III. EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW III.

THE RULING

Particularity of description [The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the
questioned decision and resolution of the CA.]

YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued

20th Century Fox Film v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76649- earlier.
51, August 19, 1988
The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in
D E C I S I O N the absence of probable cause that the private respondents
(3rd Division) violated P.D. 49. NBI agents who acted as witnesses during the
application for search warrant did not have personal knowledge
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: of the subject matter of their testimony, which was the alleged
commission of the offense of piracy by the private respondents.
I. THE FACTS Only the petitioner’s counsel who was also a witness during the
application stated that he had personal knowledge that the
Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were
assistance of the NBI in conducting searches and seizures in pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the
connection with the NBI’s anti-film piracy campaign. Petitioner petitioner. The lower court lifted the warrants, declaring that the
alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are testimony of petitioner’s counsel did not have much credence
engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted because the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not
films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law). shown to the court during the application.

The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets
pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3)
applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned
by the private respondents. The lower court issued the desired
search warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's
agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items described
in the three warrants.
Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants
and release the seized properties, which was granted by the
lower court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied
by the lower court. The CA affirmed the trial court.
II. THE ISSUE
Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier?
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films,
from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was
necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who
have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's
argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes
at the time of application may not be necessary as these would
be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether
or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the
search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume
that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from
master tapes that it owns.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at
least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the
copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court
the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased
evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine
whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former.
This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be
established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere
allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot
serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.

Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)
FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with
Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group (CSG).
Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP.
The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of
the same day, her premises were searched and 428 documents,
a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.
Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant to be
served at Aguilar-Roque’s leased residence allegedly an
underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the
documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the
CSG were filed by but the fiscal’s office merely charged her and
Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. Aguilar-
Roque asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that
it was illegally obtained and that the search warrant is void
because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently
describe with particularity the things subject of the search and
seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly
established for lack of searching questions propounded to the
applicant’s witness.
authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described
and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which
includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party
of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not
specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the
manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make
them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of
rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching
team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the
officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should
seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2
wooden boxes.
It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the
things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search
warrants of similar description were considered null and void for
being too general.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?

HELD:

NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no
Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant

Valid Warrantless Searches
PEOPLE VS MALMSTEDT
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIKAEL
MALMSTEDTG.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
Facts:
Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first
regional command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the
purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by
persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an
information also was received about a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding
stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and
announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that
they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC
Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge
on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s
passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that
was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag
and when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four
suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It
contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, the accused, a Swedish national, was invited
outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the
bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer
inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened the
bags that the accused finally presented his passport. The two
bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy
contained also hashish.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113
of the Rules of Court provides:
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another”
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting
prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the
accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search
made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph 1
of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a warrantless
search incident to a lawful arrest.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the
placed sought to be searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian
travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him a
prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.
Plain View Doctrine
PEOPLE V MUSA
FACTS:
On 14 December 1989, the accused sold 2 wrappers containing
marijuana leaves to Sgt. Amado Ani in a buy-bust operation in
Zamboanga City.
The said buy-bust operation was planned since a civilian
informer told that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana
and therefore, a test-buy was conducted the day prior to the said
buy-bust operation. During the buy-bust operation, after Sgt. Ani
handed the money to Musa, Musa entered his house to get the
wrappings. Upon his return and with the inspection of the
wrappings, Musa was arrested, but the marked money used as
payment cannot be found with him, prompting the NARCOM
agents to go inside his house. There, they could not find the
marked money, but they found more marijuana leaves hidden in
a plastic bag inside the kitchen.
The leaves were confirmed as marijuana by the forensic chemist
of the PC crime laboratory, who later on served as a witness,
along with T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, the team leader of the buy-bust
operation and Sgt. Ani.
The defense gave a different version of what happened on 14
December 1989 wherein he and his wife, Ahara Musa, served as
witnesses. They said that the NARCOM agents, dressed in
civilian clothes, got inside their house since the door was open,
and upon entering, declared that they were NARCOM agents
and searched the house, despite demands of the couple for a
search warrant. The agents found a red bag whose contents
were unknown to the Musas.
Musa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the trial
court.
On appeal, Musa contests that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. He also questioned the credibility of the
witnesses, as well as the admissibility of the seized plastic bag
as evidence since it violates his constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures provided in Art. III, Sec. 2.
ISSUES:
1. WON Musa is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
2. WON the seized plastic bag containing marijuana is
admissible as evidence.
HELD/RATIO:
1. Yes. The testimony given by T/Sgt. Belarga only
strengthened the testimony of Sgt. Ani since it was the testimony
of the latter that served as direct evidence, being enough to
prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug, and
that their testimonies were not conflicting as well.
2. No. Although the warrantless search done falls under Sec.
12 of Rule 126 and that the search may include premises or
surroundings under the accused’s immediate control, it does not
fall under the “Plain View” doctrine. The agents found the plastic
bag inside the kitchen, and upon asking about the contents of
the bag, the accused did not answer, making the agents open
the bag and find marijuana leaves. Even if an object is observed
in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure
of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not
apparent from the "plain view" of the object.
“Stop and Frisk”
TERRY V. OHIO
Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, John W. Terry (the
“Petitioner”�), was stopped and searched by an officer after the
officer observed the Petitioner seemingly casing a store for a
potential robbery. The officer approached the Petitioner for
questioning and decided to search him first.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An officer may perform a search for
weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause, when
the officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed
and dangerous.
Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another
individual on a street corner while repeatedly walking up and
down the same street. The men would periodically peer into a
store window and then talk some more. The men also spoke to a
third man whom they eventually followed up the street. The
officer believed that the Petitioner and the other men were
“casing”� a store for a potential robbery. The officer decided to
approach the men for questioning, and given the nature of the
behavior the officer decided to perform a quick search of the
men before questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner
produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was charged
with carrying a concealed weapon.
Dissent. Justice William Douglas (“J. Douglas”�) dissented,
reasoning that the majority’s holding would grant powers to
officers to authorize a search and seizure that even a magistrate
would not possess.
Concurrence.
Justice John Harlan (“J. Harlan”�) agreed with the majority, but
he emphasized an additional necessity of the reasonableness of
the stop to investigate the crime.
Justice Byron White (“J. White”�) agreed with the majority, but
he emphasized that the particular facts of the case, that there
was suspicion of a violent act, merit the forcible stop and frisk.
Discussion. The facts of the case are important to understand
the Supreme Court’s willingness to allow the search. The
suspicious activity was a violent crime, armed robbery, and if the
officer’s suspicions were correct then he would be in a
dangerous position to approach the men for questioning without
searching them. The officer also did not detain the men for a
long period of time to constitute an arrest without probable
cause.

Issue. Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for

arrest is an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution (“Constitution”�)?

Held. The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme

Court”�) held that it is a reasonable search when an officer
performs a quick seizure and a limited search for weapons on a
person that the officer reasonably believes could be armed. A
typical beat officer would be unduly burdened by being prohibited
from searching individuals that the officer suspects to be armed.
PEOPLE v. SOLAYAO
FACTS:
Accusedappellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the
Regional Trial Court with the crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitiondefined and penalized under Presidential
Decree No. 1866. The lone prosecution witness, SPO3 Jose
Niño, narrated that at about 9:00 o’clock inthe evening of July 9,
1992, he went to Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran with
his team of police officers. They were to conduct an intelligence
patrol as required of them by their intelligence officer to verify
reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the
barangays of Caibiran.From Barangay Caulangohan, the team of
PoliceOfficer Niño proceeded to Barangay Onion where they met
the group of accused appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five. The
former became suspicious when they observed that the latter
were drunk and that accused appellatn himself was wearing a
camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. Accused appellant’s
companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled.Police
Officer Niño told accused appellant not to run away and
introduced himself as “PC,” after which he seized the dried
coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found wrapped
in it a 49 inch long homemade firearm locally known as“latong.”
When he asked accused appellant who issued him a license to
carry said firearm or whether he was connected with the military
orany intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no
permission to possess the same.Thereupon, SPO3 Niño
confiscated the firearmand turned him over to the custody of th e
policemen of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and
charged him with illegal possession of firearm. The trial court
found accused appellant guilty of illegal possession offirearm.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution was able to establish the elements of
the crime
HELD:
[First element duly proved] As to the question of whether or not
the prosecution was able to prove the second element, that is,
the absence of a license or permit to possess the subject
firearm, this Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General
which pointed out that the prosecution failed to prove that
accused appellant lacked the necessary permit or license to
possess the subject firearm.In the case at bar, the prosecution
was only able to prove by testimonial evidence that accused-
appellant admitted before Police Officer Niño at the time that he
was accosted that he did not have any authority or license to
carry the subjectfirearm when he was asked if he had one. In
other words, the prosecution relied on accused-appellant’s
admission to prove the second element. Is this admission
sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element
of illegal possession of firearm which is that accused appellant
does not have the corresponding license? Corollary to the above
question is whether an admission by the accused-appellant can
take the place of any evidentiary means establishing beyond
reasonable doubt the fact averred in the negative in the pleading
and which forms an essential ingredient of the crime charged.
This Court answers both questions in the negative. By its very
nature, an “admission is the mere acknowledgment of a fact or of
circumstances from which guilt may be inferred,tending to
incriminate the speaker, but notsufficient of itself to establish his
guilt.” In other words, it is a “statement by defendant of fact or
facts pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of
other facts or circumstances, to
prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize
conviction.”From the above principles, this Court can infer that
an admission in criminal cases isinsufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged.
Moreover, said admission is extrajudicial in nature. Not being a
judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not
prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal
possession offirearm. It does not even establish a prima facie
case. It merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not
stand as proof of the fact of absence or lack of a license.
There was no error on the part of the trial court when it admitted
the homemade firearm as evidence nor violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of
seizures. illegal possession of firearm.

The SC ruled that the search and seizure conducted in this case Hence, Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was ACQUITTED for
be likened to the Posadas case where the suspicious conduct of insufficiency of evidence.
Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk" situation.
There was a probable cause to conduct a search even before an
arrest could be made.

In the present case, after SPO3 Nino told accused-appellant not

to run away, the former identified himself as a government
agent.[16] The peace officers did not know that he had
committed, or was actually committing, the offense of illegal
possession of firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that there
were armed men roaming around in the barangays surrounding
Caibiran, their attention was understandably drawn to the group
that had aroused their suspicion. They could not have known
that the object wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-
appellant was carrying hid a firearm.

As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where

a search and seizure may be effected without first making an
arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-
appellant when his companions fled upon seeing the
government agents. Under the circumstances, the government
agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first.

However, the prosecution failed to produce evidence that the

accused-appellant has no license to carry the firearm by merely
relying on the lone witness’ (SPO3 Nio) testimony that accused-
appellant admitted to them during the time he was apprehended
that he has no license to carry such weapon.

The prosecution should have presented a certification from the

Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine National Police
that accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any
kind or caliber would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove
 MALACAT V. CA - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
MALACAT V. CA G.R. No. 123595. December 12, 1997
FACTS:
● Police officer Rodolfu Yu, in response to bomb threats
reported seven days earlier, was on foot patrol with three
other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon
Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at
Plaza Miranda.
● They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with
each group, comprised of three to four men, posted on
opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the
Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously
with [t]heir eyes moving very fast.
● Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic
points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes.
● The police officers then approached one group of men, who
then fled in different directions.
● As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and
apprehended petitioner.
● Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation
grenade tucked inside petitioners front waistline.
● Yu’s companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran,
apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver
was recovered.
● Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station
No. 3 where Yu placed an X mark at the bottom of the
grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander.
On cross-examination, Yu declared that:
1. they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of
Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the
vicinity of Plaza Miranda.
2. Yu recognized petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August
1990, likewise, at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2 others
attempt to detonate a grenade.
3. The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen
chased petitioner and his companions; however, the former was
unable to catch any of the latter.
4. Yu further admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely
standing on the corner of Quezon Boulevard when Yu saw them
on 27 August 1990.
5. Although they were not creating a commotion, since they were
supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his companions
approached them.
6. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly
recovered from petitioner.
7. Also, officer Serapio, took petitioner’s confession without a
counsel during the inquest.
● Petitioner as the lone witness denied all the allegations
against him and asserted that he was just strolling in Plaza
Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air and that he was
surprisingly apprehended by the police with the allegation
that he shoots him and he saw the grenade only in court
when it was presented.
● The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure
of petitioner was akin to a stop and frisk, where a warrant
and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to maintain
the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to
obtain more information.
● Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a
crime had been committed, however, the situation called for
an investigation, hence to require probable cause would
have been premature.
● The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were
[c]onfronted with an emergency, in which the delay
necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of
evidence and the officers [h]ad to act in haste, as petitioner
and his companions were acting suspiciously, considering
the time, place and reported cases of bombing. Further,
petitioners group suddenly ran away in different directions as
they saw the arresting officers approach, thus [i]t is
reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the
purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a
 crime but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation
without fear of violence.
● The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from
petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since
petitioner [l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police
investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug
Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish
petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
CA affirmed lower court’s decision.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest was valid
HELD:
NO. The warrantless arrest is illegal.
According to the SC, the prosecution failed to establish
petitioners guilt with moral certainty.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures are
that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The
Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches
and seizures refer to those effected without a validly issued
warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid
warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. -- Arrest, without warrant; when lawful -- A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped ***
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated
under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante
delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a
"hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the
following:
(1) customs searches;
(2) the search of moving vehicles;
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consent searches;
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
(6) (6) a "stop and frisk."
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless
search as a stop and frisk with the seizure of the grenade from
the accused as an appropriate incident to his arrest, hence
necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of these
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts
of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the
requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected
and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the
arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot
be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting
officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within
which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to
destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used
in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that
which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the
arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct
which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other
than that his eyes were moving very fast an observation which
leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were
nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely
standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or
trouble.

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot
pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal
knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt
physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had
just been committed, was being committed or was going to be
committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this
case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have
been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to
believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None
was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
discovered inside the front waistline of the petitioner, and from all
indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any
telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a
grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.
Hence, petitioner is acquitted of the crime under Section 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 (IPF)

In the case at bar, at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-
frisk was invalid:

First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that petitioner was

a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda
two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police
report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who
allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility
as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a
genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If
only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to
his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be chased
before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A")
expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other
police officers, petitioner, and his companions were "immediately
collared."
Search of Moving Vehicles
PAPA V. MAGO - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PAPA V. MAGO G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968
FACTS:
● Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence
unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable
information that a certain shipment of personal effects,
allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released
the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila
and loaded on two trucks,
● Upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of
Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of
Customs, Petitioner Alagao conducted surveillance at gate
No. 1 of the customs zone.
● When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the
afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-
intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at
the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila.
● The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods,
and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief
of Police.
● Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the
goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-
5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a
certain Bienvenido Naguit.
● Remedios Mago, herein respondent, said that she owns the
goods seized.
❖ That she purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in
San Fernando, Pampanga;
❖ that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to
transport, the goods from said place to her residence at
1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila;
❖ that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police
Department without search warrant issued by a competent
court;
❖ that Manila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request
of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened
and the goods contained therein be not examined;
❖ that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had
illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because
the goods were no longer under the control and supervision
of the Commissioner of Customs;
❖ that the goods, even assuming them to have been
misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure
under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because
Remedios Mago had bought them from another person
without knowledge that they were imported illegally.
● Hence, respondent Mago filed for prohibition and certiorari.
● Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 67496 (regarding restraining
respondents from opening 9 bales), Judge Hilarion Jarencio
issued an order ex parte restraining the petitioners.
However, when the restraining order was received by herein
respondent, some bales had already been opened by the
examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of
officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city
fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios
Mago.
● Also, Remedios Mago filed an ex parte motion to release the
goods which the court granted.
● Petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods
under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police
Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs
of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination
of the seizure proceedings.
● Without waiting for the court's action on the MR, and alleging
that they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed the present
action for prohibition and certiorari with a preliminary
injunction before this Court.
ISSUE:
WON the seizure of the imported goods is validly done by herein
petitioners
WON an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched
without search warrant
HELD:
1. YES. The seizure is valid.
The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of
Cebu. Should they be found to have been released irregularly from
Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and
forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires
exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of
enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are
actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or
detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present
case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question
on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs
acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the
enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the
regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of
Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector
of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on
January 12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as respondents
contend, that the issuance of the said warrant was only an attempt to
divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire
jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for
mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting
it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it
follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to
issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the
Manila Police Department, could not seize the goods in question
without a search warrant. This contention cannot be sustained.
The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having
been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could,
for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws,
effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make
seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable
property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any
fine imposed under customs and tariff laws.
He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or
other containers wherever found when he had reasonable cause to
suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine
any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or
conveying such article as aforesaid.
It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa,
Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure
of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes
him to demand the assistance of any police officer to effect said
search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said
assistance. This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt.
Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the
two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the
Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make
the interception of the cargo.
2. YES. Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had
authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a
competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said
warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having
police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code
to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse,
store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect,
search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, Therefore, the seizure by the members of the Manila Police
or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and Department of the goods in question was in accordance with law and
examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or by that seizure, the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over
conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of the customs and
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search tariff laws.
warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the
Code provides that said: "dwelling house may be entered and
searched only upon a warrant issued by a judge or justice of the
peace. . . ." It is our considered view, therefore, that except in the
case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure
without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
An automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development,
which has multiplied by quantity production and taken possession of
our highways in battalions until the slower, animal-drawn vehicles,
with their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered
vehicles to standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity
for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for a successful
commission of a crime a disguising means of silent approach and
swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent.
The question of their police control and reasonable search on
highways or other public places is a serious question far deeper and
broader than their use in so-called "bootlegging" or "rum running,"
which is itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of
private ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and
transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on
private premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards
against search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to
which they are successfully utilized to facilitate the commission of a
crime of all degrees, from those against morality, chastity, and
decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of
common knowledge. Upon that problem, a condition, and not a
theory, confronts proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether
the search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or
other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its
final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the
circumstances under which it is made.
Emergency Circumstances
PEOPLE V. DE GRACIA (1994) |SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
February 8, 2017
G.R. No. 102009, 233 SCRA 716, July 6, 1994
Doctrine: Where the military operatives had reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime was being committed, and had no opportunity to
apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts, the same
constituted an exception to the prohibition against warrantless
searches.
Facts:
Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People
(RAM-SFP) staged coup d’état in December 1989 against the
Government.
Efren Soria of Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command,
together with his team, conducted a surveillance of the Eurocar
Sales Office in EDSA, QC on early morning of December 1, 1989,
which surveillance actually started November 30, 1989 at around
10:00 PM. Such surveillance was conducted pursuant to an
intelligence report that the said establishment was being occupied by
the elements of the RAM-SFP as communication command post.
Near the Eurocar office, there were crowd watching the on-going
bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo when a group of 5 men
disengaged themselves and walked towards their surveillance car.
Maj. Soria ordered the driver to start the car and leave the area.
However, as they passed the area, then 5 men drew their guns and
fired at them, which resulted to the wounding of the driver. Nobody in
the surveillance team retaliated for they were afraid that civilians
might be caught in the crossfire.
Thereafter, on the morning of December 5, 1989, a search team
raided the Eurocar Sales Office and confiscated 6 cartons of M-16
ammunition, 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different
calibers, and molotov.
Obenia, who first entered the establishment, found De Gracia in the
office of a certain Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously
peeping though door.
No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because,
according to them, there was so much disorder considering that the
nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces
and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar
office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed.
Issue:
Whether there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
Held:
YES, there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
It is admitted that the raiding team was not armed with a search
warrant at that time. It was actually precipitated by intelligence
reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM.
Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises
wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming
from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the
place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite
requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break
into the office.
The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is
definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories
for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in
the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of
high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even
colorably explained.
In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time
because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the
office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by
rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously
closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were
deserted.
Under circumstances, SC considered that the instant case falls
under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless
search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account
the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe
that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more
than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, in
the prevailing situation, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply
for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge
himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was
conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency
of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
Checkpoints
The Checkpoints Case : Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988
September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
I. THE FACTS
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of
conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and
peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in
various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s
Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative,
they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National
Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate
guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of
the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the
respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures
without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
II. THE ISSUE
Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people
against unreasonable search and seizures?
III. THE RULING
[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]
NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the
people against unreasonable search and seizures.
xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply
looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of
the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security.
In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to
urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so
clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and
military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance
of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and
violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in
media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic
conditions – which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the
very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state
to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individual's right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community.
ANIAG VS. COMELEC [237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7 OCT
1994]
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local
elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323, “Gun Ban”,
promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and
transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security
personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security
agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of
reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued
Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of
candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of
firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot
checkpoints. Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”, Mr. Serrapio Taccad,
Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner
for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of
Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to
pick up the firearms from petitioner’s house and return them to
Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by
Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and
found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and detained. He
then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that
Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was
not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued
Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against
petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code,
and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified
from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the
constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that “gunrunning,
using or transporting firearms or similar weapons” and other acts
mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution
No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of
petitioner from running in the elections was rendered moot when he
lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for
instructing his driver to return the firearms issued to him on the basis
of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car
Held: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued
by an appropriate authority. However, a warrantless search is not
violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the
case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellano’s waist nor placed
within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and
placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these
circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car
lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional
injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to
the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not have
been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless
search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was
also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of
the purpose of setting up the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not
among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he
was a respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a
violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended
that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation
against him as he was not informed that he was himself a
respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by
the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search
cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner.
Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.
Warrantless Arrests illegal trade of drugs within the area. The police officer saw petitioner
handling over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left,
they searched him and discovered two cellophane of marijuana. His
ESPANO VS CA arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bag of marijuana
RODOLFO ESPANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF seized were admissible in evidence, being fruits of the crime.
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998

Facts:

Pat. Pagilagan together with other police officers went to

Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug
pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling something to another
person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner,
identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search
yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if
he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house.
The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more
cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the
police headquarters where he was charged of possession of
prohibited drugs.

Issue:

Whether or not the pieces of evidence were inadmissible

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court provides:

“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense . . . “

Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He

was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy bust operation conducted
by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO [234 SCRA 246; G.R. NO. 109633; 20
JUL 1994]
Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal
possession of firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs,
particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the
search warrant, which authorized the search and seizure of an
undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernalia’s,
an entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and
to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalia’s and of a .22 caliber
pistol with 3 live ammunition.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper.

Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a
search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. In
herein case, the only objects to be seized that the warrant
determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s
therein. The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional.

Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.

People vs. Joselito del Rosario – GR 127755, April 14, 1999
FACTS
The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide
and sentenced to death. The conviction of the accused was based
on the testimony of a tricycle driver who claimed that the accused
was the one who drove the tricycle, which the suspects used as their
get-away vehicle. The accused was then invited by the police for
questioning and he pointed to the location where he dropped off the
suspects. When the police arrived at the supposed hide-out, a
shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death of some of the
suspects. After the incident, the accused was taken back to the
precinct where his statement was taken on May 14, 1996. However,
this was only subscribed on May 22, 1996 and the accused was
made to execute a waiver of detention in the presence of Ex-Judge
Talavera. It was noted that the accused was handcuffed through all
this time upon orders of the fiscal and based on the authorities*
belief that the accused might attempt to escape otherwise.
ISSUES
1. Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were
violated.
2. Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was
lawful.
Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is voluntary,
express, in writing and made in the presence of counsel.
Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish that the accused
made such a waiver.
No. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a
lawful warrantless arrest: a.) when the accused is caught in flagrante
delicto, b.) when the arrest is made immediately after the crime was
committed, and c.) when the one to be arrested is an escaped
convict. The arrest of the accused in this case did not fall in any of
these exceptions. The arrest was not conducted immediately after
the consummation of the crime; rather, it was done a day after. The
authorities also did not have personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense
because they were not there when the crime was committed. They
merely relied on the account of one eyewitness. Unfortunately,
although the warrantless arrest was not lawful, this did not affect the
jurisdiction of the /ourtin this case because the accused still
submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In
effect,he waived his right to contest the legality of the warrantless
arrest.

HELD:

Yes. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his
rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel in the course of the investigation. The Court held that the
accused should always be apprised of his Miranda rights from the
moment he is arrested by the authorities as this is deemed the start
of custodial investigation. In fact, the Court included “invitation”s by
police officers in the scope of custodial investigations .It is evident in
this case that when the police invited the accused-appellant to the
station, he was already considered as the suspect in the case.
Therefore, the questions asked of him were no longer general
inquiries into an unsolved crime, but were intended to elicit
information about his participation in the crime. However, the
Umil vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 81567, October 3, 1991
FACTS:
These are 8 consolidated petitions for habeas corpus. Petitioners
assert that their detention is unlawful on two grounds: (1) they were
arrested without warrant; and (2) no prior preliminary investigation
was conducted.
Rolando Dural’s petition
Dural shot 2 CAPCOM Soldiers. He was charged with double murder
without bail. Later, Bernardo Itucal was included as defendant. A
petition for habeas corpus was filed on behalf of Roberto Umil,
Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. Umil and Villanueva were
charged for violating the Anti-subversion Act but subsequently
posted bail and were released. The double murder case filed against
Dural and Itucal proceeded to trial. The two were found guilty and
were serving their sentences at the time the petition was filed.
Hence, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to Dural.
Amelia Roque’s petition
Rogelio Ramos was a former NPA member but surrendered to the
authorities. He informed the military regarding Communist Party’s
operations in Manila. He even identified several NPA members and
pointed to Renato Constantino’s house as a safe house by the CPP-
NPA. A search warrant was issued, where numerous firearms,
ammunition, and other communications equipment were found.
Constantino was apprehended and brought to the CIS headquarters
where he admitted being a member of the CPP-NPA.
On the same evening, Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at Constantino’s
house to deliver letters to the rebels. He also had a piece of paper
with the jumbled telephone number of Amelia Roque’s sister.
Buenaobra was also apprehended and upon questioning, admitted to
being a member of the CPP-NPA. Amelia Roque was also found
using the leads the military got. Her house was searched where
subversive documents, ammunition and a fragmentation grenade
were found. Roque and her companions were taken to Camp Crame.
However, Roque admitted that the articles belonged to her and her
companions were consequently released. Buenaobra and Roque
were charged of violating the Anti- subversion Act. Roque was also
charged of violating PD 1866. A petition for habeas corpus was filed
on their behalf, but Buenaobra later withdrew his petition and
preferred to stay in Camp Crame.
Domingo Añonuevo and Ramon Casiple’s petition
Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were both members of the
NUFC-CPP. They were apprehended at Constantino’s house after
having been caught carrying a bag of subversive materials. They
also carried unlicensed firearms. They were charged of violating PD
1866 where no bail was recommended. A petition for the writ of
habeas corpus was filed on their behalf of the two alleging that they
were unlawfully arrested and that there was no preliminary
investigation prior to the filing of the information. The two, however,
refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the RPC.
They also failed to request for a preliminary investigation after the
filing of informations against them.
Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera’s petition
The PC search the house of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. The PC
found subversive documents and ammunition in Ocaya’s car. She
was charged with violation of PD 1866. No preliminary investigation
was conducted because Ocaya refused to waive the Provisions of
Article 125. Rivera, however, was released since he committed no
crime. A petition for habeas corpus was filed on their behalf.
Deogracias Espiritu’s petition
Deogracias Espiritu was the General Secretary of PISTON. He was
arrested without warrant in his home and brought to Western Police
District where he was detained. The respondents argued that
Espiritu was lawfully arrested because of a prior offense he
committed. He allegedly urged drivers and operators to go on a
nationwide strike to force the government to give in to their demands
in November 1988. He was invited for questioning. Later, an
information was filed against him for violating Art 142 of the RPC. He
filed for a petition for habeas corpus, which was denied because his
warrantless arrest was in accordance with the provisions of the
Rules of Court.
Ramil Regala’s petition
Ramil Regala was one of the suspects in the killing of Romulo Bunye
II for which he was arrested. Upon questioning, he identified Narciso
Nazareno as his conspirator in killing Bunye. Relying on this
admission, the police, without warrant, invited Nazareno for
questioning. Later, an information charging Nazareno, Regala and
two others for killing of Bunye was filed with the RTC Makati.
Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, which was denied. A petition for
habeas corpus was then filed on his behalf, which was also denied in
light of the cases filed against him.
Arguments
Ocaya, Anonuevo, Caiple and Roque assert that the subversive
documents found in their possession were planted by the military.
The People argued that they failed to substantiate their claim. There
was also no evil motive on the part of the respondents to falsely
accuse the petitioners. The People also points out that the arrest of
the petitioners was not a a “witch-hunt” but borne out of an in-depth
surveillance of NPA safe houses.
ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless arrests of the petitioners were valid – YES
RULING:
The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the
contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, Dural was committing an
offense, when arrested because he was arrested for being a member
of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where
membership penalized and for subversion which, like rebellion is,
under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing offense.
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which
includes armed struggle for the overthrow of organized government,
Dural did not cease to be or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of
arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital.
Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before
his arrest, without a warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two
(2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the
two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a
"sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then.
Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot
other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of the
organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like
rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense.
Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder,
arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion
and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels
the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the
overriding objective of overthrowing an organized government is
attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere
suspicion by the arresting officers of his membership in the
CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported
by actual facts mentioned in this case.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and
after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra,
Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Ocaya), no prudent man can say
that it would have been better for the military agents not to have
acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an
unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary
action against the peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in
order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities
upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the information has been filed. The remedy would be that the Court
alleged violation of the law and to prosecute and secure the inquires into every phase of detention and that all cases of
punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an deprivation of liberty be brought to the courts for immediate scrutiny
administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is and disposition.
without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113
are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in
peace and order in our communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in

accordance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this
Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty
of committing the crime for which they were arrested. Not evidence
of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel
the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the
interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant.

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the
law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5,
Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested
persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting
officers are not liable. But if they do not strictly comply with the said
conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of
arbitrary detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26
and/or for other administrative sanctions.

RATIO:

In all the cases above, criminal charges have been filed against the
petitioners. Hence, habeas corpus is not be allowed.

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that if a person

alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge
had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such
person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not
issue.

The court refused to abandon its ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile, where it

was held that the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed after an
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON G.R.
No. 121234, August 23, 1995
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON
G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed
with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners
Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6)
other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N.
Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister
Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF
Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors
headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to
conduct the preliminary investigation.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause.
They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and
uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28,
1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the
procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine
witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later,
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest
against them without conducting the required preliminary
examination.
Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to
due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation.
They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its
discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with
the crime of rape and homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely
abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional
right to due process during their preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial
prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information
as an accused.
HELD:
1. NO.
2. NO.
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were
given all the opportunities to be heard.
4. NO.
REASONS:
1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by
the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their
discretion. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a
crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested
committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing
of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for
the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of
petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted “searching
examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against
them.
3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence
in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted
more fully.
4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty
assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial
function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and
legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains
to the executive department of government whose principal power
and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their
violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal
basis).

With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of

Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes that these have been sufficiently
explained and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were
deliberately made to distort the truth.

With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial

publicity that attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the
publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected
the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just
rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of
the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond
knowing.
PEOPLE V. SUCRO
R No. 93239 March 18, 1991
FACTS:
Roy Fulgencio was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station
Commander of the INP) to monitor the activities of appellant Edison
Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was
selling marijuana.
Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something
which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a
cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he
handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant
went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he
gave to a group of persons. Pat. Fulgencio called up Seraspi to
report that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was
transacting with appellant.
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and
while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St.,
Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and
appellant.
Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground
which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana.
When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the
same from Sucro. The police team was able to overtake and arrest
appellant and recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from
the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante
ISSUES:
Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful
and consequently.
Whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest
without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:
A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it;
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an
officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a
warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or
hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the
scene thereof. Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro
conduct his nefarious activity and the fact that Macabante, when
intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the marijuana stick
and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from
accused-appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the
marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an
illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge, being
members of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity.
Police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of
the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the
accused.
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is
not an absolute rule. Among the exceptions granted by law is a
search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 13, Rule 126 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant. There is nothing unlawful about the arrest
considering its compliance with the requirements of a warrantless
arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are
admissible in evidence.
PEOPLE V. DON RODRIGUEZA - CASE DIGEST
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PEOPLE V. DON RODRIGUEZA G.R. No. 95902
February 4, 1992
FACTS:
● The police officers of Ibalon, Legaspi City, received a
confidential information regarding an ongoing illegal traffic of
prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay.
● The police officer (Taduran) acted as a poseur-buyer. He
was told by the informant to look for a certain Don, the
alleged seller of prohibited drugs.
● Taduran went to Tagas alone and, while along the road, he
met Samuel Segovia. He asked Segovia where be could find
Don and where he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a
while and when be returned, he was accompanied by a man
who was later on introduced to him as Don, herein appellant.
● After agreeing on the price (P200.00) for 100 grams of
marijuana, Don left Taduran and Segovia and when he came
back, he’s already bringing with him a plastic containing
Marijuana. Thereafter, Taduran returned to the headquarters
and made a report regarding his said purchase of marijuana.
● Based on that information, they apprehended the accused
without a warrant of arrest.
● Thereafter, NARCOM agents raided without a search
warrant the house of the father(Jovencio Rodrigueza) of
herein accused-appellant. During the raid, they were able to
confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe,
among others.
● The next 2 days, the father was released and Don and co-
accused remained.
● The three accused (Don, Segovia, Lonceras) presented
different versions of their alleged participation.
● RTC found Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as amended) while the two
co-accused were acquitted.
- ● l Hence, this appeal raising the issue of the legality of his
arrest.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest was in consonance to his constitutional
right
HELD:
NO. The arrest and seizure were illegally conducted.
As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must
generally be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the
proper government authority. True, in some instances, this Court has
allowed government authorities to conduct searches and seizures
even without a search warrant.
➔ when the owner of the premises waives his right against
such incursion;
➔ when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;
➔ when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of
customs laws;
➔ when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of
preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws;
➔ when it involves prohibited articles in plain view;
➔ in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the
enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations,
In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM
agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by
any search warrant.
It does not appear, either, that the situation falls under any of the
aforementioned cases above.
Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure
was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents could not have justified
their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation
because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the
place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time.
Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should,
because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant
during that time.

The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the

identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other
prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against
appellant.

From the records of the case, Taduran (poseur-buyer) bought 100

grams of marijuana from Don but the evidence presented were the
prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-
called follow-up raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza.

The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the

marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In
People vs. Rubio, this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic
bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the
corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the existence thereof must be
proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be
fatal to the cause of the prosecution.

Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to sustain the conviction
of the accused, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 31 As clearly
shown by the evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish its
cause. It has not overcome the presumption of innocence accorded
to appellant. This being the case, appellant should not be allowed to
suffer for unwarranted and imaginary imputations against him.
ROLITO GO V. CA - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ROLITO GO V. CA G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
FACTS:
● The incident happen along Wilson Street, San Juan, Metro
Manila where the car of Rolito Go bumped the car of Eldon
Maguan while the Go was traversing a one-way “wrong
direction” road.
● Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot
Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and
left the scene.
● A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take
down petitioner's car plate number.
● The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the
shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round
of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol.
● Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that
the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
● The following day, the police returned to the scene of the
shooting to find out where the suspect had come from.
● The police were informed that petitioner had dined at
Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting.
● The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit
card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop.
● The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of
petitioner and he positively identified him as the same
person who had shot Maguan.
● Having established that the assailant was probably the
petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for petitioner.
● 7 days after the shooting incident, petitioner presented
himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news
reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was
accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith
detained him.
● An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station
at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.
● That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for
frustrated homicide against petitioner with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
● First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio
("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his
lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to a
preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
● 2 days after and before the prosecutor filed the information in
court, Eldon Maguan died of gunshot wounds.
● Accordingly, instead of filing an information for frustrated
homicide, the prosecutor filed an information for murder
before the RTC. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of
the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary
investigation had been conducted because the accused did
not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code.
● Counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus
motion for immediate release and proper preliminary
investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner
was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been
conducted before the information was filed.
● Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance
or on bail.
● Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus
motion, wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he
interposed no objection to petitioner being granted
provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.
● Petitioner was released when his cash bond was approved.
● Prosecutor filed with the RTC a motion for leave to conduct a
preliminary investigation and prayed that in the meantime all
proceedings in the court be suspended.
● The prosecutor stated that petitioner had filed before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus
motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation,
which motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor
Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail of
P100,000.00.
● The trial court issued an Order granting leave to conduct
preliminary investigation and cancelling the arraignment set
 for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have
concluded its preliminary investigation.
● However, the respondent judge issued an order on July 17,
1991, recalling his bail, the leave to conduct P.I, and his
omnibus for immediate release. Likewise, the judge ordered
the petitioner to surrender within 48 hours.
● Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July
1991 Order.
● Petitioner contends that the information was null and void
because no preliminary investigation had been previously
conducted, in violation of his right to due process. Petitioner
also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case
pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this
motion was, however, denied by respondent Judge.
● Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without a
warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days
after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus,
petitioner argues, the crime had not been “just committed” at
the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police
officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the
shooting of Maguan and accordingly, none had the “personal
knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless
arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest,
Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes
the only exception to the right to a preliminary investigation,
could not apply in respect of petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful
WON petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary
investigation.
HELD:
1. NO. The arrest was invalid.
● First, the trial court’s reliance in the case of Umil v. Ramos is
incorrect. Herein, appellant was charged with murder while
in Umil, the accused was charged with subversion, a
continuing offense.
● The petitioner’s appearance to the police station did not
mean he was arrested at all. Petitioner neither expressed
surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of
any crime.
● Second, the instant case did not fall within the terms of
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
● Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting
of Maguan.
● The "arresting" officers obviously were not present, within
the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had
allegedly shot Maguan.
● Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the
shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the
shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the
meaning of Section 5(b).
● Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the
gunman who had shot Maguan.
● The information upon which the police acted had been
derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to
the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman;
another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's
plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's
wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute
"personal knowledge."
2. NO. Petitioner did not waive his right to P.I.
● Petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a
preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed
out, on the same day that the information for murder was
filed with the RTC, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an
omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation.
● Moreover, the Court does not believe that by posting bail
petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In
 People v. Selfaison, we did hold that appellants there had
waived their right to a preliminary investigation because
immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded
to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the
benefit of a preliminary investigation.

● In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on

recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in
one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to
preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved
the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release
on 12 July 1991.
● Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of a
preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact,
when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave
to conduct a preliminary investigation, he clearly implied to
recognized that petitioner's claim to the preliminary
investigation was a legitimate one.
G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990 in this case identified themselves and apprehended the
POSADAS V. CA petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he
ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner, had committed, or was actually committing the offense of
vs. illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. They did not know what its contents were. The said
GANCAYCO, J.: circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.
Facts:
While Pat. Ungab and Umpar were conducting a surveillance
along Magallanes Street, Davao City, they spotted petitioner
carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
suspiciously.They approached the petitioner and identified
themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to
flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two
notwithstanding his resistance.
They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where
they found one (1) caliber .38 revolver, two (2) rounds of live
ammunition for a .38 caliber gun 2 a smoke (tear gas)
grenade, 3 and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber
gun. 4 the petitioner was asked to show the necessary
license or authority to possess the firearms and ammunitions
but failed to do so.
Issue:
Whether or not the warantless arrest and search was valid.
Ruling:
An arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace
officer or private person, among others, when in his
presence the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or
when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
arrested has committed it.
Contrary to the argument of the Solicitor General that when
the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was
actually committing or had just committed the offense of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the
presence of the police officers and consequently the search
and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful
arrest in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure; At the time the peace officers
PEOPLE V. MENGOTE
Facts:
The Western Police District received a telephone call from
an informer that there were three suspicious looking persons
at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in
Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was
forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two
men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his
abdomen. They approached the persons and identified
themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but
unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded
them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the
accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live
ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The
weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to
the police headquarters for investigation. Information was
filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal
possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the
weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he
reported to the police including the revolver. For his part,
Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm
or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed
that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest.
He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads
that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him
because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of
a poisonous tree.
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense,
(b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person
arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested
has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another. These requirements have
not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the
arrest in question, the accused appellant was merely looking
from side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the
arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no
offense that has just been committed or was being actually
committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their
presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and
frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on
unexplained suspicion. Judgment is reversed and set aside.
Accused-appellant is acquitted.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was

illegal.

Held:
Evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and
seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose as
provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5
of the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful
when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed, is
PEOPLE VS AMINNUDIN
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y
AHNI
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
Facts:
The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a
tip from one of their informers that the accused was on board
a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He
was identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for
him in the evening and approached him as he descended
from the gangplank after the informer pointed at him. They
detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was
found to contained three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the basis
of the finding, the corresponding charge was then filed
against Aminnudin.
M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
identified. The date of his arrival was certain. And from the
information they have received, they could have persuaded
a judge that there was a probable cause, indeed, to justify
the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill of
Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant
who was the head of the arresting team had determine on
his own authority that a search warrant was not necessary.
The evidence of probable cause should be
determined by a judge and not law enforcement agents.
ACQUITTED

Issue:

Whether or not accused constitutional right against

unreasonable serach and seizure is violated

Ruling:

The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest

allowed under Rule 113 of the rules of court not justified
unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was
about to be committed or had just been committed.

A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches

and seizures for violation of the customs law because these
vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.

In the present case, from the conflicting declarations

of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two
days within which they could have obtained a warrant to
arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the