App E PHA Bitumen Storage

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS,
BITUMEN STORAGE AND HANDLING,

VOPAK TERMINALS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD,
PORT BOTANY, NSW
Prepared by: Dean Shewring

1 November 2011
Pinnacle Risk Management Pty Limited

ABN 83 098 666 703
PO Box 5024 Elanora Heights

NSW Australia 2101
Telephone: (02) 9913 7284
Facsimile: (02) 9913 7930
Pinnacle Risk Management
Preliminary Hazard Analysis, Vopak, Bitumen

Storage and Handling
Disclaimer
This report was prepared by Pinnacle Risk Management Pty Limited (Pinnacle
Risk Management) as an account of work for Vopak Terminals Australia Pty Ltd
(Vopak). The material in it reflects Pinnacle Risk Management’s best
judgement in the light of the information available to it at the time of preparation.
However, as Pinnacle Risk Management cannot control the conditions under
which this report may be used, Pinnacle Risk Management will not be
responsible for damages of any nature resulting from use of or reliance upon
this report. Pinnacle Risk Management’s responsibility for advice given is
subject to the terms of engagement with Vopak.
Rev Date Description Reviewed By
A 23/8/11 Draft for Comment -
B 19/9/11 Site Location Changed Vopak
C 10/10/11 Vopak Comments Included Vopak
D 1/4/11 Final Issue Vopak
Vopak Bitumen PHA Report Rev D.Doc

1 November 2011
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ I
GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................... III
1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1
1.1 Background...................................................................................... 1
1.2 Objectives ........................................................................................ 2
1.3 Scope................................................................................................ 2
1.4 Methodology .................................................................................... 2
1.5 Findings and Recommendations ................................................... 3
2 SITE DESCRIPTION......................................................................................... 5
3 BITUMEN FACILITY DESCRIPTION .................................................................... 8
3.1 Operations Product Flow ................................................................ 8
3.2 Proposed Tanks............................................................................... 8
3.3 Vapour Combustor ........................................................................ 10
3.4 Shipping Supply and Discharge................................................... 10
3.5 Bitumen Road Tanker Loading Gantry ........................................ 11
3.6 Heating System.............................................................................. 12
3.7 Heat Tracing ................................................................................... 12
3.8 Thermal Insulation and Cladding ................................................. 12
3.9 Pipework ........................................................................................ 13
3.10 Fire Protection System ................................................................. 13
4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION .............................................................................. 14
4.1 Hazardous Materials...................................................................... 14
4.2 Potential Hazardous Incidents Review ........................................ 16
4.3 Hazardous Events - Shipping ....................................................... 16

1 November 2011
4.4 Hazardous Events – Terminal Operations ................................... 18
5 RISK ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 33
5.1 Pool Fire Modelling ....................................................................... 35
5.2 Products of Combustion ............................................................... 40
5.3 Natural Gas Fires and Explosions ............................................... 41
5.4 Aircraft Impact and Other External Events ................................. 43
5.5 Cumulative Risk............................................................................. 44
5.6 Societal Risk .................................................................................. 44
5.7 Risk to the Biophysical Environment .......................................... 45
5.7.1 Escape of Materials to Atmosphere ............................................. 45
5.7.2 Escape of Materials to Soil or Waterways ................................... 46
5.7.3 Solid Wastes .................................................................................. 46
6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................... 48
7 REFERENCES .............................................................................................. 50
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 - Site Location .................................................................................... 6
Figure 2 – Site Layout ...................................................................................... 7

1 November 2011
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 – Hazard Identification Word Diagram – Bitumen Facility ............. 19
Table 2 - Risk Criteria, New Plants ................................................................ 34
Table 3 – Predicted SEP................................................................................. 36
Table 4 – Fire Scenarios Calculation Data and Results .............................. 37
Table 5 - Radiant Heat Impact ....................................................................... 38
Table 6 – Layout Considerations – Tolerable Radiant Heat Levels ........... 38
Table 7 – Fire Plume Rise Modelling ............................................................ 40
Table 8 –Natural Gas Jet Fires ...................................................................... 41
Table 9 – Effects of Explosion Overpressure .............................................. 42
Table 10 – Natural Gas Vapour Cloud Explosions and Flash Fires ........... 42
Table 11 - Piping Failure Frequencies .......................................................... 43
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix 1 – Process Flow Drawing.
Appendix 2 – Radiant Heat Contours.

1 November 2011
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Vopak Terminals Australia Pty Ltd (Vopak) is proposing to install a bitumen
import, storage and road tanker loading facility at the Vopak Site A facility, Port
Botany.
As part of the project requirements, a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is

required. This report details the results from the analysis.
The risks associated with the new tanks, associated equipment and bitumen
facilities at the Vopak Site A, Port Botany, have been assessed and compared
against the DoP risk criteria.
In summary:
1. Fires:
 No risk of injury or fatality at residential areas or other sensitive land

uses as the separation distance is large, i.e. 1 km or larger to residential
areas;
 As the estimated radiant heat levels from potential fire events are less
than 12.6 kW/m2 at neighbouring industrial facilities, the likelihood of
fatality at these locations is acceptably low and there exists a high
probability of escape; and
 Propagation to neighbouring industrial facilities is not expected given that

the significant levels of radiant heat are largely contained on-site.
2. The shipping activities associated with this project are commensurate with
the zoning for the Port Botany area and are not considered intolerable.
3. Societal risk is qualitatively concluded to be acceptable given:
 Few events analysed in the study have the potential for off-site impact
and, for the ones that do, their likelihood is acceptably low; and
 The population density in the Port Botany area is relatively low.
Therefore, the results of this PHA show that the risks associated with the
proposed changes comply with the DoP guidelines for tolerable fatality, injury,
irritation, propagation and societal risk. Also, risks to the biophysical
environment from potential hazardous events are broadly acceptable.
Additionally, the proposed bitumen handling and storage equipment have no

significant impact to the cumulative individual risk contours (for future
development planning) as presented in the Port Botany Land Use Safety Study
by DUAP in 1996.

i 1 November 2011
The primary reason for the low risk levels from the proposed changes is that
significant consequential impacts from potential hazardous events (mainly
radiant heat from fires) do not extend far from the relevant processing areas.
It is assumed that the proposed changes will be reviewed via the HAZOP
methodology, a fire safety study will be performed and the existing safety
management systems and emergency response plans will be updated to reflect
the proposed changes.
The following recommendations are made from this review:
1. Include in the existing Vopak safety management system procedures for

safely emptying and opening a bitumen tank or vessel given the risk of fires on
contact with air.
2. Procedures need to be developed to routinely handle and remove

carbonaceous deposits (possibly with iron sulphides which can result in a
pyrophoric material) inside the bitumen tanks and vessels. If not routinely
removed, the carbonaceous deposits may provide an ignition hazard when they
are exposed to a sudden increase in temperature or oxygen supply. Also, solid
deposits can float on the bitumen surface and these can interfere with level
instruments.
3. Develop procedures to control the risk of hydrogen sulphide exposure to

personnel in the vicinity of the bitumen handling equipment or those who are
required to enter confined spaces associated with the bitumen equipment.
4. Develop procedures for heating a tank from cold given the risk of a boilover
event from water in the tank being heated and evaporating.
5. Perform a SIL study on the proposed bitumen storage and processing facility
to ensure the instrumented protective loops are suitably designed and are of
adequate reliability for the potential hazardous events that can occur.
6. Ensure the transformer / MCC building is adequately designed to prevent fire

propagation from a transformer explosion / fire event to the electrical switch
gear and/or to the adjacent hot oil heaters or vice versa.

ii 1 November 2011
GLOSSARY
API American Petroleum Institute
AS Australian Standard
ASME American Society for Mechanical Engineers
BLB Bulk Liquids Berth
CCTV Closed circuit television
DoP NSW Department of Planning
ESD Emergency Shutdown
ESV Emergency Shutdown Valve
HAZAN Hazard analysis
HAZOP Hazard and operability study
HIPAP Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper
IEC International Electro-technical Commission
LEL Lower explosion limit
LPG Liquefied petroleum gas
LNG Liquefied natural gas
MCC Motor Control Centre
ML Megalitre
NDT Non-destructive testing
PHA Preliminary hazard analysis
QRA Quantitative risk assessment
SEP Surface emissive power
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SPC Sydney Ports Corporation
STEL Short Term Exposure Limit
TLV Threshold Limit Value
TNO The Netherlands Organisation of Applied Scientific Research

iii 1 November 2011
REPORT
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
Vopak Terminals Australia Pty Ltd (Vopak) is proposing to install a bitumen

import, storage and road tanker loading facility at the Vopak Site A facility, Port
Botany.
Vopak have owned and operated the existing Chemical Terminal (Site A) facility
for hazardous and non-hazardous bulk liquids at Port Botany since 1979. The
Petroleum Terminal (Site B) has been in operation since 1996.
The proposed bitumen facility will occupy approximately 10,000 m2 of the

approximately 40,000 m2 site.
The projected annual throughput of the proposed facility is 160,000 tonnes of

bitumen feedstock with potential for future growth. The projections indicate an
increase in shipping movements at BLB1 (Bulk Liquids Berth) of approximately
16 arrivals / discharges per year.
The main features of the proposal are summarised as follows:
 Bitumen feed stock will be imported via BLB1 and transferred to three
heated 10 ML tanks;
 The bitumen will be transferred from the storage tanks into road tankers
via new road tanker loading bays; and
 Loaded trucks will deliver bitumen to the customers.
The Bitumen is classified as a Dangerous Goods Class 9, Packing Group III,

elevated temperature liquid.
As part of the project requirements, a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is

required. This PHA has been prepared in accordance with the guidelines
published by the NSW Department of Planning (DoP) Hazardous Industry
Planning Advisory Paper (HIPAP) No 6 (Ref 1). Vopak have appointed
Pinnacle Risk Management Pty Ltd (Pinnacle Risk Management) to prepare this
Preliminary Hazard Analysis report.

1 1 November 2011
1.2 OBJECTIVES
The main aims of this PHA study are to:
 Identify the credible, potential hazardous events associated with the new
bitumen facility;
 Evaluate the level of risk associated with the identified potential

hazardous events to surrounding land users, including other Port Botany
companies and their operations, and compare the calculated risk levels
with the risk criteria published by the DoP in HIPAP No 4 (Ref 2);
 Review the adequacy of the proposed safeguards to prevent and

mitigate the potential hazardous events; and
 Where necessary, submit recommendations to Vopak to ensure that the

proposed facility is operated and maintained at acceptable levels of
safety and effective safety management systems are used.
1.3 SCOPE
This PHA assesses the credible, potential hazardous events and corresponding
risks associated with the new equipment at the proposed Vopak Port Botany
bitumen facility with the potential for off-site impacts.
In summary, the assessment includes:
 The new equipment and operations associated with the bitumen import,
storage and road tanker loading facility; and
 On-site pipelines and the proposed new bitumen pipeline in the pipeline
corridor from the existing Bulk Liquids Berth to site.
Off-site transport risk is not included in this PHA as off-site traffic impacts are to
be assessed in the Review of Environmental Factors.
Qualitative assessment of the use of the berth operations and shipping activities
is included in this report. The BLB is a purpose built wharf specifically for
transferring hazardous cargo such as the materials stored at Port Botany, e.g.
LPG, and it is used by a number of companies.
1.4 METHODOLOGY
In accordance with the approach recommended by the DoP in HIPAP 6 (Ref 1)

the underlying methodology of the PHA is risk-based, that is, the risk of a
particular potentially hazardous event is assessed as the outcome of its
consequences and likelihood.

2 1 November 2011
The PHA has been conducted as follows:
 Initially, the proposed equipment and its location were reviewed to

identify credible, potential hazardous events, their causes and
consequences. Proposed safeguards were also included in this review;
 As the equipment is located at a relatively significant distance from other

sensitive land users, the consequences of each potential hazardous
event were estimated to determine if there is any possible unacceptable
off-site impacts;
 Included in the analysis is the risk of propagation between the new

equipment and the surrounding land users;
 Where adverse off-site impacts can occur, the likelihood of each

potential hazardous event was reviewed, using appropriate techniques /
methods, to check if there is any significant increase to existing risk
levels and if the risk levels are within the criteria in HIPAP 4 (Ref 2); and
 A comparison is made to the existing Port Botany regional study (Ref 3)

to determine if there is any impact on cumulative risk.
1.5 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In summary:
1. Fires:

areas;


3 1 November 2011

by DUAP in 1996.

contact with air.

instruments.



4 1 November 2011
2 SITE DESCRIPTION
Vopak’s Site A was established in 1979 to serve an identified need for an

independent bulk liquid distribution facility in the greater Sydney Region. The
facility caters for the distribution of bulk liquid chemicals to chemical
manufacturers, oil companies and chemical traders who sell into the local
markets.
A map of the area showing the location of Site A is shown in Figure 1. A site
layout drawing is shown in Figure 2.
The four hectare site is bounded to:
 The north by Friendship Road;
 The south by the Port Botany pipeline corridor and Patrick’s Container
Depot;
 The east by Patrick’s Container Depot; and
 The west by Origin Energy (LPG Storage & Distribution).
The nearest residential area is located at Phillip Bay approximately 1 kilometre

to the east of the site across Yarra Bay. Other residential areas, slightly further
away, are located at Chifley to the north-east and Botany to the north-west.
The site is an established bulk chemicals storage and distribution facility.

Security for the site is also established and comprises the following measures:
 Site perimeter fence installed with electronic access gates;

 The main gate is monitored by security staff based at Site B outside
normal hours;
 All personnel gain access via the main gate (either by swiping their
security passes or by signing in as a visitor);
 The site has lighting throughout the night to aid observation;
 Patrols by Site B operations personnel outside Site A operational hours;
and
 The site can be observed by security personnel via a closed circuit TV.
There are approximately 30 people during normal business hours and none
outside of normal business hours on the site (except when shipping operations
occur).
Depending on weather conditions, it may lie under the flight path to Sydney
Airport. There are no known natural hazards associated with this location that
pose unacceptable levels of risk.

5 1 November 2011
Figure 1 - Site Location
New Vopak
Bitumen
Facility

6 1 November 2011
Figure 2 – Site Layout

7 1 November 2011
3 BITUMEN FACILITY DESCRIPTION
3.1 OPERATIONS PRODUCT FLOW
From Ref 4, bitumen feedstock will be imported via BLB1 and transferred to
heated 10,000 m³ tanks. A process flow diagram is shown in Appendix 1.
The facility is proposed to be comprised of:
 Ship receipt facilities, including an electrically traced pipeline to BLB 1;
 Storage and heating facilities for bitumen products in three 10,000 m3

tanks; and
 Gantry facilities for loading and in-line blending bitumen road tankers (2
bays initially with expansion to 4 in the future).
The bitumen will be stored at approximately 140°C - 150°C and will be loaded
out at approximately 180°C. Heating will primarily be facilitated through two hot
oil heaters and associated heat exchangers by the use of natural gas as fuel.
The facility will store up to three imported bitumen grades (no cutback grades
proposed).
Various specialty grades will be generated by blending the main grades through
an inline blending system during road tanker loading.
The facility will operate 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
3.2 PROPOSED TANKS
Three tanks are to be constructed each with a capacity of 10,000 m³. The tanks
are 22 metres in diameter and have an overall height of 27 metres. These
tanks will be used to store the three grades of bitumen.
There is one (smaller) tank for potentially contaminated storm water associated
with the facility.
The tanks will be fixed roof carbon steel and fabricated to API650 standard.
The venting of these tanks will be to a vapour combustor for the three large
tanks during ship unloading operations. Overfill protection will be installed and
will comprise of two independent level systems with high level alarms as well as
an automatic computer driven product transfer system between tanks. The
main tank’s features are as follows:
 The tanks will meet industry design standards (API 650 and API2000)
and customer requirements;
 The product in storage will be maintained at 140°C - 150°C and must be

on delivery at the road tanker loading gantry at 180°C - 190°C;

8 1 November 2011
 Product receipt into the tanks will be approximately 400 te/hr (minimum)
at a temperature of 140°C;
 The tanks will have hot oil coils and controls capable of maintaining the
product at 150°C;
 Level measurement and monitoring will be with a radar level gauging

system:
 Alarm points suitable for alarming and/or interlocking (high, high-
high, low and low-low)
 Control system feedback capability
 Independent high-high level capacitance switches will be fitted;
 Thermal insulation suitable for maintaining storage temperatures at

150°C will be fitted. Design and installation will be consistent with best
industry practice to minimise corrosion under insulation. Lagging
installation will be designed to prevent water or hydrocarbon ingress into
insulation.
 The tank vents will be suitable for bitumen and sized for air blowing of
the ships line;
 The tanks will be top filled via an external riser and internal slotted pipe;
 Alarms and interlocks will be as follows:

 High level to generate an audible alarm and a message in the
control room;
 High-high level to generate a site audible alarm and a message in
the control room;
 High-high independent level switch to generate a site audible
alarm and a message (in the control room) and an emergency
shutdown;
 Low level to generate an audible alarm and a message in the
control room;
 Low-low level alarm to generate a site audible alarm and message
in the control room;
 Low-low level alarm activation will stop the loading pumps, close
the tank pump suction valve and close the hot oil coil control
valve;
 High temperature to generate an audible alarm and a message in
the control room; and
 High-high temperature to generate a site audible alarm and a
message in the control room and close the hot oil coil control
valve.
 Lighting to be provided for night dipping, ship unloading, truck loading
and sampling operations;

9 1 November 2011
 The tanks will be connected to a vapour combustor for use during filling
of the tanks and road tankers;
 Structural integrity tests conducted every 10 years in accordance with

AS1940; and
 Containment of liquid within the bund to meet AS1940 requirements.
The bunded areas (tank pits, pump bays and road tanker loading gantries) will
have sumps for the collection of rainwater and possible spills and will be
directed to the waste water treatment plant prior to disposal. Treated water
collected in these sumps will be sampled and inspected prior to release to
stormwater.
Should the water be contaminated, it will be pumped to a waste tank for

transport to an approved (Office of Environment and Heritage) waste treatment
facility.
Open paved areas will have a first flush containment system (10mm / m2 design
criteria) with a capability to direct flow to the waste water treatment plant.
The tanks are separated by intermediate bund walls and are designed to
overflow into each other providing a total containment capacity to meet AS1940.
3.3 VAPOUR COMBUSTOR
A vapour combustor is to be located in a new facilities compound adjacent to

Friendship Road. This will be used for treating the bitumen tank’s vapours
during ship unloading operations and truck venting when being filled. This unit
will be fired by natural gas.
3.4 SHIPPING SUPPLY AND DISCHARGE
The facility will receive products (160,000 tonnes per year) via ship from BLB1.
Bitumen products would be imported on vessels of up to 15 kte tanker size and
the typical parcel size would be 5-10 kte per shipment. The frequency would be
8-16 shipments per annum (depending on ship size). The main features for the
shipping transfers are summarised as follows:
 A single carbon steel pipeline (electrically heat traced and insulated) is to

be dedicated for bitumen unloading from BLB1. The unloading capacity
minimum rate is 400 te/hr with electric heat tracing and insulation /
cladding;
 All hoses and fittings required to connect the ship to the unloading
pipeline will be dedicated to bitumen use only;
 Hose and wharf pipeline design will facilitate draining / blowing of the
hoses and means to confirm that the hose is drained prior to breaking
connections (e.g. low point sample point);

10 1 November 2011
 Suitable bunding / containment will be provided at the wharf connection

point (for smaller spills);
 The design of the pipeline between the wharf and the storage tanks will
include requirements for the following issues:
 Heating prior to and during transfers (required to heat from
ambient to 120°C within 24 hours and maintain product at 120°C);
 Resting the line empty or on product (or partially empty);
 Public safety (e.g. hot surfaces, electrical hazards);
 Product security;
 Thermal relief; and
 Thermal expansion and thermal stress of the pipeline as it heats /
cools.
 The wharf pipeline will be blown clear of product with nitrogen at the
completion of each discharge.
3.5 BITUMEN ROAD TANKER LOADING GANTRY
A two bay road tanker loading gantry is proposed. Loading operations will
occur 24 hours per day, 365 days a year and will be driver self-loading. The
main features of the road tanker loading gantry are as follows:
 The gantry will initially consist of 2 loading bays, each fitted with 1
loading arm, with provision to increase to 4 bays in the future;
 The facility will be sized to accommodate the ingress / egress and

turning requirements of a 26 metre B-Double road tanker, without
reversing;
 Each barrel of the B-Double will be loaded separately;
 Each bay will be capable of loading at a rate of 80 tonnes/hr;
 Mass flow meters will be installed with a pre-set auto shut off and also an
overfill protection probe;
 The gantry will house the bay controller in a safe area (i.e. an enclosed
area) from where the driver can view the truck hatch. The bay controller
will be fitted with a 3 minute (man down) delay button;
 Truck top access via fold down stairs with a cage on the end (fall
protection) will be installed;
 A truck earth system with an interlock will be installed;
 All bays will be provided with weather protection to protect the truck and
driver from exposure to elements;
 The road tanker parking area will be outside the gantry but on-site; and

11 1 November 2011
 A paperwork collection station will be provided.
It is anticipated that there will be an average of 15 trucks per day.
3.6 HEATING SYSTEM
A thermal oil system and furnace will be installed to fulfil the following heating
applications:
 Heating of the bulk storage tanks using hot oil coils;
 Heating of the bitumen loading line heat exchangers;
 Heating of the oil traced pipeline systems (where required); and
 The furnace fuel will be natural gas.
The hot oil system will incorporate the following features:
 100% redundancy of the hot oil pumps;
 A radar level gauge will be fitted to the hot oil expansion tank;
 A low-level switch will be installed on the expansion tank which will trip
the furnace and hot oil pumps and raise an alarm in the office;
 A degassing pot; and
 All electric equipment will be rated to the required zone classification.
3.7 HEAT TRACING
Unless identified by exception all pipelines and equipment operating in bitumen

service require heat tracing. Heat tracing may be either hot oil or electric.
Electric tracing will be in accordance with IEC 62086 Electrical Resistance
Trace.
3.8 THERMAL INSULATION AND CLADDING
All pipelines, tanks and equipment operating above 70°C will require thermal
insulation for heat conservation and personnel protection.
Thermal insulation will be designed, fabricated and installed in accordance with

best practices to shed and drain water and to minimise potential for corrosion
under insulation. Insulated pipes and equipment will be located so as to
minimise the potential for mechanical or pedestrian damage to insulation and
cladding.

12 1 November 2011
3.9 PIPEWORK
All pipework will be designed and constructed in accordance with the

appropriate piping classes e.g. (AS4041).
Pipework design will consider variations in operating temperatures (including

start up and shut down) and the corresponding impact on product viscosity.
A pipework stress analysis study will be completed to ensure that only

acceptable stresses are developed in pipework systems and transferred to
equipment nozzles. The stress analysis will consider start up, shut down and
operating conditions as well as shipping transfers.
A surge study will also be performed for the wharfline.
3.10 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM
It is expected that a Fire Safety Study will be conducted on this new facility.
However, it is anticipated that the fire protection facilities will include a fixed ring
main system with installed hydrants, hand held hoses, portable fire
extinguishers, fire and/or smoke detection, fire call points and a fire indicator
panel.

13 1 November 2011
4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
4.1 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
The proposed equipment will handle and store the following chemicals:
1. Bitumen;
2. Natural gas; and
3. Hot oil.
A summary of the material hazards is given below.
Bitumen
Bitumen is a complex black solid consisting of high molecular weight organic

compounds with carbon numbers greater than C25 and high carbon to
hydrogen ratios. It is used for road building, and industrial and civil engineering
applications. It is not classified as Hazardous according to the Worksafe
Australia criteria but it is combustible. Bitumen is relatively stable and unlikely
to react in a hazardous manner.
Bitumen can contain hydrogen sulphide, which is a toxic and flammable gas, as
well as other flammable light hydrocarbons. The latter can collect in confined
spaces, e.g. within a tank, and hence pose an explosion hazard. For the control
of ignition sources, e.g. avoid static buildup, equipment should be earthed and
hoses to be electrically continuous. Any confined areas where hydrogen
sulphide can collect pose significant risks to humans due to its toxicity. As
bitumen’s normal boiling point and flash point are both above 250 oC then the
fire hazard is relatively low. Care is therefore required to prevent overheating.
As bitumen is a solid at ambient temperature, it is normally handled and stored

at temperatures above 100oC. Therefore, contact with hot bitumen is a
potential burn hazard.
In the presence of water, there is a risk of boilover, i.e. on heating of the

bitumen and hence water, steam can be rapidly evolved with the potential to
overpressure tanks with subsequent losses of containment. Therefore, bitumen
tanks need to be as watertight as possible and any steam heating coils are
regularly checked for leaks. For bulk bitumen storage, the temperature should
not be allowed to fluctuate above and below 100 oC due to the risk of water
condensation leading to boilover.
It is possible that pyrophoric (self-heating) deposits may form inside storage

tanks. These can lead to fires and/or explosions. Products of combustion
include smoke, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, hydrogen sulphide and
oxides of sulphur.

14 1 November 2011
Whilst bitumen is not biodegradable, spills are unlikely to penetrate into the soil
and cause significant environmental impact. As it is relatively stable, spills are
also unlikely to have a long term impact on the aquatic environment.
Natural Gas
Natural gas is a Class 2.1 Dangerous Good (flammable gas).
Natural gas is a colourless hydrocarbon fluid mainly composed of the following

hydrocarbons:
 Methane (typically 88.5% or higher);
 Ethane (typically 8%);
 Propane (typically 0.2%);
 Carbon dioxide (typically 2%); and
 Nitrogen (typically 1.3%).
For a typical natural gas, the TLV is approximately 1,000 ppm and the STEL
(short term exposure limit) is 30,000 ppm (i.e. approaching 5 vol% which is the
lower explosive limit).
The hydrocarbons are not considered to represent a significant environmental

threat. Their hazard potential derives solely from the fact that they are
flammable materials.
To enable ready leak detection, natural gas is normally odorised with

mercaptans (sulphur containing hydrocarbons).
The flammability range is typically 5% to 15% v/v in air. The vapours are lighter
than air and will normally disperse safely if not confined and/or ignited.
Natural gas ignition can lead to jet fires, flash fires or vapour cloud explosions.
Products of combustion include carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide.
Hot Oil:
The proposed hot oil is classified as a combustible liquid. However, as it will be

handled at elevated temperatures, there is an increased risk of fires when
losses of containment occur, e.g. spraying of the hot oil with a source of ignition.
All petroleum products are potentially injurious to humans, e.g. carcinogenic

properties, and aquatic organisms.

15 1 November 2011
4.2 POTENTIAL HAZARDOUS INCIDENTS REVIEW
In accordance with the requirements of Guidelines for Hazard Analysis, (Ref 1),
it is necessary to identify hazardous events associated with the tank operations.
As recommended in HIPAP 6, the PHA focuses on “atypical and abnormal
events and conditions. It is not intended to apply to continuous or normal
operating emissions to air or water”.
A search of available literature and information was conducted to review the

types of historical events that can occur with bulk fuel terminals and bitumen
facilities. The search included the following references:
1. Frank Lees, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries (Ref 5);
2. Australian, US and UK Departments of Transport records;
3. US National Transport Safety Board statistics;
4. US Occupational Health and Safety Administration statistics;
5. US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board statistics;
6. UK Health and Safety Executive statistics; and
7. Previous risk studies for various terminals.
4.3 HAZARDOUS EVENTS - SHIPPING
Whilst it is not the purpose of this PHA to perform a detailed analysis of all
shipping activities at or near the BLB, the following types of potential hazardous
events are included for information. As previously noted in Section 1.3, the BLB
is a purpose built wharf specifically for transferring hazardous cargo such as the
materials stored at Port Botany and it is used by a number of companies. The
proposed changes to Vopak operations are commensurate with the design
intent of the BLB.
Hazardous events resulting from the release of the products include pool fires
upon ignition and pollution of the local environment.
Shipping incidents which could occur that may lead to losses of containment of
products include grounding, collision (ship-ship), impacts with the wharf and
movement away from the wharf during transfer.
Descriptions of potential scenarios are as follows (Refs 5 and 6).
Grounding
Grounding occurs when a vessel runs onto the shore or submerged rocks and
would require either loss of power and/or steering, human error or severe
weather conditions.

16 1 November 2011
Striking
This is where a vessel moored at the wharf is struck by another passing vessel.
The risk of significant damage to the moored vessel in such an event clearly
depends on the size, speed, direction and type of the vessel doing the
impacting.
Collision
Collision refers to the collision of two vessels underway, either with their own
power or being manoeuvred by tugs. The potential energy in such a collision
may theoretically be sufficient to damage the outer and inner (if included) hulls
of a vessel.
Impact with Wharf
Impact with the wharf / jetty could result from the vessel approaching the wharf
too fast or attempting to dock during bad weather.
Fire / Explosion
A fire or explosion (e.g. within the engine room) on a vessel may spread to
involve the cargo and/or bunker. A fire / explosion could also occur directly
within the cargo.
Transfer Incidents
Losses of containment can occur while a vessel is being loaded / unloaded.

Causes include water hammer from, for example, fast closing of valves,
movement of the ship away from the wharf, line failures due to mechanical
impact from a vehicle, corrosion, mechanical defect (e.g. poor weld), flange
leaks and thermal expansion of trapped liquid causing overpressure, hose or
hose coupling failures, and human error, e.g. leaving drain valves open.
Overflowing of the vessel’s tanks can also occur during loading.
In addition to the above events, the following events are also possible but are
generally found to represent lower risks:
Foundering / Capsize
This occurs when a ship sinks in rough weather or a leak has occurred.
Structural Failure
This occurs where the cargo tank cracks due to fatigue, wave loads, vibration or
adverse cargo load distribution.
Aircraft Strike
There exists the possibility of an aircraft or helicopter impact with the ship.

17 1 November 2011
Spontaneous Failure
Manufacturing defects may lead to a spontaneous failure of the cargo tank.
Domino Incident
Where an accident on one ship either causes or is caused by an accident on a

nearby ship or in a storage or process plant onshore.
Sabotage / Terrorism
It is possible that an act of sabotage, either from company or non-company

employees or terrorism can lead to a loss of containment.
Natural Events
Natural events such as strong winds can lead to losses of containment.
The accident outcomes for the above causes for a loss of containment of
products could be a fire (pool fire) and/or environmental effect, including fish
and bird kill. These events can also lead to injuries due to radiant heat impact
and/or equipment damage. Fires will also release products of combustion such
as carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, water vapour, NOx, soot etc. As the
bitumen is hot, burns to people can also occur should a loss of containment
occur. These potential hazardous events can occur now at the BLB or
immediate area for the bulk liquid fuels and the use of the berth for bitumen is
not considered inappropriate.
4.4 HAZARDOUS EVENTS – TERMINAL OPERATIONS
In keeping with the principles of risk assessments, credible, hazardous events

with the potential for off-site effects have been identified. That is, “slips, trips
and falls” type events are not included nor are non-credible situations such as
an aircraft crash occurring at the same time as an earthquake. The large
majority of the specific release scenarios are generic equipment failures, e.g.
failures of tanks, pipes etc, as per previous industrial incidents. These are
supplemented by process incidents due to other abnormal modes of operation,
control system failure and human error.
The credible, significant incidents identified for the proposed bitumen facility are
summarised in the Hazard Identification Word Diagram following (Table 1). A
literature search of incidents involving bitumen processing and storage facilities
indicates numerous events involving bitumen. One study (Ref 7) on heated
bitumen tanks shows that there were 73 significant incidents reported in the UK
during the period 1971 to 1992. The results of the literature search are
combined in the scenarios in Table 1.
This diagram presents the causes and consequences of the events, together
with major preventative and protective features that are included as part of the
design.

18 1 November 2011
Table 1 – Hazard Identification Word Diagram – Bitumen Facility
Event Hazardous Event Causes Possible Consequences Proposed Prevention and Mitigation
ID No. Control Measures
1. Explosion within a Buildup of flammable gases Damage to the tank and possible injury to Bitumen tanks have frangible roofs to prevent
bitumen tank or from the bitumen with people nearby, e.g. by ejected bitumen. excessive explosion overpressures
vessel subsequent source of Potential for missile generation and developing and also include large diameter
ignition (such as electrical propagation to nearby equipment. Explosions emergency vents.
equipment). can result in a bitumen fire.
Hazardous Area Electrical Equipment
Welding on a tank with For historical tank explosions, some tanks standards applied.
bitumen still present. have rocketed away from the foundations
Control of ignition sources throughout the
Unblocking pipes or vents terminal.
with direct flames.
All equipment is to be earthed.
Low level in the bitumen
tanks with exposure of the Hot work permits for maintenance.
heating tubes. This can
lead to temperatures above Unblocking procedures are based on the
the autoignition point for the storage and handling of bitumen products
vapours in the tank. standard (DR 07435 CP; previously AIP CP
20).
Overheating a tank and
hence the potential for The storage tank temperatures are
greater flammable vapour automatically controlled at about 140 C.
generation.
Heating is by coils via hot oil and no direct
Smouldering of deposits on flame heating.
the underside of the roof
can lead to high enough Hot oil high temperature is limited with alarms
temperatures (if sufficient and trips.
oxygen is present) for the
flammable vapours to Storage tanks designed to maintain minimum
autoignite level above heating floor coils (normal draw-

19 1 November 2011
off point higher than upper heating coil level).
Stripper drain locked closed except for

maintenance purposes (procedural control to
isolate heating etc).
Fire protection facilities available, e.g. ring

main with hydrants
2. Self-ignition of Bitumen heated and Tank fire (typically slow burning) with toxic Low likelihood event given the proposed
bitumen. exposed to air. products of combustion and radiant heat bitumen grades have low sulphur content.
emitted. Potential for injury to people nearby
Note that when Deposits can build-up, e.g. and environmental impact The storage tank temperatures are
oxygen levels fall under tank roofs due to the automatically controlled at about 140 C.
below 3%, the condensation of hot
tank condition vapours, which can auto- Heating is by coils and no direct flame
o
favours the ignite around 190 C or at heating.
formation of lower temperatures if iron
pyrophoric sulphide is present. Hot oil high temperature is limited with alarms
materials. Deposits can also self-heat and trips.
Smouldering of if their thickness exceeds
deposits can critical values. Deposit Storage tanks are balanced with atmospheric
lower the oxygen formation will increase with air in breathing (21% oxygen).
levels to below overheating, i.e. excessive
3% vapour generation Storage tank roofs are not heated but they are
insulated.
Deposits within tanks are to be removed

during ten year tank shutdowns when the tank
is cool and high pressure water jetting or
mechanical cutting tools are used

20 1 November 2011
3. Burns or People exposed to hot Burn injuries. The piping design is to comply with existing
exposure to bitumen from losses of Vopak and Australian Standards, e.g.
hydrogen containment. Potential for toxic impact from hydrogen AS4041, to minimise the likelihood of losses
sulphide. Note sulphide. This may result in fatality if the dose of containment.
that these events People exposed to is high enough. Note that people may suffer
will not contribute hydrogen sulphide from loss of smell at high concentrations of Trained first aiders available from Site B for
to off-site risk but losses of containment or hydrogen sulphide, e.g. 300 ppm elevated temperature bitumen burns.
are included for entering confined spaces
completeness Safety showers are to be located throughout
the bitumen processing facility for quick
quenching of any hot bitumen that may be
stuck on people’s skin or for cooling of any
burns.
Road tanker loading is enabled by the driver

being in a protected booth and fumes are
extracted from area.
Confined space entries, risk assessments and

permits are included in the Vopak safety
management system.
o
The bitumen will not be heated above 200 C
in the storage tanks nor road tankers to avoid
generating too much fumes.
Fumes / vapours are handled by extracting /

treating or returned to source tanks and are
not free vented to limit exposure potential.
Emergency response including ringing 000 to

get an ambulance for the affected people to
get to hospitals for further treatment.

21 1 November 2011
200 ppm of H2S in tank (typically as tested in

tank ullage), i.e. typically below fatal level for
short exposures.
Access to the tank bunds to be banned

(signage / chain across stairs to be installed)
and as well as banning access to the tank
tops during shipping discharges.
Tanks will vent to a combustor via ducting

during shipping discharges (note H2S hazard
in combustor area).
Confined Space Entry Rules to apply to bund

access.
Special, enclosed type sampling devices to be

used
o
4. Tank boilover Water entering a tank and Steam will be generated with the potential to All tanks to be kept above 100 C to prevent
being heated overpressure the tank, causing failure, and water condensation.
resulting in a loss of containment
Tanks will have a large diameter emergency
vent as well as open goose neck vents.
Steam will not be used to heat the tanks (hot

oil used).
Frangible roofs

22 1 November 2011
5. Overflowing a Incorrect conversion factors Potential for burns. Bitumen tanks safefill level to be nominated
bitumen tank for changes in bitumen and included in the level monitoring and
temperature. Potential for a fire if exposed to source of alarming system.
ignition with injury to people, damage to
Failure of the level equipment and environmental impact from Level instrumentation to be included in the
instruments products of combustion existing Vopak preventative maintenance
systems.
Redundant independent level systems on all

tanks with additional alarms.
Tanks are bunded.
Control of ignition sources in the bunded

areas
6. Major mechanical Metal fatigue Large spillage of bitumen in bund. Fire if Tanks designed to API 650.
failure of tanks ignited.
Faulty fabrication Bitumen solidifies quickly when heating
Impact to people (radiant heat and/or removed.
Corrosion of tank base / exposure to products), property and the
weld environment (products of combustion) Regular maintenance and inspection
procedures.
Adjacent tank on fire
Tank and site fire protection facilities available

23 1 November 2011
7. Loss of Pipe failures, e.g. due to Potential for burns. Regular maintenance and inspection
containment from corrosion, valves left open, procedures.
piping systems hose failures, pump seal, Potential for a fire if exposed to source of
shaft or casing failures and ignition with injury to people, damage to Emergency isolation valves on the outlet lines
water in the hot oil system equipment and environmental impact from of the new tanks.
products of combustion.
Fire fighting system.
Hot oil transfer / return pipework leaks
Most pipes in bunded areas; all pumps are
bunded.
Pipelines surge study.
The piping is designed to ASME 31.3 / AS

4041 to resist the combined effects on internal
pressure due to contents, wind loads,
earthquake forces and hydrostatic test loads.
Trained first aiders on site for elevated

temperature bitumen burns.
Safety showers are to be located throughout

the bitumen processing facility for quick
quenching of any hot bitumen that may be
stuck on people’s skin or for cooling of any
burns.
Operators to wear additional appropriate PPE

for handling bitumen if they have potential for
exposure; i.e. heat resistant gauntlet gloves,
face shield and hood (all skin protected).
Bitumen hoses to be included in the existing

24 1 November 2011
Vopak Hose Register with routine inspection,
testing and replacement.
The hot oil system includes an expansion tank

with a 200 mm free vent and a vessel
pressure rating of 400 kPa to cope with
overpressure should water ingress occur
8. Loss of Pipe failures, e.g. due to Potential for burns. The piping design is to comply with existing
containment at corrosion, valves left open, Vopak and Australian Standards, e.g.
the berth hose failures. Potential for a fire if exposed to source of AS4041, to minimise the likelihood of losses
ignition with injury to people, damage to of containment.
Hose rupture on an equipment and environmental impact from
emergency shutdown valve products of combustion. Operators to wear additional appropriate PPE
(ESV) closure for handling bitumen if they have potential for
Potential for bitumen to enter the water, sink exposure; i.e. heat resistant gauntlet gloves,
and hence environmental impact face shield and hood (all skin protected).
Safety showers are located at the BLB for

quick quenching of any hot bitumen that may
be stuck on people’s skin or for cooling of any
burns.
Trained first aiders on site for elevated

temperature bitumen burns.
Bitumen hoses to be included in the existing

Vopak Hose Register with routine inspection,
testing and replacement
Surge study will be done on the wharfline

system. There will be a slow closure rate for
the ESV’s. Slow line velocity (300 mm line at
400 m3 per hour) to limit surging

25 1 November 2011
9. Loss of Pipe failures, e.g. due to Most likely outcome is a spill onto the ground Regular maintenance and inspection
containment in corrosion, thermal with subsequent cooling and solidification. procedures.
the Pipeline overpressure, pipe thermal Few sources of ignition exist in the Pipeline
Corridor expansion or third party Corridor. Emergency isolation valves.
activity / malicious act
Note, however, when solid deposits are Fire fighting system.
heated, there is the risk of flammable vapours
being evolved with subsequent ignition and Pipelines surge and thermal expansion study.
burning of the bitumen
Routine inspections during transfers
10. Insulation fires Loss of containment of Potential for fires, i.e. from burning of the Small amount of bitumen adsorbed as limited
bitumen into the piping, bitumen and/or flammable vapours, and to about 50 mm thick insulation around tanks.
tank or vessel insulation. hence propagation to the adjoining system
Flammable vapours are limited and H2S is
Light ends dripping from readily noticeable at low odour levels of 0.005
the tank top vents ppm well before LEL.
Combustible product.
Fire fighting systems.
Tank top vent design includes drip catchment

(for light ends).
The insulation specification includes

waterproofing and minimised roof top
openings to handrail supports etc (that may
allow ingress)

26 1 November 2011
11. Failure of a hot oil High temperature induced Potential for bitumen and flammable vapours Hot oil piping designed to suit conditions.
heater coil (in a failure, cycling of the metal to enter the heating circuit. The flammable
tank) temperature, corrosion, vapours could ignite, e.g. when exiting the hot Hot oil piping system is higher pressure
material of construction oil head tank (usually 5 to 10 bar) than bitumen storage so
failure leaks are into bitumen system. The top of the
bitumen tanks are designed for Zone 1 so no
immediate ignition sources.
Regular testing and monitoring of hot oil for

degradation and in turn contamination.
Fire fighting systems

12. Hot oil fires Loss of containment of hot Hot oil fire with the potential to burn people Hot oil is combustible product at maximum
oil with subsequent ignition, and/or damage nearby equipment. Products temperature.
e.g. pump seal failures or of combustion, e.g. smoke, will have an
sprays from a joint failure, environmental impact Furnace leak likelihood low due to routine
or failure of a hot oil tube visual inspection and routine NDT (non-
within the furnace destructive testing).
Furnace explosion side panels. Fire fighting

systems
13. Explosion within Operating the oil at high Potential for the hot oil to crack to lighter The hot oil temperature is limited to 270 C.
the hot oil system temperatures for a hydrocarbons which can accumulate within High temperature trip (in the emergency
significant period of time the vessels, e.g. the hot oil expansion tank. If shutdown system [ESD]). SIL study to
ignited, these lighter hydrocarbons can lead to confirm adequacy of the overheat protection.
an explosion (i.e. they have lower flash points
than the bitumen) Regular sampling and replacement of the hot
oil.
Control of ignition sources within the facility.
Hot work permits for any spark producing

activities

27 1 November 2011
14. Loss of Pipe failure, e.g. corrosion, Potential for a jet fire, flash fire or vapour Piping is welded steel or brazed copper and at
containment of flange failure or impact. cloud explosion (particularly if some degree of low pressure.
natural gas confinement exists), if ignited. These events
Valve left open can lead to injury and/or radiant heat / Piping is designed and constructed to AS
explosion overpressure damage to 2885, Gas Pipelines code.
equipment. In the absence of confinement,
most probable outcome will be jet or flash Fully welded pipeline with no flanges in the
fires if ignited natural gas pipeline except at regulator;
metering and control valve stations / areas.
All drain and vent valves are plugged.
Annual pipeline inspection as part of the

regular maintenance and inspection
procedures.
Piping is located in open areas promoting

good dispersion of buoyant gas.
Gas is odorous and periodically patrolling

enables easy detection if leaking
15. Internal explosion Passing natural gas Potential for an internal explosion within the Double isolation valves as automatic
within the oil isolation valves during a heater which can result in injuries to nearby shutdown with a certified burner management
heaters shutdown and the heaters personnel and/or damage to equipment. unit. Pre-purge before start up sequence.
are not adequately purged Historically, the effects of these types of
at startup incidents are generally local to the heaters Testing of shutdown and pre-purge sequence
on a regular basis to AS 3788 as part of
procedures.
Furnace explosion side panels

28 1 November 2011
16. Internal explosion Gas mixture is in the Potential for an internal explosion within the Detection of no flame closes the double
within the vapour flammable region, e.g. combustor which can result in injuries to isolation valves.
combustor during a startup, and a nearby personnel and/or damage to
source of ignition is equipment. Historically, the effects of these Pre-purge before start up sequence.
present, e.g. flame igniter types of incidents are generally local to the
combustors (the combustor is an open ended Testing of shutdown and pre-purge sequence
burner in a vertical chamber) on a regular basis to AS 3788 as part of
procedures.
Detonation arrestors fitted at tanks, road

tanker loading and vapour combustor. These
will be included in the preventative
maintenance system for routine cleaning
17. Transformer fires Short circuiting, build-up of Potential for an initial explosion followed by a Low load, sealed 11KV transformer.
/ MCC fires flammable gas (hydrogen) fire involving the transformer oil. Potential for
in the oil with subsequent damage to the electrical equipment within the Testing schedule for transformers and oil
ignition, loss of containment MCC. Potential to damage nearby equipment degradation.
of oil with subsequent and/or injure people
ignition Separated from plant and people activity
areas.
Emergency Response Plan includes fire

events.
Smoke detection within the MCC.
Flammable and combustible materials will not

be stored within the MCC

29 1 November 2011
18. Leak during filling Failure of loading arm. Leak of bitumen in loading area. High level of surveillance and immediate
of road tanker access button to shutdown systems.
Leak from valves or fittings. Fire if ignited.
Drivers are well trained so as to minimise
Road tanker overfill. Impact to people (radiant heat and/or chance of operator error and ensure quick
exposure to products), property and the response to leaks.
Switch loading (Class 3 environment (products of combustion)
fumes from cutback Driver Pre-Checklist in place.
bitumen tankers).
Ignition sources controlled at top of road
Boilover (water traces in tanker.
RTL compartment)
Road tanker overfill shutdown system.
Driver training including a slow start to filling

where the driver can listen for water (will
create cracking / popping sounds if present in
road tanker).
Proposed entry traffic lights to prohibit entry

into the neighbouring bay during the initial
start sequence

30 1 November 2011
19. Road tanker Failure of procedures and Leak of bitumen in loading area. Driver training.
drive-away hardware interlocks
incident (i.e. Fire if ignited. Driver not in cab during filling but monitoring
driver does not at same elevation as loading arm.
disconnect the Impact to people (radiant heat and/or
arm and drives exposure to products), property and the Automatic loading system instructs driver on
away from the environment (products of combustion). actions required.
loading bay)
Loading arm break-away Ignition sources controlled at top of road
tanker.
Traffic lights (or boom gates) to be installed.
Walkway and loading arm not rigidly

connected to vehicle, therefore, expect minor
damage only
20. Road accident Bad road or traffic Most likely outcome is no loss of load. Design of road tankers to survive accident
(off-site) conditions without a loss of containment - pipes and
Leak may occur, leading to fire. running gear designed to shear off without
product loss
Impact to people (radiant heat and/or
exposure to products), property and the Driver training and choice of routes to reduce
environment (products of combustion) accident potential
21. Aircraft crash Pilot error. Propagation to tank / bund fires. As per aviation standards
Bad weather. Impact to people (radiant heat and/or

exposure to products), property and the
Plane fault environment (products of combustion)

31 1 November 2011
22. Strong winds, Strong winds cause Loss of containment leading to a fire if ignited The tanks are designed API 650 / AS 1692 /
earthquakes, equipment damage etc (as above) AS 1170 to resist the combined effects on
floods internal pressure due to contents, weight of
platforms, ladders, live loads, wind loads,
earthquake forces and hydrostatic test loads.
Operations stopped in adverse weather

conditions
23. Breach of Disgruntled employee or Possible release of product with Security measures include fencing, CCTV,
Security / intruder consequences as per above security patrols, operator / driver vigilance.
Sabotage
Pressure tests prior to commissioning
transfer.
Pipe inspections prior to commissioning

transfer; regularly during ship discharge and
otherwise on a periodic basis

32 1 November 2011
5 RISK ANALYSIS
The assessment of risks to both the public as well as to operating personnel

around this industrial development requires the application of the basic steps
outlined in Section 1. As per HIPAP 6 (Ref 1), the chosen analysis technique
should be commensurate with the nature of the risks involved.
The typical risk analysis methodology attempts to take account of all credible
hazardous situations that may arise from the operation of processing plants etc.
For quantitative risk analysis (QRA), this is done by first taking a probabilistic
approach to vessel and pipe failures for all vessels containing hazardous
materials. Specific incidents, identified by a variety of techniques, are then
added and the combined data used to generate composite risk contours which
can be used for both the public and plant personnel.
Having assembled data on possible incidents, risk analysis requires the

following general approach for individual incidents (which are then summated
for all potential recognised incidents to get cumulative risk):
Risk = Likelihood x Consequence
For QRA and hazard analysis, the consequences of an incident are calculated
using standard correlations and probit-type methods which assess the effect of
fire radiation, explosion overpressure and toxicity to an individual, depending on
the type of hazard.
In this PHA, however, the approach adopted to assess the risk of the identified
hazardous events is scenario based risk assessment. The reasons for this
approach are:
1. The distance to residential and other sensitive land users is large for the Port
Botany area and hence it is unlikely that any significant consequential impacts,
e.g. due to radiant heat from fires, from the proposed equipment will have any
significant contribution to off-site risk; and
2. The distance between the on-site tanks and other equipment to the
neighbouring industrial facilities is relatively large, hence, the consequential
impacts may not have any significant contribution to off-site industrial risk.
Therefore, appropriate analysis of credible scenarios is performed in this PHA.

Initially, the consequences of the potential events with off-site impact are
assessed. For the events which do not contribute to off-site risk (as determined
by the risk criteria in HIPAP No. 4 (Ref 2) then no further risk analysis is
warranted. When the consequence of an event does contribute to off-site, the
likelihood and hence risk is then analysed as required.

33 1 November 2011
The risk criteria applying to developments in NSW are summarised in Table 2

below (from Ref 2).
Table 2 - Risk Criteria, New Plants
Description Risk Criteria

-6
Fatality risk to sensitive uses, including hospitals, schools, aged care 0.5 x 10 per year
-6
Fatality risk to residential and hotels 1 x 10 per year
-6
Fatality risk to commercial areas, including offices, retail centres, 5 x 10 per year
warehouses
-6
Fatality risk to sporting complexes and active open spaces 10 x 10 per year
-6
Fatality risk to be contained within the boundary of an industrial site 50 x 10 per year
-6
Injury risk – incident heat flux radiation at residential areas should not 50 x 10 per year
2
exceed 4.7 kW/m at frequencies of more than 50 chances in a
million per year or incident explosion overpressure at residential
areas should not exceed 7 kPa at frequencies of more than 50
chances in a million per year
-6
Toxic exposure - Toxic concentrations in residential areas which 10 x 10 per year
would be seriously injurious to sensitive members of the community
following a relatively short period of exposure
-6
Toxic exposure - Toxic concentrations in residential areas which 50 x 10 per year
should cause irritation to eyes or throat, coughing or other acute
physiological responses in sensitive members of the community
-6
Propagation due to Fire and Explosion – exceed radiant heat levels 50 x 10 per year
2
of 23 kW/m or explosion overpressures of 14 kPa in adjacent
industrial facilities
As discussed above, the consequences of the potential hazardous events are

initially analysed to determine if any events have the potential to contribute to
the above-listed criteria and hence worthy of further analysis.

34 1 November 2011
5.1 POOL FIRE MODELLING
The credible hazardous events associated with the bitumen operations are
largely pool fires due to potential losses of containment being ignited. The
potential fire events associated with the new equipment are detailed in Table 4.
This data is used in the fire modelling. A discussion on burndown rates and
surface emissive powers is given below.
Burndown Rates:
For burning liquid pools (Ref 8), heat is transferred to the liquid via conduction,
radiation and from the pool rim. For pool fires less than 1 m diameter, the
radiative heat transfer and the resulting burning rate increases with pool
diameter. For pool diameters greater than 1 m, radiative heat transfer
dominates, thus a constant burning rate is expected.
Wind can affect the burning rate (experiments have shown both an increase
and decrease in burning rates due to the effects wind) but also can affect flame
stability (and hence average flame emissive power) (Ref 9). Therefore, average
reported values for burndown rates are used in this study.
For very large pool fires with diameters greater than 5 to 10 m, there is some
evidence of a slight decrease in burning rate. This is believed to be due to poor
mixing with air and is unlikely to reduce the burning rate by more than 20%.
Typical burndown rates for general hydrocarbon fuels are 4 to 6 mm/min (Refs
5 and 10). An average value of 5 mm/min is used for the hot oil. Due to the
heavy nature of bitumen, the burndown rate is taken to be 2 mm/min (Ref 5).
The burning rate is used in the determination of flame height. Normally, the
higher the burning rate, the higher the estimated flame height.
Surface Emissive Power:
Surface emissive power can be either derived by calculation or by

experimentation. Unfortunately, experimental values for surface emissive
powers are limited.
When calculated, the results can be overly conservative, particularly for large
diameter fires, as it is assumed that the entire flame is at the same surface
emissive power. This is not the case for large diameter fires as air entrainment
to the centre of the flame is limited and hence inefficient combustion occurs.
A surface emissive power correlation that fits experimental data well for
products that produce smokey flames (as is the case for bitumen) is as follows
(Ref 8):
SEP (average) = 140 x e (-0.12xD) + 20 x (1 – e (-0.12xD))
Where D = the pool fire diameter.

35 1 November 2011
The constant, 140 kW/m2, is the maximum emissive power of luminous spots
and the constant, 20 kW/m2, is the emissive power of smoke.
The values in the following table are derived from this equation.
Table 3 – Predicted SEP
Diameter, m SEP Average,

2
kW/m
1 126
5 86
10 56
15 40
20 31
25 26
30 23
35 22
40 21
45 21
50 20
Note that materials such as propane, ethane, LNG, ethanol and other low
molecular weight materials do not produce sooty flames.
The distances to specified radiant heat levels for the potential fire scenarios are
shown in Table 4. The distances were calculated using the View Factor model
for pool fires (Refs 5 and 10). This model was used as it better approximates
the square sided potential bund fires. It will be slightly conservative for the tank
top fires. Graphical representations of the estimated radiant heat contours are
shown in Appendix 2.

36 1 November 2011
Table 4 – Fire Scenarios Calculation Data and Results
Note that “Eq. D” is the equivalent diameter of the fire (4 x the fire area / the fire perimeter) and “SEP” is the surface emissive power (i.e. the radiant heat level
of the flames). Where bund fires width is significantly different to the length, the top row results corresponds to the radiant heat predicted for an object
perpendicular to the width and the bottom row results corresponds to the radiant heat predicted for an object perpendicular to the length.
Item Item Description Width, Length, Eq. D, Tank Liquid SEP, Distance to Specified Radiant Heat Level, m
2
No. m m m Height, Density, kW/m (from base of flame)
3
m kg/m
35 23 12.6 4.7 2.1

2 2 2 2 2
kW/m kW/m kW/m kW/m kW/m
1 Bund fire, i.e. for all 66 70 68 - 970 20 - - 4 34 66
three tanks - - 4 35 68
2 Individual bund fire 36 37 34 - 970 22 - - 5 23 42
(Tank B used)
3 Pump bund 8 29 8 - 970 66 3 5 8 15 24
4 Tank top fire - - 22 27 970 29 - - 7 20 34
5 Bitumen road tanker bay 8 8 8 - 970 66 3 5 8 15 24
fire
6 Hot oil unit fire 8 12 8 875 66 3 5 8 15 24
Notes for Table 4:
1. Note that Scenario Numbers 2 and 6 are modelled as a channel fire, i.e. the equivalent diameter is taken as the width (to estimate the flame height) along
the entire length of the channel.
2. The fire dimensions for a road tanker bay fire are based on typical conditions expected once the fire is established.

37 1 November 2011
The maximum ground level radiant heat values for the tank top fires are
typically much lower due to the angle from the base of the flames
(approximately the tank top height) to the ground. Representative ground level
radiant heat levels are as follows.
1 Tanks, 22 m diameter, tank height being approximately 27 metres - a

maximum ground level radiant heat value of 3.3 kW/m2 at 10 metres
from the tank wall is estimated.
The values of interest for radiant heat (DoP, HIPAP No. 4 and ICI HAZAN
Course notes) are shown in Table 5.
Table 5 - Radiant Heat Impact
HEAT FLUX EFFECT

2
(kW/m )
1.2 Received from the sun at noon in summer
2.1 Minimum to cause pain after 1 minute
4.7 Will cause pain in 15-30 seconds and second degree burns after 30
seconds. Glass breaks
12.6 30% chance of fatality for continuous exposure. High chance of injury
Wood can be ignited by a naked flame after long exposure
23 100% chance of fatality for continuous exposure to people and 10%
chance of fatality for instantaneous exposure
Spontaneous ignition of wood after long exposure
Unprotected steel will reach thermal stress temperatures to cause
failure
35 25% chance of fatality if people are exposed instantaneously.
Storage tanks fail
60 100% chance of fatality for instantaneous exposure
For information, further data on tolerable radiant heat levels is shown in Table 6.
Table 6 – Layout Considerations – Tolerable Radiant Heat Levels
Plant Item Tolerable Radiant Heat Source

2
Level, kW/m
Drenched Storage Tanks 38 Ref 5

Special Buildings (Protected) 25 Ref 5
Cable Insulation Degrades 18-20 Ref 5
Normal Buildings 14 Ref 5
Vegetation 12 Ref 5
Plastic Melts 12 Ref 5
Escape Routes 6 Ref 5

38 1 November 2011
Plant Item Tolerable Radiant Heat Source

2
Level, kW/m
Glass Breakage 4 Ref 11

Personnel in Emergencies 3 Ref 5
Plastic Cables 2 Ref 5
Stationary Personnel 1.5 Ref 5
The results in Table 4 are analysed as follows to check compliance with HIPAP
4 (Ref 2) risk criteria.
For assessment of the effects of radiant heat, it is generally assumed that if a

person is subjected to 4.7 kW/m2 of radiant heat and they can take cover within
approximately 20 seconds then no serious injury, and hence fatality, is
expected. However, exposure to a radiant heat level of 12.6 kW/m2 can result
in fatality for some people for limited exposure durations. Therefore, for the
larger spills, appropriate emergency response actions are required to minimise
the potential for harm to people. This should include moving people away from
such releases to a safe distance.
Given the large distance to the nearest residential area (approximately 1 km to

the east) and the estimated radiant heat levels from the potential fire events
shown in Table 4 then there is no credible risk of injury or fatality in residential
areas or to other sensitive land users.
Correspondingly, the risk criteria for fatality and injury (Table 2) in residential
areas are satisfied for radiant heat from fires.
The results in Table 4 also show that the estimated levels of radiant heat at
neighbouring industrial areas (including the pipeline corridor and the Origin
Energy site) are less than 12.6 kW/m2. It is possible under some wind
conditions that the radiant heat levels will increase downwind, e.g. due to flame
drag or wind tilt. This may occur for the larger bund fires. Fortunately the
likelihood of these potential fire events is low (approximately 6 x 10 -6 per year
for large bund fires, Ref 12).
Given that the radiant heat levels are less than 12.6 kW/m2 at neighbouring
facilities and the adjacent areas are not usually occupied then it is unlikely that
fatality at these industrial neighbouring areas will result from these events.
The risk of propagation due to fires to neighbouring industrial areas (i.e.

exceeding 23 kW/m2) is not expected given the predicted results in Table 4.
Therefore, the criterion of 50 x 10-6/year for industrial propagation risk for

exceeding 23 kW/m2 (Table 2) is satisfied for fire events.
Hence, propagation to neighbouring industrial facilities is unlikely due to radiant

heat from pool fires.

39 1 November 2011
For the same reasons above for off-site propagation not being expected,
propagation within the Vopak’ site, i.e. across the internal access road to the
existing adjacent tanks, is not expected given the predicted results in Table 4
(i.e. the 23 kW/m2 contours do not impact existing plant areas). In the event
that strong winds are blowing in this direction during a low likelihood bitumen
bund fire event then emergency cooling will need to be provided to these
existing tanks to prevent propagation.
Should a large loss of containment occur from the tanks and be ignited then, as
per the current bund design, the other intact bitumen tanks in the larger pit are
at risk of failure. This is a common business risk for pit designs where the
intermediate bund walls within the pit are lower than the outer bund walls.
Given the limited radiant heat impact as above, no further risk analysis of the
identified pool fire scenarios is warranted in this study as compliance with the
DoP criteria (Table 2) has been shown.
5.2 PRODUCTS OF COMBUSTION
There is a potential risk to those attending a fire emergency (and possibly off-
site) of effects from toxic products of combustion, e.g. carbon oxides and
smoke, as well as vaporised product (i.e. not combusted).
Impact from toxic products of combustion will only be significant, generally, local
to the fire. As stated in Lees (Ref 5):
“The hot products of combustion rising from a fire typically have a temperature
in the range 800-1200oC and a density a quarter that of air.”
Hence, a buoyant plume is formed (as seen when smoke is emitted from a
chimney) and the combustion products rise and are dispersed as per the
prevailing wind / weather conditions. Several runs of the Brigg’s Plume Model
(Ref 9) for various combinations of weather / wind conditions and fire
temperatures show that the plume rises from a 22 m diameter tank fire to at
least 132 metres and then disperses via passive dispersion in the down wind
direction. Momentum effects continue to cause the plume to rise whilst it is
dispersing. The results are shown in Table 7. The results also show that plume
rise is insensitive to fire temperature variations of 800 oC +/- 100oC (not shown).
An efflux velocity of 5 m/s for the products of combustion is taken for the fire
event.
Table 7 – Fire Plume Rise Modelling
Wind (m/s) / Initial Height of

Weather Plume, m
5D 132
3E 220
2F 330

40 1 November 2011
Therefore, unless a temperature inversion exists where reverse atmospheric

currents can occur (i.e. air slumps to the ground as opposed to air eddies that
rise), no effect at ground level is expected. Note that dispersion models best
account for temperature inversions by using F class stability (i.e. typically when
the adiabatic lapse rate is positive). The models, however, do not include the
provision for air slumping to ground.
5.3 NATURAL GAS FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS
Failures associated with the natural gas feed line to the hot oil heaters or
combustor will release the natural gas to atmosphere and, if ignited, it can form
a jet fire, a flash fire and/or an explosion.
The natural gas line is proposed to be installed from the existing street main to
the new Utilities Building, i.e. adjacent to Friendship Road and the weighbridge
area. This building will house the hot oil heaters etc. The supply pressure is 4
barg and the gas pipe will be 75 mm nominal diameter. The pipe will have
welded joints where possible. All flanged joints will have a hazardous
atmosphere zone around them.
The analysis of the potential jet fires from the natural gas feed line to the hot oil
heaters / combustor is shown in Table 8. From above, the natural gas pressure
is taken as 4 barg at ambient temperature.
Table 8 –Natural Gas Jet Fires
Stream Estimated Estimated

Release Rate, Length of Jet,
kg/s m
Full bore failure (75 mm) 2.3 15
50 mm hole 1.0 10
13 mm hole 0.07 3
Notes: Jet flames modelled using methane.
However, as the new gas pipeline is to be piped underground from the street
main and then above ground only when entering the new Utilities Building
(valves / regulators etc to be installed on the outside of the Utility Building wall)
then the risk of adverse radiant heat levels being imposed off-site from a natural
gas fire is low.
Potential flash fires and vapour cloud explosions (in particular, if the gas cloud
is large and/or confined) can occur from the natural gas line failures, i.e.
delayed ignition.
The effects from explosion overpressures (Ref 2) are summarised in Table 9.

41 1 November 2011
Table 9 – Effects of Explosion Overpressure
OVERPRESSURE, kPa PHYSICAL EFFECT
3.5 90% glass breakage
No fatality, very low probability of injury
7 Damage to internal partitions & Joinery
10% probability of injury, no fatality
14 Houses uninhabitable and badly cracked
21 Reinforced structures distort, storage tanks fail
20% chance of fatality to person in building
35 Houses uninhabitable, rail wagons & plant items overturned.
Threshold of eardrum damage, 50% chance of fatality for a person

in a building, 15% in the open
70 Complete demolition of houses
Threshold of lung damage, 100% chance of fatality for a person in a

building or in the open
For flash fires, any person inside the flash fire cloud is assumed to be fatally
injured. As flash fires are of limited duration (typically burning velocity is 1 m/s,
Ref 13) then those outside the flash fire cloud have a high probability of survival
without serious injury.
The analysis of the potential flash fires and vapour cloud explosions from the
natural gas pipe failures is shown in Table 10. The mass calculated in the
flammable range is assumed to be 25% confined, i.e. 25% of the gas is involved
in the explosion calculations. As methane is not a high reactive flammable gas
and the quantities involved are relatively small then a weak deflagration is
assumed in the explosion calculations (multi-energy method – TNO).
Table 10 – Natural Gas Vapour Cloud Explosions and Flash Fires
Stream Mass of Radius of Distance (m) Distance (m)

Natural Gas Flash Fire, to 14 kPa to 7 kPa
in the m Explosion Explosion
Flammable Overpressure Overpressure
Range, kg
Full bore failure (75 mm) 81 64 m < 10 m 22 m
50 mm hole 20 37 m <8m 15 m
Notes: 1. Pipeline failures assumed to be isolated within 30 minutes.

42 1 November 2011
2. Radius of flash fires calculated for F weather stability and 2 m/s wind speed.
3. 13 mm holes not modelled as they are too small to generate gas clouds of any
significant size.
For these releases of natural gas, choked flow exists and rapid jet mixing with
air occurs. The result is a relatively small vapour cloud size with limited
consequential impacts if ignited. The probability of ignition with a subsequent
explosion is significantly less than 1% (Ref 10).
The 30 minute release duration also has no significant impact on the release.
Steady state conditions are reached soon after the release occurs (i.e. after
approximately 4 minutes, the distance to the LEL does not change at steady
state dispersion conditions).
Given these results for the natural gas vapour cloud explosions and flash fires,
no significant adverse consequential impacts will be imposed off-site. The low
likelihoods for these events are supported by the following data.
For piping failures, frequencies have been estimated either from data compiled
and published by ICI (Ref 14) or from frequency estimates published by the
Institution of Chemical Engineers (Ref 15).
Table 11 - Piping Failure Frequencies
Type of Failure Failure Rate per year

Pipelines
-6
13 mm hole 3 x 10 / m
-6
50 mm hole 0.3 x 10 / m
-6
3 mm gasket (13 mm hole equivalent) 5 x 10 / joint
Guillotine fracture (full bore):
-6
< 50 mm 0.6 x 10 / m
-6
> 50 mm but < 100 mm 0.3 x 10 / m
-6
> 100 mm 0.1 x 10 /m
For example, the frequency of catastrophic pipe failure for an 80 mm pipe is

0.3 x 10-6 / m. This is a low level of risk and not considered intolerable.
5.4 AIRCRAFT IMPACT AND OTHER EXTERNAL EVENTS
Catastrophic events such as aircraft crashes are possible but are rare.
Previous studies, e.g. Ref 16, show the following typical frequencies associated
with aircraft crashes are:
 Scheduled aircraft 1x10-8/year; and
 Unscheduled aircraft 4x10-7/year.

43 1 November 2011
The outcomes of any aircraft crash on this site will be dominated by larger
hazardous events in other storage and handling areas as well as the ensuing
fire from the plane wreckage. This is an existing risk for the site and the
proposed changes to the site have negligible effect. The likelihood of this type
of event is acceptably low for a site of this size and location.
Other external events that may lead to propagation of incidents on any site
include:
Subsidence Landslide
Burst Dam Vermin/insect infestation
Storm and high winds Forest fire
Storm surge Rising water courses
Flood Storm water runoff
Breach of security Lightning
Tidal waves Earthquake
These events were reviewed and none of them were found to pose any
significant risk to the new bitumen facility given the proposed safeguards.
5.5 CUMULATIVE RISK
Cumulative risk for the Port Botany area was considered by the Department of
Urban Affairs and Planning (now the DoP) in 1996 (Ref 3). The estimated risk
contours extended well beyond the Vopak site and largely over the water. As
shown in this PHA, the proposed changes to the Vopak site will have negligible
impact on the cumulative risk results for the Port Botany area as the significant
radiant heat levels are retained on the site.
Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that the modified development does not

make a significant contribution to the existing cumulative Port Botany risk.
The recommendations from the 1996 study have been reviewed to determine if
the proposed changes are consistent with the intent of these recommendations.
In summary, all current proposed changes to the Vopak site have been found to
be consistent with the intent of the recommendations and do not contribute to
unacceptable cumulative risk in the Port Botany area.
5.6 SOCIETAL RISK
The above criteria for individual risk do not necessarily reflect the overall risk
associated with any proposal. In some cases for instance, where the 1 pmpy
contour approaches closely to residential areas or sensitive land uses, the
potential may exist for multiple fatalities as the result of a single accident. One

44 1 November 2011
attempt to make comparative assessments of such cases involves the

calculation of societal risk.
Societal risk results are usually presented as F-N curves, which show the
frequency of events (F) resulting in N or more fatalities. To determine societal
risk, it is necessary to quantify the population within each zone of risk
surrounding a facility. By combining the results for different risk levels, a
societal risk curve can be produced.
In this study of the modified Vopak site at Port Botany, the risk of fatality does
not extend off the site and is therefore well away from the residential areas. In
fact, the nearest house is approximately 1 kilometre away. The concept of
societal risk applying to residential population is therefore not applicable for the
terminal.
5.7 RISK TO THE BIOPHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
The main concern for risk to the biophysical environment is generally with
effects on whole systems or populations. For the expanded terminal, it is
suitably located away from residential areas. However, due to the nature of the
activities, there are operations, e.g. ship transfers and road tanker filling, where
losses of containment can potentially impact the environment. Major fires can
also effect the environment (combustion products).
Whereas any adverse effect on the environment is obviously undesirable, the

results of this study show that the risk of losses of containment is broadly
acceptable.
For completeness, risks to the biophysical environment due to loss of

containment events are summarised below.
5.7.1 Escape of Materials to Atmosphere
Combustion of bitumen, caused by ignition following a spillage or leak, will

release products of combustion (e.g. carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, soot,
vaporised product [unburnt] and water vapour). As shown in Section 5.2, for
typical wind / weather conditions, the products of combustion from a fire will rise
due to momentum and buoyancy. Local impact can be expected for very still
conditions only (in which case, emergency response is required for evacuation).
The products of combustion are unlikely to include any materials which present
a long-term risk to the biosphere.
Hydrocarbons vapour emissions whilst loading a road tanker and ship unloading
are, as previously discussed, controlled via a combustor unit. Hence emissions
of hydrocarbon vapours and low levels of hydrogen sulphide are prevented
during these activities.
Whilst natural gas releases can occur, the likelihood of these events is
acceptably low given the pipe failure rates in Table 11.

45 1 November 2011
5.7.2 Escape of Materials to Soil or Waterways
Products Stored in Bunded Areas
Spillages of materials from the tanks, heat exchangers, vessels and adjacent
piping are contained in the bunds. The bunded areas are sized to contain the
entire contents of the single tank so that a total loss of contents does not spill
over the bund, plus an allowance for rainwater, fire water, hosing down etc.
The bitumen heat exchangers, pumps and hot oil heaters are also located
within bunded areas.
Drainage Systems and Site Grades
These have been designed so that in the event of fire, fire water run off
containing any materials is held on site. All open areas are paved.
Loss of containment within the bitumen road tanker loading bay will be
contained within a bunded area.
If a spill was to occur on a general paved site area then equipment such as
absorbents and booms are available for use to minimise the spread of the
liquid. As bitumen readily cools, most spills will solidify and then be removed
manually.
Bulk Liquids Berth
For small spills at the Bulk Liquids Berth, containment will be provided by the
bunded area of the Berth deck (250mm kerbing) which in turn drains to two
1,000 L catchment tanks under the decking. Small bitumen spills will not reach
these tanks. Shipping discharge preparations will include provisions of spill kits
/ laying out of booms alongside each hose string.
Larger releases are designed to be contained by a bunded wharf with a

collection sump providing 100,000 litres containment. Any liquid spills entering
the sea water involve emergency response from personnel from Vopak, SPC
and the ship’s crew. Again, for bitumen, recovery of solid bitumen will be
required as it will solidify on entering the water (if a loss of containment is not
held by the BLB catchment systems).
5.7.3 Solid Wastes
There will be minimal solid wastes from the new equipment and are low
consequence hazards. The dedicated bitumen dockline will be purged with
nitrogen to the relevant storage tank and left with residual bitumen. This
material will solidify as the heat tracing is turned off between ship unloading
operations; removing the need to completely empty the pipeline.
Any maintenance of equipment will require purging to remove residual liquid.

Any residual solidified product will be recycled to stakeholder facilities, where
practicable, or sent off site for disposal.

46 1 November 2011
From the analysis in this report, no incident scenarios were identified where the
risk of whole systems or populations being affected by a release to the
atmosphere, waterways or soil is intolerable.

47 1 November 2011
6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In summary:
1. Fires:

areas;


by DUAP in 1996.

48 1 November 2011

contact with air.

instruments.



49 1 November 2011
Appendix 1
Process Flow Diagram

Vopak Bitumen PHA Report Rev D.doc

A1.1 1 November 2011
Appendix 1 – Process Flow Diagram.

Appendix 2
Radiant Heat Contours


Appendix 2 – Radiant Heat Contours.
Scenario 1 – Bund Fire
Note: The shape of these radiant heat contours are an approximation only given
the irregular shape of the bund.
Key:
2
12.6 kW/m
2
4.7 kW/m

Scenario 2 – Individual Bund Fire (Tank B shown)
Note: The shape of these radiant heat contours are an approximation only given
the irregular shape of the bund.
Key:
2
12.6 kW/m
2
4.7 kW/m

Scenario 3 – Pump Bund Fire
Key:
2
23 kW/m
2
12.6 kW/m
2
4.7 kW/m

Scenario 5 – Road Tanker Bay Fire
Key:
2
23 kW/m
2
12.6 kW/m
2
4.7 kW/m

Scenario 6 – Hot Oil Unit Fire
Key:
2
23 kW/m
2
12.6 kW/m
2
4.7 kW/m

7 REFERENCES
1 Department of Urban Affairs & Planning (NSW) Hazardous Industry

Planning Advisory Paper No 6 – Guidelines for Hazard Analysis, 1992
2 Department of Urban Affairs & Planning (NSW) Hazardous Industry
Planning Advisory Paper No 4 – Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety
Planning, 1992
3 DUAP, Port Botany Land Use Safety Study, Overview Report, 1996
4 Vopak, Project Description, Bitumen Storage Facility at Vopak Site A,

[Lot 5 & Part Lot 3], 29 Friendship Road, Port Botany, 5 September 2011
5 Lees F.P., Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2nd Edition 1996
6 Advisory Committee on Dangerous Substances (ACDS), Major Hazards

Aspects of the Transport of Dangerous Substances, 1991
7 Davie et al, Case Histories of Incidents in Heated Bitumen Storage

Tanks, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 1994, Vol 7,
No. 3
8 Centre for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Chemical Process

Quantitative Risk Analysis, 2000
9 TNO, Methods for the Calculation of Physical Effects (The Yellow Book),
1997
10 ICI HAZAN Course Notes, 2000
11 TNO, Methods for the Determination of Possible Damage (The Green

Book), 1992
12 Thomas, Historical Fire Incident Data Use & Sources, June 2003
13 ICI HAZAN Course Manual, 1997

14 ICI Engineering Department, Process Safety Guide 14 - Reliability Data,
ICI PLC (UK)
15 A W Cox, F P Lees and M L Ang, Classification of Hazardous Locations,
Institution of Chemical Engineers, 1990
16 Pinnacle Risk Management, Preliminary Hazard Analysis, Site B

Petroleum – Stage 3 Project, Vopak Terminals Sydney Pty Ltd, Port
Botany, NSW, September 2006

50 1 November 2011

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PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS,

BITUMEN STORAGE AND HANDLING,

Prepared by: Dean Shewring

Pinnacle Risk Management Pty Limited

PO Box 5024 Elanora Heights

Preliminary Hazard Analysis, Vopak, Bitumen

Rev Date Description Reviewed By

A 23/8/11 Draft for Comment -

B 19/9/11 Site Location Changed Vopak

C 10/10/11 Vopak Comments Included Vopak

D 1/4/11 Final Issue Vopak

Vopak Bitumen PHA Report Rev D.Doc

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ I

GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................... III

1.2 Objectives ........................................................................................ 2

1.4 Methodology .................................................................................... 2

1.5 Findings and Recommendations ................................................... 3

3 BITUMEN FACILITY DESCRIPTION .................................................................... 8

3.1 Operations Product Flow ................................................................ 8

3.2 Proposed Tanks............................................................................... 8

3.3 Vapour Combustor ........................................................................ 10

3.4 Shipping Supply and Discharge................................................... 10

3.5 Bitumen Road Tanker Loading Gantry ........................................ 11

3.6 Heating System.............................................................................. 12

3.7 Heat Tracing ................................................................................... 12

3.8 Thermal Insulation and Cladding ................................................. 12

3.9 Pipework ........................................................................................ 13

3.10 Fire Protection System ................................................................. 13

4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION .............................................................................. 14

4.1 Hazardous Materials...................................................................... 14

4.2 Potential Hazardous Incidents Review ........................................ 16

4.3 Hazardous Events - Shipping ....................................................... 16

Vopak Bitumen PHA Report Rev D.Doc

4.4 Hazardous Events – Terminal Operations ................................... 18

5 RISK ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 33

5.1 Pool Fire Modelling ....................................................................... 35

5.2 Products of Combustion ............................................................... 40

5.3 Natural Gas Fires and Explosions ............................................... 41

5.4 Aircraft Impact and Other External Events ................................. 43

5.5 Cumulative Risk............................................................................. 44

5.6 Societal Risk .................................................................................. 44

5.7 Risk to the Biophysical Environment .......................................... 45

5.7.1 Escape of Materials to Atmosphere ............................................. 45

5.7.2 Escape of Materials to Soil or Waterways ................................... 46

5.7.3 Solid Wastes .................................................................................. 46

6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................... 48

Figure 2 – Site Layout ...................................................................................... 7

Vopak Bitumen PHA Report Rev D.Doc

Table 2 - Risk Criteria, New Plants ................................................................ 34

Table 3 – Predicted SEP................................................................................. 36

Table 4 – Fire Scenarios Calculation Data and Results .............................. 37

Table 5 - Radiant Heat Impact ....................................................................... 38

Table 6 – Layout Considerations – Tolerable Radiant Heat Levels ........... 38

Table 7 – Fire Plume Rise Modelling ............................................................ 40

Table 8 –Natural Gas Jet Fires ...................................................................... 41

Table 9 – Effects of Explosion Overpressure .............................................. 42

Table 11 - Piping Failure Frequencies .......................................................... 43

Appendix 2 – Radiant Heat Contours.

Vopak Bitumen PHA Report Rev D.Doc