Module 2 – Rule of Admissibility

1. Object Evidence

People of the Philippines vs Rullepa

GR No. 131516
March 5, 2003
Facts:
Ronnie Rullepa was charged with rape of a 3 year old before the RTC. Upon arraignment, Rullepa pleaded not guilty.
According to the prosecution, Cyra Mae (rape victim) who was then 3.5 years old told her Mama about Ronnie’s
doing to her, which includes insertion of penis on her anus and mouth. Col. Buenafe and Gloria, parents of Cyra Mae,
confronted Rullepa and the latter readily admitted doing those things to Cyra Mae. The spouses brought Rullepa to
Camp Karingal where he admitted the imputations against him. The defense’s sole witness was Rullepa who denied
having anything to do with the abrasions found in Cyra Mae’s genitalia (abrasion which was reported by Dr. Preyra,
medico-legal officer). RTC found Rullepa guilty beyond reasonable doubt and is sentenced to death.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon Rullepa
Held:
No. The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the
woman is below twelve years of age. The first element, carnal knowledge, had been established beyond reasonable
doubt. The
1. same is true with respect to the second element.

The victim’s age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute an element of the offense. Furthermore, the victim’s
age may constitute a qualifying circumstance, warranting the imposition of the death sentence. Because of the
seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the victims’ age in rape cases, this Court, in
the recently decided case of People v. Pruna, established a set of guidelines in appreciating age as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance, to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years
old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years
old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years
old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives
concerning
the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victims certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents in
evidence. The victim and her mother, however, testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be proved (below
twelve
years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victims age from her appearance. No reasonable
doubt,
therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was below twelve years of age at the
time of the
commission of the offense, is present.
Note:
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age x x x.
x x x.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
x x x.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity with the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
x x x.
4. when the victim is x x x a child below seven (7) years old.

2. Documentary Evidence

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1431 : May 9, 2003

SPO2 JOSE B. YAP, complainant, v. JUDGE AQUILINO A. INOPIQUEZ, JR., respondent.

Before us is the administrative complaint filed by SPO2 Jose B. Yap of Matag-ob, Leyte Police Station
against Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Kananga-Matag-ob,
same province, for grave abuse of authority and acts unbecoming a judge.

In his sworn affidavit-complaint dated July 12, 1999, complainant alleged that on March 6, 1999
(Saturday), pursuant to an alias arrest warrant, he arrested Antonio Laurente, Jr., the accused in Criminal
Case No. 8458 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, pending in the Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) at
Ormoc City.

On the same day, March 6, respondent judge issued an Order of Release 1 on the basis of a cash bond
posted on March 8, 1999, as shown by the corresponding Official Receipt No. 9215725. 2 cräläwvirtualibräry

Also on March 6, respondent judge issued another Order of Release, 3 this time based on a property bond.
This bond was subscribed and sworn to before him on March 10, 1999 (Wednesday) by bondsman Antonio
Laurente, Sr. However, this date was changed to March 6.

Complainant claimed that respondent judge issued the two (2) Orders of Release on March 6, 1999
although there was yet no cash bond or property bond, for actually the cash bond was posted on March 8,
 while the property bond was filed on March 10. Clearly, respondent judge ordered the release of the
accused prematurely. Complainant finally alleged that the accused is the relative of respondents wife.

On October 27, 1999, respondent judge filed his comment. He denied the charges, asserting that the
relationship of his wife to the accused has no bearing to his judicial duties of approving the bail and
issuing the Order of Release. On March 6, 1999, when accused Laurente, Jr. was arrested, his brother
Silverio Laurente and one Salvador Almoroto went to respondents residence and presented O.R. No.
9215725 showing that on that date, a cash bond was posted with the office of respondents Clerk of Court
Servando O. Veloso, Jr. The money in the amount of P18,000.00 belonged to Almoroto. Silverio Laurente
also handed to respondent judge, for his signature, the Order of Release dated March 7, 1999 prepared by
Clerk of Court Veloso. The latter placed the date March 7 instead of March 6 because he thought
respondent judge would only be available on that date.

Also on the same day, March 6, minutes after Silverio Laurente and Almoroto left, Antonio Laurente, Sr.,
accuseds father, and Court Interpreter Pedro M. Beltran arrived. Laurente, Sr. presented to respondent
judge a property bond and an Order of Release, also dated March 6, 1999, both prepared by Beltran.
Respondent judge told them that he had already approved the cash bond and signed the corresponding
Order of Release. However, Laurente, Sr. pleaded to him to approve the property bond in order that the
money utilized as cash bond could be returned to Almoroto to avoid paying interest thereon. After
examining the property bond, respondent judge approved the same and signed another Order of Release.

Respondent judge claimed that O.R. No. 9215725 was actually issued to Almoroto on March 6 after he had
posted the cash bond that same day. Respondent judge insisted though that it was Clerk of Court Veloso
who altered the date appearing thereon, from March 6 to March 8, 1999, since complainant angrily
protested that Veloso should not issue an official receipt dated March 6, 1999 as it was a Saturday, a non-
working day.

In our Resolution dated March 21, 2001, we referred the instant case to Executive Judge Fortunito L. Madrona,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Ormoc City, for investigation, report and recommendation.

In his Report and Recommendation dated September 3, 2001, Executive Judge Madrona found that there is no
substantial basis in the claim of complainant about the alleged anomaly in the issuance of two Orders of
Release by the respondent judge. Thus, Executive Judge Madrona recommended the dismissal of the charges
for lack of merit. Executive Judge Madrona further recommended that respondent judge be reprimanded for
his failure to avoid the appearance of impropriety by exercising proper safeguards in the performance of his
official duties, considering that accused Laurente, Jr. is his relative by affinity. On this point, Executive Judge
Madrona was referring to respondent judges failure to observe Section 11, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, quoted as follows:

Sec. 11. Property bond, how posted. A property bond is an undertaking constituted as lien on the real property
given as security for the amount of the bail. Within ten (10) days after the approval of the bond, the accused
shall cause the annotation of the lien on the certificate of title on file with the Registry of Deeds if the land is
registered, or if unregistered, in the Registration Book on the space provided therefore, in the Registry of
Deeds for the province or city where the land lies, and on the corresponding tax declaration in the office of the
provincial, city and municipal assessor concerned.

Within the same period, the accused shall submit to the court his compliance and his failure to do so shall be
sufficient cause for the cancellation of the property bind and his re-arrest and detention.

It appears that respondent judge did not require the accused to cause the annotation of the lien (property
bond) in the Registration Book of the Registry of Deeds and on the corresponding tax declaration in the office
of the provincial, city or municipal assessor concerned.

Executive Judge Madronas recommendation to dismiss the charges is based on his findings quoted as follows:

(12) On this particular factual issue of the real date of the official receipt for the cash bond, which the
undersigned finds crucial in the overall appreciation of the herein complaint, it is the opinion of the
undersigned that the version of testimony of Mr. Veloso is credible. That is, the date of issuance of the official
receipt was actually March 6, 1999 but that he caused it to change to March 8, 1999 affixing thereon his
counter initial for the reason, according to him, that when complainant went to see him on March 8, he was
protesting to him about the date, and to avoid further argument he did the alteration. For this indiscretion on
Velosos part, he should be made to answer administratively.
xxx

(14) In short, the whole complaint boils down to an appreciation of the factual issues which have been
substantially presented in the foregoing. As to whether there was really cash bond being posted on March 6,
1999 as could be attested to in the official receipt issued therefor and which could validate the first Order of
Release issued by the respondent judge the undersigned finds in the affirmative. It is the words of Mr. Veloso,
the Clerk of Court who issued the official receipt for the cash, bond as against the words of the complainant. In
the absence of strong and convincing evidence to the contrary, the explanation of Mr. Veloso as regards his
official acts had to be given credence as one coming from one whose official duty is presumed to have been
regularly performed. (Sec. 3 (m), Rule 131, Rules of Court)

(15) The factual issue surrounding the date of issuance of the official receipt for the cash bond having been
resolved, there is no substantial basis in the claim of complainant about alleged anomaly in the issuance of the
two Orders of Release by the respondent judge. Complainants basis is reduced only to mere suspicion.

On October 10, 2001, this Court referred Executive Judge Madronas Report and Recommendation to the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA).

In her Report dated March 5, 2002, Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao, adopted the findings of
Executive Judge Madrona but recommended that:

1. The complaint against respondent judge be re-docketed as an administrative case and that he be ordered to
pay a fine of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) for giving unwarranted favor to the accused who is a second
cousin of his wife, by approving the two (2) bail bonds and issuing the two (2) release orders;

2. Clerk of Court Servando O. Veloso, Jr. be directed to explain within thirty days from notice why no
disciplinary sanction should be imposed on him for: a) altering the date of the official receipt of the cash bond;
and (b) failure to cancel the cash bond and the first Order of Release after the approval of the property bond;

3. Interpreter Pedro M. Beltran be ordered to: (a) explain within thirty days from notice why he should not be
administratively sanctioned for preparing and processing bail bonds without the authority of his presiding
judge; and (b) immediately cease and desist from preparing and processing bail bonds unless duly authorized.

In the same Report, Deputy Court Administrator Elepao stated that respondent judge was previously adjudged
guilty of abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law and fined in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) and suspended without pay for three months.4 cräläwvirtualibräry

On May 28, 2002, we issued a Resolution approving respondent judges application for optional retirement in
A.M. No. 10822-RET but directing that his retirement benefits be withheld pending the resolution of the instant
case.

On April 24, 2002, we resolved to (a) re-docket the case as a regular administrative matter; (b) direct Clerk of
Court Veloso and Interpreter Beltran to submit their explanations as recommended by the OCA; and (c)
require the parties to manifest, within twenty (20) days from notice, whether they are submitting the case for
decision on the basis of the pleadings.

On July 22, 2002, respondent judge filed his Manifestation that he is willing to have the case so decided. To
date, or after almost one year, complainant has not yet submitted the required manifestation. Therefore, he is
deemed to have agreed that the case be decided on the basis of the pleadings.

Clerk of Court Veloso and Interpreter Beltran submitted the required explanations.

Clerk of Court Veloso explains that he altered the date of O.R. No. 9215725 from March 6 to March 8, 1999
after complainant went to his office and inquired why it was dated March 6 (Saturday), a non-working day.
Veloso stated that there was nothing wrong in rendering service on a Saturday. However, complainant refused
to listen and continued to berate him. To avoid further arguments, he superimposed 8 over 6. He altered the
date, believing there was nothing irregular in doing so because the cash bond had already been released to the
bondsman and substituted with a property bond.
Beltran states that he has been assisting litigants in the preparation of bail bonds with the knowledge of
respondent judge and Clerk of Court Veloso. He does not charge fees for this service because he believes that
as a court employee, it is his duty to assist anyone who seeks his help. Upon receipt of our April 24, 2002
Resolution, he immediately ceased assisting any litigant in the preparation of bail bonds. He now earnestly
seeks the compassion and understanding of this Court.

On January 10, 2003, Deputy Court Administrator Elepao, submitted a Report reiterating her recommendation
that respondent judge be fined in the amount of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) and recommending further
that Clerk of Court Veloso and Interpreter Beltran be fined in the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00),
each, with a warning that a repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with more severely.

The sole issue for our resolution is whether respondent judge ordered the release of accused Antonio Laurente,
Jr. although the cash or property bond for his temporary liberty had not yet been posted and approved.

Section 14, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that if the accused is
arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed with any
RTC of said place, or, if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or
municipal circuit trial judge therein.

Criminal Case No. 9458 against Antonio Laurente, Jr. was filed with the MTCC of Ormoc City but he was
arrested in Matag-ob, Leyte. Since there was no RTC in Matag-ob, respondent judge, as Presiding Judge of
MCTC, Kananga-Matag-ob, was then authorized under Rule 114 to approve the bail of Antonio Laurente, Jr.
and order his release.

Complainant contends that the cash bond of P18,000.00 was posted by Almoroto not on March 6, 1999, when
the accused was released, but on March 8, 1999 as shown by the corresponding O.R. No. 9215725. 5 cräläwvirtualibräry

To justify the issuance of the Order of Release on March 6, respondent judge would want us to believe that
O.R. No. 9215725 was issued on March 6, not March 8, 1999, the date appearing thereon. In fact, he insisted
that it was Clerk of Court Veloso who altered the date of the O.R. from March 6 to March 8. It can be readily
discerned that respondent judge, in order to cover up his misdeed, even laid the blame on his Clerk of Court
who, out of apparent loyalty to him, admitted having changed the date in order to make it appear that the
cash bond was posted on March 6. Clerk of Court Velosos pretext that he gave in to complainants demand to
avoid further arguments is too flimsy and unworthy of belief.

Relative to the property bond, respondent judge maintains that it was filed also on the same day, March 6,
minutes after Almoroto posted the cash bond. Consequently, he issued the corresponding Order of Release
also on March 6.

We observe that the property bond was subscribed and sworn to by bondsman Antonio Laurente, Sr. before
respondent judge on March 10, 1999 (Wednesday). However, very clear to the naked eye is that 6 was
superimposed on 10th (day of March) to make it appear that the bail was accomplished and filed on March 6.
The jurat positively shows that the property bond, in lieu of the cash bond, was filed, not on March 6, but on
March 10, 1999, or four (4) days after respondent judge issued his second Order of Release on March 6, 1999.

It is a basic rule of evidence that between documentary and oral evidence, the former carries more
weight.6 The cash bond was posted on March 8 (Monday), not on March 6, 1999, as shown by O.R. No.
9215725. The property bond, in substitution of the cash bond, was filed, not on March 6, but on March 10
(Wednesday), as shown by the jurat. Both Orders of Release were issued on March 6 (Saturday). Therefore,
there is no doubt that respondent judge ordered the release of the accused despite the fact that there was yet
no bail filed and approved for his provisional liberty.

That respondent judge issued the release orders prematurely is not difficult to understand. He admitted that
accused Antonio Laurente, Jr. is his wifes relative. And in his desire to help the accused and please his wife, he
would even involve his Clerk of Court and Interpreter. Considering the facts of this case, it is safe to conclude
that they were constrained to comply with his instructions. Hence, they should have been spared from any
administrative sanction.

Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that an accused may
only be released on bail after the corresponding cash or property bond has been properly posted. Respondent
judge violated this Rule when he issued the two Orders of Release on March 6, 1999 in favor of accused
Antonio Laurente, Jr. despite the fact that the corresponding cash or property bond was posted only
thereafter, or on March 8 and March 10, 1999, respectively.

Moreover, records show that upon approval of the property bond filed after the release of the accused,
respondent judge failed to order the cancellation of the cash bond. Neither did he require the accused, within
ten (10) days from the approval of the bond, to cause the annotation of the bail as lien in the Registration
Book of the Registry of Deeds and on the corresponding tax declaration in the office of the provincial, city or
municipal assessor concerned, pursuant to Section 11, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, quoted earlier.

We have held that the exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 7 When the judge himself becomes a transgressor of
any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and
impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself. 8 This Court cannot countenance such act as it
erodes the publics trust in the judiciary.

In the instant case, respondent not only failed to perform his judicial duties in accordance with the rules, he
acted in bad faith. Despite the fact that he ordered the release of a person lawfully arrested even before he
had posted bail, he tried to hide his culpability by altering the dates of the cash bond and property bond. His
actuations constitute gross misconduct which merits sanctions even if he already retired 9 on January 1,
2002.10cräläwvirtualibräry

In Canson vs. Garchitorena,11 this Court explained the concept of gross misconduct, thus:

Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of
justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause (Blacks Law Dictionary,
Fourth Ed., p. 1150). It generally means wrongful, improper, unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose (Words and Phrases, Vol. 27, p. 466, citing Sewell vs. Sharp, La App. 102 So
2d 259, 261). The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent (Ibid., citing State
Ex Rel Asbaugh v. Bahr, 40 N.E. 2d 677, 680, 68 Ohio App. 308). On the other hand, the term gross connotes
something "out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful" (Blacks Law
Dictionary, Fourth Ed., p. 832).

For administrative liability to attach it must be established that the respondent was moved by bad faith,
dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive (Atty. Antonio T. Guerrero v. Hon. Adriano Villamor, AM No. RTJ-
90-483; George Carlos v. Hon. Adriano Villamor, AM No. RTJ-90-617, 25 September 1998). As defined

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it
partakes of the nature of fraud (Spiegel v. Beacon Participation, 8 NE 2nd Series, 895, 1007). It contemplates
a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior
purposes (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166-167). Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate
intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage (Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 287 SCRA 382
[1998], citing Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, 185 SCRA 346 [1990]).

Gross misconduct under Section 8(3), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, is classified as a
serious charge punishable by any of the sanctions provided under Section 11 of the same Rule, thus:

Sec. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations; Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave benefits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6)
months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

 WHEREFORE, Judge AQUILINO A. INOPIQUEZ, JR. is declared GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT and is FINED
in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

a. Original Document Rule

G.R. No. 198799

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner

vs
AMADO M. MENDOZA and MARIA MARCOS VDA. DE MENDOZA, Respondents

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari  is the Decision  dated February 4, 2011 and the
1 2

Resolution  dated August 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. CV No. 91704, which reversed and
3

set aside the Decision  dated May 9, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 87
4

(RTC) in Civil Case No. 1913, and consequently, dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) against respondents Amado M. Mendoza (Amado) and his mother, Maria Marcos vda.
de Mendoza (Maria; collectively, respondents).

The Facts

This case stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money with Application for Writ of Attachment  filed by BPI
5

against respondents before the RTC. BPI alleged that on April 8, 1997, respondents: (a)  opened a foreign
currency savings account with Account No. 0584-0007-08 (US savings account) at BPI-Gapan Branch and
deposited therein the total amount of US$l6,264.00, broken down as follows: US$100.00 in cash and
US$16,164.00 in US Treasury Check with No. 3149-09693369 payable to "Ma. Marcos Vda. de Mendoza"
(subject check); and (b)  placed the amount of US$2,000.00 in a time deposit account. After the lapse of the
thirty (30) day clearing period on May 9 and 13, 1997, respondents withdrew the amount of US$16,244.00 from
the US savings account, leaving only US$20.00 for bank charges.  However, on June 26, 1997, BPI received a
6

notice from its correspondent bank, Bankers Trust Company New York (Bankers Trust), that the subject check
was dishonored due to "amount altered",  as evidenced by (1) an electronic mail (e-mail) advice from Bankers
7

Trust,  and (2) a photocopy of the subject check with a notation "endorsement cancelled" by Bankers Trust  as
8 9

the original copy of the subject check was allegedly confiscated by the government of the United States of
America (US government).  This prompted BPI to inform respondents of such dishonor and to demand
10

reimbursement.  BPI then claimed that: (a)  on July 18, 1997, respondents allowed BPI to apply the proceeds of
11

their time deposit account in the amount ofUS$2,015.00 to their outstanding obligation;  (b)  upon the
12

exhaustion of the said time deposit account, Amado gave BPI a promissory note dated September 8, 1997
containing his promise to pay BPI-Gapan Branch the amount of ₱l,000.00 monthly;  and (c)  when respondents
13

failed to fulfill their obligation despite repeated demands, BPI was constrained to give a final demand letter  to
14

respondents on November 27, 1997. 15

For their part, while respondents admitted the withdrawals and exchanged the same with BPI at the rate of
₱26.l59 per dollar, they did not receive the amount of ₱582,140.00 from the proceeds. Respondents then
maintained that Amado only affixed his signature in the letter dated July 18, 1997 in order to acknowledge its
receipt, but not to give his consent to the application of the proceeds of their time deposit account to their
purported obligations to BPI. According to Amado, he would have been willing to pay BPI, if only the latter
presented proper and authenticated proof of the dishonor of the subject check. However, since the bank failed
to do so, Amado argued that BPI had no cause of action against him and his mother, Maria. 16
 The RTC Ruling

In a Decision  dated May 9, 2007, the RTC ruled in BPI's favor, and accordingly, ordered respondents to
17

pay: (a)  ₱369,600.5l representing the peso equivalent of amounts withdrawn by respondent less the amounts
already recovered by BPI, plus legal interest of 12% per annum reckoned from the time the money was
withdrawn; and (b) 10% of the aforesaid monetary award representing attorney's fees. 18

The RTC found that: (a) BPI duly notified respondents of the dishonor of the subject check, thus, creating an
obligation on the part of the respondents to return the proceeds that they had already withdrawn; and
(b)  Amado unmistakably acknowledged the same by executing a promissory note dated September 8, 1997
promising to pay BPI-Gapan Branch the amount of ₱l,000.00 monthly in connection with such obligation. In this
regard, the RTC opined that since respondents withdrew the money prior to the dishonor and that BPI allowed
such withdrawal by mistake, it is only proper that respondents return the proceeds of the same pursuant to the
principle of solutio indebiti  under Article 2154 of the Civil Code. 19

Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA. 20

The CA Ruling

In a Decision  dated February 4, 2011, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling, and consequently,
21

dismissed BPI's complaint for lack of merit.  It held that BPI failed to prove the dishonor of the subject check,
22

since: (a) the presentation of a mere photocopy of the subject check is in violation of the Best Evidence Rule;
and (b)  the e-mail advice from Bankers

Trust was not properly authenticated in accordance with the Rules on Electronic Evidence as the person who
sent the e-mail advice was neither identified nor presented in court. As such, the CA ordered the dismissal of
the complaint due to BPI's failure to prove its claim against respondents. 23

Dissatisfied, BPI moved for reconsideration,  which was, however, denied in a Resolution  dated August 26,
24 25

2011; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly dismissed BPI's complaint for
sum of money against respondents.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

As a general rule, the Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is limited to the review of pure questions of law. Otherwise stated, a Rule 45 petition does not allow the
review of questions of fact because the Court is not a trier of facts.  Case law provides that "there is a 'question
26

of law' when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on
the other hand, there is a 'question of fact' when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of 'law' or 'fact' is not the
appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the
issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of
fact."  Where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from
27

these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to
each other, the issue is factual.
28
Notably, however, the foregoing general rule admits of several exceptions, such as where the factual findings
of the RTC and the CA are conflicting or contradictory,  which is evident in this case. As such, the Court is
29

constrained to make its own factual findings in order to resolve the issue presented before it.

To recapitulate, the RTC declared that BPI was able to sufficiently establish by preponderance of evidence that
respondents were duly notified of the dishonor of the subject check, rendering them liable to refund what they
had withdrawn from BPI. Pertinently, it hinged its ruling on the pieces of evidence presented during the trial,
namely: the e-mail printout advice from Bankers Trust informing BPI that the subject check was dishonored, the
BPI letters dated June 27, 1997 and July 18, 1997 addressed to respondents, and the subject promissory note
voluntarily executed by Amado. On the contrary, the CA held that respondents were not liable to BPI for its
failure to competently prove the fact of the subject check's dishonor and its subsequent confiscation by the US
government. In this relation, the CA deemed that the printout of the e-mail advice is inadmissible in evidence
for lack of proper authentication pursuant to the Rules on Electronic Evidence.

After a judicious review of the records, including a re-evaluation of the evidence presented by the parties, the
Court is inclined to sustain the findings of the RTC over that of the CA, as will be explained hereunder.

It is settled that in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence
thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendant's.  Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
30

side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term 'greater weight of evidence' or 'greater weight of
credible evidence.'  Succinctly put, it only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than the
31

opposing evidence. 32

Records evince that BPI was able to satisfactorily prove by preponderance of evidence the existence of
respondents' obligation in its favor. Verily, Amado acknowledged its existence and expressed his conformity
thereto when he voluntarily: (a) affixed his signature in the letters dated June 27, 1997  and July 18,
33

1997,  where he acknowledged the dishonor of the subject check, and subsequently, allowed BPI to apply the
34

proceeds of their US time deposit account to partially offset their obligation to the bank; and (b) executed a
Promissory Note  dated September 8, 1997 wherein he undertook to pay BPI in installments of ₱l,000.00 per
35

month until the remaining balance of his obligation is fully paid.

On the other hand, aside from his bare testimony, Amado did not present any corroborative evidence to
support his claim that his performance of the aforesaid voluntary acts was subject to BPI's presentment of the
proper and authenticated proof of the dishonored subject check. Amado's unsubstantiated testimony is self-
serving at the most, and hence, cannot be relied upon.  In fact, the RTC did not lend any credence to Amado's
36

testimony in resolving this case. In this regard, it should be borne in mind that the "findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial judge is in the best position to assess the
credibility of the witnesses, and has the unique opportunity to observe the witness firsthand and note his
demeanor, conduct and attitude under gruelling examination. Absent any showing that the trial court's
calibration of credibility was flawed, the appellate court is bound by its assessment,"  as in this case.
37

Overall, assessing the pieces of evidence presented by BPI as opposed to the self-serving allegations of
respondents, the weight of evidence clearly preponderates in favor of the former. Otherwise stated, BPI has
proven by the required quantum of proof, i.e., preponderance of evidence, respondents' obligation towards it,
and as such, respondents must be made to fulfill the same.

In any event, the CA erred in concluding that BPI failed to prove the dishonor of the subject check by merely
presenting: (a) a photocopy thereof with its dorsal portion stamped "ENDORSEMENT CANCELLED" by
Bankers Trust;  and (b) a print-out of the e-mail advice from Bankers Trust stating that the subject check was
38

returned unpaid because the amount was altered. 39

Anent the subject check, while the Best Evidence Rule under Section 3, Rule 130  of the Rules of Court states
40

that generally, the original copy of the document must be presented whenever the content of the document is
under inquiry, the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as "[w]hen the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror."  In order to fall under the aforesaid
41

exception, it is crucial that the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b)  the loss and
destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the
part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. 
42

In this case, BPI sufficiently complied with the foregoing requisities. First, the existence or due execution of the
subject check was admitted by both parties. Second,  the reason for the non-presentation of the original copy of
the subject check was justifiable as it was confiscated by the US government for being an altered check. The
subject check, being a US Treasury Warrant, is not an ordinary check, and practically speaking, the same
could not be easily obtained. Lastly, absent any proof to the contrary and for the reasons already stated, no
bad faith can be attributed to BPI for its failure to present the original of the subject check. Thus, applying the
exception to the Best Evidence Rule, the presentation of the photocopy of the subject check as secondary
evidence was permissible.

As to the e-mail advice, while it may not have been properly authenticated in accordance with the Rules on
Electronic Evidence, the same was merely corroborative evidence, and thus, its admissibility or inadmissibility
should not diminish the probative value of the other evidence proving respondents' obligation towards BPI,
namely: (a) Amado's voluntary acts of conforming to BPI's letters dated June 27, 1997 and July 18, 1997 and
executing the promissory note to answer for such obligation; and (b) the photocopy of the subject check, which
presentation was justified as falling under the afore-discussed exception to the Best Evidence Rule. As such,
their probative value remains.

Besides, it should be pointed out that respondents did not proffer any objection to the evidence presented by
BPI, as shown by their failure to file their comment or opposition to the latter's formal offer of evidence.  It is
43

well-settled that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may validly be considered by the court in
arriving at its judgment, as what the RTC did in this case, since it was in a better position to assess and weigh
the evidence presented during the trial. 44

In sum, considering that BPI had proven its cause of action by preponderance of evidence, the Court finds the
CA to have erred in dismissing BPI's complaint against respondents. Accordingly, the RTC ruling must be
reinstated, subject to modification in the award of interest imposed on the adjudged amount.

To recount, respondents were ordered by the RTC to pay BPI the amount of ₱369,600.51 representing the
peso equivalent of the amounts withdrawn by respondents less the amounts already recovered by BPI, plus
legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum reckoned from the time the money was withdrawn,  thus, 45

implying that such amount was a loan or a forbearance of money. However, records reveal that BPI's payment
of the proceeds of the subject check was due to a mistaken notion that such check was cleared, when in fact, it
was dishonored due to an alteration in the amount indicated therein. Such payment on the part of BPI to
respondents was clearly made by mistake, giving rise to the quasi-contractual obligation of solutio
indebiti  under Article 2154  in relation to Article 2163  of the Civil Code. Not being a loan or forbearance of
46 47

money, an interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be imposed on the amount to be refunded and on the
damages and attorney's fees awarded, if any, computed from the time of demand until its
satisfaction.  Consequently, respondents must return to BPI the aforesaid amount, with legal interest at the rate
48

of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of extrajudicial demand - or on June 27, 1997, the date when BPI
informed respondents of the dishonor of the subject check and demanded the return of its proceeds - until fully
paid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 4, 2011 and the Resolution dated
August 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91704 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated May 9, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 87 in
Civil Case No. 1913 is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION, adjusting the interest imposed on the amount
ordered to be returned, i.e., ₱369,600.51, to six percent (6%) per annum reckoned from the date of
extrajudicial demand on June 27, 1997, until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
Magdayao vs. People
G.R. No. 152881, August 17, 2004
Engr. Magdayao was indicted for a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing a PNB check (No. 3999967) worth 600k in
favor
of Rocky Olvis which upon presentment, bounced for insufficient funds and despite repeated demands, Magdayao
did not make
good the check’s value. Also subsequent events led to Magdayao offering two other checks P400k and P200k
respectively, in
exchange of the first check. Out of pity, Olvis accepted the replacements and returned the no good check. However,
Magdayao
again failed to make good on his promise and to pay his obligation.
During trial, a photocopy of the first check was marked as Exhibit A. Eventually, the same was offered in evidence
which the court admitted. Due to Magdayao and his counsel’s failure to appear several times, the case was
submitted for
decision. Magdayao insisted on the inadmissibility of the Exhibit for the prosecution’s failure to produce the original
thereof.
The trial court convicted him. CA affirmed such. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: (1) Is the photocopy of the check inadmissible, and hence has no probative value?

HELD: No.
It was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce in evidence the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to prove
the
contents thereof. Section 3, Rule 129 specifically provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of the
document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original thereof. The purpose of the rule requiring the production by the
offeror of
the best evidence is the prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it and
presents
inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the latter evidence is withheld from the court and
the adverse
party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose and defeat. As long as the original
evidence can
be had, the court should not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the
absence of
any clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. Such
photocopies must
be disregarded, being inadmissible evidence and barren of probative weight.
Furthermore, under Section 3(b), Rule 130, secondary evidence of a writing may be admitted when the original is in
the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after
reasonable notice. In fact, in his "Motion to Suspend Proceedings", the petitioner admitted that he received the
original copy of
the dishonored check from the private complainant. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the need for the
production of the
original copy of PNB Check No. 399967, and the fact that the prosecution was able to present in evidence only a
photocopy
 thereof because the original was in his possession.

Heirs of Prodon vs. Heirs of Alvarez

G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013
In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Prodon, the respondents averred as the plaintiffs that their

parents, the late spouses Alvarez, Sr. and Clave, were the registered owners of that parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 84797;

that upon their parents’ deaths, they had continued the possession of the property as heirs, paying the real property
taxes due
thereon; that they could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but the original copy of TCT No.
84797 on file
with the Register of Deeds of Manila was intact; that the original copy contained an entry stating that the property had
been sold
to defendant Prodon subject to the right of repurchase; and that the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon
because the
deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the property did not exist. Prodon claimed that the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. had
executed on September 9, 1975 the deed of sale with right to repurchase; that the deed had been registered with the
Register
of Deeds and duly annotated on the title; that the late Alvarez, Sr. had been granted six months within which to
repurchase the
property; and that she had then become the absolute owner of the property due to its non-repurchase within the
given 6-month
period. During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase
could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila. RTC opined that although the deed itself could not
be presented
as evidence in court, its contents could nevertheless be proved by secondary evidence in accordance with the Rules
of Court,
upon proof of its execution or existence and of the cause of its unavailability being without bad faith. It found that the
defendant
had established the execution and existence of the deed. The RTC concluded that the original copy of the deed of
sale with
right to repurchase had been lost, and that earnest efforts had been exerted to produce it before the court. CA
promulgated its
assailed decision, reversing the RTC.
ISSUE: : Whether or not the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had been complied with.
HELD: Best Evidence Rule was not applicable herein. The court conclude that the CA and the RTC both misapplied
the Best
Evidence Rule to this case, and their misapplication diverted the attention from the decisive issue in this action for
quieting of
title. The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written document the original of the document
must be
produced in court. Verily, if a party is in the possession of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute
inferior
evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes
that its
production would expose and defeat.17 Lastly, the rule protects against misleading inferences resulting from the
intentional or
unintentional introduction of selected portions of a larger set of writing. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only
when the
terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the
existence,
execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such
a case,
secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original. The action for quieting of title may be
based on
the fact that a deed is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may not be
material to an
action for quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. It is not denied that this action does not
involve the
terms or contents of the deed of sale with right to repurchase. In an action for quieting of title based on the
inexistence of a
deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best
Evidence Rule

does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other than the
original document

COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION vs ANTONIO LAGMAN

G.R. No. 165487
PEREZ, J
FACTS: Nelson Santos (Santos) applied for a license with the National Food Authority (NFA) to engage in the
business of storing
not more than 30,000 sacks of palay in his warehouse. Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (Country Bankers)
issued
Warehouse Bond No. 0330 & 02355 (1989 Bonds) through its agent, Antonio Lagman (Lagman). Santos was the
bond principal,
Lagman was the surety and the Republic of the Philippines, through the NFA was the obligee.
In consideration of these issuances, corresponding Indemnity Agreements were executed by Santos, as bond
principal, together
with (Ban Lee Lim), (Reguine) and Lagman, as co-signors. The latter bound themselves jointly and severally liable to
Country
Bankers and to reimburse Country Bankers of whatever amount it may pay or cause to be paid or become liable to
pay thereunder
Santos then secured a loan using his warehouse receipts as collateral. When the loan matured, Santos defaulted in
his
payment. The sacks of palay covered by the warehouse receipts were no longer found in the bonded warehouse. By
virtue of
the surety bonds, Country Bankers was compelled to pay P1,166,750.37.
Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint for a sum of money before the (RTC) of Manila. In his Answer,
Lagman alleged
that the 1989 Bonds were valid only for 1 year from the date of their issuance, as evidenced by receipts; that the
bonds were
never renewed and revived by payment of premiums; that on 5 November 1990, Country Bankers issued Warehouse
Bond No.
03515 (1990 Bond) which was also valid for one year and that no Indemnity Agreement was executed for the
purpose; and that
the 1990 Bond supersedes, cancels, and renders no force and effect the 1989 Bonds. The trial court rendered
judgment declaring
Reguine and Lagman jointly and severally liable to pay Country Bankers. The trial court rationalized that the bonds
remain in

force unless cancelled by the Administrator of the NFA and cannot be unilaterally cancelled by
Lagman.

Lagman anchors his defense on two (2) arguments: 1) the 1989 Bonds have expired and 2) the 1990 Bond novates
the 1989
Bonds.
Country Bankers questions the existence of a third bond, the 1990 Bond, which allegedly cancelled the 1989 Bonds
on the
following grounds: First, Lagman failed to produce the original of the 1990 Bond and no basis has been laid for the
presentation
of secondary evidence; Second, the issuance of the 1990 Bond was not approved and processed by Country
Bankers; Third,
the NFA as bond obligee was not in possession of the 1990 Bond.
ISSUE: Whether a photocopy of a document is admissible as secondary evidence.
HELD: Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be produced whenever its contents are the subject
of
inquiry.[25] The rule is encapsulated in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as follow:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part
of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the
whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable
Section 5,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC.5 When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove
the following:
(1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-
production
in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed. The
correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.
In the case at bar, Lagman mentioned during the direct examination that there are actually four (4) duplicate originals
of the 1990
Bond: the first is kept by the NFA, the second is with the Loan Officer of the NFA in Tarlac, the third is with Country
Bankers and
the fourth was in his possession. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation
for the nonproduction
of the original instrument. When more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not
be used
without accounting for the other originals.
Despite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of these duplicate originals, Lagman merely presented a
photocopy. He
admitted that he kept a copy of the 1990 Bond but he could no longer produce it because he had already severed his
ties with
Country Bankers. However, he did not explain why severance of ties is by itself reason enough for the non-availability
of his copy
of the bond considering that, as it appears from the 1989 Bonds, Lagman himself is a bondsman. Neither did Lagman
explain
why he failed to secure the original from any of the three other custodians he mentioned in his testimony. While he
apparently
was able to find the original with the NFA Loan Officer, he was merely contented with producing its photocopy.
Clearly, Lagman

failed to exert diligent efforts to produce the original.

G.R. No. 222861, April 23, 2018

PO2 JESSIE FLORES Y DE LEON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated August 13, 2015 and Resolution2 dated February
3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36187. The CA affirmed with
modification the May 28, 2013 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 91
(RTC) finding PO2 Jessie Flores y De Leon (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Simple Robbery (extortion) as defined and penalized under Article 294 (5) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).

The Antecedents
On June 29, 2000, petitioner was arrested via an entrapment operation conducted by the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) pursuant to a complaint lodged by
private complainant Roderick France (France). The accusatory portion of the
Information4 dated July 3, 2000 reads:

That on or about the 29th day of June 2000 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused taking advantage of his official position as a member of the Traffic Enforcement
Group, Central Police Traffic Enforcement Office, with intent to gain and by means of
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob Roderick S. France
of P2,000.00 in cash in the following manner, to wit: on June 26, 2000, the driven taxi of
Roderick S. France figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney and the said
accused confiscated his Driver's License then issued a Traffic Violation Receipt indicating
therein his alleged violations and demanded from him the amount of P2,000.00 as a
condition for the return of his Driver's License thus creating fear in the mind of said
Roderick S. France who was compelled to give to the said accused P2,000.00 in cash on
June 29, 2000 to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Petitioner posted a bail bond of P100,000.00 for his conditional release.

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: France, PO2 Aaron Ilao (PO2 Ilao) and
PO2 Richard Menor (PO2 Menor) of the PAOCTF. The defense, on the other hand, presented
petitioner, Robert Pancipanci (Pancipanci) and photographer Toto Ronaldo (Ronaldo) as its
witnesses.

The facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:

xxx. The People's version of the facts are as follows:

On 26 June 2000, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, private complainant France figured
in a vehicular collision with a passenger jeepney at the corner of E. Rodriguez and Aurora
Blvd., Quezon City. Soon thereafter, a traffic enforcer arrived at the vicinity and prepared a
sketch of the incident. Then, France and the jeepney driver proceeded to Station 10,
Kamuning Police Station. At the station, appellant PO2 Flores investigated the incident. The
jeepney driver was told to go home while France was asked to remain at the station. He was
told to return to the station after two days and prepare the amount of P2,000.00 so he can
get back his driver's license. Because France could not raise the said amount in two days,
he was told by PO2 Flores to just return on the third day in the evening because he was on
a night shift duty then. Subsequently, a Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR) No. 1022911 was
issued and signed by PO2 Flores who told France that the same would serve as the latter's
temporary driver's license. France became suspicious as he recalled that on a previous
occasion when his driver's license was confiscated due to a traffic violation the same was
claimed from the office of the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) or City Hall and
not from the officer who confiscated his license.

Sensing that something was not right, France went to the headquarters of the PAOCTF in
Camp Crame to file a complaint against PO2 Flores. Meanwhile, France was asked to provide
the amount of P2,000.00 which he heeded and four (4) 500-peso bills were dusted with
ultraviolet fluorescent powder. Thereafter, France executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay.
Headed by PO2 Ilao, the PAOCTF team proceeded to Station 10, Kamuning Police Station
together with France. When France entered the station, PO2 Flores asked him if he brought
with him the money. After an hour, PO2 Flores called France to his table. He opened a
drawer and told France to drop the money inside. PO2 Flores then counted the money inside
the drawer using his left hand. As soon as France asked for his driver's license, the PAOCTF
team suddenly materialized (sic) at the scene through PO2 Ilao's pre-arranged signal. They
arrested PO2 Flores and confiscated the things inside his drawer including the marked
money. The team subsequently proceeded to Camp Crame where PO2 Flores was turned
over for ultraviolet examination. France was further asked to execute a "Karagdagang
Sinumpaang Salaysay" regarding the incident. PO2 Menor also executed an affidavit in
connection with the incident that lead to the arrest of Flores.

After the People rested its case, the trial court directed PO2 Flores to present his evidence.
To exculpate himself from criminal liability, Flores interposed the defense of denial and
"frame-up". He adduced his own testimony and the testimonies of Robert Pancipanci and
photographer Toto Ronaldo which hewed to the following version of the facts:

On 26 June 2000, PO2 Flores received a report in his office that there was a vehicular
collision in his area of assignment. Upon investigation, PO2 Flores determined that the
accident was due to France's fault. He confiscated the driver's license of France, issued a
citation ticket and told France that he could claim his driver's license from the Quezon City
Redemption Center upon payment of the amount of P2,000.00. On 29 June 2000, PO2
Flores had no idea why France returned to his office in the evening. Because he had to
interview Robert Pancipance at that time, France was told to wait. France was, however,
persistent in giving him the TVR with the enclosed money. On the third attempt, France
convinced him to receive the TVR and money but PO2 Flores refused to receive them. While
PO2 Flores was at the comfort room, France took the chance to place the money inside PO2
Flores' drawer. When PO2 Flores returned, the operatives from the PAOCTF arrested him
and brought him to Camp Crame.6
The Ruling of the RTC

In its May 28, 2013 decision, the RTC found petitioner guilty of simple robbery (extortion).
It ruled that the prosecution established all the elements of the crime beyond reasonable
doubt. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of SIMPLE ROBBERY (Extortion) under Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code
and is hereby sentenced to a penalty of Two (2) Years, Ten (10) Months and Twenty One
(21) Days as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Month and Eleven (11) days as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the RTC's Order 8 dated July
11, 2013.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed before the CA.

In his Brief,9 petitioner averred that the RTC incorrectly convicted him of simple robbery by
giving weight on pieces of evidence in violation of the Best Evidence Rule. He argued that
the prosecution's exhibits were mere photocopies and the original pieces of the marked
money were never even presented. He also assailed the failure of the prosecution to present
the forensic chemist who made the laboratory report which found traces of ultraviolet
powder on his index finger. He further argued that the RTC disregarded the testimonies of
the defense witnesses which clearly showed that he did not extort any money from France.
Moreover, he reiterated that his exoneration from the administrative case arising from the
same set of facts should have been sufficient basis for the dismissal of the criminal case.

The prosecution, thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that all the elements
of the crime charged were adequately established. The OSG further asserted that the
dismissal of the administrative case should not affect the criminal case since only a
summary hearing was conducted for the former while a full blown trial was done for the
latter. It added that the photocopies of the exhibits were sufficient and admissible since
they were public records. It also said in its brief that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were enough to prove the elements of the crime and that the presentation of the
original marked money was no longer necessary.10

The Ruling of the CA

In its decision, the CA denied the appeal. It held that the best evidence rule admits of some
exemptions which were present in this case. It stated that the Complaint Sheet dated June
28, 2000 and Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by France were public records
under the custody of a public officer, hence, the presentation of the photocopies as
evidence, was deemed sufficient. It further held that the said documents were identified by
the private complainant during trial and he attested to the veracity of the contents thereof.
With regard to the photocopy of the TVR, the CA ruled that the same should be admitted
since petitioner himself admitted in his direct testimony that he indeed issued it. As to the
marked money, the CA held that the non-presentation of the original marked money did not
create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as the serial numbers were duly recorded
in the memorandum prepared by the PAOCTF requesting the ultraviolet fluorescent powder
dusting after the entrapment operation. The CA, however, modified the penalty after
appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of authority. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the appeal. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that PO2 Jessie Flores is sentenced to a penalty of Two (2) years, Four (4)
months, and One (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum.

IT IS SO ORDERED.11
Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration,12 petitioner is now before the Court via a
petition for review on certiorari raising the following-
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE

WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION, WHICH AFFIRMED THE RTC
ORDERS, IN THAT:

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS PREROGATIVES WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION, DESPITE THAT IT IS GLARING FROM THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT THE RESPONDENT MISERABLY FAILED TO ESTABLISH HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A PALPABLE MISTAKE WHEN IT UNCEREMONIOUSLY

OVERLOOKED THAT UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT, THE
ISSUE ON THE ALLEGED TAKING OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THIS ACCUSATION CAN
NO LONGER BE RE-LITIGATED IN THIS CRIMINAL ACTION.13
The Court's Ruling

The petition has no merit.

In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of
law may be raised, not issues of fact. The factual findings of the RTC, especially when
affirmed by the CA, are generally binding upon this Court. Though this rule admits of some
exceptions,14 the Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the factual findings of the
lower court, as affirmed by the CA.

The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.

Simple robbery is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, but

the extent of the violation or intimidation does not fall under paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article
294 of the RPC.15 For the successful prosecution of this offense, the following elements must
be established: a) that there is personal property belonging to another; b) that there is
unlawful taking of that property; c) that the taking is with intent to gain; and d) that there
is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. 16

In robbery, there must be an unlawful taking, which is defined as the taking of items
without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things.17 As ruled in a plethora of cases, taking is
considered complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he
did not have the opportunity to dispose of the same.18 Intent to gain or animus lucrandi, on
the other hand, is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking of the personal
property belonging to another.19

In the present case, there is no doubt that the prosecution successfully established all the
elements of the crime charged. France, the private complainant categorically testified that
that petitioner demanded and eventually received from him the amount of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000.00) in exchange for the release of his driver's license. When the marked
money was placed inside petitioner's drawer, who counted it afterwards, he was deemed to
have taken possession of the money. This amount was unlawfully taken by petitioner from
France with intent to gain and through intimidation. As aptly observed by the CA, petitioner
was a police officer assigned as an investigator at the Traffic Sector of Kamuning Police
Station whose main duties and responsibilities included conducting inquiries involving traffic
law violations and making reports of his investigation. While petitioner had the authority to
confiscate the driver's license of traffic violators, nowhere in the law is he authorized to
keep an offender's license and receive any payment for its return.

The Court likewise agrees with the courts a quo that petitioner employed intimidation to
obtain the amount of P2,000.00 from France as the act performed by the latter caused fear
in the mind of the former and hindered the free exercise of his will. In the case of People v.
Alfeche, Jr.,20 the court held:
But what is meant by the word intimidation? It is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as
"unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear". To take, or attempt to take, by
intimidation means "willfully to take, or attempt to take, by putting in fear of bodily harm".
As shown in United States vs. Osorio, material violence is not indispensable for there
to be intimidation, intense fear produced in the mind of the victim which restricts
or hinders the exercise of the will is sufficient. In an appropriate case, the offender
may be liable for either (a) robbery under paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code if the subject matter is personal property and there is intent to gain or animus furandi,
or (b) grave coercion under Article 286 of said Code if such intent does not exist. 21
Here, petitioner confiscated the driver's license of France after figuring in a vehicular
accident. He then issued a TVR but demanded from France the amount of P2,000.00 for the
return of his driver's license. When France could not produce the said amount, petitioner
informed him to return on the evening of June 29, 2000 as he was then on night shift duty.
For France whose daily living depends on his earnings from driving a taxi, the thought of not
having his driver's license back and the possibility that he might not be able to drive a taxi
and earn a living for his family prompted him to give the amount demanded. Petitioner
succeeded in forcing France to choose between parting with his money or have his driver's
license confiscated or cancelled.

Non-presentation of the original pieces of the marked money is not fatal to the cause of the
prosecution.

Petitioner contends that a mere photocopy of the alleged marked money is inadmissible for
not conforming to the basic rules of admissibility. Hence, he must be acquitted for failure of
the prosecution to present the original pieces of marked money which is the property
subject of this criminal offense.

The Court disagrees.

In People v. Tandoy,22 the Court held that the best evidence rule applies only when the
contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether
or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to
or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence
is admissible.23

In this case, the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of
establishing its existence and not its contents. Therefore, other substitute evidence, like a
xerox copy thereof, is admissible without the need of accounting for the original. 24 In
contrast with People v. Dismuke,25 where the accused was acquitted partly because of the
dubious circumstances surrounding the marked money, the existence of the marked money
in the case at bar was never questioned. It was not disputed that the four (4) pieces of
P500 bills which were used as marked money, were produced and thereafter turned over to
the police officer for dusting of fluorescent powder. The serial numbers of these marked
money were duly recorded in the memorandum prepared by the PAOCTF in connection with
the entrapment operation, and the same set of P500 bills bearing similar serial numbers
was reflected in the request for laboratory examination after the conduct of the entrapment
operation. More importantly, these four pieces of P500 bills were positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses during the trial. As such, the absence of the original pieces of the
marked money did not militate against the cause of the prosecution.

Presence of ultraviolet fluorescent powder is not an indispensible evidence to prove receipt

of marked money

Petitioner also assails the failure of the prosecution to produce the forensic chemist who
actually conducted the testing for fluorescent powder. This contention, however, deserves
scant consideration.

The presence of ultraviolet fluorescent powder is not an indispensable evidence to prove

that the appellant received the marked money. Moreover, there is no rule requiring that the
police officers must apply fluorescent powder to the buy-bust money to prove the
commission of the offense. In fact, the failure of the police operatives to use fluorescent
powder on the boodle money is not an indication that the entrapment operation did not take
place.26 Both the courts a quo did not even give much weight on the laboratory report. The
CA instead stressed on the straightforward, candid and categorical testimony of France,
corroborated by PO2 Ilao, as to how petitioner took the money of France in exchange for
the latter's driver's license. The laboratory report is merely a corroborative evidence which
is not material enough to alter the judgment either way.

Testimony in open court is given more weight than statements in affidavits

In his attempt to discredit France, petitioner pointed to the inconsistency of his statements
between his Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay and his testimony in open court,
particularly on how the marked money found its way to his drawer.

The argument fails to convince.

The Court has held that discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in court
will not instantly result in the acquittal of the accused.27

In Kummer v. People,28 the Court explained that:

It is oft repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate. Oftentimes, an
affidavit is incomplete, resulting in its seeming contradiction with the declarant's testimony
in court. Generally, the affiant is asked standard questions, coupled with ready suggestions
intended to elicit answers, that later turn out not to be wholly descriptive of the series of
events as the affiant knows them. Worse, the process of affidavit-taking may sometimes
amount to putting words into the affiant's mouth, thus allowing the whole statement to be
taken out of context.29
Applying these principles to the present case, the Court finds that as between France's
testimony given in open court and the affidavits executed before the PAOCTF, the former
prevails because affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to the
testimony given in court.30

In appreciating the facts of the case, the RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. It found the testimony France to be candid and straightforward, and
his assertions categorical. As we have ruled in a multitude of cases, the trial court judge is
in the best position to make this determination as the judge was the one who personally
heard the witnesses of both parties, as well as observed their demeanor and the manner in
which they testified during trial.31 Since there is no showing that that the RTC overlooked or
misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, We see no
reason to disturb and interfere with its assessment of the facts and credibility of the
witnesses.32

Exoneration in an administrative case does not automatically cause the dismissal of the
criminal case

Lastly, petitioner insists that his exoneration from the administrative case arising out of the
same act is already sufficient basis for his acquittal in the present case based on the
doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment.

We disagree.

It is hornbook doctrine in administrative law that administrative cases are independent from
criminal actions for the same acts or omissions. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge
is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa.33 Given the differences in the
quantum of evidence required, the procedures actually observed, the sanctions imposed, as
well as the objective of the two proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not
necessarily be binding on the other.34 Hence, the exoneration in the administrative case is
not a bar to a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of
the administrative complaint or vice versa.35

The case of Constantino vs. Sandiganbayan,36 which petitioner heavily relies on, finds no
application in the case at bar. In Constantino, the Court dismissed the criminal action due to
his exoneration in the administrative case because the same crucial evidence was presented
and evaluated in both proceedings, and there was a categorical finding that the act from
which the liability was based did not actually exist. It should also be noted that it was the
Court who dismissed the administrative complaint against Constantino and Lindong, and
reversed the ruling of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus:
It may be true that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability as the
purpose of administrative proceedings on the one hand is mainly to protect the public
service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the
other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. However,
the dismissal by the Court of the administrative case against Constantino based on the
same subject matter and after examining the same crucial evidence operates to dismiss the
criminal case because of the precise finding that the act from which liability is anchored
does not exist.37
In the case at bar, the administrative case for grave misconduct38 filed against petitioner
and the present case for simple robbery are separate and distinct cases, and are
independent from each other. The administrative and criminal proceedings may involve
similar facts but each requires a different quantum of evidence.39 In addition, the
administrative proceeding conducted was before the PNP-IAS and was summary in nature.
In contrast, in the instant criminal case, the RTC conducted a full blown trial and the
prosecution was required to proffer proof beyond reasonable doubt to secure petitioner's
conviction. Furthermore, the proceedings included witnesses who were key figures in the
events leading to petitioner's arrest. Witnesses of both parties were cross examined by their
respective counsels creating a clearer picture of what transpired, which allowed the trial
judge to have a better appreciation of the attendant facts and determination of whether the
prosecution proved the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

In fine, the Court is convinced from the evidence on record that the prosecution has
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner with proof
beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt. He must, therefore, suffer the penalty prescribed by
law for abusing his power and blemishing the name of public service.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 13, 2015 Decision and February 3, 2016
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36187 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

b. Rule on Electronic Evidence

G.R. No. 223274, June 19, 2019

RCBC BANKARD SERVICES CORPORATION, PETITIONER, v. MOISES ORACION, JR.
AND EMILY* L. ORACION, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court (Rules) filed by petitioner RCBC Bankard Services Corporation (petitioner) assailing
the Decision2 dated August 13, 2013 (RTC Decision) and the Order3 dated March 1, 2016
(RTC Order) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City (RTC) in Civil Case No.
73756. The RTC Decision affirmed in toto the Decision4 dated September 28, 2012 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig City (MeTC) in Civil Case No. 18629, which
dismissed the complaint of petitioner for lack of preponderance of evidence. 5 The RTC Order
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 6

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

The antecedent facts as gleaned from the MeTC Decision and narrated in the RTC Decision
are straightforward.

Respondents Moises Oracion, Jr. (Moises) and Emily L. Oracion (Emily) (collectively,
respondents) applied for and were granted by petitioner credit card accommodations with
the issuance of a Bankard PESO Mastercard Platinum7 with Account No. 5243-0205-8171-
4007 (credit card) on December 2, 2010.8 Respondents on various dates used the credit
card in purchasing different products but failed to pay petitioner the total amount of
P117,157.98, inclusive of charges and penalties or at least the minimum amount due under
the credit card.9 Petitioner attached to its complaint against respondents "duplicate original"
copies of the Statements of Account from April 17, 2011 to December 15, 2011 10 (SOAs,
Annexes "A", "A-l" to "A-8") and the Credit History Inquiry (Annex "B"). 11 The SOAs bear the
name of Moises as the addressee and the Credit History Inquiry bears the name: "MR
ORACION JR M A" on the top portion.12 Despite the receipt of the SOAs, respondents failed
and refused to comply with their obligation to petitioner under the credit
card.13 Consequently, petitioner sent a written demand letter (dated January 26, 2012,
Annex "C" to the complaint14) to respondents but despite receipt thereof, respondents
refused to comply with their obligation to petitioner.15 Hence, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Sum of Money16 dated February 7, 2012 before the MeTC.17

Acting on the complaint, the MeTC issued summons on March 13, 2012.18 Based on the
return of the summons dated April 12, 2012 of Sheriff III Inocentes P. Villasquez, the
summons was duly effected to respondents through substituted service on April 11,
2012.19 For failure of respondents to file their answer within the required period, the
MeTC motu proprio, pursuant to Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, considered
the case submitted for resolution.20

Ruling of the MeTC

The MeTC, without delving into the merits of the case, dismissed it on the ground that
petitioner, as the plaintiff, failed to discharge the required burden of proof in a civil case,
which is to establish its case by preponderance of evidence.21 The MeTC justified the
dismissal in this wise:
Perusal of the records shows that the signature in the attachments in support of the
[complaint] are mere photocopies, stamp mark22 in the instant case. The Best Evidence Rule
provides that the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its
nature, such as stamp mark, as long as the original evidence can be had. Absent a clear
showing that the original writing has been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced in court;
the photocopies must be disregarded being unworthy of any probative value and being an
inadmissible piece of evidence (PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and LEONILO MARCOS, respondents, G.R. No 127469 2004 Jan 15, 1st
Division).23
The decretal portion of the MeTC Decision dated September 28, 2012 reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of [preponderance of evidence, herein [complaint] is hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.24
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal25 dated December 17, 2012 on the ground that the MeTC
Decision was contrary to the facts and law.26

In its Memorandum for Appellant27 dated February 19, 2012, petitioner argued that what it
attached to the complaint were the "duplicate original copies" and not mere
photocopies.28 Petitioner also argued that:
x x x [if for] unknown reasons or events the said Duplicate Original Copies were no longer
found in the record of the court or that the copy of the Complaint intended for the court,
where these Originals were attached, was not forwarded to the x x x MTC, [petitioner]
respectfully submits that justice and equity dictates that the x x x MTC should have required
[petitioner] to produce or reproduce the same instead of immediately dismissing the case
on that ground alone. In which case, a clarificatory hearing for that purpose is proper. This
is especially true in the present case considering that there were allegations in the
complaint that the Duplicate Original Copies were attached as annexes therein; and that the
x x x MTC motu proprio submitted the case for decision. Not to mention the fact that these
documents are computer generated reports, in which case,  [petitioner] could simply
present another set of printed Duplicate Original Copies for the x x x MTC['s] perusal. 29
Ruling of the RTC

The RTC found petitioner's appeal to be without merit.30 It reasoned out that:
In the instant case, it is up to [petitioner] to prove that the attachments in support of the
complaint are originals and not merely substitutionary in nature. Only after submission of
such original documents can the court delve into the merit of the case.

[Petitioner's] insistence that it attached Duplicate Original Copies of the [SOAs] and the
Credit History Inquiry as Annexes x x x in its complaint is entirely for naught, as such
documents could not be considered as original.

A perusal of the said annexes would show that there is a stamp mark at the bottom right
portion of each page of the said annexes, with the words "DUPLICATE ORIGINAL (signature)
CHARITO O. HAM, Senior Manager, Collection Support Division Head, Collection Group,
Bankard Inc."

Further inspection of the said stamp marks would reveal that the signatures appearing at
the top of the name CHARITO O. HAM in the respective annexes are not original signatures
but are part of the subject stamp marks.

Indeed, Annexes "A", "A-1" to "A-8" and "B", attached to the complaint, cannot be
considered as original documents contemplated under Section 3, Rule 130 of the x x x Rules
of Court. In fact, even [petitioner] found the need to stamp mark them as "DUPLICATE
ORIGINAL" to differentiate them from the original documents.

The Court also noted the fact that [petitioner] filed a MANIFESTATION dated August 9,
2012, attaching therewith as Annexes "A", "A-1" to "A-8" the Duplicate Original Itemized
[SOAs], and as Annex "B" the Credit History Inquiry. Upon examination of these latter
annexes, the Court observed that they are merely photocopies of the annexes attached to
the complaint, but with a mere addition of stamp marks bearing the same inscription as the
first stamp marks. These only demonstrate that whenever [petitioner] describes a document
as "DUPLICATE ORIGINAL", it only refers to a copy of the document and not necessarily the
original thereof. Such substitutionary documents could not be given probative value and are
inadmissible pieces of evidence.31
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision dated August 13, 2013 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding no cogent reason to disturb the Decision of
the [MeTC] dated September 28, 2012, said DECISION is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.32
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration33 dated August 29, 2013, which was denied by
the RTC in its Order34 dated March 1, 2016.

Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition. The Court in its Resolution 35 dated June 27, 2016
required respondents to comment on the Petition and directed the Branch Clerk of Court of
the RTC to elevate the complete records of Civil Case No. 73756, which were subsequently
received by the Court. In view of the returned and unserved copy of the Resolution dated
June 27, 2016, the Court in its Resolution36 dated June 6, 2018 dispensed with respondents'
comment.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. on pure question of law, whether the RTC erred in affirming the MeTC's dismissal of
petitioner's complaint in that pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC), an electronic document is to be regarded as an original
thereof under the Best Evidence Rule and thus, with the presented evidence in "original
duplicate copies," petitioner has preponderantly proven   respondents' unpaid obligation;
and

2.       in any event, invoking the rule that technicalities must yield to substantial justice,
whether petitioner must be afforded the opportunity to rectify its mistake, offer additional
evidence and/or present to the court another set of direct print-outs of the electronic
documents.

The Court's Ruling

On the first issue, petitioner invokes for the first time on appeal the Rules on Electronic
Evidence to justify its position that it has preponderantly proven its claim for unpaid
obligation against respondents because it had attached to its complaint electronic
documents. Petitioner argues that since electronic documents, which are computer-
generated, accurately representing information, data, figures and/or other modes of written
expression, creating or extinguishing a right or obligation, when directly printed out are
considered original reproductions of the same, they are admissible under the Best Evidence
Rule.37 Petitioner explains that since the attachments to its complaint are wholly computer-
generated print-outs which it caused to be reproduced directly from the computer, they
qualify as electronic documents which should be regarded as the equivalent of the original
documents pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence. 38

Procedurally, petitioner cannot adopt a new theory in its appeal before the Court and
abandon its theory in its appeal before the RTC. Pursuant to Section 15, Rule 44 of the
Rules, petitioner may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has
been raised in the court below and is within the issues framed by the parties.

In the Memorandum for Appellant which it filed before the RTC, petitioner did not raise the
Rules on Electronic Evidence to justify that the so-called "duplicate original copies" of the
SOAs and Credit History Inquiry are electronic documents. Rather, it insisted that they were
duplicate original copies, being computer-generated reports, and not mere photocopies or
substitutionary evidence, as found by the MeTC. As observed by the RTC, petitioner even
tried to rectify the attachments (annexes) to its complaint, by filing a Manifestation dated
August 9, 2012 wherein it attached copies of the said annexes. Unfortunately, as observed
by the RTC, the attachments to the said Manifestation "are merely photocopies of the
annexes attached to the complaint, but with a mere addition of stamp marks bearing the
same inscription as the first stamp marks"39that were placed in the annexes to the
complaint. Because petitioner has not raised the electronic document argument before the
RTC, it may no longer be raised nor ruled upon on appeal.

Even in the complaint, petitioner never intimated that it intended the annexes to be
considered as electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence. If such
were petitioner's intention, then it would have laid down in the complaint the basis for their
introduction and admission as electronic documents.

Also, estoppel bars a party from raising issues, which have not been raised in the
proceedings before the lower courts, for the first time on appeal. 40 Clearly, petitioner, by its
acts and representations, is now estopped to claim that the annexes to its complaint are not
duplicate original copies but electronic documents. It is too late in the day for petitioner to
switch theories.

Thus, procedurally, the Court is precluded from resolving the first issue.

Even assuming that the Court brushes aside the above-noted procedural obstacles, the
Court cannot just concede that the pieces of documentary evidence in question are indeed
electronic documents, which according to the Rules on Electronic Evidence are considered
functional equivalent of paper-based documents41 and regarded as the equivalent of original
documents under the Best Evidence Rule if they are print-outs or outputs readable by sight
or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately. 42

For the Court to consider an electronic document as evidence, it must pass the test of
admissibility. According to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "[a]n
electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility
prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner
prescribed by these Rules."

Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence lays down the authentication process of electronic
documents. Section 1 of Rule 5 imposes upon the party seeking to introduce an electronic
document in any legal proceeding the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner
provided therein. Section 2 of Rule 5 sets forth the required proof of authentication:
SEC. 2. Manner of authentication. - Before any private electronic document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following
means:

(a)    by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed
the same;

(b)    by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be

authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were
applied to the document; or

(c)    by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
As to method of proof, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence provides:
SECTION 1. Affidavit of evidence. - All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary
weight of an electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct
personal knowledge of the affiant or based on authentic records. The affidavit must
affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to testify on the matters contained therein.
Evidently, petitioner could not have complied with the Rules on Electronic Evidence because
it failed to authenticate the supposed electronic documents through the required affidavit of
evidence. As earlier pointed out, what petitioner had in mind at the inception (when it filed
the complaint) was to have the annexes admitted as duplicate originals as the term is
understood in relation to paper-based documents. Thus, the annexes or attachments to the
complaint of petitioner are inadmissible as electronic documents, and they cannot be given
any probative value.

Even the section on "Business Records as Exception to the Hearsay Rule" of Rule 8 of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence requires authentication by the custodian or other qualified
witness:
SECTION 1. Inapplicability of the hearsay rule. - A memorandum, report, record or data
compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by electronic, optical
or other similar means at or near the time of or from transmission or supply of information
by a person with knowledge thereof, and kept in the regular course or conduct of a business
activity, and such was the regular practice to make the memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation by electronic, optical or similar means, all of which are shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witnesses, is excepted from the rule on
hearsay evidence.
In the absence of such authentication through the affidavit of the custodian or other
qualified person, the said annexes or attachments cannot be admitted and appreciated as
business records and excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence. Consequently, the
annexes to the complaint fall within the Rule on Hearsay Evidence and are to be excluded
pursuant to Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules.

In fine, both the MeTC and the RTC correctly applied the Best Evidence Rule. They correctly
regarded the annexes to the complaint as mere photocopies of the SOAs and the Credit
History Inquiry, and not necessarily the original thereof. Being substitutionary documents,
they could not be given probative value and are inadmissible based on the Best Evidence
Rule.

The Best Evidence Rule, which requires the presentation of the original document, is
unmistakable:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
(a)    When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b)    When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c)    When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d)   When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office. (2a)43
With respect to paper-based documents, the original of a document, i.e., the original
writing, instrument, deed, paper, inscription, or memorandum, is one the contents of which
are the subject of the inquiry.44 Under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, an electronic
document is regarded as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect
the data accurately.45 As defined, "electronic document" refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically; and it includes digitally
signed documents and any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which
accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. 46 The term
"electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message"47 and
the latter refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or
similar means.48

Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules and Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence
identify the following instances when copies of a document are equally regarded as
originals:
[1] When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with
identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.

[2] When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from
another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded
as originals.49

[3] When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time with
identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or
from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical
reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original,
such copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original. 50
Apparently, "duplicate original copies" or "multiple original copies" wherein two or more
copies are executed at or about the same time with identical contents are contemplated in 1
and 3 above. If the copy is generated after the original is executed, it may be called a
"print-out or output" based on the definition of an electronic document, or a "counterpart"
based on Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.

It is only when the original document is unavailable that secondary evidence may be
allowed pursuant to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules, which provides:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. - When the original document has been lost
or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
Going back to the documents in question, the fact that a stamp with the markings:
DUPLICATE ORIGINAL

(Sgd.)
CHARITO O. HAM
Senior Manager
Collection Support Division Head

Collection group
Bankard Inc.51
was placed at the right bottom of each page of the SOAs and the Credit History Inquiry did
not make them "duplicate original copies" as described above. The necessary allegations
to qualify them as "duplicate original copies" must be stated in the complaint and duly
supported by the pertinent affidavit of the qualified person.

The Court observes that based on the records of the case, only the signature in the stamp
at the bottom of the Credit History Inquiry appears to be original. The signatures of the
"certifying" person in the SOAs are not original but part of the stamp. Thus, even if all the
signatures of Charito O. Ham, Senior Manager, Collection Support Division Head of
petitioner's Collection Group are original, the required authentication so that the annexes to
the complaint can be considered as "duplicate original copies" will still be lacking.

If petitioner intended the annexes to the complaint as electronic documents, then the
proper allegations should have been made in the complaint and the required proof of
authentication as "print-outs", "outputs" or "counterparts" should have been complied with.

The Court is aware that the instant case was considered to be governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, which does not expressly require that the affidavits of the witness
must accompany the complaint or the answer and it is only after the receipt of the order in
connection with the preliminary conference and within 10 days therefrom, wherein the
parties are required to submit the affidavits of the parties' witnesses and other evidence on
the factual issues defined in   the order, together with their position papers setting forth the
law and the facts relied upon by them.52

Given the nature of the documents that petitioner needed to adduce in order to prove its
cause of action, it would have been prudent on the part of its lawyer, to make the necessary
allegations in the complaint and attach thereto the required accompanying affidavits to lay
the foundation for their admission as evidence in conformity with the Best Evidence Rule.

This prudent or cautionary action may avert a dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence, as what happened in this case, when the court acts pursuant to Section 6 of the
Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides:
SEC. 6. Effect of failure to answer. — Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint
within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall
render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to
what is prayed for therein: Provided, however, That the court may in its discretion reduce
the amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise
unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants.
As provided in the said Section, the judgment that is to be rendered is that which is
"warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint" and such facts must be duly established in
accordance with the Rules on Evidence.

Upon a perusal of the items in the SOAs, the claim of petitioner against respondents is less
than P100,000.00,53  if the late charges and interest charges are deducted from the total
claim of P117,157.98. Given that the action filed by petitioner is for payment of money
where the value of the claim does not exceed P100,000.00 (the jurisdictional amount when
the complaint was filed in January 2013), exclusive of interest and costs, petitioner could
have opted to prosecute its cause under the Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims
Cases (Revised Rules for Small Claims).

Section 6 of the Revised Rules for Small Claims provides: "A small claims action is
commenced by filing with the court an accomplished and verified Statement of Claim (Form
1-SCC) in duplicate, accompanied by a Certification Against Forum Shopping, Splitting a
Single Cause of Action, and Multiplicity of Suits (Form 1-A-SCC), and two (2) duly certified
photocopies of the actionable document/s subject of the claim, as well as the affidavits of
witnesses and other evidence to support the claim. No evidence shall be allowed during the
hearing which was not attached to or submitted together with the Statement of Claim,
unless good cause is shown for the admission of additional evidence."

If petitioner took this option, then it would have been incumbent upon it to attach to its
Statement of Claim even the affidavits of its witnesses. If that was the option that petitioner
took, then maybe its complaint might not have been dismissed for lack of preponderance of
evidence. Unfortunately, petitioner included the late and interest charges in its claim and
prosecuted its cause under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Proceeding to the second issue, petitioner begs for the relaxation of the application of the
Rules on Evidence and seeks the Court's equity jurisdiction.

Firstly, petitioner cannot, on one hand, seek the review of its case by the Court on a pure
question of law and afterward, plead that the Court, on equitable grounds, grant its Petition,
nonetheless. For the Court to exercise its equity jurisdiction, certain facts must be
presented to justify the same. A review on a pure question of law necessarily negates the
review of facts.

Petitioner has not presented any compelling equitable arguments to persuade the Court to
relax the application of elementary evidentiary rules in its cause.

Secondly, petitioner has not been candid in admitting its error as pointed out by both the
MeTC and the RTC. After being apprised that the annexes to its complaint do not conform to
the Best Evidence Rule, petitioner did not make any effort to comply so that the lower
courts could have considered its claim. Rather, it persisted in insisting that the annexes are
compliant. Even before the Court, petitioner did not even attach such documents
which would convince the Court that petitioner could adduce the original
documents as required by the Best Evidence Rule to prove its claim against
respondents.

A Final Note

The present Petition is clearly a frivolous appeal. An appeal is frivolous if it presents no

justiciable question and is so readily recognizable as devoid of any merit on the face of the
record that there is little, if any, prospect that it can ever succeed. 54 The Petition indubitably
shows the counsel's frantic search for any ground to resuscitate petitioner's lost cause,
which due to the counsel's fault was doomed with the filing of a deficient complaint. 55 Thus,
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 142 of the Rules the imposition of treble costs on petitioner, to
be paid by its counsel, is justified.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated August 13, 2013 and the
Order dated March 1, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City in Civil Case
No. 73756 are AFFIRMED. Treble costs are hereby charged against the counsel for
petitioner RCBC Bankard Services Corporation. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
the personal records of Atty. Xerxes E. Cortel in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

NPC v HON. RAMON CODILLA, JR.

GR 170491 | 4 April 2007
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS: M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private respondent Bangpai Shipping,
Co.,
allegedly bumped and damaged petitioners Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the Cebu International Port.
Thus, on
26 April 1996,
Petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for
the alleged
damages caused on petitioners power barges when M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and
operated by private
respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioners Power Barge 209.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence consisting of Exhibits A
to V
together with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem
Shipping,
Inc. filed their respective objections to petitioners formal offer of evidence.
Public respondent judge issued the assailed order denying the admission and excluding from the records petitioners
Exhibits
A, C, D, E, H and its sub- markings, I, J and its sub-markings, K, L, M and its sub-markings, N and its sub-markings,
O, P and
its sub-markings, Q and its sub-markings, R and S and its sub-markings holding that Xerox copies do not constitute
the electronic
evidence defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the appellate
court, the
photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic evidence based on its own premise
that an
electronic document as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited to
information that
is received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically. Rather, petitioner maintains that an electronic document
can also
refer to other modes of written expression that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the
sections
catch-all proviso: any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means.
ISSUE: Are the photocopies considered electronic evidence?
HELD: NO, they are not. What differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by
which the
information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the
contents therein,
such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced
electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as
information electronically received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these
paper
printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined
in the
Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus
declared that
the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be
considered
as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in denying admission and excluding from the records
petitioners
Exhibits A, C, D, E, H and its sub-markings, I, J and its sub-markings, K, L, M and its sub-markings, N and its sub-
markings, O,
P and its sub- markings, Q and its sub-markings, and R. The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as
they violate
the best evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence. Before the
onset of liberal
rules of discovery, and modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence rule was designed to guard against
incomplete
or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and the withholding of the originals. But the modern
justification for the
rule has expanded from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law. The
importance
of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence
of the
terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule.
Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of
which is the
subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been
lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court; (b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the
evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original is a record or other document
in the
custody of a public officer; (d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is
made
evidence by law; (e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole."
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution
or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of
its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The offeror of
secondary evidence
is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of
the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents;
(b) the
proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or
destruction of the
original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the
document
in the proper place or places.
However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed
to establish
that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted rule.
Accordingly, we find
no error in the Order of the court a quo denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary
evidence.
Petition is denied.

MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN

G.R. No. 203302 | 11 April 2013
Bersamin, J.

FACTS: In the 2010 Local Elections for Mayor of Imus, Cavite, COMELEC declared Homer Saquilayan as the
winner, but
Emmanuel Maliksi filed an election protest. The RTC thereafter granted the protest and order Saquilayan to cease
and desist
from performing the functions as Mayor. COMELEC First Division then decided to conduct a recount of votes using
the printout
of ballot images from the CF cards. After the recount, the COMELEC nullified the RTC ruling and reinstated
Saquilayan as the
winner. Maliksi filed his MR, contending that he was denied due process as he had not been notified of the
decryption
proceedings; and that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been
unwarranted
because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved. COMELEC En Banc
decided to deny
the MR.
In a petition for certiorari with the SC, the Court likewise denied the same, pronouncing that the First Division did not
abuse its
discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot
images
were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same evidentiary value as the official ballots
under the
Rule on Electronic Evidence.
ISSUE: Did the Supreme Court err in upholding the COMELEC First Division’s ruling to dispense with the physical
ballots and
resort to their digital images, in an alleged contravention to the best evidence rule?
RULING: YES, it did. Indeed, the picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the
equivalents
of the original official ballots themselves. Both the official ballot and its picture image are considered "original
documents," and
are thus given equal probative weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as
weightier than
the other.
However, this does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally
resort to the
printouts of the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to the parties. Despite
the equal
probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision of
ballots
adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the
voters’ will. In
that regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost
or their
integrity has been compromised.

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION v SSANGYONG CORPORATION

G.R. No. 170633 | October 17, 2007
Nachura, J.
FACTS: Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo, Manila, is engaged in
the
business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation
(Ssangyong),
an international trading company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City,
Philippines.
The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions.
Ssangyong would
send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its
representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax.

The petitioner and the respondent agreed on the sale and purchase of 220MT of stainless steel at US$1,860.00 per
MT. This
initial contract was perfected. Later, as petitioner asked for several extensions to pay, adjustments in the delivery
dates, and
discounts in the price as originally agreed, the parties slightly varied the terms of their contract, without necessarily
novating it,
to the effect that the original order was reduced to 200MT, split into two deliveries, and the price discounted to
US$1,700 per
MT. Petitioner, however, paid only half of its obligation and failed to open an L/C for the other 100MT. Thus,
respondent filed a
civil action for damages due to breach of contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before
the RTC
Makati.
After Ssangyong rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that the photocopies of the pro
forma invoices
presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in
evidence and
do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best evidence the original fax
transmittal.
The court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence presented had already been admitted in the
December
16, 2002 Order and their admissibility finds support in RA 8792. Considering that both testimonial and documentary
evidence
tended to substantiate the material allegations in the complaint, Ssangyong's evidence sufficed for purposes of a
prima facie
case.
Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the copies of the said pro-forma invoices submitted by the appellee are admissible in
evidence,
although they are mere electronic facsimile printouts of appellant's orders. Such facsimile printouts are considered
Electronic
Documents under the New Rules on Electronic Evidence, which came into effect on August 1, 2001. (Rule 2, Section
1 [h], A.M.
No. 01-7-01-SC).
ISSUE: Is an original printout of a facsimile transmission an electronic data message or electronic document, and
ultimately,
are the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions electronic evidence and admissible as such?
HELD:
NO, it is not. The terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic
Commerce Act
of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as
electronic
evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as
electronic
evidence.
Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and cannot be
considered as
electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such fax transmission not electronic
evidence. In the
present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2- POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"),
which are
mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial
and the
appellate courts.."
Nevertheless, despite the pro forma invoices not being electronic evidence, the court found that the respondent has
proven by
preponderance of evidence the existence of a perfected contract of sale.

c. Parol Evidence rule

EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. CAMERON GRANVILLE
G.R. NO. 204700

OVEMBER 24, 2014

FACTS:
For resolution is respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.'s motion for reconsideration of the
Supreme Court’s
decision, which reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals' resolutions and ordered respondent to produce the
Loan Sale and
Purchase Agreement (LSPA), including its annexes and/or attachments, if any, in order that petitioners may inspect
or photocopy
the same.
Respondent contends that the production of the LSPA will violate the parol evidence rule under Rule 130, Section 9
of the Rules
of Court.
For their part, petitioners counter that the parol evidence rule is not applicable to them because they were not parties
to the deed
of assignment, and "they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the Deed of
Assignment." Besides, the deed of assignment made express reference to the LSPA, hence, the latter cannot be
considered as
extrinsic to it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the production of the LSPA will violate the parol evidence rule.
RULING:
The parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the deed of assignment and do not base
a claim on
it. Hence, they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the deed of
assignment.
Even assuming that Rule 130, Section 9 is applicable, an exception to the rule under the second paragraph is when
the party
puts in issue the validity of the written agreement, as in the case a quo. Besides, what is forbidden under the parol
evidence rule
is the presentation of oral or extrinsic evidence, not those expressly referred to in the written agreement. "Documents
can be
read together when one refers to the other." By the express terms of the deed of assignment, it is clear that the deed
of assignment
was meant to be read in conjunction with the LSPA.

SPS AMONCIO VS BENEDICTO

GR NO. 171707

FACTS: Wilfredo and Angela Amoncio entered into a contract of lease with a certain Ernesto Garcia over a 120 sq.
m. portion
of their property in Quezon City. The spouses then entered into another contract of lease, this time with Aaron Go
Benedicto
over a 240 sq. m. portion of the same property.
The Amoncio spouses allege that Benedicto stopped paying his monthly rentals and shortly thereafter, discovered
that Benedicto
was putting up improvements on another 120 sq. m. portion of the property that is not being leased to either him or
Garcia. It
was also alleged that after Garcia vacated his portion, Benedicto occupied it as well. After repeated demands asking
him to
vacate, pay arrears and desist from the construction, the spouses rescinded the contract and filed with the RTC of
Quezon City
a case for recovery of possession of real property against Benedicto.
In his answer, Benedicto denied the accusation of the spouses and alleged that it was the them who owed him as
there was
allegedly an agreement between them to construct five commercial buildings on the property wherein Garcia with
occupy one
building and the spouses and Benedicto would occupy 2 buildings each.
The RTC gave credence on Benedicto’s version and dismissed the case for lack of factual and legal basis. One of
the arguments
of the Amoncio spouses is that the RTC disregarded the parol evidence rule which disallowed the court from looking
into any
other evidence relating to the agreement of the parties outside the written contract between them.
The CA, in affirming the RTC decision, stated that the rule on parol evidence could no longer apply after they failed to
object to
Benedicto’s testimony about their agreement regarding the construction of the buildings.
ISSUE:
Can the PER be applied in this case?
HELD:
NO. The so-called “parol evidence” forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by
testimony
purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other terms were orally agreed on by the parties.
Under such
rule, the terms of the written contract are conclusive upon the parties and evidence aliunde is inadmissible to vary an
enforceable
agreement embodied in the document.
However, where a party entitled to the benefit of the parol evidence rule allows such evidence to be received without
objection,
he cannot, after the trial has closed and the case has been decided against him, invoke the rule in order to secure a
reversal of
the judgment.
Petitioners failed to make a timely objection and to dispute the fact that Aaron undertook the construction of the
buildings.
Evidence further disclosed that the building permit issued by the Building Official bore the signature of petitioner
Wilfredo
Amoncio. Hence, by failing to object to respondent’s testimony in the trial court, petitioners waived the protection of
the parol
evidence rule.

d. Testimonial Evidence
i. Qualification to be a Witness
-Child witness Rule

PEOPLE VS. GLORIA UMALI

G.R. NO. 84450
4 FEBRUARY 1991
FACTS:
Pierre Pangan a minor was investigated by Pat. Felino Noguerra for drug dependency and for an alleged crime of
robbery. In
the course of the investigation, the policemen discovered that Pierre Pangan was capable of committing crime
against property,
only if under the influence of marijuana.
To determine the source of marijuana being sold to the minors in Tiaong, Quezon, the police sought the help of the
detained
accused Francisco Manalo. He charged with the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts, concealment of deadly
weapon, and
other crimes against property.
The police gave Manalo some marked money to buy marijuana from sources known to him. The instruction was for
Manalo to
act as a poseur-buyer and bring back the prohibited drug purchased by him to the police headquarters. After the
purchase,
Manalo returned with 2 foils of dried marijuana which he allegedly bought from the accused Gloria Umali.
In the criminal trial of Umali, the prosecution presented Manalo as its witness. He testified on the circumstances
regarding his
purchase of marijuana from Umali.
Based on Manalo’s testimony, among others, the trial court found Umali guilty for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, i.e. sale
of illegal drugs.
On appeal, Umali alleges that Manalo is not reputed to be trustworthy and reliable and that his words should not be
taken on its
face value. Furthermore, she stressed that said witness has several charges in court and because of his desire to
have some of
his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood.
ISSUE:
Is a witness facing several criminal charges disqualified from testifying in court?

HELD:
NO. The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" under Sec. 20 of Rule 130 takes into
account Article
821 of the Civil Code which states that persons "convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony"
are
disqualified from being witnesses to a will.”
Manalo has not been convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness. The fact that
Manalo is
facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness.
The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence that he was actuated by
improper
motive. Hence, in the absence of any evidence that Manalo was actuated by improper motive, his testimony must be
accorded
full credence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDWIN ALEMAN

G.R. NO. 181539
JULY 24, 2013
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Edwin Aleman appeals from the Decision which found him guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide.
The prosecution’s case against accused-appellant hinges on the following eyewitness account of Mark Almodovar:
Mark went out of his house to play ball in the basketball court. He walked to the basketball court, played and at about
9:00
o’clock, he stopped playing as he then felt like urinating. He went to a place near the basketball court where there
were five cars
parked. While urinating, he saw a fat man walking towards a car. The fat man was talking on his cellular phone. He
then noticed
two men following the fat man, who entered a parked car. The two male persons who were then following the fat man
then
separated: one went to the left side of the fat man’s car and stood by the door at the driver’s side of the vehicle.
While the other
positioned himself by the door at the opposite side of the car. Mark made a diagram, rectangular shape and two
circles on both
sides, depicting the car and the positions of the two men. The man who stood by the door at the driver’s side had a
knife while
his companion was armed with a gun. He then witnessed the man with the knife in his hand stabbing the fat man
repeatedly on
different parts of his body, while the man with the gun fired once.
After taking the fat man’s personal belongings, including his ring, watch, wallet and cellular phone, the two men left.
He followed
them to a place which he described as far and there, he saw them buried the knife and covered it with soil. He made
a drawing representing the place where he followed them. After burying the knife in the ground, the men left and he
followed them again to
a place which he described as near. While thereat, he saw one of the culprits uncovered his face. He recognized him
as the
person who went to the left side of the car and stabbed the victim who was later on identified as the accused Edwin
Aleman.
After which, the two men left. He decided not to follow them and went home instead. It was about 11:00 o’clock in the
evening
when he arrived home. After waking up at 8:00 o’clock the following morning, he returned to the scene of the
incident. There
were many people gathered in the area, including policemen. He saw a chubby girl and requested her to call the
policemen. He
rode in a car with the police officers and the chubby girl. They went to a house in a far place, but no one was there.
He recognized
and identified the face of the fat man depicted in the picture shown to him.
Mark was 14 years old when he testified. He is a deaf-mute. He was assisted in his testimony by Daniel Catinguil, a
licensed
sign language interpreter from the Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf who has been teaching in the
Philippine School
for the Deaf since 1990. Catinguil had also completed a five-year course at the Philippine Normal University with a
degree in
teaching special education children.
Accused-appellant interposed denial and alibi as his defenses. He claimed that, at the time the incident happened on
February
10, 2003, he was at the billiards hall which was a 15-minute walk from his residence.
The trial court rejected the defenses of accused-appellant for their inherent weakness and implausibility. Accused-
appellant
appealed his case to the Court of Appeals. His claim was four-pronged, all aimed at discrediting the eyewitness,
Mark.
Accused-appellant questioned the qualification of Mark to be a witness. Accused-appellant argued that, being a deaf-
mute who
cannot make known his perception to others as he has no formal education on sign language.
Court of Appeals held that the contentions of accused-appellant lacked merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mark, being deaf-mute, can be a credible witness.
RULING.
Yes. The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to be a witness. The rule is that “all
persons who
can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.” A deaf-mute may not
be able to
hear and speak but his/her other senses, such as his/her sense of sight, remain functional and allow him/her to make
observations about his/her environment and experiences. The inability to hear and speak may prevent a deaf-mute
from
communicating orally with others but he/she may still communicate with others in writing or through signs and
symbols and, as
in this case, sketches. Thus, a deaf-mute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she has the faculty to make
observations
and he/she can make those observations known to others.
Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they
1. Can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath;
2. Can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and
3. Can communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter.
In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found that Mark understood and appreciated the sanctity of an
oath and that
he comprehended the facts he testified on.
Mark communicated his ideas with the help of Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter from the Philippine
Registry of
Interpreters for the Deaf who has been teaching in the Philippine School for the Deaf since 1990 and possessed
special education
and training for interpreting sign language. The trial and the appellate courts found Catinguil qualified to act as
interpreter for
Mark. No ground to disturb that finding exists.

PEOPLE VS. BUSTOS AND MACASPAC

G.R. NO. L-27200
JANUARY 20, 1928
FACTS:
In the afternoon of October 24, 1925, while trying to determine the boundaries of the lands they respectively occupy,
accused
Francisco Bustos and Angel del Castillo (del Castillo) engaged in a dispute, due to which Bustos grabbed del Castillo
by the
neck. A certain Mariano Montemayor and accused Mariano Macaspac hurried to the scene to separate the two.
Bustos then left
the scene accompanied by Macaspac.
Lareana Yumul, wife of del Castillo and who was also present when the incident happened, went home ahead of her
husband.
Upon approaching their house, she heard the desperate cries of her deaf-mute daughter, Soledad Encarnacion.
Going in the
direction pointed out by her daughter, Laureana came upon her son Felipe del Castillo (Felipe) stretched out on the
ground and
wounded. Felipe told Laureana that it was Bustos and Macaspac who attacked him. Felipe died moments later. The
autopsy
disclosed that Felipe incurred sharp wounds on the left arm and a penetrating wound on the abdomen.
Bustos and Macaspac was charged with the crime of homicide. At the trial, Laureana and Soledad testified for the
prosecution.
Laureana testified that when she arrived at the place pointed out by Soledad, she found Felipe on the ground and
wounded, that
at that moment Felipe told her that Bustos and Macaspac attacked and stabbed him, that a few moments later Felipe
died, and
that the authorities arrived later on but by that time Felipe was already dead. The defense impeached the veracity of
the testimony
of Laureana by the testimony of the municipal president, Nicanor Garcia, and Cristino Basay, who testified that they
were first to
arrive at the scene and that Laureana then approached them and then asked them what had happened and who had
killed
Felipe. Laureana Yumul denied asking such questions. Soledad’s testimony was made with the help of an interpreter.
The trial
court covicted the two accused of the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of Bustos and Macaspac has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
YES.
The Court held that the trial court correctly found Laureana’s testimony more credible. However, Soledad’s testimony
should not
have been admitted. Her testimony was interpreted by a teacher from a deaf and dumb school who had never taught
the witness,
nor had Soledad ever been to such a school. While it is true that modern pedagogy has made tremendous strides in
the instruction
and education of persons so afflicted, even to the extent of enabling the blind to read by means of the sense of touch
and deafmutes
to receive instruction through conventional signs and objects, nevertheless, with respect to deaf-mutes, it is
necessary
that he who is to communicate with them know the meaning of their signs, either from having had them taught to him,
or from
having acquired a knowledge of them through frequent contact with the same. Without these circumstances, although
it is
possible to guess part of what deaf-mutes mean by their signs even without having had much to do with them, still
much of what
they wish to say escapes us, and in our eagerness to understand them, we resort to enjecture. It will be seen how
dangerous
then in such a procedure to arrive at the truth, and above all when the life and liberty of an accused man are at stake.
This was
shown in the present case, in which during the course of interpretation, there were times when the interpreter could
not make
out what the witness meant by such signs as she uses, and this is due to the fact that the deaf-mute had never been
a pupil of
the interpreter, nor had the latter previously had anything to do with the former, such as would have given her an
opportunity to
acquire some knowledge of the meaning of the signs the deaf-mute used. In view of this, it would not be prudent to
admit the
deaf-mute's testimony as interpreted by the teacher.
Nonetheless, the Court affirmed the trial Court’s conviction of the two accused of the crime of homicide only with a
modification
of the penalty imposed.

ii. Marital Disqualifiaction Rule

MAXIMO ALVAREZ VS. SUSAN RAMIREZ

G.R. NO. 143439
OCTOBER 14, 2005
FACTS:
The petitioner went to the house of his sister-in-law, Susan Ramirez, poured gasoline, and set the house ablaze. His
wife,
Esperanza Alvarez was inside the house during the incident and saw him pour the gasoline. Susan Ramirez filed a
criminal case
in RTC Branch 72, Malabon City against the petitioner for Arson. The private prosecutor called Esperanza to the
witness stand
as a witness against her husband, to which she testified that petitioner committed the acts of Arson. The petitioner
filed a motion
to disqualify Esperanza from testifying pursuant to Sec. 22, Rule 130. The trial court issued an order disqualifying her
and deleting
her testimony from the records. Thus, Susan Ramirez filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals with
application for
preliminary injunction and TRO. The CA granted the petition.

ISSUE:
May Esperanza testify against her husband?
HELD:
Yes. Sec. 22 provides:
"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their marriage, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants."
The Court ruled that while the circumstances do not expressly fall under the exceptions, since the crime of arson was
committed
against the sister of Esperanza, notice must be given to the reasons behind the rule:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the
risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness;
and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse
through the hostile testimony of the other.
Thus: ‘The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the rule that any
offense
remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that,
when an offense
directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the
statute that one shall not
be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against the other.’"
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife
Esperanza.
His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life
such as trust,
confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
"The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well that
his wife was
there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of
marital
relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of directly
and vitally
impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations between her and the
accusedhusband
have become so strained that there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court
has
held that in such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which
the law
aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. It
should be
stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship between petitioner and
his wife
was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the
evidence and facts
presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the
State aims
to protect.

PEOPLE VS. QUIDATO

G.R. NO. 117401
OCTOBER 1, 1998

FACTS:
Quidato, Jr., along with the brothers Reynaldo and Eddie Malita, was charged for parricide for the murder of
Bernardo Quidato,
Sr. The accused-appellant, and the brothes as hired hands, accompanied Bernardo to Davao City to sell 41 sacks of
copra. After
selling the copra and being paid, the three retreated back to the brother’s house and drank tuba. Gina Quidato then
overheard
that the three planned to go to her father-in-law’s house to get money from the latter. This was presented in direct
testimony
against Quidato, Jr. and the brothers. Ultimately, Bernardo was hacked to death by the three. Nevertheless, Quidato
Jr. averred
that he had no participation in the crime, and was merely coerced by the brothers to accompany the two to his
father’s house.
During trial, the accused-appellant objected to his wife’s testimony pursuant to Section 22 of Rule 130. The trial court
acknowledge the applicability of the ruled, yet allowing the testimony as against the brothers as co-accused.
ISSUE:
May the testimony be admitted as against the co-accused?
HELD:
Yes. As correctly observed by the court a quo, the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not
precluding the wife
from testifying when it involves other parties or accused. Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case
against Reynaldo
and Eddie, which was jointly tried with accused-appellant's case. This testimony cannot, however, be used against
accusedappellant
directly or through the guise of taking judicial notice of the proceedings in the murder case without violating the
marital
disqualification rule. "What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly" is a rule familiar even to law students.
Thus, with
regard to Gina Quidato's testimony, the same must also be disregarded, accused-appellant having timely objected
thereto under
the marital disqualification rule.

PEOPLE VS. ROBERTO PANSENSOY

G.R. NO. 140634
SEPTEMBER 12, 2002
FACTS:
Roberto Pasensoy is charged with the crime of murder for the death of Hilario Reyes. As witness for the prosecution,
Analie
Pasensoy – Roberto’s wife – testified that he went to the house of Hilario in Antipolo Rizal where she was currently
living in.
Upon opening the door, Analie saw that Roberto was carrying a gun, and thus embraced him in a failed attempt to
wrest the gun
away from him. Afterwards, Hilario went outside the house and confronted Roberto. Appellant approached Hilario
and asked
him if he really loves his wife. Hilario answered in the affirmative. Appellant next asked Hilario if he was still
single.Hilario
answered yes. Appellant counted one to three and at the count of three shot Hilario. Hilario was hit on the forehead
and sprawled
on the ground.
However, Roberto Pasensyo averred that his killing Hilario was an act of self-defense. The appellant kicked the door
of the room
and there he found his wife and Tisoy lying beside each other. They were only clad in their underwear. He dragged
his wife out
of the room by her hair and while doing so, he saw Tisoy pull a gun from the table which was covered with clothes.
He let go of
his wife and jumped on Tisoy to grab the gun. While they struggled for possession of the gun he hit the testicles of
Tisoy with his
knees. Tisoy fell on his knees but was still holding the gun. Still grappling for possession of the gun, appellant held on
to the back
portion of the gun and part of the trigger, while his other hand held Hilarios hand which was holding the butt of the
gun. When
Hilario knelt down, appellant was able to twist Hilarios hand and to point the barrel of the gun towards the latter,
eventually killing
him.
Roberto was convicted on the strength of Analie’s testimony.
ISSUE:
May Roberto be convicted on Analie’s testimony?
HELD:

Yes. The Court held that Analie’s testimony would have been disregarded had appellant timely objected to her
competency to
testify under the marital disqualification rule. Under this rule, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or
against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
crime
committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants. However, objections to the
competency of
a husband and wife to testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of other
witnesses
generally. The objection to the competency of the spouse must be made when he or she is first offered as a witness.
In his case,
the incompetency was waived by appellants failure to make a timely objection to the admission of
Analies testimony.

III. Disqualification – Privileged Communication

ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107383
February 20, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. Petitioner entered the clinic of her husband,
a doctor of
medicine, and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport,
and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification
from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner.
The case was
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila which after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo
Martin.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as
evidence"
the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the documents and papers, so forcibly/illegally taken or seized by the wife from and without the consent of
her husband
as the capital owner of the same, are admissible in evidence in a case of legal separation to which they are parties
RULING:
No, the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the
privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks
herself
aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in
any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity
or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband
nor wife may
testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save
for specified exceptions.

UNITED STATES VS ANTIPOLO;

GR NO. L-13109; MARCH 6, 1918
FACTS: Respondent Dalmaceo is charged for the murder of one Fortunato Dinal. The trial court convicted him of
homicide. The
decision was appealed, and one of the errors assigned is the refusal of the trial to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow
of Dinal, to
testify as a witness on behalf of the defense concerning certain dying allegations. Accoding to the testimony of
Ezpeleta, it was
the dying declaration of her husband that his injury that caused his death was from a fall, and not respondent. The
fiscal objected to the testimony of Ezpeleta. According to the fiscal, Ezpeleta, as the widow of the deceased, is
incompetent
to testify under the rules and procedure in either civil or criminal cases, unless it be with the consent of her husband.
Since the
husband is dead, he cannot grant permission. Therefore, the witness is disqualified from testifying in this case in
which her
husband is the injured party. The trial court sustained the object.
The defense now argues that the witness is competent. According to the defense, disqualification related only to
cases where a
husband/wife of one of the parties to proceeding is called to testify. According to them, the parties in this case are the
government
and the accused.
ISSUE:
Is Ezpeleta disqualified from being a witness for the defense?
HELD:
NO.
Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows:
"Except with the consent of both, or except in cases of crime committed by one against the other, neither husband
nor wife shall
be a competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both shall be
parties."
This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is based. The purpose of section 58 is
to protect
accused persons against statements made in the confidence engendered by the marital relation, and to relieve the
husband or
wife to whom such confidential communications might have been made from the obligation of revealing them to the
prejudice of
the other spouse. Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a
statement
regarding the manner in which he received those injuries, the communication so made is in no sense confidential. On
the contrary,
such a communication is made for the express purpose that it may be communicated after the death of the declarant
to the
authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause of his death.

PEOPLE VS CARLOS;
GR NO. 22948; MARCH 17, 1925
FACTS:
The case is regarding the murder of Dr. Sityar. The accused, Carlos, is the husband of one the doctor’s patients. In
one of their
consultations asked the defendant, he was met by his outraged wife due to an argument with the doctor. Despite
what happened,
Carlos still went to the doctor for consultation. Several days after, he received a letter from the doctor asking him for
immediate
settlement of his wife’s account.
According to the prosecution, the defendant went to the office of the doctor. Without any preliminary quarrel, Carlos
willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attacked the doctor with a fan-knife and stabbed him causing the doctor’s immediate
death. Defendant
admitted he killed the deceased but maintained in court that it was a mere act of self-defense.
The trial court decided that there was no self-defense. Therefore, what was left to determine is whether defendant
was guilty of
committing murder or simple homicide. In proving that there was murder, the prosecution presented a hand-penned
letter written to the defendant by his wife. The tenor
of the letter shows that the writer (his wife) feared what could be the consequences of what the defendant was
contemplating
which is resorting to physical violence in dealing with the doctor. Due to this found element, premeditation was
established which
completely constitutes the crime of murder.
ISSUE:
Does the letter between the husband and the wife constitute privileged communication as was contemplated in the
Rules of
Evidence?
HELD:
YES. The letter was held to be inadmissible. The Supreme Court held that generally where a privileged
communication of spouseto-
spouse comes either legally or not into the hands of a third party, if without collusion and there is voluntary
foreclosure on either
spouse, then the privilege is extinguished and the communication becomes admissible.
But in this case however, the letter in question was obtained through search and seizure where no warrant was
issued. And
documents obtained by illegal searches are not admissible in a criminal case.
Furthermore, the letter was held to be hearsay evidence. The letter was written by the wife of the defendant and if
she had testified
at the trial the letter might have been admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand
and the
letter was therefore not offered for that purpose. If the defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his
assent to the
statements contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is not the case here; the fact that he
had the letter
in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure
hearsay and its
admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the
witnesses for
the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine them.

VS DAVID;
GR NO. L-961; SEPTEMBER 21, 1949
FACTS: In April 1945, Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled against Selim Assad.
Assad was
represented by a certain Atty. Ohnick.
In January 1946, Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad and he entered his appearance
in court.
In May 1946 or four months later, counsel of Hilado filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be disqualified because
Hilado
approached Atty. Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding her case and for which Atty. Francisco sent
Hilado a legal
opinion letter.
Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification.
In his opposition, he said that no material information was relayed to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilado’s
story, Atty.
Francisco advised her that her case will not win in court; but that later, Hilado returned with a copy of the Complaint
prepared by
Atty. Dizon; that however, when Hilado returned, Atty. Francisco was not around but an associate in his firm was
there (a certain
Atty. Federico Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to Hilado; that after Hilado left, leaving behind the legal
documents, Atty. Agrava
then prepared a legal opinion letter where it was stated that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that Atty.
Agrava had Atty. Francisco sign the letter; that Atty. Francisco did not read the letter as Atty. Agrava said that it was
merely a letter explaining why
the firm cannot take on Hilado’s case.
Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that no confidential information was relayed
because all Hilado
brought was a copy of the Complaint which was already filed in court; and that, if any, Hilado already waived her right
to disqualify
Atty. Francisco because he was already representing Assad in court for four months in the said case.
Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.
ISSUE:
Should Atty. Francisco be disqualified in this case?
HELD:
YES. There is already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty. Francisco. Hence, Atty.
Francisco cannot
act as counsel against Hilado without the latter’s consent.
As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not necessary that any retainer
should have been
paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case
about which
the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his
attorney in his
professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or
acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when he is
listening to his
client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his
client’s
pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court.
Anent the issue of what information was relayed by Hilado to Atty. Francisco: It does not matter if the information
relayed is
confidential or not. So long as the attorney-client relationship is established, the lawyer is proscribed from taking
other
representations against the client.
Anent the issue that the legal opinion was not actually written by Atty. Francisco but was only signed by him: It still
binds him
because Atty. Agrava, assuming that he was the real author, was part of the same law firm. An information obtained
from a client
by a member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm, his associates or his employers.

REGALA VS SANDIGANBAYAN;
GR NO. 105938, 108113; SEPTEMBER 20, 1996
FACTS:
The matters raised in the present case are an offshoot of the institution of the PCGG against Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
Jr., as one
of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the several
corporations.
Petitioners in this case are all the partners in ACCRA law firm.
The complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 alleged that the ACCRA LAWYERS and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with
each other
in setting up through the use of coconut levy funds the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to
the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others. Also, that through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA,
using its whollyowned
investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares
representing
roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987.
The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco
who furnished
all the monies to the subscription payment; hence, ACCRA LAWYERS acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents
by allowing
themselves, among others, to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth.
On August 20, 1991, PCGG filed a “Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint” which EXCLUDED private
respondent ROCO
from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant, whereas ACCRA LAWYERS still were included still as
defendants.
ACCRA LAWYERS subsequently filed their Comment/Opposition with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG
similarly grant the
same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent ROCO.
PCGG in its comment agreed to exclude the ACCRA LAWYERS on the ff conditions: (a) the disclosure of the identity
of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of
assignments
ACCRA LAWYERS executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.
SANDIGANBAYAN RULING: DENIED the exclusion of ACCRA LAWYERS in PCGG Case No. 33 for their refusal to
comply with
the conditions required by respondent PCGG.
ISSUE:
Should petitioners be compelled to reveal their clients?
HELD:
NO. The High Court upheld that petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the breach of
fiduciary duty
owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that
the client's
name is not privileged information. Sandiganbayan resolution annulled and set-aside. Petitioners excluded from
complaint.
A lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client. Reasons: 1. Court has
a right to
know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.; 2. Privilege begins to
exist only
after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a
client; 3.
Privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.; 4. Due process considerations require that the
opposing
party should, as a general rule, know his adversary.
BUT when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences: 1.
A strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he
sought the
lawyer’s advice.; 2. Disclosure would open the client to civil liability. (case at bar); 3. Government's lawyers have no
case against
an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form
the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime. (case at bar); 4. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal
problem on
which the client seeks legal assistance (case at bar); 5. Nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously
disclosed
and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential

LIM VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 91114
25 SEPTEMBER 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner, Nelly Lim and private respondent, Juan Sim, are lawfully married to each other. Private respondent filed
petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a
mental illness called schizophrenia
Private respondent's counsel announced that he would present as his next witness the Chief of the Female Services
of the
National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel
forthwith orally
applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify.
Petitioner's counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is
privileged since
the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from
schizophrenia.
Private respondent’s counsel contended that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and would not
testify on
any information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity.
ISSUE:
Is Dr. Lydia Acampado barred by the privilege communication rule from testifying as an expert witness?
HELD:
NO. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations,
are therefore
not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated.
She did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner;
moreover, the
facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever information
or findings
the doctor obtained while attending to the patient.
It is quite clear from Dr. Acampado's testimony that the petitioner was never interviewed alone. Said interviews were
always
conducted in the presence of a third party. There is authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation
with a
physician in the presence of third parties removes such information from the mantle of the privilege:
CHAN VS. CHAN
G.R. NO. 179786
24 JULY 2013
FACTS:
This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the production and submission in court of the
respondent
husband's hospital record in a case for declaration of nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental fitness
as a husband.
Petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before RTC of Makati Cit a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to
respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny).
Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City,
covering Johnny’s
medical records when he was there confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to “be allowed to submit in
evidence”
the records sought by subpoena duces tecum.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege.
ISSUE:
Can the court order the production of Johnny’s hospital records?
HELD:
NO. Josielene claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the “testimonial”
evidence of the
physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician “cannot in a civil
case, without the consent of the patient, be examined” regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says
Josielene, does not cover
the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests that the
physician
ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him— would be to allow access to
evidence
that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s
records. Disclosing
them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with
the patient,
without the latter’s prior consent.

KROHN VS. CA
G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994
FACTS:
Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married. However, the relationship between the couple developed
into a stormy
one. Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain. The effort however
proved futile.
They finally separated in fact.
Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs.
Cornelio Banaag,
Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial court. In
his petition,
he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the
contents of the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on privileged
communication
between physician and patient.
Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of the contents of the psychiatric report. She argues
that since Sec.
24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court prohibits a physician from testifying on matters which he may have
acquired in
attending to a patient in a professional capacity, "with more reason should be third person (like respondent-husband
in this
particular instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying on privileged matters between a physician and patient or from
submitting any
medical report, findings or evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his
confidential and
privileged relation with a patient."
Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that "the rules are very explicit: the prohibition applies only to
a physician.
Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the case at bar where the person sought to be barred from
testifying
on the privileged communication is the husband and not the physician of the petitioner."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the husband with regard to the confidential evaluation report is prohibited.
RULING:
No. The requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
(b) the person
against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such
person acquired
the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary
to enable him
to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation
(formerly character)
of the patient.
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or
obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners.
Plainly and
clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of
the prohibition
because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient
and executed
the report.

EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. CAMERON GRANVILLE

G.R. NO. 204700

NOVEMBER 24, 2014

FACTS:
For resolution is respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.'s motion for reconsideration of the
Supreme Court’s
decision, which reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals' resolutions and ordered respondent to produce the
Loan Sale and
Purchase Agreement (LSPA), including its annexes and/or attachments, if any, in order that petitioners may inspect
or photocopy
the same.
Respondent contends that the production of the LSPA will violate the parol evidence rule under Rule 130, Section 9
of the Rules
of Court.
For their part, petitioners counter that the parol evidence rule is not applicable to them because they were not parties
to the deed
of assignment, and "they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the Deed of
Assignment." Besides, the deed of assignment made express reference to the LSPA, hence, the latter cannot be
considered as
extrinsic to it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the production of the LSPA will violate the parol evidence rule.
RULING:
The parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the deed of assignment and do not base
a claim on
it. Hence, they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the deed of
assignment.
Even assuming that Rule 130, Section 9 is applicable, an exception to the rule under the second paragraph is when
the party
puts in issue the validity of the written agreement, as in the case a quo. Besides, what is forbidden under the parol
evidence rule
is the presentation of oral or extrinsic evidence, not those expressly referred to in the written agreement. "Documents
can be
read together when one refers to the other." By the express terms of the deed of assignment, it is clear that the deed
of assignment
was meant to be read in conjunction with the LSPA.

AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION vs. PENNSWELL, INC.

G.R. No. 172835
December 13, 2007
FACTS:

On various dates, respondent Pennswell, Inc. delivered and sold to petitioner Air Philippines Corporation sundry
goods in trade.
Under the contracts, petitioner’s total outstanding obligation amounted to P449,864.98 with interest at 14% per
annum until the
amount would be fully paid. For failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under said contracts, respondent
filed a
Complaint for a Sum of Money with the RTC.
In its Answer, petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was not without valid and justifiable reasons. In particular,
petitioner
alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of P592,000.00 by respondent for its previous sale of four items. Said
items were
misrepresented by respondent as belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in fact, identical with products
petitioner had
previously purchased from respondent. Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by respondent which merely altered
the names
and labels of such goods.
During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel respondent to give a detailed list of the
ingredients and
chemical components of its certain products. The RTC rendered an Order granting the petitioner’s motion.
Respondent sought
reconsideration of the foregoing Order, contending that it cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical components
sought
because the matter is confidential. It argued that what petitioner endeavored to inquire upon constituted a trade
secret which
respondent cannot be forced to divulge.
The RTC gave credence to respondent’s reasoning, and reversed itself. Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC,
petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which denied the Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the chemical components or ingredients of respondent’s products are trade secrets or industrial
secrets that are
not subject to compulsory disclosure.
RULING:
Yes. A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those
of his
employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of
respondent’s special
lubricants are trade secrets within the contemplation of the law. The ingredients constitute the very fabric of
respondent’s
production and business. To compel its disclosure is to cripple respondent’s business, and to place it at an undue
disadvantage.
Section24 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication, to wit: (a)
communication
between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c) communication between physician
and patient;
(d) communication between priest and penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. There are, however, other
privileged
matters that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the following: (a) editors may not be compelled to
disclose the
source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d)
information
contained in tax census returns; and (d) bank deposits.
That trade secrets are of a privileged nature is beyond quibble. The protection that this jurisdiction affords to trade
secrets is
evident in our laws
What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is that the chemical formulation of
respondent’s
products is not known to the general public and is unique only to it. Both courts uniformly ruled that these ingredients
are not
within the knowledge of the public. Since such factual findings are generally not reviewable by this Court, it is not
duty-bound to
analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. Indeed, the privilege is
not absolute; the trial court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for doing justice. We do not,
however, find reason to except respondent’s trade secrets from the application of the rule on privilege. The revelation
of
respondent’s trade secrets serves no better purpose to the disposition of the main case pending with the RTC, which
is on the
collection of a sum of money.

NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE

G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008

FACTS:
The competing interests in the case at bar are the claim of executive privilege by the President, on the one hand, and
the
respondent Senate Committees’ assertion of their power to conduct legislative inquiries, on the other.
Petitioner Neri appeared before respondent Committees and testified for on matters concerning the National
Broadband Project
(the "NBN Project"). Petitioner disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange
for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
("President Arroyo")
of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President
Arroyo and
petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be
specific,
petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b)
whether or not
she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by requiring him to
appear and testify
once more. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to
dispense with
petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. However, petitioner did not appear before respondent
Committees
upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege. Respondent Committees cited petitioner in contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not executive privilege may be invoked.
RULING:
Yes. The communications are covered by executive privilege. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in
cases where
the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and
foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may
enjoy
greater confidentiality than others.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications
elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public
officials”
necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed
might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are
presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations. It is easy to
discern the
danger that goes with the disclosure of the President’s communication with her advisor. The NBN Project involves a
foreign
country as a party to the agreement. It was actually a product of the meeting of minds between officials of the
Philippines and
China. Whatever the President says about the agreement - particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - are
matters which China will surely view with particular interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could
adversely affect our diplomatic as
well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.

PNB VS. GANCAYCO

G.R. No. L-18343 September 30, 1965
FACTS:
Emilio A. Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as special prosecutors of the Department of Justice, required the plaintiff
Philippine
National Bank to produce at a hearing the records of the bank deposits of Ernesto T. Jimenez, former administrator
of the
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administration, who was then under investigation for unexplained wealth.
In declining to reveal its records, the plaintiff bank invoked Republic Act No. 1405 which provides:
SEC. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments
in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any
person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of
impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in
cases
where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
On the other hand, the defendants cited the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) in support
of their claim
of authority. The law invoked by the defendant states:
SEC. 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. — If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered
One
thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency,
whether
in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his
salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of
the
spouse and unmarried children of such public official may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through
legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the
enforcement
of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.
Because of the threat of prosecution, plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory judgment in the Manila Court of First
Instance. After
trial, the court rendered judgment, sustaining the power of the defendants to compel the disclosure of bank accounts
of ACCFA
Administrator Jimenez. From that judgment, plaintiffs appealed to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PNB can be compelled to disclose the records of accounts of a depositor who is under investigation
for unexplained
wealth.
RULING:
Yes. While Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits are "absolutely confidential ... and may not be
examined, inquired
or looked into," except in those cases enumerated therein, the Anti-Graft Law directs in mandatory terms that bank
deposits "shall
be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary."
The only
conclusion possible is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by
providing
additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits. With regard to the claim that disclosure would
be contrary to the policy making bank deposits confidential, it is enough to point
out that while section 2 of Republic Act 1405 declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential," it nevertheless
allows such
disclosure in the following instances: (1) Upon written permission of the depositor; (2) In cases of impeachment; (3)
Upon order
of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; (4) In cases where the money
deposited is the
subject matter of the litigation. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and
no reason is
seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy
as to one
cannot be different from the policy as to the other. This policy express the motion that a public office is a public trust
and any
person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is
open to public
scrutiny.

BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK VS. PURISIMA

G.R. No. L-56429 May 28, 1988
FACTS:
Customs special agent Manuel Caturla was accused by BIR of allegedly having acquired property manifestly out of
proportion to
his salary and other lawful income, in violation of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." In the course of the
preliminary
investigation,, the Tanodbayan issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank,
commanding its
representative to appear and furnish the Tanodbayan with duly certified copies of the records in all its branches and
extension
offices, of the loans, savings and time deposits and other banking transactions, dating back to 1969, appearing in the
names of
Caturla, his wife, Purita Caturla, their children. Caturla moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum arguing that
compliance
therewith would result in a violation of Sections 2 and 3 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits.
Banco Filipino took over from Caturla in the effort to nullify the subpoena. It filed a complaint for declaratory relief
praying for a
judicial declaration as to whether its compliance with the subpoenae duces tecum would constitute an infringement of
the
provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 1405 in relation to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner argues that the
subpoena in
question is in the nature of "fishing expeditions" or "general warrants" since they authorize indiscriminate inquiry into
bank records;
that, assuming that such an inquiry is allowed as regards public officials under investigation for a violation of the Anti-
Graft &
Corrupt Practices Act, it is constitutionally impermissible with respect to private individuals or public officials not under
investigation
on a charge of violating said Act. It also asked that pending final resolution of the question, the Tanodbayan be
provisionally
restrained from exacting compliance with the subpoena. Respondent Judge Purisima issued an Order denying for
lack of merit
the application by Banco Filipino for a preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the "Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits" precludes production by subpoena duces tecum of bank
records of
transactions by or in the names of the wife, children and friends of a special agent of the Bureau of Customs accused
of a violation
of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."
RULING:
No. The inquiry into illegally acquired property extends to cases where such property is concealed by being held by
or recorded
in the name of other persons. This proposition is made clear by R.A. No. 3019 which quite categorically states that
the term,
"legitimately acquired property of a public officer or employee shall not include.. property unlawfully acquired by the
respondent,
but its ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name of, or held by, respondent's spouse, ascendants,
descendants,
relatives or any other persons."
To sustain the petitioner's theory, and restrict the inquiry only to property held by or in the name of the government
official or
employee, or his spouse and unmarried children is unwarranted in the light of the provisions of the statutes in
question, and would make available to persons in government who illegally acquire property an easy and fool-proof
means of evading investigation
and prosecution; all they would have to do would be to simply place the property in the possession or name of
persons other than
their spouse and unmarried children. This is an absurdity that we will not ascribe to the lawmakers.
 A.M. NO. 01-7-01-SC.- RE: RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

EN BANC
RESOLUTION

Acting on the Memorandum dated 18 June 2001 of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules
of Court to Draft the rules on E-Commerce Law [R.A. No. 8792] submitting the Rules on
Electronic Evidence for this Court’s consideration and approval, the Court Resolved to
APPROVED the same.

The Rules on Electronic Evidence shall apply to cases pending after their effectivity. These
Rules shall take effect on the first day of August 2001 following their publication before the 20th
of July in two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
17th July 2001.

RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

RULE 1: COVERAGE

Section 1. Scope. – Unless otherwise provided herein, these Rules shall apply whenever an
electronic data message, as defined in Rule 2 hereof, is offered or used in evidence.
Section 2. Cases covered. – These Rules shall apply to all civil actions and proceedings, as
well as quasi-judicial and administrative cases.
Section 3. Application of the other rules on evidence. – In all matters not specifically
covered by these Rules, the Rules of Court and pertinent provisions of statues containing rules
on evidence shall apply.

RULE 2: DEFINITION OF TERMS AND CONSTRUCTION

Section 1. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of these Rules, the following terms are defined,
as follows:

(a) “Asymmetric or public cryptosystem” means a system capable of generating a secure key
pair, consisting of a private key for creating a digital signature, and a public key for verifying the
digital signature.

(b) “Business records” include records of any business, institution, association, profession,
occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit, or for legitimate
purposes.

(c) “Certificate” means an electronic document issued to support a digital signature which
purports to confirm the identity or other significant characteristics of the person who holds a
particular key pair.

(d) “Computer” refers to any single or interconnected device or apparatus, which, by electronic,
electro-mechanical or magnetic impulse, or by other means with the same function, can receive,
record, transmit, store, process, correlate, analyze, project, retrieve and/or produce information,
data, text, graphics, figures, voice, video, symbols or other modes of expression or perform any
one or more of these functions.
(e) “Digital Signature” refers to an electronic signature consisting of a transformation of an
electronic document or an electronic data message using an asymmetric or public cryptosystem
such that a person having the initial untransformed electronic document and the signer’s public
key can accurately determine:

(i) whether the transformation was created using the private key that corresponds to the signer’s
public key; and

(ii) whether the initial electronic document had been altered after the transformation was made.

(f) “Digitally signed” refers to an electronic document or electronic data message bearing a
digital signature verified by the public key listed in a certificate.

(g) “Electronic data message” refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by
electronic, optical or similar means.

(h) “Electronic document” refers to information or the representation of information, data,

figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by
which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and
affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any print-out or output, readable by
sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic
document. For purposes of these Rules, the term “electronic document” may be used
interchangeably with electronic data message”.

(i) “Electronic key” refers to a secret code which secures and defends sensitive information that
crosses over public channels into a form decipherable only with a matching electronic key.

(j) “Electronic signature” refers to any distinctive mark, characteristics and/or sound in electronic
form. Representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the
electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedure employed or
adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of
authenticating, signing or approving an electronic data message or electronic document. For
purposes of these Rules, an electronic signature includes digital signatures.

(k) “Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages,

chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of
communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.

(l) “Information and Communication System” refers to a system for generating, sending,
receiving, storing or otherwise processing electronic data messages or electronic documents
and includes the computer system or other similar devices by or in which data are recorded or
stored and any procedure related to the recording or storage of electronic data message or
electronic document.

(m) “Key Pair” in an asymmetric cryptosystem refers to the private key and its mathematically
related public key such that the latter can verify the digital signature that the former creates.

(n) “Private Key” refers to the key of a key pair used to create a digital signature.
(o) “Public Key” refers to the key of a key pair used to verify a digital signature.

Section 2. Construction. – These Rules shall be liberally construed to assist the parties in
obtaining a just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination of cases.

The Interpretation of these Rules shall also take into consideration the international origin of
Republic Act No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act.

RULE 3: ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

Section 1. Electronic documents as functional equivalent of paper-based documents.

– Whenever a rule of evidence refers to the term of writing, document, record, instrument,
memorandum or any other form of writing, such term shall be deemed to include an electronic
document as defined in these Rules.
Section 2. Admissibility. – An electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with
the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated
in the manner prescribed by these Rules.

Section 3. Privileged communication. – The confidential character of a privileged

communications is not solely on the ground that it is in the form of an electronic document.

RULE 4: BEST EVIDENCE RULE

Section 1. Original of an electronic document. – An electronic document shall be regarded

as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or
output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
Section 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals. – When a document is in two or more
copies executed at or about the same time with identical contents, or is a counterpart produced
by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic
re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which is accurately
reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the
original.Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall not be admissible to the same
extent as the original if:

(a) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or

(b) in the circumstances it would be unjust or inequitable to admit a copy in lieu of the original.

RULE 5: AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an electronic

document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner
provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:

(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the
same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by
the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the
document; or

(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

Section 3. Proof of electronically notarized document. – A document electronically notarized

in accordance with the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court shall be considered as a public
document and proved as a notarial document under the Rules of Court.

RULE 6: ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES

Section 1. Electronic signature. – An electronic signature or a digital signature authenticate

din the manner prescribed hereunder is admissible in evidence as the functional equivalent of
the signature of a person on a written document.
Section 2. Authentication of electronic signatures. – An electronic signature may be
authenticate in any of the following manner:

(a) By evidence that a method or process was utilized to establish a digital signature and verity
the same;

(b) By any other means provided by law; or

(c) By any other means satisfactory to the judge as establishing the genuineness of the
electronic signature.

Section 3. Disputable presumptions relation to electronic signature. – Upon the

authentication of an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that:

(a) The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates;

(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of authenticating or
approving the electronic document to which it is related or to indicate such person’s consent to
the transaction embodied therein; and

(c) The methods or processes utilized to affix or verity the electronic signature operated without
error or fault.

Section 4. Disputable presumptions relating to digital signatures. – Upon the

authentication of a digital signature, it shall be presumed, in addition to those mentioned in the
immediately preceding section, that:

(a) The information contained in a certificate is correct;

(b) The digital signature was created during the operational period of a certificate;

(c) The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from the time it was
signed; and
(d) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated therein

RULE 7: EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

Section 1. Factors for assessing evidentiary weight. – In assessing the evidentiary weight of
an electronic document, the following factors may be considered:

(a) The reliability of the manner or method in which it was generated, stored or communicated,
including but not limited to input and output procedures, controls, tests and checks for accuracy
and reliability of the electronic data message or document, in the light of all the circumstances
as well as any relevant agreement;

(b) The reliability of the manner in which its originator was identified;

(c) The integrity of the information and communication system in which it is recorded or stored,
including but not limited to the hardware and computer programs or software used as well as
programming errors;

(d) The familiarity of the witness or the person who made the entry with the communication and
information system;

(e) The nature and quality of the information which went into the communication and information
system upon which the electronic data message or electronic document was based; or

(f) Other factors which the court may consider as affecting the accuracy or integrity of the
electronic document or electronic data message.

Section 2. Integrity of an information and communication system. – In any dispute

involving the integrity of the information and communication system in which an electronic
document or electronic data message is recorded or stored, the court may consider, among
others, the following factors:

(a) Whether the information and communication system or other similar device was operated in
a manner that did not affect the integrity of the electronic document, and there are no other
reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the information and communication system;

(b) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored by a party to the proceedings with
interest adverse to that of the party using it; or

(c) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course of
business by a person who is not a party to the proceedings and who did not act under the
control of the party using it.

RULE 8: BUSINESS RECORDS AS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE

Section 1. Inapplicability of the hearsay rule. – A memorandum, report, record or data
compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by electronic, optical or
other similar means at or near the time of or from transmission or supply of information by a
person with knowledge thereof, and kept in the regular course or conduct of a business activity,
and such was the regular practice ot make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation
by electronic, optical or similar means, all of which are shown by the testimony of the custodian
or other qualified witnesses, is excepted from the rule or hearsay evidence.
Section 2. Overcoming the presumption. – The presumption provided for in Section 1 of this
Rule may be overcome by evidence of the untrustworthiness of the source of information or the
method or circumstances of the preparation, transmission or storage thereof.

RULE 9: METHOD OF PROOF

Section 1. Affidavit of evidence. – All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary
weight of an electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct
personal knowledge of the affiant or based on authentic records. The affidavit must affirmatively
show the competence of the affiant to testify on the matters contained therein.
Section 2.  Cross-examination of deponent. – The affiant shall be made to affirm the contents
of the affidavit in open court and may be cross-examined as a matter of right by the adverse
party.

RULE 10: EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES

Section 1. Electronic testimony. – After summarily hearing the parties pursuant to Rule 9 of
these Rules, the court may authorize the presentation of testimonial evidence by electronic
means. Before so authorizing, the court shall determine the necessity for such presentation and
prescribe terms and conditions as may be necessary under the circumstance, including the
protection of the rights of the parties and witnesses concerned.
Section 2.  Transcript of electronic testimony. – When examination of a witness is done
electronically, the entire proceedings, including the questions and answers, shall be transcribed
by a stenographer, stenotypes or other recorder authorized for the purpose, who shall certify as
correct the transcript done by him. The transcript should reflect the fact that the proceedings,
either in whole or in part, had been electronically recorded.
Section 3. Storage of electronic evidence. – The electronic evidence and recording thereof
as well as the stenographic notes shall form part of the record of the case. Such transcript and
recording shall be deemed prima facie evidence of such proceedings.

RULE 11: AUDIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC. VIDEO AND EPHEMERAL EVIDENCE

Section 1. Audio, video and similar evidence. – Audio, photographic and video evidence of
events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided is shall be shown, presented or
displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who
made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.
Section 2.  Ephemeral electronic communication. – Ephemeral electronic communications
shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
knowledge thereof. In the absence or unavailability of such witnesses, other competent
evidence may be admitted. A recording of the telephone conversation or ephemeral electronic
communication shall be covered by the immediately preceding section.If the foregoing
communications are recorded or embodied in an electronic document, then the provisions of
Rule 5 shall apply.

RULE 12: EFFECTIVITY

Section 1. Applicability to pending case. – These Rules shall apply to cases pending after
their effectivity.
Section 2. Effectivity. – These Rules shall take effect on the first day of August 2001 following
their publication before the 20th day of July 2001 in two newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines.