals are the next type. In a mechanical seal pump, a seal face is kept in contact
between the shaft and casing. These seals leak less than packing, but do require a lubricating fluid
that must be compatible with the process fluid.

Pumps, compressors and fans

Centrifugal pumps: leaks
 There are also sealless pumps

• These are pumps with a magnetic drive, where there is no direct connection between the
motor and the pump shaft, are an example of these.

• If a very hazardous fluid is being pumped, sealless pumps can be the best choice.

 Sealless pumps also have safety considerations. If they are run dry (i.e. the inlet is blocked), the
bearings can be damaged, causing high temperature.

 There is a risk tradeoff in the selection of centrifugal sealed pumps in comparison to sealless
pumps. Pumps with seals may fail more frequently with lower consequence, while sealless pumps
may experience catastrophic failures, but less frequent, failures.

 A sealless pump may be appropriate for a highly toxic fluid but not for a less hazardous one.

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Pumps, compressors and fans

Centrifugal pumps: deadheading or isolation
 In a deadheaded pump, a blockage on the discharge side of the pump results in the flow reducing
to zero and an increase in the discharge pressure.

 The energy input from the deadheaded pump increases the temperature and pressure of the fluid
in the pump

 Designs should be considered to operate in a manner that prevents the pump from a deadhead
operation for more than a very short period of time

 If a centrifugal pump stops while on line, the fluid can flow in reverse, from the destination to the
source if the piping and differential pressures allow it

 Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA) is needed to assess the consequences and
protections needed for the reverse flow scenario

Pumps, compressors and fans

Positive displacement pumps
Types

 Rotary screw pumps

 Gear pumps
 Diaphragm pumps
 Progressive cavity pumps
 Piston pumps
 Peristaltic tubing pumps

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Pumps, compressors and fans

Positive displacement pumps
 Reverse flow is more difficult in positive displacement pumps,

 but positive displacement pumps can build up high pressures if deadheaded

 Air driven diaphragm pumps can, however, be operated deadheaded

 Because of the rapid buildup of pressure if many types of positive displacement pumps are
deadheaded, some type of pressure relief or automatic shutoff device triggered by a pressure
sensor is almost always included with the installation of positive displacement pumps

 Many companies will also install a pressure relief device or high pressure shutoff external to the
pump

Common failure modes, consequences and design

considerations for pumps, compressors, fans
Failure mode Causes Consequences Design considerations

Stopping • Power failure Consequence to • Power indication on

• Mechanical failure
• Control system action
(failure or intended)
Deadheading or Pump/compressor
Isolation outlet blocked in by:
• Closed valves (manual,
control block) on discharge
side
• Plugged lines
• Blinds left in
upstream or downstream pump
equipment (HIRA needed) • Low flow
alarms/interlocks
See Reverse Flow • Level alarms and
interlocks in other
equipment
Loss of containment due • Overpressure
to high temperature and protection.
pressure causing seal, • Minimum flow
gasket, expansion joint, recirculation lines.
pump or piping failure. • Alarms/interlocks to
shut down the pump
Possible phase changes, or compressor on low
reactions. flow or power
• Limit closing time for
valves

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Common failure modes, consequences and design

considerations for pumps, compressors, fans
Failure mode Causes Consequences Design considerations

Cavitation/Surging Blocked suction by: Loss of containment due • Low flow

• Closed inlet valves to damage to seals or alarms/interlock to
• Plugged filters/strainers impellers shut down the pump
or compressor
• Vibration
alarms/interlocks
Reverse Flow Pump or compressor stops • Loss of containment • Non-Return (Check)
upstream valves on discharge
• Overpressure side
upstream • Automatic isolation
• Contamination valves
upstream • Overpressure
protection upstream
• Positive displacement
pump

Common failure modes, consequences and design

considerations for pumps, compressors, fans
Failure mode Causes Consequences Design considerations

Seal Leaks • Particulates in feed Loss of containment due • Alarms or interlocks on

• Loss of seal fluids
• Age (wearing out)
Contamination/ Liquid in compressor feed
change of fluid
to damage to seals seal fluid system to
shutdown
pump/compressor
• Double mechanical
seals with alarm on
loss of one seal
• Sealless pumps
Compressor damage Knock out pots before
Seal leaks compressor

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Pump Application Data Sheet

 The first block of information, Liquid Properties,

specifically asks for safety information such as
flammability, toxicity, regulatory coverage

 Other properties that could be of interest could be

thermal stability or reactivity of the fluid

 The next block, Materials of Construction, is

important to safe processing

 Use of the incorrect material of construction can lead

to loss of containment

Engineering standards that include design

considerations for pumps

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Heat Exchange Equipment

 Heat exchange equipment is used to control temperature by transferring heat from one fluid to
another

Heat transfer equipment includes

• heat exchangers
• Vaporizers
• Reboilers
• Process heat recovery boilers
• Condensers
• Coolers
• Heating/cooling coils in a vessel such as a reactor or storage tank

Heat Exchange Equipment

Shell and tube heat exchanger

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Heat Exchange Equipment

 Thermal stress: Due to its nature, heat exchange equipment can see thermal stress due to
temperature gradients, which can lead to loss of containment

 Corrosion or erosion: Leaks due to corrosion or erosion are another common failure mode. The
consequence of this depends on the nature of the process, the direction of the leak (process side
to utility or vice versa), and the fluids involved.

• Failure to keep the fluids separate due to tube leaks can result in reactive chemical incidents
or release of a toxic or flammable material into the low pressure side where it can escape
elsewhere

 Other failure modes: Failure of this equipment can occur due to fouling, plugging, or loss of the
heat transfer fluid supply

Heat Exchange Equipment:

Fouling
 The deposition of any undesired material on heat transfer surfaces is called fouling.
 Fouling may significantly impact the thermal and mechanical performance of heat exchangers.

Scaling/Crystallization Particulate/Sedimentation Corrosion Fouling

Fouling Fouling

Inverse solubility salts

such as calcium
carbonate (CaCO3) Metals such as copper and
found in water Particles (e.g. dirt, sand aluminum form adherent oxide
or rust) coatings

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Heat Exchange Equipment:

Fouling

Chemical Fouling Freezing Fouling Biological Fouling

Coking of hydrocarbon paraffin solidified from a cooled

material petroleum product When biological organisms grow
on heat transfer surfaces where
untreated water is used as the
coolant.

Heat Exchange Equipment

 Thus, failures in heat transfer equipment can lead to

• Loss of temperature control

• Contamination of one of the fluids
• Loss of containment of the heat transfer fluid

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Heat Exchange Equipment

Case study: Failure to keep the fluids separate due to tube leaks resulting in reactive chemical incidents

 Cause: Leak of molten nitrate salt (used to

remove heat from a reactor) into piping
where carbonaceous deposits had been
trapped in a short dead-leg

 Resulting reaction resembled closely the

decomposition of TNT explosive

 Lessons:
• The incident showed that it was critical
to avoid leaks of the nitrate salt
• To detect leaks if they did occur and
• To have a safe shutdown procedure if
there was a leak

Ruptured pipe from reaction with heat transfer fluid

Dead leg

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Heat Exchange Equipment

Case study: Failure caused due to thermal stress

 Longford Gas Plant Explosion, 1998

 Cause: Loss of lean oil flow leading to a major reduction in temperature of the heat exchanger,
resulting in embrittlement of the steel shell

 This allowed a metal heat exchanger to become extremely cold and brittle

 When operators restarted flow of the lean oil to the heat exchanger, it ruptured, releasing a cloud
of gas and oil

 When the cloud reached an ignition source, the fire flashed back to the release and exploded

Heat Exchange Equipment

Design considerations: addressing leaks
One of the biggest concerns is mixing of fluids due to tube leaks. Design considerations to prevent
or mitigate this include:

 Put a highly toxic fluid on the tube side so tube leaks go into the shell side and can be detected in
the cooling tower or piping at low non-hazardous concentrations. Also leaks from a shell failure
are the utility fluid and not the highly toxic fluid.

 Careful selection of materials of construction to resist corrosion on both sides

 Use of double tube sheets for heat exchangers handling toxic chemicals or for materials where
mixing must be avoided

 Consideration of fluid velocities, fluid properties, contaminants (solids and dissolved materials),
and impingement

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Heat Exchange Equipment

Design considerations: control of temperature

 Control of temperature in a process is usually an important, if not

critical, process parameter

 Some design considerations to deal with this are:

• Design for periodic cleaning to remove fouling

• Provide a tube sheet vent nozzle or other a means to vent

non condensable gases from the process system

• Tube pitch and spacing, flow distribution, fluid velocity and

temperature gradient should be considered to prevent
fouling

Engineering standards that include design

considerations for heat exchangers
 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
 API Standard 660, Shell and Tube Heat Exchangers
 Tubular Exchanger Manufacturers Association
 Heat Exchanger Institute standards

48

Common failure modes, causes, consequences, design
considerations for heat exchange equipment
Failure mode Causes
Leak from • Corrosion from
heat transfer contaminants in the process • Inadvertent mixing
surface fluids, and cooling fluids,
and/or loss of treatment
chemicals
• Anaerobic attack under
sediments and Scale
• Thermal stress (e.g. extreme
heat/cold)
Common failure modes, causes, consequences, design
considerations for heat exchange equipment
Failure mode Causes
Rupture from heat • Corrosion
transfer surface • Thermal stress (e.g. extreme
heat/cold)
• Operation out of design
temperature range resulting
in stress cracking,
improvement, weakening of
tubes or tubesheet (see loss
of cooling or heating load)
• Blocking in one fluid side
during operation
Loss of cooling or • Loss from supply
heating fluid • Control system malfunction
• Pluggage
• Mis-valving
2/7/2020
Consequences Design considerations
• Loss of containment • Periodic inspection
• Choice of materials of
and contamination of construction
low pressure side, • Choice of heat transfer
potential reactions, fluid
(HIRA needed) • Shell expansion joints
• Non shell and tube
design
• Control of introduction
of process fluids
during startup and
shutdown
• Monitoring of low
pressure side fluid
• Toxic fluids in tubes,
monitor shell side
Consequences Design considerations
• Potential rupture of • Emergency relief
heat exchanger device
• Loss of containment • Control of introduction
of process fluids
during startup and
shutdown
• Loss of process control • Alarms / interlocks on
(HIRA needed) low flow or pressure of
• High pressure heat transfer medium
• High or low
temperature alarms on
process side
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Common failure modes, causes, consequences, design

considerations for heat exchange equipment
Failure mode Causes Consequences Design considerations

Inadequate heat • Fouling • Loss of process control • Ability to clean

transfer • Accumulation of non- (HIRA needed) • High or low
condensable gases (mostly • High pressure temperature alarms on
condensers) process side

Mass Transfer:
Distillation, Leaching and Extraction, Absorption
 Mass transfer operations are used to separate materials, purify products, and detoxify waste
streams

 Knowledge of the properties of the materials being handled is necessary to assess the hazards of
the potential failures of mass transfer equipment

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Mass Transfer:
Distillation, Leaching and Extraction, Absorption

Mass Transfer:
Distillation, Leaching and Extraction, Absorption
 Distillation, stripping and absorption frequently involve flammable materials; therefore, loss of
containment can result in fires and explosions

 High temperatures are used, especially in the reboilers, to drive the distillation/stripping; therefore the
thermal stability of the materials being handled needs to be understood

 Loss of cooling to a reflux condenser can affect the composition of materials in a distillation, which
again leads to the need to understand the effect of composition on the thermal stability characteristics
of the material being handled

 High levels of liquid in columns can lead to, high pressure, and loss of containment

 Higher liquid loading on trays can result to damage to trays and result in more serious temperature
upsets

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 Distillation is any process where a mixed stream is separated by boiling point. For example, we might start with a
mix of A and B. If we know that A has a much lower boiling point, we can heat the mixture to A's boiling point and
get a much more concentrated stream of A out of the top (called the distillate). Depending on how you design the
distillation tower, you can also potentially get a more concentrated stream of B out of the bottom (called the
bottoms), but it's not guaranteed.

 Stripping is a separation process where a contaminate is removed from a liquid stream by a vapor stream. For
maximum effectiveness they are generally made to flow counter-current to each other (vapor into the bottom,
liquid into the top). For example, if we had a stream of chemical A that was contaminated with chemical B, and we
knew that air has a higher affinity for chemical B than chemical A does, then we can mix our contaminated stream
with air and the air will carry away the contaminate, leaving us with a concentrated A stream.

 Extraction is a separation process where two immiscible liquids are mixed to remove a contaminate from one of
them. "Immiscible" means that the two liquids do not mix (like oil and water). Say for example we had a stream of
A which is immiscible in water, that's contaminated with some B which is miscible in water. We could mix some
water into our contaminated A and the water will dissolve the B and carry it away. A and water can be easily
separated because they do not mix, and will create distinct layers.

 Absorption is the process of absorbing a gas into a liquid stream. For instance, if you have a coal-
based power plant, and you want to let out the gaseous wastes of your combustion furnace
(technically called flue gas) into the atmosphere, you need to remove (or at least greatly reduce
the concentrations of) harmful gases present in it before you can do so. Now, for the sake of
simplicity, let us assume there is only one harmful gas, B, and the rest of it is harmless gas, A. This
is where absorption can help you - you pass your flue gas stream through a column exposed to a
liquid Z that preferentially dissolves B over A. This is absorption.

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 Stripping is mainly conducted in trayed towers (plate columns) and packed columns, and less
often in spray towers, bubble columns, and centrifugal contactors.[1]
 Trayed towers consist of a vertical column with liquid flowing in the top and out the bottom. The
vapor phase enters in the bottom of the column and exits out of the top. Inside of the column are
trays or plates. These trays force the liquid to flow back and forth horizontally while the vapor
bubbles up through holes in the trays. The purpose of these trays is to increase the amount of
contact area between the liquid and vapor phases.
 Packed columns are similar to trayed columns in that the liquid and vapor flows enter and exit in
the same manner. The difference is that in packed towers there are no trays. Instead, packing is
used to increase the contact area between the liquid and vapor phases. There are many different
types of packing used and each one has advantages and disadvantages.

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Stripping coloumn

An example of a bubble cap tray that

could be found inside of a stripping
column.

Mass Transfer:
Distillation, Leaching and Extraction, Absorption
Packing
The term structured packing refers to a range of specially designed materials for use in absorption
and distillation columns.
Structured packing typically consist of thin corrugated metal plates or gauzes arranged in a way that
they force fluids to take complicated paths through the column, thereby creating a large surface
area for contact between different phases and a low resistance to gas flow.

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Mass Transfer:
Distillation, Leaching and Extraction, Absorption
Packing material fires

 Hydrocarbon residue that remains on column packing can self-ignite at elevated temperatures
when exposed to the atmosphere

 Iron sulfide, which is pyrophoric, can be formed from sulfur found in crude oil

 Corrosion of carbon steel components can settle on packing and can ignite when exposed to the
air or oxygen

Mass Transfer:
Distillation, Leaching and Extraction, Absorption
Adsorption processes

 Adsorption processes are exothermic

 Carbon bed adsorbers are subject to fires due to this overheating

 For certain classes of chemicals (e.g. organic sulfur compounds (mercaptans), ketones, aldehydes, and
some organic acids) reaction or adsorption on the carbon surface is accompanied by release of a heat
that may cause hot spots in the carbon bed

 Adsorption of high vapor concentrations of organic compounds also can create hot spots

 If a flammable mixture of fuel and oxygen are present, the heat released by adsorption or reaction on
the surface of the carbon may pose a fire hazard (e.g., a fire may start if the temperature reaches the
autoignition temperature of the vapor and oxygen is present to support ignition)

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Mass Transfer:
Distillation, Leaching and Extraction, Absorption
Extractors

 Extractors will contain two immiscible fluids plus some materials being transferred from one
phase to another

 Loss of containment can result in flammable or toxic releases, depending on the nature of the
materials

 Failure of level control in extractors can result in the wrong material being sent to downstream
equipment, leading to high levels or pressure in downstream equipment

Mass Transfer Equipment

Case study: Distillation column incident
 In 1969, an explosion occurred in a butadiene recovery unit in Texas City, Texas

 The location of the center of the explosion was found to be the lower tray section of the butadiene
refining (final purification) column

 The column had been slowly losing material through a closed, but leaking, valve in the column
overhead line

 Loss of butadiene through the leaking valve resulted in substantial changes in tray composition in the
lower section of the column, causing a doubling of the concentration of vinyl acetylene in the tray
liquid in the vicinity of the tenth tray

 The loss of liquid level in the base of the column uncovered the reboiler tubes, allowing the tube wall
temperature to approach the temperature of the steam supply

 The combination of increased vinyl acetylene concentration and high tube wall temperature led to the
decomposition of vinyl acetylene and set the stage for the explosion that followed

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Mass Transfer Equipment

Design considerations: Distillation
 Distillation is temperature, pressure, and composition dependent; special care must be taken to
fully understand any potential thermal decomposition hazards of the chemicals involved.

 Columns need adequate instrumentation for monitoring and controlling pressure, temperature,
level and composition.

 The location of sensing elements in relation to column internals must be considered so that they
provide accurate and timely information and are in direct contact with the process streams.

 Column support structures and be fireproofed, as they are not cooled by internal fluid flow and a
ground fire can lead to the column collapsing.

 Overpressurization can result from freezing, plugging, or flooding of condensers, or blocked vapor
outlets, if the heat input to the system is not stopped

Mass Transfer Equipment

ISD considerations
Emphasis should be placed upon the use of inherently safer design alternatives using concepts such
as

 Limiting the maximum heating medium temperature to safe levels

 Selecting solvents which do not require removal prior to the next process step
 Using a heat transfer medium that prevents freezing in the condenser
 Locating the vessel temperature probe on the bottom head to ensure accurate measurement of
temperatures, even at a low liquid level
 Minimizing column internal inventory
 Avoiding dead legs that can corrode, plug or freeze

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Mass Transfer Equipment

Design considerations: Packing
 Cool columns to ambient temperature before opening
 Wash the column thoroughly to remove residues and deposits
 Use chemical neutralization to remove pyrophoric material
 Purge columns with nitrogen
 Monitor temperatures of the packing and column as it is opened
 Minimize the number of open manways to reduce air circulation

Mass Transfer Equipment

Design considerations: Carbon bed adsorbers
 Test the impact of the vapors on the carbon for potential heat release before putting the carbon
adsorption system into service; if possible identify reactions that are not already known.
 Measure bed temperatures at a large number of places
 Provide fire control systems such as water sprays, nitrogen or steam
 Include flame arrestors to prevent the spread of fire from the carbon containers to the flammable
chemical containers

58