Criminal Law - Case Digests

August 29, 2019

A.
G.R. No. 122641     January 20, 1997

Bayani Subido, Jr. and Rene Parina, petitioners

vs.

The honorable Sadiganbayan and the people of the Philippines, respondents

Davide, Jr., J:

On June 25, 1992, Subido, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) and Parina, a BID Special Agent, issued and implement a warrant of arrest
dated on the same day against James J. Masimuk. The petitioners were charged with Arbitrary
Detention filed on July 28, 1995.

On August 28, 1995, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash, the Sandinganbayan had no
jurisdiction on both the offense charged and the person accused. They argued that: (1) the case
should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (2) R.A. No. 7975, effectivity of
May 6, 1995, should be given prospective application and at the time the case filed, petitioner
Subido was already a private person since he was separated from the service on February 28,
1995, while petitioner Parina did not hold a position corresponding to salary grade “27,” which a
requirement, according to R.A. 7975, to be on Sandinganbayan’s jurisdiction, and (3) penal laws
must be strictly against the State.

In its Resolution on October 25, 1995, the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners’ Motion
to Quash and the Supplement. It set arraignment on November 10, 1995. Petitioners’ filed on
November 9, 1995, a motion for reconsideration to abort the arraignment.

On November 10, 1995, the Sandinganbayan issued an order denying petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration, and a second order entering a plea of not guilty in favor of petitioners since
they objected the arraignment and setting a pre-trial on January 12, 1996.

Petitioners seek to set aside the resolution of October 25, 1995 and the orders of
November 10, 1995.

The petition is dismissed and the question resolution and orders of the respondent
Sandinganbayan are affirmed.

 
Issue:

(1) Whether or not Sandiganbayan have the jurisdiction of the cases of a government officer with
salary grade “27” and lower?

(2) Whether or not R.A.7975 has retroactive effect?

Ruling:

(1) No, according to the provision of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, that in cases
where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions corresponding to salary grade
“27” or higher the exclusive jurisdiction therefor shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. However, when a principal
accused, who occupying a position to salary grade “27” or higher, have a coconspirator who
occupying a position lower than salary grade “27”, the coconspirator, as well as the principal
accused, will be under the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.

(2) Yes, R.A. No. 7975 or “AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONAL AND
STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THAT
PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED”, in further amending P.D.
No. 1606  as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, mode of appeal, and other procedural
matters, is procedural laws. R.A. 7975, as the procedural statute, may validly be given a
retroactive effect.

B.
C.ORIEL MAGNO vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 96132

June 26, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop, but do not have complete equipment and
also lacked funds, thus, Petitioner approached a distributor, Corazon Teng, of Mancor Industries. And to
accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities, Corazon Teng referred Magno to LS Finance
and Management Corporation advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez.

On condition, a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value amounting to
P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not pay, he requested Joey Gomez for a third party who could lend
him the amount of the warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who
advanced the deposit, on condition of  3% interest. Part of it, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a
leasing agreement.
When the equipment were delivered to petitioner, he issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey
Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured,
petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he was no longer banking with
Pacific Bank.

To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2)
checks were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on
the request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds. Subsequently, petitioner could not
pay LS Finance, thus it pulled out the equipments.

After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the accused-petitioner was
convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22.  

ISSUE:

Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.

RULING:

NO. The maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal sanction
of the law in issue, and, with a willing court system to apply the full harshness of the special law in
question, using the "mala prohibita" doctrine, the noble objective of the law of the law is tainted with
materialism and opportunism in the highest degree.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner’s four (4) checks were used to collateralize an
accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent,
and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question.

Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the issuance of the checks, of the
obligation in consideration of which the checks were issued, would have resulted in placing the case at
bar beyond the purview of the prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no satisfactory proof that
there was such an extinguishment in the present case. Appellate aptly points out that appellant had not
adduced any direct evidence to prove that the amount advanced by the complainant to cover the warranty
deposit must already have been returned to her.

And the trial court concluded that there is no question that the accused violated BP Blg. 22, which is a
special statutory law, violations of which are mala prohibita.

Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment. From the very
beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the funds to put up the warranty deposit and
as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom
petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was not
communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was
covered by L.S. Finance Management.
 WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED
of the crime charged.

D. 
G.R. No. L-23625 November 25, 1983

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, 

vs.

MARIANO TERRADO, PEDRO TERRADO and CASIMIRO FLORES, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No.L-23626 November 25, 1983

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, 

vs.

REMEDIOS GUNDRAN, PEDRO TERRADO, CASIMIRO FLORES, and BRUNO GUNDRAN,

defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-23627 November 25, 1983

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellants, 

vs.

GERTRUDES OBO, PEDRO TERRADO, CASIMIRO FLORES, and BRUNO GUNDRAN.

defendants-appellees.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

German G. Vilgera for defendants-appellees.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:

Facts:

Obo, Gundran, and Terrado applied for, and were issued free patents for contiguous parcels of
land. The said parcels of land were allegedly forest land and, hence, not disposable. The
appellees were charged for falsification of public documents for having conspired, confederated,
cooperated and helped one another, through false and fraudulent misrepresentations in willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously with full knowledge of their falsity, preparing or causing to be
prepared, documents containing false narration of facts. While the informations sufficiently
alleged the commission of falsification of public documents under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal
Code, lands of the public domain is also punishable as perjury under Sec. 129 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which reads, as follows: 
 Sec. 129. Any person who present or causes to be presented, or cooperates in the presentation
of, any false application, declaration, or evidence, or makes or causes to be made or cooperates
in the making of a false affidavit in support of any petition, claim, or objection respecting lands of
the public domain, shall be deemed guilty of perjury and punished as such.

Appellees claim that the crime has already prescribed according to Public Act No. 3326, as
amended, but the State argues that the crime has not prescribed under the RPC where the
crime of perjury prescribes in 10 years.

Under the RPC, Perjury, which is correlational in nature, and prescribes in ten (10) years.
However, Public Act No. 3326, as amended by Act 3585 and Act 3763, provides that "violations
penalized by special laws shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance
with the rules so that perjury which is punishable by imprisonment prescribes after eight (8)
years.

Issue:

Whether the prescriptive period to be applied should be 10 years under the RPC or 8 years
under Act No. 3585.

Held:

Penal statutes, substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly
applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused.  As it would be more
favorable to the herein accused to apply Section 129 of Commonwealth Act 141 and Act 3326,
as amended, in connection with the prescriptive period of the offenses charged, the same
should be applied. Since the informations were filed only on March 1962, or more than eight (8)
years after the said offenses were allegedly committed, the lower court correctly ruled that the
crimes in question had already prescribed.

E.
Schneckenburger vs Moran
G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936

Facts:
The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine Islands. He
was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification
of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction on the ground that both under the
Constitution of the UnitedStates and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no
jurisdiction to try him. The petitioner contended that the Court of First Instance of Manila is
without jurisdiction to try the case filed against him for the reason that under Article III, Section
2, of the Constitution of the UnitedStates, the Supreme Court of the United States has original
jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors,other public ministers, and consuls, and such
jurisdiction excludes the courts of the Philippines; and even under the Constitution of the
Philippines original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors and public ministers and
consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has the jurisdiction to try the petitioner and
not the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution
Ruling:
The Constitution of The United States provided that the Supreme Court shall include all cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. In construing this constitutional
provision, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the "original jurisdiction thus
conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution was not exclusive jurisdiction. The laws
in force in thePhilippines prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth conferred upon the
Courts of the FirstInstances original jurisdiction in all criminal cases to which a penalty of more
than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding $100(Act No. 136, Sec. 65) might be
imposed. Such jurisdiction included the trial of criminal actions brought against consuls for, as
we have already indicated,consuls,not being entitled to the privileges and immunities of
ambassadors or ministers, are subject to the laws and regulations of the country where they
reside. The Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and the petition was
denied.

F.

G.R. No. 97765. September 24, 1992

KHOSROW MINUCHER, Petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR W. SCALZO, JR., Respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.

FACTS: Scalzo offered help to Minucher since his family has problems regarding their expired visas.
Furthermore, Scalzo gave Minucher his calling card showing that he is an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), Department of Justice of the United States of America assigned
to the American Embassy in Manila. Petitioner has an Iranian products business, wherein Scalzo
was interested of his products. Scalzo purchased 2 kilos of caviar from petitioner, informing him that
he has a buyer. Their meetings or business transactions followed, however the private respondent
had prepared a plan to frame-up the petitioner and Torabian (fellow Iranian) for alleged heroin
trafficking. They were charged under Section 4 of R.A. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972),
however both of them were acquitted. Subsequently, petitioner alleges that private respondent
falsely testified against him and complains the unlawful arrest wherein they were handcuffed for
three days without food and water. Thus, petitioner seeks compensatory damages. However, Scalzo
files a motion to dismiss the complaint because he is entitled to diplomatic immunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is entitled to diplomatic immunity

RULING: Yes, because in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations states: 1) A
diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also
enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except in the case of an action relating to
any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State
outside his official functions. Moreover, Scalzo still claimed that his acts were his official functions.
However, nothing supports his claim other than the Diplomatic Note. In addition, he did not provide
evidence that he actually indeed acted in his official capacity. Thus, motion to dismiss is reinstated. 
G.

US vs Bull
15 Phil 7/ G.R No. L-5270  January 15, 1910

Facts:
On December 2, 1908, a steam vessel known as the steamship Standard, commanded by H.N.
Bulldocketed into Manila. The said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa transported 677 head of
cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing the said animals white in
transit which resulted for most of the animals to be cruelly wounded or killed.

Issue:
Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship
while inside the territorial waters of the Philippines

Ruling:
When a vessel reach within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the
entrance of Manila Bay, the said vessel was within territorial waters and thus, the Philippine law
applies. Acrime committed on board a Norwegian vessel sailing through the Philippine is within
the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines as long as the illegal conditions existed during the
time the ship was within territorial waters. Regardless of the fact that the same conditions
existed when the ship settled from the foreign port and while it was on the high seas. The
defendant was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost.

H.
I.THE UNITED STATES v. JOSE TAMPARONG ET AL.

G.R. No. 9527. August 23, 1915.

Trent, J.

FACTS:

The defendants were convicted by the justice of the peace of Baguio for having played the game of
chance called "monte" in violation of Ordinance No. 35. They appealed to the Court of First Instance,
where they were again tried and convicted upon the same charge.

And appeal to this Honorable Court, questioning the validity of Ordinance No, 35.

ISSUE:

1.     W/N Ordinance No. 35 valid.

2.     W/N SC is required under the law to examine the evidence for the purpose of determining the guilt or
innocence of the defendant

RULING:
(1) Yes, Ordinance No. 35 is valid. The Honorable Court in the case of the United States v. Joson (26
Phil. Rep., 1). The cases are on all fours, and a further discussion of this branch of the case is
unnecessary. 

(2) No. Under the Spanish criminal procedure, appeals from justices’ courts were allowed only to Courts
of First Instance. By section 43 of General Orders No. 58, this procedure has been so amended that
appeals can be taken to the Supreme Court in such cases when the validity or constitutionality of a
statute is involved. This amendment of the procedure does not carry with it the right of review of the facts,
but is confined to the purpose stated and that is, of determining the validity or constitutionality of the
statute or ordinance upon which the judgment was predicated. Former cases reviewed, showing that such
has uniformly been the interpretation of section 43 by this court.

This Court are not authorized to examine, are those which are essential to be examined for the purpose
of determining the legality of Ordinance No. 35 and the penalties provided for therein, and no other.

Section 43 does not expressly so limit our power. Neither does it expressly authorize us to review the
testimony touching the guilt or innocence of the defendants. 

Wherefore, by the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
defendants.

J. JOEY P. MARQUEZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN ; GR NO. 187912-14; JANUARY 31, 2011

MENDOZA, J.

FACTS:

From the records, it appears that several anomalies were discovered against Joey P. Marquez and
Ofelia Caunan, having been found probable cause for violation of Sec 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3090.

Before the arraignment, alleging discovery of the forged signatures, Marquez sought referrals of
the disbursement vouchers purchase order and authorization request to the NBI and the
reinvestigation of the case against him. But were denied.

To prove its case, the prosecution presented witnesses and evidences and were all admitted by
the anti-graft court.

On the SB 5 Division, Marquez, files the subject Motion to Refer Prosecution’s Evidence for
th

Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the NBI repeatedly insisting that the affixed
signature on the voucher were forged. But repeatedly and consistently denied alleging that
Marquez is just merely trying to delay the proceedings.

ISSUE:

W/N the Petitioner were denied his right to present evidence and his twin constitutional right
rights to due process
RULING:

YES. One of the most vital and precious rights accorded to an accused by the Constitution is due
process, which includes a fair and impartial trial and a reasonable opportunity to present one’s
defense.  

it is well settled that due process in criminal proceedings requires that (a) the court or tribunal
trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused
is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
Marquez bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove the fact that his signatures were
indeed forged. In order to be able to discharge his burden, he must be afforded reasonable
opportunity to present evidence to support his allegation, but for having denied Marquez the
opportunity to be heard and to produce evidence of his choice in his defense, the SB-5th Division
committed grave abuse of discretion warranting intervention from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolutions of the 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to allow the
petitioner Joey P. Marquez to refer the evidence of the prosecution to the Questioned Documents
Section of the National Bureau of Investigation for examination as soon as possible and, after
submission of the results to the court and proper proceedings, to act on the case with dispatch.

K.

G.R. No. 148560               November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, 
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.

FACTS: Petitioner, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, was charged under Republic Act No. 7080 or “An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder”, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Moreover,
Section 2 of R.A. 7659 states that “Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members
of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value
of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in
the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating
and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the
court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and
assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof
forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).” Subsequently, he files an appeal contending
that the said law is unconstitutional. The grounds include (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness;
(b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes
the element of mens rea (proof of criminal intent) in crimes already punishable under The Revised
Penal Code, all of which are clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of plunder is malum prohibitum

RULING: No, the Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent (mens rea). Moreover, it was affirmed that plunder is a heinous offense or malum in se
because it involves acts that are inherently immoral or inherently wrong.

L.

G.R. No. 192935               December 7, 2010

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, 

vs.

THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 193036

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.

DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., Petitioners, 

vs.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND

MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents. 

FACTS: 

For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which essentially assail
the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating
the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."

In, G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative
power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional
authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B.
Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.

The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent
collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to
his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section
37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial
body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption
and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine
from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.

ISSUE: 

Should EO No. 1 be struck down as they distort the constitutional and statutory plan of criminal
justice system? 

HELD:

Yes. EO and its truth-telling function must also be struck down as they distort the constitutional
and statutory plan of the criminal justice system without the authority of law and with an
unconstitutional impact on the system.

The Existing Legal Framework

The Constitution has given the country a well-laid out and balanced division of powers,
distributed among the legislative, executive and judicial branches, with specially established
offices geared to accomplish specific objectives to strengthen the whole constitutional structure.

The Legislature is provided, in relation with the dispensation of justice, the authority to create
courts with defined jurisdictions below the level of the Supreme Court; to define the required
qualifications for judges; to define what acts are criminal and what penalties they shall carry;
and to provide the budgets for the courts.

The Executive branch is tasked with the enforcement of the laws that the Legislature shall pass.
In the dispensation of justice, the Executive has the prerogative of appointing justices and
judges, and the authority to investigate and prosecute crimes through a Department of Justice
constituted in accordance the Administrative Code. Specifically provided and established by the
Constitution, for a task that would otherwise fall under the Executive’s investigatory and
prosecutory authority, is an independent Ombudsman for the purpose of acting on, investigating
and prosecuting allegedly criminal acts or omissions of public officers and employees in the
exercise of their functions. While the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction is not exclusive, it is primary; it
takes precedence and overrides any investigatory and prosecutory action by the Department of
Justice.

The Judiciary, on the other hand, is given the task of standing in judgment over the criminal
cases brought before it, either at the first instance through the municipal and the regional trial
courts, or on appeal or certiorari, through the appellate courts and ultimately to the Supreme
Court. An exception to these generalities is the Sandiganbayan, a special statutorily-created
court with the exclusive jurisdiction over criminal acts committed by public officers and
employees in the exercise of their functions. Underlying all these is the Supreme Court’s
authority to promulgate the rules of procedure applicable to courts and their proceedings, to
appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary other than judges, and to exercise
supervision over all courts and judiciary employees.

By specific authority of the Constitution and the law, a deviation from the above general process
occurs in the case of acts allegedly committed by public officers and employees in the
performance of their duties where, as mentioned above, the Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction. While the Executive branch itself may undertake a unilateral fact-finding, and the
prosecutor’s office may conduct preliminary investigation for purposes of filing a complaint or
information with the courts, the Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction gives this office precedence
and dominance once it decides to take over a case.

Whether a complaint or information emanates from the prosecutor’s office or from the
Ombudsman, jurisdiction to hear and try the case belongs to the courts, mandated to determine
– under the formal rules of evidence of the Rules of Court and with due observance of the
constitutional rights of the accused – the guilt or innocence of the accused. A case involving
criminal acts or omissions of public officers and employees in the performance of duties falls at
the first instance within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to higher
recourse to the Supreme Court. This is the strictly judicial aspect of the criminal justice system.

A necessary consequence of the deviation from the established constitutional and statutory plan
is the extension of the situs of the justice system from its constitutionally and statutorily
designated locations (equivalent to the above-described first forum), since the Commission will
investigate matters that are bound to go to the justice system. In other words, the Commission’s
activities, including its truth-telling function and the second forum this function creates, become
the prelude to the entry of criminal matters into the Ombudsman and into the strictly judicial
aspect of the system.

In practical terms, this extension undermines the established order in the judicial system by
directly bringing in considerations that are extraneous to the adjudication of criminal cases, and
by co-mingling and confusing these with the standards of the criminal justice system. The result,
unavoidably, is a qualitative change in the criminal justice system that is based, not on a
legislative policy change, but on an executive fiat.

M.
G.R. No. 105907 May 24, 1993
Feliciano V. Agbanlog, petitioner
vs.
People of the Philippines and Sandinganbayan, respondents

Quiason, J:

Facts: 
Petitioner filed a petition for review of the decision of Sandinganbayan on June 23, 1992, which
found the petitioner guilty of Malversation of Public Funds of P21,000 with a penalty of eleven
years and one day of prison mayor, as minimum, to sixteen years, five months and eleven years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The prosecution has established (a) that appellant received in his possession public
funds (b) that he could not account for them and did not have them in his possession when
audited; and (c) that he could not give a satisfactory explanation or reasonable excuse for the
disappearance of said funds.
The petition for review is dismissed.

Issue: 
(1) Whether or not a public officer who accused for Malversation of Public Funds can be liable
even though the prosecution cannot proved them during the audit?
(2) Whether or not the penalty for malversation of P21,000 is oppressive and unconstitutional
with the penalty of eleven years and one day of prison mayor, as minimum?

Ruling:
(1) Yes, as long as the public officer failed to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property, it will become an evidence that he has put such funds or property to personal use.
(Art. 127, last paragraph, Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 1060)

(2)  No, as long as the law provide such penalty, the Court must follow. Even considering the
value of peso in 1932, the value of peso in 1992, and the inflation, the remedy cannot come
from the Court but from Congress. The Court can only intervene and strike down a penalty as
cruel, degrading or inhuman only when it was become oppressive and disproportionate to the
nature of the offense as to shock the moral senses. The court said that they are not prepared to
say that the penalty imposed on the petitioner is so disproportionate to the crime committed as
to shock the moral sense.