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Election Law Digest - Bautista
Election Law Digest - Bautista
Election Law Digest - Bautista
FACTS:
In the 1967 election for mayor of Iligan City wherein Camilo Cabili and
Mariano Badelles were candidates. Cabili was proclaimed as the winner. This
prompted Badelles to file a protest before the CFI of Lanao. He alleged that flagrant
violations of Election Code attended the election. He pointed out that more than 200
voters were registeredper precinct contrary to what the law mandated at 200 voters
per precinct. He also alleged that no publication of lists of voters per precinct was
made up to the election day itself enabling around 8,300 persons to vote illegally
while around 8,000 qualified voters were not able to vote since their names were not
found on the lists.
Camilo Cabili filed a motion to dismiss the protest based on three grounds namely:
(1) Failure to file the protest within the reglementary period; (2) lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the subject-matter of the case; and (3)
failure to state a cause of action. Motion to dismiss the protest was granted but only
on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. In granting the MTD, the court
argued that while irregularities as well as misconduct on the part of election officers
were alleged in the election protests filed, there was however an absence of an
allegation that they would change the result of the election in favor of the
protestants and against the protesters, that such irregularities would destroy
the secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast, or that the protesters knew of or
participated in the commission thereof. It also declared that voters should not be
deprived of their right to vote occasioned by the failure of the election officials to
comply with the formal prerequisites to the exercise of the right of suffrage and that
the rules and regulations for the conduct of elections while mandatory before the
voting should be considered directory thereafter.
ISSUE:
RULING:
A republic then to be true to its name requires that the government rests on
the consent of the people, consent freely given, intelligently arrived at, honestly
recorded, and thereafter counted. Only thus can they be really looked upon as the
ultimate sources of established authority. It is their undeniable right to have officials
of their unfettered choice. The election law has no justification except as a means for
assuring a free, honest and orderly expression of their views. It is of the essence that
corruption and irregularities should not be permitted to taint the electoral process.
2. Pangutan v. Abubakar, G.R. No. L-33541, January 20, 1972
FACTS:
Abubakar and the other candidates alleged that in the towns of Siasi, Tapul,
Parang and Luuk, no elections were in effect held in view of massive violence,
terrorism and fraud. Pungutan denied this and said the election was valid. Comelec:
that the returns from Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk are spurious returns or
manufactured returns and no returns at all and that the elections in said
municipalities are sham. The Commission is of the opinion that the elections in said
municipalities were just as bad if not worse than the elections in Karomatan, Lanao
del Norte. Actually no elections were held in said municipalities as the voting was
done by persons other than the registered voters while armed men went from
precinct to precinct, prepared the ballots and dictated how the election returns were
to be prepared. The same reasons which compelled the Commission to reject the
returns from Karomatan and to consider said returns as no returns at all or spurious
or manufactured returns not one notch above returns prepared at gunpoint. By
majority vote of the members of the Commission to direct the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sulu to reconvene in Jolo and complete the canvass excluding from
said canvass the returns from the towns of Siasi, Parang, Tapul, and Luuk and to
proclaim the 3rd winning candidate at 5:00 P.M. on May 28, 1971, unless restrained
by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
Respondent disregarded this requirement and none of the petitions for inclusion
based on lack of forms contains the attached certificate of the Chairman or any
member of the Board of Inspectors of the precinct concerned to the effect that
petitioner or petitioners applied for registration on October 9, 1971 but were refused
registration for lack of registration forms. While it may be true that the various;
petitions for inclusion contained the sworn statement of Eduardo Belbes that a copy
of the petition had been served on the members of the Board of Inspectors of the
corresponding precinct, yet this notice applied to the original dates of hearing stated
in the Petition and it is reasonable to assume that on the dates at which the petitions
were ordered reset for hearing by respondent Judge, to wit: On October 18 for the
petitions filed on October 14; and on October 20 for the petitions filed on October 19,
the Board of Inspectors were not notified. This is impliedly admitted by respondent
when he expressed the belief that notice to the Election Registration Board alone
was sufficient, and that the certificate of the Board of Inspectors to the effect that the
petitioners applied for registration in the corresponding precinct on October 9, 1971,
but were refused registration for lack of forms was not necessary inasmuch as he
relied on the testimonies of the petitioners themselves on that point. Also, even if
respondent was motivated by a desire to adhere strictly to the requirement of
Comelec Resolution No. RR-938 that inclusion cases be decided within two (2) days
from the filing of the petition, it would seem that respondent acted rather hastily in
resetting the inclusion cases filed in the afternoon of October 19, 1971 for hearing
immediately the following morning or on October 20, 1971. This is especially true of
Election Cases Nos. 93 to 172, except Cases Nos. 162 to 172 (Exhs. 8A to 8K
inasmuch as Mrs. Efren admittedly informed respondent of the filing of the cases
right the same morning of October 20. Hence it is not likely that the various members
of the Board of Inspectors could have been notified to appear and testify that
petitioners in fact appeared before their respective precincts and were denied
registration for lack of forms. caution dictated that this requirement or this procedure
be followed as this was one sure way of Identifying the petitioners and ascertaining
whether in fact they applied for and were refused registration for lack of forms. True,
inclusion and exclusion cases are summary in nature but the procedure adopted by
respondent Judge provided no safeguard whatsoever against indiscriminate
inclusion. For he admitted that as long as the petitioners were present when he
called the inclusion cases for hearing and the respondent Election Registration
Board or the members of the Board of Inspectors of the precincts concerned were
not present he considered the latter in default and summarily granted the petition.
This could be the only reason why practically all the inclusion cases resulted in the
issuance of orders directing the inclusion of the petitioners now marked as Exhs 'B',
'B-l' to 'B-54' and, as it turned out, on appeal most of the petitions were dismissed
either for failure of the petitioners to appear or, as in Cases Nos. 136-153, because
the Court found on the basis of the testimony of the Chairman of Precinct No, 41 of
Talisay that he even had a surplus of seventeen (17) application forms
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent failed to comply with the requirements of Section 136 of
the electoral law.
RULING:
Yes. In our republican system of government, the exercise by the people of their
right of suffrage is the expression of their sovereign will. It is, therefore, absolutely
essential that the free and voluntary use of this right be effectively protected by the
law and by governmental authority. As stated in an earlier case: The people in
clothing a citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose of securing a consistent
and perpetual administration of the government they ordain, charge him with the
performance of a duty in the nature of a public trust, and in that respect constitute
him a representative of the whole people. This duty requires that the privilege thus
bestowed should be exercise, not exclusively for the benefit of the citizen or class of
citizens professing it, but in good faith and with an intelligent zeal for the general
benefit and welfare of the state. (U.S. vs. Cruikshank 92 U.S. 588.) In the last
analysis, therefore, the inclusion in or exclusion from the permanent electoral list of
any voter concerns not only the latter in his individual capacity but the public in
general. In the light of the statutory purpose, the seriousness of respondent's failure
to comply with the requirements of Section 136 of the electoral law becomes evident.
His good faith or lack of malice is of no avail, considering that in crimes which are
mala prohibita the act alone irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense. It
appears, however, that on April 8, 1974, the President of the Philippines
promulgated Presidential Decree No. 433, which grants general amnesty under
certain conditions to public school teachers, other government officials and
employees, members of the armed forces of the Philippines and other persons for
violation of election laws and other related statutes in connection with the elections
of 1965, 1967, 1969, 1971, and the election of delegates to the Constitutional
Convention.
4. Taule v. Santos, G.R. No. 90336, August 12, 1991
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
2. Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section
205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang
panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the
said sanggunian, etc. He acted as the presiding officer of the sangguniang
panlalawigan. As presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the officers of
the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If said
member assumes his place under questionable circumstances, the sanggunian may
be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Therefore, respondent
governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of
the FABC. The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and
void for not complying with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09. DLG Circular
No. 89-09 provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President shall
preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." It is admitted that
neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the
meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of
Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore, there was a clear violation of the said
mandatory provision. Pending resolution, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition
alleging that public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum
dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio, despite him being absent on said
election. The Secretary of Local Government has no authority to appoint anyone who
does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of
barangay councils.
5. Romualdez v. RTC, G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Court held that YES, Petitioner is qualified as a registered voter because
he is still considered a resident of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Stating that, the political
situation brought about by people’s Power Revolution must have caused great fear
to the Romualdez, and as having concern over the safety of their families, their self-
exile is understandable. Moreover, their sudden departure cannot be described as
‘voluntary’ or ‘abandonment of residence’. It must be emphasized that the right to
vote is a most precious political right; a bounden duty of every citizen enabling them
to participate in the government process to ensure the will of the people.
II. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ITS POWERS
1. Antonio Gallardo vs. Hon. Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr., G.R. No. 104848,
January 29, 1993
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Petitioners would have us prohibit, restrain and enjoin public
respondent Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch 28 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Mambajao, Camiguin, from continuing with the proceedings in a
petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order filed as a taxpayer’s suit, docketed
therein as Special Civil Action No. 465 and entitled "Pedro P. Romualdo, Jr. versus
Gov. Antonio Gallardo, et al." Petitioners likewise seek to prohibit the enforcement of
the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), issued by the respondent Judge on 10 April
1992, on the ground that the latter acted whimsically, capriciously and without
jurisdiction when he took cognizance of the case and issued the said order because
the case principally involves an alleged violation of the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code the jurisdiction over which is exclusively vested in the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). It is additionally averred that the action is completely
baseless, that the private respondent is not a real party in interest and that the public
respondent acted with undue haste, manifest partiality and evident bias in favor of
the private respondent in issuing the Temporary Restraining Order.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil
Action No. 465.
RULING:
Needless to say, the acts sought to be restrained in Special Civil Action No.
465 before the court a quo are matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commission. Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the Commission with
the power to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices. Indeed, the present Constitution envisions a truly independent
Commission on Elections committed to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the people's sacred right of
suffrage -- the citizenry’s vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of government
and in achieving and promoting political stability. Additionally, by statutory mandate,
the present Commission on Elections possesses, inter alia, the following powers:
1) Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local
officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement
agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties
relative to the conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMT cadets
eighteen years of age and above to act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing
its orders. The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the
preceding paragraph from the performance of his duties relating to electoral
processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions,
orders, decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the
Commission, the corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from office
any or all of such officers or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty
of such violation or failure.
2) To stop any illegal election activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any
unlawful, libelous, misleading or false election propaganda, after due notice and
hearing.” The present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid
statutory authority to grant the Commission on Elections broader and more flexible
powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from legislative
intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making power is made to depend on statutes,
Congress may withdraw the same at any time.
2. Antonio V.A. Tan Vs. Commission On Elections G.R. No. 112093, 4 October
1994
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Yes. It should be stressed that the administrative case against petitioner is in relation
to the performance of his duties as an election canvasser and not as a city
prosecutor. The COMELEC’s mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and
immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees,
including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and
instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the
conduct of elections. In order to help ensure that such duly deputized officials and
employees of government carry out their respective assigned tasks, the law has also
provided than upon the COMELEC’s recommendation, the corresponding proper
authority, which is the Secretary of the Department of Justice in the case at bar, shall
take appropriate action, either to suspend or remove from office the officer or
employee who may, after due process, be found guilty of violation of election laws or
failure to comply with instructions, orders, decision or rulings of the COMELEC.
3. Montejo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118702 March 16, 1995
FACTS:
Biliran was originally a municipality of the 3rd District of the province of Leyte.
It was later converted into a sub-province then a regular province. COMELEC sought
to remedy the consequent inequality of the distribution of inhabitants, voters and
municipalities in the province of Leyte by promulgating Resolution No. 2736 where it
transferred (in Sec 1 thereof) the municipality of Capoocan of its 2nd District and
Palompon of its 4th District to its 3rd District. Cong. Montejo of the 1st District of
Leyte sought to annul said Sec of Res. No. 2736 on the ground that it violates the
principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, he prays to
transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the 2nd District of the province.
ISSUE:
May the Court transfer the Municipality of Tolosa of the 1st District to the 2nd
District of Leyte as prayed for?
RULING:
No. The court held Sec 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void and conceded that the
conversion of Biliran to a regular province brought about an imbalance in the
distribution of voters in the legislative districts and, as such, could devalue a citizen’s
vote in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. However, what is
prayed for involves an issue of reapportionment of legislative districts and remedy for
such lies with Congress in accordance to Art VI, Sec 5(4). While this Court can strike
down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot itself make the reapportionment
as Montejo would want the Court to do by directing COMELEC to transfer Tolosa
from the 1st District to the 2nd District. Transferring a municipality from one district to
another is a substantive (not minor) change.
4. Herrera v. COMELEC, 3 G.R. No. 131499 November 17, 1999
2. The consultative meetings did not express the true sentiment of the voters
of the province.
4. There is disparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a Board Member
represents.
ISSUE:
RULING:
COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The petition is dismissed.
2. There were two consultative meetings held by the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor. As required by COMELEC Resoluiton No. 2313, all interested
parties were duly notified and represented.
3. Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang
Panlalawigan members. Also, under Republic Act 7166, provinces with 1 legislative
district shall be divided into 2 districts for purposes of electing the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The province of Guimaras, being a 4th class province
and having only 1 legislative district, shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan
members and 2 districts.
4. Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis
for division shall be the number of inhabitants of the province concerned not the
number of listed or registered voters. The districting of the Province of Guimaras was
based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified by the National Statistics
Office.
5. Matsura v. COMELEC, 285 SCRA 443 (1998)
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
No, COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether
mere existence of a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from
the disputed voting centers. Once the election returns were found to be falsified or
tampered with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board of
Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the genuine
returns.
6. Banaga, Jr. Vs. Comelec. G.R. No. 134696. July 31, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Banaga, Jr. and respondent Bernabe, Jr. were both candidates for
vice-mayor of the City of Parañaque in the May 1998 election. In said election, the
city board of canvassers proclaimed respondent Bernabe, Jr., as the winner for
having garnered 71,977 votes over petitioner Banaga, Jr.’s 68,970 votes.
Dissatisfied with the result, petitioner filed with the COMELEC on May 1998, a
Petition to Declare Failure of Elections and/or For Annulment of Elections, alleging
that said election was replete with election offenses, such as vote buying and flying
voters. He also alleged that numerous Election Returns pertaining to the position of
Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque appear to be altered, falsified or fabricated. In
fact, there were people arrested who admitted the said election offenses. Therefore,
the incidents were sufficient to declare a failure of elections because it cannot be
considered as the true will of the people. Petitioner Banaga, Jr. is praying that he
should be adjudged as the duly elected Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque, during
the May 1998 local elections. Respondent COMELEC dismissed petitioner’s suit and
held that the election offenses relied upon by petitioner do not fall under any of the
instances enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. The election
tribunal concluded that based on the allegations of the petition, it is clear that an
election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect and therefore, cannot
be viewed as an election protest. Thus, this petition for certiorari alleging that the
respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction for dismissing his petition motu propio without any basis
whatsoever and without giving him the benefit of a hearing.
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives.
Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It is undisputed that Miranda has already been
proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office on June 14, 2004. As such,
petitioner’s recourse would have been to file an electoral protest before the HRET.
His remedy is not this petition for certiorari.
8. Ronald Allan Poe A.K.A. Fernando Poe, Jr., Protestant, Vs. Gloria
Macapagalarroyo, Protestee. P.E.T. Case No. 002. March 29, 2005
FACTS:
Past midnight, in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the Congress as the
representatives of the sovereign people and acting as the National Board of
Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (GMA) the duly elected President of the Philippines. She obtained 12,905,808
votes, as against 11,782,232 votes for the second-placer, the movie actor Fernando
Poe, Jr. (FPJ). She took her Oath of Office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court on June 30, 2004. Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the
elections, Mr. FPJ, filed seasonably an election protest before this Electoral Tribunal
on July 23, 2004. Mrs. GMA, through counsel, filed her Answer with Counter Protest
on August 5, 2004. As counsels for the parties exchanged lively motions to rush the
presentation of their respective positions on the controversy, an act of God
intervened. On December 14, 2004, the Protestant died in the course of his medical
treatment at St. Lukes Hospital. However, neither the Protestee’s proclamation by
Congress nor the death of her main rival as a fortuitous intervening event, appears to
abate the present controversy in the public arena. Instead, notice may be taken of
periodic mass actions, demonstrations, and rallies raising an outcry for this Tribunal
to decide the electoral protest of Mr. FPJ against Mrs. GMA once and for all.
Together with the formal Notice of the Death of Protestant, his counsel has
submitted to the Tribunal, dated January 10, 2005, a MANIFESTATION with
URGENT PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR
DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ, by the widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe claiming
that because of the untimely demise of her husband and in representation not only of
her deceased husband but more so because of the paramount interest of the Filipino
people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late
husband in the election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will
of the electorate in the 2004 elections. In her Comment, the Protestee, Mrs. GMA,
relying on Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias and subsequent cases including analogous
cases decided by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), asserts
that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party to replace the
deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a property that passes
on to the heirs. Protestee also contends Mrs. FPJ cannot substitute for her deceased
husband because under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the
registered candidates who obtained the 2 nd and 3 rd highest votes for the
presidency may contest the election of the president and patently, Mrs. FPJ did not
receive the 2 nd and 3 rd highest votes for she was not even a candidate for the
presidency in the election that is being contested. Citing pertinent PET Rules,
protestee also stresses that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction over actions of surviving
spouses to ascertain the vote of the electorate as the Tribunal has jurisdiction only
over election protests and quo warranto cases.
ISSUE:
May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the
pendency of the latter’s protest case?
RULING:
FACTS:
Loren B. Legarda filed an election protest against Noli L. de Castro before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). De Castro filed a motion for its outright
dismissal but the PET confirmed its jurisdiction over the protest. De Castro filed a
motion for reconsideration assailing the PET resolution. He argues that where the
correctness of the number of votes is the issue, the best evidence are the ballots;
that the process of correcting the manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or
election returns is a function of the canvassing bodies; that once the canvassing
bodies had done their functions, no alteration or correction of manifest errors can be
made; that since the authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power
to determine the facts based on the evidence presented and to apply the law based
on the established facts, it cannot perform the ministerial function of canvassing
election returns; that the averments contained in the protest are mere conclusions of
law which are inadequate to form a valid cause of action; and that the allegations are
not supported by facts. He also contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the
manifest errors on the statements of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC).
ISSUES:
1. Can the PET correct the manifest errors in the SOV and COC?
RULING:
1. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President
and Vice-President is expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution. Included therein is the duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and
COCs.
2. We agree that the ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence in an
election contest where the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate is
involved. However, we do not find any reason to resort to revision in the first part of
the protest, considering that the protestant concedes the correctness of the ballot
results, concerning the number of votes obtained by both protestant and protestee,
and reflected in the election returns. Protestant merely seeks the correction of
manifest errors, that is, errors in the process of different levels of transposition and
addition of votes. Revision of ballots in case of manifest errors, in these
circumstances, might only cause unwarranted delay in the proceedings.
FACTS:
Nine (9) special civil actions for certiorari, hereby jointly resolved, seek to set
aside the resolutions of respondent COMELEC. Petitioners impugn that the
challenged resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion, in that the
Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance and decided the appeals without first
referring them to any of its Divisions.
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
Julian Lallave, Jr. won the 1996 SK Elections of Brgy Ican, Malasiqui, Pangasinan,
garnering a total of 46 votes over Marivic Zarate who garnered 45 votes. Unsatisfied
with the proclamation by the Barangay Board of Canvassers, Zarate filed an election
protest before the Municipal Trial Court stating that three or more votes that read
“JL” should not have been credited in favor of Lallave. Zarate further stated that the
votes bearing “JL” were stray votes and that there was no candidate with the name
or nickname of “JL”. The Municipal Trial Court rendered it decision in favor of
petitioner Zarate, declaring 8 of the original 46 votes invalid. Lallave appealed to the
Commission on Elections theorizing that the votes reading “JL” should be credited in
his favour considering that such initials sufficiently identify him as the candidate and
that the votes bearing “Julian, Jr de Real”, “Notno Lallave”, and “Nono de Real”
should have been credited as well being his nickname and middlename,
respectively. The appeal by Lallave was not referred to a division of the Commission
but was, instead, submitted to the Commission en banc.The COMELEC en banc
annulled the decision of the Municipal Trial Court and declared Lallave as the
elected SK chairman.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Yes. The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction without first referring
the case to any of its division. The petition for annulling the COMELEC’s decision
was granted and was set aside. The Commission was ordered to assign the case to
a division. The recourse of respondent Lallave transgressed Section 3 Article IX of
the Constitution which provides that “...election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by
the Commission en banc.”
12. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF GLAN v. COMELEC
FACTS:
a) after the original and second MBC had resigned, the third MBC was illegally
constituted as its Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Secretary are not qualified under
the Omnibus Election Code;
b) the canvassing proceedings, which were initially held in the Session Hall of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Glan, were later transferred to the Provincial Capitol of
Danao Province, contrary to COMELEC Resolution No. 3848;
c) the Secretary of the MBC failed to record the minutes of the canvassing
proceedings since the start of the canvass;
d) neither Benzonan nor her representatives were notified of the last three days of
the canvassing proceedings and, consequently, they were not able to participate
therein;
e) a substantial number of the election returns had been tampered with or falsified;
and f) the MBC had falsified the certificate of canvass votes. On December 4, 2001,
the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution finding that, based on the evidence
presented, the canvass of votes had been conducted in a place other than the
previous venue at the inception of the proceedings to which all were notified. Thus,
the proclamations of the winning candidates were declared null and void and a re-
canvass of the election returns was ordered.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
(2) it prematurely acted on the Motion for Execution pending appeal; and
ISSUE:
FACTS:
ISSUES:
The COMELEC cannot defeat the exercise of the people's original legislative
power for lack of budgetary allocation for its conduct.
RULING:
The Court has definitely ruled the question of whether the COMELEC may
prevent the conduct of a recall election for lack of specific budgetary allocation
therefor. The Court added that "when the COMELEC receives a budgetary
appropriation for its 'Current Operating Expenditures,' such appropriation includes
expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions" There is no reason not to
extend the Goh ruling to the present case. In fact, Marmeto's second initiative
petition was also filed in 2014; in dismissing Marmeto's petition for lack of funds, the
COMELEC was referring to its budget under the FY 2014 GAA. Although Goh
involved the conduct of recall elections, the 1.4 billion appropriation under the FY
2014 GAA was for the "conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes
and plebiscites. The term "election" is comprehensive enough to include other kinds
of electoral exercises, including initiative elections.
III. REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear
provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be
conducted within 120 days before the regular election. The right of suffrage is not
absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a mere
statutory requirement. Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not
require that the impossible be done. The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible. In other words,
there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligatio est.
Hence, a statute may not be so construed as to require compliance with what it
prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally, coincidentally, it must be presumed that
the legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or application of a law which is
far removed from the realm of the possible. The State, in the exercise of its inherent
police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s
registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election
activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and
orderly manner – one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing
order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over
RA 8436 in that RA 8189’s provision is explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say
that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset. Further, even if what is asked is a
mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is
allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters
because the additional voters from the special two day registration will have to be
screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected again, verified,
sealed, then entered into the computerized voter’s list; and then they will have to
reprint the voters information sheet for the update and distribute it – by that time, the
May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes
after the special registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience than good.
Further still, the allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient.
Nowhere in AKBAYANYouth’s pleading was attached any actual complaint from an
individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that the voters
registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted
in their pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed to register on
time for some reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant
and not those who slumber on their rights.
2. Datu Inocencio C. Siawan Vs. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr. A.M. No.
Mtj95-1056 .May 21, 2001
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
ISSUES:
Whether the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave
misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Section 8,
Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended.
RULING:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Court accords merit to the petition. As may be noted, there is no provision
in the dual citizenship law – R.A. 9225 – requiring “duals” to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their
right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are
most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as
that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that
R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas
Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter
under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the
Constitution, respectively reading as follows: SECTION 1. Suffrage may be
exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. xxx. SEC 2. The Congress shall provide … a
system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. In a nutshell, the
aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor
for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a
system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an
exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote.
In effect, qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote
even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or
re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the
system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003.