LA MALLORCA VS.
COURT OF APPEALS Mariano returned to the bus to claim their
GR No L-20761, 27 July 1966, Barrera, J.
DOCTRINE:
“The inclusion of this averment for quasi-
delict, while incompatible with the other claim
under the contract of carriage, is permissible
under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of
Court, which allows a plaintiff to allege causes of
action in the alternative, be they compatible with
each other or not, to the end that the real matter
in controversy may be resolved and determined.”
FACTS:
The present case stems from a complaint
for a breach of contract of carriage when one of
the daughters of the plaintiff died in accident after
they alighted from the bus operated by La
Mallorca. The antecedents of the case are as
follows.
Plaintiff Mariano Beltran (Mariano),
together with his wife and their three minor
daughters, namely, Milagros, Raquel, and Fe
boarded the Pambusco Bus operated by La
Mallorca, in San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for
Anao, Mexico Pampanga. After an hour’s trip, the
bus reached its destination in Anao. The bus
stopped and the driver allowed the passengers to
get off as they have already reached their
destination. One of the first few who alighted the
bus was Mariano Beltran, who was at the time
carrying their baggage, followed by his wife and
children. Mariano led his wife and children to a
shaded area to wait for him because he still
needed to claim some of their remaining baggage
from the bus.
bayong then suddenly, sensing that the bus was
again in motion, he immediately jumped from the
running board without getting his bayong from the
conductor which caused him to land on the side
of the road almost in front of the shaded place
where he left his wife and children. At that precise
time, he saw people beginning to gather around
the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground,
her skull crushed, and without life. The child was
none other than his daughter Raquel, who was
run over by the bus in which she rode earlier
together with her parents.
Lower court ruling:
The trial court found La Mallorca liable for
breach of contract of carriage and sentenced it to
pay Php 3,000 for the death of the child and Php
400 as compensatory damages representing
burial expenses.
CA:
The Court of Appeals found that not only
was La Mallorca liable for breach of contract of
carriage, the same is likewise liable for quasi-
delict in accordance with Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code. Likewise, the appellate court raised
the damages from the award of Php 3,000 to Php
6,000.
ISSUE:
Did the appellate court err in its finding of
an alternative cause of action for also holding La
Mallorca liable for quasi-delict considering that
respondents’ complaint was one for a breach of
contract?
RULING: That aside from the aforesaid breach of
contract, the death of Raquel Beltran,
NO. In the present case, the father
plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the
returned to the bus to get one of his baggage
negligence and want of exercise of the
which was not unloaded when they alighted from
utmost diligence of a very cautious
the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must
person on the part of the defendants and
have followed the father. However, although the
their agent, necessary to transport
father was still on the running board of the bus
plaintiffs and their daughter safely as far
awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or
as human care and foresight can provide
bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he
in the operation of their vehicle.
(the father) had to jump down from the moving
vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who
is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The
must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In
inclusion of this averment for quasi-delict, while
the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the
incompatible with the other claim under the
carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost
contract of carriage, is permissible under Section
diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by
2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court, which
Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by
allows a plaintiff to allege causes of action in the
a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation
alternative, be they compatible with each other or
to transport safely its passengers. In the first
not, to the end that the real matter in controversy
place, the driver, although stopping the bus,
may be resolved and determined.
nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly,
he started to run the bus even before the bus The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the
conductor gave him the signal to go and while the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was
latter was still unloading part of the baggage of predicated when it was alleged in the complaint
the passengers Mariano Beltran and family. The that "the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs'
presence of said passengers near the bus was daughter, was caused by the negligence and
not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very
considered still as passengers of the carrier, cautious person on the part of the defendants and
entitled to the protection under their contract of their agent." This allegation was also proved
carriage. when it was established during the trial that the
driver, even before receiving the proper signal
But even assuming arguendo that the
from the conductor, and while there were still
contract of carriage has already terminated,
persons on the running board of the bus and near
herein petitioner can be held liable for the
it, started to run off the vehicle. The presentation
negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of
of proof of the negligence of its employee gave
Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil
rise to the presumption that the defendant
Code. Paragraph 7 of the complaint, which reads
employer did not exercise the diligence of a good
—
father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its employees. And this
presumption, as the Court of Appeals found,
petitioner had failed to overcome. Consequently,
petitioner must be adjudged peculiarily liable for
the death of the child Raquel Beltran.
Anita A. Ledda vs. Bank of the Philippine
Islands
G.R. No. 200868, 12 November 2012, J. Carpio
DOCTRINE:
In this case, the complaint is an action for
collection of sum of money arising from Ledda’s
default in her credit card obligation with BPI. BPI’s
cause of action is not based only on the
document containing the Terms and Conditions
accompanying the issuance of the BPI credit card
in favor of Ledda. Therefore, the document
containing the Terms and Conditions governing
the use of the BPI credit card is not an actionable
document. As such, it is not required by the Rules
to be set forth in and attached to the complaint.
FACTS:
As one of respondent Bank of the Philippine
Island’s (BPI) valued clients, petitioner Anita
LEdda was issued a pre-approved BPI credit
card. However, Ledda defaulted in the payment
of her credit card obligation. Consequently, BPI
sent letters to Ledda demanding payment. But
despite repeated demands, Ledda failed to pay
her credit card obligation, prompting BPI to file an
action for collection of sum of money with the
RTC.
RTC: Declared Ledda in default for failing to file
an Answer within the prescribed period, despite
receipt of the complaint and summons. Upon
Ledda’s motion for reconsideration, it lifted the
default order and admitted Ledda’s Answer Ad
Cautelam.
While she filed a Pre-Trial Brief, Ledda and her
counsel failed to appear during the continuation
of the Pre-Trial; hence, the trial court allowed BPI
to present its evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, it
ruled in favor of BPI.
CA: Rejected Ledda’s argument that the
document containing the Terms and Conditions
governing the use of the BPI credit card is an
actionable document in the Rules of Civil
Procedure. It held that BPI’s cause of action is
based on Ledda’s availment of the bank’s credit
facilities through the use of her credit/plastic
cards, coupled with her refusal to pay BPI’s
outstanding credit for the cost of the goods,
services, and cash advances despite lawful
demands.
ISSUE:
Whether the document containing the Terms and
Conditions governing the issuance and use of the
credit card is an actionable document
RULING:
NO. Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that whenever an action or
defense is based upon a written instrument or
document, the substance of such instrument or
document shall be set forth in the pleading, and
the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to
the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed
to be a part of the pleading or said copy may with
like effect be set forth in the pleading.
Clearly, this provision applies when the action is
based on a written instrument or document.
In this case, the complaint is an action for
collection of sum of money arising from Ledda’s
default in her credit card obligation with BPI. BPI’s
cause of action is primarily based on Ledda’s (1)
acceptance of the BPI credit card, (2) usage of
the BPI credit card to purchase goods, avail
services and secure cash advances, and (3) non-
payment of the amount due for such credit card
transactions, despite demands. In other words,
BPI’s cause of action is not based only on the
document containing the Terms and Conditions
accompanying the issuance of the BPI credit card
in favor of Ledda. Therefore, the document
containing the Terms and Conditions governing
the use of the BPI credit card is not an actionable
document. As such, it is not required by the Rules
to be set forth in and attached to the complaint.
FINANCIAL BUILDING CORPORATION vs
FORBES PARK ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 133119| August 17, 2000 | JUSTICE
DE LEON JR.
CASE: Involves two cases which are co-related
to each other
DOCTRINE:
A compulsory counterclaim is one which
arises out of or is necessarily connected with
the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.
If it is within the jurisdiction of the court and it does
not require for its adjudication the presence of
third parties over whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction, such compulsory counterclaim is
barred if it is not set up in the action filed by the
opposing party.
Since Forbes Park filed a motion to dismiss in
Civil Case No. 16540, its existing compulsory
counterclaim at that time is now barred. A
compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the
proceeding in the original suit and derives its
jurisdictional support therefrom. A counterclaim
presupposes the existence of a claim against the
party filing the counterclaim. Hence, where there
is no claim against the counterclaimant, the
counterclaim is improper and it must dismissed,
more so where the complaint is dismissed at the
instance of the counterclaimant.
FACTS:
The then Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
(hereafter, USSR) was the owner of a residential
lot in Forbes Park Village in Makati City. The
USSR engaged the services of Financial Building
for the construction of a multi-level office and staff
apartment building at the said lot, which would be
used by the Trade Representative of the USSR.
Due to the USSR’s representation that it would be
building a residence for its Trade Representative,
Forbes Park authorized its construction and work
began shortly thereafter.
Forbes Park reminded the USSR of existing
regulations authorizing only the construction of a
single-family residential building in each lot within
the village. It also elicited a reassurance from the
USSR that such restriction has been complied
with. Promptly, the USSR gave its assurance that
it has been complying with all regulations of
Forbes Park. Despite this, Financial Building
submitted to the Makati City Government a
second building plan for the construction of a
multi-level apartment building, which was
different from the first plan for the construction of
a residential building submitted to Forbes Park.
Forbes Park discovered the second plan and
subsequent ocular inspection of the USSR’s
subject lot confirmed the violation of the deed of
restrictions. Thus, it enjoined further construction
work. Forbes Park suspended all permits of entry
for the personnel and materials of Financial
Building in the said construction site. The parties
attempted to meet to settle their differences but it
did not push through.
Financial Building filed in the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Metro Manila, a Complaint for
Injunction and Damages with a prayer for
Preliminary Injunction against Forbes Park
docketed as Civil Case No. 16540. The latter, in
turn, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
Financial Building had no cause of action
because it was not the real party-in-interest. The
trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
against Forbes Park but the Court of Appeals
nullified it and dismissed the complaint.
After Financial Building’s case was terminated
with finality, Forbes Park sought to vindicate its
rights by filing with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati a Complaint for Damages, against
Financial Building arising from the violation of its
rules and regulations.
RTC: RTC rendered a decision in favor or Forbes
Park.
Ordering the defendant to remove/demolish the
illegal structures within three (3) months from the
time this judgment becomes final and executory,
and in case of failure of the defendant to do so,
the plaintiff is authorized to demolish/remove the
structures at the expense of the defendant and
pay for damages.
CA: Financial Building appealed the said decision
of the RTC. However, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the alleged claims and causes of
action therein are barred by prior judgment and/or
are deemed waived for its failure to interpose the
same as compulsory counterclaims in the earlier
case. (YES)
SC:
The instant case is barred due to Forbes Park’s
failure to set it up as a compulsory counterclaim
in the earlier case.
A compulsory counterclaim is one which arises
out of or is necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the opposing party’s claim. If it is within
the jurisdiction of the court and it does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties
over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction,
such compulsory counterclaim is barred if it is not
set up in the action filed by the opposing party.
Thus, a compulsory counterclaim cannot be the
subject of a separate action but it should instead
be asserted in the same suit involving the same
transaction or occurrence, which gave rise to it To
determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory
or not, we have devised the following tests: (1)
Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim
and the counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would
res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s
claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
(3) Will substantially the same evidence support
or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the
defendant’s counterclaim? and (4) Is there any
logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim?
Affirmative answers to the above queries indicate
the existence of a compulsory counterclaim.
Since Forbes Park filed a motion to dismiss in
Civil Case No. 16540, its existing compulsory
counterclaim at that time is now barred. A
compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the
proceeding in the original suit and derives its
jurisdictional support therefrom. A counterclaim
presupposes the existence of a claim against the
party filing the counterclaim. Hence, where there
is no claim against the counterclaimant, the
counterclaim is improper and it must dismissed,
more so where the complaint is dismissed at the
instance of the counterclaimant.
Natividad Lim vs National Power Corporation
GR No.17879, 14 November 2012, J. Abad
DOCTRINE:
Personal service is required precisely
because it often happens that hearings do not
push through because, while a copy of the motion
may have been served by registered mail before
the date of the hearing, such is received by the
adverse party already after the hearing. Thus, the
rules prefer personal service. But it does not
altogether prohibit service by registered mail
when such service, when adopted, ensures as in
this case receipt by the adverse party.
FACTS:
National Power Corporation (NPC) filed
an expropriation suit against Natividad B. Lim
(Lim) before the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan
covering Lots 2373 and 2374 that the NPC
needed for its Sual Coal-Fired Thermal Power
Project. Since Lim was residing in the United
States, the court caused the service of summons
through her tenant, a certain Wilfredo
Tabongbong. Upon notice to Lim and the deposit
of the provisional value of the property, the RTC
ordered the issued writ of possession in NPCs
favor that would enable it to cause the removal of
Lim from the land.
However, Lim, represented by her
husband Delfin, filed an omnibus motion to
dismiss the action and to suspend the writ of
possession, questioning the RTCs jurisdiction
over Lims person and the nature of the action.
She also assailed the failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action. The RTC denied the
motions.
Spouses Roberto and Arabela Arcinue
(the Arcinues) filed a motion for leave to admit
complaint in intervention, alleging that they
owned and were in possession of Lot 2374, one
of the two lots subject of the expropriation. The
RTC granted the Arcinues motion and required
both the NPC and Lim to answer the complaint-
in-intervention within 10 days from receipt of its
order.
When Lim and the NPC still did not file
their answers to the complaint-in-intervention
after 10 months, the Arcinues filed a motion for
judgment by default. Lim sought to expunge the
motion on the ground that it lacked the requisite
explanation why the Arcinues resorted to service
by registered mail rather than to personal service.
At the scheduled hearing of the motion, Lims
counsel did not appear. The NPC for its part
manifested that it did not file an answer since its
interest lay in determining who was entitled to just
compensation.
Lower court ruling: The RTC issued an order of
default against both Lim and the NPC. The RTC
pointed out that the Arcinues failure to explain
their resort to service by registered mail had
already been cured by the manifestation of Lims
counsel that he received a copy of the Arcinues
motion 10 days before its scheduled hearing. Lim
filed a motion for reconsideration to lift the default
order but the Court denied the motion, prompting
Lim to file a petition for certiorari before the CA
CA: The CA rendered a decision that affirmed the
RTCs order of default. Lim filed a motion for
reconsideration but the CA denied it,prompting
her to file the present petition for review.
On September 24, 2007 the Court initially
denied Lims petition but on motion for
reconsideration, the Court reinstated the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its
discretion in affirming the order of default that the
RTC entered against Lim
RULING:
NO. Lim points out that an answer-in-
intervention cannot give rise to default since the
filing of such an answer is only permissive. But
Section 4, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure requires the original parties to file an
answer to the complaint-in-intervention within 15
days from notice of the order admitting the same,
unless a different period is fixed by the court. This
changes the procedure under the former rule
where such an answer was regarded as optional.
Thus, Lim’s failure to file the required answer
can give rise to default.
The trial court had been liberal with Lim.
It considered her motion for reconsideration as a
motion to lift the order of default and gave her an
opportunity to explain her side. The court set her
motion for hearing but Lim’s counsel did not show
up in court. She remained unable to show that her
failure to file the required answer was due to
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. And, although she claimed that she
had a meritorious defense, she was unable to
specify what constituted such defense.
Lim points out that the RTC should have
ordered the Arcinues motion for judgment by
default expunged from the records since it lacked
the requisite explanation as to why they resorted
to service by registered mail in place of personal
service.
There is no question that the Arcinues
motion failed to comply with the requirement of
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides:
SECTION 11. Priorities in modes of
service and filing. Whenever practicable,
the service and filing of pleadings and
other papers shall be done personally.
Except with respect to papers emanating
from the court, a resort to other modes
must be accompanied by a written
explanation, why the service or filing was
 not done personally. A violation of this
Rule may be cause to consider the paper
as not filed.
But the above does not provide for
automatic sanction should a party fail to submit
the required explanation. It merely provides for
that possibility considering its use of the term
"may." The question is whether or not the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in not going for the
sanction of striking out the erring motion.
The Court finds no such grave abuse
of discretion here. As the RTC pointed out,
notwithstanding that the Arcinues' failed to
explain their resort to service by registered mail
rather than by personal service, the fact is that
Lim's counsel expressly admitted having received
a copy of the Arcinues' motion for judgment by
default I0 days before its scheduled hearing. This
means that the Arcinues were diligent enough to
file their motion by registered mail long before the
scheduled hearing.
Personal service is required precisely
because it often happens that hearings do not
push through because, while a copy of the motion
may have been served by registered mail before
the date of the hearing, such is received by the
adverse party already after the hearing. Thus, the
rules prefer personal service. But it does not
altogether prohibit service by registered mail
when such service, when adopted, ensures as in
this case receipt by the adverse party.
Magdiwang Realty Corporation, et al. v. The
Manila Banking Corporation, etc.,
G.R. No. 195592, September 5, 2012,
REYES, J.
DOCTRINE: We agree with the trial and appellate
courts, for as the records bear, that the ten (10)-
year prescriptive period to file an action based on
the subject promissory notes was interrupted by
the several letters exchanged between the
parties. This is in conformity with the second and
third circumstances under Article 1155 of the New
Civil Code (NCC) which provides that the
prescription of actions is interrupted when: (1)
they are filed before the court; (2) there is a
written extrajudicial demand by the creditors; and
(3) there is any written acknowledgment of the
debt by the debtor. In TMBC’s complaint against
the petitioners, the bank sufficiently made the
allegations on its service and the petitioners’
receipt of the subject demand letters, even
attaching thereto copies thereof for the trial
court’s consideration
FACTS: The case stems from a complaint for
sum of money filed on April 18, 2000 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City by herein
respondent, The Manila Banking Corporation
(TMBC), against herein petitioners, Magdiwang
Realty Corporation (Magdiwang), Renato P.
Dragon (Dragon) and Esperanza Tolentino
(Tolentino), after said petitioners allegedly
defaulted in the payment of their debts under the
five promissory notes they executed in favor of
TMBC.
All promissory notes included stipulations on the
payment of interest and additional charges in
case of default by the debtors. Despite several
demands for payment made by TMBC, the
petitioners allegedly failed to heed to the bank’s
demands, prompting the filing of the complaint for
sum of money. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 00-511 and raffled to Branch 148 of the
RTC of Makati City.
Instead of filing a responsive pleading with the
trial court, the petitioners filed on October 12,
2000, which was notably beyond the fifteen (15)-
day period allowed for the filing of a responsive
pleading, a Motion for Leave to Admit Attached
Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to
Dismiss, raising therein the issues of novation,
lack of cause of action against individuals Dragon
and Tolentino, and the impossibility of the
novated contract due to a subsequent act of the
Congress. The motions were opposed by the
respondent TMBC, via its Opposition which
likewise asked that the petitioners be declared in
default for their failure to file their responsive
pleading within the period allowed under the law
The petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was
denied by the trial court in its Order dated August
2, 2005. The ex parte presentation of evidence by
the bank before the trial court’s Presiding Judge
was scheduled in the same Order.
Unsatisfied with the RTC orders, the petitioners
filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, which
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 91820. In a
Decision dated December 2, 2006, the CA
affirmed the RTC orders after ruling that the trial
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it declared herein petitioners in default. The
denial of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
prompted the filing of a petition for review
on certiorari before this Court, which, through its
Resolutions dated March 5, 2008 and June 25,
2008, denied the petition for lack of merit.
Lower court ruling: The RTC declared the
petitioners in default. In the meantime, TMBC’s
presentation of evidence ex parte proceeded.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of TMBC
CA: The CA affirmed the RTC Decision. As
shown by the evidence, the CA ruled that the
prescriptive period was legally interrupted on
September 19, 1984 when the petitioners,
through several letters, proposed for the
restructuring of their loans until the respondent
sent its final demand letter on September 10,
1999. Indeed, the period during which the
petitioners were seeking reconsideration for the
non-settlement of their loans and proposing
payment schemes of the same should not be
reckoned against it. Consequently, when the
respondent sent its final demand letter to the
petitioners, thus, foreclosing all possibilities of
reaching a settlement of the loans which could be
favorable to both parties, the period of ten years
within which to enforce the five promissory notes
under Article 1142 of the New Civil Code began
to run again and, therefore, the action filed on
April 18, 2000 to compel the petitioners to pay
their obligations under the promissory notes had
not prescribed. The written communications of
the petitioners proposing for the restructuring of
their loans and the repayment scheme are, in our
view, synonymous to an express
acknowledgment of the obligation and had the
effect of interrupting the prescription.
ISSUE: Whether the prescriptive period was
legally interrupted when petitioners, through
several letters, proposed for the restructuring of
their loans until the respondent sent its final
demand letter on September 10, 1999.
RULING: Taking into consideration the bank’s
allegations in its complaint and the totality of the
evidence presented in support thereof, coupled
with the said circumstance that the petitioners, by
their own inaction, failed to make their timely
objection or opposition to the evidence, both
documentary and testimonial, presented by
TMBC to support its case, we find no cogent
reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts’
findings.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts, for
as the records bear, that the ten (10)-year
prescriptive period to file an action based on the
subject promissory notes was interrupted by the
several letters exchanged between the parties.
This is in conformity with the second and third
circumstances under Article 1155 of the New Civil
Code (NCC) which provides that the prescription
of actions is interrupted when: (1) they are filed
before the court; (2) there is a written extrajudicial
demand by the creditors; and (3) there is any
written acknowledgment of the debt by the
debtor. In TMBC’s complaint against the
petitioners, the bank sufficiently made the
allegations on its service and the petitioners’
receipt of the subject demand letters, even
attaching thereto copies thereof for the trial
court’s consideration.
As against the bare denial belatedly made by the
petitioners of their receipt of the written
extrajudicial demands made by TMBC, especially
of the letter of September 10, 1999 which was the
written demand sent closest in time to the
institution of the civil case, the appreciation of
evidence and pronouncements of the trial court
shall stand. In addition to these, we take note that
letters prior to the letter of September 1999 also
form part of the case records, and the existence
of said letters were not directly denied by the
petitioners. The letters that form part of the
complaint and included in TMBC’s formal offer of
exhibits were correctly claimed by the
respondents in their Comment as also containing
the petitioners’ acknowledgment of their debts
and TMBC’s demand to its debtors.
MERCEDES S. GATMAYTAN, vs.
FRANCISCO DOLOR (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS
HEIRS) AND HERMOGENA DOLOR
G.R. No. 198120| February 20, 2017| JUSTICE
LEONEN
DOCTRINE: It is just as basic that a judgment
can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified
as soon as it becomes final and executory. Once
a case is decided with finality, the controversy is
settled and the matter is laid to rest. Accordingly,
a final judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made
by the court rendering it or by the highest court of
the land.
We sustain petitioner's position that the service
made on her counsel's former address was
ineffectual. We find however, that petitioner failed
to discharge her burden of proving the specific
date - allegedly June 1, 2006 - in which service
upon her counsel's updated address was actually
made. Having failed to establish the reckoning
point of the period for filing her Motion for
Reconsideration, we cannot sustain the
conclusion that petitioner insists on, and which is
merely contingent on this reckoning point. We
cannot conclude that her Motion for
Reconsideration was timely filed. Having failed to
discharge her burden of proof, we are
constrained to deny her Petition.
FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, praying that the assailed March 24,
2011 decision and August 9, 2011 resolution be
reversed and set-aside.
In a Complaint for Reconveyance of Property and
Damages filed with the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, the Dolor spouses alleged that on
February 17, 1984, they, as buyers, and Manuel
Camayo, as seller, executed a Deed of Sale over
a 300 square meter parcel of land. This parcel of
land is to be segregated from a larger
landholding.
The Deed of Sale stated that, of the total
consideration of P30, 000.00, half would be paid
upon the execution of the deed and the balance
would be paid upon the release of Transfer
Certificate Title (TCT). Dolor was able to pay the
whole P30, 000 even before it is released.
On May 18, 1984, a second deed was executed,
setting aside the first deed. The second deed no
longer referenced the condition for payment. But
merely state that the lot was sold at P30,000.
In March 1989, the Dolor spouses authorized
Cecilio Manzanilla and his family to occupy the lot
they bought.
In October 1999, the Dolor spouses were surprise
when petitioner Gatmaytan filed and ejectment
suit against Manzanilla. Petitioner Gatmaytan
anchored her suit on the ground that the lot where
Manzanilla and his family are staying is not
registered to him. Gatmaytan claimed that the
Deed of Sale between the Dolor spouses and
Camayo is not registered.
Camayo answered that he acknowledges
executing a Deed of Sale in favor of the Dolor
spouses. He added that he entered into an
agreement with Gatmaytan for the latter to defray
the expenses for the payment of real estate
taxes, and the segregation of the title covering the
portion sold to the Dolor spouses from the larger,
5, 001 square meters. Per this agreement,
Gatmaytan was to have the larger parcel titled in
her name with the condition that Gatmaytan
would deliver to the Dolor Spouses the
segregated portion and TCT covering it.
RTC: RTC rendered a decision ordering
Gatmaytan to convey the lot to Dolor spouses.
CA: Gatmaytan appealed in CA, however, appeal
was dismissed.
The CA ruling that the RTC's March 27, 2006
Decision had already attained finality as
Gatmaytan filed her Motion for Reconsideration
beyond the requisite 15-day period. First, the
RTC's Decision was rendered on March 27,
2006. Second, per the registry return receipt
attached to the back portion of the last page of
the RTC's Decision, Gatmaytan's counsel, Atty.
Raymond Palad, received a copy of the same
Decision on April 14, 2006. Finally, Gatmaytan
filed her Motion for Reconsideration only on June
16, 2006.
ISSUES:
Whether the RTC’s March 27, 2006 Decision has
already attained finality, thus, precluding the filing
of petitioner Gatmaytan’s appeal with the CA.
(YES)
SC:
It is just as basic that a judgment can no longer
be disturbed, altered, or modified as soon as it
becomes final and executory. Once a case is
decided with finality, the controversy is settled
and the matter is laid to rest. Accordingly, a final
judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made
by the court rendering it or by the highest court of
the land.
In accordance with Rule 36, Section 2 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, unless a Motion for
Reconsideration is timely filed, the judgment or
final order from which it arose shall become final.
In turn, Rule 37, Section 1, in relation to Rule 41,
Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
allows for 15 days from notice of a judgment or
final order within which a Motion
Reconsideration may be filed.
Reckoning the date when a party is deemed to
have been given notice of the judgment or final
order subject of his or her Motion
Reconsideration depends on the manner by
which the judgment of final order was served
upon the party himself or herself. When, however,
a party is represented and has appeared by
counsel, service shall, as a rule, be made upon
his or her counsel. While petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the RTC's March 27, 2006
Decision, there is a dispute as to the date from
which the 15-day period for filing a Motion for
Reconsideration must be reckoned. That is, there
is a dispute as to when petitioner was given
notice of the Decision.
We sustain petitioner's position that the service
made on her counsel's former address was
ineffectual. We find however, that petitioner failed
to discharge her burden of proving the specific
date - allegedly June 1, 2006 - in which service
upon her counsel's updated address was actually
made. Having failed to establish the reckoning
point of the period for filing her
Motion for Reconsideration, we cannot sustain
the conclusion that petitioner insists on, and
which is merely contingent on this reckoning
point. We cannot conclude that her Motion for
Reconsideration was timely filed. Having failed to
discharge her burden of proof, we are
constrained to deny her Petition.
In this case, none of the documents that petitioner
adduced before this Court attests to the truth of
her allegation that service to her counsel's new
and correct address was made only on June 1,
for 2006. In her Petition, petitioner alluded to a
receipt attached at the back of the RTC's March
27, 2006 decision. No copy of this receipt,
however, was produced by petitioner. Lacking
evidentiary basis, petitioner's contention that
for
service upon her counsel's updated and correct
address was made only on June 1, 2006 cannot
be sustained. As her plea for relief hinges on this
singular detail, we are constrained to deny such.
Bereft of any avenue for revisiting the RTC's
March 27, 2006 Decision, its findings and ruling
must stand.