Aboitiz Shipping Co.

v CA

Case Doctrine:

The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the
passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's
dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the
passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's
conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons
who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be
deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this
rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to
see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship
is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his
destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his
baggage.
When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes,
which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. Even if he had already
disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's premises was not without
cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one hour after the
vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's
vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time.

Case: CONTRACTUAL EFFECTS, EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE

Facts: Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel owned by defendant ABOITIZ, at the port at
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. Said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North
Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a gangplank having been
provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of using said gangplank
Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier.
After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the
exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of
Agreement between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and
defendant Aboitiz. The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its
crane operator Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one hour after the
passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the
cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had
already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes
were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing
to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane
hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter
brought to the hospital where he later died. Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint
for damages against Aboitiz for breach of contract of carriage. Aboitiz denied
responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel was completely
under the control of Pioneer as the which handled the unloading of cargoes from the
vessel of Aboitiz. It is also averred that since the crane operator was not an employee of
Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held liable under the fellow-servant rule. Judgment is
rendered in favor of the plantiffs. The trial court absolved Pioneer from liability for failure
of the Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly established a case of negligence against
the crane operator which the court ruled is never presumed. Aboitiz appealed the same
to respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of of the trial court except as
to the amount of damages awarded to the Vianas. Hence the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not the responsibility of Aboitiz to the victim ceased when it
disembarked from the vessel.

Held: No. The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the
passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's
dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the
passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's
conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons
who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be
deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this
rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to
see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship
is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his
destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his
baggage.
When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes,
which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. Even if he had already
disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's premises was not without
cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one hour after the
vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's
vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time. Consequently,
under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a
passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that there was a
cordon of drums around the perimeter of the crane, as claimed by petitioner. It also
adverted to the fact that the alleged presence of visible warning signs in the vicinity was
disputable and not indubitably established. Thus, we are not inclined to accept
petitioner's explanation that the victim and other passengers were sufficiently warned
that merely venturing into the area in question was fraught with serious peril. Hence,
Aboitiz is negligent. Pioneer had taken the necessary safeguards insofar as its
unloading operations were concerned, a fact which appears to have been accepted by
the plaintiff therein by not impleading Pioneer as a defendant, and likewise inceptively
by Aboitiz by filing its third-party complaint only after ten months from the institution of
the suit against it. Parenthetically, Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on
extraordinary diligence required of, and the corresponding presumption of negligence
foisted on, common carriers like Aboitiz.
LOPEZ VS. DURUELO 52 PHIL 229

Facts: On February 10, 1927, plaintiff Augusto Lopez was desirous of

embarking upon the interisland steamer San Jacinto in order to go to Cebu,
the plaintiff embarked at the landing in the motorboat Jison which was
engaged in conveying passengers and luggage back and forth from the
landing to the boats at anchor.
As the motorboat approached San Jacinto in a perfectly quiet sea, it
came too near to the stern of the ship, and as the propeller of the ship had not
yet ceased to turn, the blades of the propeller strucked the motorboat and
sank it at once. As it sank, the plaintiff was thrown into the water against the
propeller, and the revolving blades inflicted various injuries upon him. The
plaintiff was hospitalized. He filed a complaint seeking to recover damages
from the defendant. The defendant however alleged that the complaint does
not have a right of action, a demurrer was submitted directed to the fact that
the complaint does not allege that the protest had been presented by the
plaintiff, within twenty-four hours after the occurrence to the competent
authority at the port where the accident occurred as provided for Article 835 of
the Code of Commerce.

Issue: Whether the motorboat Jison is a vessel provided for by Article 835 of
the Code of Commerce?

Held: The word vessel as used in the third section of tile IV, Book III of the
Code of Commerce, dealing with collisions, does not include all ships, craft or
floating structures of any kind without limitation. The said section does not
apply to minor craft engaged in a river and bay traffic.Therefore, a passenger on boat
like the Jison, is not required to make protest as a condition
precedent to his right of action for the injury suffered by him in the collision
described in the complaint.Article 835 of the Code of Commerce does not
apply.

ANG VS. AMERICAN STEAMSHIP AGENCIES (19 SCRA 631)

Facts: Yau Yue Commercial Bank of Hongkong agreed to sell 140 packages
of galvanized steel durzinc sheets to Herminio Teves for $32,458.26. Said
agreement was subject to the following terms: the purchase price should be
covered by a bank draft which should be paid by Teves in exchange for the
delivery to him of the bill of lading to be deposited with honking and Shanghai
Bank of Manila; that Teves would present said bill of lading to carrier’s agent,
American Steamship Agencies which would then issue the “permit to deliver
imported articles” to be presented to the Bureau of customs to obtain the
release of the articles.
Yau Yue shipped the articles aboard S.S. Tensai Maru owned by
Nissho Shipping Co., of which the American Shipping is the agent in the
Philippines.
When the Articles arrived in manila, Honkong Shanghai’s Bank notified
Teves of the arrival of the goods and requested for the payment of the
demand draft. Teves, however, failed to pay the demand draft. So, the bank
returned the bill of lading and the demand draft to Yau Yue which endorsed
the bill of lading to Domingo Ang.
Despite his non-payment, Teves was able to obtain a bank guarantee
in favor of the American Steamship Agencies, the carrier’s agent. Thus,
Teves succeeded in securing a “ permit to deliver imported articles” from the
carrier’s agent, which he presented to the Bureau of Customs, that released
the said articles to him.
Subsequently, Domingo Ang claimed the articles from American
Steamship, by presenting the indorsed bill of lading, but he was informed that
it had delivered the articles to Teves. Ang filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Manila against American shipping agencies, for having
wrongfully delivered the goods.
The American Steamship filed for a motion to dismiss, citing the
carriage of Goods by Sea Act, section 3 paragraph 4, which states: in any
event, the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect
to loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year, after delivery of
goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered.
Thus, the lower court dismissed the action, on the ground of
prescription.

Issue: Whether or not the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act Section 3,

Paragraph 4, applies to the case at bar?

Held: The provision of the law speaks of “loss or damage”. But there was no
damage caused to the goods which were delivered intact to Herminio Teves.
As defined by the Civil Code and as applied to section 3, paragraph 4,
of the Carriage of Goods by sea Act, “loss” contemplates a situation where no
delivery at all was made by the shipper of the goods because the same had
perished, gone out of commerce, or disappeared that their existence is
unknown or they cannot be recovered. It does not include a situation where
there was indeed delivery, but delivery to the wrong person.
The applicable rule on prescription is that found in the Civil Code,
either: ten years for breach of contract or four years for quasi-delict. In either
case, the plaintiff’s cause of action has not yet prescribed. Thus, the case is
remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.