WHERE DOES LANGUAGE KNOWLEDGE COME FROM?

PSYCHOLINGUISTICS

(Submitted to Fulfill the Assignment of Psycholinguistics Course)

Lecturer: Rosmania Rima, S.Pd, M.Pd.

Class: 6B

Group: 9

Finka Pramesti Ridhani (2223180107)

Hafizhah Azzahra (2223180134)

ENGLISH EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

FACULTY OF TEACHER TRAINING AND EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF SULTAN AGENG TIRTAYASA

2021
 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Background of The Study

The study of the nature and origin of knowledge is a branch of philosophy called
'epistemology', that is, where language comes from and how human infants begin to
analyze and learn language. Do human babies use innate intelligence or language ideas, or
both? If it is the use of intelligence, are babies then born with this intelligence or do they
have to develop it?
In contrast, psycholinguistics agreed if there is an indirectly process of intelligence
while produce and comprehend a language. Language is a common thing but it will be a
complex matter while we try to examine it. Based on its explanation, most linguistics
suggests that the ability of human being to communicate with other people have strict
correlation with their intelligences.
Behavior theory explained that language is come from society. Skinner is a linguist
who creates this theory or some linguist who follows skinner’s Theory, language is come
from society. Human being can communicate because the input from their society. Their
society introduce and build their vocabulary up in order to speak, the process of baby
acquire her/ his first language.
Innateness is about the capability of human language as a gift from (since they were
born. The basic ideas, (god, triangle, etc.) are already in the mind at birth. To activate these
ideas, one uses reason (ratio meaning reason) in conjunction with experience. Innate ideas
are of a general nature (beaver 1970) Chomsky as a pioneer of rationalism believed that
human being that was born has the brain as a language acquisition device so the language
will be acquired naturally. he also stated that the children has natural ability to evolve the
language the naturalability work automatically when the children exposure the language.
Intelligence, innateness, and behavior are completing each other. They build up the
language using perfectly.
B. Formulation of The Problem
1. How do we acquire knowledge?
2. What’s the essence of mentalist vs. materialism?
3. What’s the behaviorism wars: materialism vs. epiphonomenalism vs. reductionism in
language knowledge?
4. What makes philosophical functionalism and the objections to it?
5. What happened in mentalist wars: empiricism intelligence vs. rationalism innate ideas?
6. What are Chomsky’s arguments for innate language ideas and the inadequacy of those
arguments?

C. Purpose of The Problem

1. To find out the acquire knowledge.
2. To find out the essence of mentalist vs. materialism.
3. To find out the behaviorism wars: materialism vs. epiphonomenalism vs. reductionism
in language knowledge.
4. To find out the philosophical functionalism and the objections to it.
5. To find out what happened in mentalist wars: empiricism intelligence vs. rationalism
innate ideas.
6. To find out the Chomsky’s arguments for innate language ideas and the inadequacy of
those arguments.
 CHAPTER II

DISCUSSION

A. How Do We Acquire Knowledge?

According to Lawson (2000), knowledge acquisition involves a pattern of idea
generation (representation) and testing which, when broadcast in the form of verbal
arguments, follows an If / then / Therefore pattern. Self-generated ideas / representations
are tested by comparing expected and observed results. Ideas can be defended or rejected,
but cannot be proven or disproved. Therefore, Absolute Truth about any and all ideas,
including the idea that the external world exists, is impossible to attain. Yet learning at all
levels above motor-sensory requires one to assume the independent existence of the outside
world because only then can the behavior of the objects in that world be used to test the
next higher level ideas. Although the process of knowledge acquisition has limitations, its
use results in increasingly useful representations of the assumed external world
assumptions as evidenced by advances in technology which are undeniably based on sound
scientific theories.
Human and natural sciences use the scientific method in which there are four key
aspects: observation, measurement, experiment and law. Both use inductive logic to
generalize and make their theories explain and predict. There must be special challenges
in studying humans scientifically. In human science the observer cannot be separated from
what is observed. Explanations in the natural sciences are predictions, in human science
they are guidelines, people do behave in a more or less predictable way but only that we
are somehow quite unique phenomena of the physical universe.
This is known as the chicken and egg scenario. For example, are you rich because
you own a lot of shares? Or do you own a lot of shares because you are rich? This is relevant
in many social problems. Are you a drunk because you are poor, or are you poor because
you are a drunk? Is prison one of the answers to crime, or is it one of the persistent reasons?
These things are often self-perpetuating, and we must dig deep to discover why they
happened in the first place. Sometimes things just happen by chance, and no rules can be
 found to explain them. This is especially the case in human science (not natural science)
where people usually act on a whim, and phenomena occur randomly.

B. Mentalism vs. Materialism

1. The Essence of Materialism
Materialists view that everything that can be felt is reality. Materialists do not
believe in supernatural powers or mysterious entities. They view the mind as an organ
that functions as a product of the environment. They believe that reality is constant and
does not change according to people's perceptions. John B. Watson, a psychologist who
founded Behaviourism, considers mind and consciousness to be religious superstitions
irrelevant to the study of psychology.
According to John B. Watson, there is only one type of object in the universe,
namely matter or matter and physiology is the study of psychology. Chalmers (1996)
argues that some philosophical functionalists have recently followed this tradition but
take this view one step further and provide mental characteristics as long as there is a
functional identity with humans. Behaviorist philosophical theories of Ryle (1949,
p.199) and Quine (1960, pp. 34-5) take a similar view, that the object of psychological
study should not be the mind but the disposition of the body to behave (thought and
mental processes can be reduced to physiological functions body). From this diversity
of anti-mentalist theorists, they hold one principle in common: they argue to study the
physical body including the brain, where they can relate bodily processes and bodily
functions to situations and events in the physical environment.

2. The Essence of Mentalism

Mentalists argue that mind has a different nature from matter. Qualitatively, there
are two kinds of matter in the universe: matter and mental. Mentalists view the world
through an idealist point of view. They see everything as a subjective experience, in
other words, to be understood. Mentalists also view the mind as its own entity,
operating in ways that humans cannot possibly understand. For the last theorists,
understanding the mind and consciousness is very important for understanding human
intelligence, especially language. Most modern psycholinguists and linguists are
 mentalists, placing their emphasis as they do on the study of the mind and the
interactions of body and mind in order to understand the process of language and its
learning by children.
The two basic mind and body relationships with respect to environmental stimuli
and behavioral responses in the world are: Interactionist and Idealist. Interactionism is
the main idea supported mentalism (Searle, 1997). According to this interactionist
view, similar to that advanced by Descartes (1641, Meditation VI), people behave as
they do as a result of the body acting on its own (as in breathing, and circulating blood)
or the body interacting with the mind (as when a person deliberately holding his breath
or raising his hand). Idealism according to the radical mentalist view is the body and
the whole physical world are only constructions of the mind. The world exists only in
the conscious mind of the individual, with the only true substance being mental.
Subjective idealism is on the other side of radical Materialism. Whereas for materialists
there is only matter, for Idealists, there is only mental. Currently, there is little interest
in Idealism.

C. Behaviourist wars: Materialism vs. Epiphenomenalism vs. Reductionism

1. Materialism: In this view, only the physical body exists. The mind is fiction and thus
only the body has to be studied.

2. Epiphenomenalism: The essence of this view is that although the body and mind exist,
the mind reflects only what is happening in the body. Since the mind has no causal
power, proper study of psychology remains, as Watson argues, on the body. Watson's
criterion for determining the presence or absence of something is knowing whether
something can be seen and observed physically or not.

3. Reductionism: The mind can be reduced to being physical, that is, the body. For many
of these theorists, body and mind are two aspects of one reality, one can learn all there
is to know about the mind by doing a thorough study of the body, no need to study the
mind (Feigl, 1958; Smart 1959; Armstrong, 1968). So, the mind is reduced to the body.
The mind can thus be studied entirely through the body in relative metaphysical
 comfort. Psychological proponents of this view such as Osgood (1980), Mowrer
(1960), and Staats (1968, 1971) have argued that stimuli and responses occur in the
body and brain and thus mediate between open stimuli and open responses, where
'overt' represents events outside the body. Overt stimuli could, for example, be a beam
of light or someone asking a question, while an open response could be a wink of an
eyelid or spoken words in response to a question.

D. Philosophical Functionalism and Objections to Philosophical Functionalism

1. Philosophical Functionalism
In recent years, along with the development of artificial intelligence, computer
language, and cognitive science, a new theory of philosophy / psychology, called
functionalism, has been put forward. Like Behaviorism, Functionalism is Materialism.
When Functionalists allow thought and consciousness, they consider mind and
consciousness in physical terms. With their focus on behavior and the brain, and on the
functioning of the dead machines, Functionalists are the natural successors of
Behaviorists. Thus, when we hear Chalmers (1996) say, 'The very fact that [conscious]
experience can be coherently subtracted fro m any causal account implies that
[conscious] experience is superfluous in the explanation of behaviour' (Chalmers, 1996,
pp. 158-9), from Skinner's quintessential assertion, no ted a few sections before, that,
'It [Behaviourism] rejects explanations of human behaviour in terms of feelings, states
of mind, and mental processes, and seeks alternatives in genetic and environmental
histories' (Skinner, 1971, p. 35). The theory in more detail consider the following:
1. Is it not possible that minds might occur in structures other than brains; in
artificially intelligent devices, for example? Yes. It may be possible.
2. Is it not possible that, unlike humans, some minds might not be dependent on brains
but be made of different materials? Yes, It may be possible.
3. Is it not possible, too, that these minds made with different materials could perform
intelligent tasks? Yes. It may be possible.
Functionalism is the basis for cognitive science which will abstract from the details of
physical implementation in search of principles common to all intelligent processing
devices (Dennett, 1978; Fodor, 1980; Dretske, 1981). As long as the functions of
 calculators are identical to those of humans performing arithmetic, because they have
the same input and output relationship, Functionalists have a basis for arguing that
calculators can have the same mental state and experience as humans. Because of this
functional equation, a Functionalist like Chalmers was willing to give the attributes of
'mental' and 'mind' to calculators.

2. Objections to Philosophical Functionalism

According to Shoemaker (1975), Block (1978), Lewis (1980), without thought and
awareness, functionalists cannot deal with certain problems. The same types of
objections that can be raised regarding functionalism can also be applied to
Behaviorism, such as Insincerity and Lying, Dreams and Speech, and Toothache and
Dentists. Maloney (1987) says that the entire theory of functionalism is based on the
premise that thoughts can be manifested in something outside the brain. This premise
is dramatized by supposing. There is no answer to the answer that anything imaginable
is possible. Because in this case, one can easily imagine the opposite, that is, thoughts
need to be linked to the brain. Maloney argues that until Functionalists can 'validate'
(bring evidence to affirm) the possibility of a brainless mind, Functionalist philosophy
itself can only be considered a mere possibility. Until then, Functionalism must remain
in the realm of science fiction.

E. Mentalist wars: Empiricism’s Intelligence vs. Rationalism’s Innate Ideas

1. Empiricism’s Intelligence
According to the conception of most mentalists, a person is considered to have
thoughts. This mind is related to the body but is not the same as it is, because the mind
has consciousness and consciousness can use the mind to control behavior. meaning
the mind can control behavior. Thus, mentalism is characterized by a belief in
thoughts, ideas, consciousness, and the role of consciousness in behavior.
Empirical view no. 1: Intelligence comes from experience
While all Mentalists would agree on the existence of thoughts and that in their minds
humans have ideas, namely knowledge, the Empirical View is that ideas are passed
down entirely through experience (empeir is Greek for 'experience'). Empiricists will
 then argue with each other as to whether intelligence is innate. Intelligence, then, is
considered not as knowledge but as a means of acquiring knowledge. In Locke's radical
view, humans at birth have an empty mind, then experience implants ideas on it and
develops intelligence from those ideas.
Empirical view no. No. 2: Intelligence or its fundamentals are innate
But how can something (intelligence) come from nothing (empty mind)? The
contemporary philosopher Putnam (1967) argues that humans are born with
intelligence, an innate intelligence that develops through evolution. Such intelligence
would incorporate a 'Common Multipurpose Learning Strategy', he said.
Piaget takes a middle position between Locke and Putnam. He did not argue, as
Locke did, that there is nothing in the human mind at birth. Nor does he argue, as
Putnam does, that basic intelligence is already in the mind at birth - more precisely
Piaget proposed the innate 'indifferentiated scheme' from which intelligence develops.
His own view is that children are born with the essence of the propositions and entities
to which they are involved, as well as the essence of the analytical operations of
inductive and deductive logic. It is through operating logical analytical procedures on
the data they experience that children acquire their knowledge of the world and then
the language they use to deal with the world and the people in it.
There is an important point in confusing terminology that must be clarified. The
words 'Empiricism' (and 'Empiricism') have developed two different meanings. One,
the more philosophical tradition, concerns the mentalistic philosophical schools, of
which Aristotle (fourth century BC) and John Locke (1690) were supporters. We all
often use the word 'empirical' to denote this meaning. But in this interpretation nothing
is implied about mentalism. This notion is one that Behaviorist theorists, in particular,
imply whenever they use the words 'Empiricism' and 'Empiricism'. 'Empiricism',
perhaps, would be a better term to label their views.

2. Rationalism’s Innate Ideas

According to Descartes (1641), the rationalist view is that basic ideas (God,
triangles, etc.) already exist in the mind from birth. To activate these ideas, one uses
reason in relation to experience. In Rationalist philosophy, such as Descartes,
 Chomsky holds that many basic ideas are already in the mind at birth, he further claims
that there are ideas with a different nature of language. He calls this set of built-in
language ideas 'Universal Grammar' (he previously used the name LAD, for Language
Acquisition Toolkit). Chomsky claims that certain grammars develop through certain
inherent, typical innate language processes of Universal Grammar that are said to be
independent of reason, logic, or intelligence. Another modern rationalist, Bever (1970)
says does not separate language from other kinds of ideas. In contrast, Bever argues
that innate ideas are general and basic in this view that they serve to produce language
as well as other types of knowledge such as mathematics. This is a defensible point of
view. Despite these differences, all Rationalists agree on the essential principle that
some knowledge is innate in human beings. Different rationalists, for example, have
argued that concepts such as 'justice', 'obscurity', 'God', 'perfection' and 'triangles' are
innate. They argue that such ideas cannot be intelligently derived from the experience
of a human.

F. Chomsky’s arguments for innate language ideas and the inadequacy of those
arguments
According to Chomsky, humans are born with minds that contain innate knowledge
about a number of different fields. One such area or ability of mind has to do with language.
The set of innate language ideas made up of language faculties is called 'Universal
Grammar'. UG is universal because every human being is born with it. So, UG is not the
grammar of a particular language but contains important things by which a certain grammar
can be obtained. This opinion is one of the bases for Chomsky's often-repeated assertion
that language acquisition is independent of intelligence and logic and that animals do not
have language because they were not born with UG (Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch, 2002).
Universal Grammar does not become functional or operational unless one receives
certain spoken input from the environment. So, for example, given an English sentence as
input, the UG will construct English grammar in the mind of the child. Certain grammatical
acquisitions involve UG interactions with world experiences. The role of language
experience is to activate the UG so that it can develop the grammatical essence of a
particular grammar. This essence involves certain principles and parameters that are
universal. Such a view is different from the Empiricist view which places a greater role on
experience, which is the provider of ideas. According to Chomsky, Universal Grammar is
defined as a core grammar which contains principles and parameters applicable to all
languages. Other aspects of the grammar of certain languages are referred to as 'peripheral
grammar' and 'mental lexicons'. Thus, according to Chomsky (1986, p.150), what children
know innately is the notion of (1) the principles of the various Universal Grammar
subsystems, (2) their mode of interaction, and (3) the parameters associated with these
principles. The exact content of the various UG categories is not provided by Chomsky.
Chomsky's four main arguments about the need for UG are: (1) degenerate, slight,
and minor language input; (2) The ease and speed of children's language mastery; and (3)
the irrelevance of intelligence in language learning. Our additional objections to UG are
(4) simultaneous multilingualism and the problem of multiple settings on a single
parameter.

1. Chomsky argument no. 1: Degenerate, meagre, and minute language input

Chomsky argues that the evidence for the aid of the innate language idea is that
children have good grammar mastery, even though they are not exposed to sufficient
language data. Linguistic data, Chomsky (1967a, p. 6) asserts, consists, 'for the most
part, of sentences which deviate in form from the ideal structure determined by the
grammar that he [the child] develops'. This data is a 'small sample of linguistic material
that has been thoroughly mastered'. This insufficient data will certainly result in
inadequate grammar, if one accepts an empirical point of view.
Empirical research by Labov, Newport, and others has conclusively shown that the
dominant sentence is grammar and not degenerate and not grammatical as Chomsky
argues. As Labov (1970, p. 42) points out, 'Colloquial grammatical expressions seem
to be myths without foundation in actual fact. In various empirical studies that we have
done. . . the proportion of sentences that were completely un grammatical and in bad
shape fell to less than two percent '. Instead of using Chomsky's complex Universal
Grammar theory to try to deal with only 2 percent of sentences that are not grammatical
(which may be caused by the speaker getting cut off in mid-sentence, a change in
thinking, etc.) a 2-year-old is likely not going to spend much. time to think about the
 complexity of the passive voice he heard, even when such a sentence was made
grammatical. The child accepts what can be understood and discards what cannot be
processed. Regarding Chomsky's claim that only ‘meagre’ and ‘minute sample’
language is experienced by children, it is realized that there is no empirical evidence
that he provides to support that claim. What happened was just the opposite. The
sentences experienced by the child (although the number may be limited) contain an
adequate representation of the syntactic structure that the child should learn.

2. Chomsky argument no. 2: Ease and speed of child language acquisition

According to Chomsky (1962, p.529), 'A young child is capable of acquiring
perfect language acquisition with much greater ease and without explicit instruction.
Only language exposure, for a very short period of time, seems to be all normal children
need to develop native speakers' competencies. Because, the child's extraordinary
achievement in acquiring grammar is impossible. The accumulation of language
learning that a child will experience if someone postulates an Empirical-based
acquisition process, this phenomenon can only occur with the help of Universal
Grammar. Through the help of built-in language ideas, language acquisition becomes
so easy and fast. Therefore, Chomsky's claim cannot empirically explain the ease and
speed of acquisition.
However, Putnam (1967) refutes Chomsky's argument by comparing the number
of hours a child spends learning language with an adult learning language. He argues
that a 4 or 5 year old child who has learned the basics of a language has spent more
time in the process than an adult in learning a second language.
Chomsky argues about the speed and ease of children's language acquisition: that
children learn faster than adults, and that this superior speed is the result of Universal
Grammar assistance for children. The implication here is that adults do not benefit from
Universal Grammar. Adults will never learn a second grammar. However, this is not
the case because adults are able to learn a second language. Another of his main
arguments for the existence of the Universal Grammar: the argument that every
language has certain essential principles or functions which cannot be acquired through
experience. But the fact is that, with sufficient time and input into the right language
 and environment, adult language learners can learn foreign grammar, sometimes very
well.

3. Chomsky argument no. 3: The irrelevance of intelligence in language learning

In his conception of the ability of the mind, Chomsky argues that language learning
is fundamentally independent of intelligence. he argues that since grammar has a
distinctive form (its own grammatical formula) and it is not a logical form, therefore,
it is not a direct function of rational operating intelligence, but must be a function of
innate linguistic knowledge. Thus, regarding humans he has asserted, 'large differences
in intelligence have only a small effect on the resulting competence [knowledge of a
particular grammar]' (Chomsky, 1967a, p. 3). By this he implies that if intelligence is
relevant to language acquisition, then a more intelligent person should acquire greater
knowledge of language and in less time. But, he claims, smarter people do not acquire
greater competence than less intelligent people. Therefore, Chomsky then concludes
that different levels of intelligence do not affect language acquisition, and that
intelligence itself is irrelevant to language acquisition.
Chomsky claims (without evidence) that people with high or low intelligence
acquire the same grammar. This, he stressed, was because Universal Grammar for
Empiricists would predict that the smarter a person is, the better his grammar will be.
However, there are serious problems with Chomsky's claims. This is the assumption
that a low level of intelligence is not sufficient for mastering grammar. Because, it
could be that low intelligence is enough to master grammar.
After all, people with high and low intelligence (except for disabilities) learn to
drive cars, play cards, and do many other things. Thus, it is possible that although
intelligence is relevant for these tasks, and for language as well, only a low level of
intelligence is required for its mastery; that high degree is very useful. Therefore,
according to our thinking, language acquisition can only be affected if the intelligence
level is too low.
4. Objection no. 4: Simultaneous multilinguals and the problem of multiple settings
on a single parameter
It is generally observed that sometimes in this situation the child in a family learns
two different languages from birth without special difficulty and speaks two languages
fluently by the age of 4 or 5 years. Their mother will speak one language and the father
will speak another. Simultaneous learning has two basic situations in which a child can
learn two (or more) languages at the same time: everyone speaks one language only to
the child (1P-1L), or everyone speaks two different languages to the child (1P-2L).
How does Universal Grammar allow for two different settings on the same parameter?
Is there more than one Universal Grammar in the child's mind? Or, is the mind
duplicating another Universal Grammar for every other language that is to be studied?
Do children have three different Universal Grammars by making two duplicates of
the original? This solution contradicts the UG which has evolved through evolution. If
UG did evolve by evolution, it doesn't make sense that it would develop a process that
could replicate itself. According to Chomsky's definition, UG is universal and can
explain mastery of all languages. And, if it is postulated that there is a dominating
intelligence that regulates what UG should do, by making duplicates, that intelligence
must be stronger than the UG itself. Therefore, UG was not needed in the first place.
(Flynn and Martohardjono (1994) have previously dealt with the problem of bilingual
children and concluded that Chomsky's theory cannot explain this phenomenon.)
 CHAPTER III

CONCLUSION

The origin of where language originates and how humans can analyze, acquire, and learn
language is explained by many philosophers who assume that language is acquired by innate
intelligence or language ideas, or behavior. Based on these three theories intelligence innate nature,
and behavior complement each other. They constrict language perfectly. In all the arguments that
a Universal Grammar does exist, which Chomsky claims, there is no credible evidence to support
it. All of Chomsky's arguments for Universal Grammar prove inadequate
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