 Book Reviews / Bustan: The Middle East Book Review  () –

Rashid Khalidi, The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood
(Boston: Beacon Press, ),  pp. ISBN- , ISBN- -


The Declaration of Principles signed between the Palestine Liberation Organi-

zation (P.L.O.) and Israel in September  (the “Oslo Accords”) culminated
a clandestine negotiation process, carried out behind the backs of the local
Palestinian leadership in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. At the time, these
leaders were involved in negotiations with Israel over establishing autonomy
in the territories. Close to fifteen years after the signing of the Oslo Accords,
Rashid Khalidi examines the failure of the P.L.O.’s leadership to end Israeli
occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state within the frame-
work of a diplomatic settlement with Israel. This failure echoed loudly at the
time of the book’s writing, as the Palestinian Authority’s institutions collapsed
and the foundations of Palestinian society were affected by years of an armed
conflict with Israel during the second (Al-Aksa) intifada. The two-state solu-
tion, which seemed a just and viable remedy in the s, now appeared to
Khalidi and many others as out of reach. These dramatic developments led
many scholars, mostly non-Palestinian, to re-examine the roots and origins of
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, along with the reasons for the Palestinians’ failed
struggle to realize their right for self-determination and the establishment of
a sovereign nation-state. Khalidi, a Palestinian-American historian, scion of a
notable Jerusalem family who was close to the P.L.O. leadership in the s,
who served as an adviser to the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid peace con-
ference in  and later to the abovementioned autonomy talks with Israel,
brings a different perspective to these questions. Khalidi staunchly opposed the
Oslo Accords and vehemently criticized the P.L.O.’s leaders for allowing Israel
to maintain its control of the West Bank and Gaza and continue its settlement
activity in those territories.
The book’s title reflects political obstacles that the Palestinians faced over
the years, which according to Khalidi led the Palestinians to incarcerate their
aspirations for independence in an “iron cage,” from which they find it difficult
to extract themselves. The “iron cage” today presents itself in the form of the
security barrier that Israel built in the West Bank, separating the Jewish state
from the Palestinians. It also evident in the diplomatic boycott announced
by Israel and the international community on the Palestinian governments
established after the  elections, in which the nationalist Fatah movement
was defeated and Hamas, the religious Islamist movement, emerged victori-
ous. In this book, Khalidi’s main analytical approach is an effort to divide
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden,  DOI: 10.1163/187853011X605168
 Book Reviews / Bustan: The Middle East Book Review  () – 

responsibility for the failure to establish a Palestinian state between various

players, including Palestinian leadership throughout history. Over the course
of the book, Khalidi presents a complex, critical historical narrative which is
uncommon in Palestinian public discourse.
Khalidi’s book discusses the way Palestinians related to the issue of estab-
lishing an independent state before and after . He seeks to answer the
question of why they did not assume control of the British Mandate’s admin-
istration in Palestine and failed to create their own alternative political struc-
tures. For Khalidi, these failures led in turn to the Palestinian defeat in conflicts
with the Jewish community and later with the state of Israel. He criticizes the
Palestinian leadership, arguing that the ways in which these leaders coped with
the limits and obstacles imposed on them by foreign players significantly con-
tributed to the Palestinian people’s failure to realize their national aspirations.
Khalidi highlights the internal disputes and squabbles among these leaders,
along with their insistence on viewing the Jewish community as a religious,
and not national, group—a view that led them not to recognize Zionism and
to reject the British offer to establish a legislative council or an Arab agency,
similar to the Jewish Agency, within the Mandate’s framework. Such an orga-
nization could have provided the Palestinian leadership with legitimacy and a
platform for presenting its positions.
Khalidi’s basic contention, which is presented in his other writings, is that
Palestinian collective identity was never properly defined, apart from the con-
flict with Zionism and Israel. As he sets out to support his criticism of the
Palestinians and their leaders during the Mandate period, he compares their
situation to that of other Arab societies under colonial rule. These societies
managed to establish political structures, form political and military fronts,
lead nationalist struggles and ultimately secure political independence. His
conclusion is that the Palestinians could and should have struggled to establish
national, state-oriented institutions. For Khalidi, what the Palestinians lacked,
compared to other Arab societies, was not a sentiment of national identity, a
well-educated social stratum or civil society organizations, but rather a suffi-
cient capability for social and political mobilization in order to overcome the
challenges they faced.
Such a critical approach, which places on the Palestinians a degree of respon-
sibility for the fact that their state has not yet been established, is highly com-
mendable. It reflects the author’s realistic view of the various events—a his-
torian’s view of past events that is not influenced by emotional or practical
involvement in the Palestinian struggle for liberation and political indepen-
dence. This is a good effort to present the Palestinian historical narrative from
 Book Reviews / Bustan: The Middle East Book Review  () –

a viewpoint that involves a degree of introspection and soul-searching about

the Palestinians’ own role in shaping their destiny as a people. Notwithstand-
ing this, Khalidi’s conclusions, based on comparing Palestinian society to other
Arab societies placed under a mandate system of government, as well as his
criticism about not recognizing Zionism and Jewish collective national rights,
warrant further attention.
Palestinian Arab society enjoyed a degree of social and economic develop-
ment under the British Mandate, similar to other Arab societies who were sub-
jected to a similar form of government. This development led to the emergence
of a new Palestinian elite that was nevertheless unable to challenge the tradi-
tional elite. While a new class of merchants and industrialists became discern-
able, this group lacked any form of socio-economic thought. Two other groups
also emerged in the Mandate era: a new Palestinian proletariat, which did not
transform itself into a class-oriented political movement, and an educated elite,
which failed to become a leading force in Palestinian politics, economy, or
society. Many of these educated individuals were technocrats and bureaucrats,
largely dependent on government employment and budgets. Palestinian soci-
ety did not benefit from the existence of a large intellectual milieu, which in
many societies often serves as an important foundation for national renewal
and revival. Palestinian society continued to be framed by a loose arrangement
between well-known families who did not coalesce into an official organic sys-
tem. Social, religious, and political leadership remained in the hands of a small
group of landowners. This reality remained intact throughout the period of
Jordanian rule after . Notable families could rely on their ties with the
Jordanian monarchy to enhance their prestige. Most prominent West Bank
clans gained new importance starting from the s, as they served as may-
ors, members of the Jordanian parliament, or ministers in the kingdom’s gov-
ernment. For Jordan, these notable families were reliable allies against radical
ideologies, such as Palestinian nationalism as it developed in the s.
Khalidi’s assertion that Palestinian Arab society did develop a sentiment
of collective national identity during the Mandate period, and that it was
merely Palestinians’ inability to mobilize politically and socially that blocked
the possibility of overcoming the challenges they faced, can be contested.
Palestinian scholar Issa Khalaf explains that the traditional notable Palestinian
leadership made use of Palestinian national identity during the Mandate period
in order to maintain its political power.1 While this reflects the presence of a

1)
Issa Khalaf, Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration –,
New York: State University of New York Press, .
 Book Reviews / Bustan: The Middle East Book Review  () – 

national sentiment among Palestinians, the factionalism which underpinned

the traditional leadership averted the possibility of securing a greater degree of
national internal cohesion. This reality was not conducive to the development
of political and social institutions, which could have promoted a greater degree
of Palestinian national consciousness and identity, in a similar manner to other
Arab Middle Eastern countries. The Palestinians, for the record, rejected the
 White Paper, which promised the establishment of a bi-national state
in Palestine within ten years, while severely restricting Jewish immigration
to Palestine and limiting the sale of land to Jews. Instead, they demanded a
complete end to Jewish immigration and a rejection of the idea that Palestine
should serve as a national home for the Jewish people. This naturally raises the
question of why the Palestinians rejected the White Paper’s generous offer. Even
if Palestinian leaders such as the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni,
rejected the proposal for various reasons, demonstrating a degree of political
short-sightedness, one would expect opposition voices to rise up and denounce
his rejectionist stance. This did not happen. Ultimately, Palestinian national
consciousness during this period was still in its early stages, a long way off from
reaching a state of maturity. This type of consciousness developed only later.
It was actually the loss of Palestinian territory in , coupled with military
defeat and dispersion, which became a unifying factor and helped crystallize
a Palestinian national identity. The establishment of the P.L.O. () was an
expression of the Palestinian national revival, while the  Arab-Israeli war
contributed to the strengthening of a particular Palestinian national identity,
legitimizing the idea of a Palestinian nation-state.
Khalidi, whose previous studies have extensively discussed the question of
Palestinian national identity,2 does not devote enough space and importance in
this book to the crucial question of identity in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
The two peoples are locked in a dilemma which stems from associating their
national identity with the same homeland. They define their national identity
in combination with religious elements and their attachment to the holy land.
Israeli researchers Yohanan Peres and Eliezer Ben Rafael note that sanctifying
the Palestinian and Israeli historical narratives through religious symbolism,
using terms such as the “promised land” and “Islam’s third holy territory,”
added a totalistic dimension to the conflict, defining any compromise as defeat.
Dividing the country—as a necessary solution—is therefore viewed in many
circles on both sides as an act of religious defiance.

2)
Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity—The Construction of Modern National Consciousness,
New York: Columbia University Press, .
 Book Reviews / Bustan: The Middle East Book Review  () –

Thus, the Palestinian national movement views Palestine as part of a broader

Arab homeland, while the Palestinian Islamist movement considers it reli-
giously endowed Muslim territory. Both factions contend that any form of
territorial partition is unjust, and that Palestine should retain its territorial
integrity from the Jordan river to the Mediterranean sea. They also share
the view that the Jews of Palestine are a religious—rather than a national—
community and are therefore entitled to civil and religious rights but not
to collective national ones. Palestinian nationalist leaders later adopted the
idea, beginning in the mid s, that accepting the idea of partition with-
out renouncing claims to the entire territory was a necessary measure in order
to secure Palestinian identity and existence in their homeland. They realized
that without an agreement and without the establishment of a political entity
in Palestine, Palestinians could yet lose their national identity and ultimately
their right for self determination. On the other hand, it was also clear to
these leaders that an agreement which would include a commitment to end
the conflict, a territorial compromise, and settle the question concerning the
right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland would weaken the
Palestinian national narrative, which defines the Palestinian people. A strate-
gic decision was therefore made, aiming to reach a political agreement of a
two-state solution (within the  borders), without decisively abandon-
ing claims to the rest of Palestine. Ascribing to the notion that regaining the
entire Palestinian homeland was at the moment untenable, nationalist lead-
ers devised an interest in reaching a temporary compromise which would set-
tle the “ file,” secure the establishment of a sovereign state on part of
the Palestinian homeland, and leave the “ file” open for future genera-
tions.
This Palestinian position was influenced from the outset by early Zionist
ideology, which viewed the Land of Israel as an ancient homeland to which Jews
would return after a  year exile. Most Zionist leaders rejected the existence
of a Palestinian people and at times considered the idea of “transferring” the
Palestinian Arab population to the eastern bank of the Jordan river. Religious
Zionists viewed any form of territorial compromise as a breach of a divine
covenant between the Jewish people and god. These combined secular and
religious ideas were internalized over the years by the Israeli public, often
serving as the ideological foundations of Israeli right and left wing politics,
leading to Israeli settlement in the West Bank and Gaza and an Israeli rejection
of the Palestinian right to self-determination. Since the signing of the Oslo
Accords, the Israeli public has accepted the idea that it will have to choose
between a territorially reduced Israeli state and the vision of a “greater Israel.”
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However, despite Israel’s stated policy, which endorses the idea of a two-state
solution, Israeli leaders from both right and left wing parties have found it
difficult to reach a decision to relinquish territory.
In his study, Khalidi weakens the P.L.O.’s image as the entity which pro-
vided Palestinians with a state-like framework that would eventually lead to
the establishment of an independent state. He underscores the organization’s
failure to promote the rule of law and a worthy institutional system within the
framework of the Palestinian Authority, created after the signing of the Oslo
Accords. Khalidi reaches the conclusion that the P.L.O., which until estab-
lishing itself in Palestinian territory functioned as a liberation movement, was
inept and inadequate for the task of establishing a state. Khalidi would like
to see the current Palestinian national leadership be more fully aware of their
responsibility and understand the historical debt they have to their people.
They must, he contends, decide on the proper structure for the independent
Palestinian entity they seek to create, an entity that would co-exist peacefully
with Israel. Concomitantly, he does think the Palestinians will not be able to
flee the “iron cage” in the near future, mostly because in his view they remain
trapped in the configuration of a two-state solution they are incapable of real-
izing. Khalidi offers a sort of warning that if leaders on both the Palestinian
and Israeli sides, along with the international community, will not act soon,
the one-state solution will emerge as the leading default alternative.
However, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which since the Oslo Accords is
frequently presented as a territorial dispute, is far deeper and more complex.
One cannot ignore the fact that the roots of the conflict continue to be found
in the deep clash between the basic values which define the national identity of
both nations. These roots go far beyond the influence of the obstacles Khalidi
identifies, which are an outcome of Israeli policies and external players, along
with the weakness of former or current Palestinian leaders. The historic struggle
between two people over the same territory, and the more recent disputes
between them during negotiations concerning a final status agreement, are
nothing more than an external representation of the clash between nationalist-
religious values. This confrontation is the “iron cage” in which Palestinians and
Israelis are locked, barring them both in the past and present from moving
closer towards an agreement that would end a century-old conflict.

Ephraim Lavie
Tel Aviv University
lavieeph@post.tau.ac.il