LABOR | ATTY.

GOLANGCO CASE DIGEST

1. Magsaysay Mari me Corpora on v. Lobusta, January 25, 2012

2. SSS v. Azote, April 15, 2015
3. Marlow Naviga on v. Ganal, June 7, 2017
4. Seapower Shipping v. Subanal, June 19, 2017
5. GSIS v. Pauig, January 30, 2017
6. CF Sharp v. Cas llo, April 19, 2017
7. SSS v. Favilla, March 28, 2011
8. Mendoza v. People, August 3, 2010
9. SSS v. Signey, January, 28, 2008

LABOR STANDARD
Case Digests

Be stronger than your excuses. CHLOE FRANCISCO | SBU-COL 2020-2021

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 LABOR | ATTY. GOLANGCO CASE DIGEST
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION vs LOBUSTA Held:
GR. No. 177578 No. A temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company
25 January 2012 physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expira on of the maximum
Tickler: 240-day medical treatment period without a declara on of either tness to work or the
Facts: existence of a permanent disability. Upon sign-o from the vessel for medical treatment, the
Pe oner Magsaysay Mari mie Corpora on (MMC) is a domes c corpora on and the local seafarer is en tled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage un l he is declared t to
manning agent of the vessel MV “Fossanger” and of pe oner Wastrel-Larsen Management A/ work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company designated
S (WLM). Respondent Orberto Lobusta is a seaman who has worked for MMC since 1994. In physician[,] but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
March 1998, he was rehired as an Able Seaman by MMC on behalf of its principal WLM).
Lobusta boarded MV "Fossanger" on March 16, 1998. A er two months, he complained of Upon repatria on, Lobusta was rst examined by the Pulmonologist and Orthopedic Surgeon
breathing di culty and back pain. On May 12, 1998, while the vessel was in Singapore, on May 22, 1998. The maximum 240-day (8-month) medical-treatment period expired, but no
Lobusta was admi ed at Gleneagles Mari me Medical Center and was diagnosed to be declara on was made that Lobusta is t to work. Nor was there a declara on of the existence
su ering from severe acute bronchial asthma with secondary infec on and lumbosacral of Lobusta’s permanent disability. On February 16, 1999, Lobusta was s ll prescribed
muscle strain. Dr. C K Lee cer ed that Lobusta was t for discharge on May 21, 1998, for medica ons for his lumbosacral pain and was advised to return for reevalua on. May 22, 1998
repatria on for further treatment. Upon repatria on, Lobusta was referred to Metropolitan to February 16, 1999 is 264 days or 6 days short of 9 months.
Hospital. The medical coordinator, Dr. Robert Lim, reported that Lobusta has been diagnosed
to have a moderate obstruc ve pulmonary disease which tends to be a chronic problem, such Dr. Roa’s clinical summary also shows that as of December 16, 1999, Lobusta was s ll un t to
that Lobusta needs to be on medica ons inde nitely. Pe oners "then faced the need for resume his normal work as a seaman due to the persistence of his symptoms. But neither did
con rma on and grading by a second opinion" and "it took the par es me to agree on a Dr. Roa declare the existence of Lobusta’s permanent disability. Again, the maximum 240-day
common doctor, un l they agreed on Dr. Camilo Roa." According to Dr. Roa, Lobusta is not medical treatment period had already expired. May 22, 1998 to December 16, 1999 is 19
physically t to resume his normal work as a seaman due to the persistence of his symptoms. months or 570 days. In Remigio, un tness to work for 11-13 months was considered
Magsaysay Mari me Corpora on suggested that Lobusta be examined by another company- permanent total disability. So it must be in this case. And Dr. David’s much later report that
designated doctor for an independent medical examina on. Dr. David opined that Mr. Lobusta Lobusta "ought not to be considered t to return to work as an Able Seaman" validates that his
ought not to be considered t to return to work as an Able Seaman. As no se lement was disability is permanent and total as provided under the POEA Standard Employment Contract
reached despite the above ndings, the Labor Arbiter ordered the par es to le their and the Labor Code, as amended.
respec ve posi on papers.
In fact, the CA has found that Lobusta was not able to work again as a seaman and that his
The LA ordered pe oners to pay Lobusta medical allowance, disability bene ts, and disability is permanent "as he has been unable to work since 14 May 1998 to the present or
a orney’s fees. The LA held that provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, on permanent for more than 120 days." This period is more than eight years, counted un l the CA decided
total disability do not apply to overseas seafarers. the case in August 2006. On the CA ruling that Lobusta’s disability is permanent since he was
unable to work "for more than 120 days," SC have clari ed in Vergara that this "temporary
Lobusta appealed. The NLRC dismissed his appeal and a rmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days.”
The NLRC ruled that Lobusta’s condi on may only be considered permanent par al disability.
The CA ruled that Lobusta's disability brought about by his bronchial asthma is permanent and SSS vs AZOTE
total as he had been unable to work since May 14, 1998 up to the present or for more than GR. No. 209741
120 days, and because Dr. David found him not t to return to work as an able seaman 15 April 2015
Tickler:
Issue: Facts:
Does the poea contract considers the mere lapse of more than one hundred twenty (120) days On June 19, 1992, respondent Edna and Edgardo, a member of the Social Security System
as total and permanent disability? (SSS), were married. Their union produced six children. In 1994, Edgardo submi ed Form E-4
to the SSS with Edna and their three older children as designated bene ciaries. Therea er or
on September 7, 2001, Edgardo submi ed another Form E-4 to the SSS designa ng his three

Be stronger than your excuses. CHLOE FRANCISCO | SBU-COL 2020-2021

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 LABOR | ATTY. GOLANGCO CASE DIGEST
younger children as addi onal bene ciaries. On January 13, 2005, Edgardo passed away. on their database as expressly permi ed by Sec on 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 8282.
Shortly therea er, Edna led her claim for death bene ts with the
SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. It appeared, however, from the SSS records that MARLOW NAVIGATION vs HEIRS OF GANAL
Edgardo had earlier submi ed another Form E-4 on November 5, 1982 with a di erent set of GR. No. 220168
bene ciaries, namely: Rosemarie Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer Azote (Elmer), 7 June 2017
as dependent, born on October 9, 1982. Consequently, Edna’s claim was denied. Her children Tickler:
were adjudged as bene ciaries and she was considered as the legal guardian of her minor Facts:
children. The bene ts, however, would be stopped once a child would a ain the age of 21. On September 16, 2011, herein pe oners employed Ricardo Ganal (Ganal) as an oiler aboard
the vessel MV Stadt Hamburg in accordance with the provisions of the Philippine Overseas
On March 13, 2007, Edna led a pe on with the SSC to claim the death bene ts, lump sum Employment Administra on (POEA)-Standard Employment Contract, which was executed by
and monthly pension of Edgardo.7 She insisted that she was the legi mate wife of Edgardo. In and between the par es. On September 20, 2011, he commenced his employment.
its answer, the SSS averred that there was a con ic ng informa on in the forms submi ed by
the deceased. Summons was published in a newspaper of general circula on direc ng Around 7 o'clock in the evening of April 15, 2012, a party was organized for the crewmen of
Rosemarie to le her answer. Despite the publica on, no answer was led and Rosemarie was MV Stadt Hamburg while the ship was anchored at Chi agong, Bangladesh. A er nishing his
subsequently declared in default. shi at 12 midnight, Ganal joined the party. Around 3 o'clock in the morning of April 16, 2012,
the ship captain no ced that Ganal was already drunk so he directed him to return to his cabin
The SSC ruled that Edna is not en tled to bene ts. The SSC dismissed Edna’s pe on for lack of and take a rest. Ganal ignored the ship captain's order. Thus, a ship o cer, a security
merit. Ci ng Sec on 24(c) of the SS Law, it explained that although Edgardo led the Form E-4 watchman and a member of the crew were summoned to escort Ganal to his cabin. The crew
designa ng Edna and their six children as bene ciaries, he did not revoke the designa on of members a empted to accompany him back to his cabin but he refused. They then tried to
Rosemarie as his wife bene ciary, and Rosemarie was s ll presumed to be his legal wife. restrain him but he resisted and, when he found the chance to escape, he ran towards the
However, the appellate court reversed the decision. ship's railings and, without hesita on, jumped overboard and straight into the sea. The crew
members immediately threw life rings into the water towards the direc on where he jumped
Issue: and the ship o cer sounded a general alarm and several alarms therea er. Contact was also
WON respondent is en tled to claim the SSS death bene t and pension of Edgardo made with the coast guard and the crew members searched for Ganal, to no avail. Ganal was
later found dead and oa ng in the water.
Held:
No. Under R. A. No. 8282, the law in force at the me of Edgardo’s death, only the legal spouse The subsequent medico-legal report issued by the Philippine Na onal Police showed that the
of the deceased-member is quali ed to be the bene ciary of the la er’s SS bene ts. In this cause of his death was asphyxia by drowning. Subsequently, Ganal's wife, Gemma Boragay
case, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with another (Boragay), for herself and in behalf of their minor children, led a claim for death bene ts with
individual as evidenced by their marriage contract and Edgardo’s acknowledgment of his pe oners, but the la er denied the claim.
married status when he lled out the 1982 Form E-4 designa ng Rosemarie as his spouse.
Thus, on October 29, 2012, Boragay, led with the NLRC a complaint for recovery of death and
The updated Form E-4 of Edgardo was not determina ve of Edna’s status and eligibility to other bene ts, unpaid salaries for the remaining period of Ganal's contract, as well as moral
claim the death bene ts of deceased-member. Although an SSS member is free to designate a and exemplary damages.
bene ciary, the designa on must always conform to the statute. To blindly rely on the form
submi ed by the deceased-member would subject the en re social security system to the On July 26, 2013, the LA rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
whims and caprices of its members and would render the SSS Law inu le. Although the SSC is Aggrieved by the Decision of the LA, respondents led an appeal with the NLRC. On October
not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of marriages, it is required by Sec on 21, 2013, the NLRC issued a Resolu on denying respondents' appeal and a rming the
4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 8282 to examine available sta s cal and economic data to ensure that the Decision of the LA. Respondents led a Mo on for Reconsidera on, but the NLRC denied it in
bene ts fall into the righ ul bene ciaries. The existence of two Form E-4s designa ng, on two its November 21, 2013 Resolu on. Respondents then led a pe on for cer orari with the
di erent dates, two di erent women as his spouse is already an indica on that only one of CA.
them can be the legal spouse. It should be emphasized that the SSC determined Edna’s
eligibility on the basis of available sta s cal data and documents

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 LABOR | ATTY. GOLANGCO CASE DIGEST
On February 25, 2015, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which reversed the October 21, The Court agrees with the LA and the NLRC that the pieces of evidence presented by
2013 and November 21, 2013 Resolu ons of the NLRC. The CA held that Ganal jumped into pe oners, consis ng of the tes mony of the crew members present at the me of the
the sea while he was overcome by alcohol and completely intoxicated and deprived of his unfortunate incident, as well as the accident report made by the master of the vessel, prove
consciousness and mental facul es to comprehend the consequence of his own ac ons and the willfulness of Ganal's acts which led to his death. The term "willful" means "voluntary and
keep in mind his own personal safety. Pe oners led a Mo on for Reconsidera on, but the inten onal", but not necessarily malicious. In the case of MabuhayShipping Services, Inc. v.
CA denied it in its Resolu on dated August 18. Na onal Labor Rela ons Commission, the seaman, in a state of intoxica on, ran amuck and
commi ed an unlawful aggression against another, in ic ng injury on the la er, so that in his
Issue: own defense the la er fought back and in the process killed the seaman.
WON respondents are en tled to death bene ts as heirs of Ricardo S. Ganal under Sec on
20(B) of the Standard Terms and Condi ons Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino This Court held that the circumstances of the death of the seaman could be categorized as a
Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships, as amended in 2010 deliberate and willful act on his own life directly a ributable to him. In the same manner, in
the instant case, Ganal's act of inten onally jumping overboard, while in a state of
Held: intoxica on, could be considered as a deliberate and willful act on his own life which is directly
Yes. It is se led that the employment of seafarers, including claims for death bene ts, is a ributable to him. Indeed, Ganal may have had no inten on to end his own life. For all we
governed by the contracts they sign at the me of their engagement. As long as the know he was just being playful. Nonetheless, he acted with notorious negligence. Notorious
s pula ons in said contracts are not contrary to law, morals, public order, or public policy, they negligence has been de ned as something more than mere or simple negligence or
have the force of law between the par es. Nonetheless, while the seafarer and his employer contributory negligence; it signi es a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own
are governed by their mutual agreement, the POEA Rules and Regula ons require that the personal safety.
POEA-Standard Employment Contract be integrated with every seafarer's contract. Under the
provisions of the Standard Terms and Condi ons Governing the Overseas Employment of In any case, regardless of Ganal's mo ves, pe oners were able to prove that his act of
Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships, as amended, the death of a seafarer by reason jumping was willful on his part. Thus, pe oners should not be held responsible for the logical
of any work-related injury or illness during the term of his employment is compensable. On consequence of Ganal's act of jumping overboard. As a nal note, it is true that the bene cent
the other hand, Sec on 20(D) of the same Standard Terms and Condi ons states that: D. No provisions of the Standard Employment Contract are liberally construed in favor of Filipino
compensa on and bene ts shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or seafarers and their dependents. The Court commiserates with respondents for the unfortunate
death of the seafarer resul ng from his willful or criminal act or inten onal breach of his fate that befell their loved one; however, the Court nds that the factual circumstances in this
du es, provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or case do not jus fy the grant of death bene ts as prayed for by them as bene ciaries.
death is directly a ributable to the seafarer.
SUBPOWER SHIPPING vs SUBANAL
Also, under Ar cle 172 of the Labor Code, which may also be made applicable to the present GR. No. 198544
case, the compensa on for workers covered by the Employees Compensa on and State 19 June 2017
Insurance Fund are subject to the limita ons on liability, to wit: Art. 172. Limita ons of liability. Tickler:
-The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for the compensa on to the employee or his Facts:
dependents except when the disability or death was occasioned by the employee's Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. (Seapower), herein pe oner, hired Warren Sabanal
intoxica on, willful intent to injure or kill himself or another, notorious negligence, or (Sabanal) as Third Mate onboard MT Montana on July 20, 1996. A er undergoing the rou ne
otherwise provided under this Title. In the present case, it may be conceded that the death of pre-employment medical examina on and being declared t to work, Sabanal boarded the
Ganal took place in the course of his employment, in that it happened at the me and at the ship and performed his du es. Some me in September 1995, Sabanal started exhibi ng
place where he was working. However, the accident which produced this tragic result did not unusual behavior. The captain, upon no cing this, wanted to supervise him be er, so he
arise out of such employment. The occasion where Ganal took alcoholic beverages was a grill assigned Sabanal to do simple tasks such as correc ng maps, and collec ng and typing the
party organized by the ship o cers of MV Stadt Hamburg. It was a social event and Ganal crew’s declara on. The captain observed that Sabanal’s condi on was “rather be er” and he
a ended not because he was performing his duty as a seaman, but was doing an act for his “did not appear to have any problems.” Later that day, Sabanal requested that he be allowed
own personal bene t. to return to the deck for some fresh air. Once on deck, he suddenly ran to the stem and
jumped to the sea. Rescue a empts proved pointless and his body was never recovered.

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 LABOR | ATTY. GOLANGCO CASE DIGEST
Sabanal’s wife, Elvira, wanted to claim contractual bene ts from Seapower. However, 1977. On July 19, 1977, he became a permanent employee, and on August 1, 1977, he became
Seapower disclaimed any liability for the death of Sabanal and informing the wife that she a GSIS member, as indicated in his Informa on for Membership.
could only claim death bene ts under the Social Security System. The wife then led a Therea er, on November 3, 2004, he re red from the service upon reaching the mandatory
complaint for payment of her husband’s death bene ts. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the re rement age of sixty- ve (65) years old. But when he led his re rement papers with the
case by reason that the pieces of evidence shown clearly indicate that Sabanal had taken his GSIS-Cauayan, the la er processed his claim based on a Record of Creditable Service (RCS) and
own life. Upon appeal, the Na onal Labor Rela ons Commission (NLRC) a rmed the LA’s a Total Length of Service of only twenty-seven (27) years. Disagreeing with the computa on,
decision. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals which concluded that the Pauig wrote a le er-complaint to the GSIS, arguing that his rst fourteen (14) years in the
pe oner was liable to pay death bene ts to the wife. government service had been. erroneously omi ed.
The GSIS ra ocinated that Pauig’s rst fourteen (14) years in the government were excluded in
Issue: the computa on of his re rement bene ts because during those years, no premium payments
WON the death of Subanal is compensable were remi ed to it. Under the Premium-Based Policy of the GSIS which took e ect on August
1, 2003, only periods of service where premium payments were made and duly remi ed to
Held: the System shall be included in the computa on of re rement bene ts. Aggrieved, Pauig led
No. The Supreme Court held Sabanal’s death was not compensable. It further explained that a case before the RTC of Cabagan, Isabela.
under the POEA-SEC, the employer is generally liable for death bene ts when a seafarer dies On July 15, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision, the decretal por on of which reads:
during the terms of employment. The only excep on is when it can be proved that the death WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby renders judgment as follows:
was caused by an injury directly a ributable to his deliberate or willful act. Evidence of 1. Declaring the Premium-Based Policy under Resolu on No. 90 and Policy and Procedural
insanity or mental sickness may be presented to negate the requirement of willfulness as a Guidelines No. 171-03, both dated April 2, 2013, of the Government Service and Insurance
ma er of counter-defense. The burden of proof rests upon the wife to prove that the Sabanal System (GSIS) as in accordance with law and thus lawful, valid, binding and e ec ve.
was of unsound mind. 2. Direc ng the GSIS to credit under Policy and Procedural Guidelines No. 171-03 the casual/
temporary service from February 10, 1964 to July 18, 1977 in government of the plain
Jurisprudence consistently held that insanity or mental illness that is required to be proved Apolinario C. Pauig as creditable service for re rement purposes upon payment of the
must be one that deprived him of full control of the senses. Strange behavior alone is premium contribu ons and interest thereon in accordance with the provisions thereof.
insu cient to prove insanity. Establishing insanity, there must be an opinion or tes mony
given by a witness who is in mately acquainted with the person, or who has a ra onal basis to Issue:
conclude that a person was insane based on the witness; own percep on of the person, or WON the GSIS should include Pauig’s rst fourteen (14) years in government service for the
who is quali ed as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. calcula on of the la er’s re rement bene ts claim.

In this case, Elvira has failed to support her claim that her husband was already insane when Held:
he jumped overboard. For insanity to prosper as a counter-defense, she must substan ally No. Indubitably, compulsory coverage under the GSIS had previously and consistently included
prove that her husband su ered from complete depriva on of intelligence in commi ng the regular and permanent employees, and expressly excluded casual, subs tute or temporary
act or complete absence of the power to discern the consequences of his ac on. Mere employees from its re rement insurance plan. A permanent appointment is one issued to a
abnormality of the mental facul es does not foreclose willfulness. Thus, the respondents are person who has met the requirements of the posi on to which appointment is made, in
not en tled to receive compensa on for the death of Warren Sabanal. accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards, while
temporary appointment is made in the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes
GSIS vs PAUIG necessary in the public interest to ll a vacancy. Casual employment, on the other hand, is not
GR. No. 210328 permanent but occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature. Based on the records,
30 Jan 2017 Pauig began his career in the government on February 12, 1964 as Emergency Laborer on a
Tickler: bus driver; eld personnel casual status. Then, he became a temporary employee from July 5, 1972 to July 18, 1977.
Facts: However, the Court notes that it was not un l 1997 that the compulsory membership in the
Respondent Apolinario C. Pauig (Pauig) was the Municipal Agriculturist of the Municipality of GSIS was extended to employees other than those on permanent status.
San Pablo, lsabela. He started in the government service on February 12, 1964 as Emergency
Laborer on casual status. Later, he became a temporary employee from July 5, 1972 to July 18,

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 LABOR | ATTY. GOLANGCO CASE DIGEST
CF SHARP vs CASTILLO be shown that there is a causal connec on between the seafarer’s illness or injury and the
GR. No. 208215 work for which he had been contracted (Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc. vs. Mesina, 710 Phil.
19 Apr 2017 531, 541-542).
Tickler:
Facts: The respondent did not adduce proof to show a reasonable connec on between his work and
Respondent Rhudel Cas llo was hired by pe oner CF Sharp Crew Management to serve as his illness. Although respondent’s personal physician issued a medical cer cate declaring that
security guard on board the vessel MV Norwegian Sun. Respondent boarded the ship MV the former’s illness is work-aggravated/related, it was replete with details jus fying such; not
Norwegian Sun. Prior to his deployment, respondent underwent a Pre-employment Medical to men on that they met only once.
Examina on (PEME) and was pronounced t to work. While on board the vessel, respondent
su ered from di culty of breathing and had a brief seizure a ack causing him to fall from his Therefore, the medical opinion of company-designated physicians, who a ended to the
bed. He was immediately treated by the ship doctor. When the ship docked at the port of respondent since his repatria on up to almost ve (5) months and who are familiar with his
Mazatlan, Sinaloa, Mexico, respondent was brought to a hospital where he was immediately medical history and condi on, deserve more credence as opposed to personal physican’s
admi ed. Respondent was repatriated on October 7, 2008. He was referred to the company- unsupported conclusions.
designated physicians for further treatment, evalua on, and management. He underwent an
MRI with the following ndings: “T1 and T2 weighted hypedensiuy over cor cowhite ma er In sum, the [Supreme Court] hold that the respondent is not en tled to total and permanent
junc on of the right parietal lobe. disability bene ts for his failure to refute the company-designated physicians’ ndings that his
illness was not work-related.
Repatriated on October 7, 2008, respondent was diagnosed by company-designated physicians
to be su ering from cavernoma – declared as idiopathic and congenital; and thus, not work- SSS vs FAVILLA
related. GR. No. 170195
28 Mar 2011
Respondent led a complaint for total and permanent disability bene ts, damages, and Tickler:
a orney’s fees. Facts:
Respondent Teresita Favila led a claim with the SSS for pension bene ts, and averred therein
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed respondent’s complaint which was a rmed by the Na onal that a er she was married to Florante Favila (Florante) on January 17, 1970, the la er
Labor Rela ons Commission (NLRC). These decisions were later reversed by the Court of designated her as the sole bene ciary in the E-1 Form he submi ed before pe oner Social
Appeals (CA). Security System (SSS), Quezon City Branch on June 30, 1970.When they begot their children
Jofel, Floresa and Florante II, her husband likewise designated each one of them as
Issue: bene ciaries.Teresa further averred that when Florante died on February 1, 1997, his pension
WON respondent is en tled to total and permanent disability bene ts bene ts under the SSS were given to their only minor child at that me, Florante II, but only
un l his emancipa on at age 21.Believing that as the surviving legal wife she is likewise
Held: en tled to receive Florantes pension bene ts, Teresa subsequently led her claim for said
No, the respondent is not en tled to total and permanent disability bene ts. bene ts before the SSS.The SSS, however, denied the claim.

En tlement of seamen on overseas work to disability bene ts is ma er governed, not only by Resolving Teresitas claim, the SSC stated that the surviving spouses en tlement to an SSS
medical ndings, but by law and contract (Magsaysay Mari me Corpora on, et al. vs. NLRC members death bene ts is dependent on two factors which must concur at the me of the
and Cedol, G.R. 186180). The illness of respondent, cavernoma, is not included in the list of la ers death, to wit:(1) legality of the marital rela onship; and (2) dependency for support.As
occupa onal diseases under Sec on 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC. However, Sec on 20 (B)(4) of to dependency for support, the SSC opined that same is a ected by factors such as
the contract provides that those illnesses not listed in Sec on 32 are disputably presumed as separa onde factoof the spouses, marital in delity and such other grounds su cient to
work-related. disinherit a spouse under the law.Thus, although Teresa is the legal spouse and one of
Florantes designated bene ciaries, the SSC ruled that she is disquali ed from claiming the
S ll, for a disability to be compensable under Sec on 20 (B), it is not su cient to establish that death bene ts because she was deemed not dependent for support from Florante due to
the seafarer’s illness or injury has rendered him permanently or par ally disabled; it must also marital in delity.

Be stronger than your excuses. CHLOE FRANCISCO | SBU-COL 2020-2021

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 LABOR | ATTY. GOLANGCO CASE DIGEST
The CA, however, reversed the SSCs decision. 151. 09 inclusive of penal es. SSS granted him several extensions within which to remit the
premiums, however pe oner s ll failed to comply. Pe oner contends that during the
Issue: ques oned period that he failed to remit the premiums, SATII shut down due to the general
WON Teresita a primary bene ciary in contempla on of the Social Security Law as to be decline in the economy, hence he should be exculpated.
en tled to death bene ts accruing from the death of Florante
Issue:
Held: WON pe oner was jus ed for the non-remi ance of the premiums
No. Under Sec. 8(e) and (k) of RA 1161, for a spouse to qualify as a primary bene ciary
under paragraph (k) thereof, he/she must not only be a legi mate spouse but also a Held:
dependent as de ned under paragraph (e), that is, one who is dependent upon the member No. Remi ance of contribu on to the SSS under Sec on 22 (a) of the Social Security Act is
for support. There is no ques on that Teresa was Florantes legal wife. What is at point, mandatory. United Chris an Missionary Society v. Social Security Commission explicitly
however, is whether Teresa is dependent upon Florante for support in order for her to fall explains: No discre on or alterna ve is granted in the enforcement of the law's mandate that
under the term "dependent spouse" under Sec on 8(k) of RA 1161. the employer who fails to comply with his legal obliga on to remit the premiums to the
System within the prescribed period shall pay a penalty of three 3% per month. The prescribed
In Re: Applica on for Survivors Bene ts of Manlavi, this Court de ned "dependent" as "one penalty is evidently of a puni ve character, provided by the legislature to assure that
who derives his or her main support from another [or] relying on, or subject to, someone else employers do not take lightly the State's exercise of the police power in the implementa on of
for support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will, power the Republic's declared policy 'to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security
or aid of someone else. In SSS v. Aguas, "the obvious conclusion is that a wife who is already system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and (to)
separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be dependent for support upon the provide protec on to employers against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death.
husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and In this concept, good faith or bad faith is rendered irrelevant, since the law makes no
wife were s ll living together at the me of his death, it would be safe to presume that she dis nc on between an employer who professes good reasons for delaying the remi ance of
was dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing premiums and another who deliberately disregards the legal duty imposed upon him to make
for herself." such remi ance. From the moment the remi ance of premiums due is delayed, the penalty
immediately a aches to the delayed premium payments by force of law.
In this case, aside from Teresas bare allega on that she was dependent upon her husband for
support and her misplaced reliance on the presump on of dependency by reason of her valid SIGNEY vs SSS
and then subsis ng marriage with Florante, Teresa has not presented su cient evidence to GR. No. 156367
discharge her burden of proving that she was dependent upon her husband for support at the 16 May 2005
me of his death.She could have done this by submi ng a davits of reputable and Tickler: bus driver; eld personnel
disinterested persons who have knowledge that during her separa on with Florante, she does Facts:
not have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupa on from which she derives Rodolfo Signey, Sr., a member of the SSS, died on 21 May 2001. In his member's records, he
income su cient for her support and such other evidence tending to prove her claim of had designated Yolanda Signey (pe oner) as primary bene ciary and his four children with
dependency. her as secondary bene ciaries. On 6 July 2001, pe oner led a claim for death bene ts with
the public respondent SSS. She revealed in her SSS claim that the deceased had a common-law
AUTO BUS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC vs BAUTISTA wife, Gina Servano (Gina), with whom he had two minor children namey, Ginalyn Servano
GR. No. 156367 (Ginalyn), and Rodelyn Signey (Rodelyn). Pe oner's declara on was con rmed when Gina
16 May 2005 herself led a claim for the same death bene ts on 13 July 2001 in which she also declared
Tickler: bus driver; eld personnel that both she and pe oner were common-law wives of the deceased and that Editha
Facts: Espinosa (Editha) was the legal wife. October 2001, Editha also led an applica on for death
Pe oner Romarico J. Mendoza, president of Summa Alta Tierra Industries, Inc. (SATII), failed bene ts with the SSS sta ng that she was the legal wife of the deceased. SSS: -denied the
to remit the Social Security System (SSS) premium contribu ons of its employees. For such he death bene t claim of pe oner -it recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor children of the
was convicted of viola on of Sec on 22 (a) and (d) vis-à-vis Sec on 28 of R.A. No. 8282 or the deceased with Gina, as the primary bene ciaries under the SSS Law. -also found that the 20
Social Security Act of 1997. The premiums which pe oner failed to remit amounted to P421, March 1992 marriage between pe oner and the deceased was null and void because of a

Be stronger than your excuses. CHLOE FRANCISCO | SBU-COL 2020-2021

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 LABOR | ATTY. GOLANGCO CASE DIGEST
prior subsis ng marriage contracted on 29 October 1967 between the deceased and Editha, as
con rmed with the Local Civil Registry of Cebu City. SSC: -gave more weight to the SSS eld
inves ga on and the con rmed cer ca on of marriage showing that the deceased was
married to Editha on 29 October 1967, than to the aforestated declara ons of Editha in her
waiver of rights. -It found that pe oner only relied on the waiver of Editha, as she failed to
present any evidence to invalidate or otherwise controvert the con rmed marriage cer cate.
- found, based on the SSS eld inves ga on report dated 6 November 2001 that even if Editha
was the legal wife, she was not quali ed to the death bene ts since she herself admi ed that
she was not dependent on her deceased husband for support inasmuch as she was cohabi ng
with a certain Aquilino Cas llo. -SSC applied Sec on 8(e) and (k) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8282,
the SSS Law which was in force at the me of the member's death on 21 May 2001, and held
that the dependent legi mate and illegi mate minor children of the deceased member were
also considered primary bene ciaries. -The records disclosed that the deceased had one
legi mate child, Ma. Evelyn Signey, who predeceased him, and several illegi mate children
with pe oner and with Gina. -the deceased SSS member's four illegi mate children with
pe oner could no longer be considered dependents at the me of his death because all of
them were over 21 years old when he died on 21 May 2001, the youngest having been born on
31 March 1978. - the other hand, the deceased SSS member's illegi mate children with Gina
were quali ed to be his primary bene ciaries for they were s ll minors at the me of his
death, Ginalyn having been born on 13 April 1996, and Rodelyn on 20 April 2000.

Issue:
WON pe oner has a superior legal right over the SSS bene ts as against the illegi mate
minor children of the deceased.

Held:
No. SSS death bene ts, Sec on 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282 is very clear. Since pe oner is
disquali ed to be a bene ciary and because the deceased has no legi mate child, it follows
that the dependent illegi mate minor children of the deceased shall be en tled to the death
bene ts as primary bene ciaries. The SSS Law is clear that for a minor child to qualify as a
"dependent " the only requirements are that he/she must be below 21 years of age, not
married nor gainfully employed. In this case, the minor illegi mate children Ginalyn and
Rodelyn were born on 13 April 1996 and 20 April 2000, respec vely. Had the legi mate child
of the deceased and Editha survived and quali ed as a dependent under the SSS Law, Ginalyn
and Rodelyn would have been en tled to a share equivalent to only 50% of the share of the
said legi mate child. Since the legi mate child of the deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn and
Rodelyn, as the only quali ed primary bene ciaries of the deceased, are en tled to 100% of
the bene ts.

Be stronger than your excuses. CHLOE FRANCISCO | SBU-COL 2020-2021

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