The Russian Biological Weapons Program

Critical Reviews in Microbiology, 30:241–261, 2004
Copyright c Taylor & Francis Inc.

ISSN: 1040-841X print / 1549-7828 online
DOI: 10.1080/10408410490468812
The Russian Biological Weapons Program:

Vanished or Disappeared?
Dany Shoham
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
Ze’ev Wolfson
Mayrock Center for Russian, Eurasian and East European Research, the Hebrew University
of Jerusalem, Israel
Critical Reviews in Microbiology Downloaded from informahealthcare.com by Lunds Universitet on 12/05/13
in parallel included, necessarily, vaccines, anti-sera, drugs, and

The legacy and arsenal of biological weapons Russia inherited disinfectants as vital protective means. The disintegration of
from USSR in 1991 became a lingering unsolved issue, in terms the USSR in 1991 did not provide any substantial guaranty for
of a prime strategic arm that ought to be eliminated, advisably, abatement of that program within the configuring Russian na-
in accordance with the Biological Weapons Convention Russia is
committed to, and considering further undertakings and declara- tional strategic outline. In pragmatic terms, there are doubts as
tions made by the Russian regime. Indeed, that inheritance was to whether anything has fundamentally changed. Some changes
created by USSR as a powerful, highly sophisticated component of did occur and might be regarded as significant, or, perhaps only
utmost importance within the Soviet military paradigm, based on superficial. The present article aims to examine the cardinal issue
For personal use only.
a wide spectrum of virulent, stabilized pathogens and toxins plus of whether a significant change has occurred since the dissolu-
delivery systems. Moreover, remarkably advanced biotechnologies
were thus applied to procure stockpiles of military-grade pathogens tion of the USSR.
and toxins. Yet, an intriguing debate aroused with regard to the ex- One development that took place was the influx of Russian
tent of the weaponized biological inventory accumulated by USSR, defectors and immigrants to the West; some of whom provided
as well as the in effect attitude of Russia towards perpetuating or invaluable information about the subject in question. In addition,
wiping out that inheritance. It turned out to form a far reaching scientific, technological, and commercial cooperation has been
and challenging complexity, both strategically and scientifically.
The present study concentrates on the strategic as well as scientific formed between classified microbiological Russian facilities and
spheres shaping that overall issue at large, attempting to thoroughly many Western institutionalized and non-institutionalized bodies
analyze it through an innovative methodology. One main conclu- (largely backed by the US within financial support programs
sion thereby reached at is that the Russian military still poses a for Russia), a cooperation creating a kind of window to look
potential menance, in terms of both stockpiled, probably deploy- inside the former Soviet BW complex and its fate. Further, a
able biological weapons, and prevailing production capacities.
degree of transparency has been achieved, in actuality, within
the Russian media, supposedly bringing out certain segments of
Keywords Biological Weapons (BW); Biological Warfare Agent
the Soviet/Russian BWP.
(BWA); Biological Weapons Convention (BWC); Bio-
logical Weapons Program (BWP) The most significant sources of information have come from
two senior Russian microbiologists: Dr. Vladimir Pasechnik,
who landed in London in 1989, and Dr. Ken Alibek (Alibekov),
BACKGROUND who landed in New York in 1992. The former served as di-
The Soviet—and then Russian—BWP has for years been rector of the Institute of Ultra Pure Biochemical Preparations in
an enigma, although bearing a strategic essence of paramount Leningrad, and the latter was first deputy chief of the Biopreparat
importance, and propelling remarkable shifts in the field of system, a large network of BW-oriented facilities (Pasenchnik’s
microbiology—technologically, medically, and ecologically. It institute being among them). Moreover, in 1998, Alibek pub-
has been targeted against humans, husbandry, and crops, and lished a book, Biohazard that uncovered wide segments of the
Soviet and then Russian BWP. The information included in that
book appears to be credible and representative, even if gauged,
objectively, in terms of possible partiality, tendentiousness (com-
Received 11 March 2004; accepted 6 April 2004.
Address correspondence to Dany Shoham, Begin-Sadat Center for
mercial or other), or biases. It mainly brings out the continuity
Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel. E-mail: and persistence of the Russian BWP, beyond portraying, very
shoham d@netvision.net.il effectively, the related system in itself.
241
242 D. SHOHAM AND Z. WOLFSON
Russian authorities certainly considered that shortly after • climax of the Soviet BWP—1980–89
their landing in Britain and the US, most—if not all—of the • conversion and reassortment—1990–1996
classified information the two Soviet microbiologists had, re- • restoring and regenerating—1997–present
garding the Soviet/Russian BWP, would probably be revealed
to British and US authorities. Consequently, steps intended to Concurrently, since 1981 the following events occurred along
counter and minimize the damage must have been conducted, that same axis:
sensibly, one way or another. Schematically, three modes could 1981—First Review Conference of the BWC (further confer-
have taken place: ences occurred periodically);
• Perfect abandonment of the existing BWP (an attitude 1991—disintegration of the USSR and succession by Russia;
already established, then, within various Russian ad- 1992—Yeltsin BW-declaration and the Tri-Lateral Agreement
ministration cycles that truly strive for weapons of mass (with the US and Britain);
destruction deproliferation). 1998—Alibek’s book (years after he—and, earlier, Pasechnik—
• Perfect retaining of the existing BWP (possibly trans- defected).
figured, and probably better camouflaged by the Russian

The second axis represents a contemporary, yet different, en-
Ministry of Defense).
• Some intermediate between those two edges.
during entity. Its fundamental point of reference consists in the
chief Russian military microbiological installations concerned,
Relying on a wide variety of Soviet and Russian sources of namely, the facilities located primarily in Zagorsk (ZF), Kirov
information, this article is inclined to inquire into those three (KF), Sverdlovsk (SF), Leningrad (LF), and Moscow (MF).
alternatives, and carefully trace the hard nucleus of the Russian Constituting the hard nucleus of the entire system involved, it
BWP—namely, the different microbiological facilities affiliated is assumed that the ongoing activities of those five facilities—
with the Ministry of Defense—since the collapse of the USSR, mainly though not merely—may soundly reflect the complete
as compared with earlier phases. Aiming to decipher concrete fate, or rather shape, of the actual BWP, overall. Yet, this line of
moves taken, both scientifically and strategically, by the con- thinking may certainly have been figured out by some Russian
cerned Russian system, this article attempts also to illuminate authorities on their own, serving them, therefore, as a working
various aspects related to the interplay prevailing in effect be- hypothesis for appropriate countermeasures to be taken, both
tween Moscow and BW, at large. For that purpose, some evolu- scientifically and structurally. Meaning: the extraneously moni-
tionary processes marking the Soviet/Russian BWP in its broad tored activities of those military facilities may be used by Russia
perspective are tracked, as well. Declarations, statements, wit- to render an image of a totally civilian or defensive conversion.
nesses, reports, orientations, and activities of Soviet/Russian Hence, the methodology related to that axis and implemented
microbiologists and officials, ones that give ideas of the pos- in the present analysis is aimed at tracing a wide spectrum of
sible developments occurring in actuality, are discussed, then, scientific activities taking place within those facilities, particu-
herewith. larly with reference being made to the periods until 1991 (the
year when Soviet disintegration took place), and, comparatively,
since 1992. Additional institutions—military as well as nomi-
METHODOLOGY nally civilian—are secondarily looked into, in part, whenever
The Soviet BWP was initially crystallized during the 1920s, affecting or accompanying an emerging paradigm related to the
but it has evolved considerably since. The present analysis is pri- mentioned five military ones.
marily based, however, upon two temporal axes: a chronological- From a methodological viewpoint, then, this study is system-
strategic axis, the inception of which took place in 1972—while atically based upon a set of three categories of domestic Soviet
the Soviet administration was approaching acceding to the con- and Russian sources:
solidating BWC (an axis that has proceeded up to the present).
And, in parallel, a chronological techno-scientific axis, reflecting • Published statements and expressions made by Russian
a very broad microbiological scientific sphere, one that is tightly officials and scientists (mostly alone, and sometimes
interlinked with the Soviet/Russian BWP. Those two method- together with foreign colleagues);
ological axes are applied here, completely independent of the • Scientific works published in the Soviet/Russian open
immensely important—and largely open, by now—information microbiological literature by researchers affiliated with
and assessments provided by Pasechnik, Alibek, and Western or related to the military facilities under discussion;
analyses. • Unpublished information provided by scientists linked
The first axis progresses through the following milestones to or informed about those facilities during the past
and phases: twenty years.
• Acceding to the BWC—1972 An important part of the materials for this article were collected
• non-impact of the BWC—1973–74 through personal interviews with Russian scientists: Prof. Lev
• upgrading and scaling up the BWP—1975–79 Fedorov and the late Dr. Max Rokhlin in Moscow; as well as
RUSSIAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM 243
with the former Soviet scientists Prof. Ely Shliakhov, Dr. Boris were so adamant. They always answered that control was out of the
Freger, and Dr. Roma Tzvang, currently in Israel. Others pre- question because it could reveal the extent of the development of
ferred anonymity and cannot be identified. these weapons and would show Soviet readiness for their eventual
use. They refused to consider eliminating their stockpiles and in-
Notably, some scientists interviewed manifested an incli- sisted upon further development of those weapons. The Politburo
nation to generally gauge various moves and activities occur- approved this.1
ring within the concerned Russian system more harshly than
The USSR acceded to the BWC. In practical terms, the US
is to be expected. The reality, then, may be milder and, hence,
destroyed its BW arsenal, and, consequently, the USSR could
more positive, perhaps, in terms of Russian BW deprolifera-
follow the US, and, thus, comply with the BWC; or, inversely,
tion trends being fulfilled, in effect. Basically, we assume that
take supreme advantage of the new imbalanced bio-strategic
the integration of the above-mentioned three categories of infor-
equation. The Soviet military was incisive while favoring the
mation sources may produce a coherent picture fairly close to
latter option.
actuality.
Moreover, in 1972 and 1973 a brilliant Russian microbiolo-
gist, named Yury Ovchinikov, had learned from Western journals
and colleagues the way for genetic modifications of bacteria.

THE SOVIET/RUSSIAN BWP STRATEGIC AXIS
Since the 1940s, in Soviet biology had dominated the ideo-
Stages of Soviet and of Russian BWP logical concept of Trophym Lysenko, who described genes as
Biological weapons constitute the most nontransparent sphere “bourgeois’s dirty trick,” and even in early 1970s ideas related to
of the Soviet/Russian military complex, and possibly the most genetic research had to wait for a long time to penetrate through
dangerous one, both for Russia and for the rest of the world. the scientific establishment, if at all.
Moreover, the general aggravation of the essence of BW due to Ovchinikov realized, however, that any civilian-oriented ge-
continuing breakthroughs achieved in the areas of biotechnol- netic research had but a little chance. The only way that the
ogy and medical microbiology is a significant factor in terms of Central Committee of Communist Party could “swallow” genes
strategic potency. and compromise with the genetic development was military use
The strategic axis of the Soviet BWP traces back to the first of them. It meant to develop new militant strains of pathogens as
BW. Consequently, in 1973, Premier Leonid Brezhnev signed a
half of the twentieth century. In 1925, the USSR signed the

Geneva Protocol on Prohibition of BW & CW with a short reser- decree ordering a comprehensive update and expansion of the
vation on the right to use BW & CW against a state that had entire Soviet BW apparatus. Moreover, adding a proper civilian
used it first against USSR. This reservation legally and practi- aroma, in April 1974 the Central Committee issued the decree of
cally served as a basis for future developing a whole system of “Measures of acceleration of development of biological sciences
R&D, tests, and production centers of various forms of highly and its practical implementations in Soviet economy.” Largely,
virulent pathogens and toxins. Concurrently, then, an initial BW Ovchinikov generated that course.2
facility was founded in Moscow, designated the Scientific Re- The enormous budgets allocated following this special de-
search Institute of Health. Its activities slowly evolved, appre- cree, which announced the program Enzyme, were used by
ciably influenced during the 1930s by the extensive—and rather Ovchinikov, then, for the construction of at least four huge
intensive—BWP run by Japan, in parallel. centers for research in microbiology. He rebuilt his Institute
After World War II and the appearance of nuclear weapons, of Bioorganic chemistry in Moscow, the Institute of Applied
BW lost their importance in many ways. The Soviets held their Microbiology in Obolensk (Moscow region), the Leningrad In-
BWP alive mainly by inertia supported by top brass generals. stitute of Extra Pure Preparations, and the Institute of Applied
Gradually, the program scaled up, until the 1970s, counter- Virology in Novosibisk (now “Vector Center”). Most labs in
balancing—if not exceeding—a contemporary American BWP.
In 1972, the USSR and Western countries formed a specific 1 Arkady Shevchenko, the Soviet diplomat who defected to the USA, and
convention prohibiting development, production, or stockpil- at the time under discussion was a personal advisor to Soviet Foreign Minister
ing of pathogens and toxins for offensive military purposes, Gromyko.
2 Sojourning in 1973 for several months as a guest of some most advanced US
namely the BWC. This was the first and only case brought out
bio-centers, Ovchinikov left the country keeping in one blazer’s pocket several
(much later and merely personally), whereby the Soviet military tubes with steeled cultures of modified bacterial strains, and professional secrets
bluntly exhibited, inwardly, its stance with respect to its own of their developments in the other. As son of a famous hero of WW Two, he
BWP: used the opportunity to meet within few months Brezhnev himself and explain
him what smart and powerful weapons they can invent from microbes’ genes,
While the political leadership, Foreign Minister Gromyko in par- especially after 1972, when US and UK took the obligation not to develop new
ticular, felt it necessary for propaganda purposes to respond to a pro- BW. The communists leader liked such an idea to fight “imperialists with their
posal to conclude a special separate convention to prohibit BW as a own invents” Interview with the late Dr. Max Rokhlin, deputy of Y. Ovchinnikov
first step, the military’s reaction was to say “go ahead and sign the in the Institute of Bioorganic chemistry during the 60s and 70s; Moscow, June
convention; without international controls, who would know about 1995. see also http://www.expert.ru, 18 2002 Vaccine for Life, and
us anyway?” . . . Several times I asked military officials why they http://www.vector.nsc.ru/ex1102-r.htm
those centers were strictly secret places, apparently only due to officers who confirmed that the source was a nearby military
“bio-safety reasons.”3 facility. Russian and American scientists agreed it was a BW in-
In addition, tens of labs affiliated with the Ministry of Public cident. Brain autopsies of people who died from anthrax proved
Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Academy of Sci- that. (Dr. Abramova kept dozens of them in secret—but in front
ences started to develop secret programs, with generous grants of her desk—for 14 years.) However, the Sverdlovsk military
from the Enzyme budgets. An organizational framework— microbiological facility continued to work under supervision of
Biopreparat, a semi-military center for management and coordi- the Ministry of Defense.6 Internally, Zernova was the first to
nation of activities in dozens of nominally civilian facilities and propel the shift of transparency, in that context.
labs—has been established in 1973. The military also approved Beyond the boundaries of the USSR, a concomitant course
such budgets to create a whole chain of new labs and modernize occurred. Since the defection of Dr. Pasencknic in 1989, and in
the old ones. In addition, the KGB had its own R&D centers for spite of the consequent revelations regarding the Soviet BWP,
special toxic matters including bio-toxins and pathogens for use it took three years for the British and American governments to
in espionage aims and sabotage (so called Fleita program). obtain a Russian admission. It came in a speech by Boris Yeltsin
After the collapse of the USSR, the total number of scientific in January 1992, on the eve of his visit to the United States to
and technological “know-how” facilities that remained intact in meet with President Bush, when he referred to “a lag in imple-
the Russian Federation out of its outstandingly wide-scale BWP, menting” the 1972 BWC.7 However, the military Directorate for
was hardly even known. Until recently, there was only frag- Bacteriological, Radiological and Chemical Defense claimed—
mented and vague information available for the public and the following President Yeltsin’s admissions—that all charges of an
experts outside of various intelligence services, chiefly members active Soviet (and then Russian) BWP were lies, and that “all
of the teams working in this field in US and UK. A few publica- work on BW stopped in 1975.” A seemingly proper formula
tions in the West, such as Ken Alibek’s book Biohazard, Jeanne emerged then, while in February 1992 President Yeltsin and his
Guillemin’s book Anthrax, as well as articles published mainly military advisor, General Volkogonov, had promised, “halt (in)
by Milton Leitenberg, Jonathan Tucker, and Reymond Zilinskas Russian research into BW.”8
(in the US), plus Anthony Rimmington and John Hemsley (in Perfectly sincere, Yeltsin persisted in this line, ignoring—or
Britain), contribute to clarifying the real picture. rather unaware of—the genuine, enduring attitude of his mili-
The Russians themselves, in contrast, published only arti- tary toward BW. By March 1992, thus, a Tri-Lateral Agreement
cles that dealt with specific issues or a particular research cen- was reached between Russia, UK, and the US, giving parties ac-
ter, and refrained from bringing out or analyzing the system of cess to their biological research facilities to check compliance
BW research, development, and production, as a whole. More- with the BWC. The trilateral statement “confirmed the termi-
over, the total number of Russian publications about its BWP is nation of offensive research, the dismantlement of experimental
much smaller than that about the chemical weapons issue, not to technological lines for the production of agents, and the clo-
mention the nuclear weapons issue. The first—and at the time sure of the BW testing facility” in Russia. It also “dissolved the
fairly overwhelming—of these (domestic BW revelations) was department in the Ministry of Defense responsible for the of-
the September 1990 article by Natallie Zernova, about the real fensive biological program.” Moreover, in April 1992 President
nature of the Sverdlovsk 1979 anthrax disaster. Yeltsin announced a decree stating, “It shall be established that
She wrote for the first time ever in the Soviet press: “in 1979 the development and implementation of biological programs in
in Sverdlovsk, the source of anthrax was not infected meat (as breach of the BWC . . . are not being permitted in the territory
declared); the contagion was contracted by inhalation in the re- of the Russian Federation.”9
gion of the military compound.”4 This report was fully incrimi- In the decree, Yeltsin also appointed a committee—headed
nating. Moreover, by 1991 Zernova insisted on official investi- by Major General Anatoly Kuntsevich, formerly deputy head
gation of the disaster, relying on direct information forwarded by of the Soviet chemical forces—which was to report to him in a
several families of victims. They explained that they had prob- month about how to achieve this transparency of the Russian pro-
lems with lungs, not with stomach. Further, people related to gram and to end its illegitimate activities. Subsequently, General
the food industry attested that they knew nothing of any cattle Kuntsevich stated the following in a Russian interview:
anthrax in 1979. There were no ways to use flash or any infected Indeed these clear violations on the convention were only admit-
parts.5 In 1993, Zernova provided names of the former KGB ted after the totalitarian regime collapsed and duplicity in politics was
abandoned . . . The remnants of the offensive programs in the area of
BW were still around as recently as 1991. It was only in 1992 that
3 Ovchinikov often used to hint that actually he put the ‘Enzyme’ money
into development of fundamental biology and fool the top brass generals in the
name of progress of real science. The generals in their turn laughed over such 6 Literaturnaia Gazeta, 14.04.93.
“intelligent” rumors—they knew that only a small part of the budgets went to 7 http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/hui01/
non-military research, to be used as a carrot for scientists who loved the freedom 8 TASS, 26 Feb, 1992.
9 “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on Fulfilling Inter-
of science. (Interview with Max Rokhlin, 1995)
4 Literaturnaia Gazeta, no. 34, Sep. 1990. national Obligations with Regard to Biological Weapons,” Moscow, April 11,
5 Literaturnaia Gazeta, 02.10.91. 1992.
Russia absolutely stopped this work . . . We did not have stockpiles of 1991 (Third Conference): The USSR supports administra-
BW. The point is that they cannot be kept for a long time. Therefore, tive strengthening of confidence-building measures, and calls
the question of their destruction does not come up.10 for new modalities aimed at furthering openness. Among these
The boom came shortly after Yeltsin’s decree on BW in 1992. measures are: annual submission of information on national pro-
It faded within a year, however, and only one or two serious grams of work in the area of protection against BW; annual sub-
publications had appeared annually, added to two or three pieces mission of information on facilities with P4 containment level
of free journalists or the NGOs, like Prof. L. Fedorov, founder as well as on facilities with a lower level of containment in case
and head of the “Association for Chemical Safety.”11 they carry out research and development in the area of protec-
Under the tri-lateral agreement, reciprocal visits took place tion against BW, or implement other related activities on orders
in 1993 and 1994 in various facilities. Further, by April 1994 the of the Ministry of Defense; international exchange of scientists
Russian Presidential Committee on the Problems of Chemical conducting such activities.
and Biological Disarmament also referred to the issue of visiting 1996 (Fourth Conference): Russia calls for rigid, precondi-
in Russian facilities nominally affiliated with the military, and at tioned provisions through which a request for conducting a chal-
the summit in May 1995, Russia agreed—in principle—to finally lenge inspection may be approved. Within that context, such re-
permit inspection visits to the BW facilities directly managed by quests have to be based upon a complaint concerning a possible
the Russian military. The visits were to occur in August 1995,12 breach of the BWC; such a complaint “must contain all possible
but they had not yet occurred. Obviously, since 1996 the Russian evidence confirming that it is well-founded.”14
information flow weakened and became less valid. In the last few 2001 (Fifth Conference): Russia accentuates—due to the con-
years there were mainly reactions to Ken Alibek’s publications tinuing danger of terrorism involving the use of WMD—its be-
and few statements about the R&D of new medicines, supported lief in the need to strengthen the operation of the BWC by rati-
by the US program and aimed at decreasing the threat. Some- fying a multilateral and legally binding document.15
times, those Russian publications demonstrate that in Moscow Remarkably, the posture posed in 1986, while categorically
there is the feeling that in 1992 they went too far in their open- denying any offensive-oriented BWP, took place right during
ness, and that is why after 1996 they narrowed the borders of the climax-phase of developing BW by the USSR. By 1991,
unclassified information. contrastingly, a genuine bud of deproliferation emerged, and
persisted for several years. Yet, the year 1996 marked, indeed
Soviet and Russian Postures at the BWC (as reflected in the respecting posture), an outset of Russian re-
Review Conferences gression, which has been continuing up to these days. It was
aimed to decelerate domestic conversion processes and control
Mirroring an alternating strategic course, the postures taken
foreign interference moves. Somewhat mitigating, ostensibly, a
by USSR and then Russia at the BWC Review Conferences
guest article by Alexander Vorobiev, permanent representative
are worth mentioning.13 They add the diplomatic dimension
of Russia to the Conference on Disarmament, called, concur-
of Moscow’s international policy conducts relating to BW, as
rently, for “decisions that should be made in national capitals
follows:
and instructions given to the negotiators to find the possibility to
1981 (First Review Conference of the BWC): The USSR—
proceed intensively with the elaboration of the BWC verifica-
together with the USA—undertakes to intensify negotiations
tion regime . . . A major step forward for the negotiators would
aimed at achieving a joint initiative concerning ways for imple-
be to start working as soon as possible on the rolling text of
menting the BWC.
the Protocol or at least parts of it, e.g., on mandatory declara-
1986 (Second Conference): The USSR declares that it does
tions.”16 Later on, the Russian stance manifested at the 2001
not possess any of the biological agents or toxins, weapons,
BWC Review Conference was rather insignificant, in whatever
equipment, or means of delivery specified in the BWC, nor does
sense serving to gauge it.
it conduct research or development work for the purposes of
Beyond the BWC, and contrary to the 1980s line of denial,
producing or perfecting that kind of weapon. The USSR agrees
on one occasion a senior member of the Soviet Central Com-
to an exchange of information dealing with certain categories of
mittee stated, while participating in a Pugwash conference, in
its microbiological research institutions.
1987: “We will use new scientific principles which are avail-
able to us, and the utilization of genetic engineering allows for
10 Interview with General Kuntsevich in Rossiyskie Vesti, September 22,
achieving very dangerous consequences that may not be man-
1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-186, September 24, 1992.
11 Among the few valid ones was the analysis by journalist Sergey Leskov,
ageable.”17 Overall, the inconsistent diplomatic course of the
who spent several months in the US and compared the US and Russian BW
programs. Leskov stated that information on Russian BW production is scarcely 14 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention website www.opbw.org/
available. As he said, even in 1992, this was a “very impolite question,” asking 15 TASS, 21 Nov. 2001.
authorities about BW, the equivalent of asking to hold the “nuclear briefcase” 16 Vorobiev, A. V., Working on the compliance regime for the BWC; Chem.
for a while. (Izvestiya, 26 June 1993) Biol. Convention Bull., 31, 2-4, 1996.
12 TASS, 29 May 1995. 17 Pugwash Annual Meeting: From Confrontation to Reconciliation, Sep.
13 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention website www.opbw.org/
1987, Austria.
Soviet/Russian postures, as described, constitutes a notable— be considered a trustworthy figure. In 1992, when Yeltsin had
largely misleading—reflection of the actual BWP stages pre- appointed him a Chairman of the Committee for the Issues of
sented above. BW and CW Conventions, he said to an official governmental
newspaper:21
Did the USSR Manufacture BW? “We admitted, that after the ratification of the convention
(o f 1972), the offensive BW programs were not immediately
All in all, then, the USSR and Russia did not admit to ever pro-
discontinued; researched continued, testing continued, and pro-
ducing BW, eventually. Unlike its progenitor, however, Russia
duction was taking place” (in Russian: “shlo proizvodstvo.
did acknowledge the existence of operational production lines,
“ ”).22 Notably, nobody can argue that the
which have been designed and installed (by the USSR, chiefly)
Russian word “proizvodstvo” means something other than “pro-
for that purpose, but were never run in effect, allegedly, beyond
duction”; not pilot project or preparation for production. It was
experimental scale. Weren’t they?
undeniable: Kuntsevitch meant production, literally, period;
The key question about production of BW and hoarding them,
namely, full-scale manufacturing.
the Soviets always kept vague. They did not reaffirm the need
Kuntzevich was, in all opinions, a key expert in the fields of

for dismantling of specific BW production facilities, since 1992.
BW and CW in USSR. Since 1972 he served for years as chief
Further, during a discussion in the Duma on 27 October 2000
military adviser for the Soviet delegation on the Geneva nego-
and the vote on the new law that eliminates the 1925 reserva-
tiations about eliminating BW and CW held by USSR, US, and
tion to the BW & CW Convention, officials such as Deputy of
GB. In such a position Kuntzevich was better aware than any-
Foreign Minister Mamedov and Chief of Staff Kvashnin told
body of the meaning of terminology in international affairs and
the parliament: “We have no BW, and therefore there is noth-
of the possibilities to manipulate it. The chance that Kuntzevich
ing to destroy . . . The new law related to the BWC will not be
could have used the improper words in an interview that he gave
translated to any budget allocation for BW stock destruction
to governmental newspaper—is next to zero. Not to mention
facilities, in opposite to what happened with the ratification of
that before printing, it would have been carefully reread by his
CWC.”18
assistants (unlike in a live talk show on TV).23 In early 2000,
For years, times and again, Russian officials rejected even
Ze’ev Wolfson sent a letter to the Editor of Nuclear Control,
hints of the existence of BW production in the former USSR. For

whereby he asked Evstigneyev about the contradiction in his
instance, Lieutenant General Valentin Estigneyev, Chief Com-
and Kuntzevich’s statements. The letter had been published in
mander of Biological Warfare Directorate in the Russian army
the May–June 2000 issue of that Russian journal; however, no
has been interviewed by Izvestiya on that issue.19 Referring to
reaction from any Russian official has followed.
the 1979 anthrax accident, he still (as of 1998) discredited at-
Actually, Evstigneyev contradicted not only his older col-
tributing the affair to weapon-grade anthrax. He implied that
league Kuntzevitch, but himself as well. In an interview with
Soviet weapon-grade anthrax would unlikely contain a mixture
Evstigneyev in 1992, published in the Russian Army newspaper
of several strains (as analyzed by an international scientific team
Krasnaia Zvezda, one can find a similar phrase: “In the mid 70s,
in Sverdlovsk), but rather a single strain, expectedly bearing,
in several Soviet pharmaceutical plants, strictly protected sec-
however, a 100% lethality rate. Generally, indeed, completed
tions were constructed, the purpose of which was clear to all.”
weaponization is perforce a precondition for BW production,
(It was not direct speech of Evstigneyev, but anyway the hint
whereas it is not necessarily indicative of subsequent BW pro-
was very clear and the article was based on his words.).24
duction occurring in reality. That plain logic is seemingly useful.
Mention should be made of some additional indications of
Thus, in the end of 1999, Estigneyev stated, “What we devel-
BW production in the former USSR.
oped never went into serial manufacturing . . . Nobody hoarded
Fedorov stated with confidence that large quantities of BW in
it, or tried to create strategic stocks.” He then added, “in 1989 we
the form of warheads for some types of SS-missile, which con-
eliminated indications of forbidden activity” (but not the activity
sist of numerous orange-sized balls (containers) to disseminate
itself—authors’ note).20
anthrax and other pathogens over wide territories, plus bombs
In retrospect, even faced with very solid evidence provided by
and shells in several models, had been secretly stored on a base
Pasechnic in 1989 and by Alibek in 1992, Moscow persisted in
its stance. One cannot dispute, ostensibly, the underlying ratio-
nale: both are defectors and, hence, “must write what they did for 21 Rossiyskie Vesti, 22 Sep, 1992.
commercial reasons”. . . Well, let us agree with this, strictly for 22 Rossiyskie Vesti, 22 Sep. 1992.
discussion purposes. In comparison, General Kuntzevich occu- 23 General Anatolii Kuntsevich was dismissed, two years later (in April
pied high-ranking positions in the system for decades, and must 1994), and charged with selling some 800 kilograms of chemical precursor
for chemical weapons to Syria and with the attempt to sell another consignment
of chemicals whose export is banned. These had been stolen from an institute
18 The DUMA (Russian Parliament) website (in Russian): http://www.akdi. developing CW in Moscow. After months of investigation, the charges were
ru/GD/plen z/2000/s27-10 d.htm dropped and the case never made it to court. (Nezavismaia Gazeta 24 October
19 Izvestiya, 3 March 1998. 1995)
20 Yadeirnyi (Nuclear) Kontrol, no. 4, p. 19, 1999. 24 Krasnaia Zvezda 29 Sept. 1992 p. 3.
for CW. Moreover, he elaborated on BW munitions in 1996: Aralsk. As a result, the epidemic around the country was prevented. I
“After 1992 our military kept the stock of BW far from any sign called Andropov, who at that time was Chief of KGB, and informed
detectable by international experts . . . the US cannot find it, not him of the exclusive recipe of smallpox obtained on Vozrazhdenie
Island.”28
in Stepnogorsk, neither in Makhachkala. They move the muni-
tions from one storage site of CW to another.”25 This statement— By 2002, other Russian epidemiologists still declined to ac-
perhaps the most important one made by a Russian—is meaning- knowledge the incident, attributing it to a natural outbreak, trig-
ful in several senses: the very fact that BW production was car- gered by the “garden variety” smallpox virus. When asked about
ried out by the USSR; the enduring retention of BW by Russia; the specific strain that generated the outbreak—a highly commu-
and the ongoing, sound practice of concealing BW in (inter-alia) nicable, possibly vaccine-resistant strain named Aralsk—they
CW storage sites. replied curtly that no such strain existed, a stance they main-
Notably, since 1992, Russian officials avoided acknowledg- tain to this day. Actually, it was a new lethal strain of small-
ing the issue of production more than once, but rather played pox that traveled far from the BW testing facility on an island
linguistic games. In the latest example—the most recent offi- in the Aral Sea to infect people downwind on a ship. Most of
cial statement, made by Valery Spirande, Deputy Chief Man- the adults exposed to the strain contracted smallpox despite be-
ager of the Department of BW & CW Conventions issues in the ing immunized. Prompted, remarkably extensive countermea-
Russian State Agency for Munitions, in 2003—instead of “pro- sures, including vaccination, disinfection, and quarantining were
duction” of various BW, the word “vytachivanie” was used—a conducted.29
word habitually used only to describe the process of molding pre- The virulent strains of anthrax and smallpox that have been
cious stones into souvenirs or figurines. Remarkably, Spirande adopted—and likely upgraded, parallel to other pathogens—
claimed most of it was for tests of samples of US bio-weaponry were rather produced and stockpiled by the USSR, beyond tech-
that the Russians got only in drawings.26 nical weaponization, considering the overall information pre-
It so happened, that during the last few years, Russian mil- sented in this article. At any rate, the fact that Russia did—or,
itary officials sometimes demonstrated real detention of 1992 sensibly, does—possess lines for production of an arsenal of BW,
statements. Thus, in November 2001, in connection with the has not just technical implications such as demand from West-
anthrax attacks in the US, commander of biological and chem- ern partners to destroy large fermentation vessels. It definitely
ical defense directorate general Holostov, maintained: “Russia means that Russia had and still has hundreds of scientists and
never developed, produced or stored BW.”27 This statement un- engineers highly qualified in the stages of production processes
ambiguously excludes the possibility of ever storing BW entirely per se, with all technical knowledge of how to solve problems
manufactured earlier by the USSR. arising when a virulent microbiological seed is transferred from
During the same month, however, another report was elicited a lab tube to an industrial line.
from General Prof. Peter Burgasov, former Chief Sanitary Physi- Assuming that the Soviets did produce combat strains and
cian of the Soviet Army, and a senior researcher within the BWP. various weaponry platforms, such knowledge may be helpful in
Admitting that development of BW by the Soviets did take place, reopening the production lines one day.
in the form of live field tests, he described a “smallpox incident”
that happened in the 1970s, and was then hushed: The Issue of Conversion
“On Vozrazhdenie Island in the Aral Sea, the strongest recipes Essence of the Course
of smallpox were tested. Suddenly I was informed that there were In 1992, Soviet military microbiologists asserted that their
mysterious cases of mortalities in Aralsk. A research ship of the Aral
budgets had suffered a 30% cut and the personnel had been cut by
fleet came 15 km away from the island (it was forbidden to come any
closer than 40 km). The lab technician of this ship took samples of 50%. According to the army newspaper Krasnaia Zvezda,30 the
plankton twice a day from the top deck. The smallpox formulation— new Department for Biological Defense at the Defense Ministry
400 gr. of which was exploded on the island—”got her” and she employed at the time “hardly more than ten experts,” and there
became infected. After returning home to Aralsk, she infected several were 400 scientists altogether who worked in the sphere of mil-
people including children. All of them died. I suspected the reason
itary microbiology, whereas just one center in the US had 1000
for this and called the Chief of General Staff of Ministry of Defense
and requested to forbid the stop of the Alma-Ata—Moscow train in employees. The newspaper also claimed that only ten active lab-
oratories were left in Russia, whereas there were 100 such labs in
25 www.voortuzhenie.narod.ru/Enciklopedia
the US. Moreover, in 1991 the USSR had reportedly spent some
Vooruzhenia/.
26 He said as follows: “. . . in the USSR and in Russia modeled real
70 million rubles ($0.5 million) on her ten labs and only 50 mil-
foreign ammunition—aviation bomb from 1 to 4 pounds in weight. lion rubles in 1992, whereas the US had spent $100 million on its
“Turned out” singles samples of it, produced tests in real condition 100 institutes.” Clearly, none of the quoted figures is perfectly
on the animals on the testing plots. (In Russian. . . . B CCPP reliable, because they are the result of various machinations,
http://www.vremya.ru/2003/74/ 28 Interviewin the Russian newspaper “Courier,” 24 November 2001.

6/56655.html 24 April 2003 29 Vedomosty (Moscow), 27 March, 2003.
27 (Russian Information Agency) Novosti, 2 Nov. 2001. 30 Krasnaia Zvezda, 29 Sept. 1992.
such as ignoring the entire Biopreparat research, development, Thus, an appreciable proportion of BW-related scientific and
and production complex that still employs thousands of people. technical manpower plus assets have indeed been removed or
A significant drop did take place, nevertheless. Within a short converted. Budgets have tangibly been diminished. Drifting of
time after the 1992 decree, because of deep crisis of Russian scientists, including key scientists, from one facility to another
economy, many of the R&D centers found themselves out of significantly intensified, but has been regulated. Examples of
budgets. Thousands of scientists and professional staff had no absorbing facilities are the Bio-Med Scientific-Industrial Com-
sources of income at all. For instance, from the end of the 1980s plex (located at Perm), and certain sections within the Bio-Mash
to 1994, the Kolstovo-based Siberian Vector Virology Center re- Scientific-Production Association (based at Moscow). Cooper-
duced, reportedly, as much as 58% of his staff (3500 out of 6000). ation with civilian frameworks remarkably decreased. In prac-
Similarly, the Institute of Appliance Microbiology in Obolensk, tice, the Biopreparat system almost stopped its various activities
lost 54% of his personal, (about 1400 out of 2700), including with regard to BW, although the related techno-scientific poten-
28% of the leading researchers, in the years 1990–1996.31 tial has been retained to a certain degree. Generally, then, those
Those and other nominally civilian institutes, belonging to steps necessarily weakened the overall competence of the BWP.
the Biopreparat Enterprise, formed scientific and commercial All in all, yet, no major alteration could be discerned or traced,
connections with various Western institutions; current recipro- in essence, regarding the confidentiality and techno-scientific
cal visits were—and still are—included. Although common, that R&D microbiological profile of the concerned properly military,
phenomenon was described, yet, as typical camouflage by an- parallel system, as a whole; neither could be detected, therein, in-
other senior Russian defector who came over (October 1993) to dications of a shift in favor of a concrete anti-bioterrorism effort,
British Intelligence to tell his debriefers what steps the Russian being taken place, as declared. Still, such endeavor did serve, in
military had taken to keep the concealed project going. Appar- practice, for conversion purposes within the Biopreparat system.
ently reliable, he stated: “In every facility that had been opened
for inspection to Western intelligence, the Russians had estab-
ANTI-BIOTERRORISM
lished convincing cover stories that made it appear as if each site
had been converted to research and manufacture of vaccines. The In the place where the Russian governmental initiative of
secret work continued in parts of the sites that were never vis- converting military R&D centers and absorbing into the mar-
ited by the American or British officials. Work is continuing ket economy had little success, American assistance within the
as before, in defiance of Yeltsin’s orders.”32 Salient examples “Reduce the Common (WMD) Threats” program fared much
embodying that practice are the distinguished facilities located better. In the biological sphere, a chief course of that program for
at Obolensk, Koltsovo, Berdsk, Omutninsk, and so forth. Some conversion has been the anti-bioterrorism one. The Novosibirsk-
other ones did convert completely. based Biopreparat-affiliated Vector microbiological center has
Unlike many branches of the military-industrial complex, the been a pioneering facility, within that context. Longtime before
microbiological industry in Russia benefited from ideal market others, Vector’s Director, Academician Sandakhchiev started to
conditions, or a so-called “niche,” in the early 1990s. First, the cooperate with international institutions, and already in the early
country has always suffered from a chronic shortage of vaccines, 1990s focused on issues related to monitoring and prevention
vitamins, and modern antibiotics that had to be imported. Sec- of bioterrorism.34 The Vector Institute had originally been es-
ond, since the late 1980s, Russia has been inundated by a wave tablished in the Novosibirsk Academic Compound, in the end
of protests against environmental pollution that was closely re- of 1970s, but for security reasons, it was later moved outside
lated to the activity of the pharmaceutical and microbiological of the city to the village Koltsovo. Recently, as an indepen-
enterprises. Some of them were shut down. The growing short- dent scientific enterprise, Vector became the main center for the
age of medicines was compensated for by increasing imports Russian (non-military) microbiological research. From 1989 to
from Western markets that had by then become accessible. 1996, Vector lost about a half of its staff, but until 2002, accord-
At that time, the Russian government managed to preserve ing Dr. Raisa Martuniuk, in charge of international programs in
the basis of the military-biological complexes, although they suf- Vector, it nearly rebuilt itself and not one of its scientists is in a
fered substantial losses. The government offered them a chance hurry to leave it.35
for independent survival by tossing them the idea of conversion There are plenty of microbiological labs all over Russia
as a life belt. Centers that belonged to the Ministry of Defense, eager—for financial, professional, or even ideological reasons—
such as Institutes in Kirov (Viatka), Sverdlovsk (Ekatherinburg), to save forbidden strains, bio-toxins, equipment, and informa-
and Zagorsk (Sergiev Posad), generally refrained from releasing tion. On the other hand, with time the Americans became more
data concerning their personal; however, they also went through attentive to Russian arguments about development of anti-terror
a troubled period.33 measures. Similarly, already in the mid 1990s they accepted the
Russian classification of “police gases” that gave a green light
to Moscow for further development of sleeping and irritating
31 http://www.expert.ru, 18 2002 r Vaccine for Life.
32 “At Face Value,” The Sunday Times, March 27, 1994.
33 Spirande said “the number of our experts in military institutes and labs is 34 http://www.vector.nsc.ru/art1-r.htm
the minimal for their tasks”. . . (Interview with Spirande, op. cit.) 35 http://www.expert.ru, 18 2002 r Vaccine for Life
agents, partially supported also by the US grants. A recent ex- reconfiguration of large-scale, formerly Soviet BW research,
ample of such a biotoxin-based agent is the pepper gas. In fact, it development, and production facilities for civilian purposes, by
represents a wide range of biotoxin-based incapacitating agents. creating Russian-US research partnerships.39 Collaboration has
The sort of sleeping gas used by the Russians to free hostages then been established in 2003 between the International Science
in the Moscow Theatre was another incapacitating substance. and Technology Center (ISTC), Moscow, and the Boston-based
The Russians, from their side, stressed that the US grants, Center for Integration of Medicine and Innovative Technology
which play a major role the survival of many Russian centers, (CIMIT), to implement the BII. Conversion is thus intended to
have a very negative aspect: Reportedly, then, while Americans take place through formation of systems in Russia to link scien-
receive sophisticated researches for a small charge, the best tists, physicians, and engineers to solve medical and scientific
Russian scientists now actually work for foreign military or problems, and identify innovative technologies and commercial-
semi-military projects. At the same time, Russia cannot use the ization opportunities.40
money for full-scale production vaccines and diagnostic kits, The Russians are seemingly pleased with the BII. At best,
to protect itself against the bio-terror threat.36 Also, the anti- however, the conversion of the Biopreparat network may pre-
bioterrorism outline and legislative base that was established in sumably be accomplished, thus. Still, the trends of anti-
Russia—to deny possible access by terrorist states and terror- bioterrorism and biomedical collaboration do not appear to
ist groups to dual-use technologies, plus materials—have been facilitate conversion within the military microbiological insti-
described by Vorobiev. He thereupon pointed at potential inter- tution. Neither do the following declared arguments of commer-
national cooperative efforts to be implemented, accordingly.37 cial secrecy, with reference being made to the MOD facilities in
Eventually, in 2001, a commitment was achieved between Rus- Sverdlovsk and Kirov.
sian and US Presidents, Vladimir V. Putin and George W. Bush,
to pursue cooperation to counter the threat of bioterrorism, in- Sverdlovsk
cluding a focus on health-related measures. In August 1992, official representatives stated that there were
The meaningfulness of bioterrorism has been further accen- no more military secrets in the domain of BW or related fields,
tuated during the 55th session of the World Health Assembly in but that there are commercial secrets forming a potential, which
Geneva (May 2002), when Russia came out for stepping up the will be realized by the microbiologists for the benefit of pub-
struggle against the threat of bioterrorism. As Minister of Health lic health and country’s economy. Consequently, in September
of Russia and head of the Russian delegation Yuri Shevchenko 1992, Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar issued a decree that formally
stated, this concerns intensification of scientific-research work to marked the beginning of the conversion process of the military-
obtain a new smallpox vaccine based on the collections of wild biological complex. The decree dealt with the reconstruction
strains of this most dangerous disease existing in Russia and of the Sverdlovsk facility, which became the most known and
the US. Shevchenko noted that during his meeting with head of problematic facility consequent to the 1979 event, when anthrax
the American delegation Tommy Thompson main attention had leek caused a disastrous, primarily concealed incident.41
been paid to the “questions of joint resolution” of the pressing According to the decree and related commentaries, the equip-
problems of countering bioterrorism and ensuring biosecurity.38 ment of the Sverdlovsk facility was dismantled by 1985. After
According to Shevchenko, “for twenty years we have not the reconstruction ordered by Gaidar, the facility was supposed
been vaccinating the population, while smallpox is not anthrax, to manufacture new products, such as vaccines, antibiotics, and
from the standpoint of the danger it breeds. If the smallpox virus other medicines. Correspondent Aleksander Pashkov, who vis-
is used as a BW, the world’s population will be incapable of re- ited the facility in Sept. 1992, wrote that the equipment that
sisting this disease.” As he stressed, it is necessary not only to he had been shown appeared outdated, and could not be com-
start vaccinating as soon as possible the people of the “high- pared with the equipment of the American military center for
risk group,” livestock-farmers and workers of the biotechnolog- biological research seen in a German TV film.42
ical sphere in particular, but “to think of all people in general.” If the equipment for the production of BW had already been
He contended, however, that the inoculation of the population dismantled in 1985, then what was Pashkov shown in 1992? And
against smallpox will be resumed, provided a new safe vaccine if it is a matter of manufacturing vaccines and medicines, then
is obtained. Russia has thereupon been noted for intensifying why is the comparison made with a center dealing with BW?
the struggle against threat of bioterrorism. A statement by the director of the Sverdlovsk facility, Major
Consequently, The Russian-US BioIndustry Initiative (BII) General Anatoly Kharechko, clarified things. In March 1993
began in 2002, constituting the newest proliferation threat reduc- (only six months after Gaidar’s decree), he held that “ . . . the staff
tion program. It aims to counter bioterrorism through targeted
39 www.state.gov/documents/organization/28781
36 Interview 40 New Russian-American Collaboration Against Bioterrorism: Moscow’s
with Spirande, op. cit.
37 Vorobiev, Alexander. “Countering Chemical/Biological Terrorism in the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) participating, Pravda, 17
Former Soviet Union: The Need for Cooperative Efforts,” Politics and the Life Sept. 2003.
41 Izvestiya 25 April 1992, p. 1.
Sciences, [London], 15, September 1996, 233–5.
38 Pravda, 15 May 2002. 42 Izvestiya, 22 Sep. 1992, p. 8.
employed by the center is currently continuing to implement the belonged to Kirov University, and for reasons of commercial
scientific research plans approved by the higher authorities of confidence (in August 2002). This case left a bad taste, because
the Defense Ministry; therefore, it is a matter only of a partial never before did Kirov University has any modern facility of
re-orientation of the staff efforts.” 43 Subsequently, the center that sort, while situated just next to the Kirov military microbio-
has been producing some antibiotics, samples of which were logical center (a facility that has been working with BW already
later shown on local television in 1998. Since 1992, however, for 60 years).47
not one single correspondent has been allowed on the premises
of the military town number 19 that still houses the center. Local
THE PROBLEM OF BIOTECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
journalists maintain that new equipment was bought from Japan
and other countries and that, according to Kharechko, the center An Inevitable Consequence?
returned to its previous active level of work after the regression A rather more important phenomenon is the Russian exper-
in the mid 90s. About 200 soldiers with Rottweiler dogs still tise, possibly being the most demanded “products” within the
patrol the entire complex.44 world black market of BW technologies, in various forms of
Too many questions remain unanswered concerning the transferring (from direct personal consultation to selling copies
Sverdlovsk 1979 disaster and its corollaries. Addressing them of records on operation of processes). Such knowledge could be
could also aid in understanding the real Russian BW-related utilized for bio-proliferation for years.
system at large. One of the questions is: did people actually die Remarkably typifying the applicability of a cardinal dual-use
from genetically modified anthrax? Prof. Ely Shliakhov, one of technology, migration of biotechnological components and as-
the internationally acclaimed experts on anthrax offered the fol- sets from Russia plus other formerly Soviet states takes place
lowing evidence. His former university classmate, Prof. Peter in a variety of modes: fully or semi-institutionalized, private
Burgasov, while serving as a Chief Soviet Army Sanitary Physi- (completely commercial), through “scientific mercenaries,” for-
cian, took a key position in the investigation of the Sverdlovsk warded confidential documents, or performed other technolog-
disaster. Even for him there was no way to approach the full ical thefts. Moreover, primary state-to-state transfer of such es-
data. However, he studied one aspect of the epidemiological sentials and assets does not mean that a secondary phase of
observation with his team that had no explanation. Burgasov’s migration to another country, or countries, would not occur,
staff took numerous samples from school desks a few days after consequently. Significantly, biotechnologies were provided by
the disaster in several schools beside Compound 19 (the places Russia to Cuba, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The inter-
where the underground secret facilities were situated, the source faces with Iraq (until 2002) and with Iran, are herewith detailed,
of anthrax fallout). Many probes taken from pupils’ desks con- together with Russian commenting, to demonstrate the problem
tained a large number of active anthrax—more than is needed of biotechnology transfer.
to infect children sitting on them or inhaling the bacteria—for
a few days already. None of those children fell ill or died, and
The Past Interface with Iraq
neither did the teachers—all of them females. This may indicate
that several Russian experts who supposed that some anthrax Several specific cases, whereby Russia was blamed for di-
strain was “oriented” on combat staff, namely adult males only, rectly supporting Iraq’s BWP, led to unequivocal—though not
were right.45 necessarily convincing—discountenances made by Russian sci-
entists and officials.
Kirov First, a DIA report of 1994 noted that BW technology related
According to one of its directors, Yevgenii Pimenov, another to anthrax and smallpox was made available to Iraq (and North
major military-microbiological institute in Kirov approached the Korea), around 1992. This allegedly occurred mainly through
idea of conversion in a more serious manner.46 The institute was scientists from the Kirov facility that traveled to Iraq.48 Seem-
having serious difficulties paying wages (that, according to the ingly compatible with that report has been information for-
military, were lower than those of civilian experts) and purchas- warded to the New York Times by an unspecified CIA source
ing the most basic equipment, and it suffered from a “brain (as of December 2002), stating that Iraq had possibly obtained
drain,” although previously the military could afford to choose a particularly virulent strain of smallpox from a Russian scien-
the best from dozens of applicants. In Kirov, as in Sverdlovsk, it tist, Dr. Nelli Maltseva—a senior specialist on smallpox virus—
soon became clear that the only client for their production could while visiting Iraq in 1990. Maltseva has been a distinguished
be just the same old one, namely the Ministry of Defense. researcher at the Moscow Research Institute for Viral Prepa-
Unsurprisingly, then, Senator Lugar was prevented from vis- rations, a cardinal facility housing hundreds of virulent strains
iting the installation called Kirov-200, with the excuse that it
47 Interview
with Spirande, op. cit.
43 ibid. 48 Department of Defense, DIA report, Filename: 22010910.94a, May
44 VecherniiSverdlovsk (city newspaper ) 25 November 1998. 26, 1994; IIR 2 201 0910 94/RUSSIAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
45 E.Shliahkov, personal interview, Tel Aviv, June 2000. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. html head /headbodypre<html>
46 Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 Dec. 1992. <head> </www.fas.org/irp/gulf/intel/950719/22010910 9
of various viruses, including smallpox. Russian scientists who remote-controlled drowns, capable of disseminating BWA. Fi-
worked for many years with her, unambiguously discredited nally, in 1999, Iraq’s Scud-C (al-Hussein) missiles were acquired
such a possibility, arguing that all smallpox strains (about 120) from high-level military officials and Russian arms dealers. The
were absolutely inaccessible for Maltseva, unless granted, and al-Hussein was retrofitted to deliver biological (and chemical)
at any event were all transferred to Vector Center for Virol- weapons with Russian technology. UNSCOM was prevented
ogy and Biotechnology, at Koltsovo, Novosibirsk.49 That asser- from verifying Iraqi claims that it had destroyed the al-Hussein
tion might be questionable, as shown in the appendix of this warheads. At the time, Russia joined with France and Germany
article. in taking up Iraq’s campaign to weaken inspections. Referring
Moreover, key microbiologists included in the UN BW in- to the amassing incriminating data, Russia’s Foreign Minister,
spection team in Iraq (UNSCOM) were Russians who had been Igor Ivanov, was decidedly testy: “there is no evidence confirm-
deeply involved in the Soviet BWP. Premier Yevgeny Primakov ing violations by Russian firms of existing sanctions,” he stated,
worked with the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to pack in- before aiming sharp words at the U.S.53 Notably, he did not
spection teams with Russians picked by Moscow. The directly deny the alleged violations.
manipulation seemingly paid off. Reportedly, the Russians on

the inspection team were “paranoid” about efforts made to un- The Interface with Iran
cover production of smallpox virus, a pathogen that has been The Russian-Iranian biological interface appears to be coor-
weaponized by Iraq.50 dinated, in terms of displaying a line of total innocence, parallel
Also, negotiations took place in 1995 between Russia and Iraq to granting assistance desired by Iran. Thus, in a 1998 statement
for the supply of fermentation equipment, including a 5,000-liter issued in response to a New York Times article on Iran’s BWP,
fermentation vessel. The vessel that Moscow agreed to sell Iraq Vladimir Rakhmanin, a spokesman for the Russian foreign min-
was 10 times larger than the largest vessel Iraq has admitted istry, said that Moscow has taken note of Western media reports
using to brew germs. Uncovered documents call for an agree- of Iran’s attempts to hire Russian researchers for the develop-
ment between Russian experts and leaders of Iraq’s weapons ment of BW. He repeated that Russia “has been and will continue
programs and for the “design, construction and operation of the to abide by international standards for WMD and missile deliv-
plant,” ostensibly for producing single-cell animal feed protein. ery systems.”54 That positive line has apparently been fulfilled
The agreement includes, however, the names of the director of on one occasion, when connections between the Russian semi-
Iraq’s botulinum toxin program (a different single-cell protein, military Obolensk microbiological institute and Iran were cut.
in that case), the chief engineer for the Iraqi al-Hakam BW The formerly Soviet, Islamic sisters, Kazakhstan and
plant, and prominent members of Iraq’s military industrial com- Turkmenistan, are geo-strategically of vital importance for Iran.
mission. Though Russia flatly denied involvement, it refused Iran recognized their capacities in the WMD area—particularly
to allow interviewing Russians to determine whether the equip- after they gained independence—and formed ties, accordingly.
ment was actually delivered (indeed delivered, in all probability). Thus, during their meeting in Ashkhabad in June 1992, the three
The Russians were “constantly giving the Iraqis the benefit of leaders found merit in declaring together that all three states will
doubt. They said, ‘no way could al-Hakam be a dual-use facil- make efforts to counter accumulation and employment of bio-
ity.” 51 Further, in response to a request written to the Russian logical, chemical, and nuclear weapons altogether.
Ambassador to the UN, Sergei Lavrov, asking him to clarify Kazakhstan and Armenia serve as main bridges and sources.
documentation that his inspectors secured in Baghdad in 1997, Thus, the equipment of an Armenian biological key-plan was
the Russian Foreign Minister and Defense Minister completely entirely sold to Iran through a firm affiliated, officially, with the
rejected the whole affair.52 United Arab Emirates, in spite of a vigorous American attempt
In another uncovered file detailing a deal for Russian air- to foil the move.55 Yet, it has been indicated that Russian plants
craft, one chapter pertains to engine and guidance systems for stood behind the Armenian “leaks.” Thus, the Russians would
transfer to the Armenians, and to other partners, superfluous
49 Gazeta.Ru, December 5, 2002, US paper to face Russian smallpox lawsuit, production equipment and information potentially necessary for
By Yelena Vrantseva. Iran; or the Russians would ignore (of course, not without a
50 Robert Goldberg, The Russian Strain (Commentary), Wall Street Journal,
payoff) the question of how Armenian businessmen disposed of
March 27, 2003. the property belonging to them.56
51 Robert Goldberg, The Russian Strain (Commentary), Wall Street Journal,
March 27, 2003.

The dimension of techno-scientific cooperation between
52 Rohde, D., ‘A possible Russian link to Iraq arms buildup,’ New Russia and Iran is no less significant. The Iranian-Russian
York Times, 12 Feb. 1998, URL http://search.nytimes.com/; Smith, R. J.,
‘Did Moscow try to skirt sanctions?,’ Moscow Times, 13 Feb. 1998, URL
http://www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1998/Feb/13/story2.html; Smith, 53 Robert Goldberg, The Russian Strain (Commentary), Wall Street Journal,
R. J., ‘Russian firms discussed factory sale with Iraqis,’ Moscow Times, March 27, 2003.
19 Feb. 1998, URL http://www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1998/Feb/19/ 54 Interfax, 1224 GMT, 11 Dec 98; FBIS-TAC-98-345.
story4.html; and ‘Russia denies allegations in “Washington Post,” ’ RFE/RL 55 Khachtrian, E. and Danielyan, E., US named Armenian firm subject to
Newsline, 12 Feb. 1998, URL http://search.rferl.org/newsline/1998/02/120298. Iran sanction; RFE/RL Armenian Report, May 16, 2002.
html. 56 Oleg Khrabryi www.vesti.ru, May 28, 2002.
biotechnological interface includes, indeed, strong, continuing toxins), to develop a variety of biochemical warfare agents for
ties between scientists of both parties, stemming, apparently, diverse purposes; the related activities conducted within various
from regular academic cooperation. One conspicuous frame- chemical-weapons-oriented facilities, including military ones.
work of that evolving interface is the annual “Agriculture and The non-microbial toxins-concerned system has been operating
Natural Resources” Iranian-Russian Conference. Bearing a re- independently of the pathogens plus microbial toxins related
markably wide scientific scope, this framework includes typi- system, except for those cases involving genetically induced
cally applicable topics, diluted within its overall scope. Clostrid- non-microbial toxin production within benign bacteria (toxin
ium botulinum (isolation of types A, B, E, in north of Iran) biosynthesis), or within recognized pathogens (virulence ampli-
and the related toxinogenic bacterium Clostridium chauvoei fication). At large, BWA against humans, livestock, and crops
(large-scale cultivation) were two topics presented, thereupon, have all been developed, produced, and weaponized. Within the
in Moscow, among many others.57 present analysis, a wide range of anti-human BWA is visited,
excluding pathogenic fungi and non-microbial toxins.
THE SOVIET/RUSSIAN BWP TECHNO-SCIENTIFIC In contrasting, Russia admitted that the only BWA included
MICROBIOLOGICAL AXIS: ACTIVITIES WITHIN in her (merely R&D) program were the pathogens of plague,
MILITARY FACILITIES anthrax, brucellosis, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, Q-fever,
and typhus, plus botulinum toxin.58 Notably, this declared list
Until 1991 mostly overlapped (not casually) with the much earlier list ac-
Five military facilities engaged heterogeneously in various knowledged by the US, concerning its own weaponized BWA;
sub-domains of medical microbiology, and forming, altogether, at the same time, it reflected but one slice of a much wider spec-
a sensible entirety, have long constituted the skeleton of the trum of pathogens and toxins cultivated by Moscow’s military
Soviet BWP: (see appendix).
• Institute for Military Sanitation—Center of Virology,
located in Zagorsk (now Sergiyev Posad)—mainly vi- Since 1992
ral and rickettsial BWA; None of the military facilities became civilian or accessi-
• Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology, located ble for foreigners. The quality of R&D activities—in terms of
in Kirov (now Vyatka)—mainly bacterial BWA; both the range of pathogens being dealt with, as well as their
• Center for Military-Technical Problems of Anti- applicability—mostly persisted. The general volume of R&D
Bacteriological Defense, located in Sverdlovsk (now activities has yet been somewhat reduced. BW production in the
Yekaterinburg)—mainly anthrax; main five facilities under discussion ostensibly stopped. Their
• Scientific Research Institute of Military Medicine, lo- reorganization has been configured by the MOD according to
cated in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg)—mainly epi- three conceptual principles:
demiological and medical aspects relating to BWA;
• • retaining of existing capacities;
State Establishment for Biological Instrumentation,
• hindering effective foreign monitoring;
Precision Machinery and Safety Techniques, located
• misleading of domestic civilian authorities, if needed.
in Moscow—mainly apparatuses, installations and sub-
stances related to BWA. A profound perception regarding the magnitude and power of
Detailed information about each of these five facilities, with BW—possibly a realistic one, objectively—marked that mili-
special reference to their microbiological profile of activities tary concept. It is substantiated, as well, by the still predomi-
until 1991, is briefly described in the following sections and is nant Russian assessment that the US is not giving up BW, in
presented in depth in the appendix. actuality, and that some countries in Eurasia, China in particu-
The Soviet BWP carried out within those facilities included lar, are in possession of BW, and unwilling to depreciate them.
most types of anti-human BWA: bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, Hence, a variety of ways through which reorganization processes
and toxins. Those BWA types were laboratory- and field-tested, should—tentatively, at the least—be accomplished, have been
then, and, consequently, serially weaponized. There is some worked out:
doubt concerning weaponization of anti-human pathogenic fungi • false or semi-false conversion of some existing BW-
(regardless of mycotoxins, which at any event have been oriented installations or parts of them;
weaponized). Non-microbial toxins (phytotoxins and zootox- • assimilation by existing BW-oriented facilities or labs;
ins) have extensively been looked into (in addition to microbial • construction of new, alternative facilities or labs—either
“non-existing” or under-coverage existing ones (such
57 H.R. Tavakoli, Isolation of Clostridium botulinum (types A, B & E) in
as the large and modernized unspecified ones in Strizhi
sediments from coastal areas of the north of Iran; R. P. Langroudi, Large scale and in Lakhta);
cultivation of clostridium chauvoei (Blackleg) vaccine by fermenter. The 3rd
International Iran and Russia Conference “Agriculture and Natural Resources,”
September 18–20, 2002. 58 TASS, 12 Sep. 1992.
• formation of a system of modular mobile installations storage facilities are apparently being utilized for BW storage,
that could possibly substitute certain existing non-mobile as well.
installations. Technical weaponization took place within installations usu-
ally affiliated to some primarily conventional-warhead-oriented
From a scientific microbiological viewpoint, this outline may facilities that partially underwent sub-specializations. An excep-
serve to implement some courses that have lately emerged (in tion has been an underground military installation located very
addition to earlier, still ongoing ones, as detailed below) for close to the Saratov Anti-Plague Institute. In this facility, serial
instance: production of the plague bacterium has been conducted within
• increased virulence and shortened incubation periods infected horses, and ultimately the product has been serially
of pathogenic agents; installed—at another wing of this installation—into surface-to-
• induced UV resistance and heat-stability; surface missiles, warheads, or sub-munitions. Another excep-
• usability of innocent or relatively benign bacteria or tion, in that sense, has been the Sverdlovsk compound, with
viruses, infective to man, as operators of toxin-coding anthrax development, production, weaponization, and storage
genes; altogether occurring therein. Two new, large BW military owned

• serial production of protein toxins within abiotic arti- complexes were constructed in Lakhta and Strizhi, totally un-
ficial systems containing the coding gene plus needed specified. A third one has been built elsewhere.
conditions; namely, an in vitro appliance containing Several military facilities were responsible for field testing of
certain coding gene plus components (not cells, viruses weaponized systems, namely those on the Komsomolskiy and
or tissues) essential for bringing about its functioning. Vozrozhdeniye Islands (designated Aralsk-7 sites), Shikhany
(mainly for testing of toxins and non-pathogenic simulants, as
Concurrently, however, very senior Russian microbiologists in- well as platforms and dispensers), and unspecified sites in
volved in the BWP brought out large portions of their profes- Northern Siberia and Southern Siberia, possibly in the vicin-
sional knowledge through books (regardless of Alibek’s book), ity of Koltsovo or the Mongolian borderline. Field tests con-
significantly contributing, thus, to the trend of transparency. The sisted in both ground and aerial dissemination trials of BW in
following is a list of these books published in Russia: various forms of the active pathogen, sub-munitions, and mu-
• 1998—Chuma (plague), by I. V. Domaradskii; nitions. Additionally, ballistic warheads have been field tested
• 1999—Sibirsca Yazva (anthrax) (authors detailed be- successfully.
low); In general, strict separation between weaponization facili-
• 2003—Biowarrior: Inside the Soviet/Russian Biologi- ties and the facilities engaged in developing and producing the
cal War Machine, by I. V. Domaradskii. BWA themselves has been followed, both physically and proce-
durally. Experimental weaponization often took place through
The book about anthrax, is intriguing in that it was written by a cooperation between development and weaponization facilities.
battery of distinguished figures: Major-General Nikifor T. Vasi- Serial manufacturing of BWA-filled-weapon systems was sepa-
lyev, Commander of the Directorate of Radiation, Chemical and rate. Coordination has been supervised only at the highest levels
Biological Security of the Defense Ministry (former “15 Di- of the military headquarters of the BWP.
rectorate, bacteriological warfare”), Major-General Academi-
cian Anatoly T. Kharechko, Head of the Center of Military- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Technological Problems of Biological Protection, Ekaterinburg The might borne by human pathogens has been explored
(former “Compound 19”, Sverdlovsk), his deputy Nikolay V. extensively in Russia; certainly by its Soviet progenitor. The
Sadovoi, N.V. Litusov, a key scientist of the Center, Vladimir motivation behind this exploration—for military purposes, ei-
V. Kozhukhov, Head of the Anthrax Department of the R&D ther defensive or offensive—is a resulting issue with its own
Institute of Microbiology of the Defense Ministry (Vyatka, for- significance. Nonetheless, the immeasurable entirety of knowl-
mer Kirov), P.G. Vasilyev, a key scientist of the Institute, and edge, expertise, and experience gained and imbibed by Russia
Gennady G. Onishchenko, Chief Sanitary Inspector of Russia. in the field of medical microbiology is apparently unique in
comparison to any other country, stemming from a conjunc-
Other Military Facilities tion of vast, mostly diversified territories and environments (in
In addition to the above-mentioned military facilities, re- part formerly Soviet, non-Russian), containing a grand variety
markably few classified military installations have been of native pathogens; favoring conditions for natural expression
responsible—since the late 50s—for technical weaponization of those pathogens; considerable attention and alertness paid
of BWA. Storage has ordinarily been carried out in the form of toward them; and tangible scientific abilities that are solemnly
loaded sub-munitions right upon the weaponization facilities, utilized within both civilian and military Russian frameworks.
and in the form of preserved bulky agent right upon the agent Mutual, positive feedback has formed and has continuously
production facilities, with the exception of the Malta storage fa- been increasing between that entirety and a supremely strategic
cility and an additional unidentified storage facility. Several CW Soviet/Russian paradigm, configuring the vitality of BW. The
outcome has been the most advanced and sophisticated BWP • Notably broadening tangential interface between BW
worldwide. Paradoxically, the Soviet BWP has been carried out and novel biotechnologies;
until 1972, parallel to the US BW arsenal—rather exceeding, • Confidentiality achieved through asserted commercial
in practice, the latter—whereas since 1973 it remarkably scaled secrecy;
up in spite of, or, actually, in consequence of the elimination • Preparedness to face naturally emerging, or reemerg-
of the American arsenal (plus Soviet acceding to the BWC). ing, highly virulent/epidemic pathogens.
Other emerging extraneous BW threats—such as the Chinese
one—fueled that process, secondarily. One increasing course, then, is an effort being made to re-
BW manufacturing (or production), in terms of serial stock- cover from various frozen environments naturally preserved
piling of both BWA and weapon-systems designed to contain early strains of pathogens that are outstandingly virulent, variola
them in an operational state, is the key issue of the whole com- being a predominant example. For that purpose, a new facility
plexity relating to the Soviet\Russian BWP. Therefore, if such is intended to be constructed in Tuymen, apparently designated
manufacturing did not ever take place, then any efforts made the Institute for Cryo-Virology and Immunology.
so as to uncover BW, or demand to expose them, are totally Generally, thus, the activities of most of the described Russian
meaningless; and vice versa. The findings of the present analy- military facilities did not substantially change, in practical terms,
sis suggest that BW were manufactured by the USSR, inherited though the cardinal, ultimate phase of serial BWA weaponiza-
to Russia, mostly preserved by her, and apparently incorporated tion and stockpiling has been reduced and transfigured, to an
into somewhat modified, enduring, exclusively classified mili- unknown extent; possibly, it ceased. Military-civilian interactive
tary frameworks. (To a certain extent, the latter are still backed, crash programs for BW production, involving nominally civilian
technologically, by some secret remains of the converted Bio- installations such as those located at Kurgan, Omsk, and some
preparat system.) other sites, considerably deteriorated, marking, thereby, the cul-
The current phase of that evolutionary process is facilitated, mination of real conversion processes. Actually, the course of
in effect, by an informal Russian-American status quo, one that conversion of the nominally civilian installations began in 1989,
has virtually been established lately, acknowledging the non- unexpectedly. The superb information forwarded by Dr. Pasech-
termination of BW, for the time being. In a sense, the cardi- nik, who defected to Britain in 1989, brought about Prime Min-
nal, unsolved issue of the smallpox virus constitutes an illus- ister Thatcher and President Bush both pressing the issue with
trative reflection of that much broader, yet unresolved issue. President Gorbachev. Gorbachev denied, then, that the USSR
Sheltered by seemingly acceptable justifications of essential on- had any BWP. Yet, shortly after Pasechnik’s defection, “the spe-
going research into the most dreadful pathogen of mankind is cial equipment and documentation in the mothballed shops were
thus still extant in Russia, the US and, most likely, some other shipped out; some destroyed and some re-stored elsewhere”;
places. It perfectly symbolizes the bivalent potential of further, meaning, in certain cases conversion was but ostensible, even
extremely ominous pathogens held, militarily, by Russia and ad- within nominally civilian installations.
ditional states. In Russia, it is retained, probably, as a stockpiled Yeltsin’s decree of April 1992 was historical, indeed, and did
weapon, along with an arsenal of various pathogens and tox- reflect a sharp change in Russian policy and an important deci-
ins. The argument that full acquaintances with pathogens reck- sion, certainly, regardless of the military-biological complex ori-
oned as BWA—and, likewise, with their aggressive attributes, entation. Nevertheless, the economic crisis, which started even
in terms of bio-terrorism threats—are necessary for achieving before the collapse of USSR, already in 1990, was as influential
effective protection, is a very reasonable one, and is subject to as the governmental decrees in pushing the military-biological
much debate. It is therefore, objectively, a salient dual-purpose complex to nearly the edge of survival, seemingly.
factor; particularly that engineered pathogens and bio-terrorism Overall, conversion attempts had little success, economically,
menaces are becoming common. Concurrently, and perhaps gen- despite ideal local market conditions (a chronic shortage of
uinely, this attitude is applied within the US Army as defensively medicines). Yet, Russian authorities did well in keeping the main
oriented “bioprofiling.”59 facilities of R&D of BW (both military and nominally civilian)
Several evolving trends, while reflecting sensible legitimacy, afloat, albeit with a tangible reduction of staff (up to approxi-
may indirectly facilitate, then, various segments of the ongoing mately 50%) and installations. Some of them were shut down.
Russian BW-related activities: The military facilities were significantly less degraded. Con-
comitantly, since 1992 the Russians often ignored demands to
• The strategic durability of BW, globally, in spite of dismantle facilities designed for BW production. Consequently,
continuing deproliferation efforts; years of experience with BW left behind large numbers of scien-
• Evaluating and confronting the bioterrorism threat; tists and engineers with unique skillfulness and technical records
• Certain developing aspects related to space of production “secrets.” Such resources are vital for all those
microbiology; countries that seek to acquire BW. Although the Kremlin has no
interest in transferring such resources to anybody, there are too
59 Matsumoto, G., Anthrax powder: state of the art? Science, v. 302, 28 Nov. many experts that could “share” their knowledge through non-
2003, pp.1492–1497. governmental ways to non-governmental or even institutional
agencies. Practically, biotechnology transfer did take place, to from the Poultry Breeding Institute to ZF. Quantities are reg-
an unknown, probably significant degree. ulated according to the current needs of ZF, for both labora-
New international approaches toward the threats of bioter- tory and wider scale of propagation of the viruses and rick-
rorism provided for Russian BW centers the second chance (af- ettsiae being developed and produced as BWA. ZF mainly did
ter conversion plans) to survive and continue their activities. R&D. Serial production of pre-weaponized BWA was carried
According to numerous indications coming from Russian sci- out from time to time. Serial weaponization was conducted
entists, the money flows, however, through the “Program for elsewhere.
Reduction of Common Threats” to labs belonging to the Min- ZF has for long been designated within the Soviet military
istry of Defense and to some military-oriented projects still be- “The Institute for Military Sanitation,” while concentrating, in
ing conducted in centers like the Vector Virology Center, or effect, on BWA. It has been a crucial component within the So-
the Institute of Applied Microbiology in Obolensk. At the same viet BW system. A considerable degree of independence marked
time, by providing new jobs for BW related scientists in Russia, the overall activity of ZF, in terms of professional considerations
the risk of their emigration to rogue countries is appreciably and paradigms, even to the level of strategic ones.
diminished. ZF has ostensibly been closed down during the first half
Nonetheless, during recent years Russians feel free enough of the 1980s, following western reports pointing at this instal-
to ask for much more aid, and, contemporarily, furnish but lim- lation as being a leading Soviet BW facility. The move was
ited transparency of their activities. Moreover, official and semi- rather formal. In practice, is has never been dismantled, not
official persons gradually aggravate claims that the US govern- even partially, though reciprocal substitutions of key scientists
ment is breaching the BWC in order to develop new kinds of and some organizational changes have indeed taken place, mis-
non-lethal weapons. According to this Russian observation, the leadingly, several institutes of the Ministry of Health at Moscow
US behaves as a sole superpower, making all decisions alone, being involved. Such were the Gamaleya Institute of Micro-
and bears the responsibility for proliferation of BW. Russia— biology and Epidemiology and the Research Institute for Vi-
that had and still has a dangerous stock of combat strain and ral Preparation. The activities in ZF have not at all been im-
secret facilities—has not shared a bit of that responsibility. Con- paired, substantially, and have persisted. Furthermore, over time,
versely, however, the present study shows that the Russian mili- several scientists that had previously left ZF returned to ZF.
tary skeleton comprising at least the five facilities analyzed here Maximum biohazard containment installations have been re-
(and likely additional ones) appears to remain solid, structurally constructed during the 80s, to facilitate safe and completely
and functionally, although somewhat impaired. Hence, it may controlled experimentation, handling and accumulation of Var-
be regarded as a framework still posing a potential menace, in iola, Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa viruses, as well as glanders
terms of both stockpiled, probably deployable BW, and prevail- bacterium.
ing production capacities. Production of BWA usually reaches semi-industrial scale,
with three main wings have been operating in ZF: Virology;
APPENDIX: THE MILITARY MICROBIOLOGICAL Rickettsiology; and Bacteriology (secondarily).
FACILITIES AT ZAGORSK, KIROV, SVERDLOVSK, A wide spectrum of viruses has been explored as potential
LENINGRAD, AND MOSCOW—SCIENTIFIC PROFILE BWA at ZF. In general, those viruses consisted in encephalitic
UNTIL 1991 AND SINCE 199260 viruses and hemorrhagic viruses, including the variola
pathogen.
The Zagorsk Facility (ZF)—‘Institute for Military
In the late 1960s, after it has been established by the KGB
Sanitation—Center of Virology’, Zagorsk (now
that VEE virus has been weaponized by USA, and while anti-
Sergiyev Posad)
viral drugs were totally unavailable, a long-term immunological
Until 1991 experiment started, aimed at appraising the efficacy of live VEE
ZF has been the central facility of the Soviet military, with vaccine in human beings. Two strains—15 and 230—were used
regard to the development and production of viruses and rick- for preparing the vaccine, which has been administrated sub-
ettsiae as BWA. It has permanently been included within the cutaneously, and later also orally. Neutralizing immunity was
MOD; occasionally, activities taking place at ZF were officially found to steadily persist for up to 25 years at least. At times,
attributed to the MOH by the authorities, to confer upon a civil- during that period, some naturally occurring, remarkably viru-
ian coverage. lent strains of VEE virus have been positively considered, and
Assistance has been given by the All Union Research Tech- consequently prepared as BWA. Nevertheless, EEE, TBE and
nical Institute of Poultry Breeding, located at Zagorsk—all sup- Japanese B encephalitis viruses have been evaluated as well,
plies of embryonated chicken eggs for the cultivation of viruses and one of them has been stockpiled, in parallel. The strains
and rickettsiae. The embryonated eggs are routinely transported Aina/1448 (tick-borne) and Hanoi-60 (Japanese B) have been
of first priority.
60 Parts of the following information are based on Soviet and Russian micro- Langat and Sindbis viruses have widely been applied as model
biological and medical scientific literature. and simulant viruses, but controlled live experiments upon
humans have concomitantly been conducted as well. Inacti- adults and children (empirically) were included. Main scientists
vated vaccines based on intact virus have been developed. Main involved were Balaeva, Lukin, and Voroben. Different strains of
scientists involved were Gaidmovich, Lukin, Selivaenko, and R. Ehrilichia have been evaluated as well.
Chernikova. Later, anti-viral drugs were tested by Marikov in The epidemic potency of R. prowazeki has been studied, in
monkeys. The virus causing West-Nile fever has been explored, terms of the needed degree of louse infestation and initial rate
and then upgraded as a BWA. Among other arboviruses, one ad- of rickettsial infectedness within a human tentative target pop-
ditional non-indigenous mosquito-borne and air-borne virus— ulation. The anticipated transmissibility and the derived fitness
the Rift-Valley virus—has been tested as well. Main scientists as an arthropod borne BWA have thus quantitatively appraised.
involved were Lomachenova and Lebedev. The final evaluation has been positive.
Elevated thermo-resistance and chemo-resistance of arbo- C. burneti has aerogenically been experimented with on mon-
viruses have been attained throughout propagation under varying keys and guinea pigs, goats and humans, in the form of pow-
factors within different cell cultures, in addition to embryonated dered and wet aerosols. Parallel field tests have been success-
eggs, mainly Vero and BHK-21. The purpose of that effort fully conducted as well. The predominant virulent strain has
has been concerned with improved weaponization processes of been strain Gishin. A highly effective live enteric vaccine de-
arboviruses. Main scientists involved were Yonov, Khamitov, rived from strain m/44 has been standardized. Primary scientists
Zhirkova, Badikova, and Myasnikov. have been Solodyankin, Mikhailov, and Oleichik.
Synthesized molecular probes have been efficiently prepared The main bacterial BWA being dealt with include Pseu-
and applied for accurate differentiation between various patho- domonas pseudomallei and Ps. mallei. Key scientists involved
variants of arboviruses under development as BWA. Main sci- have been Adimov and Ponomarev. Bacterial recombinant DNA
entists involved were Proskryakova, Viknskaya, Gorban, Kunz- technologies are mastered and applied by Lazarenko, Khomenko,
nesova, and Strelets. Improved detection systems for encephalitic and Makhai. Production of the two a.m. pathogens (causal agents
viruses have been developed by Moskvina, Butenko, Kavrova, of glanders and melioidosis) has been applied in infected ani-
and Osin. mals, along with regular fermentation processes. Various related
The departments of hemorrhagic fevers:—Ebola, Lassa, and aspects were applied by Vorobyev.
Marburg viruses have been profoundly researched, to effectively Special emphasize has been laid at proper functioning of a co-
develop one of those pathogens as a BWA, concurrently. The task located, large animal house. Animals are largely used for exper-
has apparently been realized. A strong requirement has been the imental infections, pathogens propagation, prophylaxis, treat-
development of protective measures. Thus, the three pathogens ment, and detection tests. Many species of monkeys are often
have been systematically applied for experimental air-borne in- used as experimental specimens, including green monkeys, Java
fection of different monkeys, anti-sera preparations used for monkeys, rhesus monkeys, chimpanzees, and baboons.
both immunotherapy and immunodetection (rapid and metic-
ulous), production of inactivated vaccines and development of Since 1992
anti-viral drugs. Remarkable results were obtained as to the aero- There were no significant changes in ZF since 1992. Most
genic infectivity and virulence of the various strains investigated. activities persist. Lebedev (together with Bystrov from KF) em-
Of most protective value has been a mixture of UV-inactivated phasized at mixed arboviral infections, to generate hybrid forms
vaccines plus immunoglobulins to early virus-specific proteins. of certain RNA fragments. The Japanese B encephalitis strain
Main scientists were Donchenko, Pshenichnov, and Krasnyansky. SP-69 possibly replaced the above-mentioned strain Hanoi-60.
The smallpox pathogen has been stockpiled by USSR as a Similarly, Vorobyev had increasing cooperation with Lebedin-
BWA throughout the 1970s and 1980s, in part consequently sky (from KF), while developing various forms of vaccines—
to direct active involvement of ZF. Improved detection tech- particularly aerosol-based ones—aimed at protecting against
niques have been developed and oral immunization of humans some specific strains of pathogens adapted as BWA (mainly
and laboratory animals was found to be much more valuable smallpox, tularemia, plague, and anthrax). Seemingly, he later
than intra-dermal immunization. Main scientists involved have moved to civilian facilities, dealing with immunity under pres-
been Podkuiko and Dykanon. sure conditions.
The main rickettsial pathogens explored as BWA include Potrivaeva, a senior scientist in the field of hemorrhagic fever
Coxiella burneti, Rickettsia prowazeki R. conori, and R. rick- viruses has been covertly drifted to the related projects, mainly
ettsi. At least one of those has fully reached weapon-grade state in terms of achieving full proof protective measures against the
and been serially manufactured. Various strains of R. conori, most virulent hemorrhagic viruses. Zezerov, a knowledgeable
originating from Morocco, Israel, and other Mediterranean re- scientist that masters both R. prowazeki and variola virus has
gions have experimentally been compared with Soviet strains been drifted to a program aimed at inducing weapon-grade ge-
and with various American pathogenic strains of spotted fever, in netic modifications within those two pathogens, and later shifted,
terms of pathogenicity and drug resistance. The antibiotic prepa- outwardly, to the sphere of oncogenesis.
rations included were levomycetin, quinolone, rifampicin, and Variola virus is likely still extant within the premises of ZF.
tetracyclin. Dogs and cats (experimentally), as well as human Marenikova, a Russian key scientist with respect to variola virus,
strengthened cooperation with ZF. Drifting from the Moscow- the Ultra-Pure Biochemical Preparations Institute in Leningrad
based Research Institute for Viral Preparations, to the Koltsovo- (antibiotic resistance) and the Immunological Engineering
based Vector Complex and ZF, this scientist used monkey-pox Institute in Lyubuchany, Chekhov (other genetically-based
virus as a simulant, along with the variola virus in itself. Seem- resistance mechanisms). Ultimately, a combination of pneu-
ingly, cooperation with ZF was restricted to arboviruses and monic and bubonic plague pathovariants has apparently been
polio virus (as vector viruses), whereas in effect variola was achieved.
a concurrent topic, certainly of no less importance. That co- Also, the pathogens of legionellosis, brucellosis, and anthrax
operation became of paramount significance, as the issue of have been tested as BWA. While the anthrax bacterium has defi-
global destruction of variola virus turned to be critical. Also, nitely been serially weaponized (in SF), serial weaponization of
creation of superb BWA in the form engineered viral hybrids Legionella and Brucella has not been conclusively evidenced.
was a paramount objective. At any rate, the fitness of certain strains belonging to those two
pathogens has been fully supported experimentally. Further, se-
lected strains of Salmonellae and Shigellae bacteria have been
The Kirov Facility (KF)—Scientific Research Institute of positively evaluated as water borne and food-borne BWA. Be-
Microbiology—Kirov (Now Vyatka) ing enteropathogens, stockpiling could have—and most likely
Until 1991 has—been carried out as non-weaponized material.
KF has been the most important military facility, in terms The Oborin-Vasilev team developed the tularemia pathogen
of bacterial pathogens included in the formerly USSR BWP. as a BWA. Two strains—F. tularensis strain holarctica/01s and
Founded in the early 1960s, it has been dedicated for develop- strain 15/Gaisky—have been explored for that purpose, mainly
ing and complete upgrading of bacterial BWA, until the final in terms of increased virulence and drug resistance. Conse-
phase of pre-weaponization pilot plant. Mass production and quently, it has been standardized as an intermediate strain and
subsequent stockpiling took place from time to time. Induced pilot-planned. Scaling up was conducted in solid culture medium.
genetic modifications have been a cardinal task, which has ap- Remarkably broadened resistance against antibiotics and chem-
preciably been accomplished. KF has long been in an influential icals has been systematically and effectively pursued. Enhanced
position as to shaping and updating the Soviet BW master plant, pathogenicity—not at all impaired throughout freeze drying,
both technically and conceptually. In a sense, KF and ZF resem- stockpiling or reconstitution, namely liquefying frozen (not
ble twins, sharing the domains of bacteriology plus toxicology freeze-dried) material intended for wet dissemination (in addi-
(bacterial) and virology plus rickettsiology. Still, this division tion to dry dissemination)—has concomitantly been worked out.
has not been absolute, and there is a coordinated interface be- A scientist named Kravets has covertly been drifted for that team,
tween the two facilities. Interactions occur with other military together with another scientist named Glushkova. Certain assis-
facilities, as well. tance has been forwarded by specialized non-military institutes
The work in KF has been organized in teams. The Lebedinsky- in support of the activities relating to the tularemia pathogen.
Chicherin team has mostly been dealing with the plague microbe Besides, the concerned KF team systematically tested the Pseu-
as a BWA, since the 1960s. A main trend has been the devel- domonas pathogens of glanders and melioidosis as BWA, with
opment of a pathovariant that would avoid the immunity ac- some aid afforded by ZF and non-military institutes. The de-
quired through regular vaccines, if a specific vaccine against velopment of at least one of these Pseudomonas sp. as a stan-
that pathovariant is achievable. That trend has probably been dardized highly drug-resistance BWA has most probably been
materialized, concerning both the virulent agent and the specific completed. Anthrax has been developed by a team headed by
vaccine against it. Three scientists have covertly been drifted Kozhukhov, in coordination with the Sverdlovsk facility.
to that team—Yudin, Abdulin, and Yurchenko. At times, appre- The Smirnov-Yevstigneev team carried out the development
ciable assistance has been extended by plague experts affiliated of botulinum toxin as a standardized BWA. The principle ob-
with the All-Union Anti-Plague Institutes network, in terms of jective has been to standardize a mixture of types A, B, and
knowledge and materials. Particularly, the anti-plague facilities E. Stabilizing ingredients for aerosol dissemination have effec-
in Saratov, Rostov-on-Don, and Irkutsk have been involved. tively been added. Eventually, the toxin has been successfully
Improved aerosol stability and UV resistance of the selected weaponized and serial production scaled up to the level of pilot
pathovariant have been attained as well, through genetic ma- plant (serial, yet pre-industrial), though it is not clear whether
nipulations conducted within E. coli. In parallel, elevated resis- the outcome has been a single type toxin or some mixture. At
tance towards anti-bacterial drugs, both synthetic and natural, a later stage, an attempt has been done to genetically control
has been attained. The plague bacterium has been stockpiled as and increase the toxigenicity of the cultivated bacterium, while
a standardized BWA. P. pseudotuberculosis and P. enterocolitica assistance has been afforded by experts from other non-military
have often been applied as simulants, but eventually, any aspect institutes. For that purpose, the gene coding for the toxin has
pertaining to the evaluation of the plague bacterium as a BWA profoundly been researched.
has been searched into through live tests with P. pestis. Produc- In general, there has been sensible cooperation and inter-
tive interface took place, in terms of scientific exchange, with changeability between the various teams. Prominent common
denominators marking the activities of all teams have been the worked, at the same time, for the Sverdlovsk facility on
principle of applying any experiment within both intact animals anthrax.
(always several species, including monkeys) and in vitro, as well Sadovoy and Kharechko—affiliated also with the Sverdlovsk
as the principle of conducting comparative analysis of several facility, contemporarily—seemingly drifted to a pioneering
strains of each pathogen. Besides, comparative analyses have project aimed at military development of novel technology for
often been made with parallel findings that came out of other antibiotic production. The system thus developed is a dual-
non-military specialized facilities. use one, not mentioning their ongoing activities (together with
Vasilev and Kalininsky) concerning BWA, mainly pneumonic
Since 1992 P. pestis.
Coordination with SF considerably increased with regard to Work on C. botulinum continued by Smirnov and
activities taking place in SF concerning anthrax. Also, from time Yevstigneev, together with a scientist named Telitsyn. A ma-
to time, scientists were exchanged between KF and LF. Further- jor objective has been to qualitatively and quantitatively deci-
more, scientists from KF traveled to North Korea and Iraq to pher the correlation between the level of toxigenicity and related
assist those countries with their BW programs. plasmids and bacteriophages. The involvement of extrachromo-
Drobkov and Darmov replaced Lebedinsky and Chicherin. somal genetic elements was thoroughly looked into.
Under their guidance, the fitness of Kl. pneumoniae as a BWA
has been explored, in terms of selected variants having improved
aerogenic infectivity and drug resistance. Kl. pneumoniae strain The Sverdlovsk Facility (SF)—Center for
K-10 and strain 3-129 have been applied. Plasmids techniques Military-Technical Problems of Anti-Bacteriological
have been used for that purpose. Defense—Sverdlovsk (Now Yekaterinburg)
Lebedinsky moved to a seemingly new Microbiological Re- Until 1991
search Institute, affiliated with the MOD and located in Moscow. Constructed subsequent to WW Two as “Military Compound
Yudin was drifted, formally, to the State Research Center for No. 19,” SF has been designated “Center for Military Techni-
Antibiotics, Moscow. Yet, experimentation conducted by them cal Problems of Anti-bacteriological Defense.” This facility has
and aimed at further improvements of the plague microbe as a been primarily devoted to the development and production of
BWA has proceeded. Formation of induced mutants and recom- anthrax as a first priority BWA. Secondarily, other BWA have
binants derived from pulmonary plague pathogens have been been dealt with in parallel.
carried on in particular, along with other BW related aspects, B. subtilis was generally used as stimulant for anthrax. The
such as thermo-stability, drug resistance, antigenicity, lethal- primary anthrax strain selected for manufacturing has been at-
ity, genetic modifications and so forth. Special attention has tained through classical antibiotic-resistance fortifying method-
been drawn to substantial upgrading of massive cultivation pro- ology of a virulent native pulmonary isolate. Other virulent
cesses, mainly submerged fermentation, in terms of contam- strains, including the Ames strain, were later added, to form
ination control, cells functionality and optimized nourishing a misleading mixture. Mass production has started in the late
amino-acid-based media. Main strains looked into to possibly 1960s and the product has been lyophilized and stockpiled.
be modified and replace the already weaponized strain have During the 1970s cultivation has been elaborated, while the
been Sp. hissarica, pestis, kaukasika, and altaica. Also, prior- main components of the fermentation liquor were fish flour hy-
ity was given to techniques for enriching of multiple locus mu- drolyzate, corn extract, and glucose. Leading scientists were
tageneses. Chicherin and Dodonov largely led those activities, Kuzmich, Sadovoy, Fedorova, and Derbin. The pathogen has
together with a scientist named Zolotareva. Further, Mironin been successfully propagated in goats and lambs as well, to
AV and Romanov VE emphasized this topic as it relates to establish a standardized system for intact animal-based produc-
epidemicity. tion. In that way, the pathogen has been accumulated as wet
Concomitantly, three teams have been formed for elaborating agent, but eventually freeze drying has been preferred. The aero-
and upgrading of semi-industrial to industrial biotechnological genic virulence of that product was found higher, to some extent,
systems, concerned with pathogenic bacteria. One team, led by than that of the fermentation product. Production was carried out
Lashchenko and Mikhailovsky developed an improved, auto- separately through both fermentation and propagation within
matically operating system for concentrating of sporogenic and host animals. Further improvements, in terms of antibiotic re-
non-sporogenic bacteria. The other team, led by Nikitin and sistance, have been achieved by Proskurina.
Nestrenko developed a fully controlled system for preventing Concurrently, a Jewish Colonel named Vladimir, serving as a
indoor contamination of and outdoor contamination originat- medical doctor at SF developed a specific potent powder for de-
ing from infectious bacterial material during its manufacturing contaminating anthrax. Anti serum, as well as scarification, sub-
and stockpiling. A third team, led by Kravets and Supotnitsky cutaneous, and aerosol vaccines have been developed in parallel.
developed certain bacterial pore forming proteins as additives Another anthrax expert, specialized in both immunogenetic and
enhancing the invasiveness of pathogens, as well as the effi- pathogenetic aspects, and at times affiliated with SF, has been
cacy of immunological preparations derived from them. Kravets Tarumov.
While the 1979 anthrax disaster occurred, the KGB com- BIOMASH (details given below). thereat this facility, Kuzmich
menced an emergency blurring operation immediately after ini- systematically inquired into the optimized conditions required
tial signs of what actually happened surfaced. General Andrey for mass production of B. thuringiensis. Fedorova, his partner
Myroniuk of the KGB has been responsible for the operation, at SF, moved to the Moscow-based Institute for Meat Industry,
throughout which parts of the damaged installation has been ostensibly entering a new field—the dynamics of yields during
translocated to the Irkutsk-based Anti-plague Institute in Siberia. yeasts mass cultivation—while actually making (together with
The head of SF, a medical doctor having a rank of General, com- Doronin) but a slight turn (at SF) to optimized mass production
mitted suicide consequent to the incident. (Many more details of non-pathogenic bacilli (simulants).
about the incident have already been published.) A new mod- B. anthracis strain H-7 has profoundly been researched. Its
ernized laboratory had been constructed underground in SF to virulence, particularly by aerosol route, has been increased
replace the translocated one, and than SF has fully proceeded to through genetic engineering techniques. The same strain and
its activities. some other ones have been appreciably upgraded in terms of re-
Very significant quantities of the anthrax pathogen have been sistance to antibiotics. Concomitantly, a remarkably improved
manufactured until the 1979 incident. Later on, after reorgani- vaccine against anthrax has been developed in Russia (report-
zation has somewhat been achieved, a leading scientist by the edly at the State Research Institute of Applied Microbiology,
name Mostov joined the production team. External assistance Obolensk), relying, principally, on the components cereolysine
has been given by Podolkin, who used B. thuringiensis as sim- AB, phospholipase C, and sphingomyelinase. The selected vac-
ulant, as well as by Cherkasky, a prominent expert on anthrax, cine strain has apparently been adopted by the Stavropol Anti-
affiliated with the Central Research Institute of Epidemiology at Plague Institute, for current vaccine production, though not fully
Moscow. Support given by the adjacent military compound 32 protective against the very recent anthrax strain (if not a set of
has been increased, apparently in terms of basic/peripheral logis- strains) held by Russia as a BWA. Yet, a fully protective vaccine
tics and security. Some scientists affiliated with the Sverdlovsk- is possibly being produced in parallel at that Stavropol-based
based Institute for Phthisiopulmonology and the Microbiology institute, in SF, or elsewhere.
Department of the Ural’s State Medical Institute have occasion-
ally been helpful as well.
The Leningrad Facility (LF)—Scientific Research Institute

of Military Medicine—Leningrad (Now Saint-Petersburg)
Since 1992
Until 1991
Highly classified activities were translocated underground,
whereas aboveground activities consist of only those that are This facility has for long been located aside the Military Med-
defensive. Strict separation has been formed in between the four ical Academy (MMA), which has been operating in Leningrad
main elements of the complex, namely: for about a hundred of years as the main research and devel-
opment facility of the Medical Corps. Coverage and backing
• the Scientific Research Institute in Military Compound have often been provided accordingly by the MMA to LF, both
19; formally and practically (details given below).
• the Material Technical Support Division in Military Derived from two fundamental objectives of the MMA—
Compound 19; prevention of and countering infectious diseases—the major
• the tunnel connecting Military Compounds 19 with 32; fields of LF have been:
• Compound 32 by itself.
• Defense against BW, in terms of prophylactic mea-
Moreover, in contrast to the presidency line, completely com- sures, early detection and identification, control and
partmentalized wings were then constructed in some labs, to han- treatment;
dle highly dangerous BWA and prevent leaks. They were fully • Extensive and profound practical knowledge concern-
refurnished and highly equipped. Some personnel have been ing infectious diseases that are exceptionally difficult
moved to other facilities, at times symbolically. Most essential to cope with, thus having the proper potential for BW;
BW-oriented tasks did not change, though carrying out decel- • Exotic and remote pathogens;
erated to some extent. Serial BW production possibly scaled • Knowledge and techniques concerning epidemiologi-
down. cal patterns and handling of a variety of pathogens and
The dynamic interface between powdered aerosols and a hu- toxins, particularly under field conditions.
man respiratory-resembling system has been profoundly stud-
ied, both theoretically and practically, by Kolobov, Plotnikov, Arboviruses have been widely dealt with, including Japanese B
and Pitirimov. Substantial improvements relating to aerosol tech- and tick-borne encephalitis, Isfahan virus, Kemerovo, Negishi,
nology were achieved by that team. Rift Valley fever, Omsk hemorrhagic fever, West Nile fever,
Kuzmich, a key scientist, moved to a Moscow-based, seem- Dengue-like fevers, flavivruses, phleboviruses, and others. Prop-
ingly non-military facility, Scientific Production Association agation devices are based on optimized readily transportable
cell cultures (LL-C/MK/2, BHK and newborn albino mouse) tative of the Medical Corps contribution to the overall Soviet
while in vivo propagation is principally intracerebral. Main sci- BWP.
entists were Nikolaev, Shmidt, and Gaydamovich. The former
was drifted for highly classified activities between the late Since 1992
70s and the early 1980s, probably concerned with the virus
Activities since 1992 turned to concentrate, ostensibly, upon
of Jap. B encephalitis; subsequently, the later has been drifted
defensive aspects merely. In practice, this has only partially tran-
for highly classified activities between the early 1980s and
spired that way. The personnel have not been impaired signif-
the late 1980s, probably concerned with some virulent exotic
icantly. Offensive aspects are reduced but did not become sec-
arbovirus.
ondary. Cooperation with a new military BW facility in Lakhta
Hepatitis A viruses have been systematically tested as water-
has formed.
borne BWA by Sibilev during the 1980s. The incubation period
A senior pharmacologist, Krasilnikov, started a project of
of infectious hepatitis (virus A) is several weeks, and among
developing specific drugs against certain arboviruses as well as
some rare species could be even less. It has been intended mainly
against bacterial toxins. The idea is to form full proof pharma-
for attrition warfare purposes and has possibly been employed

cological preparations that would be equally effective for pro-
in Afghanistan.
phylactic and therapeutic needs concerned with specific BWA
Rickettsial pathogens have been researched into, and a related
included in the ongoing program. Mishnikova plays a role in
highly classified project, apparently concerned with Rickettsia
that effort, with regard to bacterial toxins, along with her cur-
sibirica, has been conducted from the mid 1970s until the late
rent activities respecting highly virulent water and food-borne
1980s by Prusakova.
bacterial pathogens.
Bacterial pathogens included mainly cholera and salmonella,
The Raevsky-Churnosov team outwardly disintegrated, wile
the former probably projected covertly as a BWA since the mid
the later moved, formally, to the Leningrad-based Pasteur In-
1970s until the late 1980s by Mishnikova. Bacterial toxins, in-
stitute, and the former apparently shifted (together with Do-
cluding cholera and botulinum toxins, have covertly been pro-
brinin) to the field of non-pathogenic bacteria. Actually, their
jected by Mishnikova as well. Assistance concerning botulinum
covert BW-oriented activities are partially continuing. Likewise,
has been provided by Podolkin, who used Cl. felsineum as a
Sibilev, for instance, totally shifted, seemingly, to the arena of

simulant. Optimization of various culture media for cultivation
military epidemiological preparedness for defensive needs.
of bacteria has been conducted by Dobrinin.
Meaningful contribution of Gapochko and Ogarkov to BW-
Leading scientists profoundly involved in highly classified
related activities persists, mainly in terms of elevated aerogenic
BW-related projects have been Ogarkov and Gapochko, partic-
infectivity, while additional defensive aspects, essentially mass
ularly with respect to aspects of optimized aerogenic infectivity.
troops vaccination by combined immunological preparations,
Professional support has been given by several experts:
are concurrently being handled by them.
A new antiviral drug—Jodantipyrin—has been developed,
• Podolkin—bacterial dispersibility in aerosols; particularly for prevention and treatment of tick-borne encephali-
• Ivanov—experimental infections; tis and hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome. Clinical tests
• Raevsky—decontamination of artificially infected sur- were successfully conducted, while the related viruses were con-
faces; comitantly evaluated in terms of pathogenesis and virulence.
• Agafonov—epidemicity, vaccination and early detec-
Collaboration with North Korea has been formed, probably, in
tion throughout field tests; that context, and some additional ones.
• Churnosov—prophylactic and therapeutic application
of systematically combined interferon inducers and an-
tibiotics. The Moscow Facility (MF)—State Establishment for
Biological Instrumentation, Precision Machinery, and
Ongoing support has been given by the departments of infec- Safety Techniques—Moscow
tious diseases and microbiology of the MMA, in terms of current A complex, highly classified system affiliated to the Min-
provision of materials and equipment needed for all activities, istry of Defense and connected with the so-called civilian frame-
both classified and unclassified. Besides, essential support has works Mikrobio-Prom (for Program), Bio-Preparat (for Prepa-
been given by the Epidemiological Health Unit of the Leningrad ration), and Scientific Production Association Bio-Mash (for
Military District, particularly for the conduction of field activi- Machinery), comprising in a set of directorates and co-located
ties. The support given by that unit was in terms of basic field compounds. In practice, those three, ostensibly civilian com-
epidemiological monitoring needed for forming current “cali- ponents represent, complementarily, concept (program), bio-
bration.” materials (preparations) and technical essentials (machinery).
Overall, the involvement of LF in BW-related projects un- At the MOD headquarter level, MF has been linked to the CBR
til 1991 has been considerable, in both defensive and offensive (Chemical-Biological-Radiological) Warfare Administration
aspects. In effect, this involvement has mostly been represen- (especially Division 15), and, rather tightly, to the Medium
Machine Building Administration (which is in charge of nu- variant involved exhibited an appreciable degree of virulence,
clear weapons production). Concurrently, MF has been strictly although the extent did not exceed a dozen of cases. All recov-
overseen by the KGB, in particular. ered. The event was fully undisclosed.
MF deals with development, testing, manufacturing, and ap- Moreover, since 1992 the entire concerned system has seem-
plying of multi-disciplinary installations, devices and substances ingly been engaged in purely defensive and protective aspects,
related to BWA, in terms of both defensive and offensive needs the main ones being: processing of non-pathogenic bio-material;
(except for final weaponry, literally). The leading entity within detection, identification and diagnosis of arbo-viral and unaer-
that system is the State Research Institute of Biological obic microbial contaminants and infections; as well as environ-
Instrument-Making, a cluster of various sub-entities formed to mental decontamination and disinfection of extremely potent
mislead and mask. Thus, for instance, while Bio-Mash has been BWA. Within that framework, a new, remarkably broad-spectrum
working since the 80’s on installations for spray drying of bi- disinfectant, designated PFK, has been effectively developed. It
ological substances, another entity designated PharmBio-Mash was applied in a variety of field tests. In practice, yet, during lab-
has later been founded, one which deals, in effect, with fermen- oratory, and particularly field experiments thereby conducted, a
tation vessels, autoclaves, dryers, as well as milling, filling and set of human pathogens were evaluated, equally, under alter-
packing machinery for various biological substances, both naı̈ve nating environmental conditions. Furthermore, controlling and
and hazardous. One emphasize laid within that context was ap- regulating the concentrations of human pathogens in air was em-
plying remarkably sophisticated methods—both chemical and phasized, as well as the efficacy of microorganisms causing fuel
physical—for effective preservation, recovery, and aerial dis- biodegradation and material disruption.
semination of biological substances (wet and dry; toxin-based Leading scientists: Buyanov, Nikolskaya and Gromova. Col-
and pathogen-based; viral and bacterial; sporogenic and non- laboration with the Moscow-based Gabrichevsky Research In-
sporogenic; aerobic and unaerobic). Confusingly, yet, has been stitute of Epidemiology and Microbiology occasionally occurs;
operating at the same time a variant sub-entity—PharmPribor for instance, concerning aspects such as rise and control of
Production Association—covering, on the surface, parallel epidemic processes in isolated collectives and rooms (an area
aspects. apparently mastered by Domaradskii, a senior plague special-
During the 1980s, a confined epidemic incident resulting ist). Cooperation with a new military BW facility in Strizhi has
from a Brucella outward leakage once occurred. The patho- formed.

The Russian Biological Weapons Program

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The Russian Biological Weapons Program

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Critical Reviews in Microbiology, 30:241–261, 2004

Copyright c Taylor & Francis Inc.

The Russian Biological Weapons Program:

in parallel included, necessarily, vaccines, anti-sera, drugs, and

figured, and probably better camouflaged by the Russian

and colleagues the way for genetic modifications of bacteria.

half of the twentieth century. In 1925, the USSR signed the

Kuntzevich was, in all opinions, a key expert in the fields of

hints of the existence of BW production in the former USSR. For

http://www.vremya.ru/2003/74/ 28 Interviewin the Russian newspaper “Courier,” 24 November 2001.

manipulation seemingly paid off. Reportedly, the Russians on

March 27, 2003.

genes; altogether occurring therein. Two new, large BW military owned

The Leningrad Facility (LF)—Scientific Research Institute

for attrition warfare purposes and has possibly been employed

Sibilev, for instance, totally shifted, seemingly, to the arena of

from a Brucella outward leakage once occurred. The patho- formed.

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