Space Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Space Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/spacepol

Space programs of India and Pakistan: Military and strategic installations in

outer space and precarious South Asian regional strategic stability
Mian Zahid Hussaina, Raja Qaiser Ahmedb,∗
a
College of Engineering, Mathematics and Physical Sciences, University of Exeter, UK
b
School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid I Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan

A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Outer space can be used for military and strategic purposes. The growing dependence of militaries on outer space
Missile defense assets in pursuit of operational and communicational undertakings make them productive assets and plausible
Space weapons targets for adversaries. Such threats push the states to take measures to secure their space assets. India is de-
Antisatellite weapons veloping its dedicated military satellites for C4ISR capabilities. The progress in military assets in outer space,
Ballistic missile defense systems
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, Antisatellite (ASAT) weapons, surveillance and intelligence capabilities
Strategic stability
are a major concern for Pakistan. Strategic stability in South Asia is under question, and there is a need to
analyze the changing security dynamics of the region. This paper provides a detailed overview of India's recent
development on BMD system and other space assets of India and Pakistan. The emerging technologies will have
serious implications for strategic stability in South Asia. This paper is an attempt to understand the potential
security scenarios between India and Pakistan and concludes that the technological asymmetries may lead to
strategic instability.

1. Introduction
The 21st century is witnessing some unprecedented challenges
which encompass traditional as well as non-traditional aspects of se-
curity [1]. The technological revolution has compelled states and its
policymakers to craft a mechanism where all the dimensions of security
get adequately addressed. The land, the sea, and airspace have achieved
strategic significance. During the Cold War era, the entry into space was
the prime drive of the superpowers. With the changing geostrategic
environment exploration of space has become an attractive venture.
Moreover, the dual use of space technology makes it more lucrative.
Space is emerging out to be an important ambit for future military
operations. Therefore, outer space is seen as a decisive factor and force
multiplier in military operations against a rival state.
Addressing an audience of Marines at the Miramar Marine Corps Air
Station in San Diego California, President of the U.S. Donald Trump
said, “Space is a war-fighting domain just like the land, air, and the sea.
We may even have a space force—develop another one—space force.
We have the Air Force; we will have the space force. We have the Army,
the Navy.” [2] President's remarks have once again brought up the
debate of space corps which will be closely monitored by all likeminded
states.
Space is militarized but yet not weaponized. These terms are
sometimes used as if they are synonymous, but they are not. States have
been using their space assets for intelligence gathering and commu-
nication purposes. China, France, Germany, Italy, Israel, Spain and the
United Kingdom all have dedicated military space assets for commu-
nications and imaging. Therefore, space militarization is not a new
concept. There are no specifically deployed space weapons in the space
yet. However, there are satellites that could be maneuvered to act as
weapons and destroy or disable the space assets of the enemy state.
There is a subtle difference between ‘militarization of space’ and
‘weaponization of space.’ The militarization of space essentially occurs
by using various space assets for information gathering or helping the
military to undertake land, air, and sea battles. However, the weapo-
nization of space signifies getting into the act of destroying of space
assets or ground assets from the space of other states, either by using
against ground targets could be included. Besides, the weapons used to
attack missile traveling through space could also be termed as space
weapons [3]. Hence, space has not yet been weaponized, but it is
heavily militarized, as different satellites can be maneuvered to support
navigational aspects and enhance national security. In the 21 s t century
it is a notable fact that technology is driving strategy and becoming an
integral defining characteristic of the major powers.
The military use of space is not restricted to ‘defensive’ applications.
The concept of militarized outer space has been replaced by that of

∗
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: rajaqaiserahmed@gmail.com (R.Q. Ahmed).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2018.06.003
Received 4 October 2017; Received in revised form 3 June 2018; Accepted 18 June 2018
0265-9646/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Hussain, M.Z., Space Policy (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2018.06.003
M.Z. Hussain, R.Q. Ahmed
‘weaponized’ outer space. The expression ‘weaponization of space’ de-
fines the process which results in the deployment of weapons in space
which may then become a theatre of conflict, a battlefield, by the use of
weapons aimed at destroying targets either in orbit or on the earth's
surface. The arming of space constitutes a destabilizing factor for in-
ternational relations [4].
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the U.S. developed and
deployed robust military space programs including hardened commu-
nications satellites; missile early warning satellites; electro-optic and
radar imaging satellites; global positioning and navigation satellites;
signals intelligence satellites for eavesdropping on communications;
and weather satellites for mapping and planning purposes.
The space race was first started by former USSR by sending Sputnik-
I in the space [5]. The strategic use of space weaponization has been
laterally imparted from the will to peacefully explore the space assets.
The focus has been diverted towards a strategic competition. The So-
viets tested an ASAT, the co-orbital ASAT consisting of a missile in-
terceptor that would explode its conventional payload into shrapnel-
sized bits once it had rendezvoused with the target in 1982 [6]. Like-
wise, the last U.S. declared ASAT test was in 1985. Considering the
repercussions of arms race in space, Russia and the U.S. have ended up
in an informal mutual moratorium on ASAT testing due to uncertainties
about the destabilizing effects of ASAT use on crisis escalation and the
nuclear balance, as well as considering resulting space debris [7].
The recent developments in space field let to insertion of Prevention
of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), an essential component of
Conference of Disarmament (CD) agenda [8]. Since the 1990s, the
primary obstacle to the launch of any formal discussions or negotiations
on the issue has been rejection by the U.S. of the need for new space
arms control initiatives. Moreover, the U.S. also believes it is not pos-
sible to develop an adequately verifiable agreement for the banning of
either space-based ‘weapons’ or terrestrial-based anti-satellite (ASAT)
systems.” [9].
Russia joined the call for PAROS negotiations in 2002, following the
abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty by the adminis-
tration of U.S. President George W. Bush. Moreover, in 2002 Russia and
China submitted to the CD a joint working paper on “Possible Elements
for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the
Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force
against Outer Space Objects.” [10] However, it did not reach desired
ends because of lack of consensus of member states.
In 2007, China destroyed one of its aging Fengyum-1C weather
satellite, thus resurrecting the specter of space weaponization in the
international arena since President Ronald Regan's 1983 Star Wars
speech [11]. Thus, Chinese test was a game changer which compelled
great powers to again think about modernizing their space programs. It
compelled the U.S. Air Force and Pentagon officials to take effective
counter-measures to secure their space assets against aggressors' threat.
‘Space is no longer a sanctuary,’ said Secretary of the Air Force Michael
Wynne, following the Chinese test. “This change is seismic in nature.”
[12].
In February 2008 U.S. shoot-down of a crippled U.S. spy satellite
using developing sea-based missile defense technology [13]. While the
U.S. government claimed that the act was to avoid public safety hazard
from satellite crashing to earth. However, China saw the destruction of
USA-193 as a tit for tat display of ASAT capability vis-a-vis China. Thus,
at the end of 2008, Washington and Beijing seemed to be heading to-
wards a new Cold War in space. Keeping the military dynamics of major
powers in mind, it is pertinent to say that Russia can hardly resist the
temptation to follow suit. There are number of space-faring nations,
who are working on space development programs. India being an as-
pirant of gaining a great power status is also heavily investing in its
space program which will have repercussions at regional and interna-
tional level.
The U.S. and coalition forces resorted to the active military use of
space installations for the first time in a real battlefield scenario during
2
Space Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
the first Gulf War in the military operation “Desert Storm” against Iraq
in January 1991. Satellite-based communication networks supported
planning and deploying more than 400,000 soldiers in the war theatre
in a few weeks. In that operation, U.S. forces used a fleet satellite
communication system (FLTSATCOM) and a navy's leased satellite
(LEASAT), two defense satellite communication systems (DSCS) on
station over the Indian Ocean. FLTSATCOM satellite over the Atlantic
and DCCS satellites over the Eastern Atlantic were also used to com-
municate between Central Command (CENTCOM) and headquarters in
the U.S [14]. Joint staff directorate for C3 Systems, Lt. Gen. James
Cassity stated that the U.S. deployed and established military commu-
nication connectivity to the Persian Gulf in only 90 days [15]. This
constellation of satellites provided an uninterrupted exchange of a vast
quantity of data, a navigation system which enabled U.S. forces to ac-
quire accurate information for combat soldiers, on missiles, tanks, air-
craft, and ships. These satellites provided images of Iraqi troops and
reconnaissance photographs for Allied forces' attacks [16]. The opera-
tion was a first real battlefield demonstration of a Revolution in Mili-
tary Affairs (RMA). A document published by U.S military titled “Joint
Vision 2020” describes that the key elements of RMA are information
led warfare, precise strike capability and dominant maneuverability.
Full spectrum dominance is the primary constituent of modern warfare.
The document describes U.S.’ future warfare as “The strategic concepts
of decisive force, power projection, overseas presence, and strategic
agility will continue to govern our efforts to fulfill those responsibilities
and meet the challenges of the future.” [17].
China and Russia also consider the militarization of space as a pri-
mary element of RMA. In Chinese military view, space warfare is a
central determinant of future military conflicts. China interprets ele-
ments of space militarization and technological development in an in-
tertwined way considering Antisatellite (ASAT) weapons, Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) systems and satellite miniaturization of satellite
launchers as building blocks of RMA. Some Chinese strategic analysts
foresee space weaponization as the third military revolution [18]. The
former chairman of China's Central Military Commission (CMC), Jiang
Zemin, declared in 1999 that “Any future war would be a war involving
high technology, a war of multiple dimensions, a war of electronics and
a war of missiles. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) would have to be
ready for such an occasion.” [19].
China's space military assets, conventional and nuclear capabilities
and its economic power are serious concerns for India to become a
regional superpower. The trade of more than 70 billion U.S. dollars is
pivotal between India and China, but the regional conflicts and eco-
nomic interests keep them in a competition-cooperation relationship.
The antecedent of Sino-India war of 1962 over a territorial dispute in
Himalaya still needs to be settled. China's strong presence in the Strait
of Malacca and recent development on economic cooperation with
Pakistan are current conflict-carrying issues. The Kashmir dispute,
cross-border terrorism, and internal security challenges are major pro-
blems to be solved. India, which led predominantly a successful civilian
space program, now, considers space militarization an essential need to
establish a robust defense mechanism through modern warfare cap-
abilities.
This article discusses current military assets and capabilities of India
and Pakistan. This paper also provides an overview of the Indian space
program and its leaning toward militarization in recent years which
eventually may lead to space weaponization in future. Military mod-
ernization and changing economic and security scenarios have direct
implications for nuclear deterrence and strategic stability between India
and Pakistan.
2. Brief history of India's space program
The launch of Sputnik-I in 1957 by the former Soviet Union opened
a new dimension for science as well as national security. Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru and India's renowned space scientist Dr. Vikram
M.Z. Hussain, R.Q. Ahmed
Sarabhai envisioned India's space program. In 1958, Prime Minister
Nehru expressed his views in his speech on science policy for the na-
tion. He said: “Science alone could solve the problem of hunger and
poverty, insanitation and illiteracy, of superstition and deadening cus-
toms and traditions, of vast resources running to waste, of a rich
country inherited by starving people.” [20] Sarabhai stated his strategy
for a space program in the early 1960s: “There are some who question
the relevance of space activities in a developing nation. To us, there is
no ambiguity of purpose. We do not have the fantasy of competing with
the economically advanced nations in the exploration of the moon or
planets or manned space flights. However, we are convinced that if we
are to play a meaningful role nationally and in the comity of nations, we
must be second to none in the application of advanced technologies to
solve problems of man and society which we find in our country” [21].
Satish Dhawan, the successor of Sarabhai, took the Indian space pro-
gram forward explicitly and outlined the relationship between the ci-
vilian and the military applications of space. He developed multi-
dimensional utility of Indian space program [22].
India's initial space research efforts came under the Indian atomic
energy commission in the 1950s. Headed by Homi Bhabha, Atomic
energy commission of India funded the initial space research projects. A
few years later, under the chairmanship of Sarabhai, the Indian
Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) got established in 1962,
which built the Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station (TERLS)
in the same year. In the first indigenous project by INCOSPAR India
started working on the Rohini Sounding Rocket series. It tested Rohini
rocket RH-75 successfully in 1967, and it reached up to an altitude of
10 km. It led to the launch of a two-stage Rohini rocket with a 100 kg
payload up to 320 km altitude [23].
The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) was established in
1969 to coordinate space activities. In 1972, India created the
Department of Space (DOS) along with a Space Commission. Prime
minister of India directly administered this program. Indian space
program evolved slowly and gradually. In early years, the focus was on
getting expertise and launching light payloads up to 100–300 km alti-
tude [24]. In 1970, Sarabhai expressed his goals to acquire the cap-
abilities of building and launching telecommunication satellites, such as
INSAT-1, into the geosynchronous orbit. His vision was, to begin with, a
Scout type satellite launcher and acquire experience in its operation.
Then, a five-year period from 1975 to 1980 would be sufficient to de-
velop larger boosters [25]. However, the space program went slower
than expected. It lagged almost a decade behind from the anticipated
schedule. Until the early 1980s, the focus was on experimental, low
capability projects. It helped Indian engineers and scientists to gain
experience in the construction, operations, and launching of satellites.
In these years, ISRO built Bhaskara earth observation satellites where
free launch was provided by FSU and France. The next milestone was
building Ariane Payload Experiment (APPLE) communication satellite.
Initial efforts included the building of indigenous satellite launch ve-
hicles (SLV). In July 1980, a four-stage vehicle of 17 tons and 22 m
height was launched from Sriharikota Range (SHAR) and placed a
Rohini Satellite (RS-1) in the low earth orbit (LEO). From 1979 to 1983,
ISRO conducted four tests of SLV-3. The design of this SLV was very
similar to U.S. Solid Controlled Orbital Utility Test Systems (SCOUT)
rockets, and it employed an open loop guidance system with a stored
pitch program to steer the vehicle during the flight along a pre-
determined trajectory [26].
The second phase of the Indian space program began in the mid-
1980s, building the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicles (PSLV), the working
horse of India's space program. The focus was on mission-specific pro-
jects with more powerful and high capability launchers. The Indian
Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) launched Indian Remote
Sensing (IRS), the Mars Orbiter Mission Spacecraft (MOMS) and the
Radar Satellite (RISAT) series. The Satellite with ARGOS and ALTIKA
(SARAL) was also a significant development [27]. After gaining enough
expertise, India started working on the Geosynchronous Satellite
3
Space Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
Launch Vehicle (GSLV), which is already operational and has placed
Geostationary Communication Satellites (GSAT) and Indian National
Satellite (INSAT) series in orbit since 2001. ISRO is working on a more
powerful three-stage launch vehicle LVM-3. They claim that an in-
digenously built cryogenic engine used as the upper stage would allow
this vehicle to place four-tons class geosynchronous satellites into the
orbit; the first experimental flight, LVM3-X/CARE was carried out from
Sriharikota on December 18, 2014, and successfully tested the atmo-
spheric phase of flight [28].
3. Military dimension of Indian space program
The U.S.-led operation “Desert Storm” had set a precedent for net-
work-centric warfare (NCW) for future war-like scenarios. Military
operations, such as in Kosovo, Iraq invasion and the Afghanistan war on
terror, have validated the course of future warfare of militarily ad-
vanced countries. Though both, civilian and military aspects of space
systems, were already a part of national security policies of countries
before, the emphasis on utilizing space for defense purposes became
more distinct in the 1990s. The Indian rocket scientist and former
President Dr. Abdul Kalam was one of the leading advocates of India's
space program as well as a supporter of the security imperative of space
technology. In his vision for the Indian Air force of 2025, he empha-
sized on the utilization of space technologies for military purposes. He
said, “I visualize the Indian air force of 2025 to be based on our sci-
entific and technological competence in the development of commu-
nications satellites, high precision resource mapping satellites, missile
systems, unmanned super-sonic aerial vehicles and electronics and
communication systems. This capability will enable the air force to
succeed in the electronically controlled warfare in the midst of space
encounters, deep sea encounters, and ballistic missile encounters.” [29]
In his book “India Vision 2020: A Vision for the New Millennium”,
Kalam discussed the need for advanced technology for national security
while reviewing India's historical weakness of defense against foreign
invaders and colonizers.
ISRO is primarily a civilian space research institute. However, the
dual use of these technologies could serve the military purposes. India's
Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) has been
getting technical support from ISRO for a long time. One example of
this organizational overlap was when Kalam and his fellow researcher
Sivathanu Pillai moved from the civilian ISRO to the DRDO along with
their scientists and technicians to help the Integrated Guided Missile
Development Program (IGMDP). Department of Space (DOS) and the
Hindustan Aeronautical Limited (HAL) agreed on mutual cooperation.
HAL is a main Indian aircraft manufacturer which produces Advanced
Light Helicopters (ALH), Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Intermediate Jet
Trainers (IJT) and other military machinery [30]. Another interesting
aspect of civil-military collaboration was from the growing trend of
India's military dependence on space assets. Dr. V. Siddhartha who was
an Officer on Special Duty in the Secretariat of the Scientific Advisor to
Raksha Mantri argued in his article that, India's Satcom, weather sa-
tellites, and remote sensing satellites have provided efficient space
capabilities for Ballistic Missile Defense Program (BMD) and Anti-Sa-
tellite (ASAT) weapons and one can see a pattern of development of
civil-military collaboration in space moving from commercial civil,
non-commercial to dual use, yet to defensive and offensive use of space
[31]. A brief review of India's space assets for military purposes will
help to explain India's changing posture of security and its potential
implications for the region.
4. Satellites
India's military is becoming more independent in utilizing space
assets as it is acquiring its dedicated satellites which would enable it to
establish a more robust Integrated Guided Missile Defense Program
(IGMDP). The Indian military was dependent on dual-use civilian
M.Z. Hussain, R.Q. Ahmed
satellites until it launched a military dedicated satellite. For instance, it
uses digital data transmission and remote area communications, INSAT
series satellites for teleconferencing. However, the Indian air force and
Indian navy have lately voiced their wish to acquire their dedicated
satellites.
India has launched 77 satellites since 1975 in various orbits from
different launch vehicles and launch sites. Currently, it has more than
28 operational satellites in space for multiple purposes [32]. Minister of
State, Jitendra Singh, told the Parliament in February 2015 that besides
11 communication satellites, 12 earth observation satellites, three na-
vigation satellites, and one Mars orbiter mission are currently in place.
India has launched another satellite, IRNSS-1D, in March 2015 into the
geosynchronous orbit (GSO) [33]. UCS database says that India has
around 68 percent of its satellites in LEO and 32 percent satellites in
GEO which is effective for useable military satellites for imaging, re-
connaissance, weather forecasting and surveillance. The altitude in LEO
was 36000 km. It was mainly meant for telecommunication, broad-
casting, navigation, early warning and remote sensing satellites. India's
dedicated military satellite series RISAT and other dual-use satellites
CARTOSAT, IRS series and TES lie in LEO.
India has launched its military dedicated satellite GSAT-7 also
known as INSAT-4F on August 30, 2013, which enabled Indian navy to
acquire blue water capabilities and has made it independent in com-
munication to its ships. Through this satellite, navy ships can exchange
data about the precise location of enemy ships and submarines.
Indigenously built by IRSO, the satellite was launched from Kourou in
South America using a French-made Ariane rocket into GSO at long-
itude 74° east. This satellite at perigee 35,799 km and apogee
35,806 km, carries 11 communication transponders operating in UHF,
S, C and Ku bands. It is considered a significant addition to India's
maritime security and intelligence setup. This multi-band spacecraft is
exclusive for naval use to provide real-time communication among
warships, submarines, aircraft and land systems [34]. INSAT's series
satellites are usually not suitable for military purposes because the C, S
and K band transponders operate in frequencies in UHF and low SHF
ranges which are generally for civilian uses due to their high probability
of jamming. Dedicated military satellites mostly work in the high SHF
or EHF range which are harder to jam. In TES and GSAT-7, these effects
along with the issues of a limited number of transponders may have
been resolved: INSAT series could only have a small number of trans-
ponders and were in shortage until 2002; ISRO first had to lease Arab-
sat 1-C and three C-band transponders from Thailand. India effectively
uses some civilian communication transponders to fulfill the military
communication requirements. However, with the launch of GSAT-7
which also carries Ku-band transponders allowing a higher volume of
communications than C-band, these issues have been resolved. INSAT-4
series consists of seven satellites, INSAT-4A through INSAT-4G, with
INSAT-4D as a spare. These satellites with transponders in UHF, C, S,
extended C and Ku band have upgraded India's communication cap-
abilities to a significant level. In this series, GSAT-7A is expected to be
launched by 2017 [35].
Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellites series started in 1988 with its
first remote sensing satellite IRS-1A. It could provide resolution only up
to 36 m. With the launch of IRS-1C, equipped with a Panchromatic
Camera (PAN) in 1995, it improved the resolution up to 5.8 m. The
United States launched its satellite Ikonos in 1999 which provided
images better than 1-m resolution. India began dual-use Technology
Experiment Satellite (TES) in 2001 which was able to provide images
up to 0.8-m resolution [36]. Indian Defense Minister, Pranab Mu-
kherjee, told Parliament in 2005 that India was working on military
surveillance and reconnaissance satellite system that was supposed to
be operational in 2007. The current Indian remote sensing series,
Cartographic satellites (CARTOSAT) started in 2005 and Cartosat-1 was
launched which has a resolution around 2.5 m with stereo imaging
capability. In January 2007, Cartosat-2 with a PAN camera was laun-
ched which provided the resolution up to 0.8 m and was capable of
4
Space Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
providing spot imaging using “paint-brush” coverage for any given area
of interest. In this series, Cartosat-2A and Cartosat-2B were funded by
the Ministry of Defense and were the first military-only satellites [37].
The military application of these satellites was to provide scene-specific
spot imagery in high resolution to the Indian military. Induction of such
military dedicated satellites in the system is a step in the gradual pro-
cess of establishing an aerospace command [38]. These two satellites
were launched in April 2008 and June 2010. These satellites equipped
with single PAN cameras can be steered up to 25 and 26° respectively as
well as across the direction of its movement to take images of a spatial
resolution less than 1 m and around 10 km swath. The PAN cameras can
sense the radiation beyond visible wavelength ranges, and they have
low geometric distortion. Therefore, they are very advantageous for
photogrammetry, forests and land cover surveying and gathering visual
and near-infrared (IR) band data [39]. The fifth satellite of this series,
Cartosat-3 will be able to take images with the resolution of 0.25 m. It
will use 1.2-m optics 60 percent lighter as compared to Cartosat-2. It
will have adaptive optics, acoustic optical devices, in-orbit focusing,
using Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMs) and large area light-
weight mirrors. The expected launch of this satellite was in 2014 for
weather mapping, cartography, and strategic applications [40].
TES was not sufficient for military requirements. The Indian mili-
tary wanted to have a satellite which could provide data in all-weather
conditions, to map through clouds and other obscure situations. For
that one needs Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) as a primary payload
which overcomes this limitation. According to UCS database, Radar
Imaging Satellite series, RISAT-1, and RISAT-2 are considered the
dedicated military satellites. After the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008,
India found a great deficiency in its maritime surveillance. Another
prime objective of such military dedicated systems is to balance the
Chinese space capabilities. Since 2006, China has launched a series of
radar and electro-optical spy satellites into the orbit. Such surveillance
capabilities are considered an essential component for information
dominance. In August 2010 China launched another remote sensing
satellite Yaogn-10 for military purposes. India started developing its
own SAR satellites. RISAT-1 was an indigenously built reconnaissance
satellite, but the project was delayed and could not meet the deadline.
As a countermeasure to these developments, India procured an x-band
SAR based RISAT-2 from Israel that was launched on April 20, 2009
[41]. This satellite by the Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) was based on
the TecSAR mini-satellite design. RISAT-1 was launched after three
years in April 2012. From coarse resolution scanSAR (CSR) mode to
High Resolution ScanSAR more (HSR), their scan ranges lie between 50
and 1 m respectively with a swath between 220 and 10 km. ISRO's
commercial wing Antrix Cooperation Limited claims that RISAT-1
provides near-real-time processing and electronic delivery of data [42].
5. Ballistic missiles
If not overtly, but India's missile program has obtained significant
support from ISRO. In the early years of ISRO, when Sarabhai and Dr.
Satish Dhawan headed the space program, they opposed the military
applications of the program. However, DRDO borrowed human re-
sources and technology from ISRO for its missile program. India
decided to establish an IGMDP in July 1983. Dr. Abdul Kalam, a leading
scientist of ISRO's SLV program at that time, was appointed as Chief
Executive of IGMDP. Along with other key scientists and engineers,
Kalam and Dr. V.S. Arunachalam played a leading role in developing
India's main ballistic missile series, “Agni,” a medium-range ballistic
missile, and “Prithvi,” a short range surface to surface tactical missile.
There is no open source data available but according to some sources it
can be argued that the development of Agni missile became possible
with the help of ISRO's SLV program. Kalam, who was the head of the
SLV program in IRSO, might have designed the Agni-1 missile by using
SLV-3's solid fuel first stage added onto a liquid fuel second stage [43].
Propulsion technology of Prithvi missiles had derived from Soviet
M.Z. Hussain, R.Q. Ahmed
SA-2 surface to air missiles. India tested Prithvi-1 on February 25, 1988,
from Sriharikota SHAR Centre, Andhra Pradesh. Prithvi-1 has the range
up to 150–300 km. With the modifications, later versions of Prithvi
series are capable of carrying nuclear, sub-munitions, chemical as well
as conventional warheads from 150 to 600 km.
The IGMDP project was envisioned to build five missiles, an anti-
tank missile, two surfaces to air missiles, Prithvi and the Agni missiles.
After IGMDP, India continued upgrading Agni series. The success of
Agni series gave it a separate status outside IGMDP and was taken out
as an important strategic weapon. India's defense budget assigned it as a
unique program. Capable of delivering strategic nuclear, conventional
HE-unitary, penetration, sub-munitions and fuel-air explosive war-
heads, the series constitutes most powerful Indian ballistic missiles with
a range of 700 km to 10,000 km and gets fired from Transporter Erector
Launcher (TEL) as well as Rail Mobile Launcher (RML). It furthered
with the two-stage solid propellant Agni-II with a range of
2000–2500 km and capable of carrying a 15–250 Kt HE nuclear war-
head as a part of credible deterrence against China and Pakistan [44].
India continued to improve the range and precision of Agni series. The
test of Agni-III on July 9, 2006, though, was not successful because the
second stage of the rocket did not separate, and the missile had fallen
short of the target. India conducted the second test of Agni-III, which on
April 12, 2007, was claimed to have been successful. Its third test on
May 7, 2008, was again successful and provided India with enough
reliability to include it in its military arsenal. This missile is capable of
delivering 1.5 ton nuclear HE warhead up to 3500 km range. It has
changed India's strategic profile after which India took the position that
it’s nuclear and missile programs are not Pakistan centric but China.
With a little improvement in range, India tested the Agni-IV, the next
version of this series with the flight altitude of 900 km and operational
range up to 4000 km, and a two-stage solid propellant ballistic missile
which is capable of delivering strategic nuclear, conventional as well as
thermobaric warheads [45].
India claims to have a strategic need to develop a missile weapon
more than 4000 km range. Although China and Pakistan, both can be
deterred with Agni-IV inducted into the military after successful tests.
During his service, India's former Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik expressed
his views in June 2011 that “India should pursue an ICBM program to
acquire ranges of 10,000 km or even more. Breaking out of the regional
context is important as the country's sphere of influence grows. We
have no territorial designs on any country, but India needs the cap-
ability to match its scope of influence” [46].
India has already been working on Agni-V since 2008 because sig-
nificant modifications require India's existing missile capacity. There
could be two options: Either DRDO adds another solid fuel stage in the
existing two-stage solid fuel Agni-III or Agni-IV missiles and modifies
the case by developing a lighter material with high strength and heat
shielding or it uses PSLV as an ICBM. For PSLV, it seems less feasible
because strap-on boosters which increase the effective diameter of the
system and make it difficult to deploy on mobile or rail launchers.
Moreover, PSLV is extremely heavy and not sufficient regarding weight
to payload ratio. A missile using first and second stage PSLV boosters
would weigh around 170 tons while LRBM with capabilities similar to
ICBM is mostly less than 100 tons [47]. DRDO tested its first 50 tons
three-stage solid fuel Agni-V missile in 2012. They took the first stage of
Agni-III, modified the second stage and added a miniaturized third
stage for the stable flight up to 5000 km. It uses a ring laser gyroscope
and accelerometers for navigation and guidance. This missile would be
able to hit targets across Asia and into Europe with a high accuracy of
less than 10 m. Agni-V would be able to work as Multiple Independent
Re-entry Vehicle (MIRVs), capable of delivering multiple nuclear and
conventional warheads to different assigned targets. India inducted
Agni-V in the military arsenal in 2014 which expectedly enhanced In-
dia's capability to counter missile defense systems of China.
The growing influence of China in Indian Ocean region and strong
ties with Sri Lanka and the Maldives is a cause of uneasiness for India.
5
Space Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
The frequent docking of Chinese submarines at Chinese built ports in
the Arabian Sea create suspicion among Indian policymakers. The work
on Agni-V, next-generation ICBMs, Agni-VI, and Surya are preparatory
measures [48]. According to open sources, it would be a four-stage solid
fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a weight between 55
and 70 tons. It is expected to have Multiple Independent Re-entry Ve-
hicle (MIRVs) as well as maneuverable Reentry warheads (MARVs)
which would give this ICBM an extended range. The details of this
program are currently classified. However, the speculated range would
be around 8000 km [49]. DRDO chief V.K. Saraswat argued that Agni-
VI will serve as a “force multiplier."
6. Pakistan's space capabilities
In the early 1960s, Pakistani physicist and Nobel Laureate Dr. Abdus
Salam advised President Ayub Khan to establish a space research pro-
gram. President Ayub accepted the proposal and Pakistan's space
agency known as Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission
(SUPARCO) got established on September 16, 1961. During the Apollo
project, scientists at NASA realized that almost no data is available
about the Indian Ocean related to wind structure of the upper atmo-
sphere. NASA offered all countries on the shoreline of Indian Ocean to
establish rocket ranges to obtain such data on the condition of complete
sharing with NASA. Dr. Abdus Salam was accompanying President
Ayub Khan as a chief scientific advisor on a state visit to U.S. Pakistan
accepted the offer and became the first country among developing
nations to carry out experimental rocketry program.
Pakistan procured rocket range equipment and instrumentation,
selected payloads constructed a rocket launch facility at Sonmiani,
Baluchistan and selected team of Pakistani scientists trained at U.S fa-
cilities. Within a year, a two-stage solid fuel sounding rocket with 80
pounds sodium payload Rahber-1 was launched on June 7, 1962, which
flew up to 130 km into the atmosphere. This rocket was built around
the U.S Nike-Cajun/Apache rocket to measure the wind velocities and
wind shear in the upper atmosphere. It tested the derivatives of Rahber,
two hypersonic sounding rockets Shahpar and Rukhnum. Shahpar was
7-m solid fuel two stage rocket which carried 70 kg payload up to
950 km. Rukhnum was a three-stage liquid fuel rocket which reached to
1000 Km with a 38–50 Kg payload.
7. The militarization of space program
After few years, Pakistan secretly started its nuclear and military
space program which got revealed after Pakistan's first indigenously
built multistage rocket in January 1989 with a claim that the rocket
reached the altitude of 480 km. Little information is available in open
sources. Hatf missile program was developed secretly using SUPARCO's
little expertise [50]. When U.S. government came to know about the
military purpose of the space program, the president George H. W. Bush
imposed immediate economic and global sanctions on SUPARCO. Initial
versions of Hatf series were unguided battlefield missiles. However,
later versions Hatf-IB and Hatf-IV were equipped with an inertial gui-
dance system and were capable of carrying conventional as well as
nuclear warheads.
8. Shaheen-III, A potential satellite launch vehicle (SLV)
In 1998, SUPARCO was assigned to develop a space launch vehicle.
Dr. A.Q. Khan said on March 2001 that Pakistan is in the process of
developing its first Space Launch Vehicle [51]. The International De-
fense and Exhibition Seminar (IDEAS) 2002 held at Karachi Expo centre
exhibited two models, similar to Shaheen-III. One model utilized the
common core booster without straps-on while the other design used
four strap-on boosters attached to the common core first stage. No of-
ficial confirmation is available in open sources. However, from the
models displayed at IDEAS 2002, it is estimated that this possible SLV
M.Z. Hussain, R.Q. Ahmed
can be a modified form of Shaheen ballistic missiles series.
To acquire this design as a space booster, they used the design of
Shaheen-I (probably a copy of china's M-9 missile) as a precursor and
lengthened and increased the thrust of first and second stage solid
motors of the basic Shaheen-II. Some analysts claim that Shaheen-II is a
copy of China's M-11 missile [52]. It seems an attempt to come up with
a composite design with a modified Shaheen-I solid motor for a strap-on
design applications. However, currently, Pakistan has technological
limitations. More significant challenges are to put the chambers, noz-
zles, igniters and fuel tanks together to perfect the rocket for space
flight. Other significant challenges are steering and flight control in
space. For that purpose, current versions of Shaheen-II and Sheheen-III
are not adequate as they lack the appropriate guidance system and
steering capability in inertial space dynamics [53]. During a con-
versation, Dr. Abdul Karim, SUPARCO's former chairman confirmed
after Dr. A. Q. Khan's statement in 2001 and told that “Pakistan envi-
sions a low-cost SLV and Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) to
launch a light-weight satellite into low-earth orbit (LEO).” According to
unofficial reports, Pakistan is trying to acquire such technical cap-
abilities to deter India's growing numbers of surveillance and remote
sensing satellites in LEO. After Agni-V, Pakistan is also working on
Long-Range Ballistic Missiles named Tipu and Ababeel. Apparently,
there is no strategic need to develop such LRBMs, but it speculates that
these multistage, long-range missiles LRMs with cryogenic engines and
improved guidance and navigation systems would serve as a precursor
for indigenous PSLVs. However, these programs are classified, and no
information is publicly available [54].
On March 9, 2015, Pakistan tested a multistage solid-fuel medium-
range ballistic missile Shaheen-III successfully. The range claimed by
Inter-services Public Relations (ISPR) is 2750 km and is capable of
targeting Northeastern part of India especially Andaman and Nicobar
Islands, a Tri-service command of India. Pakistan army claimed that
this missile was a response to Agni-III and it has made Pakistan's
military capable of reaching all parts of India with a full spectrum
credible deterrence [55]. A google map analysis claimed that in a
battlefield scenario, these missiles could only hit northeastern islands of
India if deployed close to the border areas and it does not seem a wise
strategy to transport such weapons in vulnerable zones in a war-like
scenario. In the near future, India will be capable of a robust satellite
surveillance to observe and target any such mobility preemptively.
There are speculations from reliable sources that a variant of Shaheen-
III would be Pakistan's first SLV. However, it kept all tests in secret [56].
9. Ababeel: A potential MIRV
In 2017 Pakistan developed Ababeel which is a solid fuel surface to
surface Medium Range Ballistic (MRB) missile with a range of
2200 kms. Pakistan claims it to be a MIRV which can carry multiple
nuclear or conventional warheads with a high accuracy of hitting the
targets. In MIRV system, successful release of warheads and accuracy
are complicated and very crucial factors which rely upon onboard na-
vigation system to deliver the independent warheads with the circular
error of probability (CEP). In other words, the footprint area of these
independently released warheads should be minimum to achieve the
accuracy. According to the unclassified information, Ababeel missile is
a variant form of the Shaheen III missile. To make the base for a MIRV,
the airframe and solid fuel motors of Shaheen-III are further developed
with a payload fairing of enlarged diameter. The second stage of the
missile is also lengthened [57]. Despite the ISPR claims, further details
are not publically available about the technical status of the MIRV
system. It is not known that how many MIRVs can be loaded on the bus
built for the Ababeel missile system. However, the independent in-
telligence reports estimate that no missiles yet are operationally de-
ployed [58]. This massive development came in the backdrop of the
debate of India's BMD systems Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) and Advanced
Air Defense (AAD) [59]. The development of MIRVs by India and
6
Space Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
Pakistan have further complicated the already hostile environment in
South Asia. A strong opinion prevails among Pakistani nuclear policy-
makers that the deployment of BMD by India would compel Pakistan to
expand its missile arsenal qualitatively and quantitatively to reestablish
a conventional credible strategic nuclear deterrence. Consequently, the
already suffering economies will face another setback from enormous
military expenses driven by an unending arms race.
10. Satellites
Pakistan's first digital communication satellite Badr-1 was launched
with the support of China in 1990. After sanctions imposed on
SUPARCO by the U.S. due to its involvement in military-related pro-
grams, it was unable to continue the indigenous space program. When
the U.S. showed no interest, China helped Pakistan to launch its sa-
tellites. Now, Pakistan is working on remote sensing satellite system
(RSSS). This constellation of six electro-optical and SAR satellites are in
space for dual use. SUPARCO claims that satellites in this constellation
would carry 1.5 m PAN cameras and would serve in sun-synchronous
orbit (SSO) at 700 km altitude. This series of RSS will be completed by
2020 and expected to be delivered by Shaheen-III. RSSS would replace
Badr-II satellite. Pakistan has set up its version of Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNS) and acquired the Beidou navigation system from
China in September 2012. The expected launch of the first satellite of
this system was in 2017.
On August 11, 2011, Pakistan launched its communication satellite
PAKSAT-1R from Xichang Satellite Launch Centre into geostationary
orbit (GEO) and replaced PAKSAT-1 which was originally an
Indonesian satellite Palapa. PAKSAT-1R has 12 C-band and 18 Ku band
transponders. Primarily it functions in the civilian domain. However,
the military also uses some transponders for communications and op-
erate its recently inducted Un-manned armed vehicles (UAVs) [60].
Within a decade, Pakistan might be operating its remote sensing sa-
tellites, communication satellites, and earth observation satellites for
surveillance, reconnaissance and military communication. Pakistan
considers technologically advanced India a threat to the strategic sta-
bility. This concern causes Pakistan to acquire SLVs, PSLVs, BMD sys-
tems and probably its ASATs.
11. Military modernization: A potential arms race in space?
Since the gulf war of 1991, every country with a desire to be a
dominant player in global politics is trying to acquire space-based in-
tegrated warfighting capabilities. India jumped in space arena in the
1960s with a civilian space program and gradually leaned toward
militarization of space by launching dedicated military satellites. The
launch of India's TES in 2001, CARTOSAT-1A in 2008, CARTOSAT-2B
in 2010, RISAT-2 in 2009, RISAT-1 in 2012 and GSAT-7 in 2013 are
significant steps toward military dedicated space systems. These sa-
tellites would enhance India's C4ISR capabilities. After establishing
these indigenous and independent systems, India would pursue more
vigorously its BMD program and ASAT capabilities. After China's anti-
satellite (ASAT) test in 2007, the Indian military has been working
toward an ASAT test to demonstrate its capabilities. However, in do-
mestic politics and bureaucracy, opinions vary about such decisions.
There has been concern regarding space debris production which could
be a potential threat to other satellites in LEO. India might have rea-
lized that the ASAT test would not bring any strategic benefits rather it
would damage India's position as a responsible country internationally.
India maintains a strategic narrative that its nuclear and space
programs are not Pakistan centric but focused on China. India's main
concerns are the growing influence of China in the Arabian Sea around
South and South-East region and a historical territorial dispute in the
Himalayan region. Moreover, India has security concerns on Line of
Control (LoC), cross-border terrorism and on Kashmir with Pakistan.
However, Pakistan feels more insecure under India's LEO satellites and
M.Z. Hussain, R.Q. Ahmed
dominant surveillance and espionage capabilities. Almost near real-
time monitoring of Pakistan's ballistic missile launch sites, the mobility
of arms forces and nuclear weapon installations made them more vul-
nerable. These military advancements are perturbing the existing stra-
tegic stability posture. Pakistan has changed its position from minimum
credible deterrence to the full spectrum credible deterrence which in-
cludes induction of tactical nuclear weapons, dedicated military sa-
tellites, BMD and ASAT capabilities to fend off adversary's LEO sa-
tellites. This strategic policy shift may trigger a limited arms race in
South Asia.
12. Missile defense system in South Asia
The purpose of developing early warning systems is to prevent the
adversary's ballistic missiles from destroying sensitive targets on the
ground. The functionality of such systems depends upon the calculation
of correct trajectory of the incoming missile, threat assessment as
“warning,” decision-making and response. The U.S. Early Warning
System (EWS) follows certain operational procedure. North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) manages this system and is
classified. However, a consistent picture of BMD's process is established
by independent analysts. The U.S. system would work in a way that the
ground-based radars and the remote sensing satellites in geosynchro-
nous orbit would observe the missile launch independently as well as
simultaneously and send the signal down to the ground stations to
process which would take around 30 s. Ground stations would decide
about the information to pass on to NORAD and other command centers
dedicated to early warning assessment. It would take 15 s. The com-
mand director would communicate with ground station operators tel-
ephonically to evaluate the reliability of satellite data and revalidate
the detection. It would be highly essential part of the procedure to
confirm that it was not a malfunction of the installed equipment. The
political, military and intelligence assessment of the situation will be in
consultation with the strategic analysts. The command director would
forward the information to Pentagon and strategic command. It would
reasonably take 3 min. After gaining enough confidence on warning,
the information will get transferred to the chain of command including
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Defense Secretary and then to the
President. After this, a Missile defense conference would be initiated to
decide about the launch of Anti-ballistic missiles. This process may take
10–15 min. If the final decision comes to launch the anti-ballistic mis-
sile, it will take 2 min to send the order for launch, 3 min to fire ground-
based interceptors and few more minutes for the missile to hit the target
at a considerable distance from their bases to minimize the impact of
the incoming missile. The whole detection and decision-making process
would take more than 20 min while total flight time in case of US-
Russia is 30 min. The system may work but with unreliably low effi-
ciency. However, in case of nuclear-tipped ballistic missile launches
from off-shore submarines, the flight times are about 10–15 min which
make the BMDs unworkable [61].
In South Asian context, where Pakistan and India have much shorter
missile flight times, BMD systems would have no reliability. India
claims that it has achieved the terminal phase defense against ballistic
missiles. Zia Mian, R. Rajaraman, and M.V. Ramana have done an
analytical study of early warning system in South Asia which provides a
proper assessment of merits and demerits of the system. A graph below
tells about the possible flight times for ballistic missile optimal trajec-
tories as well as depressed trajectories.
There are three phases of Ballistic missile flights which are boost
phase, ballistic phase, and re-entry phase. To hit an incoming missile,
the trajectories of the missiles are usually calculated for re-entry phases
including air resistance, engine thrust, earth rotation and other para-
meters by numerical calculations using computer programs. It is a very
complicated calculation, and one can only get approximate results in
real cases. In South Asia, the existing missiles have flight times between
5 and 13 min from launch sites to the impact points (national capitals,
7
Space Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
locations of nuclear arsenals and major military installations) in both
countries. If the long-range missiles get fired on depressed trajectories,
flight times would be much less than the time for optimal trajectories.
The missile could be detected after 30–60 s of launch depending upon
the capabilities of infrared sensors on satellites in GEO. Even if a missile
launch gets detected by the satellite and a radar, the assessment of data,
verification of warning, decision-making process and in response the
launch time to hit the incoming satellite at an appropriate altitude and
distance must be completed within 4–10 min for depressed trajectories
as well as for long-range missile flights. To complete all steps in this
limited time after warning are very difficult. To eliminate the proce-
dural time, if the automatic response system gets installed, even then it
would not be sure to determine that in-coming missile is carrying either
a nuclear warhead or the conventional one. In either case, only a pre-
determined response without the involvement of human decision-
making can make such systems workable in South Asia. However, such
early warning involves a constant deployment of weapons at the hair-
trigger response for prompt retaliation. Lack of ability to differentiate
between incoming nuclear and conventional warhead would increase
the probabilities of misjudgment and miscalculations. Deployment of
early warning systems and BMD systems with abysmal missile inter-
ception efficiency may increase the risk of accidental exchange of
missiles in South Asia.
Satellite-based missile detection has many limitations. Main pro-
blems for remote sensing satellites are a solar reflection from moun-
tains, snow, ocean surface and clouds which are a significant cause of
false alarms and difficulty in detecting the missile plume. A large
constellation of satellites in LEO can minimize this problem to avoid the
coinciding of blind spots caused by sun glare. One or two satellites
cannot provide a reliable body of data. Other than this, India's TES,
RISAT-1, and RISAT-2 can provide proper surveillance with less than 1-
m resolution camera, but these satellites, being in LEO cannot offer a
reliable remote sensing system. LEO satellites cannot map wide area
due to small swath. For continuous and complete coverage of sectors
between Karachi and Islamabad, more than 100 satellites would be
required to monitor 1100 km. TES and RISAT series have only five to
seven-year in-orbit lifespan so India would have to send satellites
continuously to replace the retired satellites. Even the in-orbit posi-
tioned satellites deceive camouflaging and use window opportunities
and other means. LEO satellites cannot provide real-time missile launch
warning due to their small scanning area at a given time. Satellites in
geosynchronous orbit can do a better job and could be able to detect
missile launches anywhere in South Asia in real time scenario.
However, to avoid deception and blinding factors due to sun glare and
cloud reflection, a constellation of satellites would be required to de-
ploy efficiently [62].
13. Anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons in South Asia
India has more than 68 percent of its satellites in LEO and around 32
percent in GEO. CARTOSAT series, RISAT series, IRS series and TES, the
first military dedicated satellites are all orbiting in LEO. India will place
future satellites in LEO to strengthen its reconnaissance and surveil-
lance capabilities. Space has significant debris objects which pose ser-
ious threats to in-orbit satellites. Total identified waste pieces in LEO
with sizes larger than 10 cm (around 4 inches) are more than 16,000
which can destroy the satellite in case of a collision. More than 400,000
debris objects with sizes less than 10 cm are in space which can severely
damage the satellite. The tracking of the objects smaller than 1 cm is
very hard, but usually, satellites efficiently shield against such smaller
objects. Maneuvering is the resort to avoid such potential collisions in
orbit. However, these maneuvers create hindrance in normal operation
of satellites and decrease their lifetime (Fig. 1).
Space debris production largely depends upon the velocities of the
interceptor and the target. Though it is not easy to predict, debris
generation depends on how the two objects would interact, how they
M.Z. Hussain, R.Q. Ahmed Space Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Fig. 1. A notional picture of militarization trends in India's space program. Source: “Small and Medium Space Powers,” Prof. Scott Pace, Issues in Space Policy
graduate course, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

Fig. 2. Impact of orbital debris generated from a KE-ASAT test based on the relative velocities and a rough lifetime of the resulting debris. Source: Dr. Wang Ting
(Provided by Brian Weeden, Secure World Foundation).

fragment into pieces and how they would move away with different
velocities. Some pieces would get enough forward velocities to speed up
to stay in orbit. In Fig. 2, it can be seen that the lifetime of debris
produced from satellite breakup with a medium-range ballistic missile
(MRBM) most likely be staying in orbit. ASAT or BMD tests below
300 km are less liable to contribute any debris. However, in Operation
Burnt Frost in 2008, a satellite USA-193 was intercepted with Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) at the altitude of 225 km. While most of the orbital
debris was short-lived, a few dozen pieces got boosted up into orbits
hundreds of km higher, with a couple of pieces reached as high as
800 km in apogee. If the target object already has orbital velocity (i.e.,
satellite), then we know that a significant proportion of the debris is
likely to stay in orbit. The lifetime of any resulting debris is a function
of the area to mass ratio of the objects and its orbital altitude. It is not
linear at an elevation of 400 km is measured in months whereas lifetime
at the height of XXX gets measured in decades [63](see. Graph 1).
After China's KE-ASAT test in 2007, India has shown serious con-
cerns and considered it a potential threat to its satellites in LEO. The
Indian military has announced that it also has a strong KE-ASAT cap-
ability. In February 2010, P.V. Naik argued that “Our satellites are
vulnerable to ASAT weapon systems because our neighborhood pos-
sesses one.” [64] Some people claim that Agni-II and Agni-V possess the
capabilities of ASAT [65]. Such rationale has serious political and
strategic implications. Even if India does not test ASAT, its pursuit for
ASATs put the regional stability at risk. Apart from debris-related is-
sues, India's ASAT capability would provoke Pakistan to acquire ASAT
as well. Pakistan considers TES, RISAT-1, and RISAT-2 as potential
threats. Though Pakistan currently has no guidance and steering

8
M.Z. Hussain, R.Q. Ahmed
Graph 1. Estimated Duration of some Plausible South Asian Missile Flights.
capability to target a satellite in LEO. However, India's acquisition
would motivate Pakistan to invest more resources into it. Rather than
protecting, it would make assets in LEO vulnerable. Terrestrial deter-
rence theory cannot replicate in space. Any action in space has an
impact on assets of all states. Another ASAT test by any state would add
more debris, leaving all LEO satellites in a more vulnerable state.
14. Implications for strategic stability in South Asia
Deterrence theory revolves on the rationale that the fear of nuclear
weapons restrains adversaries from any military adventure which could
escalate into a full-scale war and optimists claim the nuclear weapons
as a stabilizing factor between the enemy states. However, in South
Asia, the introduction of nuclear weapons has fostered an arms race and
couldn't prevent war. India and Pakistan have thought to establish
strategic stability by balancing the nuclear capabilities. As a small
country with little conventional military capabilities, it was advanta-
geous for Pakistan. In the context of stability-instability paradox, the
instability has always been more exacerbating than the stability. It ar-
gues that the strategic balance of nuclear weapons in South Asia was a
miscalculation. During the cold war, both India and Pakistan were
developing their nuclear programs. As they got closer to their weapons,
they began testing each other's limits. After the nuclear tests of India
and Pakistan, contrary to the expectations, nuclear deterrence could not
prevent Kargil crises.
The Kargil War of 1999 between India and Pakistan and cross-
border terrorist activities hustled up the efforts to launch re-
connaissance and surveillance satellites. Cartosat-1, Cartosat-2, RISAT-
1, and RISAT-2 are serving the military purposes. Presently, Indian
satellites are unable to cover the entire region and are not capable of
maintaining round the clock coverage in a real-time scenario. Pakistan
does not consider this a severe threat yet but with the growing number
of satellites, India might be able to acquire real-time data from
Pakistan's military installations, and missile launch sites and constant
coverage of military mobility inside Pakistan and along the borders may
change the existing level of credible deterrence. Munir Akram, an ex-
diplomat who had negotiated a treaty between India and Pakistan in
1987 to prohibit attacks on each other's nuclear facilities claimed that
any war between India and Pakistan would escalate uncontrollably may
go nuclear quickly [66].
Some senior officers in Indian military had proposed a “Cold Start
Doctrine” to counter state-sponsored cross-border terrorism. However,
it was not embraced by political leaders. Under this doctrine, if ne-
cessary, India can launch limited conventional military strikes below
the threshold of a nuclear response. Scared of any conventional limited
military strike, Pakistan reacted to India's cold start doctrine by chan-
ging its strategy from minimum credible deterrence to “full spectrum
9
Space Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
credible deterrence.” Now, Pakistan is deploying tactical nuclear
weapons against a conventionally superior India. Strategists argue that
any such use of nuclear weapons in the battlefield has high risks of
escalation from tactical to strategic level. By developing the short-range
ballistic missiles, Hatf-IX (Nasr) with a range 60 km, the vulnerability of
strategic stability has increased. First SRBM Nasr got tested on July 21,
2011 [67]. General Khalid Kidwai, Advisor to National Command Au-
thority claimed at a conference on nuclear security that “India's larger
military could still wage a conventional war against the country,
thinking Pakistan would not risk retaliation with a bigger nuclear
weapon.” [68] The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons at opera-
tional level would always have an unreliable command and control
mechanism. At the peak of the enemy attacks, a commander of nuclear
arms unit in the battlefield would have the authority and less patience
to launch tactical nuclear weapon on an overcoming adversary. One can
imagine the scenario that such situation has less de-escalation prob-
ability.
As India is pursuing its Ballistic Missile Defense Program, the
pressure is building upon Pakistan to respond to the full spectrum
credible deterrence. On April 17, 2014, India tested its early stage
capabilities of a proposed two layered BMD system by successfully
testing a Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV) against a two-stage target de-
veloped for mimicking an adversary's ballistic missile. The test was
claimed to be successful countering a missile is coming from more than
2000 KM ″In an automated operation, radar-based detection and
tracking system detected and tracked the enemy's ballistic missile. The
computer network with the help of data received from Radars predicted
the trajectory of the incoming Ballistic Missile. The Interceptor guided
by high accuracy Inertial Navigation System (INS) supported by a
Redundant Micro Navigation System moved towards the estimated
point of the interception. All events were monitored in real-time by
Telemetry/Range Stations, at various other locations. The mission got
completed, and the interception parameters were achieved” [69].
To assess the potential strategic consequences of military techno-
logical installments, the policymakers should take into account that
South Asia is a sensitive region due to its geostrategic location, presence
of two nuclear powers, interests of great powers, and emerging ag-
gressive posture of India. Security dilemma has always been a hallmark
of South Asian region, focusing on India -Pak relations. An Indian at-
tempt to gain the status of regional policeman as well as a pursuit of
power at international stage is increasing instability in the South Asian
region. The strategic chain reaction is perpetual in case of South Asian
regional dynamics. Any move made by China is responded by India,
persuading Pakistan to take effective counter measures be it be con-
ventional or non-conventional domain. Likewise, the extension of war
theatre from the traditional and conventional stand points to common
boundaries in the space will cast a lasting impact over the strategic
M.Z. Hussain, R.Q. Ahmed
stability. Recent remarks by President of the U.S makes it obvious that
Space is becoming a fourth medium of warfare very soon. An expensive
and unnecessary arms race in space will start in next to no time.
In case of South Asia, the history of strangulated relations and war
history of the regional states have always compelled contenders to go
for arms sophistication and build-up. Likewise, India's urge for great
power status and prestige, along with the political environment and
economic competition at the international level, resulted in the devel-
opment of the Indian space program. At first, Indian space program has
been primarily civilian in nature, focused on socioeconomic develop-
ment, but now there have been evident changes leading to military use
of space.
Former Indian President Abdual Kalam on the Golden Jubilee
Celebration of DRDO stated that they have the ability to intercept and
destroy objects in space and will do it if it endangers Indian Territory
[70]. In India Vision (2020), Kalam claimed, “Newly emerging tech-
nologies such as robotics or artificial intelligence would have a crucial
impact on future defense operations and also on many industrial sec-
tors.” [71].
Moreover, DRDO is working on the Directionally Unrestricted Ray
Gun Array (DURGA) and Kinetic Attack Loitering Interceptor (KALI)
[72]. Likewise, India is looking for a KE-ASAT, which could interdict
hostile satellites. DRDO is also planning programs such as development
of an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle, laser-based sensors and mini sa-
tellites. Mini-satellites will provide communication, navigation and
global positioning system (GPS) to armed forces of India.
India's space weaponization will have repercussion for Pakistan in
particular and internationally in general. India already has conven-
tional weapons superiority over Pakistan, and the space program will
strengthen its strategic and military capability. Space domination will
act as a force multiplier. Effective use of space satellite services will give
India upper hand over an adversary or competitor. Thus, information
domination will help India plan in a better way. It will strengthen
India's reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. It will provide
India with accurate information about enemy missile silos, military
buildup and movement of troops [73].
India's intention to develop ASAT weapons will trigger a new and
unnecessary space arms race. Moreover, putting weapons in space will
destabilize the already vulnerable international nonproliferation re-
gime. Space program can help India in their Ballistic Missile Defense
system. V. Siddhartha, Indian scientist claimed that India's Satcom,
remote sensing and weather satellites have contributed to its Ballistic
Missile Defense, and has provided these utilities as effective space
control, force application assets, and ASAT weapons [74].
Despite these claims by Indian military officials that they have a
reliable BMD system capable of killing potential targets in exo-atmo-
sphere and endo-atmosphere, India's existing capacity is insufficient to
change the fundamental strategic stability equation in South Asia, but it
has disturbed the existing strategic balance. The geographical limita-
tions and short distances between India and Pakistan may never allow
the missile defense systems for perfection but the terminal phase missile
interception. Another limitation of the missile defense system in India is
that it's a big country and it would require a significant number of short
range as well as long-range missiles. It would need a special
budget allocation which would bring the huge cost for India with fewer
benefits. Pakistan, on the other hand, would feel compelled by the
circumstances to invest more resources in its ballistic missile system,
space-based remote sensing systems, satellite-based radars and com-
munication satellites but with no promise of expected performance in
real crises. The militarization of space for India and Pakistan would
benefit less but would cost more in economic and strategic terms. A
potential arms race in space would lead these countries toward more
strategic instability, and economic oblivion, weak deterrence and less
security assurance except the more prestige and imitated technological
superiority.
10
Space Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
15. Conclusion
The Indian space program targets in the civilian domain for eco-
nomic purposes, but it is drifting gradually toward militarization.
Currently, with a 1.2 Billion U.S. $ annual budget, ISRO is a modest
space faring agency with high technological potential. Increasing assets
in space, the high growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) and the
U.S.-India nuclear deal have brought an opportunity for India to es-
tablish itself as a regional power and a major global player. Winning a
seat at United Nations Security Council (UNSC) would provide India a
more considerable political influence to protect its regional and global
interests. India is now in a transitional phase to augment its economic
and political interests beyond the region and considers it essential to
improve its nuclear deterrent and strategic capabilities. The Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported in 2014 that
India has imported 14 percent of global arms from 2009 through 2013
and is likely to grow in the coming years. It is more than any other
country.
In the U.S.-India nuclear deal, military modernization is a pre-
requisite for which space capabilities have to be improved. India is
looking forward to seizing this opportunity to establish a robust C4ISR
capability. India's predominantly civilian space program traditionally
provided little room for military utilities and security purposes. India
looks for more investments in military dedicated satellites and IGMDP
to fill this gap. This inevitability of militarization is directly related to
the changing strategic stability of the region. A chain reaction starts
from the U.S., comes to China and India and ends at Pakistan's space
militarization and consequently a new arms race in the region.
Pakistan's inability to compete with India in conventional as well as in
military terms is causing great frustration and increased dependency on
China. U.S.-India nuclear cooperation has worked as a knee-jerking
factor for China-Pakistan economic and security cooperation. China
Pakistan Economic Corridor under the umbrella of Belt and Road
Initiative is likely to change the scenario. It will give a push to
Pakistan's sluggish economy and boost its defense procurement. China
also intends to develop a maritime silk route using Gwadar port. It will
enable China to have better access and control over the Middle East and
central Asia. China will use this naval base and deep water seaport as an
alternate trade route to manage the political tensions over Strait of
Malacca. The deployment of Chinese submarines in 2008 at the base
near Sanya on the southern tip of Hainan has increased tensions in India
given this base is just 1200 nautical miles from Malacca Strait, the
closest access point to the Indian Ocean. China's control over the Indian
Ocean and a naval base at Gwadar will have profound strategic im-
plications for India. The strategic angling of China-Pakistan and India-
U.S will define the security posture of the region in the near future.
Amid close relationship, China will help Pakistan to launch more
military satellites to improve ISR capabilities against India and may
help it to acquire ASATs and missile defense system. In response, India
would maximize space militarization efforts to deter both China and
Pakistan by developing ICBMs, robust C4ISR, BMD system and ASATs.
One can foresee that this new regional security dynamics and techno-
logical asymmetries may translate into strategic instability among nu-
clear weapon states and pose more significant challenges for precarious
regional peace and security.
Moreover, Economic challenges faced by Pakistan will make it dif-
ficult for Pakistan to compete with India in this domain. Thus, low-
intensity conflicts between India and Pakistan will increase. Dual use of
satellites will strengthen India's security as well as economy. India is
working on expanding its conventional and nonconventional military
might, as is evident in its rising defense budget allocations.
Closer analysis of the issue suggests that historical relations between
India and Pakistan and India's quest for space weaponization will make
the security of the region fragile by undermining the deterrence stabi-
lity of the region. The strategic balance will be shifted to the strategic
advantage of India. Security dilemma generated by India in space will
M.Z. Hussain, R.Q. Ahmed
generate offensive and defensive reactions from its opponents and
competitors.
It is concluded that to maintain stability at the regional and inter-
national level, it is mandatory that international community assert its
efforts to put an embargo on the weaponization of the outer space and
pay attention to developments taking place in this domain. At the re-
gional level, peace and security in South Asia mainly depend on the
nature of the relationship between India and Pakistan. Hence, efforts
should be made at the regional level to have Confidence Building
Measures to ensure strategic stability and crisis stability. In the mean-
while Pakistan should build up its space assets suitable to its needs and
in the process bring in a level of space resource stability.
References
[1] Michael O’ Hanlon, Technology Change and the Future Warfare, Manas
Publications, New Delhi, 2005, p. 1.
[2] Sandra Erwin, “Defense official: Trump is serious about creating a space force,”,
Space News (15 March, 2018), http://spacenews.com/defense-official-trump-is-
serious-about-creating-a-space-force/.
[3] Ajey Lele, “Militarization of Space,” Indian Defence Review, Vol. 23, Accessed March
25, 2018. http://www.indiandefencereview.com/military-&-space/Militarization-
of-Space-.html.
[4] A.McDougall Walter, The Heavens and Earth: Apolitical History of Space Age, John
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1985, pp. 160–175.
[5] A Brief History of Space Age, Accessed March 10, 2018.http://www.gmupolicy.net/
space/shortcourse/1b.%20Launius%2020A%20Brief%20History%20of%20the
%20Space%20Age.pdf.
[6] Mathew Mowthorpe, The Militarization and Weaponization of Space, Lexington
Books, Maryland, 2004, p. 113.
[7] Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan, Meta-geopolitics of Outer Space: an Analysis of Space Power,
Security and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012, p. 208.
[8] Reaching critical Will's guide to conference of disarmament, http://www.
reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/cdbook2011.pdf, (2011) , Accessed date: 20
February 2018.
[9] Karen E. House, United States public delegate to the 63rd session of the united
nations general assembly, delivered in the debate on outer space (disarmament
aspects) of the general Assembly's first committee, October 20, Arms Control
Update, U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, 2008 Geneva, available
at: http://geneva.usmission.gov/CD/updates/1020OuterSpace.html.
[10] For further details, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches02/
chiruswp_062702cd.htm.
[11] For a complete text of the speech proposing the Strategic Defense Initiative, http://
www.pierretristam.com/Bobst/Library/wf-241html.
[12] Michael Sirak, “Air force leadership: Chinese ASAT marked turning point: space No
longer sanctuary,”, Defense Dail. (February 12, 2007).
[13] Victoria Samson, “CDI Analysis: Shooting Down USA 193,”, World Security
Institute, 2008 Feburary 27 http://www.worldsecurityinstitue.org/showarticles.
vfm?id=265.
[14] Matthew Mowthorpe, The Militarization and Weaponization of Space, Lexington
Books, Maryland, 2004.
[15] ‘Communication’, Last updated: April 07, 1997 http://fas.org/spp/military/
docops/operate/ds/communications.htm .
[16] James Cassity, ‘Operation Desert Storm-The J-6 perspective’, AFCEA News
(February, 2 1991).
[17] U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Joint Vision 2020 Emphasizes Full-Spectrum
Dominance’, Accessed April 20, 2017. http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/peace/us_dod_
2000.pdf.
[18] You Ji, “The revolution in military Affairs and the evolution of China's strategic
thinking”, Contemp. S. Asia (December 1999) 348.
[19] “The revolution in military Affairs and the evolution of China's strategic thinking”,
Contemp. S. Asia (December 1999) 348., 349.
[20] Ashok Maharaj, Space for Development: US-India Space Relationships 1955-1976,
Ph.D. Dissertation Georgia Institute of Technology, 2011.
[21] Ashok Maharaj, "reportSpace for Development: US-India Space Relationships 1955-
1976," Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2011..
[22] Ibid.
[23] Anita Bhatia, India's space program: cause for concern? Asian Surv. 25 (No. 10)
(Oct. 1985) 1013–1030.
[24] V. Siddhartha, “Military dimensions in the future of the indian presence in space,”,
Journal of the United Service Institution of India CXXX (No. 540) (April-June 2000)
251.
[25] Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “India's changing policy on space militarization: the
impact of China's ASAT test,”, India Rev. 10 (No. 4) (October–December 2011)
354–378.
[26] Ajey Lele, “Space program, adding to India's brand image”, India Strat. (July 2007),
http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories23.htm.
[27] Dinshaw Mistry, “The geostrategic implications of India's space program,”, Asian
Surv. 41 (No. 6) (November-December 2001) 1023–1043.
[28] ‘LVM3’, Accessed April 20, 2017 http://www.isro.gov.in/launchers/lvm3.
[29] ‘IAF will be model for world by 2025: Kalam’, Accessed April 22, 2017 http://news.
11
Space Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
webindia123.com/news/ar_showdetails.asp?id=703071921&cat=&n_date=
20070307.
[30] ‘Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle’, ISRO, Accessed April 20, 2017. http://www.isro.
gov.in/launchers/pslv.
[31] Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “India's changing policy on space militarization: im-
pact of China's ASAT test,”, India Rev. 10 (No. 4) (October–December, 2011)
354–378 http://www.isro.gov.in/launchers/lvm3.
[32] ‘UCS satellite data’, Accessed April 19, 2017, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_
weapons_and_global_security/solutions/space-weapons/ucs-satellite-database.html.
[33] ‘27 Indian Satellites are currently operation, says government in Lok Sabha’,
Accessed April 12, 2017 http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-27-indian-
satellites-are-currently-operations-says-government-in-lok-sabha-2063999.
[34] V. Siddhartha, "Military dimensions in the future of the indian presence in space,",
Journal of the United Services Institution of India 130 (540) (Apr/June 2000)
243–258.
[35] ‘GSAT 7, 7A (INSAT 4F)’, Accessed April 22, 2017 http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_
sdat/gsat-7.htm.
[36] N. Gopal Raj, ‘ISRO plans a new high-resolution earth satellite’, Hindu (March 6,
2013), http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/science/isro-plans-a-new-
highresolution-earth-satellite/article4482404.ece.
[37] Macro Aliberti, India in Space: between Utility and Geopolitics vol. 41, Springer
Publishing, New York, 2018.
[38] Marappa Krishnaswamy, “CartoSat-2-A dedicated satellite for cartographic appli-
cation, Proceedings of the 59th IAC (International Astronautical Congress, Glasgow,
Scotland, UK, Sept. 29-Oct. 3, 2008.
[39] ‘Cameras Used in Remote Sensing Satellites’, Angelfire, Accessed April 23, 2017,
http://www.angelfire.com/co/pallav/satcameras.html.
[40] K. Raghu, ‘ISRO plans satellite series for mapping, climate monitoring’, Livemint,
http://www.livemint.com/Industry/QHLz0LwAUfyo5lctANFKTL/Isro-plans-
satellite-series-for-mapping-climate-monitoring.html, (Jan 15, 2008) , Accessed
date: 22 April 2017.
[41] ‘RISAT-2’, eoPortal Directory, Accessed April 21, 2017. https://directory.eoportal.
org/web/eoportal/satellite-missions/r/risat-2.
[42] ‘RISAT-1’, Antrix, Accessed April 23, 2017. http://www.antrix.gov.in/RISAT-1.pdf.
[43] S. Paracha, Military dimensions of the indian space program, Astropolitics 11
(2013) 156–186.
[44] ‘Agni-2’, Missile Threat, Last updated Nov. 2, 2012, Accessed April 19, 2017. http://
missilethreat.com/missiles/agni-2/; a) ‘Long-range strategic missile Agni-IV test-
fired’, Hindu, September 23, 2012. http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/science/
article3914340.ece.
[45] P.V. Rahul Singh, ‘Air Chief, Naik in favor of flexing missile power’, Hindustan
Times, http://www.hindustantimes.com/newdelhi/air-chief-pv-naik-in-favour-of-
flexing-missile-power/article1-708062.aspx, (June 11, 2011).
[46] Dinshaw Mistry, The geostrategic implications of India's space program, Asian Surv.
41 (No. 6) (November/December 2001) 1023–1043.
[47] Jhinuk Chowdhury, The Agni-V and India's ICBM strategy, Dipl. (February 05,
2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/the-agni-v-and-indias-icbm-strategy/.
[48] Ajai Shukla, ‘Advanced Agni-VI missile with multiple warheads likely by 2017’, Bus.
Stand (May 8, 2013), http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/
advanced-agni-6-missile-with-multiple-warheads-likely-by-2017-113050800034_1.
html.
[49] ‘Hatf-1’, Missile Threat, Last updated November 08, 2012, Accessed April 16, 2017.
http://missilethreat.com/missiles/haft-1/.
[50] Usman Ansari, Pakistan tests improved shaheen missile, Defense News (April 10,
2013), http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130410/DEFREG03/304100018/
Pakistan-Tests-Improved-Shaheen-Missile.
[51] Iqtidar Khan, Revisiting the ‘sole purpose’ of developing Shaheen-III, News Nor.
(April 11, 2015), http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-36922-Revisiting-
the-sole-purpose-of-developing-Shaheen-III.
[52] ‘Launch Vehicles- Pakistan's Shaheen-III?’, Global Secur., Last updated April 20,
2009. Accessed April 22, 2017.http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/
pakistan/pakistan-shaheen-iii-space-booster.htm.
[53] “Shaheen-II/Hatf-6/Ghaznavi,” FAS, Last updated March 10, 2004, Accessed April
23, 2017. http://fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/missile/shaheen-2.htm.
[54] Irfan Ghauri, ‘Pakistan inches towards its first imaging satellite’, Express. Tribune
(May 4, 2012), http://tribune.com.pk/story/374121/pakistan-inches-towards-its-
first-imaging-satellite/.
[55] ‘SUPARCO set to get global navigation satellite system,’, Dawn (September 26,
2012), http://www.dawn.com/news/752156/suparco-set-to-get-global-navigation-
satellite-system-2.
[56] ‘Ababeel’, Global Secur., accessed September 25, 2017. https://www.
globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/ababil.htm.
[57] ‘Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat’, National Air and Space Intelligence Center,
accessed October 2, 2017.http://www.nasic.af.mil/LinkClick.aspx?.
[58] Ankit Panda, Why Pakistan's newly flight-tested multiple nuclear warhead-capable
missile really matters, Dipl. (January 25, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/
01/why-pakistans-newly-flight-tested-multiple-nuclear-warhead-capable-missile-
really-matters/.
[59] Salman Siddiqui, Celebrating Paksat-1R: Pakistani drones-a dream or reality?
Express. Tribune (August 6, 2012), http://tribune.com.pk/story/418118/
celebrating-paksat-1r-pakistani-drones-a-dream-or-reality/.
[60] Pervez Hoodbhoy (Ed.), Confronting the Bomb-Pakistani and Indian Scientists
Speak Out, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2013.
[61] R. Zia Mian, M. Rajaraman, V. Ramana, Early warning in South asia-constraints and
implications, Sci. Global Secur. 11 (2003) 109–150.
[62] Brian Weeden, Technical Advisor, Secure World Foundation, Email Message to the
M.Z. Hussain, R.Q. Ahmed
Author, (April 21, 2015).
[63] H. Bharath Gopalaswamy, V. Pant, Does India need anti-satellite Capacity? Rediff
news (February 09, 2010), http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/feb/09/does-
India-need-anti-satellite-capability.htm.
[64] Amit R. Saxena, India and space defense, Dipl. (March 22, 2014), http://
thediplomat.com/2014/03/india-and-space-defense/.
[65] Munir Akram, Gambling against armageddon, Dawn (October 26, 2014), http://
www.dawn.com/news/1140381/gambling-against-armageddon.
[66] Pakistan test-fired short-range missile Hatf IX’, Hindu, September 26, 2014.http://
www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/pakistan-testfires-short-range-
missile-hatf-ix/article6449057.ece.
[67] Baqir Sajjad Syed, NCA stresses full Spectrum Deterrence, Dawn (September 06,
2013), http://www.dawn.com/news/1040865/nca-stresses-full-spectrum-
deterrence.
[68] DRDO: test-fire of Prithvi missile defense vehicle a significant step, Hindu. Bus. Line
(April 27, 2014), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/drdo-testfire-of-
prithvi-missile-defence-vehicle-a-significant-step/article5953149.ece.
[69] India too has technology to intercept, destroy rouge satellites, Hindu. Bus. Line
(February 23, 2008), http://www.thehindubusinessline.in/2008/02/23/stories/
2008022351582100.html.
[70] Abdul Kalam, India vision 2020, information available at: http://www.
indiavision2020.org.
12
Space Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
[71] V. Siddhartha, Military Dimensions in the Future of the Indian Presence in Space,
Presentation at Center for Air Power Studies, New Delhi, September 17, 2010.
[72] Jacob Chriqui, Military Applications of India's Space Program: the Military
Surveillance and Reconnaissance System, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 20
June 2006, http://www.ipcs.org/article/military/military-applications-of-indias-
space-program-the-military-surveillance-and-2043.html.
[73] Praful Bidwai, India's Mars mission isn't about science, but spectacle, Rediff news
(November 19, 2013), http://www.rediff.com/news/column/column-indias-mars-
mission-isnt-about-science-but-spectacle/20131119.html.
[74] V. Siddhartha, Military dimensions in future of the indian presence in space,
Journal of the United States Services Institution of India 130 (no.540) (April-June
2000) 249.
Mian Zahid Hussain is a Doctoral Candidate in Physics at the College of Engineering,
Mathematics and Physical Sciences, University of Exeter, UK. Previously, he was Research
Fellow at Space Policy Institute, Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington
University, Washington, D.C.
Raja Qaiser Ahmed is Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at
Quaid I Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan. Previously, he was Associate at the School
of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, UK.